Hiring Policies/Standards
pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989.
G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
Facts:
Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8") with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man
of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual1 of PAL.
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,
petitioner failed to meet the company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner’s weight
problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with
company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was
formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was
also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was
advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of
losing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently,
his off-duty status was retained.
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence
to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds
from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment 3 to reduce weight in a letter
addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios.
The letter, in full, reads:
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such
time that my ideal weight is achieved.
Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time
schedule you will set for my weight check.
Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui4
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with
the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was
reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for
processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates. 6 Again, petitioner
ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to
explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way
over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on
the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5,
1992.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within
which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence. 8
On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.9 Notably, he did not deny being overweight.
What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since "no
action has been taken by the company" regarding his case "since 1988." He also claimed that PAL
discriminated against him because "the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members
who are similarly situated."
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, "and considering the utmost leniency" extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total
of almost five (5) years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,12 petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PAL.
Labor Arbiter - petitioner was illegally dismissed.
NLRC - WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998
as modified by our findings herein, is hereby AFFIRMED
CA - The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private
respondent’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Issue:
WON the dismissal was valid
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in
that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half
(1/2) month’s pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.
Ratio:
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.
The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by
the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere "orders" of the employer;
they were the "prescribed weights" that a cabin crew must maintain in order to
qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were
standards that establish continuing qualifications for an employee’s position. In
this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a)
whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for
dismissal. The failure to meet the employer’s qualifying standards is in fact a
ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that
falls under Article 282(e) – the "other causes analogous to the foregoing."
By its nature, these "qualifying standards" are norms that apply prior to and
after an employee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the
standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after
hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job
in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults
for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282;
the employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer "qualifies" for his job
irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was willful or intentional. x x
x45
Petitioner claims that obesity is a "physical abnormality and/or illness." Relying on Nadura v. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.,47 he says his dismissal is illegal:
Conscious of the fact that Nadura’s case cannot be made to fall squarely within the
specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the
provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Nadura’s illness – occasional attacks
of asthma – is a cause analogous to them.
Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to
convince anyone that, as the trial court said, "illness cannot be included as an
analogous cause by any stretch of imagination."
It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others
expressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the
employee. How Nadura’s illness could be considered as "analogous" to any of them
is beyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was
contracted through his own voluntary act.48
The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the
case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was
Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale
there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work
because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards
of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed
employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the
dismissal of petitioner for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the
employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given
more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is could I bring my weight
down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now."49
Types of Illegal Recruitment - Simple Illegal Recruitment
G.R. No. 167590
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE),
the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), the OVERSEAS
WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR ARBITERS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), the HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and the
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (P ASEI), Respondent.
Facts:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas
employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant
workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being
unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up this point
later together with a related case.)
(Sections 6, 7, and 9)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts constituting the same.
Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-license or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or
non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons
shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any
person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two hundred
thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less
than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from "illegal recruitment"
before the RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
(RTC Manila)
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of
"illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11
and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal
protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities.
(Supreme Court)
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s
finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters.
By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers" without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section.
On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the
appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of
the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
(RTC Manila)

The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of
the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application
of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a
report under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department under Section 6(g) are
penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of ₱200,000.00 but which
could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three persons.
(Supreme Court)
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it
believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in the lists.
But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its
prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy
of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the
Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further
stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212 which increased even more the duration of the
penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work
outside the country’s borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an
effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by
greed, are willing to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat
such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura, the State under its police power "may prescribe such regulations
as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against
the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is "that
inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."
(RTC Manila)
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties
to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal
cases which is the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said the
RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence
of the offended parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended
party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the
criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however,
That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in
court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
(Supreme Court)
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of
Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that
law’s declared policy15 of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of
the victims of illegal recruitment.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case)
(RTC Quezon City)
The Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10 of
R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the
erring company had knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable
would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas
employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
(Supreme Court)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors
and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must
be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or
tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White Falcon,20 while there is
evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate
officers and directors, were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions in
Jasmin’s case.

As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment
of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking
to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional,
the Court must uphold its validity.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and
constitutional.
Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
G.R. No. 181244 August 9, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANITA "KENNETH" TRINIDAD, Defendant and Appellant.
