TAÑADA V TUVERA

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337,
355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599,
644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199,
202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291,
293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-
713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558,
1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-
1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538,
543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-
852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that
while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus
is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town
of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does
not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to
the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for
its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be
published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time
to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that
at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the
people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled:
"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what
should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons
or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed
of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of
due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific
contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have
on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in
the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the
most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions
that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to
be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive,
have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof
are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws
until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

US v Puruganan

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23,
2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a
Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION
PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal
custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of
justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote
of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent
was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become
final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with
the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment
No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US
Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code
Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which
prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned
July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos
in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via
the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD
No. 1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of
Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter
of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of ‘special
circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will
not flee.
‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled ‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon.
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been
recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a
warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in
this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues
were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would
give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged
with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring
the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower
courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court
below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal;
and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the
decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations
under existing extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through
a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the
issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has
also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when
the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower
court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest.
Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special
and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which
has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and,
Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners,
has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution.
Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time
and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.
We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever
the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that
should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to
take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a
guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another
for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are
adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives
to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent
to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient
means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of
a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi
play a corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence
of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of
persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to
the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances
of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s
legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to
be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are
not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as
a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary
in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence
in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to
be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the
final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person
sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and
delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities
to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is
only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it.
Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to
fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage
other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to
do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to
make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found
proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience
44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested

state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior
acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
(2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition
to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that
he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a
second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing 
 Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition
Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition.
Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right
to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day
and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where
within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and
the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We
rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the
Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal
Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence
of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the
crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for
Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends
of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from
these supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent
are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a
prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally
recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning
of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less
reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor
the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the
requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under
oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for
the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the "judge
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to
verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant
of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of
guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses.
57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses

at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a
prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the
opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in
spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for
the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing
procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those
sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to
Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person
who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.
It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him
one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he
is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x
x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of
his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -
- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his
being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition
with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the
relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as
an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord
Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the government’s interest
in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
"[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced
against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of
their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if,
through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from
our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail
in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1âwphi1.nêt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since
this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here.
Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to
curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice
and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential
power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is
not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised.
In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives
and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that basis,
he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he
is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not
show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly
[from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be
addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to
serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against
groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for
the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the
case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office
is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him
during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in nature.
They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not
to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available
to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter
that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be justified.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the
power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in
June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears
the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be
taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been taken
into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -
- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s
application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers
of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great
majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-
Manifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear factual
and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private respondent
has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not
solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the
learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a
remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition." We
believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this Decision has taken
special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by
its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing
the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the
legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more
akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the
person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at
scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter
of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call
for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during
the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible
with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of
society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-
equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its
duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse
and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary
extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply
in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for
bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and
technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the
challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before
it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our
Extradition Law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Tan v barrios

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with
jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of
rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.
In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The
enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of
G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military
Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa.
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 entitled,
"People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket
Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.
The accused were:
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun
8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the defendants' lawyers) to transfer
the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended Petition,
pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state
witness. He was released from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense
witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding five (5) of
the accused namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).
Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
1. Oscar Yaun
2. Enrique Labita
3. Eusebio Tan
4. Alfonso Tan
5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions.
On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating
the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military
commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses
properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law.
This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings
as follows:
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the
accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation
to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process, Military commissions or tribunals, by
whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities of the
executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the
army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the
Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated the
law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and
as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of
the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144,
158-160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in this Court by some 217
prisoners 1 in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions during
the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled
Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare
unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals, annul the proceedings against them before these bodies,
and grant them a retrial in the civil courts where their right to due process may be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the
conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
The Court —
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some who had fully served their sentences, or had
been acquitted, or had been granted amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the sentences meted to them by the military
courts, but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in
the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino, 2 Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro
Patono, Andres Parado, Daniel Campus, 3 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, 4 are concerned. The Director of the
Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release of the abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other
legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C.
Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca,
Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo
Arcadio, Rolando Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who are all
military personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary informations against them in the
courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision, without
prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary proceedings
inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-
712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order No. 226 designating State Prosecutor
Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On
November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the regular fiscal
who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those
who had already died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,
79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565 as all accused are detained 6 except those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he increased the recommended
bail to P140,000 for each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case (Crim. Case No. 88-825), he
recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano
Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp.
8-9, Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65,
Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo
N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on October 26, 1988,
requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are
now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of
his said order (Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a matter of fact, there is no
Supreme Court order to re-file the criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No.
MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the
Cruz vs. Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that
the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled,
and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and trying
them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1
in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825
(Annexes D and E) whose annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in
the lower court of such motion is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that remedy (which
they have not yet availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule
65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the lower court had issued warrants for their
arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the respondents from implementing
the orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting
them upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who,
like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were not heard, and
over whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military tribunal which the State
itself had clothed with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may not retroactively divest of
jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted the petitioners would amount to an ex post
facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed without a prior preliminary
investigation, nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in Criminal Case No. 88-
824 for illegal possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be
1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman who was
convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the
information for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12) others, including those already dead, is
pending in the lower court (p. 37, Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute
double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy
from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription, because
"it had been interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military commission were
null and void because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions,
whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their
authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military
Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein
will be searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who
had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice unless given a limited application only to the
parties/petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against themselves and prayed for a
retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and
sundry who at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were not
parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall not adversely affect
persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's pronouncement in Cruz vs.
Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against the civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of informations
against them in the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were not parties in that case and who, not having
submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their
reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their
right to due process, the same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the
proceedings against them in the military tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process
was not due process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrile which needs to
be rectified. For, although the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were still serving their
sentences after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians
petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military
courts. We did not order their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and were still serving their
sentences, and another rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their sentences. The Court
applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper civil
courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court ordered to be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases
and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification
of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of
the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted
person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the
sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the
Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on
account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his
defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of
whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and
released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted
by a military court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the
same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court, who
is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another
hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of
being acquitted the second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the
completion of his second trial which may take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of
martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer
was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality
of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation of a
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government thus abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.'
Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the
exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it
had never been passed.' For the existence of Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief
Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a
law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot
be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would
have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. (Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before Military
Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed
to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no
serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and
decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military
Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place them in double
jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an
accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom
or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-
producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is
inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-
723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission in
their particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercised over them would
amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule,
is one which —
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them is invalid because there was no preliminary
investigation, no finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of the information by the City Fiscal
before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge the petitioners from the information in
Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

