G.R. No.

182551 July 27, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed before this Court is the Decision1 dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00282, which modified the Decision2 dated November 3, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte,
Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4232. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant Rosendo
Rebucan y Lamsin was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) separate counts of murder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.

On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double murder in an Information, the
accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old,
with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting
upon Felipe Lagera:

Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:

Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds caused the death of Felipe
Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately thereafter.3

When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4 Trial, thereafter,
ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte;
(2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis,
Jr.;5 (3) Adoracion Lagera, the wife of Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and
mother of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.

Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim Felipe Lagera on
November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds, the first of which was located at his right
arm and was about 23x2x4 centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp
instrument such as a bolo. The second wound was located at Felipe’s "nose maxillary area,"6 measuring 13
centimeters, with an inverted C shape. The second wound was not fatal and could have been caused by a sharp-
edged instrument like a bolo. The third wound was located at Felipe’s left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5
centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have likewise been caused by a sharp-edged instrument. Dr.
Profetana concluded that the causes of death of Felipe were hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple
hacking wounds. She also conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the
aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil sustained a hacking wound at the "fronto-temporal area"7 with
a skull fracture. In the case of Ranil, the cause of death was "hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss
secondary to [the] hacking wound to the head."8 The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.9

Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She pointed to the accused-appellant as the
"Bata Endong"10 (Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the
forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the
accused-appellant, the former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the direction of the coconut tree and
thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela said that she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil.
She related that Felipe also owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was attacked. She was
then inside the house with Felipe and her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about four
meters away when the hacking incident occurred indoors.11

On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing with a toy camera inside the
house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a bench. Felipe was also there near the bench and he was
carrying Ranil in his right arm. When asked whether the accused-appellant came inside the house in a sudden
manner, Carmela answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by Felipe when the
accused-appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or altercation occurred between Felipe and the
accused-appellant. After Felipe was hacked, he immediately ran outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran
to the back of the house.12

Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was at the house of a certain Justiniano
Rance. After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who told her to go home because Felipe had been
hacked. She ran towards the direction of her house. When she got there, she saw the lifeless body of Felipe
sprawled on the ground. She then went inside the house and found her daughter, Alma Tagpis, cuddling the body of
Ranil whose head was wounded. She told Alma to look for a motor vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. She also
found out that the other two children, Carmela and Jericho, hid when they saw Felipe being hacked. When she
asked them who went to their house, Carmela told her that it was the accused-appellant who entered their house
and hacked the victims.13

Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was in Brgy. Sogod, having their palay
(unhusked rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went home and proceeded to the house of her father, Felipe,
where she left her children. She then met a person looking for her mother who was about to tell the latter that Felipe
was hacked. When she rushed to Felipe’s house, she saw him lying in the grassy place, wounded and motionless.
She asked Felipe who hacked him, but he was not able to answer anymore. She went inside the house and saw
blood on the floor and the feet of her son Ranil. Thinking that the killer was still inside, she went to the back of the
house and pulled a slot of board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing the body of Ranil, she took him
and ran towards the road. She was able to bring Ranil to the hospital, but the doctor already pronounced him dead.
Her other two children, Carmela and Jericho, soon arrived at the hospital with the police. When she asked them who
killed Felipe, Carmela answered that it was the accused-appellant.14

Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidence, to wit: (1) Exhibit A – the Post-
mortem Examination Report on Felipe;15 (2) Exhibit B – the sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds
sustained by Felipe;16 (3) Exhibit C – the Certificate of Death of Felipe;17 (4) Exhibit D – the Post-mortem
Examination Report on Ranil;18 (5) Exhibit E – the sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by
Ranil;19 and (6) Exhibit F – the Certificate of Death of Ranil.20

The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Raymond Rance, the stepson of the
accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal,21 the barangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; (3)
Arnulfo Alberca, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the
accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.

Raymond Rance testified that his mother’s name is Marites Rance. The accused-appellant is not his biological
father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw
Felipe Lagera inside their house. Felipe placed himself on top of Raymond’s mother, who was lying down. Raymond
and his younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their mother and they were awakened. His mother kept
pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in driving him out. In the evening of July 20, 2002, at about
11:00 p.m., Raymond recounted that he saw Felipe’s son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy was
able to go upstairs and kept trying to place himself on top of Raymond’s mother. The latter got mad and pushed
Timboy away. She even pushed him down the stairs. The accused-appellant was working in Manila when the
aforesaid incidents happened. Raymond said that his mother thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently, he saw the
accused-appellant at the house of a certain Bernie, several days after the accused-appellant arrived in Leyte. He
told the accused-appellant about the incidents involving Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and
the accused were already living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left their house after
they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latter’s mother. Raymond testified that the
accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of his family. He also stated that the accused-appellant
seldom drank liquor and even if he did get drunk, he did not cause any trouble.22

Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered to him. The latter came to
him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant) fought with Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human
rights action officer, Ricky Irlandez, and the chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused-appellant to the police
station. Afterwards, the police officers came to his place and he accompanied them to the house of Felipe.23

Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary surrender of the accused-
appellant was entered into the records of the police blotter. He was asked to read in open court the Police Blotter
Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact of voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant.
His testimony was no longer presented, however, since the prosecution already admitted the contents of the
blotter.24

The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August 15, 2002. He went to the
house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children. There, he learned that his wife went to Manila and his
brother was taking care of his two children and his stepson, Raymond. On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at
the place of his friend, Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latter’s mother went to Manila and he was told
that, while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went to their house and tried to place themselves on top
of his wife. He then said that he harbored ill feelings towards the said men but he was able to control the same for
the sake of his children. On November 6, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house of barangay chairperson
Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. He was carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the
same to cut cassava stems in his farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested
by Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first
sought shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying
there and drinking for half an hour, the accused-appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he remembered that he
had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera.25

The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding chickens.
When Felipe asked him what was his business in going there, he confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse
of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-appellant had a bad purpose for being there and that the latter
wanted to start a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and responded that Felipe should not get angry, as
it was he (Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of
a chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. The accused-appellant then drew his long bolo and
hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter was already turning and about to run to the house. He
also went inside the house since Felipe might get hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about
to deliver a second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow
was delivered suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. When
he saw that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered a third hacking blow on Felipe, which landed on the right
side of the latter’s neck. Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and hacked him again, which blow hit the
victim’s upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on the yard of his house and was about to run towards the
road. He then left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson.26

During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he proceeded to Felipe’s
house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first hacking blow, the accused-appellant
stated that he had no intention to back out because he was thinking that the victim might get a gun and use the
same against him. The accused-appellant also asserted that when he was about to deliver the second hacking blow,
Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and used him to shield the blow. There was a long bolo
nearby but Felipe was not able to take hold of the same because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He
admitted that he had a plan to kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the latter’s house on the day of the
attack, he had no intention to kill him.27

The defense also presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 – the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885
dated November 6, 2002;28 and (2) Exhibit 2 – the Civil Marriage Contract of Rosendo Rebucan and Marites
Rance.29

On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of double
murder. The trial court elucidated thus:
[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the accused] was sexually abused by the father and
son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to avenge his wife’s sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this
decision to kill Felipe did not wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6th of November 2002, he armed
himself with a sharp long bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte where the victim
live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the spirit of London gin after consuming one bottle with his compadre "Enok", he
decided to execute his evil deeds by going to the house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of buying kerosene and once
inside the house hacked and wounded the victim, Felipe Lagera who was then holding in his arm his grandson, one
and half years 1 ½ old, Ramil Tagpis, Jr.

The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a
premeditated decision and executed with treachery.

xxxx

There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the victim, Felipe was holding in his
arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his house, when the accused entered, and without any warning
or provocation coming from the victim, the accused immediately delivered several hacking blows on the victim giving
no regard to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed
has no opportunity to put up his defense against the unlawful aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate.
Moreover, what defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up against the armed and superior
strength of the accused, but to leave his fate to God.

The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victims, unarmed, were caught totally
unprepared to defend themselves qualifies the crime committed as murder. x x x.

After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the house of Brgy. Chairman, Renerio
Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to surrender, because he killed Felipe Lagera and Ramil
Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman instructed his Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky Irlandez and his Chief
Tanod, Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of Carigara, Leyte. This fact of voluntary surrender
was corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented to Court the police blotter, under entry No. 5885,
dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP, Carigara, Leyte.

Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities showed his intent to submit himself unconditionally
to them, to save the authorities from trouble and expenses that they would incur for his capture. For this reason, he
has complied with the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.] x x x.

From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances of admission and voluntary surrender credited to
the accused are not sufficient to offset the aggravating circumstances of: a) evident premeditation; b) treachery
(alevosia); c) dwelling – the crime was committed at the house of the victim; d) intoxication – the accused fueled
himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the commission of the crime; e) abuse of superior strength; and f)
minority, in so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is concerned, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended. x x x.

xxxx

In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.30

The RTC, thus, decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and
further amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y
LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER charged under the information and
sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of Felipe Lagera and
Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (₱75,000.00) Pesos for each victim and moral damages
in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (₱75,000.00) Pesos to each; and
Pay the Cost.31 (Emphases ours.)

The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review and the same was docketed as G.R. No.
161706.32 The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.33 In our Resolution34 dated July 19, 2005,
we ordered the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition, pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Mateo.35 Before the appellate court, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282.

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying the judgment of the RTC.
The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the
accused-appellant resulted in two separate crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of a complex crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the
killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. With
respect to the ensuant mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of the accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation of intoxication, immediate vindication of a
grave offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the same was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. As modified,
accused-appellant is hereby adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of
Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr., and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of murder he has committed.

The award of civil indemnity is reduced to ₱50,000.00 for each victim; the award of moral damages is likewise
reduced to ₱50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is awarded to the
heirs of each victim.36

The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal37 of the above decision. In a Resolution38 dated February 6, 2008,
the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of the case be forwarded to this Court.

On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice.39 Thereafter, both parties manifested that they were adopting
the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals and will no longer file their respective supplemental briefs.40

The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE INTOXICATION AS A MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF

DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY.41
The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was committed with treachery and
evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as to the presence of treachery given that there was no
eyewitness who categorically stated that the accused-appellant attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving
them of the means to defend themselves. He brushed aside the testimony of Carmela Tagpis, insisting that she was
not in a position to say that there was no altercation between him and Felipe, which could have put the latter on
guard. The prosecution allegedly failed to prove that the accused-appellant intentionally waited for the time when
Felipe would be defenseless before initiating the attack. The fact that he voluntarily surrendered to the barangay
chairperson and the police and admitted the killings supposedly showed that it was not intentional and he did not
consciously adopt the method of attack upon the two victims. The accused-appellant similarly rejects the finding of
the RTC that there was evident premeditation on his part since the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately
planned the killing of Felipe.