Criminal Law; Labor Law; Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8042);
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.—Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 or the “Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” defines illegal recruitment as “any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referring contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Witnesses; Criminal Procedure; Evidence; The well-settled rule is that the
credibility of witnesses is best left to the judgment of the trial judge whose findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal, absent any showing that substantial errors were committed or that determinative
facts were overlooked which, if appreciated, would call for a different conclusion.—All three private
complainants testified in a categorical and straightforward manner; hence, the trial court properly
accorded full faith and credence to their declarations on the witness stand. The well-settled rule is that the
credibility of witnesses is best left to the judgment of the trial judge whose findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal, absent any showing that substantial errors were committed or that determinative
facts were overlooked which, if appreciated, would call for a different conclusion. The trial court has the
advantage, not available to the appellate courts, of observing the deportment of witnesses and their
manner of testifying during trial. Thus, the appellate courts confer highest respect to such findings and
conclusions of the lower courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is contrary to human nature and experience for persons to conspire
and accuse a stranger of a crime, or even a casual acquaintance for that matter, that would take the
latter’s liberty and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and assuage the
frustration of their dreams to go abroad.—Besides, the only defense offered by appellant against the
allegations against her was mere denial, an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal testimonies of complainants. Bare denials, without clear and convincing
evidence to support them, cannot sway judgment. They are self-serving statements which can easily be
put forward. It is inconceivable that private complainants would be mistaken in their claim that it was
appellant who recruited them considering that it was she who personally talked with them on several
occasions and received the sums of money for which she issued receipts. It is contrary to human nature
and experience for persons to conspire and accuse a stranger of a crime, or even a casual acquaintance for
that matter, that would take the latter’s liberty and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of
rejection and assuage the frustration of their dreams to go abroad.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta of Overseas Filipino Workers, is a significant improvement on existing laws
in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment—it broadened the concept of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties therefor, especially those that
constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment
Committed by a Syndicate.—The proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on
innocent people anxious to obtain employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the
enactment of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater
protection to Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the
recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment. Otherwise known as the Magna Carta of
Overseas Filipino Workers, it broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and
provided stiffer penalties therefor, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.
Same; Same; Same; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; The accused is guilty of illegal recruitment in
large scale because it was committed against three private complainants.—In the instant case,appellant
is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed against three private complainants.
This is in accordance with the penultimate paragraph of Section 6 Republic Act No. 8042 which provides,
thus: Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
Facts:
Sometime in May 1998, private complainant Elizabeth de Villa (De Villa), together with her cousin Elma
Hernandez, was brought by their aunt Patricia to the house of appellant in Pasay City for possible job
placement as domestic helpers in Italy.4 A cousin of hers was earlier able to leave for abroad through the
help of appellant.5 Convinced by appellant’s representation that she can send her to Italy, De Villa agreed
to give appellant ₱240,000.00, representing the price of her ticket and the processing of her
papers,6 which amount she paid in three installments. The first installment of ₱100,000.00, was given by
de Villa to appellant in the same month of May after their first meeting. 7 This initial payment was
covered by a handwritten receipt signed and issued by appellant herself.8 The second and third
installments, in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 and ₱90,000.00, respectively, were paid by de Villa in June
and August 1998.9 These latter amounts were no longer covered by receipts because, according to De
Villa, appellant had won her trust as a result of the former’s assurances that she would be able to send her
to Italy.10
On 8 August 1998, de Villa and three other recruits left the Philippines. 11 However, instead of sending
them to Italy, appellant and accused Mauro Marasigan (Marasigan) sent them to Bangkok, Thailand and
told them that they (appellant and Marasigan) will secure the visas for Italy in Bangkok because it would
be easier to get an Italian visa in Bangkok.12
Elma Hernandez (Hernandez), a cousin of De Villa, was likewise introduced to appellant by their aunt
Patricia sometime after the elections of May 1998. Upon meeting appellant, Hernandez asked if appellant
could really send her to Italy to work as a domestic helper, and appellant replied positively. Whereupon,
she agreed to give ₱240,000.00 to appellant representing the expenses for the processing of her Italian
visa.13 Hernandez paid this amount in three installments.
