Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538| Sept. 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts:
- Mariano Molo Y Legaspi (Mariano) died on January 24, 1941, and was
survived only by his wife (petitioner) and his nieces and nephew (oppositors).
- Mariano left two wills: one executed on August 17, 1918 (1918 will), and the
other on June 20, 1939 (1939 will), with the latter containing a clause
expressly revoking the former.
- After Mariano’s death, petitioner filed with the CFI a petition seeking the
probate of the 1939 will. There being no opposition, the will was probated.
o However, upon petition filed by oppositors, the order admitting the
will to probate was set aside and the case reopened. Thereafter, the
petition for probate was denied for not being executed according with
law.
- Petitioner subsequently filed another petition for probate, this time with the
1918 will.
o Oppositors filed an opposition stating that 1. Petitioner is estopped
from seeking to probate the 1918 will, 2. That said will was not
executed in a manner required by law, and 3. Said will has already
been revoked.
o Battle for liberation happened, and so the records were all lost.
Petitioner nonetheless filed a new petition similar to the one
destroyed, and oppositors filed the same grounds of opposition.
o Court admitted to probate the 1918 will.
Hence, this appeal.
Held:
- WoN petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939
will just so they could proceed with the probate of the 1918 will?—NO
o There is no evidence to justify this contention! There were
explanations made by petitioner on every “suspicious” circumstance
that the oppositors found.
 Failure to impeach the character of witness in spite of the
chance given = unable to impeach the character of the
witness because of her inability to find witnesses who may
impeach him.
 Failure to present testimony of one Artemio Reyes at the
rehearing = the latter’s whereabouts were unknown.
o If petitioner knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and
would make the testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and
ineffective, there was no need for her to go through the petition for
the probate of the same.
 This only shows that her conscience was clear.
 Also, it is unfair to impute bad faith to petitioner simply
because she exerted every effort to protect her own interest
and prevent the intestacy of the deceased.
o Hence, petitioner cannot be charged guilty of estoppel simply
because of the failure of the probate of the 1939 will.
- WoN the revocatory clause in the 1939 will nullified the prior will of 1918?—
NO
o Doctrine in Samson vs Naval is controlling in this case: “ a
subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having
been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity
with the provisions of the law, cannot produce the effect of annulling
the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”
o Although in many states in the US, such rule has been overturned,
there is reason to believe that said law is still good law (at least for
some other states). At best, opinion as regards the matter is
conflicting.
- WoN the 1918 will cannot be given effect because of the presumption that it
was revoked by testator himself in creating the second one?—NO
o There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will.
 If it is true that testator deliberately tried to destroy the 1918
will, and has given his wife, the petitioner a copy of the 1918
will beforehand, then the most logical step would have been
for Mariano to ask for such copy and destroy it as well. The
fact that the duplicate copy remained in the possession of
petitioner is proof to the contrary of oppositor’s contention.
 It is possible that after 21 years since the first will was
executed, the original had been misplaced or lost, and
forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise
to just execute a second one.
o However, granting that Mariano really wanted to destroy the previous
will, the principle of “dependent relative revocation” still steps in.
 “This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative
revocation, and is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a
new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and
the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect
for same reason…
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of
the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition
intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
 conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new
disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will…is deemed
inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will
remains in full force.
…The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon
whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to
the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and
hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a
mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will.”
 Theory of this principle: the testator did not intend to die
intestate, as shown by the two wills he executed.
 In the two wills, he instituted his wife as his universal heir.
There can therefore be no mistake of Mariano’s intent.
- WoN the 1918 will was executed in accordance with law?—YES.
o Evidence proves that the same was executed in accordance with law
(the only surviving witness’ lone testimony sufficient to prove the due
execution of the will.)
o Also, the notary public was also presented to support the stand of
petitioner as to the due execution of the will.

Order Affirmed.