The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the incident, he was still unable to control his anger as he just
recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by Felipe and the latter’s son, Timboy. He also avers that he
was a bit intoxicated when the crime took place so that he was not in total control of himself. He claims that he is not
a habitual drinker and that he merely consumed the alcohol prior to the incident in order to appease his friend. He
likewise argues that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should not have been appreciated inasmuch as the
same was not alleged in the information. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated since he did not deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and the death of the latter was
accidental. The accused-appellant prays that he should only be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense and intoxication.

The appeal lacks merit.

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution must establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.42 Ultimately, what the law simply requires is that any proof against the
accused must survive the test of reason for it is only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the
crime is the person on trial should there be a judgment of conviction.43 A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of
the prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.44

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were
attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 24845 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill another shall be guilty
of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the
situation does not fall within the provisions of Article 246.46 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.47 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with
the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.48

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of
treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this
regard, we reiterate the established doctrine articulated in People v. De Guzman49 that:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and
their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes
thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not
be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. x x x.50

Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.51
Carmela testified as follows:

PROS. TORREVILLAS:

Q: Do you have a brother named Ranil Tagpis, Jr?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Where is he now?

A: He is dead.

Q: Do you know the circumstance of his death?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Why did he die?

A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.

Q: Do you know also your grandfather Felipe Lagera, Jr?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Where is he now?

A: He is dead also.

Q: Why did he die?

A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.

Q: Is the person your Bata Endong here in the court room who hacked your brother and your grandfather?

A: Yes sir.

COURT INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to a person when asked of his name identified himself as Rosendo Rebucan.

xxxx

Q: What instrument did the accused use in killing your [brother and] your grandfather?

A: Long bolo, sundang.

Q: Were you able to see that long bolo?

A: Yes sir.

xxxx

Q: Was your grandfather armed that time?

A: He has his own bolo but he placed it on the holder of the long bolo.
Q: Was that long bolo used by your grandfather?

A: No sir.

xxxx

Q: How far were you to the incident, when this hacking incident happened?

A: (witness indicating a distance of about 4 meters).

xxxx

COURT:

Cross.

ATTY. DICO:

Q: You stated awhile ago that your brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil] and you and your papo Felipe were at the
house of your papo Felipe?

A: Yes sir.

Q: You mean to say that there were no other persons present in that house other than you four (4)?

A: Yes sir.

xxxx

Q: So, you were playing that toy camera inside the room of your papo Felipe?

A: No sir, I was playing then at the side of the chicken cage.

Q: Is that chicken cage was inside or outside the house of your papo Felipe’s house?

A: Inside the house of my grandfather.

xxxx

Q: Was your brother Ranil carried by your grandfather Felipe?

A: Yes sir.

He was carried by his right arm.

Q: So, you mean to say that your uncle Endo went inside, it was so sudden?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Because it was sudden, you were not able to do anything, what did you do?

A: I then cried at that time.

xxxx
 Q: But you are sure that when your uncle Endo entered as you said that your brother Ramil was carried by
your papo Felipe?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did your uncle Endo and your papo Felipe fight or was there an altercation?

A: No sir.52

As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly and categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as
the person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight or
altercation between the accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any provocation, the accused-appellant suddenly
delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and
deprived him of any opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child
unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise
correctly appreciated the existence of treachery. The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the
victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither
of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it.53 Furthermore, the
killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the weakness of the
victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.54

Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that the attack was preceded by a
fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to be persuaded by the accused-appellant’s version of the
events in question. Indeed, the Court has ruled that the testimony of children of sound mind is "more correct and
truthful than that of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents
which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that
of older persons."55 In the instant case, Carmela was cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained
steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of
Carmela.

Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of Carmela, but some portions thereof
do not also conform to the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the
sketch of the human anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe
sustained three hacking wounds that were found on his right arm, at his "nose maxillary area"56 and on his left arm.
On the other hand, the accused-appellant testified that he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the three of which
landed on the left side of the victim’s abdomen, the right side of his neck and on his upper left arm. When confronted
on the said apparently conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any explanation.57

Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe and Ranil to murder.

The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear
as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between
determination and execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.58 It is not enough that
evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts
evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation."59 In the case at bar, the
evidence of the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident premeditation since the testimonies
they presented pertained to the period of the actual commission of the crime and the events that occurred
thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when the
accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry out the plan and
that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.

Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, dwelling,
minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed in the latter.60 On the other hand, dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances in the instant case considering that the same were not alleged and/or specified in the information that
was filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000, a generic aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the information.
This requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to wit:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.

With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals vis-à-vis the nature of crimes committed,
we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of
murder, not the complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The
first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The
second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.61

The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under any of the two classes of
complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly and indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and
Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow from the accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela
did not contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe
was committed as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the
factual milieu of the case at bar excludes the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-
appellant should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of murder. In the past, when two crimes have
been improperly designated as a complex crime, this Court has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the
component crimes separately instead of the complex crime.62

In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal
liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.63 To be
sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and
the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.64 The accused-appellant has duly
established in this case that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay
chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted
this circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial.

We reject, however, the accused-appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the mitigating
circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave offense.

The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication of the offender shall be
taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is
habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The Court finds that the accused-
appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication since his own testimony failed to substantiate
his claim of drunkenness during the incident in question. During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant
himself positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe.65 He
cannot, therefore, be allowed to make a contrary assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he
committed on the basis thereof.

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be
appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act be
"committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees." The established rule is that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused
had sufficient time to recover his equanimity.66 In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged
attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate
vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days
thereafter, on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and
Ranil. To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the accused-appellant could
have regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of
the accused-appellant.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the
crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of any other aggravating circumstance in both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the
presence of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly established in both instances,
Article 63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code67 mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.

Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity
ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.68

The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, reduced the aforesaid
amounts to ₱50,000.00 and further awarded the amount of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the
victim.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission
of the crime.69 Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs
of the victim by reason of the latter’s death. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the
victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.70 The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand,
is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People v. Dalisay,71 the Court clarified that "[b]eing corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the
very basis of the award."72

Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
The award of exemplary damages is, however, increased to ₱30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing
jurisprudence. As held in People v. Combate,73 when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded are ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award of ₱25,000.00 temperate damages to
the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award of ₱25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder
cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224
of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proven.74

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated August 21, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of
two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accused-appellant is further ordered to indemnify the respective
heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each victim, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 4-28; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta with Associate Justices Agustin S. Dizon
and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring.

2 CA rollo, pp. 69-83; penned by Presiding Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido.

3 Records, p. 1.

4 Id. at 17.

5 Also referred to as Ramil Tagpis, Jr. and Ranel Tagpis, Jr. in other parts of the records.

6
TSN, February 18, 2003, p. 5.
7 Id. at 8.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 3-9.

10 TSN, February 24, 2003, p. 3.

11 Id. at 3-5.

12 Id. at 6-9.

13 TSN, March 4, 2003, pp. 3-5.

14 TSN, March 21, 2003, pp. 3-6.

15 Records, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

16 Id. at 2.

17 Id. at 3.

18 Id. at 4.

19 Id. at 5.

20 Id. at 6.

21 Also referred to as Reinerio Arminal, Penerio Arminal and Renerio Arcenal in other parts of the records.

22 TSN, April 9, 2003, pp. 4-15.

23 TSN, June 24, 2003, pp. 3-4.

24 TSN, July 21, 2003, p. 3.

25 TSN, July 31, 2003, pp. 2-11.

26 Id. at 11-16.

27 TSN, August 1, 2003, pp. 27-32.

28 Records, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 7-8.

29 Id. at 9.

30 CA rollo, pp. 80-83.

31 Id. at 83.

32 Id. at 35.

33 Id. at 50-68 and 116-156.

34
Rollo, p. 3.
35 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

36 Rollo, pp. 27-28.

37 Id. at 29.

Id. at 32-33; penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta with Associate Justices Pampio A.
38

Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, concurring.

39 Id. at 35.

40 Id. at 36-37 and 39-42.

41 Id. at 52-53.

42 Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.

43 People v. De La Cruz, 358 Phil. 513, 519 (1998).

44 People v. Reyes and Llaguno, 349 Phil. 39, 58 (1998).

45 The entire provision states:

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment of or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7659.)

46 Art. 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7659.)

47 Revised Penal Code, Article 14, par. 16, as amended.

48 People v. Badriago, G.R. No. 183566, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 820, 833.

49 G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990, 188 SCRA 407.

50 Id. at 410-411.
51 People v. Gutierrez, 393 Phil. 863, 874 (2000).

52 TSN, February 24, 2003, pp. 3-9.

53 People v. Iligan and Basao, 369 Phil. 1005, 1038 (1999).

54 People v. Cabarrubias, G.R. Nos. 94709-10, June 15, 1993, 223 SCRA 363, 369.

55 People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 224 (2003).

56 TSN, February 18, 2003, p. 5.

57 TSN, August 1, 2003, p. 29.

58 People v. Cual, 384 Phil. 361, 380 (2000).

59 People v. Torejas, 150 Phil. 179, 195-196 (1972).

60 People v. Caballero, 448 Phil. 514, 536 (2003).

61 People v. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 76, 88.

62 See People v. Pantoja, 134 Phil. 453, 455-456 (1968); People v. Tilos, 141 Phil. 428, 431 (1969); People
v. Bermas, 369 Phil. 191, 237-238 (1999); People v. Latupan, 412 Phil. 477, 487-488 (2001).

63 Ladiana v. People, 441 Phil. 733, 756-757 (2002).

64 Id.

65 TSN, August 1, 2003, p. 27.

66 People v. Palabrica, 409 Phil. 618, 630 (2001).

67Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. — In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxxx

3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

68 People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008, 546 SCRA 671, 699.

69 People v. Lusabio, Jr., G.R. No. 186119, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 565, 592.

70 People v. Flores, 466 Phil. 683, 696 (2004).

71 G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 807.

72 Id. at 820.
 73 G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010. See also People v. Sabella, G.R. No. 183092, May 30, 2011.

74 People v. Lusabio, Jr., supra note 69 at 593.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 149372 September 11, 2007

RICARDO BACABAC, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin,
Iloilo City in the company of Eduardo Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan
Bacabac (Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel).1

Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall. Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and on their way
home, they encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and there figured in a
misunderstanding.

On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who was also at the dance hall, noticed a commotion. He soon
saw that Melchor was "hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands." Still later, he saw the victim hit
Edzel with a "stick."2 He thus told the victim and his companions that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose
Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), whereupon Eduardo3 told him (Jesus) to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus thus left
and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and
Jonathan managed to flee.