Appellant told her that she was tentatively scheduled to leave in May 1998, but because the processing of
her papers were allegedly not completed on time, appellant moved her flight to August. Hernandez was
able to leave the Philippines on this later date but not for Italy as agreed upon, but for Bangkok where
appellant will allegedly secure her Italian visa.17
Gemma dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) first met appellant and accused Taciana "Tess" Aquino (Aquino) on 25
August 1998 in the house of one of appellant’s victims in Blumentritt, Manila. During this meeting,
appellant and Aquino convinced her of their ability to send her to Italy as long as she can produce the
amount of ₱250,000.00. Their agreement was that Dela Cruz would give an initial amount of
₱150,000.00 and when she gets to Italy, she will give the remaining balance of ₱100,000.00. Thus, on the
same date, Dela Cruz went to appellant’s house in Pasay City and paid ₱150,000.00 to appellant. Dela
Cruz did not sign the contract because it was meant to be a proof that the ₱50,000.00 Laraya loaned to
dela Cruz to complete the ₱150,000.00 payment to appellant was indeed given to the latter. 21 This claim
was affirmed by Laraya when he took the witness stand on 27 June 2002 to testify for the prosecution.
Dela Cruz was able to leave the Philippines the following day, 26 August 2002. However, as in the cases
of De Villa and Hernandez, Dela Cruz was sent to Bangkok instead of Italy. 22
In Bangkok, De Villa, Hernandez and Dela Cruz met at the Benz Residence Hotel where appellant and
Marasigan instructed all their recruits to stay. There, they met appellant’s brother Daniel Trinidad
(Trinidad), who likewise assured them that appellant would be able to secure an Italian visa for
them.23 Appellant and Marasigan followed them to Bangkok in the month of September but nothing
happened insofar as their visas were concerned.
After staying idle for four months in Bangkok, De Villa, Hernandez, and dela Cruz, together with other
recruits, were taken by appellant and Marasigan to Morocco, again, allegedly for the purpose of securing
their Italian visa there. For this, Hernandez and Dela Cruz each spent another US$2,700, which they gave
to Marasigan and his wife Louella Garen.29
The group stayed in Morocco for two months but appellant continued to fail to deliver her promise of
securing Italian visas for them. Hence, they returned to Bangkok and stayed there for another month
during which appellant persisted in dissuading them from returning to the Philippines, assuring them that
she would send them to Italy.30 They failed to be further dissuaded, however, and they returned to the
Philippines on 27 March 1999 and on 29 March 1999, filed a complaint against appellant and her
companions.31
TC: Found ANITA "KENNETH" TRINIDAD GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT as defined under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, and
penalized under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Defense: that the real illegal recruiter is Mauro Marasigan to whom she referred private complainants
when they sought her help regarding jobs abroad and that they complained against her only because
they could no longer locate Marasigan; that she did not promise employment to complainants, that she
did not receive any money from them, and that the signature appearing on the receipt presented by
them is not hers.33
Testimonies of private complainants: that they were recruited by appellant, who was not duly licensed
to conduct recruitment activities, as certified34 by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) and the testimony of prosecution witness Rosa Mangila, Senior Labor and Employment
Officer of the POEA. (naniwala si court dito)
CA: Affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Issue:
WON accused is guilty of large scale illegal recruitment
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 August 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00490, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, finding appellant
Anita "Kenneth" Trinidad guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment and ordering her to pay a fine and actual damages, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the amount of fine is increased to ₱500,000.00; and (2) appellant is
further ordered to pay Elma Hernandez the peso equivalent of US$2,700.00.
Ratio:
*see case for testomonies
It is clear from the aforequoted statements that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.1awph!1 The
respective testimonies of private complainants clearly established that appellant promised them
employment in Italy and that she asked money from them for the processing of their papers. Relying
upon appellant’s representations, complainants parted with their money. That appellant recruited them
without the requisite license from the POEA makes her liable for illegal recruitment.
The proliferation of illegal job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people anxious to obtain
employment abroad is one of the primary considerations that led to the enactment of The Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Aimed at affording greater protection to Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs), it is a significant improvement on existing laws in the recruitment and placement of
workers for overseas employment. Otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Overseas Filipino Workers,
it broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provided stiffer penalties
therefor, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and
Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.47
In the instant case, appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed
against three private complainants. This is in accordance with the penultimate paragraph of Section 6
Republic Act No. 8042 which provides, thus:
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. 48
Illegal Recruitment v ESTAFA
G.R. No. 183879 April 14, 2010
ROSITA SY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
Rosita Sy (Sy) was charged with one count of illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-0537 and
one count of estafa in Criminal Case No. 02-0536. In a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Sy was exonerated of the illegal recruitment charge. However, she was convicted of the crime
of estafa.Thus, the instant appeal involves only Criminal Case No. 02-0536 for the crime of estafa.
