PBCOM VS.
LIM AND CALDERON On appeal, the CA ruled that respondents’ alleged debt was based on the
GR. No. 158138
April 12, 2005
FACTS: PBCom filed a complaint against respondents in the RTC
of Manila for the collection of a deficiency. Petitioner alleged therein that
respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety
agreement in favor of petitioner for all loans, credits, etc that were extended
or may be extended in the future to respondents. Petitioner granted a
renewal of said loan upon respondent’s request. It was expressly stipulated
threrein that the venue for any legal action that may arise out of said
promissory note shall be Makati City, “to the exclusion of all other
courts…” Respondents allegedly failed to pay said obligation upon maturity.
Thus, petitioner foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by
respondents, leaving a deficiency balance.
Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper
venue, invoking the stipulation contained in the last paragraph of the
promissory note with respect to the restrictive/exclusive venue.
The trial court denied said motion asseverating that petitioner
had separate causes of action arising from the promissory note and the
continuing surety agreement. Thus, [under] Rule 4, Section 2, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, x x x venue was properly laid in
Manila. An MR of said order was likewise denied.
Promissory Note, which had provided an exclusionary stipulation on venue
“to the exclusion of all other courts.” The parties’ Surety Agreement, though
silent as to venue, was an accessory contract that should have been
interpreted in consonance with the Promissory Note. Hence, this Petition
ISSUE: WON the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on
venue stipulated in the PN
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED.
YES; Since the cases pertaining to both causes of action are restricted to
Makati City as the proper venue, petitioner cannot rely on Section 5 of Rule
2 of the Rules of Court.
**
Section 2 of Rule 4 of the ROC provides that personal actions must be
commenced and tried
(1) in the place where the plaintiff resides, or
(2) where the defendant resides, or
(3) in case of non-resident defendants, where they may be found, at the
choice of the plaintiff.
This rule on venue does not apply when the law specifically provides
otherwise, or when — before the filing of the action — the contracting
parties agree in writing on the exclusive venue thereof. Venue is not
jurisdictional and may be waived by the parties. A stipulation as to venue
does not preclude the filing of the action in other places, unless qualifying or
restrictive words are used in the agreement.
**
In enforcing a surety contract, the “complementary-contracts-construed-
together” doctrine finds application. According to this principle, an accessory
contract must be read in its entirety and together with the principal
agreement[ This principle is used in construing contractual stipulations in
order to arrive at their true meaning; certain stipulations cannot be
segregated and then made to control. This no-segregation principle is based
on Article 1374 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
“Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from
all of them taken jointly.”
The aforementioned doctrine is applicable to the present case. Incapable of
standing by itself, the SA can be enforced only in conjunction with the PN.
The latter documents the debt that is sought to be collected in the action
against the sureties. The circumstances that related to the issuance of the
PN and the SA are so intertwined that neither one could be separated from
the other. It makes no sense to argue that the parties to the SA were not
bound by the stipulations in the PN.
NOTES:
A cause of action is a party’s act or omission that violates the rights of the
other. Only one suit may be commenced for a single cause of action. If two
or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only
one case should remain and the others must be dismissed.
CRISOLOGO-JOSE VS. LBP
GR. 167399
June 22, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of hectares of land which used to form part
of a larger expanse situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by a TCT.
She is also the owner of several parcels of land situated in the same
municipality and covered by 12 separate titles. According to the petitioner,
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) gave these landholdings –
which she inherited from her uncle Lim – a measly valuation of P9,000.00