ESTRADA V SANDIGAN BAYAN

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the
vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he
says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the
integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it
a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies.
In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades
and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of
the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when
individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing
the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2 wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that
it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call
for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from
the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person
within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth,
it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively;
(c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack
of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus
Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to
the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001
the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant
petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder
as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach
upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation
is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force
of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the
positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To
doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused
to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining,
receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel,
in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par.
(d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together
with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through
ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused
CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic
supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING
OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern"
in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in
an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words.8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident
from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the
same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more,
di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it
is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?"
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a
big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category
of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards
a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly,
there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where
the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must
define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited
by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct
to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.10 But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the
Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved
by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."14
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. 22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris24
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore,
its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.27
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts
and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the
law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn
the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance
of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law
was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible
of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial
or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through
evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their
official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because
they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from
the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct
offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the
public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act
3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par.
(e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in
that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such
exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.30
The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor
of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than ₱100 million,
but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an
enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say,
instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very
important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only ₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can
we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be ₱110 or ₱120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which
were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million, then there is a
crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime
of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of
the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient
to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least ₱50,000,000.00. There is
no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the
accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution
need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth.
Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as
defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element
of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the
crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section
4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive
element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you
do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that
cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral
certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for
the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the
rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder.
It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each
and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public
officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting
in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it
to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned
by People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now
as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the
national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation.
The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the
amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a
long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED

MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:

Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the basic facts.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20, 2001 when he was forced to vacate the
presidency by people power and then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office.1 He was charged, in eight
cases filed with the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them plunder, for allegedly having
amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He moved to quash the information for plunder on the
ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than
one offense.
In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion, along with those filed by his co-accused,
Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
to set aside the Sandiganbayan’s resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is void for being vague and
overbroad. We gave due course to the petition and required respondents to file comments and later heard the parties in oral
arguments on September 18, 2001 and on their memoranda filed on September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional claims of
petitioner.
I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW
The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by Congress on July 12, 1991 pursuant to the constitutional mandate that "the
State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption."2 Section 2 of the statute provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As
amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).
The term "ill-gotten wealth" is defined in §1(d) as follows:
"Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees
and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 4 of the said law states:
Rule of Evidence. ¾ For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED
"ON ITS FACE"
The amended information against petitioner charges violations of §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the statute. It reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former President of
the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a "Asiong Salonga" and a.k.a "Jose Velarde," together with Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane Does, of the crime of plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer, being then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself
and/or in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship,
connection, or influence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly
or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion ninety seven million eight hundred four
thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [₱4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through any
or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount of five hundred forty-
five million pesos (₱545,000,000.00), more or less, from illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Yolanda
T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;
(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and benefit,
public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [₱130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of
the two hundred million pesos [₱200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No.
7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie "Atong" Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and benefit, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to
purchase 351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks, more or
less, of the Belle Corporation in the amount of more or less one billion one hundred two million nine hundred sixty five thousand
six hundred seven pesos and fifty centavos [₱1,102,965,607.50] and more or less seven hundred forty four million six hundred
twelve thousand and four hundred fifty pesos [₱744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred
forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos [₱1,847,578,057.50]; and by
collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or
percentages by reason of said purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred
thousand pesos [₱189,700,000.00], more or less, from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Equitable-
PCI Bank under the account name "Jose Velarde";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of more or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one
hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [₱3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the same
under his account name "Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001
But, although this is a prosecution under §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing here is a wholesale attack on the
validity of the entire statute. Petitioner makes little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him. His focus
is instead on the statute as a whole as he attacks "on their face" not only §§1(d)(1)(2) of the statute but also its other provisions
which deal with plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (§1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in
business (§1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests (§1(d)(5)).
These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to this case. What relevance do questions regarding the establishment of
monopolies and combinations, or the ownership of stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal or fraudulent dispositions of
government property have to the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not even mentioned in the amended
information filed against him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the phrase "overt act" in §1(d) and §2 means the
same thing as the phrase "criminal act" as used in the same provisions when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended
information are criminal acts? Had the provisions of the Revised Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-line scrutiny
whenever a portion thereof was involved in a case, it is doubtful if we would have the jurisprudence on penal law that we have
today. The prosecution of crimes would certainly have been hampered, if not stultified. We should not even attempt to assume
the power we are asked to exercise. "The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised
with reference to hypothetical cases . . . . In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in
the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged."3
Nonetheless, it is contended that because these provisions are void for being vague and overbroad, the entire statute, including
the part under which petitioner is being prosecuted, is also void. And if the entire statute is void, there is no law under which he
can be prosecuted for plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege.
Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge to the validity of the entire statute. The first is that the statute comes
within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution and, for this reason, it must be given strict scrutiny and the normal
presumption of constitutionality should not be applied to it nor the usual judicial deference given to the judgment of Congress.4
The second justification given for the facial attack on the Anti-Plunder Law is that it is vague and overbroad.5
We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of this Court or of those of the U.S. Supreme Court, from which petitioner’s
counsel purports to draw for his conclusions. We consider first the claim that the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes
Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres6 that "when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this Court will give the
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation stricter scrutiny" and that "It will not do for authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties." As will presently be shown, "strict scrutiny," as used in that
decision, is not the same thing as the "strict scrutiny" urged by petitioner. Much less did this Court rule that because of the need
to give "stricter scrutiny" to laws abridging fundamental freedoms, it will not give such laws the presumption of validity.
Petitioner likewise cites "the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional law," i.e., footnote 4 of the opinion in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,7 in which it was stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected
to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national,
or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that "there may be narrower scope for the operation of the
presumption of constitutionality" for legislation which comes within the first ten amendments to the American Federal
Constitution compared to legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The American Court did not
say that such legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a "narrower
scope" will be given for the presumption of constitutionality in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant for
petitioner’s contention that "the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court
deals with facts regarding ordinary economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved." 8
What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with
freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass’n v. The City Mayor,9 this
simply means that "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental
acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race and facial
challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are
not subject to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of strict construction
is a rule of legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature. On the other
hand, strict scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought
to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as "deferential review" and "intermediate review."
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest, without courts
seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be
achieved. Under intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked into and the availability
of less restrictive alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.10
Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal laws can survive the test of strict scrutiny to
which petitioner proposes to subject them? How many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to
be presumed constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the State’s ability to deal with the problem of crimes, and, in
particular, with the problem of graft and corruption in government, if criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there
is a compelling governmental interest for making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that
contained in the law for achieving such governmental interest?
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for Facial Challenge,
 Not Applicable to Penal Laws
Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."11 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."12
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." 13
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."14 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,15 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
Act is … the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."16 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."17
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." 18 As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] ‘as applied’ to a particular defendant." 19 Consequently, there is
no basis for petitioner’s claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed "As Applied"
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.20 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts.21 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris:22
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
This is the reason "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"23 and is generally disfavored.24 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore,
its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.25
This brings me to the question whether, as applied, §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law is void on the ground of
vagueness and overbreadth.
III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD
As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada in the Sandiganbayan is for violation of §2, in relation to
§1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which, so far as pertinent, provide:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. ¾ Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death....
SEC. 1. Definition of Terms. ¾ ...
(d) "Ill-gotten wealth," means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview
of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer concerned;
The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during the period June 1998 to January 2001, petitioner, then the President of
the Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less,
through "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts," to wit: (1) by receiving or collecting the total amount of
P545,000,000.00, more or less, from illegal gambling by himself and/or in connivance with his co-accused named therein, in
exchange for protection of illegal gambling; (2) by misappropriating, converting, or misusing, by himself or in connivance with his
co-accused named therein, public funds amounting to P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a portion of the share of the
Province of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco excise tax; (3) by ordering the GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle Corp.,
worth P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00 respectively, or the total amount of P1,847,578,057.50, for which he received as
commission the amount of P189,700,000.00, more or less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions,
gifts, shares, percentages, and kickbacks in the amount of P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank under
the name of "Jose Velarde."
Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot possibly be mistaken as to what petitioner is accused of in Criminal Case
No. 26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But, repeatedly, petitioner complains that the law is vague and deprives him of due process. He
invokes the ruling in Connally v. General Constr. Co.26 that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law." He does this by questioning not only §2, in relation to §1(d)(1)(2), as applied to him, but also
other provisions of the Anti-Plunder Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages of discussion in his Memorandum,
petitioner tries to show why on their face these provisions are vague and overbroad by asking questions regarding the meaning
of some words and phrases in the statute, to wit:
1. Whether "series" means two, three, or four overt or criminal acts listed in §1(d) in view of the alleged divergence of
interpretation given to this word by the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a
series should be directly related to each other;
2. Whether "combination" includes two or more acts or at least two of the "means or similar schemes" mentioned in §1(d);
3. Whether "pattern" as used in §1(d) must be related to the word "pattern" in §4 which requires that it be "indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy";
4. Whether "overt" means the same thing as "criminal";
5. Whether "misuse of public funds" is the same as "illegal use of public property or technical malversation";
6. Whether "raids on the public treasury" refers to raids on the National Treasury or the treasury of a province or municipality;
7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift, commission, kickback, or pecuniary benefits in connection with a government
contract or by reason of his office, as used in §1(d)(2), is the same as bribery in the Revised Penal Code or those which are
considered corrupt practices of public officers;
8. Whether "illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government," as used in §1(d)(3),
refers to technical malversation or illegal use of public funds or property in the Revised Penal Code;
9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private corporation, such as a family firm engaged in fishing, is prohibited under
§1(d)(4);
10. Whether the phrase "monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade" in §1(d)(5) means the same thing as
"monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade" in the Revised Penal Code because the latter contemplates monopolies and
combinations established by any person, not necessarily a public officer; and
11. Whether under §1(d)(5) it is the public officer who intends to confer benefit on a particular person by implementing a decree
or it is the decree that is intended to benefit the particular person and the public officer simply implements it.
Many more questions of this tenor are asked in the memorandum of petitioner27 as well as in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE
KAPUNAN. Not only are they irrelevant to this case, as already pointed out. It is also evident from their examination that what
they present are simply questions of statutory construction to be resolved on a case-to-case basis. Consider, for example, the
following words and phrases in §1(d) and §2:
A. "Combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
Petitioner contends that the phrase "combination or series of overt, or criminal acts" in §1(d) and §2 should state how many acts
are needed in order to have a "combination" or a "series." It is not really required that this be specified. Petitioner, as well as MR.
JUSTICE KAPUNAN, cites the following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Tañada during the discussion of S. No. 733 in the Senate:
SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act while constituting a single offense, it must consist
of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, falsification of public
documents, coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I
think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and
the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by "series of overt or
criminal acts"? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of
overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein.
In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of "series" so that two, for example, would that be
already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a determination?
SENATOR TAÑADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal legislation, we should be very clear as to
what it encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene the constitutional provision on the right of the accused to due process. 28
But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the senators in the end reached a consensus as to the meaning of the phrase so
that an enumeration of the number of acts needed was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:
SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even "two" acts may already result in such a
big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words "a series of overt or." To read, therefore: "or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TAÑADA. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .
SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TAÑADA: Accepted, Mr. President.
....
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say "acts of plunder"
there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.29
Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this effect. To the contrary, Senators Gonzales and
Tañada voted in favor of the bill on its third and final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning of the term "combination"
as the "union of two things or acts" was adopted, although in the case of "series," the senators agreed that a repetition of two or
more times of the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from the ordinary meaning of the word as "a group of usually
three or more things or events standing or succeeding in order and having a like relationship to each other," or "a spatial or
temporal succession of persons or things," or "a group that has or admits an order of arrangement exhibiting progression." 30
In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice meeting held on May 7, 1991, the same meanings were given to the words
"combination" and "series." Representative Garcia explained that a combination is composed of two or more of the overt or
criminal acts enumerated in §1(d), while a series is a repetition of any of the same overt or criminal acts. Thus:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are
two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
....
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that ¾
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not twice ¾ but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of the
same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not [a] series. It’s a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, ‘di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes it, really, from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good
suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So. . .
....
REP. ISIDRO: When you say "combination", two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAÑADA): Two different. . . .
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha. . .
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition. . .31
Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word "combination" includes at least two different overt
or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such as misappropriation (§1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position
(§1(d)(6)). On the other hand, "series" is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than once. There
is no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by
the law for the offense (now P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time, since
the law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
Petitioner also contends that the phrase "series of acts or transactions" is the subject of conflicting decisions of various Circuit
Courts of Appeals in the United Sates. It turns out that the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged on
each count. (Emphasis added)
The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that Rule 8(b) is void for being vague but only
that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one of its essential functions is to assure the uniform interpretation of federal
laws.
We have a similar provision in Rule 3, §6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:
SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. ¾ All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest. (Emphasis added)
This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940 but it has never been thought of as vague. It will not do, therefore, to
cite the conflict of opinions in the United States as evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we do not have any conflict in
this country.
B. "Pattern of overt or criminal acts"
Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at least two acts to constitute either a combination or series because §4
also mentions "a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy," and "pattern" means "an
arrangement or order of things or activity."
A "pattern of overt or criminal acts" is required in §4 to prove "an unlawful scheme or conspiracy." In such a case, it is not
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a
pattern indicating the scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a combination
or series of two or more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which is "indicative of the overall scheme or
conspiracy." As Senate President Salonga explained, if there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be
sufficient to secure conviction.32
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate crimes as just one crime of plunder by
allowing their prosecution by means of a single information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely,
that of "amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts." The pattern is the organizing principle
that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder.
As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory construction, not vagueness or
overbreadth. In Primicias v. Fugoso,33 an ordinance of the City of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies in
streets and public places unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its violation, was construed to mean
that it gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public places which can be used for the purpose but not the
power to ban absolutely the use of such places. A constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given
to the ordinance.
Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General, and the Sandiganbayan as to the number
of acts or crimes needed to constitute plunder proof of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation.
For sometime it was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions can be had for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder, arson, and other common crimes. The question was finally resolved in 1956 when this Court held that
there is no such complex crime because the common crimes were absorbed in rebellion.34 The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to
a difference of opinion that nearly split the legal profession at the time, but no one thought Art. 134 to be vague and, therefore,
void.
Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable with the aid of the canons of
construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has no application.
In Connally v. General Constr. Co.35 the test of vagueness was formulated as follows:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
Holmes’s test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes said:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.36
Whether from the point of view of a man of common intelligence or from that of a bad man, there can be no mistaking the
meaning of the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to petitioner.
IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING PROOF OF MENS REA
Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question, Congress eliminated the element of mens rea, or the scienter, thus
reducing the burden of evidence required for proving the crimes which are mala in se.37
There are two points raised in this contention. First is the question whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se or a malum
prohibitum. For if it is a malum prohibitum, as the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General say it is,38 then there is really a
constitutional problem because the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea
Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element
of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime
of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute
is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S. No. 733:
SENATOR TAÑADA. . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. 39
However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman’s view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAÑADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .40
Señator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each
and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that ¾
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officers in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the
public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 41
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative
by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other
heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echagaray:42
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being. . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting
in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder,
rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and
in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions
of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees
or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se43 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in
a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to
treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of
an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
B. The Penalty for Plunder
The second question is whether under the statute the prosecution is relieved of the duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the defendant. It is contended that, in enacting the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply combined several existing
crimes into a single one but the penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime is grossly disproportionate to the
crimes combined while the quantum of proof required to prove each predicate crime is greatly reduced.
We have already explained why, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the quantum of proof required to prove the predicate crimes
in plunder is the same as that required were they separately prosecuted. We, therefore, limit this discussion to petitioner’s claim
that the penalty provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly disproportionate to the penalties imposed for the predicate crimes.
Petitioner cites the following examples:
For example, please consider the following ‘combination’ or ‘series’ of overt or criminal acts (assuming the P50 M minimum has
been acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the Penal Code:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods),
– combined with –
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period,
- equals -
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both),
– combined with –
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),
-equals-
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080.
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in its minimum period or a
fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),
– combined with –
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,
- equals -
plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets)44
But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or more existing crimes. For example,
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision
correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6 years and 1 day to 8
years). Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when
the two crimes are committed on the same occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery with homicide
and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for its commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it is reclusion temporal (12 years and 1
day to 20 years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one special complex crime of rape with
homicide and punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime
as serious as robbery with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the explanatory note
accompanying S. No. 733 explains:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high
office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period
of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft
but constitute the plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime
does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible
recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the
corrupting influences of power.
Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code and from special laws may be cited to show that, when special complex
crimes are created out of existing crimes, the penalty for the new crime is heavier.
______________________
To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating speech, I would have no hesitation examining it on its face on the chance
that some of its provisions ¾ even though not here before us ¾ are void. For then the risk that some state interest might be
jeopardized, i.e., the interest in the free flow of information or the prevention of "chill" on the freedom of expression, would
trump any marginal interest in security.
But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed to combat graft and corruption, especially
those committed by highly-placed public officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the Court cannot take chances by
examining other provisions not before it without risking vital interests of society. Accordingly, such statute must be examined
only "as applied" to the defendant and, if found valid as to him, the statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional
for overbreadth or vagueness of its other provisions. Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:
1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot be determined by applying the test of
strict scrutiny in free speech cases without disastrous consequences to the State’s effort to prosecute crimes and that, contrary
to petitioner’s contention, the statute must be presumed to be constitutional;
2. That in determining the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must be considered in light of the particular
acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner;
3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad;
4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General, the crime of plunder is a malum in se and not a
malum prohibitum and the burden of proving each and every predicate crime is on the prosecution.
For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080 is valid and that, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