The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac
(herein petitioner), together with Edzel and Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother,
and two sisters at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16
armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively.

Jesus thereupon pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel.
The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus
blurted out, however, "You are just bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small children."4 Petitioner, at
that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite ("as if spraying his rifle from right to left") at
the victim and Eduardo, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as he (Jonathan) "was on the move to strike [the victim]
with a piece of wood." Eduardo fell. And so did the victim who was in a kneeling position, and as he was raising his
hands in surrender, Jose shot him again.

Meanwhile, Melchor escaped.5

The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival.
Eduardo died two hours later.

Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions and
one bullet wound in the extremities, and that he died due to "maceration of the internal organs due to bullet
wounds."6 Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal region, and died of "hemorrhage due to
gunshot wounds."7
Two Informations for Murder were filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City against Jose, Edzel,
Jonathan, Jesus, and the herein petitioner. The accusatory portion of the first Information, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 35783, reads:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Ilo-ilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, armed with two (2) M16
[a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make and caliber, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HERNANI QUIDATO
with the firearms they were then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of
his body which caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Hernani Quidato.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The accusatory portion of the second Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 35784, reads:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1990, in the Municipality of San Joaquin, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, armed with two (2) M16
[a]rmalite [r]ifles and one (1) nickel-plated revolver of unknown make and caliber, with deliberate intent and
decided purpose to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive,
did then and willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one EDUARDO SELIBIO with the
firearms they were then provided inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Eduardo Selibio.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

The cases were jointly tried.

By Decision of April 30, 1993, Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC, finding the presence of conspiracy among petitioner and
his co-accused,10 convicted them of murder qualified by treachery.11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the
trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 35783, all the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan
Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and there being no aggravating circumstances with one mitigating
circumstance [immediate vindication for Jose and Jesus; voluntary surrender for Pat. Ricardo Bacabac12],
and applying the indeterminate sentence law, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo Bacabac and Jesus
Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10 years and 1 day, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day as maximum; while accused Edzel Talanquines and Jonathan
Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment
for a period of four (4) years, 2 months, and 1 day, as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day as maximum. All the
accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Hernani Quidato, the amount
of P50,000.00 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the
costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)

In Criminal Case No. 35784, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

All the accused, namely; Jose Talanquines, Jr., Edzel Talanquines, Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo
Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder and there being no
aggravating circumstance with one mitigating circumstance, accused Jose Talanquines, Jr., Ricardo
Bacabac and Jesus Delfin Rosadio are hereby sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for a period of 10
years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, as maximum; while accused Edzel
 Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac who are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, are hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for a period of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, as minimum to 10 years and 1 day as
maximum. All the accused are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Eduardo
Selibio, the amount of P50,000.000 for his wrongful death; P20,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. (Underscoring supplied)

Accused Jesus Delfin Rosadio, who is detained, is hereby credited with the number of days he spent under
detention, if he is qualified.

SO ORDERED.13

While petitioner and his co-accused filed a Notice of Appeal14 which was given due course,15 only petitioner filed a
Brief, albeit beyond the extensions granted to him, drawing the Court of Appeals to dismiss his appeal.16 The
conviction of petitioner's co-accused had thus become final and executory.

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration17 of the dismissal of his appeal having been denied,18 he filed a Petition for
Review with this Court which, by Resolution of October 22, 1997, directed the Court of Appeals to reinstate
petitioner's appeal.19

By Decision20 of June 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Entry of final judgment was
made by the Court of Appeals on July 22, 1999.21

The trial court thereafter issued a February 7, 2000 Order directing the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused.22 Except petitioner, all were arrested.23

On February 24, 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Order, and/or
Denial of Appeal24 which was granted,25 hence, the Entry of Judgment issued by the appellate court on July 22, 1999
was set aside. He thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 of the appellate court's June 28, 1999 Decision
which was denied by Resolution of August 8, 2001;27 hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.28

Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' decision as follows:

First: Contrary to its conclusion on the basis of the facts of the case, Petitioner may not be deemed to be
in conspiracy with the other Accused.

Second: Contrary to its conclusion, there was no treachery.

Third: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner, assuming in gratis argumenti the correctness of the
pronouncement of guilt, should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner that the other Accused were so credited.

Fourth: Contrary to its conclusion, the guilt of the Petitioner has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, by the equipoise rule, should have been acquitted.

Fifth: Contrary to its conclusion, Petitioner is not civilly liable.29 (Emphasis in the original)

The Court notes that the first, second, and fifth arguments of petitioner were, in the main, raised before the appellate
court.30

During the pendency of the present petition, petitioner, through counsel, filed before the trial court an "Urgent Ex
Parte Alternative Motions (Re: Pat. Ricardo Bacabac's Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Vacate the Order dated
February 7, 2000 [directing the arrest of the accused] and to Recall the Warrant of Arrest Dated the Same Date in
so far as the Accused Pat. Ricardo Bacabac Only is Concerned)."31 The trial court denied32 the motion as it did
deny33 petitioner's motion for reconsideration,34 drawing petitioner to file before this Court on October 5, 2006 a
"Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 39) of Iloilo City."35
In his "Motion to Vacate Order for the Arrest of the Accused and the Warrant of Arrest Issued by the Regional Trial
Court . . . ," petitioner argues that

[T]he basis of the RTC's Order of February 7, 2000 was the Entry of Judgment by the Court of
Appeals dated 25 November 1999.36 BUT THE SAID ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was ALREADY VACATED
and SET-ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ITSELF ON ITS RESOLUTION DATED 13 DECEMBER
2000. Therefore, the RTC's Order of 7 February 2000 was ipso facto vacated.37 (Emphasis in the original)

and that

[T]he second sentence of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cited by the Order of 13 July 2006
does not apply to the case at bench because the main case on the merits which originated in the RTC as
Criminal Cases Nos. 35783-84, went to the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. No. 16348 and is now pending in
the Supreme Court (Third Division) as G.R. No. 149372 because of the Petition for Review On
Certiorari filed by Movant herein x x x. THE MAIN CASE IS NO LONGER PENDING IN THIS HONORABLE
COURT [sic]. THEREFORE, THE RTC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REITERATE AND EXECUTE THE
ORDER OF 7 FEBRUARY 2000.38 (Emphasis in the original)

As this Court hereby affirms petitioner's conviction, resolution of his "Motion to Vacate . . ." is rendered unnecessary.

Petitioner, denying the presence of conspiracy on his part, argues:

[The petitioner] affirms that he was at the scene of the incident and merely fired a warning shot into the
air to respond to a public disturbance, and his firing a warning shot into the air was intended to avert
further acts of violence; both circumstances, therefore, being merely and solely in pursuance to his
avowed duty to keep peace and order in the community and clearly not to be part of any alleged community
of design to kill the victims.

xxxx

Another indication that there was no unity of purpose and of execution in so far as the Petitioner is
concerned is his conduct after Jose Talanquines, Jr. shot the victims. Eyewitness accounts state that
after that lone warning shot, closely followed by Jose Talanquines, Jr. firing at the victims, the petitioner
merely stood there and did nothing and said nothing. This is obviously because he was himself stunned by
the fast happening of events. The investigating police officer, PO3 NESTOR SANTACERA, on rebuttal,
likewise, admitted to the facts that ten (10) minutes after the incident, they (the police) responded and upon
arrival thereat, learned that the Petitioner already reported the incident to their station and that it
was the Petitioner who first reported the shooting incident officially to their office. The aforedescribed
proven conduct of the Petitioner during and immediately after the incident in question are, Petitioner
respectfully submits, inconsistent with what a co-conspirators is [sic] wont to do under the
circumstances. It is submitted instead that his conduct on the contrary underscores the lack or want of
community of purpose and interest in the killing incident to make him criminally liable under the conspiracy
theory.

Finally, in connection with the conspiracy theory and anent the finding below that the Petitioner and his Co-
Accused waited for the victims' arrival at the corner of St. Domingo and M.H. del Pilar Streets, it is
asserted that the same runs counter to the natural and ordinary experience of things and event [sic],
and raises a cloud of doubt over the correctness of the lower Courts decision which are based on the
Prosecution's version of the incident. Since, according to the prosecution, the Petitioner and the other
Accused were armed with high-powered firearms (armalite rifles and revolver); they waited at the
stated street corner for thirty (30) minutes; the stated street corner was well lighted; accompanying them
were the wife and two (2) young daughters of Jose Talanquines, Jr; and they stood there conversing with
the group of Elston Saquian [a prosecution witness who testified that he saw the petitioner and his co-
accused waiting for the victims39 and admitting that they were waiting for certain persons who mauled Edzel
Talanquines and Jonathan Bacabac.

In other words, the lower Courts gave credence to an improbable scenario painting the Petitioner, known
to the place as a police officer, and co-accused to have recklessly and uncaringly displayed, for all and
 sundry to see, their alleged criminal intentions. It would indeed be the height of foolishness for them to be by
a well lighted street corner, perhaps even well traversed, conspicuously fully armed, waiting for persons who
were not even sure would pass by such place, and apparently willing to admit to other passers-by that they
were indeed waiting for the persons who mauled Edzel and Jonathan, and consequently give out the
impression that they were intending to retaliate – which is what the lower Courts regrettably observed.

xxxx

Likewise, the presence of the wife and two (2) young daughters of the accused Jose Talanquines, Jr.
at the scene of the alleged crimes, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and believed by the lower
Courts, assumes importance in the matter of determining which version of the incident is correct.

The Prosecution places the wife and the daughters with the alleged fully armed Petitioner and Co-Accused
at Sto. Domingo Streets, also waiting during the same length of time as the men for the (probable) arrival of
the group of the victims. But such a scenario is, likewise, unnatural. Because, will the male relatives
unhesitatingly expose their defenseless womenfolk to imminent danger?40 (Citations omitted,
emphasis in the original, and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's argument that it is improbable for him and his co-accused to have waited for the victims at a well-lighted
street corner does not persuade. Crimes are known to have been brazenly committed by perpetrators, undeterred
by the presence of onlookers or even of peace officers, completely impervious of the inevitability of criminal
prosecution and conviction.41

From the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of petitioner before, during, and after
their commission,42 and the conditions attendant thereto,43 conspiracy, which need not be proved by direct evidence,
is deduced.44 Petitioner's firing of his armalite could not have amounted to none other than lending moral assistance
to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy.45

As the appellate court observed which is quoted with approval:

In the present recourse, when informed that Jonathan and Edzel were being manhandled and assaulted by
male persons, Appellant armed himself with an M-16 armalite. Jose Talanquines, Jr., the father of Edzel,
followed suit and armed himself with an M-16 armalite gun. Jesus armed himself with a revolver while
Jonathan armed himself with a piece of wood. Jonathan and Edzel were nephews of the Appellant who
resided in the house of Jose Talanquines, Jr. All the Accused including the Appellant then proceeded
posthaste to the corner of M.H. del Pilar corner Sto. Domingo Streets where the culprits would pass
by and waited for the advent of the culprits. Even as Hernani apologized for his and his companions'
assault of Edzel and Jonathan, Jesus berated Hernani and his companions. Almost simultaneously,
the Appellant fired his gun into the air as Jonathan lunged at Hernani and his companions to hit
them with the piece of wood. Almost simultaneously, Jose Talaquines, Jr. fired his gun at Hernani and
shot Eduardo hitting them and, in the process, hitting his nephew, Jonathan Bacabac. The Appellant did
not lift a finger when Jose fired at and shot Hernani and Eduardo. He stood by as Jose shot Hernani
anew when the latter on bended knees, raised his two (2) hands, in surrender. The Appellant and the
other Accused then fled from the scene, with their respective firearms and weapons. The overt act of
the Accused and the Appellant in conjunto, constitute proof of conspiracy.