per hectare (regarding implementation of the agrarian reform program which
partakes of the exercise of the power of eminent domain)
Excepting from the valuation purportedly thus given, petitioner filed, a
PETITION for determination of just compensation respecting her
landholdings aforementioned.
It appears that in the midst of petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the
trial court admitted LBP’s ANSWER.The trial court, after due proceedings,
rendered judgment fixing the fair market value of the land in question.
Following the denial of its MR, respondent LBP went on appeal to the CA.
Eventually, the CA reversed that of the trial court. In time, petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the CA denied her motion. Hence this petition for
review under Rule 45, on both procedural and substantive grounds.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in admitting respondent’s answer
HELD: The petition is without merit
NO
On the procedural angle, petitioner faults the appellate court for relying on
and lending credence to the allegations and defenses that respondent
averred in its answer which it filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed
under Section 1, Rule 11 of the ROC. Petitioner also blames the trial court
for admitting, instead of expunging from the records, said answer and for
not declaring the respondent in default.
To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court. In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules
authorizes the court to accept answer though filed late, thus:
SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such terms
as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these
Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be
filed after the time fixed by these Rules.
And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education
teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the
defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to the
plaintiff, as here. Indeed, petitioner has not demonstrated how the
admission by the trial court of respondent’s answer was prejudicial to her
case which, at bottom, involves only the determination of the fair market
value of her property.
Given Indiana Aerospace and other related cases cited therein virtually all of
which is one in saying that default orders should be avoided, petitioner’s
lament about the trial court not declaring the respondent in default for
alleged belated filing of answer should be denied cogency.
What is more, a declaration of default, if proper, shall not issue unless
the claiming party asked for it. As we said in Trajano vs. Cruz, applying
what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court “the court cannot motu
proprio declare a party in default.” In the words of Justice Regalado “there
must be a motion [for a declaration of default] by the plaintiff with proof of
failure by the defendant to file his responsive pleading despite due notice.”
Not lost on the Court, of course, is the fact that petitioner, after securing the
desired ruling from the trial court, never brought up the matter of
respondent’s belated filing of an answer before the CA. Needless to belabor,
issues not raised below cannot, as a rule, be raised for the first time before
the Court.
GSIS vs. Velasco and Molina
GR. No. 170463
Feb. 2, 2011
FACTS: Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave
misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days, for
their alleged participation in a demonstration held by GSIS employees. In a
letter, respondent Molina requested the GSIS Senior Vice President for the
implementation of his step increment. The SVP denied the request citing
GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner GSIS Board which
approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and
regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step
increment and promotion.
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee
privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle
benefits for all GSIS officials and employees. Respondents’ request was again
denied because of their pending administrative case.
Later, petitioner GSIS Board issued Resolution No. 197 approving the
following policy recommendations:
B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending
administrative case
To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall 1. 1. Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
be disqualified from the following during the pendency of the case: No. 03-108389 (lies with the CSC and not with the RTC of Manila,
Branch 19.