People vs Dela Piedra

Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the
constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license
or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy
Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced
the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not materialized [sic]
thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to
economic sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale.1
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty2 to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a
certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted
a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the
recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the
house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see
around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible
employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes
later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the
arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional
Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal
recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.3
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine
National Police who was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of
illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not
enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed
them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt.
Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and
arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded
to enter the house while the rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come
out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house.4
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside.
There, she saw another woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier
introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told
her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked Fermindoza what position she was applying for.
Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work so long as she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave
her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol
what the requirements were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she
could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine
will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form, three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine
arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put them on
top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted
permission after the raiding party introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some
supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa
if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded
to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers5 on the table.6
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office
for investigation.7
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol
dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators. 8 A check by Ramos
with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment.9 A certification10 dated February
2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses
working at the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements.11
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta
had learned from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants
for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed
them and told them to sit down. They listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said
that she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit
pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary deduction." Araneta submitted
her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she was "not yet sure."
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and
her picture. She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when
it happened.12
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her
that there was someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by
Jasmine.1âwphi1.nêt
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like
a "good opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the
round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000
will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to
Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back
to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid.13
Denial comprised the accused's defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the
Region 7 Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a
tourist, and came back to the Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December
10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club
Association. On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in
Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however,
whether her father received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed
the accused that she had a cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone number,
address and a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23,
1994 to give some presents to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that she would be going to
her house. At around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she
found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates.
Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they
received the money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told
her that she would send something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just
needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused
went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to
Cebu City. She then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked the woman if
she could do anything for her. The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that
she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman)
were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up and
went out. A minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of
the CIS and informed her that they received a call that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from
the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the house, and to get whatever Jasmine
would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that
Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go
home but could not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the
accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga
City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew
Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000
from alleged applicants as processing fee.14
The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter
visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda
Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at
around 8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. She
claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding
the P2,000 application fee.15
The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270
Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he
did not notice that she conducted any recruitment.16
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and
Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this
case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.17
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS
REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF,
SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME
CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE
RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT
ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic]
COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS
COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY
PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE
WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, HENCE, A
WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.18
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process. Appellant
also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and, thus,
violates the due process clause.19
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.20 A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness.21 The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the
accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning. 22
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:23
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.
Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more
persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the
ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy
others.'"
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be
distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language—but which nonetheless specifies a standard though
defectively phrased—in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of
this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39
of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. – (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed
if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its implementing
rules and regulations, shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not
less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years
nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the
discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,24 where this Court, to
use appellant's term, "criticized" the definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision," appellant asks, what more "the ordinary
citizen" who does not possess the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth since by merely
"referring" a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime
of illegal recruitment could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any
employment for a fee." The Court held in the negative, explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but
merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement
whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is
made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the
acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is
involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in
the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer
to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the
word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of
engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator
heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are
rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one
cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement,
which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own
countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in
Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records
notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law
and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a "perfectly vague act" whose obscurity
is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper
construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is
such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this
connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if
susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and
ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common
sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach
of those intrusted therewith."25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or
employment referral" ("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not
render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed
by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct
which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the
boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute. 26
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,27 for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting
the posting of election propaganda in any place – including private vehicles – other than in the common poster areas sanctioned
by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but
also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it
covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case, however, appellant did
not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of "recruitment and placement" that
would render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause28 in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows
that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant was the only one
criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a Zamboangueña, and the
alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its
operation.29 Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 30
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.31 Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous
or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.32 The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application
to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular
class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred
from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional
discrimination."33 Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional
discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a
reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.34 The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed
their duties,35 and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant
has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with
the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant's eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a
conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be
protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because
others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the
exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit
of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.36
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others
charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial
of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown. 37
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law
to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused commits
said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 39
In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed
or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the
Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their
testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees
involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely against her. The absence of
evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no improper
motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.40
Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons
who are eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony. 41
That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the
statute, the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment"
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into
the second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A
warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so seized are
rendered inadmissible in evidence.42 Here, even if the documents seized were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would stand
in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA
supposedly "planted" the application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although
this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted but difficult to prove.43 Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was
indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have
performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary.44
Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and
placement are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal recruitment
in large scale? We find that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more
persons whether individually or as a group.45 In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been
recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez,
was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient
evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons.46 In this case, evidence that appellant likewise
promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta,
who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that they (she and her "friends") filled up
application forms.
The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor
its contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and
inadmissible.48 In any case, hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has little probative value.49
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefing
of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information — Araneta, Modesto and
Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or
offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of persons other than those alleged to
have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.50
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the accused, and also to identify
some exhibits for the prosecution and as well as to identify the accused.51
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her recruitment by the accused and
immediately before the recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in this case,
Your Honor.52
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that she was instructed
together with a companion to conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to be going on,
that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the
accused, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution.53
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered, 54 and the purpose of the offer of their
testimonies did not include the proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it charges her with committing illegal
recruitment in large scale on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she committed the crime
on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime does not vary from that charged
in the information. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence,
appellant offered them employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime had already
been committed three (3) days earlier on January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well
as the constitutionality of the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly harsh. 55
Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that
appellant committed recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large
scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two
counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed
against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that the proper imposable
penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on
two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P30,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE NETWORK V ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR),
represented by their respective officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of
Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS),
Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante,
Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers, 4 and joined by concerned citizens
and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean
Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato
Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees
Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church
People’s Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers5 who are also bringing action on their own behalf,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL), 6 Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 179157.
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9 composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the
IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies
for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of
their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.11
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the
law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about
to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties
by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially
the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens
and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected
to "close security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as
"enemies of the [S]tate."14
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have
yet to show any connection between the purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham,
petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging
them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National People’s
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure
under the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course
of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge
of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge.
But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which
the court has no constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link"
to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct
injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America 17 (US) and the
European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes
note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.19 Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to
the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual,
prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro
Casiño, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing
the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration 21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.22 Of
recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice
before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link
to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion
charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives
Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the
Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.26
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to
the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make
it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.
Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The
IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members
with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected
under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus
standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not
shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage
of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state
that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications,"
without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation
of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual,
or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the
settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, 28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
interest in the proceeding.29
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.
Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.30 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.32
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable—definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof
on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to
be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable
controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections36 for failure to cite any specific
affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,37 to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.
The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices
to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be
sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.38
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required
to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief." 40 The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a
federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1), 41 proscribing the provision
of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they
intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.42
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
real and existing one.
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function.43
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend
to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.44
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.45 Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism 46 under RA 9372
in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the
present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free
speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."50 It added that,
at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense53 under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in
precise language.54
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the
Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of
plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed
to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in
the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."
The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face
only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile
abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial
or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a
claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.57 The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.58
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. 59
A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.60
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against
a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech,
the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes
that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.63
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged" and "underscored that an
‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed."64
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court
to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder
an accused from defeating the State’s power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute
is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, 67 observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, 68 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.69 In
Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."71
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the
definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its
entirety."72 It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."73
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in
light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants’ claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."75
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three
cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of
"unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism 77 must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected
by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede
to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element
of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of
race will require an employer to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed
as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to
punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing.
But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce
laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.79
(italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. 80 Since
speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied
to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds.
The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.
Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants
that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows
the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