The Appellant and Jose were armed with high-powered guns. Jesus was armed with a revolver. The
nature of the weapons of the Accused evinced a common desire to do away with the culprits, not
merely to scare them.

What is outrageous is that the Appellant was a policeman. He could very well have just arrested the
culprits as they sauntered by and brought them to the police station for the requisite investigation
and the institution of criminal complaints, if warranted. He could have dissuaded Jose and Jesus
and assured them that the culprits will be duly investigated and charged if warranted. The Appellant
did not. He armed himself with an M-16 armalite x x x. [T]he three (3) positioned themselves at the corner of
M.H. del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets for the culprits to arrive. Hernani and his companions were
doomed. It may be true that the Appellant did not aim his gun at the deceased but the same is peu de
chose. By his overt acts, in unison with the other Accused and his kinship with Jonathan and Edzel, We are
 convinced that he conspired with Jose Talanquines, Jr. and the other Accused to achieve a common
purpose to kill Hernani and Eduardo.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court's appreciation of community of design
between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. That it was he who first officially reported the shooting to the
police station47 does not make him any less a conspirator. Voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively
prove innocence.48 Besides, a conspirator who wants to extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an
overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of the
felony is in progress.49 In petitioner's case, he reported the shooting incident after it had already taken place. In legal
contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated since it had already materialized.50

Contrary to petitioner's assertion,51 the appellate court did not err in appreciating the presence of conspiracy despite
its finding that there was no evident premeditation. This Court's pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the
existence of evident premeditation52 does not necessarily imply that the converse ─ that evident premeditation
presupposes the existence of a conspiracy ─ is true. In any event, a link between conspiracy and evident
premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy is directly established and not where conspiracy is only
implied, as in the present case.53

Neither did the appellate court err in finding the presence of treachery. Treachery, under Article 14, paragraph 16 of
the Revised Penal Code, is present "when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

What is decisive in treachery is that "the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the
victim to retaliate."54 In the case at bar, petitioner, a policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16
armalites and a revolver. The victim and his companions were not armed.55 The attack was sudden and
unexpected,56 and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the
victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate.

Petitioner nevertheless argues that he not being the trigger man, it is not logical nor legal to hold him guilty of
treachery.57 This argument falls in the face of the settled doctrine that once conspiracy is established, the act of one
is the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the victim.58

As for petitioner's invocation of the mitigating circumstance of "immediate vindication of a grave offense," it fails. For
such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony
(delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives
by affinity within the same degree."59 The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with
a stick60 (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel).61 By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at
[his] ear, not on [his] head."62 That act would certainly not be classified as "grave offense." And Edzel is petitioner's
nephew, hence, not a relative by affinity "within the same degree" contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno*,C.J., Carpio*** , Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Quisumbing**, J., on leave.

Footnotes
* Designated member pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 75-2007.

** On Leave.

*** Acting Chairperson.

1TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 8; TSN, December 3, 1991, pp. 5, 36-37; Records, Folder 1, pp. 366, 426,
457-458.

2 TSN, December 3, 1991, p. 39; Records, Folder 1, p. 460.

3 TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 16; id. at 374.

4 TSN, August 19, 1991, p. 10; id. at 128.

5 TSN, August 26, 1991, pp. 9-10; id. at 21, 205-206.

6 Records, Folder 2, p. 24.

7 Records, Folder 1, p. 24.

8 Id. at 1.

9 Records, Folder 2, p. 1.

10 Records, Folder 1, pp. 702-706.

11 Id. at 707.

12 Id. at 12, 708.

13 Id. at 709-711.

14 Id. at 713-714.

15 Id. at 715.

16 CA rollo, pp. 139-140.

17 Id. at 142-159.

18 Id. at 178-179.

19 Id. at 203-209.

20Penned by then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., with the concurrence of Court
of Appeals Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Mariano M. Umali. Id. at 259-275.

21 Records, Folder 1, p. 763.

22 Id. at 764-768.

23 Id. at 769-773.

24 CA rollo, pp. 279-298.

25 Id. at 335.

26 Id. at 339-355.

27 Id. at 372.

28 Rollo, pp. 11-32.

29 Id. at 14-15.

30 Decision, CA rollo, pp. 266-267.

31 Rollo, pp. 282-285.

32 Id. at 286-288.

33 Id. at 293.

34 Id. at 289-292.

35 Id. at 269-278.

36The judgment was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 22, 1999 but the certification of
such entry is dated November 25, 1999. Vide records, Folder 1, p. 763.

37 Id. at 275.

38 Ibid.

39 TSN, August 19, 1991, pp. 3-7; id. at 121-125.

40 Rollo, pp. 18-19, 24-26.

41 Vide People v. Chua, G.R. No. 149538, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA 192, 202.

42 Vide People v. Rojas, G.R. Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 169, 176.

43 Vide People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991, 201 SCRA 616, 629.

44 Vide Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316, 323.

45 Vide People v. Luayon, 329 Phil. 560, 576 (1996).

46 CA rollo, pp. 272-273.

47 Rollo, p. 24.

48 Vide People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505, 532 (1996).

49 Vide People v. De los Reyes,

50 Ibid.

51 Rollo, p. 27.
 52 People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 101451, March 23, 1993, 220 SCRA 368, 387.

53 Vide People v. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422, 431-432 (1996).

54 People v. Hingan, 311 Phil. 108, 120 (1995).

55 Records, Folder 1, p. 707.

56 Ibid.

57 Rollo, p. 224.

58 Vide People v. Ambrocio, G.R. No. 140267, June 29, 2004, 434 SCRA 67, 83.

59 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

60 TSN, December 3, 1991, p. 39; Records, Folder 1, p. 460.

61 TSN, December 2, 1991, p. 12; id. at 370.

62 Id. at 38; id. at 396.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX

CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. – No criminal, but only civil liability shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:

1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the
same shall have passed into the possession of another; and

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the
crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the
blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the
death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial
application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of estafa thru falsification?

Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix1 of petitioner intestate estate of her
deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit2 for estafa against her brother-
in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince
Gregory Condominium, 105 12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:

1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one
(1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached
as Annex "A" to form an integral part hereof.

2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging
to the estate but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.

3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the children of my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in
Japan in 1991.

4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24
respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s],
[s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of
Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of
Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "A" of the Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and
thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign
involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years
prior to November, 1992.

5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the presence of Wendy, my other
niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the
second wife of my sister’s widower William Sato.

6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in the belief that they were in
connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.

7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found buyers for the property and
made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc.
2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc.
No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee
Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on the deeds of absolute sale
were not the true and actual considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her
grandmother’s properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid ₱7,000,000.00 for the property covered by
TCT No. 3148 and ₱7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds
were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my mother,
Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
 9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai paid ₱8,000,000.00 for the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to
William Sato.

10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual
knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory
thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].

11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her father’s
orders.

12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the power of attorney fraudulently
secured from my mother, which total ₱22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.

13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the
sales to me as Administratrix of my mother’s estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and
to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y
Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x3

Wendy Mitsuko Sato’s supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the deceased
Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.

In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint.4 On appeal,
however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.5 Thus, the following Information was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 87:6

INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE
CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said accused, making her believe that
said document involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all
located at Tagaytay City, as follows:

1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T.
No. 3147;

2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;

3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;

4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735,
Cadastral Lot No. 7062;

registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the possession of the said special
power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds
of Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for ₱250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for
₱250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for ₱650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the
sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who
died in 1994.

Contrary to law.7

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of
damages from ₱1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to ₱22,034,000, the actual amount received
by Sato.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his
relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an
exempting circumstance.

The prosecution disputed Sato’s motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.

In an order dated April 17, 2006,8 the trial court granted Sato’s motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal
case:

The Trial Prosecutor’s contention is that the death of the wife of the accused severed the relationship of affinity
between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.

A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code convinces this Court of the
correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has
extinguished the marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaida’s mother, herein
complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond
the death of Zenaida.

Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. "No criminal, but only civil liability[,]
shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line."

Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code, preserves family harmony and
obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather
against his stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil.
473).

Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.

WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same is GRANTED and, as prayed
for, case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9 (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecution’s motion for reconsideration10 was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.11

Dissatisfied with the trial court’s rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals12 which, however, in a decision13 dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it. It ruled:

[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity
between her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the
exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or
existing jurisprudence supports the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship
by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida, private
respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further
pointed out by the OSG, the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondent’s daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato
joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent,
William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.

There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the provision of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, from the plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the
crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato, as son-
in-law of Manolita, they being "relatives by affinity in the same line" under Article 332(1) of the same Code. We
cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the
son-in-law of Manolita, so as to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code.

Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where
none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s
intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not include the power to correct
by reading into the law what is not written therein.

Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are strictly construed against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case,
the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code’s simple language is most favorable to Sato.14

The appellate court denied reconsideration.15 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites the
commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law recognizes the
presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended party. Here, the properties
subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died
on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under the law, her right to the three
parcels of land could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother,
Manolita, no such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no
longer existed.

Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the
spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage
with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and Zenaida’s mother,
Manolita.

For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal liability provided
under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioner’s claim that Zenaida’s death dissolved
the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case against Sato created havoc among
the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332’s
provision exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and
reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.

The petition has merit.

The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In particular, it calls
for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a
surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage of Article 332.
Effect of Death on Relationship By Affinity as Absolutory Cause

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause16in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It
limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship
to the offended party.

In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the exemptions
are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.17 By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the
stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her
stepson;19 by the stepfather who steals something from his stepson;20 by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;22 and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother.23

Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage
or

a familial relation resulting from marriage.24 It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the
institution of marriage and family relations.

If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of one’s spouse, does the extinguishment
of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?

Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case. That is why the trial
and appellate courts acknowledged the "dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries" on the matter. In contrast, in
the American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author observed:

In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting views. There are some
who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman
vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other
jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by
affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which
produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or children of the marriage "in
whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the
medium of the issue of the marriage" (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).25

The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.26 Under this
view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration
is indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the
marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse
to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.

The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue.27 The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the
marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.28

The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse
and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of
whether the marriage produced children or not.29 Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This
view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity"
between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of
the married parties.30

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second view is more
consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
 First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest.31 On the
other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be
beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity
view is more appropriate.

Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of "relatives by affinity in the same line" is couched in
general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and
the surviving spouse of one’s deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his
or her parents-in-law)32 can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence
to its language.

Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic autonomous
social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.33 Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the solidarity of
the family.34 In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate
scandal.35 The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the
marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all doubts in favor
of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.36 This is in consonance with the
constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt is established
beyond reasonable doubt.37

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.38 The rule applies when the court is faced with
two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of
Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is more favorable
to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing affinity view.

Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by affinity created
between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to
the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense of
one’s relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of grave offense committed against one’s relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of
relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)

Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the
offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.

However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and
unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with
another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.39

The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is determined by the
facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense.40 What controls is not the title of the
Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the Information.41 In other words, it is the
recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime
being charged in the Information.42 It is the exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is
named.43 The determination by the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an
opinion which is not binding on the court.44

A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with simple estafa but with
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato,
by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:

(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her to sign and
thumbmark the same;

(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it was in fact a
special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of Manolita’s properties in Tagaytay City;

(c) relying on Sato’s inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA in favor of
Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;

(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the proceeds to
Manolita nor accounted for the same and

(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and prejudice of
the estate of Manolita.

The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to Manolita (who
participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolita’s acts of
signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific intention that
something be done about her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such
intention as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of
Sato’s representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document,
Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about,
i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Sato’s proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes.

Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a
special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolita’s
Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in
the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were
falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.

Moreover, the allegations in the Information that

(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato]
made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and

(2) "once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit" raise the presumption that
Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited therefrom, was the author
thereof.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase
the amount of damages from ₱1,150,000 to ₱22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended Information would now state that, while the total
amount of consideration stated in the deeds of absolute sale was only ₱1,150,000, Sato actually received the total
amount of ₱22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolita’s properties.45 This also meant that the deeds of sale
(which were public documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of
consideration stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to
falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary
means to commit the estafa.

Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.

Effect of Absolutory Cause Under Article 332 on Criminal Liability For The Complex Crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.

True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document is required
for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the ruling in
Gonzaludo v. People.46 It means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of
a public document as a necessary means to commit the crime of estafa.

However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the
nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property, namely, the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence
of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as
a separate simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for the single
(complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.

Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally liable for the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject only to civil
liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore
inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public
documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family
relation but a paramount public interest.

The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.47 Thus, the action provided under the
said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil aspect
between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed through falsification of a public document,
however, the matter acquires a very serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in
the integrity of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from
the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.

In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there may be
two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are animated by and result from one
and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability.48 That is the concept of a complex crime. In
other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g., homicide which violates the
right to life, theft which violates the right to property),49 a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in itself.50 Since only a single criminal
intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the
complex crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where the same criminal
intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one criminal
liability.51 (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document falls under this category.) This is
different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for
each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.52 The latter category is covered neither by the concept of complex
crimes nor by Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus delictuorum or concurso de
delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:

Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a
single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as
component crimes.53 (emphasis supplied)

—∞——∞——∞—

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case
where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one.54

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires that the elements of
both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and
considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and falsification of public documents are
not separate crimes but component crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.

Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for
falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime and contradict the
letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal
plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to
be punished individually.

Falsification of Public Documents May Be a Necessary Means for Committing Estafa Even Under Article 315
(3[a])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:

(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;

(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;

(3) the offended party personally signed the document and

(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the document be
falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered
as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase "necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense as a "necessary
means" to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof.55 In
People v. Salvilla,56 the phrase "necessary means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and
insure the commission of the other.57 In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a
"necessary means" as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle
his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
persons.

When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two
crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.58 The falsification of a public, official or commercial
document may be a means of committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document.59 In other words, the crime
of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.60 Actually utilizing the falsified public,
official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa.61 The damage to another is caused by the commission
of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.62
1avv phi 1

Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the falsification of public
document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution
of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly
when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita
was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at
the time she was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the
falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for) the
commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale
of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by,
and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed
would only have been the simple crime of estafa.63 On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita
herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what
was presented to her for her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of
falsification.64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated
January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Per letters of administration dated June 22, 1995 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104 in SP. Proc. Q-95-23621.

2 Docketed as I.S. No. 96-19651. Rollo, pp. 89-90.

3 Id.

4 Id., pp. 85-88.

5 Resolution No. 313, s. 2000 dated February 17, 2000. Id., pp. 81-84.

6 Docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-91385. Id., pp. 91-92.

7 Id.

8 Penned by Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala. Id., pp. 126-129.

9 Id.

10 Dated April 26, 2006. Id., pp. 130-131.

11 Id., p. 131.

12 Docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260.

13Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado
E. Maambong (retired) and Sixto C. Marella, Jr. of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo,
pp. 28-40.

14 Id.

15 Id., pp. 42-43.

16An absolutory cause is a circumstance which is present prior to or simultaneously with the offense by
reason of which the accused who acts with criminal intent, freedom and intelligence does not incur criminal
liability for an act that constitutes a crime (Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus, Third Edition, 61-62
[2007]).

17 Id., p. 736.

18 People v. Alvarez, 52 Phil. 65 (1928).

19 Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Griño Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III, 374 (1997),
citing People v. Adame, CA 40 O.G. Supp. No. 12, p. 63.

20 Id. citing People v. Tupasi, 36 O.G. 2086.

21 Id. citing People v. Patubo, CA-G.R. No. 10616-R, 15 August 1953.

22 Id. citing People v. Navas, CA 51 O.G. 219.

23 Id. citing People v. Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473 (1949).

24 Blodget v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27, 1837 WL 1956 (Vt.).

25 Sta. Maria, Melencio, Persons and Family Relations Law, Fourth Edition, 228-229 (2004).

26Back v. Back, L.R.A. 1916C,752, 148 Iowa 223, 125 N.W. 1009, Am.Ann.Cas. 1912B, 1025 citing Blodget
v. Brinsmaid, 9 Vt. 27; Noble v. State, 22 Ohio St. 541; State v. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 N. E. 747, 21
Am. St. Rep. 790; Wilson v. State, 100 Tenn. 596, 46 S. W. 451, 66 Am. St. Rep. 789; Johnson v. State, 20
Tex. App. 609, 54 Am. Rep. 535; Pegues v. Baker, 110 Ala. 251, 17 South. 943; Tagert v. State, 143 Ala.
88, 39 South. 293, 111 Am. St. Rep. 17; Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, 5 N. E. 144; Vannoy v. Givens,
23 N. J. Law, 201; 1 Bishop, New Crim. Procedure, § 901; 26 Cyc. 845.

27 In this connection, one of the commentators on the Revised Penal Code wrote:

Death of the spouse terminates the relationship by affinity (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 6[5]7, 659, 56
AmD 288; Chase v. Jennings, 38 Me. 44, 45) unless the marriage has resulted in issue who is still
living, in which case the relationship of affinity continues (Dearmond v. Dearmond, 10 Ind. 191;
Bigelow v. Sprague, 140 Mass. 425, 5 NE 144).

See Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, Book I, Fifteenth Edition Revised 188, (2001).

28 In re Bourdeux’ Estate, 37 Wash. 2d 561, 225 P.2d 433, 26 A.L.R. 2d 249.

29 Carman v. Newell, N.Y. 1 Denio 25.

30
In re Bourdeux’ Estate, supra. This view has been adopted and applied in Security Union Casualty Co. v.
Kelly, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 286; American General Insurance Co. v. Richardson, Tex.Civ.App., 132
S.W.2d 161; Simcoke v. Grand Lodge of A. O. U. W. of Iowa, 84 Iowa 383, 51 N.W. 8, 15 L.R.A. 114; Faxon
v. Grand Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and M. E. Rhea, 87 Ill.App. 262; McGaughey v. Grand
Lodge A. O. U. W. of State of Minnesota, 148 Minn. 136, 180 N.W. 1001; Hernandez v. Supreme Forest
Woodmen Circle, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 346; Renner v. Supreme Lodge of Bohemian Slavonian
Benevolent Society, 89 Wis. 401, 62 N.W. 80 following Jones v. Mangan, 151 Wis. 215, 138 N.W.
618; Steele v. Suwalski, 7 Cir., 75 F.2d 885, 99 A.L.R. 588; Benefield v. United States, D.C., 58 F.Supp.
904; Lewis v. O'Hair, Tex.Civ.App., 130 S.W.2d 379.

31 Indeed, Kelly v. Neely, supra note 27, Paddock v. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333, Chase v.
Jennings, supra note 27, Dearmond v. Dearmond, supra note 27 and Bigelow v. Sprague, supra note 27 are
all jury disqualification cases.
32Or between the child of a living parent and the surviving child of a deceased parent (in case of a stepchild
with respect to the stepparent).

33 Section 12, Article II and Section 1, Article 15.

34 Section 2, Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997).

35 Aquino and Griño Aquino, supra note 19.

36See Justice Renato C. Corona’s separate (concurring) opinion in People v. Temporada (G.R. No., 173473,
17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 318-328).

37 See Section 14 (2), Article III, Constitution.

38 Justice Corona’s separate (concurring) opinion in People v. Temporada, supra.

39 Regalado, Florenz, supra note 16, p. 736.

40 Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, 21 September 2007, 533 SCRA 643.

Id. citing People v. Resayaga, G.R. No. 49536, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 426 and Santos v. People,
41

G.R. No. 77429, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 487.

42 Id. citing People v. Elesterio, G.R. No. 63971, 09 May 1989, 173 SCRA 243.

43 Herrera, Oscar, Remedial Law, Volume Four – Criminal Procedure, 59 (1992 Edition reprinted in 2001).

44 People v. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960 (1928).

While the parties as well as the CA and RTC decisions spoke of an amended Information, the said
45

amended Information was not included in the records of this case.

46 G.R. No. 150910, 06 February 2006, 481 SCRA 569.

47 Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Griño Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Volume III, 374 (1997).

