NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

Atty. Cleo Sabado-Andrada, CPA, LLM

Janice E. Ebanio
st
1 Term A.Y. 2019-2020
August 29, 2019
 CASES RELATING TO CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS ON ENVIRONMENT
(RA NO. 386)

G.R. No. L-65935

1. FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs.THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUÑGA JR.
September 30, 1988

Facts:
Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS
Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit alleged that he
purchased a passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at
Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978. A chattel mortgage was
executed in favour of the Motor center, Inc. In addition, the mortgage was
assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of the
plaintiff.
On October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) employees
of Filinvest Credit Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr.
Gaspar de los Santos, on account of a balance which was already past its
due. Sunga’s accounts were verified and it was found out that said
accounts are all in order. The motor vehicle was returned to the plaintiff
upon proper receipt.
The Intermediate Appellate Court (now RTC) then awarded Sunga a
moral damage amounting to P30,000.00. Dissatisfied with the aforecited
decision, Filinvest Credit Corporation interposed a timely appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision,
however, it increased the moral damages to be awarded to P50,000.00.
Thus, Filinvest Credit Corporation filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, stating that the respondent court committed a
“grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award damages.”

Issue:
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court committed a “grave abuse
of discretion in increasing extravagantly the award damages”?

Held:
Yes. According to the court, "Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction
that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not
himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below."
The Intermediate Appellate Court disregarded such settled rule when
it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion in increasing extravagantly
the award moral damages, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The court
granted the petition and modified the questioned decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court. The award of moral damages is reduced to
P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses is eliminated.
 2. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA

No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection
and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces
and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160, the municipalities assumed exclusive

jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have
the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose
rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of
the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the
LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish

pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the
lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby
aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the
LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;
(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential
Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with
violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally
constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising
them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be
effected.

ISSUE: Whether the Laguna Lake Development Authority prevails over the
towns and municipalities comprising the region insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishery privileges in Laguna Lake.

HELD: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the
LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
The Local Government Code has not repealed the provisions of the charter
of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended.

Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the
enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of
municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as
are by its charter vested on it.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police
power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake
region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to
municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail
over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de
Bay.

3. AGAPITO MAGBANWA, ET. AL.

v.
IAC, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 66870-72, JUNE 29, 1985

FACTS: Six plaintiffs (petitioners) alleged that they are share tenants of the
defendants and that the defendants diverted the free flow of water from
their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their
great damage and prejudice; and that they were told by the defendants'
overseer to vacate their respective areas for they could not plant palay any
longer due to lack of water. They prayed that they be declared as leasehold
tenants and that the defendants be ordered to pay attorney's fees and
different kinds of damages.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiffs are entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

RULING: Yes. The closing of water flow to the petitioners’ farm lots caused
damage and prejudicial to them in their harvest. There is no showing in the
facts that petitioners were negligent but instead the respondents’ bad faith
which caused prejudice to the former. Under the law, the landowner has
the obligation to keep tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of
his landholding. A disturbance of possession such as the act complained of
is in violation of the law.

It appears that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their
farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants
violated the plaintiffs' rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the
unjustified diversion of the water.

The plaintiffs (now petitioners) are entitled to a measure of moral

damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code permits the award of moral
damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same code and the latter
stipulates that: "Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

The petitioners are also entitled to exemplary damages because the

defendants acted in an oppressive manner. (See Art. 2232, Civil Code.)

It follows from the foregoing that the petitioners are also entitled to
attorney's fees but the size of the fees as well as the damages is subject to
the sound discretion of the court.

4. OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS: Minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation

and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents filed a
taxpayer’s class suit against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR.
They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all
existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; (2) Cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the
State in its capacity as parenspatriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act
of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.

On the other hand, Factoran filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

on the grounds that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him; and
the issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a

class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine
rainforests?”

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that minors can, for themselves,
for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers
the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as the future generations.
 Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the
rhythm and harmony of nature for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. The minor’s assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

5. ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL. VS. IAC AND DAYTONA

CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 74816, MARCH 17, 1987

FACTS: Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with

damages against defendant.

The defendant is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing

under the laws of the Philippines. It was issued by the Quezon City
government a business permit for the manufacture of road and building
concrete materials such as concrete aggregates, with cement batching
plant. Among the conditions set forth in the permit are that the said
batching plant shall (1) institute measures to prevent dust emission during
the manual charging of cement from bags to the receiving hopper of the
bucket elevator of the batching plant; (2) remove all sediment deposit in the
settling of tank for process water and proper maintenance should be
observed at all times. While the original permit issued to the defendant
stated that its operation at the place shall 'not (be) beyond Dec. 31, 1979, it
was somehow allowed to operate way beyond said period.

The residents state that effluence and sediment of the plant has run
over to the adjacent lots. Cement dust has also caused pollution to the
area. The pollution has killed many of the resident’s plants. Also, their
health has been affected, many being affected with respiratory diseases.

After four extensions of time to file an answer by defendant, Daytona

moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action.
Motions denied, defendant was declared in default and authorized plaintiffs
to present evidence ex parte. The facts of the case at bar shows that there
are other nearby residents who were prejudiced by the Daytona Corp. for
the running of its business.

ISSUE: Whether Daytona Construction and Development Corporation are

liable for damages.

RULING: Yes. Because the business had greatly prejudiced their health
and property. The permit given to Daytona is valid but the conditions
provided were not met.
Respondents are liable for damages except for nominal damages
based on the discretion of the court instead moral and actual damages
were awarded because sufficient evidence had supported as such.
 Despite all the procedural ploys used by Daytona to invalidate the
decision of the Trial Court, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the
Trial Court:
“From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs,
there is hardly any question that the cement dust coming from the
batching plant of the defendant corporation is injurious to the health
of the plaintiffs and other residents in the area. The noise, the
vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day and night
operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious
discomfort and untold miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain
rights of the plaintiffs and causes them damage. It is thus a nuisance
and its abatement justified.”

GENERAL ENVIRONMENT LAWS

1. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS: Technology Developers, a charcoal briquette developer and seller,

received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full
cessation of its plant until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager
to submit its building permit, mayor's permit, and Region III--Pollution of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti--Pollution Permit.

Petitioners undertook to comply with the request to produce the

required documents. It sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti--Pollution Permit although prior to
the operation of the plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution
Installation was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure a mayor’s permit but were not
entertained.Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be
padlocked, effectively causing the stoppage of operation. This was done
without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the acting
mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was issued in
grave abuse of discretion.The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was proper, ordering the acting mayor to
immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology Developers to
resume its normal business operations until the case has been adjudicated
on the merits.

Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that

"Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the
fumes coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are
hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease
operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed
and operational."Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order
granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the
stoppage of Technology Developer

RULING: YES. The acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the
stoppage of Technology Developer.

Foremost, Technology Developer failed to secure a mayor's permit. It

must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility as
the DENR and EMB to protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of
his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to operate a
business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are
taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the
community from the emissions in the operation of the business.

The Acting Mayor issued a closure order after an investigation was

made by Marivic Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted
by the plant goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.

In addition, petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the

municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued
by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.While petitioner was able to
present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution
Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up
to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate
its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and
prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed

to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. The court that issued such a preliminary relief may recall or
dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION

1. EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ et al
v.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 145328, March 23, 2006

FACTS: Sometime in 1996, NAPOCOR began the construction of 29

decagon-shaped steel poles or towers with a height of 53.4 meters to
support overhead high-tension cables in connection with its 230 Kilovolt
Sucat-Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission Project.
 Alarmed by the sight of the towering steel towers, petitioners scoured
the internet on the possible adverse effects that such a structure could
cause to their health and well-being.Petitioners left no stones unturned to
address their malady. They aired this growing concern to the NAPOCOR,
which conducted a series of meetings with them.

Negotiations being unsuccessful, petitioners filed a Complaint for

Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against NAPOCOR. The lower court
then issued an order temporarily restrained the respondent from energizing
and transmitting high voltage electric current through the said project.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals
assailing the above order by the trial court. Alluding to Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (1981), "Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or
Preliminary Injunctions in Cases Involving Infrastructure and Natural
Resource Development Projects of, and Public Utilities Operated by, the
Government," particularly Sec. 1, NAPOCOR stalwartly sought the
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack jurisdiction.

The trial court, thus, enjoined the NAPOCOR from further preparing
and installing high voltage cables to the steel pylons erected near
petitioners’ homes and from energizing and transmitting high voltage
electric current through said cables while the case is pending final
adjudication.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court may issue a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to enjoin the construction and operation of the steel
poles or towers by the NAPOCOR, notwithstanding Presidential Decree
No. 1818.

RULING: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 1818 was issued prohibiting judges
from issuing restraining orders against government infrastructure projects.
In part, the decree says, "No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary order,
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project." Realizing the importance of this decree,
this Tribunal had issued different circulars to implement this particular law.

While its sole provision would appear to encompass all cases

involving the implementation of projects and contracts on infrastructure,
natural resource development and public utilities, this rule, however, is not
absolute as there are actually instances when Presidential Decree No.
1818 should not find application. In a spate of cases, this Court declared
that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition
extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside
this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that
courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.

In this case, petitioners sought the issuance of a preliminary

injunction on the ground that the NAPOCOR Project impinged on their right
to health as enshrined in Article II, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution.

To boot, petitioners, moreover, harp on respondent’s failure to

conduct prior consultation with them, as the community affected by the
project, in stark violation of Section 27 of the Local Government Code
which provides: "no project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned are complied
with, and prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned is observed."

From the foregoing, whether there is a violation of petitioners’

constitutionally protected right to health and whether respondent
NAPOCOR had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision on
prior consultation with the affected communities are veritable questions of
law that invested the trial court with jurisdiction to issue a TRO and
subsequently, a preliminary injunction. As such, these questions of law
divest the case from the protective mantle of Presidential Decree No. 1818.

The rule on preliminary injunction merely requires that unless

restrained, the act complained of will probably violate his rights and tend to
render the judgment ineffectual.

Here, there is adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion

that the project of NAPOCOR probably imperils the health and safety of the
petitioners so as to justify the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Moreover, the Local Government Code, requires
conference with the affected communities of a government project.
NAPOCOR, palpably, made a shortcut to this requirement.

After all, for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules do

not require that the act complained of be in violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of
be probably in violation of the rights of the applicant. Under the Rules of
Court, probability is enough basis for injunction to issue as a provisional
remedy, which is different from injunction as a main action where one
needs to establish absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent
injunction.
 2. LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L-72119, MAY 29, 1987

FACTS:The respondent denied Legaspi's request for information on the

civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the
Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that
he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
Mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said
information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to giving due
course to thepetition filed by petitioners. He challenges the petitioner's
standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government
employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information.
He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has legal right to access government

records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department
employees.

RULING:Yes. Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of

eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil
service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position
in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner
Valentin L. Legaspi.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the
claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligible
for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly
declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according
to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and
except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX,
B, Sec. 2.[2]).
Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions
requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be
among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service
Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are
not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names
of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations
and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service
Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and
in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the
register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person
occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.