a) Promotion; 2. 2. Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS
Board or its President and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative

b) Step Increment; and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
xx
Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits.
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with
Petitioners point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 03-108389).
lack of jurisdiction.
Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS
employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197
and 372.
The trial court granted respondents’ petition for prohibition. Petitioners filed Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal,

an MR. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion, hence, this petition. corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
ISSUE:
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the SC or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person in the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the SC. It may also be
filed in the CA whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,
or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts
or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
CA. (Emphasis supplied)
Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the
trial court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and
306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said
resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over
respondents’ petition for prohibition.
1. Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the
wrong territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be prohibited
are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office in Pasay City,
while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.
Section 18 of BP 129 provides:
SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the
RTC shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes
of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether
civil or criminal, as well as determining the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs over
which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein
granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily
accessible to the people of the different parts of the region and making
attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis
supplied)
In line with this, the SC issued Administrative Order No. 3 defining the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region, as
follows:
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of
Manila only.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – RTCs shall exercise original
Quezon City only. jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo

c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any

City only. part of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of

xx Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig,

Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the
municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action
prohibition issued by the RTC sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in
which may be filed in the SC, the CA, the Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as the
Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of
case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title
respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the
to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be
action and the venue was properly laid before it.
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the
trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be
filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:

 Russel vs. Ebasan & Austria
G.R. No. 184542
April 23, 2010
FACTS: The petition stems from a complaint for forcible entry filed by
petitioner Russel against respondents Ebasan and Austria. The MTCC
of Iligan City heard the ejectment proceedings and rendered judgment on in
favor of petitioner. The trial court ordered respondents to vacate the property
involved and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.Prejudiced by the ruling,
respondents appealed to the RTC. The RTC, in its March 28, 2007 Decision,
reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007. Inclined
to appeal the adverse ruling to the CA, petitioner, on April 20, 2007, filed a
motion for an extension of 15 days from the expiry of the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for review. Petitioner attached to her motion
postal money orders representing the filing and docket fees. She
consequently filed via registered mail her petition for review with the
appellate court on May 15, 2007.
In the assailed June 18, 2007 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal on
the following grounds:
1. The petition is filed out of time, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 42. Even if
petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review were
granted, the Petition would have still been filed 6 days late from the
requested extension of time.
2. There is no Written Explanation why the Petition was filed by mail
instead of the preferred mode of personal filing, as is required under Sec. 11,
Rule 13.
3. The Verification and Certification page is defective, since there is no
statement and therefore no assurance that the allegations in the Petition are
based on authentic records, in violation of Sec. 4, Rule 7.
4. Pertinent documents such as the Complaint and Answer filed before
the MTCC, which are material portions of the record referred to in the
Petition are not attached, in violation of Sec. 2(d), Rule 42.
Petitioner received her copy of the June 18, 2007 Resolution on July 18,
2007. On July 27, 2007, petitioner filed by registered mail her MR and
admission of her amended petition. She pointed out in her motion that the
petition was filed within the extended reglementary period. She also
explained that her office clerk inadvertently failed to attach the page
containing the explanation why filing by registered mail was resorted to.
Petitioner also begged the appellate court’s indulgence to accept the
verification because only the phrase “based on authentic records” was
missing in the same. She claimed that this was merely a formal requisite
which does not affect the validity or efficacy of the pleading. She then
pleaded for liberality in the application of the rules of procedure and for the
consequent admission of her amended petition containing the written
explanation, the corrected verification, and the certified true copies of the
complaint and the answer filed before the trial court.
The appellate court, however, in the assailed August 26, 2008
Resolution, denied petitioner’s motion. It ruled that the MR was filed only on
October 4, 2007, or 63 days after the expiry of the reglementary period for
the filing thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to this
Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
instant case is REMANDED to the CA for disposition on the merits.
YES; Petitioner’s petition for review (under Rule 42) and MR before the
appellate court were filed well within the reglementary period for the filing
thereof.
It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision
on April 13, 2007. Following the ROC, she had 15 days or until April 28,
2007 to file her petition for review before the CA. Section 1 of Rule 42
provides:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the CA, via registered mail, her
motion for extension of time to file the petition for review. She pleaded in her
motion that she be granted an additional 15 days, counted from the expiry
of the reglementary period. Petitioner likewise attached to her motion postal
money orders representing the docket fees.
Fifteen days from April 28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however,
a Sunday. May 14, 2007, the following day, was a legal holiday—the holding
of the national and local elections. Section 1 of Rule 22 states:
Sec. 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until
the next working day.
Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate
court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the extended period for the
filing thereof.
Petitioner’s MR was likewise filed on time. She received a copy of the June
18, 2007 CA Resolution on July 18, 2007. Under Section 1 of Rule 52, she
had 15 days from notice, or until August 2, 2007, to file an MR. Petitioner
filed by registered mail her MR on July 27, 2007. The fact of mailing on the
said date is proven by the registry return receipt, the affidavit of service, and
the certification of the Office of the Postmaster of Iligan City. Section 3,
Rule 13 of the ROC provides that if a pleading is filed by registered
mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of
filing. It does not matter when the court actually receives the mailed
pleading. Thus, in this case, as the pleading was filed by registered mail on
July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is inconsequential that the
CA actually received the motion in October of that year.
As to the CA’s dismissal of the petition for review on the ground that
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation for non-personal filing, the
Court finds the same improper. Iligan City, where petitioner resides and
where her counsel holds office, and Cagayan de Oro City, where the
concerned division of the CA is stationed, are separated by a considerable
distance. The CA, in the exercise of its discretion, should have realized that
it was indeed impracticable for petitioner to personally file the petition for
review in Cagayan De Oro City. Given the obvious time, effort and expense
that would have been spent in the personal filing of the pleadings in this
case, the written explanation why service had not been done personally, as rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
required by Section 11 of Rule 13, may be considered as superfluous. of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice

Relative to the defective verification, the Court excuses the same. The must always be avoided. It is a far better and wiser course of action for the

purpose of the verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in Court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a conscientious

the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not review of the case in order to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose

merely speculative. The requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of it on a technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false

of pleadings and non-compliance therewith is neither jurisdictional nor does impression of speedy disposal of cases which actually results in more delay,

it render the pleading fatally defective. Here, the perceived defect is if not in an outright miscarriage of justice

excusable and does not justify a dismissal of the petition. In any case,
petitioner, in her subsequent pleading, submitted a corrected verification. Sheker vs. Sheker
The same degree of liberality should apply to petitioner’s failure to attach a G.R. No. 157912
copy of the complaint and answer filed before the MTCC in her petition for December 13, 2007
review. After all, petitioner substantially complied with the requirement FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of
when she filed her amended petition. Alice Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their
respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner

In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. filed on a contingent claim for agent’s commission due him in the event of

The appellate court should have been more prudent in computing the the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and

reglementary period for the filing of petitions. The CA could have been more reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in

liberal in the application of the Rules considering that, in this case, the the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

MTCC and the RTC arrived at conflicting rulings, necessitating a thorough The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker (MEDINA) moved for the

review of the merits of the case. This is in keeping with the principle that dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written
explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
The RTC-Iligan City issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice
the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner’s
MR was denied.Petitioner then filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping,
a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC
provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special
proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
[The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although
directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the ROC]-
note lang^^
ISSUE:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a
certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be
dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate
proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its
filing thereat?
(a) must THE contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding
be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on the
service and filing by registered mail?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the RTC
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby DIRECTED to give
due course and take appropriate action on petitioner’s money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the ROC.
It must be emphasized that petitioner’s contention that rules in ordinary
actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not
entirely correct. Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same ROC provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. – In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the ROC govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable
of being put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the
absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose
an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the ROC does it categorically
say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to
special proceedings. Provisions of the ROC requiring a certification of non-
forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing
fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct
probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such
as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
— remedy.xx
(a) NO; The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated
upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent’s
will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting
letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be
barred, subject to certain exceptions.
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors’ claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a
material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in
which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or
remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause.
It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the
action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent’s estate; more so if the claim is contingent since
the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent
claim. Hence, herein petitioner‘s contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum
shopping.
(b) NO; On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals[ that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney’s fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
ROC, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction
over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment
of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds
for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
(c) NO; With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v.
De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay is squarely in point. Therein, the Court
held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon
Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such
should expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper;
and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if
service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some
lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than
ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice
from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or
other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating
before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of
adjective rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of
Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or
paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not
resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal
service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for
Section 11 itself begins with the clause “whenever practicable”.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the
general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in
the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or
filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable
may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by
a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a
court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case
or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City,
while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial
notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus,
following Medina v. Court of Appeals. the failure of petitioner to submit a
written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion
under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in
the interest of substantial justice.
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on
the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in
the interest of substantial justice.
FERRER vs. VILLANUEVA et al
G.R. No. 155025
August 24, 2007
FACTS: Ferrer is the president and GM of Odin Security Agency, Inc. (Odin),
a private corporation engaged in providing security and watchman services.
Sometime in August 1999, Odin was one of the bidders for the PICC security
services.
Later, the Prequalification, Bidding and Awards Committee (PBAC) of the
PICC disqualified Odin from further participating in the bidding due to the
results of a survey among its clients showing that it has not rendered a “very
satisfactory performance.”Petitioner sought reconsideration of the PBAC
ruling and requested that he be furnished the names of the
informants. However, the PBAC refused to divulge their names on the
ground of confidentiality.
Petitioner then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 6713 against the members of the PBAC of the PICC. The
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of substantial evidence.
Petitioner filed an MR, but was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (RULE 65) with the CA, but it was
dismissed, thus:
There being no proof of service on the private respondents and the agency a
quo as required under Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and as the petition is not accompanied with copies of all pleadings (such as
Joint Counter-Affidavit) and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. xx
Petitioner timely filed an MR but the CA denied the same, thus: x x x
An examination of the records shows that even in the said motion, petitioner
still failed to attach the required affidavit of service of the petition. What was
attached only was the affidavit of service of the motion . Further, the petition
is still fatally flawed because other relevant and pertinent documents, such
as the joint counter-affidavit, were not appended to the motion as required
under par. 3, Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
xx
Hence, the instant petition for Review on Certiorari (RULE 45)
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for CERTIORARI for
petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
NO
Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 13. Proof of service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place,
and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall
consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with
section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be
made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by
the sender,or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
There is no question that petitioner herein was remiss in complying with the
foregoing Rule. In Cruz v. Court of Appeals we ruled that with respect to
motions, proof of service is a mandatory requirement. We find no cogent
reason why this dictum should not apply and with more reason to a petition
for certiorari, in view of Section 3, Rule 46 which requires that the petition
shall be filed “together with proof of service thereof.”
In the instant case, we find no persuasive reason to relax the Rule.
Moreover, even if we do so, petitioner’s failure to attach the material and
relevant documents to his petition filed with the CA is a sufficient ground to
dismiss it. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 65 of the same Rules
clearly states:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari. – x x x
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order, or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings
and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
The foregoing Rule should be read in relation with Section 3, Rule 46, thus:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements.- xx
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of
service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the
court indicated as such by the petitioner, andshall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of
the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto. x x x
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.
Petitioner should have attached to his petition material portions of the
record, such as the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents herein and other
supporting documents. For without those supporting documents,
petitioner’s allegations in his petition in are nothing but bare allegations.
Verily, we sustain the questioned Resolutions of the CA.
NOTES: Republic Act No. 6713–February 20, 1989– AN ACT ESTABLISHING
A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING
INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING
PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.) INC., vs. CA and VINLUAN
G.R. No. 99434
September 24, 1991
FACTS: The petitioner is questioning the resolution issued by the
respondent court on March 12, 1991, reading as follows:
Considering that the copy of the resolution dated November 29, 1990
served upon counsel for respondent [herein petitioner] was returned
unclaimed … and afterwards the same copy sent to the private respondent
itself … was likewise returned unclaimed … the Court RESOLVED to
DECLARE service of the said resolution upon the private
respondent complete … pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court.
The private respondent submits that the petitioner was correctly deemed to