INTL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V QUISIMBING

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point.
The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction.
That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1âwphi1.nêt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. 1 To
enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the
same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad,
from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending
their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-
hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual
to the Philippines?2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he
or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a)
the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of
deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign
land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of
transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the
primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will
eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable
employment after along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of
attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance
of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-
hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring
the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation
issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than
Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. 5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino
local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners
who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.6
The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international character of the School
requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system
is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render
their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy
security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions
of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation
wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the
Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions
that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is
reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status
of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees,
hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class.
Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having
no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join
the teaching faculty of the School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. 11 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 13 the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle
against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this
principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination
by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted
to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article
248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of
work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. 23 The
Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That
would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the
employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates
without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine
Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it
be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of
compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice
of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the
distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain
benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection."
26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These relations are not

merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1)
the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights. 31
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately.
Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the
same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as
foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires
would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the
practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V COMELEC

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices – choices we
would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However,
choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important
questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases,
where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies
the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is
better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not
harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August
17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation;
and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations
with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In
Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is against
nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men
working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And
we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84)
"He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the
record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of
Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of
the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and
the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it
being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which
are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but
to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and
edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful
when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or
regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform
to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older
practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State’s avowed duty under
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion
for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman,
breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-
representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation
as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of
the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons.
Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the
nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under representation.
Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial
to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality
is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to
protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad
constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that
applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to
any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are
generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than
500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes
the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It
penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under
these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any
act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC
to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010
elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than
12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it
be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner’s
application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing
the Assailed Resolutions.16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae,
attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.19
The Parties’ Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened
its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations
of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application for
registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there
had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit
the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether
a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it
was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 21
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new one;
previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this
ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite
curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the
issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it
never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044
members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that
petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even
exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality,
or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:26
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies
and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or
agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief,
i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it
would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must
have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those
conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence
on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After
all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on
them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing
earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must
have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based,
it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to
the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in
having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish
in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence. 28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the
brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs, convictions about
the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived
lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that
"there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are committing immoral acts."30
The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but
mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum.
If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights"
and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without
authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and
should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who,
undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go
through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized
that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection
clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal protection
of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle,
"consists in the same treatment of similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold
the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable,
and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here – that is,
moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot
contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than
disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating
in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the
party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system
is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a
ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should
be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free,
every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where people
deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from
determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus,
when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences
of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and
the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not only for a majority,
however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to
those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to
impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better
reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both
expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are
protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct
violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have
ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions
in foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay
and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions
must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in
the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent
with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A
political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee. 46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They,
too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of the
community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will
only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its
members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to
review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of
elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right
which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has the
clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in
public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and – as
advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that
there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular,
has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should
be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we
explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally
to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the
right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in
force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have
an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent
of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to
vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable
on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No
person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate
and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office. 50
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the
petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines.
There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law,
and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international
law to ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is automatically a
human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that
much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in
order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer
controversial.1avvphi1
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international
law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes
are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to impose its own view
of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and
December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s
application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

BIRAOGO V TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth
Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers
duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created
under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel
of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily
include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence,
authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation
of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-
finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-
parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”
Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly
illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen”
or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers
matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the
petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited
to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount
to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject
to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the
equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission
is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to
include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance
with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

