G.R. No.

160966 October 11, 2005

PAGODA PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
UNIVERSAL CANNING, INC.,* Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

he Rules on voluntary inhibition do not give judges the unfettered discretion to desist from
hearing a case. The motion for inhibition must be grounded on just and valid causes. The
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough basis for them to inhibit, especially when
the charge is groundless.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
August 14, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 77514 and the
November 24, 2003 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
decretal portion or fallo of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED.
Public respondent’s Order dated May 22, 2003, voluntarily inhibiting himself from the case is
hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent is DIRECTED to continue hearing the case and dispose
of the same with utmost dispatch."

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

"[Petitioner] filed a civil complaint against [respondent] for Trademark Infringement, False
Representation and Unfair Competition with Damages and Injunction. The case was
docketed as Civil Case [N]o. 02-102988.

"[Petitioner] claimed that [respondent’s] ‘Family’s Brand’ Sardines is confusingly similar with
[petitioner’s] ‘Family Brand’ Sardines. [Petitioner] insisted that it has superior right to use
the trademark ‘Family’ than [respondent].

"[Respondent] filed an ‘Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim and Motion to Dismiss and
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.’

"[Respondent] prayed that [petitioner] be enjoined from using the trademark ‘Family’ and
to pay damages. [Respondent] further asked [Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr.] to set the
hearing for its motion to dismiss the action on the grounds of lack of authority of the affiant
of the complaint to institute the action, insufficient verification and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

"After hearing, [Judge Eugenio] issued a temporary restraining order enjoining [petitioner]
to use the trademark ‘Family.’
"On March 21, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] dismissed without prejudice, [petitioner’s] complaint
on the ground of insufficient verification as invoked by [respondent].

"[Respondent] filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dismissing [petitioner’s]

complaint, claiming that the defect in the verification has been rendered moot and academic
by subsequent rulings respective to the application for preliminary injunction and that the
attending circumstances of the case warrant liberal compliance [with] the rule.

"[Petitioner] filed a ‘Motion for Voluntary Inhibition,’ requesting [Judge Eugenio] to inhibit
himself from proceeding to hear, try and decide the pending incidents of the case to afford
[petitioner] an impartial trial.

"[Respondent] opposed [petitioner’s] ‘Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.’

"On May 22, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself from
further hearing the case.

"Hence, [the] petition [filed with the CA] by [respondent] for mandamus to compel [Judge
Eugenio] to continue to hear the pending incidents of the case." 4

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Finding no valid and just reason for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Eugenio, the CA issued
the writ of mandamus. It ruled that the present case fell within the exception that
mandamus would lie in instances of gross abuse of discretion.

Hence, this Petition.5

Issue

The issue was worded by petitioner in this wise:

"The principal issue raised by the petitioner for this Honorable Court to resolve is whether or
not a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to assail a purely discretionary act of
Judge Antonio Eugenio, Jr. of voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing Civil Case No. 02-
102988 and corollary thereto, whether Judge Eugenio, Jr. who inhibited himself in
accordance with the law and the Rules, can be compelled to perform an act he had already
decided not to do with the intention of assuring the litigants of an impartial trial." 6

The Court believes that there are actually two issues to be settled in this
case: first, whether mandamus is the proper remedy to assail an order of voluntary
inhibition; and second, whether there was a valid and just reason for the voluntary
inhibition of the trial court judge.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Issue:
Remedy Against the

Order of Voluntary Inhibition

At the outset, we note that petitioner, in an effort to cover its bases, filed the present
Petition as both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The applicable rule is Rule 45, which clearly provides that
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case -- regardless of the nature of the
action or proceeding involved -- may be appealed to this Court through a petition for
review. This remedy is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 7 "It is
basic that where Rule 45 is available, and in fact availed of as a remedy -- as in this case --
recourse under Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for
appeal."8

The procedural infirmity notwithstanding, this Court shall deal with this Petition as one filed
under Rule 45 only and shall treat the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CA as an allegation of reversible error.

Petitioner claims that respondent erred when the latter questioned the trial judge’s Order of
Voluntary Inhibition --supposedly a purely discretionary act -- through a Petition for
Mandamus filed with the CA.

While, ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act, the writ shall
issue in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled; and when
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 9 This Court has recognized that "[a]
judge’s decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not conclusive, and
his competency may be determined on an application for mandamus to compel him to
act."10

Second Issue:

Inhibition

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the
civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first
paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and
impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.11

In Umale v. Villaluz,12 the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-
quoted provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in
1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not
depend upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If
those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed with the case or
else risk being called upon to account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit
themselves on grounds of prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves
took great interest and an active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos13 and Del
Castillo v. Javelona14 paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for
disqualification --those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges
concerned.

The judges’ right, however, must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear
of repression. "Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges
the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be
shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand
them with the stigma of bias or partiality." 15

A perusal of the records of the case fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated
Judge Eugenio in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondent or in
dismissing petitioner’s Complaint. Neither did this Court find any questionable or suspicious
circumstances leading to the issuance of those Orders, as suggested by petitioner.

This Court has repeatedly held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their
partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law
and evidence and without fear or favor." 16

In his questioned Order of Inhibition, Judge Eugenio himself satisfactorily clarified his
actuations and the circumstances leading to the issuance of the questioned injunction and
Order of dismissal. Obviously not believing that he had been motivated by bias or prejudice,
he nonetheless granted petitioner’s Motion to Inhibit. Understandably, he did so with the
intention to uphold the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and
confidence. Under the circumstances, however, to affirm his Order of Inhibition would open
the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for
a judge more sympathetic to their cause.17 Such action would be antithetical to the speedy
and fair administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

W E C O N C U R:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Filed as a remedy under both Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
Petition included the Court of Appeals as a respondent. Since the proper remedy is a
petition for review under Rule 45, this Court has omitted the CA from the title of the
case in accordance with Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

1
Rollo, pp. 21-34.

2
Id., pp. 7-15. Fifth Division. Penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (Division chair)
and concurred in by Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Lucas P. Bersamin
(members).

3
Id., pp. 17-18.
 4
Id., pp. 7-9.

5
The case was deemed submitted for decision on November 18, 2004, upon receipt
by this Court of respondent’s Memorandum signed by Attys. Victor L. Chan and
Redentor R. Romero. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rafael Arsenio S.
Dizon, was received by the Court on October 6, 2004.

6
Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 286.

7
Heirs of Pagobo v. CA, 345 Phil. 1119, 1132, October 16, 1997.

8
Esguerra v. CA, 335 Phil. 58, 75, February 3, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

9
First Philippine Holdings Corporation v Sandiganbayan, 323 Phil. 36, 55, February
1, 1996.

10
Query of Executive Judge Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, on the
Conflicting Views of Regional Trial Court - Judges Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal
Case No. 4954-M, 155 SCRA 72, 80, October 26, 1987, per Gutierrez, J.

11
Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 446, February 27, 2003; People v. Kho, 357
SCRA 290, 296, April 20, 2001.

12
151-A Phil. 563, 568, May 25, 1973; see also Agpalo, Legal Ethics (5th ed., 1992),
p. 448.

13
112 Phil. 184, May 30, 1961.

14
116 Phil. 451, September 29, 1962.

15
Gochan v. Gochan, supra, p. 447, per Panganiban, J. (citing People v.
Kho, supra; Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126, October 13, 2000; and Abdula v.
Guiani, 382 Phil. 757, February 18, 2000.)

16
People v. Kho, supra, p. 297, per Kapunan, J. (citing People v. CA, 369 Phil. 150
July 2, 1999; Webb v. People, 342 Phil. 206, July 24, 1997; People v. Tabarno, 312
Phil. 542, March 20, 1995; Abad v. Belen, 240 SCRA 733, January 30, 1995; Go v.
CA, 221 SCRA 397, April 7, 1993.)

17
Chin v. CA, 409 SCRA 206, 215, August 15, 2003.

G.R. No. 171247 July 22, 2015

ALFREDO L. VILLAMOR, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC-PASIG CITY, BRANCH 268,
and LEONARDO S. UMALE [deceased] substituted by his spouse, CLARISSA
VICTORIA UMALE, Respondents.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the January 31, 2006
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91940.

Factual Antecedents

This case stemmed from the complaint3 filed by Leonardo S. Umale4 (respondent) against
Alfredo L. Villamar, Jr. (petitioner) and others5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City. The complaint sought to compel the petitioner to account for, pay, and deliver to the
respondent the rental payments allegedly in the petitioner's possession. 6

The case was originally raffled to Branch 155 presided over by Judge Luis R. Tongco, who
voluntarily inhibited from hearing the case upon the respondent's motion. 7 The case was
later re-raffled to Branch 268 in the sala of Judge Amelia C. Manalastas (Judge
Manalastas).8 Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for Inhibition,9 Supplemental
Motion for Inhibition,10 and Second Supplemental Motion for Inhibition11 (collectively,
Motions for Inhibition) to disqualify Judge Manalastas, on the following grounds:

(i) That defendant Villamor [petitioner] has obtained information that the presiding
Judge [Judge Manalastas] has stood, together with plaintiff [respondent], as
godparents to a child of common friend; and

(ii) That the Law Firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas, for and in behalf of
their client Mr. Hernando Balmores, wrote defendant Villamor [petitioner] on a
purported claim which appears to be the very same claims asserted by plaintiff
[respondent].12

Judge Manalastas issued Omnibus Order13 dated October 17, 2005, which denied, among
others, the Motions for Inhibition, thus:

The allegations of defendant-movant [petitioner] in seeking inhibition of the presiding Judge

fall short of the proof required to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake
her noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear and favor.

On November 7, 2005, the petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his Motions for Inhibition. 14

The petitioner claimed that Judge Manalastas's resolutions,15 not pertaining to his Motions
for Inhibition, were not included in the Petition for Certiorari as they were the subject of a
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Lift Order of Default (MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order)16 filed with the RTC on November 3, 2005.

On November 16, 2005, the CA issued a resolution requiring respondent to comment on the
petition. The respondent filed his comment on December 14, 2005. 17

The parties, however, had already filed with the CA the following manifestations and
motions before the issuance of the November 16, 2005 resolution:

1. On November 11, 2005, the respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to

Dismiss Petition on the ground of forum shopping, pointing out the pendency of the
 MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed by the petitioner with the RTC assailing
Judge Manalastas's Omnibus Order.

2. The petitioner filed his comment in opposition to the Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss Petition. He argued that the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order did not
include the subject matter of the Petition for Certiorari, i.e., the refusal of Judge
Manalastas to inhibit from hearing the civil case.18

3. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Inhibition of Presiding
Judge on Account of Institution of Administrative Case (Motion for Inhibition on
Account of Administrative Case)19 on November 12, 2005, on the basis of an
Administrative Complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure and for Bias
and Partiality (administrative complaint)20 filed with this Court through the Office of
the Court Administrator on November 11, 2005. In this regard, the petitioner filed
with the CA a Manifestation of Filing of Administrative Complaint for Gross Ignorance
of the Law or Procedure and for Bias and Partiality on November 14, 2005.

Subsequently, on November 18, 2005, the respondent filed a Supplemental

Manifestation/Motion to Dismiss Petition (reiterating his claim that the petitioner engaged in
forum shopping and praying for the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari) since Judge
Manalastas 's inhibition had also been raised as an issue in the Motion for Inhibition on
Account of Administrative Case filed with the RTC.

The petitioner later filed with the CA a Manifestation dated November 22, 2005, to the effect
that in view of his filing of an administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas, he filed
with the RTC a Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.

On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed another Manifestation with the CA stating that he
had filed an administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas with the Office of the Court
Administrator.

The CA Resolution21

The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of forum shopping. It noted that contrary to
the petitioner's claim, the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order prayed that the entire
Omnibus Order be reconsidered and set aside without excluding the issue of Judge
Manalastas' s inhibition. Moreover, the petitioner later filed with the RTC the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. The CA observed that the administrative case
referred to by the petitioner in support of the motion was based on the very same grounds
he raised in his previous motions for inhibition.

The CA also found that the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA and the pending motions
in the R TC prayed for the same relief; this, to the CA, was a plain and simple case of forum
shopping. The dispositive portion of the CA resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the private respondent's motion and supplemental

motion to dismiss the petition are GRANTED.

The instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 The Petition

The petitioner seeks the reversal of the CA resolution on the following grounds:

1. "THE COURT OF APPEALS, BY ITS RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 31, 2006, xxx
HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS, WHEN IT ACTED UPON MOTIONS TO DISMISS FILED, WITHOUT
LEAVE OF COURT, BY RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 5, RULE 46, AND ITS
OWN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 16, 2005 REQUIRING PETITIONER [sic] TO
FILE A COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND NOT A MOTION TO DISMISS, AND
THEREAFTER, DISMISSING THE PETITION IN CA-G.R. S.P. NO. 91940 ON THE
GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING; AND

2. "THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS, BY ITS RESOLUTION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED

HEREIN, SANCTIONED THE DEPARTURE BY THE TRIAL COURT, MORE PARTICULARLY
ITS PRESIDING JUDGE AMELIA C. MANALASTAS, FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF INHIBITION, SO AS TO
CALL FOR THE EXERCISE BY THIS HONORABLE COURT OF ITS POWER OF
SUPERVISION OVER THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT."22

Respondent's Comment23

The respondent raises the sole issue of whether the petitioner engaged in forum shopping.

The respondent argues that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping when he availed of
three separate remedies, namely: (1) the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order filed with the
RTC; (2) the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA; and (3) the Motion for Inhibition on
Account of Administrative Case, also filed with the RTC; praying for the same relief, i.e., the
inhibition of Judge Manalastas from hearing the case.

The respondent asserts that a party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails
of several judicial remedies in different courts all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially
the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other' court. 24

Petitioner's Reply25

The petitioner reiterates in his reply all the arguments he raised in the petition.

Additionally, he wants this Court to rule on the propriety of Judge Manalastas's refusal to
inhibit herself from hearing the RTC case. He points out that considerable time has already
elapsed, and to serve the ends of justice, the controversy must finally and totally be laid to
rest.26 Issues

Two issues thus arise for this Court' resolution:

I. Whether the petitioner engaged in forum shopping; and

II. Whether Judge Manalastas's decision to continue hearing the civil case was
improper.
 Our Ruling

The petition is without merit.

We rule that (1) the petitioner engaged in forum shopping, and (2) Judge Manalastas's
decision to continue hearing the civil case is not improper.

The Petitioner Engaged in Forum Shopping

As a rule, forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse

judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court other than by appeal or the
special civil action of certiorari. Conceptually, forum shopping is the institution of two or
more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the
courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs.27

Forum shopping also exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means
other than an appeal or certiorari.28

There is likewise forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. 29

Litis pendentia is a Latin term meaning "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some
decisions as !is pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is
based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.30

There is litis pendentia when the following requisites are present: identity of the parties in
the two actions; substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the
parties; and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that
may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.31

Otherwise stated, the test is whether the two (or more) pending cases have identity of
parties, of rights or causes of action, and of the reliefs sought. Willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt.32

Appeals and petitions for certiorari are normally outside the scope of forum shopping
because of their nature and purpose; they grant a litigant the remedy of elevating his case
to a superior court for review.

It is assumed, however, that the filing of the appeal or petition for certiorari is properly or
regularly invoked in the usual course of judicial proceedings, and not when the relief sought,
through a petition for certiorari or appeal, is still pending with or has yet to be decided by
the respondent court or court of origin, tribunal, or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
authority, e.g., a still pending motion for reconsideration of the order assailed via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.33
 Forum Shopping at the Court of Appeals

We agree with the CA that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping.

At the time the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA, the RTC had yet to
resolve the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order earlier filed with the RTC.34

The petitioner took pains to explain that the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order did not
include Judge Manalastas' s denial of his Motions for Inhibition.

The petitioner fails to convince us of the merits of this claim.

Although the arguments supporting the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order pertained solely
to the issue of declaration of default, the prayer was direct and plain.

It read:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the Omnibus Order dated
October 17, 2005, be RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE, and that defendant Villamor's
Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005, and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated
February 18, 2005, BE GRANTED. It is further prayed that the order of default issued
against Villamor be lifted or set aside.35

The petitioner prayed that the Omnibus Order be reconsidered and set aside, period. He did
not pray that it be partially reconsidered and set aside only insofar as the order of default
was concerned. With respect to the "order of default," the petitioner further prayed that this
order "be lifted or set aside," thus implying that the petitioner asked for more than the
lifting of this order. Notably, the motion's preliminary statements were also unambiguous.
The petitioner stated in clear terms that he was moving for the reconsideration of the
Omnibus Order; again, without qualification. Nowhere in the preliminary statements did the
petitioner indicate that he was only moving for a partial reconsideration of the Omnibus
Order.

The petitioner's failure to state in unequivocal terms that he was only moving for the partial
reconsideration of the Omnibus Order may or may not have been intentional.1awp++i1 But,
regardless of the petitioner's intention, the result is the same: the motion prayed for the
reversal and setting aside of the Omnibus Order in its entirety. For all intents and purposes,
the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order necessarily included the relief also prayed for in the
Petition for Certiorari. Even if we accept the petitioner's explanation that the MR with Motion
to Lift Default Order did not raise the issue of Judge Manalastas's inhibition, and that it was
meant to be a partial reconsideration of the Omnibus Order, the petitioner still cannot deny
that he engaged in forum shopping.

We find it undisputed that during the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari in the CA and
the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order in the RTC, the petitioner filed with the RTC his
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.

The petitioner's claim that he did not engage in forum shopping completely crumbles when
this new Motion is considered. Three remedies were then pending in two separate tribunals,
all praying for the same relief: the inhibition of Judge Manalastas.
First, the Petition for Certiorari, prayed among others, that

xxx after proceedings duly had, render judgment:

(i) ANNULLING the Omnibus Order dated October 17, 2005 insofar as public
respondent judge therein denied petitioner's Motion For Inhibition dated March 1.
2005, Supplemental Motion For Inhibition dared April 12, 2005 and Second
Supplemental Motion For Inhibition dated June 21, 2005;

(ii) ORDERING the inhibition of public respondent judge in Civil Case No. 70251 xxx 36

Second, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case prayed:

WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Honorable Presiding Judge inhibit herself from further
proceeding with the instant case.37

Third (and as already explained), the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order prayed that Judge
Manalastas set aside the Omnibus Order in its entirety, which would logically result in her
inhibition from hearing the case.

The petitioner, however, insists that the filing of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case was the necessary consequence of the administrative complaint. The
petitioner argues that the pendency of the administrative complaint should result in Judge
Manalastas' s inhibition.38

He asserts that the basis of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case was
Judge Manalastas's gross ignorance of the law, and bias and partiality while the basis of the
Motions for Inhibitions -denied by Judge Manalastas and later the subject of the Omnibus
Order elevated to the CA through the Petition for Certiorari - was Judge Manalastas' s grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to inhibit from hearing the civil case because of bias and
prejudice.

The petitioner argues that the grounds relied upon in the Petition for Certiorari were
different and distinct from those in support of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case.39 In sum, the petitioner claims that the remedies were based on
different grounds and that they should not be treated as praying for the same relief.

We do not find the petitioner's position persuasive.

A perusal of the administrative complaint40 would show that the petitioner raised, as one of
the grounds for imputing gross ignorance of the law to Judge Manalastas, her refusal to
inhibit. In fact, the petitioner copied the allegations from the Motions for Inhibitions and
generally pasted them on the administrative complaint.41

Glaringly, the petitioner used the same ground to support the Petition for Certiorari and the
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case. As earlier stated, the petitioner
likewise prayed for the same relief in both of these remedies.

These only lead to one inevitable conclusion: the petitioner engaged in forum shopping by
simultaneously raising the same issues in different tribunals, relying on the same ground
founded on the same facts, hoping that both or either court would grant his prayer.
Further, in anticipation of an adverse ruling in the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order, the
petitioner, without waiting for Judge Manalastas's resolution, filed the Petition for Certiorari
with the CA hoping to obtain a favorable ruling.

To reiterate, the petitioner filed the Petition for Certiorari while the MR with Motion to Lift
Default Order was pending. This violates Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the availability of a remedy in the ordinary course of law precludes the filing of
a petition for certiorari; under this rule, the petition's dismissal is the necessary
consequence if recourse to Rule 65 is prematurely taken.42

Had the petitioner waited for the resolution of the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order, the
Petition for Certiorari would have been regularly and properly invoked in the usual course of
judicial proceedings and should not have been dismissed by the CA.

In fact, if the CA had strictly applied Rule 65, it could have summarily dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari on another ground in addition to forum shopping.

One of the essential requisites of a petition for certiorari is that there is neither appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose
annulling or modifying the questioned proceeding.43

There was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to annul or modify the Omnibus Order.
The petitioner should have expressly included in the MR with Motion to Lift Default Order the
denial of his Motions for Inhibition so that Judge Manalastas could have properly
reconsidered her Omnibus Order in its entirety.

In the end, it was the petitioner's precipitate resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
that was his own undoing.

Farum Shopping in this Court

The petitioner likewise committed forum shopping when he submitted for this Court's
resolution an issue still pending with the RTC.

We do not know if the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case was still
pending with or had been resolved by the RTC when the petitioner filed the present petition.
The petitioner kept silent on its status, in violation of his commitment under the Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping he had filed.44

What we know is that the administrative complaint, the basis of the said motion, was still
pending when the present petition was filed.45

To recap, the petitioner anchored his administrative complaint on Judge Manalastas's gross
ignorance of the law. Among the grounds relied upon was Judge Manalastas's bias and
partiality, the same ground used in the Motions for Inhibition, which later became the
subject of the Petition for Certiorari (the CA's resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
is now subject of the present petition). The petitioner subsequently filed with the RTC the
Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case.
The series of events shows that the petitioner filed the present petition when the
administrative complaint, and very likely, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of
Administrative Case were both pending.

Again, the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case and the present petition
prayed for the same relief.1âwphi1

We note that the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case prays "that the
Honorable Presiding Judge inhibit herself from Further proceeding with the instant case,"46

while. the present petition prays that –

xxx (b) after proceeding duly had, render judgment:

(i) SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated January 31, 2006 x x x of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 91940 ...

(ii) ORDERING the inhibition of Presiding Judge Amelia C. Manalastas of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 268, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 70251 xxx47

Plainly, the petitioner, in an attempt to increase the chances of preventing Judge Manalastas
from hearing the case, successively filed the administrative complaint, the Motion for
Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case, and the present action.

Significantly, this Court's First Division in its Resolution 48 dated July 5, 2006, dismissed the
administrative complaint against Judge Manalastas.

With respect to the petitioner's claim that Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit herself from
hearing the civil case constitutes gross ignorance of the law, we emphasize that judges
must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external sources or factors; they
should not be subject to intimidation or to the fear of civil, criminal, or administrative
sanctions for acts they do and dispositions they make in the performance of their duties and
functions.

Try as the petitioner might to characterize and label these remedies as separate,
independent, and distinct from each other, the unavoidable reality is that their ultimate aim
is the same, they involve the same parties, and they rely on the same grounds. In short, all
the badges of forum shopping are present.

In Montes v. Court of Appeals,49 we found that the petitioner therein engaged in forum
shopping when he filed with this Court a petition for prohibition while his motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition for certiorari was still pending in the CA.
Although the purpose of a petition for prohibition is different from that of a petition for
certiorari, we ruled that there was forum shopping because the reliefs sought were the
same - to restrain a government official from implementing the same order.

In like manner, it does not matter that the apparent purpose of the administrative complaint
(the source of the Motion for Inhibition on Account of Administrative Case) is distinct from
that of the Petition for Certiorari (the source of the present petition). The controlling
consideration i s that they are both geared towards achieving the same goal: the inhibition
of Judge Manalastas from hearing the civil case.
The petitioner cannot hide under the cloak of characterization and labels to escape from the
consequences of his actions.1âwphi1 If we allow this, the evil sought to be prevented by the
rule against forum shopping would result.

We remind the petitioner and his lawyer that forum shopping constitutes abuse of court
processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, to wreak havoc upon
orderly juridical procedure, and to add to the congestion of the already burdened dockets of
the courts.50

Further, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to foster candor and transparency
between lawyers and their clients in appearing before the courts – to promote the orderly
administration of justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the
precious time of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing possibility of two or
more courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same
issue.51

Judge Manalastas's Decision

to Continue Hearing the Case
was Not Improper

Although we hold that the petitioner engaged in forum shopping for reasons already
explained, we nevertheless consider the issue of Judge Manalastas's refusal to inhibit from
hearing the case to finally settle the matter.

First, Judge Manalastas's inhibition from the civil case is discretionary. The grounds relied
upon by the petitioner do not fall under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13 7 of the
Rules of Court which enumerates the grounds for compulsory inhibition. We have held that
the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge based on his or her rational and logical assessment of the case. 52

Second, bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence, to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role
to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.53 Nothing on record
shows that the petitioner ever submitted evidence of bias and prejudice.

Villamor's claims that Judge Manalastas's impartiality was allegedly compromised because
(1) she and the respondent stood as godparents to a child of a common friend, and (2) that
her husband was a partner of a law firm which represented a client whose claim against the
petitioner was similar to the respondent's, do not suffice to overthrow the presumption that
Judge Manalastas will dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear or favor.
Because this act is discretionary, Judge Manalastas is in the best position to determine
whether or not there was a need to inhibit from the case; thus, her decision to hear the
case, in the higher interest of justice, equity, and public interest, should be respected.

While a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent in handling the case, this
right must be weighed with her duty to decide cases without fear or pressure. 54

In these lights, we see no reason to reverse Judge Manalastas's decision to proceed with
hearing the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the January 31, 2006
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 91940.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 3-75. The petition is filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2
Id. at 79-82. The resolution was penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and
concurred in by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong and Associate Justice
Lucenito N. Tagle.

3
Id. at 83-103. The complaint filed on January 13, 2005, was docketed as Civil Case
No. 70251.

4
Id. at 613. The respondent died during the pendency of the present petition and
was substituted by his wife, Clarissa Victoria Umale. This Court in a resolution dated
September 20, 2006, granted the motion for substitution of Leonardo S. Umale by
his wife.

5
The other defendants were Banco de Oro Main Branch, Banco de Oro Greenhills LS
Branch, and John Does.
6
Rollo, p. 102.

7
Id. at 4. This claim is neither supported by any document on record nor disputed by
the respondent.

8
Id. at 5.

9
Id. at 145-148.

10
Id. at 149-150.

11
Id. at 158-163.

12
Signatory to the said letter was Jesus M. Manalastas, husband of Judge
Manalastas, and a partner in the Law Firm of Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas.

13
Id. at 168-171.

14
Id. at 172-207. Filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

15
Id. at 14. These include the declaration of petitioner in default and the matter of
jurisdiction vis-a-vis payment of the correct amount of docket and filing fees and
other grounds raised in the petitioner's (defendant therein) Motion to Dismiss dated
February 18, 2005, and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss dated February 18, 2005.

16
Id. at 208-222.

17
Supra note 2 at 79.

18
Ibid.

19
Id. at 289-291.

20
Id. at 292-338.

21
Supra note 2.

22
Supra note I at 18-19.

23
Rollo, pp. 375-397. On February 22, 2006, we issued our resolution requiring
respondents to file their comment on the petition. Only respondent Umale, as
substituted by his wife, filed a comment.

24
Id. at 384. Citation omitted.

25
Id. at 490-544. On June 5, 2006, we issued a resolution requiring the petitioner to
reply to the respondent's comment.

26
Id. at 518-519. Citation omitted.
27
Young v. John Keng Seng, G.R. No. 143464, March 5, 2003, 446 Phil. 823, 832.

28
Benavidez v. Salvador, G.R. No. 173331, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 238, 248.
Citation omitted.

29
Ibid.

30
Ibid.

31
Id.

32
Madara v. Perello, 584 Phil. 613, 629-630 (2008).

33
Id. Emphasis supplied.

34
The Petition for Certiorari was filed on November 7, 2005, while the MR with
Motion to Lift Default Order was filed on November 3, 2005.

35
Supra note 16 at 220. Emphasis supplied.

36
Rollo, p. 204. Emphasis supplied.

37
Id. at 290. Emphasis supplied.

38
Ibid.

39
Id. at 239.

40
Id. at 292-338.

41
Supra note 20.

42
Supra note 35.

43
Rule 65, Section 1, RULES OF COURT.

44
Supra note 1 at 75. A certification against forum shopping is a requirement
provided under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which reads as follows:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party

shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting
a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
 Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

45
The present petition was filed on February 13, 2006, while the resolution on the
administrative complaint was issued only on July 5, 2006.

46
Supra note 38. Emphasis supplied.

47
Supra note 1 at 73-74. Emphasis supplied.

48
Id. at 583-587.

49
G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 523 Phil. 98, 106-107.

50
Wee v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004, 479 Phil. 737, 750. Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied.

51
Ibid. Emphasis supplied.

52
Santos v. lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006, 531 Phil. 239, 250.

53
Arroyo v. DOJ, G.R. Nos. 199082, 199085, 199118, September 18, 2012, 681
SCRA 181, 242-243. Citation omitted.

54
Ibid.