Version of the Prosecution
Sometime in March 1997, appellant, accompanied by Corazon Miranda (or "Corazon"), went to the
house of Corazon’s sister, Felicidad Navarro (or "Felicidad"), in Batangas to convince her (Felicidad) to
work abroad. Appellant assured Felicidad of a good salary and entitlement to a yearly vacation if she
decides to take a job in Taiwan. On top of these perks, she shall receive compensation in the amount of
Php120,000.00. Appellant promised Felicidad that she will take care of the processing of the necessary
documents, including her passport and visa. Felicidad told appellant that she will think about the job
offer.
Two days later, Felicidad succumbed to appellant’s overseas job solicitation. With Corazon in tow, the
sisters proceeded to appellant’s residence in Better Homes, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City. Thereat,
Felicidad handed to appellant the amount of Php60,000.00. In the third week of March 1997, Felicidad
returned to appellant’s abode and paid to the latter another Php60,000.00. The latter told her to come back
the following day. In both instances, no receipt was issued by appellant to acknowledge receipt of the
total amount of Php120,000.00 paid by Felicidad.
On Felicidad’s third trip to appellant’s house, the latter brought her to Uniwide in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
where a male person showed to them the birth certificate that Felicidad would use in applying for a
Taiwanese passport. The birth certificate was that of a certain Armida Lim, born to Margarita Galvez and
Lim Leng on 02 June 1952. Felicidad was instructed on how to write Armida Lim’s Chinese name.
Subsequently, appellant contacted Felicidad and thereafter met her at the Bureau of Immigration office.
Thereat, Felicidad, posing and affixing her signature as Armida G. Lim, filled out the application forms
for the issuance of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Registration
(ICR). She attached to the application forms her own photo. Felicidad agreed to use the name of Armida
Lim as her own because she already paid to appellant the amount of Php120,000.00.
In December 1999, appellant sent to Felicidad the birth certificate of Armida Lim, the Marriage Contract
of Armida Lim’s parents, ACR No. E128390, and ICR No. 317614. These documents were submitted to
and eventually rejected by the Taiwanese authorities, triggering the filing of illegal recruitment and
estafa cases against appellant.
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied offering a job to Felicidad or receiving any money from her. She asserted that when she
first spoke to Felicidad at the latter’s house, she mentioned that her husband and children freely entered
Taiwan because she was a holder of a Chinese passport. Felicidad commented that many Filipino
workers in Taiwan were holding Chinese passports.
Three weeks later, Felicidad and Corazon came to her house in Las Piñas and asked her if she knew
somebody who could help Felicidad get a Chinese ACR and ICR for a fee.
Appellant introduced a certain Amelia Lim, who, in consideration of the amount of Php120,000.00,
offered to Felicidad the use of the name of her mentally deficient sister, Armida Lim. Felicidad agreed.
On their second meeting at appellant’s house, Felicidad paid Php60,000.00 to Amelia Lim and they
agreed to see each other at Uniwide the following day. That was the last time appellant saw Felicidad and
Amelia Lim.4
RTC found Rosita Sy NOT GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Recruitment and she is hereby ACQUITTED
of the said offense. As regards the charge of Estafa, the court finds the accused GUILTY.
Aggrieved, Sy filed an appeal for her conviction of estafa. On July 22, 2008, the CA rendered a
Decision,7 affirming with modification the conviction of Sy
Issue
WON Sy should be held liable for estafa, penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).9
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 22, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30628, sentencing petitioner Rosita Sy to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, is hereby AFFIRMED. We, however, MODIFY the CA Decision as to the amount of
civil indemnity, in that Sy is ordered to reimburse the amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱120,000.00) to private complainant Felicidad Navarro.
Ratio
(Estafa)
Swindling or estafa is punishable under Article 315 of the RPC. There are three ways of committing
estafa, viz.: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1)
by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused the offended party or third person.

The act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC,
wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious
name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or
fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d)
that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 10

In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Sy misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the
capacity to deploy Felicidad Navarro (Felicidad) for employment in Taiwan. The misrepresentation was
made prior to Felicidad’s payment to Sy of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱120,000.00). It was
Sy’s misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of
Sy’s false pretenses and misrepresentations, Felicidad suffered damages as the promised employment
abroad never materialized and the money she paid was never recovered.

(Illegal Recruitment and estafa)

Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for
illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Sy’s acquittal in the illegal
recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are
entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. A
person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC.11 In the same manner, a person acquitted of illegal recruitment may be
held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum,
in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution
of which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.