GARCIA V DRILON

SEPARATE OPINION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

I concur with the conclusion reached in the ponencia ably written by the Honorable Estela Perlas-Bernabe. With due respect,
however, I submit that the test to determine an equal protection challenge against the law, denying statutory remedies to men
who are similarly situated as the women who are given differential treatment in the law, on the basis of sex or gender, should be
at the level of intermediate scrutiny or middle-tier judicial scrutiny rather than the rational basis test used in the ponencia of
Justice Bernabe.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails: (1) the Decision dated January 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01698 dismissing the Petition for Prohibition with Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Petition for Prohibition) which
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," and sought a temporary restraining order and/or injunction to prevent the implementation of the
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) and criminal prosecution of herein petitioner Jesus A. Garcia under the law; and (2) the
Resolution dated August 14, 2007, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, did not pass upon the issue
of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 and instead dismissed the Petition for Prohibition on technical grounds, as follows:
1. The constitutional issue was raised for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals by petitioner and not at the earliest
opportunity, which should be before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod City, acting as a Family Court, where
private respondent Rosalie Garcia, wife of petitioner, instituted a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order[s] 1
under Republic Act No. 9262, against her husband, petitioner Jesus C. Garcia; and
2. The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can only be questioned in a direct action and it cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack in a petition for prohibition, as the inferior court having jurisdiction on the action may itself determine the
constitutionality of the statute, and the latter’s decision on the matter may be reviewed on appeal and not by a writ of prohibition,
as it was held in People v. Vera.2
Hence, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution denied due course to the Petition for Prohibition "for being fraught with
fatal technical infirmities" and for not being ripe for judicial review. Nevertheless, four out of the five issues raised by the
petitioner here dealt with the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262. More accurately put, however, the Court of
Appeals refrained from touching at all those four substantive issues of constitutionality. The Court of Appeals cannot therefore
be faulted for any erroneous ruling on the aforesaid substantive constitutional issues.
In this instant Petition for Review, the only issue directly in point that can be raised against the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution is the first one cited as a ground for the appeal, which I quote:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT
RAISED AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION WAS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW. 3
Under the circumstances, whether this Court should consider this Petition for Review as a proper occasion to pass upon the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 shall be a separate subject matter that is tackled below after the above-quoted first
issue is disposed of.
On the Propriety of Raising the Issue of Constitutionality in a Summary Proceeding Before the RTC Designated as a Family Court
Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals ruling that he should have raised the issue of constitutionality in his Opposition4 to private
respondent’s petition for protective orders pending before the RTC for the following reasons:
1. The Rules on Violence Against Women and Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC), particularly Section 20 thereof, expressly prohibit
him from alleging any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, all of which are personal to him and therefore with more
reason, he cannot impugn the constitutionality of the law by way of affirmative defense.5
2. Since the proceedings before the Family Court are summary in nature, its limited jurisdiction is inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality.6
I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a summary proceeding, in
accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not
be considered on appeal.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must
be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not
be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action
which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner cites the above provision, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, as one of his grounds for not challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 in his Opposition. The error of such reasoning is that it treats "any cause of action"
mentioned in Section 20(b) as distinct from the "counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint" referred to in the said Section
20(b). On the contrary, the language of said section clearly refers to a cause of action that is the "subject" of the counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party complaint, which is barred and which may be litigated in a separate civil action. The issue of
constitutionality is not a "cause of action" that is a subject of the aforementioned prohibited pleadings. In fact, petitioner
admitted that such prohibited pleadings would allege "claims which are personal to him." 7 Hence, Section 20(b) cannot even be
invoked as a basis for filing the separate special civil action of Petition for Prohibition before the Court of Appeals to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262.
What obviously escapes petitioner’s understanding is that the contents of the Opposition are not limited to mere refutations of
the allegations in the petition for temporary and permanent protection order. While it is true that A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC requires
the respondent to file an Opposition and not an Answer,8 it does not prevent petitioner from challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 in such Opposition. In fact, Section 20(a) directs petitioner to state in his Opposition why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued against him. This means that petitioner should have raised in his Opposition all
defenses available to him, which may be either negative or affirmative. Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court define negative
and affirmative defenses as follows:
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his
cause or causes of action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other
matter by way of confession and avoidance.
In Bayog v. Hon. Natino,9 the respondent, in a complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), raised as
one of his defenses, the MCTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between him and
the petitioner. The MCTC applied the Rule on Summary Procedure and issued an Order stating that it could not take cognizance
of the Answer, for being filed belatedly. This Court ruled that while the MCTC was correct in applying the Rule on Summary
Procedure as the complaint was one for ejectment, it should have met and ruled squarely on the issue of jurisdiction, as there
was nothing in the rules that barred it from admitting the Answer. Hence, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence
for the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. 10
Similarly, the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court from
granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should have raised it in his Opposition as a
defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.
For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals was precipitated by and was ultimately
directed against the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order, which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited
pleading. An action questioning the constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the
RTC. This is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that can
be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the TPO against the petitioner. Thus, the controversy,
subject of a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals or the RTC, would still have to be the issuance of the TPO,
which is the subject of another case in the RTC.
Moreover, the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Dasmariñas Water
District v. Monterey Foods Corporation,11 we said:
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly pleaded in
the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts
will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.)
This Court held that such opportunity is in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, such that "if it is not raised
in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal."12 The
decision upon the constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the TPO should be issued against petitioner. Such
question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity as an affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC
handling the protection order proceedings, which was the competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue. This Court, in
Drilon v. Lim,13 held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question
in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as
they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Citation omitted, emphases ours.)
Furthermore, the filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a
protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial court,
cannot resolve the constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the petition for the issuance of a TPO.
Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an unresolved prejudicial question to
the validity of issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the protection order is not suspended, it does create the danger
of having inconsistent and conflicting judgments between the two separate courts, whether of the same or different levels in the
judicial hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject of separate motions for reconsideration, separate
appeals, and separate petitions for review before this Court – the exact scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding.
As we previously held, "the law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions."14
It must be remembered that aside from the "earliest opportunity" requirement, the court’s power of judicial review is subject to
other limitations. Two of which are the existence of an actual case or controversy and standing. An aspect of the actual case or
controversy requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." This is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Thus, a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This
direct adverse effect on the individual will also be the basis of his standing as it is necessary that the person challenging the law
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.15
In this case, the petitioner’s challenge on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 was on the basis of the protection order
issued against him. Verily, the controversy became ripe only when he was in danger of or was directly adversely affected by the
statute mandating the issuance of a protection order against him. He derives his standing to challenge the statute from the direct
injury he would sustain if and when the law is enforced against him. Therefore, it is clear that the proper forum to challenge the
constitutionality of the law was before the RTC handling the protection order proceedings. The filing of a separate action to
question the constitutionality of the law amounts to splitting a cause of action that runs counter to the policy against multiplicity
of suits.
Moreover, the filing of the Petition for Prohibition with the Court of Appeals countenanced the evil that the law and the rules
sought to avoid. It caused the delay in the proceedings and inconvenience, hardship and expense on the part of the parties due
to the multiplicity of suits between them at different court levels. The RTC where the petition for protection orders is filed should
be trusted, instead of being doubted, to be able to exercise its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of constitutionality within the
mandatory period set by the rules.
In gist, there is no statutory, reglementary, or practical basis to disallow the constitutional challenge to a law, which is sought to
be enforced, in a summary proceeding. This is particularly true considering that the issue of a statute’s constitutionality is a
question of law which may be resolved without the reception of evidence or a full-blown trial. Hence, said issue should have been
raised at the earliest opportunity in the proceedings before the RTC, Bacolod City and for failure of the petitioner to do so, it
cannot be raised in the separate Petition for Prohibition before the Court of Appeals, as correctly ruled by the latter, nor in a
separate action before the RTC.
On the Court Resolving the Issue of Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262
Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition because of petitioner’s
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 at the earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion,16 should still pass upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the
petitioner, but the private respondent as well,17 pray that the Court resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and
paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised, and in keeping
with this Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained within
the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and resolve the constitutional issue.18
Aside from the technical ground raised by petitioner in his first assignment of error, petitioner questions the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9262 on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. NO. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. NO. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 19
On the Constitutional Right to Equal Protection of the Laws
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 for making a gender-based classification, thus, providing
remedies only to wives/women and not to husbands/men. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children" is already pejorative and sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against
women.20 The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and other women. He adds that gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and
punish spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender. There being no reasonable
difference between an abused husband and an abused wife, the equal protection guarantee is violated.
Pertinently, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above provision was lifted verbatim from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which in turn was a slightly modified version of
the equal protection clause in Section 1, Amendment 1421 of the United States Constitution.
In 1937, the Court established in People v. Vera22 the four-fold test to measure the reasonableness of a classification under the
equal protection clause, to wit:
This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments of our government and
on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation
and eminent domain. The equal protection of the laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws." Of course, what may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating
against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously,
is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the foregoing "rational
basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a
showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.23
However, over time, three levels of tests were developed, which are to be applied in equal protection cases, depending on the
subject matter24 involved:
1. Rational Basis Scrutiny – the traditional test, which requires "only that government must not impose differences in treatment
except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation." Simply put, it merely demands that the
classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose.25
2. Intermediate Scrutiny – requires that the classification (means) must serve an important governmental objective (ends) and is
substantially related to the achievement of such objective. A classification based on sex is the best-established example of an
intermediate level of review.26
3. Strict Scrutiny – requires that the classification serve a compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve such interest. This
level is used when suspect classifications or fundamental rights are involved.27
Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality
of classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho,28 this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a suspect
classification nor impinged on a fundamental right, then "the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the
constitutionality of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge."29 We added:
It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the
legislative classification is rationally related to achieving some legitimate State interest. x x x.30 (Citations omitted.)
Echoing the same principle, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Puno in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,31 stated:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise,
this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the
broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test,
and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down
view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights
it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. (Citations
omitted.)
This was reiterated in League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections,32 and Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission
on Elections,33 wherein the Court, although applying the rational basis test, noted that there are tests, which are more
appropriate in other cases, especially those involving suspect classes and fundamental rights. In fact, Chief Justice Puno
expounded on this in his Separate Concurring Opinion in the Ang Ladlad case. He said that although the assailed resolutions
therein were correctly struck down, since the classification was based on gender or sexual orientation, a quasi-suspect
classification, a heightened level of review should have been applied and not just the rational basis test, which is the most liberal
basis of judicial scrutiny. Citing American authority, Chief Justice Puno continued to elucidate on the three levels of scrutiny and
the classes falling within each level, to wit:
If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the exercise of a "fundamental right," then the