have been properly served with the copy of the resolution dated November
29, 1990, after its counsel failed to claim his mail from the post office within
5 days from the date of the first registry notice. Under Section 8, of Rule 13
of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 8. Completeness of service. — Personal service is complete upon delivery
Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after
mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his
mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of
the postmaster, service shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner had been duly served
with a copy of the questioned resolution despite the lack of sufficient
evidence to support this conclusion
HELD: Accordingly, its resolutions dated March 12, 1991… are SET ASIDE
. The respondent court is ordered to properly serve on the petitioner its
resolution dated November 29, 1990.
YES
The general rule is that service by registered mail is complete upon actual
receipt thereof by the addressee. The exception is where the addressee does
not claim his mail within 5 days from the date of the first notice of the
postmaster, in which case the service takes effect upon the expiration of
such period.
Inasmuch as the exception refers to only constructive and not actual service,
such exception must be applied only upon conclusive proof that a first
notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. The
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable
where there is evidence to the contrary, as in the case at bar.
There is nothing in the records of the present case showing how, when and
to whom the delivery of the registry notices of the subject registered mail of
petitioner was made and whether said notices were received by the
petitioner. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail merely bore the
notation “RETURN TO SENDER: UNCLAIMED” on the face thereof and
“Return to: Court of Appeals” at the back. The respondent court should not
have relied on these notations to support the presumption of constructive
service.
A certification from the postmaster would be the best evidence to prove that
the notice has been validly sent. The postmaster should certify not only that
the notice was issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the
delivery thereof was made.
SANSIO PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES MOGOL
G.R. No. 177007
July 14, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. is a domestic corporation that is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling appliances and other
related products.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against
respondent spouses Mogol before the MeTC of Manila. At the request of
herein petitioner, the process server of the MeTC of Manila served the
summons and the copy of the complaint on respondent spouses Mogol at
the courtroom of the MeTC. Respondent spouses were in the said
premises, as they were waiting for the scheduled hearing of the criminal
cases filed by petitioner against respondent Alicia for violations of BP 22.
Upon being so informed of the summons and the complaint, respondent
spouses Mogol referred the same to their counsel, who was also present in
the courtroom. The counsel of respondent spouses Mogol took hold of the
summons and the copy of the complaint and read the same. Thereafter, he
pointed out to the process server that the summons and the copy of the
complaint should be served only at the address that was stated in both
documents, i.e., at Lucena City, and not anywhere else. The counsel of
respondent spouses Mogol apparently gave back the summons and the copy
of the complaint to the process server and advised his clients not to obtain a
copy and sign for the same. As the process server could not convince the
respondent spouses Mogol to sign for the aforementioned documents, he
proceeded to leave the premises of the courtroom.
The process server of the MeTC of Manila issued a Return on Service of
Summons, declaring that:
RETURN ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS
This is to certify that on October 3, 2000, the undersigned tried to serve a
copy of the Summons issued by the Court .. together with a copy of
Complaint upon defendant Leodegario .. and Alicia Mogol .. as requested by
plaintiff counsel, but failed for the reason that they refused to received (sic)
with no valid reason at all.
The original and duplicate copies of the Summons are hereby respectfully
returned, (sic) UNSERVED. xx
Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default. Petitioner
averred that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already
validly served upon the respondent spouses Mogol at the courtroom of the
MeTC. From the date of said service up to the time of the filing of the above-
stated motion, respondent spouses Mogol had yet to file any responsive
pleading.
Through a special appearance of their counsel, respondent spouses Mogol
filed an Opposition to the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default.
Respondent spouses Mogol averred the service should have been effected at
the respondent spouses’ residential address, as stated in the summons and
the copy of the complaint.
The MeTC of Manila ruled that Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not
specify where service is to be effected.. Respondent spouses Mogol were,
thus, validly served with summons and a copy of the complaint. For failing
to file any responsive pleading before the lapse of the reglementary period
therefor, the Motion to Declare [Respondents] in Default filed by petitioner
was declared to be meritorious. Respondent spouses Mogol filed an MR on
the above Order, but the same was denied by the MeTC of Manila,
Respondent spouses filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or
Injunction before the RTC of Manila against Judge de Castro, Jr. of the
MeTC of Manila, and herein petitioner. Respondent spouses insisted there
was no valid service of summons per return of the process server, which was
binding on the MeTC judge, who did not acquire jurisdiction over the
persons of respondent spouses. They contended that the MeTC of Manila
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring them in default.
The RTC of Manila issued an Order dismissing the petition. It held that
Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not mandate that summons be served
strictly at the address provided by the plaintiff in the complaint. Contrarily,
said provision states that the service of summons may be made wherever
such is possible and practicable. Therefore, it did not matter much that the