48 Regalado, supra note 16, p. 172.

49 Aquino, Ramon and Carolina Griño Aquino, supra note 47 at p. 662.

50 Id.

51 Regalado, supra note 6, p. 172.

52 Id.

53 Id., p. 176.

54 Reyes, supra note 8, p. 650.

55 People v. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163, 26 April 1989, 184 SCRA 671.

56 Id.

57 Id.
 58 Reyes, supra note 20 at p. 226.

59 Id.

60 Id.

61 Id.

62 Id.

63 See United States v. Berry, 5 Phil. 370 (1905) and United States v. Malong, 36 Phil. 821 (1917).

64 See United States v. Capule, 24 Phil. 12 (1913).

SECOND DIVISION

March 18, 2015

G.R. No. 211159

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCELINO OLOVERIO, Accused-appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN,J.:

Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds before the commission of
the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate
the commission of the crime.

This is a review of the Decision1 dated January 29, 2013 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of
accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio (Oloverio) of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and the
payment of civil indemnity and damages.

An Information was filed charging Oloverio with the crime of murder.2 The Information reads:

That at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 2, 2003, at Brgy. Belen, Palompon, Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused met the victim, DOLFO GULANE, while
the latter was walking on his lonesome, and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
stab the said victim using a sharp-pointed bolo, which the accused has provided for the purpose, thereby hitting and
inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the body of the aforesaid victim causing his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Oloverio was arraigned on January 25, 2005, where he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.4

According to the prosecution, on October 2, 2003, at around 3:00 p.m., Rudipico Pogay (Pogay) and Dominador
Panday (Panday) saw Rodulfo Gulane walking about five (5) meters away from them with Oloverio trailing behind
him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane’s right shoulder and hacked him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until
Gulane collapsed on the ground. Oloverio then allegedly took Gulane’s money from his pocket.5

Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is
already dead!") Gulane managed to tell Oloverio, "Man luba ka man, Ling?" ("Ling, why did you stab me?") After,
Gulane died. Panday proceeded to inform Gulane’s family of the incident.6

In his defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had been accusing him of having an
incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept his cool and told Gulane to go home, but the latter
continued to mock him by asking in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with your
mother?" He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell me to go
home?"7

Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his own bolo. They grappled with
it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which resulted in the latter’s death. Accompanied by
a barangay tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal hall to surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he stabbed
Gulane because he could no longer bear the insulting remarks against him.8

Romulo Lamoste (Lamoste), then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen, Palompon, Leyte, alleged that Gulane and
Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He alleged that Oloverio’s daughter had once confided to Oloverio
that Gulane wanted to touch her private parts. About a month later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask Oloverio "in a
joking manner about his incestuous relationship with his mother."9 Oloverio allegedly got mad and they ended up
fighting, but Lamoste was able to subdue them. He, however, admitted that he was not present during the incident.10

On January 29, 2010, Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte rendered its Decision11 finding
Oloverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

The trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not present in this case since it
could not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only mitigating circumstance it found present was of voluntary
surrender. As murder was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, it imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.12 The dispositive portion reads:

Wherefore, as to the proffer of mitigating circumstances of Passion and Obfuscation as defined by Art. 13 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated, what can be appreciated only is the voluntary surrender which is
covered by Art. 13 par. 7 of the Revised Penal Code.

So from the evidence extant from the records, the court finds the accused Marcelino Oloverio, GUILTY of the crime
of Murder as the evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of
Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. The voluntary surrender is none availing as reclusion perpetua is not a divisible
penalty as defined by the Revised Penal Code.

The accused Marcelino Oloverio is also ordered to pay Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos damages to the heirs of
Rodulfo Gulane.

SO ORDERED.13

The case records were forwarded to the Court of Appeals on May 6, 2010.14

On January 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision15 affirming the conviction. It found that Oloverio
failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that Gulane "committed an unlawful act which sufficiently
caused him to act with passion and obfuscation."16
The Court of Appeals found that Gulane’s act of insulting Oloverio before the stabbing was unsupported by
evidence.17 Instead, it found that treachery was present since Gulane was unsuspecting when Oloverio suddenly
attacked him. The court also noted that Gulane was already 83 years old and might not have had a chance to
defend himself.18

The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of
Oloverio’s voluntary surrender.19 It, however, modified the award of damages to include moral, temperate, and
exemplary damages.20 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2010 of the RTC,
Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte in Criminal Case No. P-1163 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that with respect to the trial court’s award of Php50,000.00
damages, this should be understood to represent the civil indemnity. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Rodulfo Gulane Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, and Php30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All damages shall be subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)

On March 18, 2013, Oloverio filed his Notice of Appeal,22 which was favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals.23

In compliance with this court’s Resolution24 dated April 2, 2014, Oloverio and the Office of the Solicitor General
separately manifested that they were no longer filing their supplemental briefs before this court since they have
already stated their arguments in their briefs before the Court of Appeals.25

Upon review of the case records, this court resolves to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He is
entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and of voluntary surrender.

Murder is the act of killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The provision states:

ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 24626 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken
the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a
street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
To be able to sustain a conviction for murder, the prosecution must prove the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.

3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.

4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.27

For murder or homicide, the prosecution must also be able to prove the accused had the intent to kill.28

The witnesses, Panday and Pogay, positively identified accused-appellant as the one who stabbed Gulane with
a bolo.

Panday stated:

Q: When you saw Rodulfo Gulane walking alone towards Brgy. San Pablo, Palompon, Leyte, do you recall of any
untoward incident that took place?

A: Yes, sir, I saw the incident.

Q: What was that incident?

A: Rodulfo Gulane was killed by [a] certain Marcelino Oloverio.

Q: Now, you said that Rodulfo Gulane was killed by Marcelino Oloverio, what was used by Marcelino Oloverio in
killing the deceased?

A: A bolo.

....

Q: Now, you said that Rodulfo Gulane was killed by Marcelino Oloverio with the use of this bolo, would you describe
to this Honorable Court, how and in what way did Marcelino Oloverio killed [sic] Rodulfo Gulane?

A: Yes, while Rodulfo Gulane was walking, Marcelino Oloverio held the right shoulder of Rodulfo Gulane then
stabbed him many times and there was strucking [sic] the victim Rodulfo Gulane.29

(Emphasis supplied)

Pogay also testified:

Q: When you reached Brgy. Belen, what have you observed?

A: I observed Lino stabbed Dolpo [sic] Gulane and when Dolfo Gulane fell down, he said "Patay na ang datu sa
Brgy. San Pablo."

....

Q: If you can recall, how many times did Marcelino Oloverio stab Rodulfo Gulane?

A: Many times and there was also a hacking blow.30

Their testimonies were consistent with the medico-legal findings that Gulane died due to multiple stab wounds. Both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals also found that the witnesses had no ill motive to testify against accused-
appellant.31

The intent to kill is established not only by the number of stab wounds found on Gulane, but also by accused-
appellant’s own admission that he stabbed Gulane.32

II

The presence of treachery, however, has not been sufficiently established. Treachery is defined by the Revised
Penal Code as:

ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. — The following are aggravating circumstances:

....

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.

For treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be proven:

(a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.33

In People v. Lobino:34

In People vs. Estrellanes, we declared in no uncertain terms that ‘the mere fact that the victim had no weapon with
which he could have defended himself is not sufficient to prove the existence of the first element of treachery, for
settled is the rule that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself.’ [sic] Furthermore, there must be some evidence, none of which, however, obtains in
the instant case, showing that this mode of assault is deliberately or consciously adopted to insure the execution of
the crime without risk to the offender. Accordingly, if the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but
was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocation on the part of the
victim, then no treachery attended the commission of the crime. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked[.]35 (Emphasis supplied)

Pogay testified that Gulane was walking down the road when accused-appellant came up behind him, tapped him
on the shoulder, and then stabbed him repeatedly, thus:

Q: You said Rodulfo Gulane[,] before the stabbing, was heading towards Brgy. San Pablo, while he was walking
where was the accused positioned himself? [sic]

A: He was following the victim and then he tapped the right shoulder and stabbed him.

....

Pros. Macapugas: Mr. Witness, during the stabbing incident, did you know whether or not the victim in this case was
able to retaliate?

A: No ma’am, he was not able to retaliate.36 (Emphasis supplied)

The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery. There must be evidence to
show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success.37
At the time of the incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Accused-appellant was standing behind him. He
already had the advantage of surprise with Gulane’s back turned. Gulane’s advanced age and position would have
ensured his death as it would have prevented him from being able to retaliate.

Instead, accused-appellant tapped Gulane on the shoulder as if to call his attention. He waited until Gulane was
facing him before he started stabbing. The medico-legal report indicates stab wounds on the chest and
extremities,38 proving that Gulane was stabbed from the front.

In People v. Real:39

As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was
coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.
The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just
triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the
victim.40 (Emphasis supplied)

The attack, while sudden, cannot be said to have been unexpected or unprovoked. Accused-appellant alleged that
before the attack, Gulane had been insulting him and mocking him in a loud voice, "How many times did you have
sexual intercourse with your mother?"41 This utterance, along with testimonies of Gulane’s previous insults, would
have been sufficient provocation for accused-appellant to stab him.

Since treachery has not been proven, the crime is merely homicide. Under the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another without
the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of
homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

The penalties of the accused-appellant must be modified accordingly.

III

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation42 is present in this case.

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the accused must be able
to prove the following elements:

1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and

2. that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.43

In People v. Lobino:44

It has been held that "[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst
of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason."

"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel
or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such
a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must
necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense."

Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal equanimity."45 (Emphasis
supplied)
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The provocation and the commission of
the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of time has passed during which the accused would
have calmed down and be able to reflect on the consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the
accused has not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when he committed the crime.

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be examined on a case-to-case
basis.

In People v. Mojica,46 Aurelio Mojica was accused of murder for stabbing Diosdado Tormon to death. He attempted
to mitigate his liability by alleging that the victim humiliated him a month before the incident. The trial court convicted
him of murder without appreciating the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. This court agreed,
stating:

The last point to consider is whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation ought to have been
appreciated in favor of appellant. What was done to him on that fateful day of November 16, 1968 when he was
subjected to treatment offensive to his dignity, having been slapped and asked to kneel down in the attitude of a
supplicant, certainly could give rise to the feeling of passion or obfuscation. There is a host of cases from United
States v. Ferrer, a 1901 decision, to People v. Pareja, decided in 1969, that so attests. Conduct of that character, in
the language of United States v. Salandanan, would ordinarily be expected to have produced "such powerful
excitement as to overcome reason and self-control." Unfortunately for appellant, however, this mitigating
circumstance cannot be invoked because the killing took place one month and five days later. The language of
Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala is relevant: "As to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation we likewise cannot agree that it can be taken into consideration because more than twentyfour hours
elapsed after the insults of Cotton to the accused and the criminal act." In the relatively recent case of People v.
Constantino, such a plea was likewise rejected. There the killing took place after four days. As pointed out by
Justice Romualdez in People v. Alanguilang: "In order that the circumstance of obfuscation can be considered, it is
necessary to establish the existence of an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and
that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity." Reference may also
be made to People v. Dagatan, where this Court could not consider the presence of this mitigating circumstance as
the act that caused the resentment "took place long before the commission of the crime." People v. Gervacio had
another way of putting it, "a time not far removed from the commission of the crime." The lower court, therefore, did
not commit any error in refusing to credit appellant with the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation.47 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, a fight between the accused and the victim prior to the crime is not always enough to be able to
successfully prove that passion and obfuscation attended it.