courts will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that suspect classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national
origin, and ancestry. The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the
presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken down. In such a case, the State
bears a heavy burden of justification, and the government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties,
or if a classification disadvantages a "quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that
interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. Noteworthy,
and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for mere rationality. This is a relatively
relaxed standard reflecting the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one. The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action,
and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State acted. 34 (Citations omitted, emphases
supplied.)
This case presents us with the most opportune time to adopt the appropriate scrutiny in deciding cases where the issue of
discrimination based on sex or gender is raised. The assailed Section 3, among other provisions, of Republic Act No. 9262 provides:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
The aforesaid law also institutionalized remedies such as the issuance of protection orders in favor of women and children who
are victims of violence and prescribed public penalties for violation of the said law.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 which denies the same protection orders to husbands who are
victims of wife-abuse. It should be stressed that under aforecited section of said law violence may not only be physical or sexual
but also psychological and economic in nature.
The Honorable Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in his concurring opinion notes that "Husband abuse maybe an under
reported form of family violence." While concurring with the majority opinion, he opines as follows:
Nevertheless, in a future case more deserving of our attention, we should be open to realities which may challenge the dominant
conception that violence in intimate relationships only happens to women and children. This may be predominantly true, but
even those in marginal cases deserve fundamental constitutional and statutory protection. We should be careful that in correcting
historical and cultural injustices, we may typecast all women as victims, stereotype all men as tormentors or make invisible the
possibility that in some intimate relationships, men may also want to seek succor against acts defined in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9262 in an expeditious manner.
Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to men, when the reality is that there are men, regardless
of their number, who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational basis test may be too wide and liberal to justify the
statutory classification which in effect allows different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In the context of the
constitutional policy to "ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men" 35 the level of scrutiny applicable,
to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny
or the intermediate standard of judicial review.
To survive intermediate review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives, and
(2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.36
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives: Safeguard Human Rights, Ensure Gender Equality and Empower Women
Republic Act No. 9262 is a legislation that furthers important, in fact essential, governmental objectives as enunciated in the law’s
Declaration of Policy, as quoted below:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and
children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
This policy is in consonance with the constitutional provisions,37 which state:
SEC. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
SEC. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.
x x x.
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed
by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was a
mere two years after it gained independence from the United States of America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to
many United Nations human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms,38 keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under
the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law. (Emphasis ours.)
The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s
obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic
violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim. The
said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men.39
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." 40 Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed
to condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to
eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice. 41 Known as the International Bill of Rights of
Women,42 the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. 43 It
brings the women into the focus of human rights concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women.44 The CEDAW,
in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and emphasized that such is a
violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
In addition, as a state party to the CEDAW, the Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement
for the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men.45 The CEDAW, going beyond the
concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis
that women have suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of their biological sex.46
The Philippines’ accession to various international instruments requires it to promote and ensure the observance of human rights
and "continually affirm its commitment to ensure that it pursues gender equality in all aspects of the development process to
eventually make real, a gender-responsive society."47 Thus, the governmental objectives of protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by our
Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are undeniably important and essential.
The Gender-Based Classification in Republic Act No. 9262 is Substantially Related to the Achievement of Governmental Objectives
As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as "gender-based violence."48 Violent acts towards women has
been the subject of an examination on a historic world-wide perspective.49 The exhaustive study of a foreign history professor
noted that "from the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life," 50 as three
great bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code, which have
influenced western society’s views and treatment of women, all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination
stemming from the view of male superiority."51 It cited 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, who explained that the
common law doctrine of coverture reflected the theological assumption that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus
"they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband,"52 a concept that evidently found its way in some
of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continue. Men are expected to take on the dominant roles both in the
community and in the family. This perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women – power, which must
necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men control women to retain such power.53
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed against
women in the Philippines. In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported54 that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases
involving violence against women were filed under Republic Act No. 9262. From 2004 to 2012, violations of Republic Act No. 9262
ranked first among the different categories of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an
increasing trend from 2004 to 2012, although the numbers might not exactly represent the real incidence of violence against
women in the country, as the data is based only on what was reported to the PNP. Moreover, the increasing trend may have been
caused by the continuous information campaign on the law and its strict implementation. 55 Nonetheless, statistics show that
cases involving violence against women are prevalent, while there is a dearth of reported cases involving violence committed by
women against men, that will require legislature intervention or solicitous treatment of men.
Preventing violence against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental
objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family life, and promoting gender
equality and empowering women. Although there exists other laws on violence against women56 in the Philippines, Republic Act
No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention
because it occurs in situations or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not. The
law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which are often reported to have
been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were
not available. The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most vulnerable
victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a
conclusion that men need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness and urgency of the situation,
which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.57 Hence, the law
permits the issuance of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing. The law
has granted authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the offender, based on the victim’s application.
The RTC may likewise grant an application for a temporary protection order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere
basis of the application. Despite the ex parte issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow
them to be availed of by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing
has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable, reasonable, and justified.
More importantly, they serve the objectives of the law by providing the victims necessary immediate protection from the violence
they perceive as threats to their personal safety and security. This translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives
as well. By assuring the victims instant relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of
dignity and equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order, to wit:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of
violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted
under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In furtherance of the governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against women and children
under this Act has been classified as a public offense,58 making its prosecution independent of the victim’s initial participation.
Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is substantially related to the important governmental objectives of
valuing every person’s dignity, respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children, promoting gender equality,
and empowering women.
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and men prescribe that they be treated
differently under particular conditions in order to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a
woman as compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee:
8. The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to
achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as
well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the
goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a
redistribution of resources and power between men and women.
9. Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These results may be quantitative and/or
qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same
income levels, equality in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.59 (Emphases
supplied.)
The government’s commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of a man,
requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative measures, such as Republic Act No. 9262. Unless the woman is
guaranteed that the violence that she endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed
to uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive equality nor be empowered.
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification. The non-
identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance
to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and women.
Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender
equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of
women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives
the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
The Issuance of the TPO did not Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due Process
A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman
or her child.60 The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof are often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims
must have immediate and uncomplicated access to the same. Hence, Republic Act No. 9262 provides for the issuance of a TPO:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court
on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO
any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing
on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service
of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The
TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers to the method or manner by
which the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an
impartial and competent tribunal.61 However, it is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural
due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to
protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the
protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.62
In Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 63 the Court enumerated three instances when notice and/or hearing may be dispensed with in
administrative proceedings:
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article
704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code,
B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are
immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
The principles behind the aforementioned exceptions may also apply in the case of the ex parte issuance of the TPO, although it
is a judicial proceeding. As mentioned previously, the urgent need for a TPO is inherent in its nature and purpose, which is to
immediately provide protection to the woman and/or child victim/s against further violent acts. Any delay in the issuance of a
protective order may possibly result in loss of life and limb of the victim. The issuing judge does not arbitrarily issue the TPO as
he can only do so if there is reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against women and their children
exists or is about to recur based on the verified allegations in the petition of the victim/s. 64 Since the TPO is effective for only
thirty (30) days,65 any inconvenience, deprivation, or prejudice the person enjoined – such as the petitioner herein – may suffer,
is generally limited and temporary. Petitioner is also not completely precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a
later time. Following the issuance of the TPO, the law and rules require that petitioner be personally served with notice of the
preliminary conference and hearing on private respondent’s petition for a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) 66 and that
petitioner submit his opposition to private respondent’s petition for protections orders. 67 In fact, it was petitioner’s choice not
to file anopposition, averring that it would only be an "exercise in futility." Thus, the twin rights of notice and hearing were
subsequently afforded to petitioner but he chose not to take advantage of them. Petitioner cannot now claim that the ex parte
issuance of the TPO was in violation of his right to due process.
There is No Undue Delegation of Judicial Power to Barangay Officials
A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay
Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household members
particularly women and their children.68 The authority of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 9262:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection
order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time
for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay
official to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Once more, the urgency of the purpose for which protection orders under Republic Act No. 9262 are issued justifies the grant of
authority to barangay officials to issue BPOs. Barangay officials live and interact closely with their constituents and are presumably
easier to approach and more readily available than any other government official. Their issuance of the BPO is but part of their
official executive function of enforcing all laws and ordinances within their barangay 69 and maintaining public order in the
barangay.70 It is true that the barangay officials’ issuance of a BPO under Republic Act No. 9262 necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, but this function, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise
of the power granted by law.71 The Court has clarified that:
"The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers. Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declare the existence of facts which call into
operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and other subordinate officers power to ascertain and
determine appropriate facts as a basis for procedure in the enforcement of particular laws." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, p. 950, sec.
235)72
Furthermore, while judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may confer on
administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government officials, quasi-judicial power involving the exercise of judgment
and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention
in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only
to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not amount to conferment of
jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. 73 In the case of a BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy under Republic
Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of
appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to the victim. In fact,
under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for a BPO shall
not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by
any court, the barangay official may no longer issue a BPO.74 The same Implementing Rules also require that within twenty-four
(24) hours after the issuance of a BPO, the barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO or PPO with
the nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC, the application may be filed in the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the Metropolitan Trial Court.75
All things considered, there is no ground to declare Republic Act No. 9262 constitutionally infirm.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