summons and the copy of the complaint in this case were served inside the
courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24, instead of the address at
Lucena City. The primordial consideration was that the service of summons
was made in the person of the respondent spouses Mogol.
Respondent spouses Mogol filed a Notice of Appeal on the above-mentioned
Order of the RTC of Manila, which was given due course. The CA rendered
the assailed Decision, the relevant portions of which read: xx
We find the appeal meritorious.
After a careful perusal of the records, We hold that there was no valid
service of summons upon the [respondent] Mogol spouses … Perforce, the
MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over them. We explain. xx
Petitioner filed an MR thereon, but the same was denied by the CA in the
assailed Resolution
ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons to the respondent
spouses
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 is GRANTED
YES; A summon is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant
is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s
voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily
submit to the court’s jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of
summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in
personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a
court, and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may
be made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for
in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the ROC, which read:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is well-established that summons upon a respondent or a defendant must
be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to
receive it, by tendering it to him. The essence of personal service is the
handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself,
wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be, provided he is in
the Philippines.
In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of
summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. The act of the
counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the
copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients,
for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already
accomplished was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to
respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC of Manila.
That being said, the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of
returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server
was no longer material.
Section 6, Rule 14 of the ROC does not require that the service of summons
on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as
stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear
that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. Nothing more is required
Much more important than considerations of practicality, however, is the
fact that respondent spouses Mogol based their case on a wrong
appreciation of the above-stated provisions of the ROC. Respondent spouses
principally argue that Section 6 of Rule 14 cannot be singled out without
construing the same with Section 7. Axiomatically, Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
14 of the ROC cannot be construed to apply simultaneously. Said provisions
do not provide for alternative modes of service of summons, which can either
be resorted to on the mere basis of convenience to the parties. Under our
procedural rules, service of summons in the persons of the defendants is
generally preferred over substituted service.
As to the reliance of the CA on the second paragraph of the Return on
Service of Summons stating that the original and duplicate copies of the
Summons were returned “UNSERVED,” the Court finds the same utterly
misplaced. A simple reading of the first paragraph of the Return on Service
of Summons, which contains the circumstances surrounding the service of
the summons on the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol, manifestly
reveals that the summons and the copy of the complaint were already validly
served on the said respondents. They merely refused to receive or obtain a
copy of the same.
Although We find lamentable the apparently erroneous statement made by
the process server in the aforesaid second paragraph – an error that
undoubtedly added to the confusion of the parties to this case – the same
was, nonetheless, a mere conclusion of law, which does not bind the
independent judgment of the courts. Indeed, it cannot be said that because
of such a statement, respondent spouses Mogol had the right to rely on said
return informing them that the summons had been unserved, thus
justifying their non-filing of any responsive pleading.
The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be
such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the
service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are
satisfied and due process is served.
In fine, we rule that jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses
Mogol was validly acquired by the MeTC in this case. For their failure to file
any responsive pleading to the Complaint filed against them, in violation of
the order of the said court as stated in the summons, respondent spouses
Mogol were correctly declared in default.
PICZON vs. CA and Heirs of Rosario Piczon
G.R. Nos. 76378-81
September 24, 1990
FACTS: 4 Piczon brothers (one of them Esteban) ventured into the business
of manufacturing ice . As the business expanded, the brothers took in other
persons (including Alejandro) in order to raise the necessary capital.
The group in the informal partnership incorporated themselves and formed
Piczon and Company, Inc. the Articles of Incorporation was signed by the
incorporators, with Esteban Piczon, as attorney-in-fact, signing for and in
behalf of the “Piczon Brothers”.
When the AOI was presented to the SEC for registration, the Commission
refused to register it on the ground that “Piczon Brothers” could not qualify
as an incorporator because under the law only a natural person could be an
incorporator. Consequently, the Piczon brothers executed a power of
attorney appointing Esteban as their attorney-in-fact “. . . to actively take
part in the interest, business, direction, management and all that ought to
be done” in the Corporation.
Alejandro Piczon, who went to Manila to have the AOI registered, felt that he
was sufficiently authorized to erase and did in fact erase the words “Piczon
Brothers” and “Attorney-in-Fact”, and initialled the erasures. Thus, only the
name of Esteban Piczon appeared as one of the incorporators, together with
Alejandro Piczon et al.
After Esteban’s death, his widow Rosario filed a petition for the settlement of
the estate of her late husband and her appointment as administratrix.
Rosario submitted an inventory of the estate wherein she listed the subject
stock investment worth P65,944 as wholly part of her husband’s estate. The
inclusion of this investment was strongly opposed by the 3 brothers of the
deceased, who contended that they owned said investment in equal co-
ownership with their brother Esteban.
The CFI of Samar rendered a decision declaring the capital stock investment
to be of equal co-ownership among the estate of the late Esteban Piczon,and
his 3 brothers. Only 1/4 of said investment belongs to the estate of the
deceased Esteban Piczon. Consequently, Rosario appealed to the CA
On May 31, 1977, the CA rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the
trial court
[Petitioners herein, filed a motion for partial reconsideration while private
respondents, appellants therein, filed an MR. Both were denied by the CA.
Appellants filed their second MR which was again denied. Undeterred,
appellants filed a third MR praying that the decision of the CA be set aside
and a new one be entered declaring that the investment in Piczon and Co.,
Inc. belonged exclusively to the estate of Esteban.]
the Heirs of Rosario came to this Court and filed a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for certiorari. Instead they filed a special civil action for
certiorari alleging that the CA abused its discretion when it did not act on
the third MR. This Court issued a resolution ordering the return of the case
to the CA and requiring the said court to act on the petition as if it were a
fourth MR.
The CA promulgated its assailed resolution which reversed the May 31, 1977
decision declaring that the capital investment .. of Esteban .. in Piczon and
Co., Inc… belongs exclusively to Esteban, and that the 3 brothers have no
share therein;
The appellees moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution praying
among others that the May 31, 1977 decision be reinstated and/or declared
final and executory.
The Appellate Court denied the MR for lack of merit.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES: WON the SC could review and reverse the decision of the CA
HELD: WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of the CA is SET ASIDE and
the decision of the same court promulgated on May 31, 1977 is hereby
ordered REINSTATED.
YES
The subject of the present action is the 2nd resolution of the CA. That
resolution contains findings of fact and conclusions of law which are in
direct conflict with those found in the decisions of both the trial court and
the Appellate Court speaking through another Associate Justice.
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require.
While the High Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, it has the prerogative
to review and reverse the factual findings of the courts below if it should find
that these do not conform to the evidence on record. Furthermore, in the
case of Heirs of Juan Dacasan vs. Court of Appeals, we held that factual
findings of the Appellate Court are binding on the SC, and the exception to
this rule is when such findings conflict with those of the trial court.
This Court, in the exercise of its authority to re-weigh and reevaluate factual
findings, have found from the maze of evidence on record that the
investment worth P65,944 representing 17,400 shares of stocks in Piczon
and Co. , Inc. is indeed owned in common by the 4 brothers.
Despite the assertions of the widow of Esteban that the subject investment
is exclusively owned by her late husband, documents signed by Esteban
himself are on record which would render these assertions nugatory,
technically admitting that the subject investment is commonly owned with
his 3 brothers.
From Esteban Piczon’s own admissions of his brothers’ rights over the
investment as found in the records and from the findings of the lower court
who was in a better position to examine real evidence as well as observe the
deportment of the witnesses while they testified in the case, we rule for the
petitioners and grant the writ prayed for.
SPOUSES BARRAZA vs. CAMPOS, JR.
G.R. No. L-50437
February 28, 1983
FACTS: On October 3, 1978, private respondent filed a Complaint for
damages based on defendants’ (petitioners herein) use of plaintiff’s (now
private respondent) trade name and style of “Gatchalian-The House of Native
Lechon and Restaurant”, with prayer for preliminary injunction.
After service of summons, petitioners as defendants therein filed an “Urgent
Ex- Parte Motion” for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an
Answer which the Court granted.
Instead of filing the Answer within the extended period of fifteen (15) days,
defendants filed through their counsel, Atty, Esmeraldo M. Gatchalian, a
“Motion to Dismiss Complaint Together With Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction” which was one (1) day before the expiration of the period as
extended by the court. Said motion moved for the dismissal of the complaint
on the following grounds: (1) That the complaint states no cause of action;
(2) That venue is improperly laid; and (3) That there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.
when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed and pending before the
court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the
extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true
that under Section 4 of Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the
termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the
time prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of
the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the
defendant to file his answer not only within the original fifteen (15) days

Private respondent, then, filed an “Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendants in period but also within “a different period (as) fixed by the court.”

Default” on the ground that the defendants failed to file an answer within
the reglementary period allowed by the Rules of Court. The defendants were
declared in default.

ISSUE: Whether or not a motion to dismiss must be filed within the time for
pleading, that is, within the time to answer.
RULING: A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds enumerated in Sec.
1, Rule 8 (now Sec. 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be filed within
the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer including the
extension of time granted to file such answer.
There is nothing in the Rules which provide, directly or indirectly, that the
interruption of the running of the period within which to file an answer