This court did not appreciate passion and obfuscation in People v. Rabanillo,48 where the accused killed the victim
30 minutes after they came to blows:

Suarez and Magalong testified that before the hacking incident, MORALES reprimanded RABANILLO in front of
their drinking mates for dousing him with water, which entered into his ear. RABANILLO resented it and felt
humiliated. Hence, a fistfight ensued, but was eventually broken up. The event must have continued to dominate
RABANILLO’s thought that he decided to strike back at the victim by hacking him to death. Clearly, the assault was
made in a fit of anger.

For passion and obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and
unreason that naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The
excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation.

Moreover, the act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained his normal equanimity. Thus, it has been
held that where at least half an hour elapsed between the previous fight and the killing, the accused cannot be given
the benefit of the attenuating circumstance of obfuscation.
In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fistfight and the killing of MORALES by RABANILLO. The attack
cannot, therefore, be said to be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. Having been
actuated more by the spirit of revenge or by anger and resentment for having been publicly berated by MORALES,
RABANILLO cannot be credited with the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.49 (Emphasis
supplied)

This court clarifies in People v. Bautista:50

The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or
excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-
control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the
offense.51

This court has also ruled that acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts done with passion and
obfuscation.

In People v. Caber,52 Francisco Caber was seen chasing Teodoro Ramirez with a bladed weapon, locally known as
a pisao, and stabbing Ramirez twice, which resulted in his death.

Caber tried to argue that he stabbed Ramirez in a fit of passion and obfuscation and alleged that Ramirez raped his
wife three (3) days before the incident. This court rejected the claim:

Even assuming, however, that he really killed Ramirez because of passion or obfuscation in order to avenge the
wrong done to his wife by the victim, still he cannot be credited with this circumstance as he would then have acted
"in the spirit of revenge." Furthermore, although accused-appellant's wife was allegedly raped by Ramirez on
November 17, 1994, the stabbing incident in question took place three days later or on November 20, 1994. Thus,
the act which was supposed to have caused passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused-appellant was so far
removed from the date of the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala, the Court ruled that the lapse of more than 24
hours, reckoned from the commission of the act which produced the passion or obfuscation up to the time of the
commission of the felony, constituted a considerable period of time after which such circumstance would no longer
be deemed present.53 (Emphasis supplied)

The facts of this case, however, are similar to that in People v. Real.54 In Real, Melchor Real and Edgardo Corpuz,
his fellow market vendor, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish.
The municipal mayor, then present at the scene, tried to pacify them and told them that they were arguing over
trivial matters. Both parties calmed down after a while.

Corpuz, however, said something to Real, to which Real softly uttered, "You are being too oppressive." When
Corpuz kept walking near the table, Real started to sharpen his bolo. As Corpuz turned his back, Real hacked him
with his bolo which caused his death.

Real was held liable for homicide, but this court took into account the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, stating that:

[t]he act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce passion and obfuscation,
considering that the incident happened in a market place within full view and within hearing distance of many
people.55

This court also noted:

In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had sharpened his bolo in
full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim
so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near
appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.56
Accused-appellant admitted that he stabbed Gulane but alleged that they had been fighting. He alleged that Gulane
had been hurling insults at him which provoked him to react; in effect, he alleged that the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation was present in this case.57

The Court of Appeals rejected his contention and stated that no evidence was presented to prove that immediately
before or at the time of the incident, there was an altercation between accused-appellant and Gulane that would
provoke his reaction.

Panday testified:

Q: Do you remember if there was any altercation that took place between the accused and the victim in this case
before the incident?

A: I have not heard any argument from both of them and he stabbed Rodulfo Gulane and Rodulfo Gulane uttered
the words in a vernacular, "Man luba kaman Ling."58

Pogay further testified:

Q: Before the stabbing incident, have you noticed if there was an altercation between Rodulfo Gulane and Marcelino
Oloverio?

A: No, sir.59

Panday, however, clarifies:

Q: Now, before the actual stabbing of the victim in this case, you said there was no altercation between the accused
and Rodulfo Gulane, now, if you can recall[,] if there was any incident that took place immediately before the
stabbing incident?

A: I cannot say any but what I only say is that I only saw the incident.60 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution could not prove that an altercation might have occurred between accused-appellant and Gulane
before the incident since their eyewitnesses could only testify to the actual stabbing.

The Court of Appeals also failed to take into account the testimony of Lamoste, the defense witness.

Lamoste testified that he and accused-appellant worked together, as he was then the barangay captain and
accused-appellant was a barangay tanod. He alleged that accused-appellant’s daughter once confided to
accusedappellant that Gulane told her that he wanted to touch her private parts.61

Lamoste testified that about a month before the incident, he witnessed Gulane telling accused-appellant, "Kumusta
na man mo imo mama nagtap-il mo imo mama naba mo produkto?" ("How is your relationship with your mother
have you produced fruits with your mother?") He alleged that accused-appellant got angry and tried to attack
Gulane, but he was able to intervene and part the two.62

The prosecution did not deny any portion of Lamoste’s testimony and only insisted that no altercation occurred
immediately before the stabbing.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its understanding of passion and obfuscation to refer only to
the emotions accused-appellant felt in the seconds before a crime is committed. It failed to understand that passion
may linger and build up over time as repressed anger enough to obfuscate reason and self-control.

The circumstances of both victim and accused-appellant were also not taken into account by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant referred to Gulane as the "datu" or rich man of Barangay San Pablo. Gulane enjoyed an
economic ascendancy over accused-appellant, a mere barangay tanod.

Gulane not only threatened to molest accused-appellant’s daughter but also accused him in public of having
incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was said to have insulted accused-appelant in full view of his
immediate superior, the barangay captain.

Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small locality of Palompon, Leyte. As with any small town, it was a
place where a person’s degrading remarks against another could be made the measure of the latter’s character.
Gulane’s insults would have been taken into serious consideration by the town’s residents because of his wealth
and stature in the community.

There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that way towards accused-appellant nor any evidence to show
that accused-appellant had previously wronged him.

The prosecution did not deny that Gulane insulted accused-appellant on various occasions. The witnesses could not
state with reasonable certainty that Gulane did not provoke accused-appellant a few minutes before the incident;
they could only testify to the incident itself and the seconds which preceded it.

In view of these considerations, we find that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present in this
case.

IV

According to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals considered accused-appellant’s voluntary surrender to the authorities as a mitigating
circumstance.63 We find no reason to disturb this conclusion.

Considering that there are two (2) mitigating circumstances in accused-appellant’s favor, the imposable penalty
must be that which is next lower to that prescribed by law. Article 64 (5) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ARTICLE 64. Rules for the Application of Penalties Which Contain Three Periods. — In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall
observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not mitigating or
aggravating circumstances:

....

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court
shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to
the number and nature of such circumstances.

Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, the minimum of which should be within the range
of prision correccional64 and the maximum of which should be within the range of prision mayor.65

Based on the records, accused-appellant was put under preventive imprisonment pending his conviction by the trial
court.

In accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time undergone by accused-appellant under
preventive imprisonment shall be credited to his service of sentence, provided that he has given his written
conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners. The provision states:

"ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or accused who
have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner
agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

"1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

"2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

"If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with
four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment[.]"66

The letter of PGI Gilbert P. Cayubit, Officer-in-Charge of the Leyte Sub-Provincial Jail, stated that accused-appellant
had been transferred to Leyte Regional Prison on May 4, 2010.67 The transfer to Leyte Regional Prison was also
confirmed by SO2 Jorge A. Colanta, Officer-in-Charge of the Leyte Regional Prison, who stated that accused-
appellant was received by the prison on May 27, 2010.68

As the exact length of time cannot be determined with certainty, the trial court shall determine the exact period of
preventive imprisonment that may be credited in accused-appellant’s favor.

The monetary awards must also be modified. In a prosecution for murder or homicide, civil indemnity and moral
damages may be awarded without need of further proof other than the victim’s death.69 The monetary awards of
_50,000.00 in civil indemnity and _50,000.00 in moral damages are in line with prevailing jurisprudence.70 Temperate
damages may also be awarded in lieu of actual damages, as in this case where the prosecution failed to prove proof
of actual damages.71 The award of exemplary damages, however, ·must be deleted in view of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.72

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

As the crime was attended with the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and voluntary surrender
with no aggravating circumstance, accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four ( 4) months, and one ( 1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.73 The period of his preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written confonnity to abide by the disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Accused-appellant Marcelino Oloverio is further ordered to pay the heirs of Rodulfo Gulane the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civi.l indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. All
damages awarded shall be subject to the rate of 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until
its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
Designated as acting member per S.O. No. I 95 I dated March 18, 2015.

1
Rollo, pp. 3-14. The Decision, docketed as CA-G.R. No. CEB-CR HC No. 0 I I 75, was penned by
Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-
Manahan and Maria Elisa Sempio-Diy of the Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals Cebu.

2
Id. at 4.

3
Id.

4
Id.

5
Id.

6
Id. at 4–5.

7
Id. at 5.

8
Id. at 5.

9
Id. at 6.

10
Id.

11
CA rollo, pp. 45–48.

12
Id. at 47–48.

13
Id. at 48.

14
Id. at 8.

15
Rollo, pp. 3–14.

16
Id. at 11.

17
Id. at 11–12.
18
Id. at 11.

19
Id. at 12.

20
Id. at 12–13.

21
Id. at 13.

22
CA rollo, p. 92.

23
Id. at 119.

24
Rollo, p. 20.

25
Id. at 21–23 and 26–27.

REVISED PENAL CODE. ARTICLE 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
26

whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

People v. De la Cruz, 626 Phil. 631, 639 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division], citing L.B. REYES, THE
27

REVISED PENAL CODE CRIMINAL LAW 469 (16th ed., 2006).

Cirera v. People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014

28

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/181843.pdf> [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division], citing Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 193 (2006) [Per J. Chico- Nazario, First
Division] and People v. Pagador, 409 Phil. 338, 351–352 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

29
Rollo, p. 9.

30
Id. at 9–10.

31
Id. at 10.

32
CA rollo, p. 36.

People v. Lobino, 375 Phil. 1065, 1076 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc], citing People vs. Valles, 334
33

Phil. 763 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Second Division].

34
375 Phil. 1065 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].

Id., citing People vs. Valles, 334 Phil. 763 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Second Division], in turn citing People v.
35

Estrellanes, G.R. No. 111003, December 15, 1994, 267 SCRA 103, 114–115 [Per J. Davide, Jr., First
Division].

36
Rollo, p. 10.

See Cirera v. People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014

37

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/181843.pdf> [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division], citing People v. Sabanal, 254 Phil. 433, 436 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, First
Division], People v. Ayupan, 427 Phil. 200, 219 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], and People v.
Templo, 400 Phil. 471, 493 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].

38
Rollo, p. 10.

39
312 Phil. 775 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division].
 Id. at 780–781, citing People v. Aguiluz, G.R. No. 91662. March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 187 [Per J.
40

Regalado, Second Division].

41
Rollo, p. 5.

42
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 13. Mitigating Circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:

....

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.

People v. Lobino, 375 Phil. 1065, 1074 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc], citing I L. B. REYES, REVISED
43

PENAL CODE 272 (14th ed., 1998).

44
375 Phil. 1065 (1999) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].

Id. at 1074–1075, citing People v. Valles, G.R. No. 110564, January 28, 1997, 267 SCRA 103, 116 [Per J.
45

Torres, Second Division], People v. Bautista, 325 Phil. 83 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division], and I L.B.
REYES, REVISED PENAL CODE 274 (14th ed., 1998).

46
162 Phil. 657 (1976) [Per Acting C.J. Fernando, Second Division].

Id. at 666–668, citing U.S. v. Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56 (1901) [Per J. Mapa, En Banc], People v. Pareja, 141 Phil.
47

379 (1969) [Per Curiam, En Banc], U.S. v. Salandanan, 1 Phil. 464 (1902) [Per J. Mapa, En Banc], U.S. v.
Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], People v. Constantino, 127 Phil. 381 (1967) [Per J.
Bengzon, J.P., En Banc], People v. Alanguilang, 52 Phil. 663 (1929) [Per J. Romualdez, En Banc], People v.
Dagatan, 106 Phil. 88 (1959) [Per J. Endencia, En Banc], and People v. Gervacio, 133 Phil. 805 (1968) [Per
Curiam, En Banc].

48
367 Phil. 114 (1999) [Per C.J. Davide, En Banc].

Id. at 126–127, citing People v. Bautista, 325 Phil. 83 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division], People v.
49

Cruz, 53 Phil. 635 (1929) [Per J. Romualdez, En Banc], People v. Giner, 6 Phil. 406 (1906) [Per J. Torres,
En Banc], U.S. v. Herrera, 13 Phil. 583, 585 (1909) [Per C.J. Arellano, En Banc], People v. Layson, 140 Phil.
491 (1969) [Per Curiam, En Banc], and People v. Matbagon, 60 Phil. 887, 890 (1934) [Per J. Vickers, En
Banc].

50
325 Phil. 83 (1996) [J. Bellosillo, First Division].

51
Id. at 93, citing People v. Giner, 6 Phil. 406 (1906) [Per J. Torres, En Banc].

52
399 Phil. 743 (2000) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

53
Id., citing U.S. v. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

54
312 Phil. 775 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First Division].

55
Id. at 781.

56
Id.

57
Rollo, p. 5 and CA rollo, p. 42.

58
Rollo at 9.

59
Id. at 10.
 60
Id. at 9.

61
Id. at 5–6.

62
CA rollo, p. 46.

63
Rollo, p. 12 and CA rollo, p. 48.

64
The duration of prision correcional is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

65
The duration of prision mayor is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

66
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 29, as amended by Rep. Act No. 10592 (2012).

67
CA rollo, p. 97.

68
Rollo, p. 35.

69
See Heirs of Castro v. Bustos, 136 Phil. 553 (1969) [Per J. Barredo, En Banc].

See Guevara v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384 [Per J. Brion, Second
70

Division], Almojuela v. People, G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014,

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/june2014/183202.pdf> [Per J. Brion,
Second Division], and Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014 http://sc.judiciary.gov.
ph/pdf/web/viewer.htm l?fi le=/j urisprudence/2014/november2014/189405. pdf [Per J. Peralta, Third
Division].

See Guevara v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5, 2014, 715 SCRA 384 [Per J. Brion, Second
71

Division].

72
CIVIL CODE. art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

73
See Heirs of Castro v. Bustos, 136 Phil. 553 (1969) [Per J. Barredo, En Banc].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22231 March 21, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARCELO PAAT alias PEDRING, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felix R. Rosacia for defendant-appellant.

DIZON, J.:
 Marcelo Paat alias Pedring, Virgilio Paat and Juan Donato 2.0, were charged below with murder. After trial
upon a plea of not guilty, the lower court acquitted Juan Donato and Virgilio Paat on the ground of reasonable doubt,
but convicted Marcelo Paat as charged and, after considering in his favor the mitigating circumstance of having
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation, sentenced him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Teodorico Catuiran
in the sum of P6,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay 1/3 of the costs.

Marcelo Paat appealed to the Court of Appeals, but after a review of the evidence, said court found that, on
the basis thereof, Paat was guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, and without any right to have the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation considered in his favor. As the imposable penalty would then be reclusion
perpetua, said court certified the appeal to Us pursuant to section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

The Court of Appeals, after a careful consideration of the testimony of prosecution witnesses, correctly found
that it established the following facts:

xxx xxx xxx

in the morning of August 25, 1957, Juan Donato, Virgilio Paat, and Marcelo Paat were in the market
place of the barrio of Masical in the municipality of Amulong in the province of Cagayan. The three brothers
Ricardo, Eulogio and Teodorico, all surnamed Catuiran, were likewise in the said market place. Eulogio and
Teodorico were drinking basi in a tienda while Ricardo was reading an issue of the
magazine Bannawag some distance from the tienda. Eulogio invited Juan Donato, who was nearby to
drink basi; the latter excused himself, saying that he was not drinking. Eulogio felt insulted and said to
Donato: "It seems that you resent us". An altercation ensued, in which Virgilio Paat and Teodorico Catuiran
intervened. Juan Donato held the right hand of Teodorico while Virgilio held Teodorico's left hand. At this
very juncture, the accused Marcelo Paat approached and stabbed Teodorico in the back with a small bolo
(imuca). When Donato and Virgilio released their hold on Teodorico, the latter drew his bolo, swung it and hit
Virgilio in the abdomen. Teodorico took a few steps, slumped to the ground, and expired.

According to Dr. Dulce Donato Baculi, the municipal health officer, Teodorico Catuiran sustained a
"stab wound above the superior angle of the right scapula running horizontally, penetrating the upper lobe of
the right lung about 5½ inches deep and about 1 inch wide" (see exh. A, post mortem examination report).
This wound was fatal; Teodorico died of hemorrhage and shock.

The same court found that the evidence for the defense tended to prove that on the morning in question — 1äwphï1.ñët

. . . Virgilio Paat and Marcelo Paat were in the market place looking for men whom they could employ
to transplant palay in their land in Bayabat. Virgilio was invited by Eulogio Catuiran to drink basi. Virgilio
declined the offer, but because of the insistence of Eulogio he drank a little. Eulogio suggested to Virgilio
that the latter buy another bottle of basi so that all of them could drink. Virgilio declined, saying that he had
no more than P0.20. Nevertheless, he bought another bottle and they drank. After this bottle was emptied,
Eulogio again requested Virgilio to buy another bottle. Virgilio excused himself this time, saying that he had
no more money. At this juncture, Eulogio hurled these remarks at Virgilio. "You are the same as the old man
your uncle Juan Donato. Vulva of your mother". Virgilio was incensed, and he retorted, "what is the matter
with you ? Because this is your place, you are scandalizing me. Leche!" As Virgilio said this, he swung his
hands and struck Eulogio's forehead. Forthwith, Teodorico stabbed Virgilio, from behind, and hit the right
side of the latter's abdomen. Teodorico attempted to stab Virgilio a second time, but the latter retreated. The
appellant Marcelo saw Teodorico in the act of stabbing Virgilio, and he immediately ran to the rescue of
Virgilio, and stabbed Teodorico in the back. Juan Donato was not present when Marcelo stabbed Teodorico,
as he had walked away to return to his house in Masical.

Virgilio was taken to the hospital in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and was examined by Dr. Gregorio Reyes.
Virgilio sustained a penetrating wound in his right loin; the right side of the middle third of his large intestine
was punctured. Dr. Reyes performed the necessary surgical operation on Virgilio. In court he declared that
Virgilio could not have survived for more than 48 hours without the surgical operation.
 It is clear from the foregoing that the decisive issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether appellant inflicted
the mortal wound that caused the death of Teodorico Catuiran in defense of his brother Virgilio.

After a careful consideration of the entire testimonial evidence of record, We have come to the conclusion that
the trial court committed no error in according full credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. Particular
mention must be made of that given by prosecution witness Alfonso Binayug against whose credibility and
impartiality the record discloses nothing. In a clear and straightforward manner he testified that while he was buying
some merchandise in the market place of Masical he heard a scream; that thereupon, as he looked in the direction
the scream came from, he saw Juan Donato holding the right hand of Teodorico Catuiran and Virgilio Paat holding
the left; that it was at that juncture that appellant, coming from behind, stabbed Teodorico in the back; that as
appellant pulled his weapon from the back of his victim, Juan and Virgilio almost simultaneously released their hold
on Teodorico and ran away; that when Virgilio passed in front of Teodorico, the latter was able to draw his bolo and
stabbed him on the right side of his abdomen.

Having arrived at the conclusion that it is the prosecution evidence that has established the manner and
circumstances under which appellant stabbed the deceased Teodorico, We must necessarily reject his claim that he
committed the crime to defend the life of his brother Virgilio. As it was only after appellant had already mortally
wounded Teodorico Catuiran that the latter, already free from the hold of Juan Donato and Virgilio Paat, was able to
stab Virgilio, it is abundantly clear that the theory of the defense has no leg to stand upon.

With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, We agree with the Solicitor General
that the trial court erred in taking it into account in favor of appellant. Upon the facts proven beyond reasonable
doubt, there was no reason for appellant to have acted under the influence of passion or obfuscation. While it is true
that Teodorico Catuiran tried — as did Virgilio Paat — to intervene in the altercation that took place between Juan
Donato and Eulogio Catuiran, the evidence shows that Virgilio and Juan Donato immediately rendered Teodorico
helpless by holding his hands, and it was while the latter was in such helpless condition that appellant stabbed him
from behind.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are of the opinion and so hold, that the crime committed by appellant
was that of murder, qualified by treachery. There being no modifying circumstance present, the penalty provided by
law — reclusion temporal to death — should be imposed in its medium period, that is, reclusion perpetua. Thus
modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.