In Re LAURENTE

PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated
on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law;
and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to
pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and due process of law
and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge
against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded
such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner
headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that
he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and officer of the Court; that as a
former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the press in
envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers;
even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse
publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent
any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was
this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial
but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case
last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez,
"a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its
integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that
his remarks were confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its
finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his
professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the
language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his
authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions on the
merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent
to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and
exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice
committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not
have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer
his client when these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which
is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for the record,
he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged deprivation of her
constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the
mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding,
and that she should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers,
they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived at without any deliberation by its
members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery" thereby prompting her to
pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting by
the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M.
Herrera, Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of
the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;"
that instead of taking the law into her own hands or joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a
peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against
those whom she felt had committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily
connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given
sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein
he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was
also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or the official actions of
the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed,
contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied
having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press
copies of the complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed
otherwise and found that those letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves,
betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land,
a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine
of independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to conduct
any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712).
Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his
professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do
with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as
"counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint
before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the
Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao,
Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta
where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670,
Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as
of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for
Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs.
Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly
completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for Ilustre. As it was, however,
service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is heightened by the
fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the
Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed
at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly
assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment
with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration
that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam
Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court
rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of
an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly
addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated
January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical
pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to
the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the
fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental
facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the
Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very
purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of
the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is
because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and
conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and
to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification, much less a reversal,
of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and
her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed
suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled
for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact
that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed that the members of the Division
voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind
closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their inability to
furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It
was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986
denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en
banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the
personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to
serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta
informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another
process server, went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no
such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix
Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but
vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she
always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla
which was returned unserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101
Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was
unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this
Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order
suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and
this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer
imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED