Republic of the Philippines Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
and
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they
are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching
sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first
petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed
before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners
(therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII,
Section 5(5)3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from
causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of
their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return
within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the
interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule;
and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the
CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P.
decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby
REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of
any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners,
to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP
Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent
on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of
the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At
past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not
Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip,
ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow
him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz,
"Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and
residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded,
he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The
one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or
older. The leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-
haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about
30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond.
Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother
Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were
each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns
for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's)
turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army.
Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades
were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered
none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high
officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the
uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and
thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much
about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the
soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time,
Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up.
They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice
with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he
could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to
the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back
the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise
with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he
managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a
forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing
the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and
caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay.
He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a
so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed.
The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars.
He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including
urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a
small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the
firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes
detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time
urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in
white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and
mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were
sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in
the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered
him to monitor and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed
men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were
detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there,
Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo.
They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months.
When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a
basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He
was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to
which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not.
He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded
that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin
n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa
hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa
bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno." 28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00
in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to
their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still
could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents
that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents
were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four
"masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to
gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the
medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove
that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance.31 During his
testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine,
named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and
instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The
"Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed
Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya,
Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his
house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion.
He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then
blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in
the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then
he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were
training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn
Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was
abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was
made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose
name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the
24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and
Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were
put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November
6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that
camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry
Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of
the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp
until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and
Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising
livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him
and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-
bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed
because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another
time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed
only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse
near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house.
Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or
9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced
in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos
ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o
marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na
dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6
x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,
piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya
ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit
sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula
sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na
dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni
Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga
sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni
Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel,
dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at
ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry
for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care
of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell
their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for
Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped
farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When
they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted
to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and
did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents'
house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening
of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up
the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for
Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14,
2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he
got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort
Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because
Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he
could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated
from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of
Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a
military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One
time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while
Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in
different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in
Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by
Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr.
Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization
handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by
an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about
their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by
respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was
conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into
writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in
conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the
October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction
but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head
of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division
in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely:
Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of
Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan
City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal
involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it
exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement
in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining
respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of
National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the
Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense
is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies)
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I
have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d)
of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum
Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of
Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is
issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well
as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to
be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A
Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose
favor the Writ of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission
of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent
evidence that may be gathered in the process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier
filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which
averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry Batallion detachment
as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no
 untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño
and Manuel Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that
none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was
used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and
Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners
could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost
Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The
territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz,
aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning;
and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative
liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a
complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of
the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished
at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn
statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to
him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez
as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate
of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over
to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006
and finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report
is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were
forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14
February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said
incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B")
states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the
concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He
claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the
abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of
the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they
claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU.
Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C")
states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a
CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their
province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to
be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the
concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only to
know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo
Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed
that they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states
that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU
based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in
their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived
home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the
fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they implicated him
in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of
said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he
is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are
familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since
childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in
Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident
lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged
members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was living
witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of
the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he
is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former
CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of
CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged
 abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF
his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
II.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING
Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims
RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S)
that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having
AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS;
helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the
AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED
in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He claims further that he is truly
AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST
innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything
OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM
fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA
FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
member.

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let
IV. DISCUSSION
us hearken to its beginning.

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking
them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired
on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is
unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the
father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to
establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also
stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction
committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it
lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is
therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and
two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence
and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED,
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted
from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances
sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based
perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from
all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" 72 participated
in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing
and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the
other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of
the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio
Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to
protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into
the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of
those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the
judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the
official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the
full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from
the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms,
in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican
Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage
that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84 What began as a
protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect
against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these
countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including
socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to
limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of
the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human
rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo
libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its
roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin
American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability
for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive
and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of
the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII,
Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule
came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it
would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance.
The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to
the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action,
to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear
and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A
few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato
para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell
phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar." 100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit
and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six
armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire
of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning
de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU
members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military
men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George.
Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion
of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU
auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were
either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka
Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-
sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that
the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he
perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware
of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or
any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan)
met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents
to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have
been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at
the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy
that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due
process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that
Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a
house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought
them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205)
It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also
brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners' parents, where only
Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join
anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their
sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-
206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse)
with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to
take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of
the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata,
Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We
also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by
the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic
specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also
corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and
confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was
abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and
tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were
supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that
the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of
cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that
the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the
case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights
to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being
once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated
with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and
unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the
1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to
security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive
recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the right to security of person,
respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful
only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to
"report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty" 115 or being put under
"monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and
a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge...
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to
life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause
of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of
the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person -
III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or
houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a
invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and
person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX,
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
Quezon City, viz: 118
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the
the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76
invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of
Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to
free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence.
invasion, viz:
(Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional
inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the (2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
reasons.119 (emphases supplied) detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and from threat" as afore-discussed.
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
should all the more be protected from these degradations.
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the
of the individual."123 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant,
who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby
violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.
provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied)
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
(emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle,
but essentially an individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
"security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and
to investigate the circumstances in question.
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation
under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

 ...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty
and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective
if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance
of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State
as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the
victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the
ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9,
the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In
other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be
invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary
school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of
paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest
and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did
indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of
the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in
the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is
no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the
rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore
known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not
arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party
to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would
render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of
conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release
from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v.
Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party
in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a
supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner
and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v.
Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since.
The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive
and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article
5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that
individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard
against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable
claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether
there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them,
would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the
first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him
before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It
should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful
order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors
even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo
attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons
known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-
to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez,
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely
relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking
the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements
or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor
for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt
rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and
preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected
offenders before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and
undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after
the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents
have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a
writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent
threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the
government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts,
and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers,
to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006
until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable
cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other
than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified
declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by
name, with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced
must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction
has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not
a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section
1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27,
issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of
Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it
violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has
been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of
medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official
functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of
personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction.
Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical
personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make
appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009 this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule
should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondent.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor
for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with
DECISION
Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis
BRION, J.: asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy
food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts
(CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer
and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis
(respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and
Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an
November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances
"enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo
surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.9
Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention
(petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against
Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him;
Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
(2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively
Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary
referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances and the facts outlined above, the
diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to
petition went on to state:
extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly
report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the action
of respondents. xxxx

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding 7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but
General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization from the police and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget. Kunnong;

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or threats of
violation against the rights to life, liberty and security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police
agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case,
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to
file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and was
surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around
and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open the room
of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones,
documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and
other groups known to be fighting against the government;

We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for
the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may 12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of
the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was
then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information from
persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed
men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband,
subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a
clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr. Tagitis to
his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts, and/or
allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious
anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao
City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been visited by
the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby
resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try
complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no
positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but assured her
not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request for help and
failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2)
months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession and custody of
[respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the
issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing
on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours
from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement
in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete
and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely
based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have any
personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to address
concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with
the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases;
and gave the following summary:13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report
on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then
roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the
said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu
PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing
person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate
findings of the whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The
said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar
set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived
at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about
6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket
bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about
10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the
cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the
ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its
part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information
gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find
Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no
such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before
the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached to
the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to
conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October 28,
2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30,
2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student identified
as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of the said
seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with
[sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived
at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found
anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police.
The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced
disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis,
who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October
30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is being detained in
CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged
enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue
investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible
therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit
which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction or
illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in
the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER nor was there any
indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our
men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained
ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in
my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating kidnap-for-
ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping
or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to abduct
or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER Mindanao
Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and
apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the cause,
manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about
the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to
submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with Police
Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office
(PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to leave any
stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar
of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced disappearances
and when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through
Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of
Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship coordinator
of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan
Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar, was
requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student
returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he immediately
inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in the counter
informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and never
returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or
omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses
and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his
disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance so that they
shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I have
caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO
to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO
to expedite compliance to my previous directive;
 c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the
owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative
statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize
efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily
submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may
somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate
the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of
operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the
case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation [sic] on
the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance
and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu
PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of
the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office is
continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the
immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far taken
on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of disappearance –
to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE
TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As planned, (1) the first hearing would be to
mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf
and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of
Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report from
PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’
disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January 4, 2008 of
Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of the
Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told
the Provincial Governor of Sulu that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken and
carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his … [personal]
bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was] intended for the …
IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he personally
went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their
detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS investigate the
disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction.25 He further
testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting
units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent
in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no
participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis last
October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank
Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB
central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by resentment or
sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly
conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student scholars
should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts
and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the
early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement
agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this
case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds:28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should
have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was
for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination
to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of
Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month
since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when
battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on
 January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the
missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an
"all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How
could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt
KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated post.
Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par.
15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK
FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s
subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad
elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went to
Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a
high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her to
"specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This friend also told her that her
husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former
boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP CIDG is
holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent recounted that she went to Camp
Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to
her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged
activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial
investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’ second wife, and they
have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife.33 She last communicated with
her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to
Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30, 2007 when her
stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since the time
they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent explained that it took her a few days
(or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s disappearance to the Jolo Police
Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular
phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular
phone’s battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal,
Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel
Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents
of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the
report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was under
custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a diabetic taking maintenance
medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the persons holding him the need to give him his medication.38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports,39 signed by the respondent,
detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine
Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the
respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight from
Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We
[were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command
(WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got information
about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to
us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very
important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to
answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the said
meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to
purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked [sic]
in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because
I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col.
Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not give me
any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na
kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office
of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not
to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis)
within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet
failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy
Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on
October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the
abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao
City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of
subject Engineer Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me to
Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that Col.
Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist
[groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier. These
are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It
was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured me that
my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please
take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her
testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the information she
received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to
Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a report
and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and
his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together with two
other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim.44 The
respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis
was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis
was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under
surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a
certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not
give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them
exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof.
Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt.
Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed,
however, that that he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in
Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars deposited in
Tagitis’ personal account.54
On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008 affidavit was
already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it.55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read the
affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] contents."56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the respondent’s
testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or
the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her narrative report,
specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that
Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your husband is in
good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the
"informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the
CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report"
sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity.60
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on
the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP
(CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The
conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her
companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was
involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less than the military – an independent agency of government.
The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to the CIDG’s involvement in
Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence
world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the
military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories
painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or
any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB
scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also
found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on
the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the
Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the
second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary
as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was
no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of
these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and
directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen.
Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly
reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it
was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION

On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to him by
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as "unofficial."61 Col. Kasim
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal
stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others.62 He testified
remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because "it was
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was
not important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the
abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the
abduction of Tagitis.63 He explained that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information
ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his abduction.64
evidence.74

In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent Jose
THE COURT’S RULING
Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis was in
the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the
PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code We do not find the petition meritorious.
particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9
RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any
operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) Sufficiency in Form and Substance
personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only
assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office conducted
any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the petitioners
contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners
allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty
and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the
portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of
course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial
concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test
in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under
the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather
than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty
or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which Tagitis
suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found
despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and
16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and
boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," and then
taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by
the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and
connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release
Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate
the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with
the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct testimony.78 This requirement, however, should
not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified
petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit
represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured
when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7
and 17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this
point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must have been
made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish
at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported
disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the Section 5(d)
requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his
companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they
were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready answer"
that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The
respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP
Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the police that her husband
was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to
no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the
factual bases for her petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police authorities, and
that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the
investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure
to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection
on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the
investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in securing
an investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the
allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing
the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken by
the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating
with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege "the
actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondent’s petition duly
outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her
petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but
while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin
Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and
other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the matter
to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB
Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then
preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos
branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who
could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as
suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and pleadings
failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police Headquarters
again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been
visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to these places
thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try
complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no
positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the
circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of
subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the
like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of
a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is sufficient in
form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the
case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in an
enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced
disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced disappearances would
be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s
Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog
Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they
were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the
desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the
fate of these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world
when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared" during
the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an
international concern when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that
continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the
practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-
insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin
American media standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced
disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In general,
there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention
center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories,89 and 855 cases were
recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132
surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were
reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing,
108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during former
President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former
President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization,
reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced
disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human
Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this
number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance91 reports
619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to
November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this
concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on
the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing
an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific definition
[for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to
formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances… so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will
define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and
disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element
incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the
concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more
specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings, the
disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So,
again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives96 and in the
Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual
definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns
within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental
definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.99 The simple reason is
that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature
has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and
purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on
actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may
have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue of
criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires
criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in
determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for
this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the
public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first
is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt
from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is
to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly
terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and
the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal
action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it
affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances of the
disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of torture,"
with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family
members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious
economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports from
various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested the "UN
Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making
appropriate recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a global
phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third preambular
clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances occur, in the
sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty
by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting
on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a
refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced
disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject
to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be subjected
to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any
other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable
with appropriate penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the
disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the
disappeared and on the progress and results of the investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance
as a continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the
victim are established.111
Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law,
however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every
enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme
Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo
cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various
conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN
Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."112 Although no
universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental freedoms"
guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance,
and this Declaration states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the
Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in
international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the
ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
"generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,116 we held
that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary
international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern
of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in
the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources
identify the substance and content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and
"opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June
1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced
disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual guarantees." 123 One of the
key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective
national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed within
their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged criminal is within its
territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal
jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala,
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention
and have defined activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with the
protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has
applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced
disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture;
Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on
the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection afforded by the European
Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126where the ECHR found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the
disappeared person when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in
the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared person’s
mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate
character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the
State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of customary
international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,128 which
provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that in a
related matter that finds close identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on
torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court further elaborated on the
significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member
nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know
what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to
one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of
great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding
pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community." Thus, a
Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States."
Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of
binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN
Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the
act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the
act may also amount to a crime against humanity.131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) also
covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a
signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the
statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels
for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition,
the implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of
national criminal provisions also covering enforced disappearance.135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced disappearance (or
by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific
crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law,
which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of
a disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective remedy
under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly,
thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States Parties
must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights… The
Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and administrative
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law… Administrative mechanisms are
particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly,
thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate
allegations of violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an
ongoing violation is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring
to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the
Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as criminal under either
domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7),
summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7 and 9 and, frequently,
6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may
well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against
humanity (see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is a
guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only as a
prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to
afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court made
effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through
substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced disappearance," the
materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of
the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed
by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the allegations of
the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss
briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form
part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged – investigates
enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators.141 Experts note that
abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of governmental
authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are generally
specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through a
separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to avoid or prevent any
interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where
they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak
out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We have had occasion to note
this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144 when we acknowledged that "where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central
piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is usually
concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have begun.145 The
problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez146 that
inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s power to destroy the
pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the
perfect crime.147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the
victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to requests for
information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing
people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or another,
in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in
Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree and
burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of
proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too,
to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial
evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their
defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an
enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first opportunity to
define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly
quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
[Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we recognized
that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need
to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique difficulties
presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must
frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without
transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a
disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact
that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by logical
inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions
consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances, because
this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents who acted
under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony
of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of conversations
she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also
told the Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a
special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed Forces.155 The IACHR likewise
considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran
military officer about the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a
man who identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and
appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-
measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the
other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence the way we do in
the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a
rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence
rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in the
Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness157 is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.158 These requisites for
admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-described conditions for the exercise of
flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning of this
term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law."159Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are
essentially fourfold:160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only
shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and
was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner,
Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious
circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or arrested
Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on
record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her allegation
that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The
first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in
the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as
both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any
information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the
respondent but denied giving her any information about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent, together with A: There were three of us, ma’am.
her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the
respondent’s testimony:
Q: Who were your companions?

Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am.162
those in charge of any records or investigation?

xxxx
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is
being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.",
sir. Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?

Q: What is J.I.? A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na
mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my
husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.
bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163

Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
xxxx

A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I
know that they would deny it, ma’am.164

Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband
was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you
when you went there?

A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.

Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?

Q: Only the two of you?

A: Yes, ma’am.

A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?

Q: Who were they?

A: Yes, ma’am.

A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.

Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?

Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Yes, ma’am.

A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.

Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?

Q: Were you able to talk to him?

A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a
military report, ma’am.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
Q: The four of you?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is
with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was
charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was
abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen under
surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik
Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then we asked him how long will
he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he cannot
give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the
computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m
certain that it was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us
[sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal
letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He
also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay
intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity.167
To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners pointed
out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her
husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly ‘parang liason
ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt.
Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy
of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that the PNP is not
part of the military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners
never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details
that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on
material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police
matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication169and only tend to strengthen
their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter
cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well
thought of and prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases, we hold
it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s letter,
that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in
good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one
Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and
Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his claim that he had
destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting
claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression of this evidence – raises the
presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we
shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct evidence,
as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation, knowledge or
consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never
quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only
implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all
point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence whose probative
value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim
himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to
acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should
simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a
statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special
evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely
remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at
least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence –
even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility
requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is
relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other evidence in the
case.
The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was reputedly
a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in
Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the
purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the
purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo police
that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he
never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking
assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than these pieces of
evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo petition
recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence
whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was
last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above aspects of
the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the
evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the
element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis
disappearance. in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black"
operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear in the
CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent, characterize the
of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation
attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by
made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate
the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was
can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondent’s
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed
own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere.
to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an investigation. As already related
above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary
purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim’s story, CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction),
without identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded moment,
Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of
unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at
denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government
Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads.
and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already
Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to
knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
pursue these aspects of the case.
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of the
disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence,
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP Chief already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of
Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,173the evidence at hand and the developments in this case
Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial report of the confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent
disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed
Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research, records show that no
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international enforced
such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better
Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the
in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for
photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and
Tagitis.
later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a
claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right to life (Article
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force Tagitis, 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14,
with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in
replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned "retraction" that the Silopi region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the
Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to
reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent
and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had anything to do with the detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a
disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with post-operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report
the money in his custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention
about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held
activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.
Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis
held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo remedy
omissions and negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008
this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we believe and so
or three months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col.
hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of
Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated
these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance
as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned. No investigation –
of Tagitis.
even an internal one – appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and
what he indeed wrote.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
"PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial of any
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The
complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent
PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of
at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis
the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these
Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational structure, the PNP-
developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial
CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates
response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to the responses made to the
against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of
respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her husband’s disappearance, and even at Task
Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by
Force Tagitis itself.
assigning the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the authorities
were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we
refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may deem
appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its investigation to
the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further
CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and
submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the
petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall
be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and
efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and
their varying attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by
the CA – are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN,
EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR.
RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge
the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for
issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a
parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite
demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local
projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment,
following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the
property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those
cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of
Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent
the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that subsequent events
changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory
judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is
hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the
verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the
MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the
metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of
demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents
prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police
officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the
Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-
throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police
operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of
February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture,
degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending
chill in any ordinary citizen,8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:

SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for
Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light
Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights,
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the
induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and
permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue
waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE.
for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007,
the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
Without any pronouncement as to costs.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which
the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the
RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the
property which was for lease.
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition,
the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the
involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial
City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
"protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19,
2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners,
forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of
light threats. constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which
coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas
internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the
Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the
Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated.
RTC Malolos.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with
the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they
resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property. liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of
March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses
employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and
Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged
underscoring supplied)
violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life,
liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of
amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint
on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be
secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
Affidavit, viz:
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following xxxx
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa
"PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents.
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners
Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life,
are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and
liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
correspondence.

Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16

As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent
Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.22
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under
even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the
the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous

More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo
xxxx
and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners
after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal
to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1
committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)

It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein
remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property
branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men
dispute.
in tow. The Court therein held:

At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred,
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding involvement
for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and
of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed
proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a
the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made
alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the
available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25
waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly
show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.18 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat
to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of
court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and SO ORDERED.
forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.20
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W.
SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE
PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN,Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN.
REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ,
ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20
April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.
193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S.
Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to
furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to
petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports
prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army.
The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction or
operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the
records of the military all documents having any reference to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza,
Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of
petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential
immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George
Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.
Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a
member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus
A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio
M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina,
Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in
G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions
occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig.
Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.
Antecedent Facts
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making
its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.2
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside
the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently,
three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the
others rode on the tricycle.3
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching
him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about
2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s Army
(NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were
soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on
learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.4
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on
the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.5
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him
board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill
him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his
blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers
repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers
tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused
to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.6
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission.
While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed
to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained
silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m.,
where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA
comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.7
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their
way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers,
was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a
member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was
acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak,
Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who
appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir."8
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that
Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose
the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with
death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA
camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and
Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA
camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military
camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two
soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and
gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers,
however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his
request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers maltreated him once more.10
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in
an encounter in Cumao, and
that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the
document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature
to show that he was merely coerced.11
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men appearing
therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed
him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote
something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the
document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him
down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted.
The torture lasted for about an hour.12
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the mountains,
where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped,
the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all
returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to
him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined
him.14 When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained
them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he
suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.15
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while
he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his photograph.
Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother. 16
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he
was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and
was warned not to report anything to the media.17
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a
pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded
him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the
military.18
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men.
His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma
that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel),
informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan.
Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took
photographs of his bruises.19
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and
asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila.
Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter
will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.20
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office,
where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and
desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his
abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR
Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them.21
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange
Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st
Lt. Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a
cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two
soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that
the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive
home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only
left thirty minutes later.23
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had
been a victim of torture.24
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that
several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a
jeepney.25
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents
and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.26 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo,
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’s
right to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez,
his family and his witnesses.
 c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and
subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.27
On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that
Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before
22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the
Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days after its
submission for decision.30
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits
and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.31
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return
of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.32 In their Return, respondents
therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under
surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal
(Cpl.) Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the
military in exchange for his protection.35
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agent’s
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.36 Since then, he
acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.37 However, he feared that his NPA
comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the
soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent.39 Hence,
the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe
turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on
16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz
made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to
speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.43 This information was
transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.44
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala,
Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez
had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the
latter’s Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers.46 In
any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and
Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were
made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not
witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at ease
with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation when
the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.49
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers and
to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.50
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this
Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which
has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life,
liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the
absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
command responsibility.53
On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-
respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial
evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening
to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not
entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the corresponding interim
reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under the
rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez –
Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and
security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary
protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.56
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and
Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:
I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and
habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit.
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
 IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the
protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in light of
the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.58 The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.60
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in
the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or
information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous
data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.67
First issue: Grant of interim reliefs
In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must
be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo clearly provides:
Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge
may grant any of the following reliefs:
Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government
agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the
petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection
may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection
to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any
person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party
alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time,
place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for
justifiable reasons.
(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order
any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain
evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information,
in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the
parties.
(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.
The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons
or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives
at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a
final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of
amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under
the privilege of the writ.
Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo
and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:69
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on
the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.) made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with
process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US
the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life,
Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts."
liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
Army. 72 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of
where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts
her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this
is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)
case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it
must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer
stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency. Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit
exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our
or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit: Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns
up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that
a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for
We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in
his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their
the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the
reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during
situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear
that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:

"x x x xxx xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would
render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may
continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from
suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases
filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that
the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind
of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure
he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that
explicit and to add other things.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In Mr. Suarez:
the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce
certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel
during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the doctrine
officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall of command responsibility:
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only
duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule
with his tenure and not his term.76(Emphasis supplied)
requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision,
shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo
Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to
Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian
Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior
responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html - fnt20cm Such limited
To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine
treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule out the
of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command responsibility
application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.
pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."78 Although
originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers from
application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In the United States, for example, command responsibility the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of
was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.
the Torture Victim Protection Act.80 This development in the use of command responsibility in civil
proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal
In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly wants
in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings
to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82(Emphasis supplied.)
on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,83 likewise penned by
Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the concerned.
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:
issuances, if there be any.

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court
National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the
would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of
signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It further stated that protection
criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
agency. (Emphasis supplied.)
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those
(i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to
the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there
is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may
nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President
Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must
now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed;
and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or
punish the perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 86
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard
of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all
Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O.
226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of
command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its
commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the
acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or
regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.90
Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military.91
b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo
The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that
former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the
"Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should
have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA.92 Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo
Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy
allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from
Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known
about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or
prevent it.
Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805
The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in Razon,94 to
wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same
being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the
totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.
a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents
for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly
found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of
his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on
account of his suspected membership in the NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise
positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction,
detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who
appeared during his release.98
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victim’s
capture.
As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the
physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she
examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and
arrived at the following findings:
FACE
- 10cm healed scar face right side
- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
 - 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area) pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4
December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made the following averments:
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha syang
pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan sa
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
lugar na iyon;

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
xxx xxx xxx

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo sa
kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
- both leg arm
xxx xxx xxx
- hip area/lumbar area101
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng aming
Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105
which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus
issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured
Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3
during his detention by the military, to wit:
December 2009:106

X. Interpretation of Findings
24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang
ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;
The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and ill-
treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were
25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang
due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The
masigla at masayahin;
abrasions could also be due to the conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood
spots found on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness
he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming punching and kicking on his body. The 26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."
occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by the subject as a result of the psychological
trauma he encountered during his detention.
27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking
kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations
28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107
The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and ill-
treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, of
Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
which the age is compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)
contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his
activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA
In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that to become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler,
sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’ claim
Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that
highly implausible.
he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in
the same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and
Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose defies logic that he would agree to become an undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains
relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)
removed from ordinary human experience.
Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of
If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house of petitioner on
September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung
on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt.
Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and
his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by
showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the
military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The
Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to
security guaranteed by the fundamental law.109(Emphasis supplied.)
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses
presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained
and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial
evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court
nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of
abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations
thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond effectively to and address human rights
violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in facilitating
and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s
rights to life, liberty and security.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and
security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.111 Moreover, in the context of
amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in
enforced disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.113
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo114
that the right to security
of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to
investigate, viz:
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance
of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not
as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their
offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.
In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The
family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant
suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the
authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.115 (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the
violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and
effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory
investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these
respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must
be emphasized:
In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for
while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted
and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the
incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by
1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to
solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged
abduction of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to
investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in
their prosecution." In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation
to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa
disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable,
however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively investigate the
violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right
to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.
Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability
on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt.
Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt.
Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months
before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that
respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life,
liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September
2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of
the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to
issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.
It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to
amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He
likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan
and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take
the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action
within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this
Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant
positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ.
DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a
certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel
assail and seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No.
00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing
the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition
to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in
substance, the following allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes),
then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and
detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted
alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment,
Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmariñas,
Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military
asset.
After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions
at different places, i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in
bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-
station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes’
daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions
about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an
investigation even after Lourdes’ disappearance had been made known to him;
3. A week after Lourdes’ release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to
leave their house because of the presence of men watching them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and
arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct
against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a
certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address
at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but nothing has happened; and the
threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite
provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes’ abduction went into hiding after being visited by government
agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that
men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction
of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was
addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police
Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents,
collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically
denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the
following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations’ truth. And by way of general
affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be
sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by
Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their
respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake
regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her daughters:
1. Gen. Esperon – attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND)
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all
concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the
disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged
personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to
continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible,
including military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look
into the matter;5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of
the petition is on-going vis-à-vis Lourdes’ abduction, and that a background verification with the
PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro,
Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files
carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmariñas municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon
disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged
aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to
AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Parañaque City. The person
residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly
working, per the latter’s house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated
with the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the
best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through
composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the
petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever source
and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its orders.61avvphi1
3. P/Supt. Roquero – stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes’ complaint, an investigation and
submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her
relatives provided the police with relevant information;
4. P/Insp. Gomez – alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the
investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267
and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under
preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes’ kidnapping;
that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the
subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of
averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also
asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of
the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners’ counsel prayed for the issuance of a
temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the
petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners’ motion that the petition and writ
be served by the court’s process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition,
petitioners’ motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this
recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the
case; denied the motion for a TPO for the court’s want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by
petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners’ failure to submit
the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review,
disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition
with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero,
P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners’ complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the
investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update
petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office.
The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-
members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be
sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys
immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in
any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10 x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or
omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights.
This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being
connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their
names were not even mentioned in Lourdes’ Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes for the
respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that
they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates
against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen.
Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing
that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family
were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the CA’s holding broadly hinted,
would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP
or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not
exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes’
disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there
were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen.
Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision
vis-à-vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact
that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little,
if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."14 In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine
of command responsibility,15foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to
which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military
commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally
bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend
concurrence in its ratification.18
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that
provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.20
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction
on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.21 Still, it would
be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to
have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on
any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may
have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),22 the writ of
amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of
violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however,
"is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative
liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."23 Of the same tenor,
and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-
judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is
that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are
matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government
involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual
perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either
the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to
show a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction
of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then,
too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to
military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in
broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the
sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes
was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become
an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical Sergeant John N.
Romano,27 officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of
Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit
of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in
the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP
yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e.,
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the
opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same
Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes’ abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents’ documentary evidence,
adduced to debunk the former’s allegations directly linking Lourdes’ abductors and tormentors to the military
or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination, expressed the
belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent.29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as
the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced
disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong
message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to
secure amparo remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary
substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.—The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.—x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding
of liability against the person charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.32 Per the CA’s evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the
testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not
satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very
real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the appellate court’s determination of the answering respondents’ role in the
alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family’s security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per
their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing
directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in
providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be
concluded with some definite findings and recommendation.
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or
indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As
police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that
would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and
obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate
number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid
in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sided––hence, ineffective––
investigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the
local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary
fact-finding on petitioners’ complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was
perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners’ counsel, Atty.
Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses’ attitude, "[They]
do not trust the government agencies to protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the
party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be
the same party who investigates it is understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To
repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s
right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation
are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a
step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)
This brings us to Mary Joy’s charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we
take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joy’s bare allegations of
harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision:
In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed
against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None …"36
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners’ allegations about the OMB failing to act on their
complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners’
contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the
affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of the designated investigators, all
dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and
administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counter-
affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act
or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of
respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the
petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And
petitioners’ motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been
accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial
judgment––disposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the
accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same
petition as to them––hews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving
cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in
any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners’ rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.42 It is an extraordinary
writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions
for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the
impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten
the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices
where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the
threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the
adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as
responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that
petitioners’ allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality
on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by
identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by
showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court
is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and
the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the
case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably
extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs.
Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures
for the protection of petitioners’ right or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came in the
form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure
that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively, under them on the
complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators
of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the
progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head
of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir.
Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and
arresting institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the
completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and
P/Dir. Gen. Razon’s imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively.
Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies,
are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the
AFP and the PNP.
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach
accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed
against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure
of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-
General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their
respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and
threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as
required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular,
to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of
respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt.
Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to
the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;

At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy
and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts
and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of
as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the
respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and
five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in
a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them.
motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of
the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within
thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General
Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action
of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and
have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when
petitioners.
the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.
Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the
stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of actions of the AFP and the PNP.
the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex
parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis
of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the
actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the CA.
kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of
the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both SO ORDERED.
proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Republic of the Philippines
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive SUPREME COURT
and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a Manila
degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining
under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe
and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the EN BANC
OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on
the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012
aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB
shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:
DECISION
(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo; DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof
that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, [the
government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information
on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3
This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC5 challenges the July
24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for
Writ of Amparo7 filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation 8 (Asian Land) arrived
at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita) located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay
Lugam, Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two
uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could
find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go
with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of
electric wires and lamps in the subdivision.9
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also
located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia
(Navia), also arrived thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they received a report from a certain
Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a
post in said subdivision.11 The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru radio to petitioners
Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land security
department. Following their department’s standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report
in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there where Dio and Buising were able
to confirm who the suspects were. They thus repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying
to invite the two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects admitted that they took the
lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post nearer to the house of Lolita.12 Soon, Navia
arrived and Buising informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the investigation.
Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to
the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.13 His mother Lolita also
signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be involved in the reported loss of
electric wires and lamps within the subdivision. After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave.
Ben also affixed his signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was
released unharmed and without any injury.14
Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make her sign the logbook as
witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the
logbook where she was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on her reading
glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her signature therein. After which, the guards
left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15 from the Malolos City Police Station requesting them to
appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing
husband Ben. In compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City Police
Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received the same invitation, the meeting was
reset to April 22, 2008.16
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her that they released Ben and
that they have no information as to his present whereabouts.17 They assured Virginia though that they will
cooperate and help in the investigation of her missing husband.18
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were unlawfully arrested, shoved into
the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security
office, Navia lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?"19 and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for
mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming from Navia hitting him on different parts of his
body.20 Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben."21
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that the area where their house is
located is very dark and his father had long been asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to
install a lamp to illumine their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp from
one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house. However, the lamp Bong got was
no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. 22
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she undertook not to allow Ben to
stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolita’s inquiry as
to why she had to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son Bong
unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the barangay. Since she has poor
eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the logbook without reading it and then left with Bong.24 At that juncture,
Ben grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid of Navia, Lolita and Bong
left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.25
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook
again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again when she already twice signed the logbook at the
headquarters. Buising assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bong’s release. Since it was
dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and signed the logbook without, again, reading
what was written in it. 26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be
told that petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben,
asked around, and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported the
matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Ben’s disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita that petitioners took
advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made her sign the logbook as a witness that they already
released Ben when in truth and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben was
when she left him in petitioners’ custody at the security office.27
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparo28 before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo
court issued an Order29dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo and the
production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution [in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also
known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo", let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:
 (1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of the Asian Land Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of Director Nestor Mantaring, and
Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
SO ORDERED.36
(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the aforementioned date and
time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally appear thereat;
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37 which was denied by the trial court in an Order38 dated August
29, 2008.
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising to file, within a
non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ, a verified written return
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:

4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten with
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or
omission;
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND’S RIGHT TO
b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or whereabouts of
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the threat,
act or omission against the aggrieved party.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ALLEGED
DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE INSTANCE OF HEREIN
(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the [petitioners], or any
PETITIONERS.39
persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of contempt, from threatening, harassing or
inflicting any harm to [respondent], his immediate family and any [member] of his household.
Petitioners’ Arguments
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the [petitioners], at their address indicated
in the petition, copies of the writ as well as this order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes.30 Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on June 27, 2008.32 On June 30,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with
2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33 praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.
some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or
a threat to Ben’s right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the testimony of Buising, while Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand,
submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness stand. the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners
released Ben on March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in
issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Ben’s disappearance.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Our Ruling
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35 granting the petition. It disposed as follows:

Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be dismissed, but not for the
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and deems it proper and
reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
appropriate, as follows:

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately conduct a deep and
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective
thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in
relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
connection with the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity." 40
the process, as part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;

(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the witnesses who
testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to secure their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to investigate the
circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur] Pardico by the [petitioners] in this
case, utilizing in the process, as part of said investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions
forming part of the record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not dispute his identity as the
same person summoned and questioned at petitioners’ security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such
uncontroverted fact ipso facto established Ben’s inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to life, liberty
and security. Article 641 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42 recognizes every human
being’s inherent right to life, while Article 943 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and
security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired
except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of
life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged in Virginia’s petition
and proved during the summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not, however, define extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. This omission was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the
Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence
and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by Congress.45 Then, the budding jurisprudence on
amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in
that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced
disappearances, as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of
the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about after
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced
or involuntary disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion that
with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not
only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition
as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is."50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to
enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons
contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts
should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a menacing attitude towards Ben and
that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of
Navia at that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig, papatayin ko na si
Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his predisposition at that time. In addition, there is
nothing on record which would support petitioners’ assertion that they released Ben on the night of March 31,
2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was prodded into affixing her
signatures in the logbook without reading the entries therein. And so far, the information petitioners
volunteered are sketchy at best, like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or
presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.1âwphi1
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in
this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented
tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or
accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition
is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 184379-80 April 24, 2012
RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO
and SPO4 ROGER VALEROSO,* Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.: Ermita and former President Arroyo, respectively.18 Sec. Atienza also purportedly instructed Lozada to pacify
his wife, petitioner Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return.19
What the Court decides today has nothing to do with the substance or merits surrounding the aborted deal of
the Philippine government with the National Broadband Network and ZTE Corporation, or any allegation of The vehicle traversed the South Luzon Expressway and drove towards the direction of Laguna.20 Along the
petitioner Rodolfo Noel "June" Lozada, Jr., (Lozada) regarding the same. There is only one issue that we way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection.21
decide today – whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him
to the protection of the writ of amparo. Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated
Lozada requested that he be brought home to Pasig, but the men were allegedly compelled to deny his request
12 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
on account of unidentified security risks.22 Eventually, however, the vehicle turned around and drove to Libis,
of Amparo.1
Quezon City. The group stopped at The Outback restaurant to meet with certain individuals, who turned out
to be Atty. Antonio Bautista (Atty. Bautista) and Colonel Paul Mascarinas (Col. Mascarinas) of the Police
Petitioner Lozada was the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Forest Corporation Special Protection Office (PSPO). At the restaurant, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of a
(PFC), a government-owned- and -controlled corporation under the Department of Environment and Natural prepared affidavit.23
Resources (DENR).2 Petitioner Violeta Lozada (Violeta) is his wife, while petitioner Arturo Lozada (Arturo) is
his brother.
After the meeting, the men informed Lozada that they were going to billet him in a hotel for a night, but he
suggested that they take him to La Salle Green Hills instead. The men acquiesced.24
At the time the Petition for the Writ of Amparo was filed, respondent former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) was the incumbent President of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Eduardo
Upon arriving in La Salle Green Hills, Lozada was met by Violeta and his sister, Carmen Lozada
Ermita (ES Ermita) was then the Executive Secretary; Avelino Razon (Razon), the Director General of the
(Carmen).25 He observed that the perimeter was guarded by policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and
Philippine National Police (PNP); Angel Atutubo (Atutubo), the Assistant General Manager for Security and
threatening not only his security, but also that of his family and the De La Salle brothers.26
Emergency Services of the Manila International Airport Authority; and Rodolfo Valeroso (Valeroso), an agent
of the Aviation Security Group (ASG) of the PNP.
On 6 February 2008, at around 10:00 a.m., Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty.
Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit.27
Antecedent Facts

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the
Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation (ZTE),
a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.3 Former National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) Secretary Romulo Neri (Sec. Neri) sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant
in the ZTE-NBN deal.4The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several
anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials.5 These events impelled the Senate of the
Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee (Blue Ribbon Committee) to conduct an investigation thereon,6 for which
it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.7
On that date, instead of appearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Lozada left the country for a purported
official trip to London, as announced by then DENR Secretary Lito Atienza (Sec. Atienza).8 In the Petition,
Lozada alleged that his failure to appear at the scheduled hearing was upon the instructions of then Executive
Assistant Undersecretary Manuel Gaite (Usec. Gaite).9 Consequently, the Senate issued an Order dated 30
January 2008: (a) citing Lozada for contempt; (b) ordering his arrest and detention; and (c) directing the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to implement the Order and make a return thereon.10
While overseas, Lozada asked Sec. Atienza whether the former could be allowed to go back to the
Philippines.11Upon the approval of Sec. Atienza, Lozada informed his family that he was returning from Hong
Kong on 5 February 2008 on board Cathay Pacific Flight No. 919, bound to arrive in Manila at 4:40 p.m. on
the same day.12
In the Petition, Lozada claims that, upon disembarking from the aircraft, several men held his arms and took
his bag. Although he allegedly insisted on meeting with his family, he later realized that it was wiser to just
follow them, especially when he overheard from their handheld radio: "[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir
nandyan ang mga taga senado."13
Lozada asked if he could go to the comfort room, an opportunity he used to call up his brother, petitioner
Arturo, and inform him of his situation.14 The men thereafter led him through the departure area of the airport
and into a car waiting for them.15 They made him sit alone at the back of the vehicle, while a man, whom he
later discovered to be respondent Valeroso, took the passenger seat and was always in contact with other
individuals.16 Lozada observed that other cars tailed their vehicle.17
Sec. Atienza then phoned Lozada, assuring the latter that he was with people from the government, and that
the former was going to confer with "ES and Ma’[a]m." Lozada surmised that these individuals referred to ES
At about 1:00 p.m., Violeta filed before this Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus, docketed as G.R. No. 181342
(the Habeas Corpus case).28 Arturo likewise filed before this Court a Petition for a Writ of Amparo, docketed
as G.R. No. 181356 (the Amparo case), and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the
authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show responsibility for his
alleged abduction.29
At around the same time that Arturo filed the Petition for a Writ of Amparo, Col. Mascarinas drove Lozada
back to La Salle Green Hills.30 Lozada was then made to sign a typewritten, antedated letter requesting police
protection.31Thereafter, former Presidential Spokesperson Michael Defensor (Sec. Defensor) supposedly came
and requested Lozada to refute reports that the latter was kidnapped and to deny knowledge of alleged
anomalies in the NBN-ZTE deal. Sec. Defensor then purportedly gave Lozada ₱50,000 for the latter’s
expenses.32
On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms,
who served the warrant of arrest on him.33 Lozada claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the
Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.34
On the same day, this Court issued a Resolution (a) consolidating the Habeas Corpus case and the Amparo
case; (b) requiring respondents in the Habeas Corpus case to comment on the Petition; (c) issuing a Writ of
Amparo; (d) ordering respondents in the Amparo case to file their verified Return; (e) referring the
consolidated Petitions to the CA; and (f) directing the CA to set the cases for hearing on 14 February
2008.35 Accordingly, the court a quo set both cases for hearing on 14 February 2008.36
On 12 February 2008, respondents filed before the CA a Manifestation and Motion, praying for the dismissal
of the Habeas Corpus case.37 They asserted that Lozada was never illegally deprived of his liberty and was, at
that time, no longer in their custody. They likewise averred that, beginning 8 February 2008, Lozada had
already been under the supervision of the Senate and, from then on, had been testifying before it.38
In their verified Return, respondents claimed that Sec. Atienza had arranged for the provision of a security
team to be assigned to Lozada, who was then fearful for his safety.39 In effect, respondents asserted that
Lozada had knowledge and control of the events that took place on 5 February 2008, voluntarily entrusted
himself to their company, and was never deprived of his liberty. Hence, respondents prayed for the denial of
the interim reliefs and the dismissal of the Petition.40
During the initial hearing on 14 February 2008, Lozada and Violeta ratified the Petition in the Amparo
case41 to comply with Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,42 which imposes an order to be followed by
those who can sue for the writ.43 The CA also dismissed the Habeas Corpus case in open court for being moot
and academic, as Lozada was physically present and was not confined or detained by any of the
respondents.44 Considering that petitioners failed to question the dismissal of the Habeas Corpus case, the
said dismissal had lapsed into finality, leaving only the Amparo case open for disposition.
Thereafter, Lozada filed a Motion for Temporary Protection Order and Production of Documents,45 while
Arturo filed a Motion for Production of Documents.46 Additionally, Arturo also filed a Motion for the Issuance
of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties Romulo Neri,
Benjamin Abalos, [Sr.], Rodolfo Valeroso, "Jaime" the Driver and Other Respondents. Respondents opposed
these motions.47 The CA denied the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena on the ground that the alleged acts
and statements attributed to Sec. Neri and Benjamin Abalos (Abalos) were irrelevant to the Amparo case, and
that to require them to testify would only result in a fishing expedition.48 The CA likewise denied Arturo’s
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.49
In its Resolution dated 5 March 2008, the CA dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent on the
ground that at the time the Petition in the Amparo case was filed, she was still the incumbent President
enjoying immunity from suit.50 Arturo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,51 which the CA denied in its
Resolution dated 25 March 2008.52
On 12 September 2008, the CA rendered its Decision denying petitioners the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
and dismissing the Petition.53 The CA found that petitioners were unable to prove through substantial
evidence that respondents violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada.
Petitioners thus filed the instant Petition, praying for: (a) the reversal of the assailed CA Decision; (b) the
issuance of the TPO; and (c) the accreditation of the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the
Philippines and the De La Salle Brothers as the sanctuaries of Lozada and his family.54 In the alternative,
petitioners pray that this Court remand the case to the CA for further hearings and reverse the latter’s Orders:
(a) denying the Motion to Issue a Subpoena Ad Testificandum and (b) dropping former President Arroyo as a
respondent. Petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in ruling to dismiss the petition for a writ of amparo and deny
Petitioners’ prayer for a Temporary Protection Order, inter alia, because there is no substantial
evidence to prove that the right to life, liberty or security of Jun Lozada was violated or threatened
with violation. This rule is not in accord with the rule on the writ of amparo and Supreme Court
jurisprudence on substantial evidence[.]
(2) Whether the Ponencia erred and gravely abused its discretion by prematurely ruling that the
testimony of witnesses which Petitioners sought to present and who are subject of the Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena ad testificandum were irrelevant to the Petition for a Writ of Amparo in a way
not in accord with the Rules of Court and Supreme Court decisions.
(3) Whether the Court a quo erred in using and considering the affidavits of respondents in coming
up with the questioned decision when these were not offered as evidence and were not subjected to
cross-examination. This ruling is not in accord with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
(4) Whether the Court a [q]uo erred in dropping as respondent Pres. Gloria Arroyo despite her
failure to submit a verified return and personally claim presidential immunity in a way not in accord
with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.55
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence, as the
allegations they propounded in support of their Petition were largely hearsay.56 The OSG also maintains that it
was proper for the CA to have dropped former President Arroyo as respondent on account of her presidential
immunity from suit.57
Respondent Atutubo also alleges, among others, that: (a) Lozada voluntarily asked for security and protection;
(b) Lozada willingly submitted himself to the company of the police escorts; (c) Atutubo merely accompanied
him to pass through the contingency route customarily provided to VIP passengers, public figures, foreign
dignitaries, and the like; and (d) Atutubo only performed his job to ensure security and maintain order at the
airport upon the arrival of Lozada.58
In the face of these assertions by respondents, petitioners nevertheless insist that while they have sufficiently
established that Lozada was taken against his will and was put under restraint, respondents have failed to
discharge their own burden to prove that they exercised extraordinary diligence as public
officials.59 Petitioners also maintain that it was erroneous for the CA to have denied their motion for subpoena
ad testificandum for being irrelevant, given that the relevancy of evidence must be examined after it is offered,
and not before.60 Finally, petitioners contend that the presidential immunity from suit cannot be invoked in
amparo actions.61
Issues
In ruling on whether the CA committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision, three issues must be
discussed:
I. Whether the CA committed an error in dropping former President Arroyo as a respondent in the
Amparo case.
II. Whether the CA committed an error in denying petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of a
Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
III. Whether petitioners should be granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Discussion
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the
people’s right to life, liberty and security.62 Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming
cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and
curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.63
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
or to threats thereof.64 Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or
threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds,65 or
in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing.66 Instead, it must be
granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary
writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the
ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions
for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.67 (Emphasis supplied.)
Using this perspective as the working framework for evaluating the assailed CA decision and the evidence
adduced by the parties, this Court denies the Petition.
First issue: Presidential immunity from suit
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or
actual incumbency.68 Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting
president even for acts committed during his or her tenure.69
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of the original Petition
and the issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that
respect, it was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential
immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended, former President Arroyo
can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a defense to evade judicial determination of her
responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former
President Arroyo’s alleged responsibility or accountability. A thorough examination of the allegations
postulated and the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful
act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain "Ma’[a]m,"70 whom Lozada
speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that "the President was ‘hurting’ from all
the media frenzy,"71 there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former
President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly received.
Second issue: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum
This Court, in Roco v. Contreras,72 ruled that for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or
documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an
action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the
production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs.
The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception
that it concludes with an injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the
books, documents, or things described in the subpoena.
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the
following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima
facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be
reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).73 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad
Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were
prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court a quo aptly ruled in this manner:
The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not relevant to the instant
Amparo Petition where the issue involved is whether or not Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security was
threatened or continues to be threatened with violation by the unlawful act/s of the respondents. Evidence, to
be relevant, must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence.
Further, Neri, Abalos and a certain driver "Jaime" are not respondents in this Amparo Petition and the vague
allegations averred in the Motion with respect to them do not pass the test of relevancy. To Our mind,
petitioner appears to be embarking on a "fishing expedition". Petitioner should present the aggrieved party
[Lozada], who has been regularly attending the hearings, to prove the allegations in the Amparo Petition,
instead of dragging the names of other people into the picture. We have repeatedly reminded the parties, in
the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-
[NBN] contract. Petitioner should focus on the fact in issue and not embroil this Court into said ZTE-NBN
contract, which is now being investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Office of the
Ombudsman.74 (Emphasis supplied.)
All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos were solely with respect to the ZTE-NBN deal,
and not to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that petitioners
purportedly received. Although the present action is rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said
government transaction, the testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the
main issue of whether there was an unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that violated the right
to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the Motion
for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.
Third issue: Grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo
A. Alleged violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada
Sections 17 and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence,75 or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.76The use of this evidentiary threshold reveals the clear intent of the framers of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in
addressing amparo situations.77
In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the
petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.78 Thus, this Court held in its
Resolution in Razon v. Tagitis:79
Manalo is different from Tagitis in terms of their factual settings, as enforced disappearance was no longer a
problem in that case. The enforced disappearance of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo effectively
ended when they escaped from captivity and surfaced, while Tagitis is still nowhere to be found and remains
missing more than two years after his reported disappearance. An Amparo situation subsisted in Manalo,
however, because of the continuing threat to the brothers’ right to security; the brothers claimed that since the
persons responsible for their enforced disappearance were still at large and had not been held accountable,
the former were still under the threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which threat
constituted a direct violation of their right to security of person.80 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of
substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils
down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on
5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent
that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up
to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport,81 as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody
of respondents:
[Lozada] was one of the first few passengers to get off the plane because he was instructed by Secretary
Atienza, th[r]ough a phone call on the night of 04 February 2008, while he was still in Hong Kong, to proceed
directly to the Bureau of Immigration so that few people would notice him and he could be facilitated in going
out of the airport without any hassle from the people of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms. Again, [Lozada] stated
that he wanted to get away from the Senate people. [Lozada] even went to the men’s room of the airport, after
he was allegedly "grabbed", where he made a call to his brother Arturo, using his Globe phone, and he was not
prevented from making said call, and was simply advised by the person who met him at the tube to (sic) "sir,
bilisan mo na". When they proceeded out of the tube and while walking, [Lozada] heard from the radio track
down, "wag kayo dyan, sir, nandyan yong mga taga Senado", so they took a detour and went up to the
departure area, did not go out of the normal arrival area, and proceeded towards the elevator near the Duty
Free Shop and then down towards the tarmac. Since [Lozada] was avoiding the people from the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, said detour appears to explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where
[Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped.
This Court does not find any evidence on record that [Lozada] struggled or made an outcry for help when he
was allegedly "grabbed" or "abducted" at the airport. [Lozada] even testified that nobody held him, and they
were not hostile to him nor shouted at him. With noon day clarity, this Court finds that the reason why
[Lozada] was fetched at the airport was to help him avoid the Senate contingent, who would arrest and detain
him at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, until such time that he would appear and give his testimony,
pursuant to the Order of the Senate on the NBN-ZTE Project. [Lozada] clearly knew this because at that time,
it was still his decision not to testify before the Senate. He agreed with that plan.82 (Emphases supplied.)
The foregoing statements show that Lozada personally sought the help of Sec. Atienza to avoid the Senate
personnel, and thus knew that the men who met him at the airport were there to aid him in such objective.
Surely, the actions of Lozada evinced knowledge and voluntariness, uncharacteristic of someone who claims
to have been forcibly abducted.
However, these men’s subsequent acts of directing Lozada to board the vehicle and driving him around,
without disclosing the exact purpose thereof, appear to be beyond what he had consented to and requested
from Sec. Atienza. These men neither informed him of where he was being transported nor provided him
complete liberty to contact his family members to assure them of his safety. These acts demonstrated that he
lacked absolute control over the situation, as well as an effective capacity to challenge their instructions.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his
right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and
has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo moot. Whether or not Lozada was
deprived of his liberty from the point when he was led inside the vehicle waiting for him at the airport up to
the time he was taken to La Salle Green Hills, petitioners’ assertions that Lozada and his family continue to
suffer various threats from respondents remain unproven. The CA correctly found as follows:
The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can
neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind
would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and
security.
xxx xxx xxx
He claims that he is threatened by the alleged presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the
De La Salle premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at
places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having
originated from any of the respondents.
[Lozada] also considers the installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as
indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for
[Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the
respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security.
[Lozada] further maintains that there is an alleged trend, i.e., wherever he goes, there is a bomb threat. There
were bomb threats in the places where he went to like in [the Polytechnic University of the Philippines],
Dagupan, Cebu and Bohol. However, [Lozada] himself testified that he did not try to ascertain where the
bomb threats emanated. Plainly, there is no evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the
respondents or done upon their instigation.
Moreover, [Lozada] views the pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice that he was put on the watch list of
the Bureau of Immigration as a threat to his life, liberty and security. This alleged threat is again unsupported
by evidence, as in fact, [Lozada] testified that he did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether
his name was actually in the official watch list of the Bureau. At any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not one of
the respondents in the amparo petition, and there is no showing in the record that it was the respondents who
ordered the same for the purpose of threatening him.
[Lozada] harps on the filing of alleged frivolous cases against him and his family as threat to his life, liberty
and security. xxx However, [Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any
of the respondents ordered the filing of these cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be
determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed
against the respondents.83 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, petitioners insist that while they were able to sufficiently establish their case by the required
evidentiary standard, respondents failed to discharge their burden to prove their defenses by substantial
evidence and to show that respondents exercised extraordinary diligence as required by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.84 This Court has squarely passed upon this contention in Yano v. Sanchez,85 to wit:
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty
does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner
from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence.
Thus, in amparo actions, petitioners must establish their claims by substantial evidence, and they cannot
merely rely on the supposed failure of respondents to prove either their defenses or their exercise of
extraordinary diligence. In this case, the totality of the evidence presented by petitioners fails to meet the
requisite evidentiary threshold, and the privilege of the writ of amparo has already been rendered moot and
academic by the cessation of the restraint to Lozada’s liberty.
B. Propriety of the privilege of the writ of amparo and its interim reliefs
As previously discussed, there is no basis to grant Lozada the privilege of the writ of amparo, considering that
the illegal restraint alleged in this case had already ceased and there is no imminent or continuing restriction
on his liberty. In Castillo v. Cruz,86 this Court held as follows:
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of
amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint
on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be
secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified. (Emphasis supplied.)1âwphi1
Further, it appears that Lozada had already filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Complaint
charging respondents with kidnapping and attempted murder, docketed as I.S. No. 2008-467.87 In this regard,
this Court’s ruling in Rubrico v. Arroyo88 is worth considering:
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts
and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed
as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the
five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in
motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the
Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have,
in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the
criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal
action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the
terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the
outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the
interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex parte
the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of
Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the
actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the
kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of
the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both
proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive
and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a
degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining
under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and
fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB;
and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the
threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid
that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall
be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily,
Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic
criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action
can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of
the writ of amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators.89 On the
other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against
those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.
Finally, with respect to the interim reliefs sought by petitioners, this Court, in Yano v. Sanchez,90 declined to
grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that
the implicated public officials were not accountable for the disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it
would be incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and
at the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life,
liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be
anchored.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. The Court of Appeals’ denial of
the privilege of the writ of amparo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183460 March 12, 2013
Spouses NERIO and SOLEDAD PADOR and REY PADOR, Petitioners,
vs.
Barangay Captain BERNABE ARCAYAN, Barangay Tanod CHIEF ROMEO PADOR, Barangay Tanods
ALBERTO ALIVIO, CARMELO REVALES, ROBERTO ALIMORIN, WINELO ARCAYAN, CHRISTOPHER
ALIVIO & BIENVENIDO ARCAYAN, all of Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Resolution2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17,
Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB. The RTC Resolution denied the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed
by petitioner-spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador against respondents - Barangay Captain
Bernabe Arcayan, Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador, and Barangay Tanods Alberto Alivio, Carmela
Revales, Roberto Alimorin, Winelo Arcayan, Christopher Alivio and Bienvenido Arcayan.
On 22 March 2008, petitioners filed with the RTC a Verified Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.3
Petitioners alleged that in February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana
planter in Barangay Tabunan, Cebu City.4 On 17 March 2008, respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales
and Roberto Alimorin raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none.5 After the
raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from respondent Barangay
Captain Arcayan.6 They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who advised them not to attend and,
instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the latter received the letter-reply, he
allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a receipt of the document.7 Petitioners then
concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal of respondent barangay
captain to receive their letter-reply – as well as the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations,
and possible violence from respondents – gravely threatened their right to life, liberty and security and
necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.8
After examining the contents of the petition and the affidavits attached to it, the RTC issued the Writ and
directed respondents to make a verified return.9
In compliance with the RTC’s directive, respondents filed their Verified Return and/or Comment.10 In their
counter-statement of facts, they alleged that on 16 March 2008, respondent Winelo Arcayan received a report
regarding the alleged existence of a marijuana plantation in a place called Sitio Gining in Barangay
Tabunan.11 He then referred the matter to Barangay Tanod Chief Romeo Pador and Barangay Captain
Arcayan, who commenced to organize a patrol.12
On the morning of 17 March 2008, while the barangay tanods were having a final briefing, Carmelo Revales
left the place to take his breakfast.13 While he was taking his breakfast, Nerio Pador, who was riding a
motorcycle, stopped and accused the former of uprooting the marijuana plants.14 Carmelo denied any
knowledge about the incident, and Nerio thereafter threatened to have him killed. Carmelo promptly reported
this threat to the other barangay tanods.15
Respondents recounted that, notwithstanding Nerio’s actions, they proceeded to patrol the area.16 When they
passed by the house of Nerio, he angrily uttered in Cebuano, "If I will be informed who reported the matter to
the police, I will attack the informant." Carmelo then asked him, "Who reported to you?" Nerio replied, "I will
tell you later once I will be captured by police authorities. All of us will be dead this afternoon. I want a shoot
out!"17
Respondents thereafter commenced their patrol of a place owned by a certain David Quintana, but their
rounds yielded a negative result.18
Later that evening, while respondent Alberto Alivio was passing by the house of Nerio, the latter threatened to
kill him, saying, "I want to kill now!"19 Alberto then asked him, "Who reported to you so that the truth will
come out?" Nerio then punched the door of his house and said, "I will tell you later when I will be captured by
the police authorities!" Alberto then left the place and reported the matter to respondent Barangay Captain
Arcayan.20
In response to the reports, Barangay Captain Arcayan stated that he ordered his secretary to prepare
invitation letters for petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador, as the allegations of threats and intimidation made by
Nerio against some of the barangay tanods were serious. Barangay Captain Arcayan explained that he no
longer signed a copy of petitioners’ letter-reply, as he had already been given a copy of it.21
The RTC then heard the Petition. On 3 July 2008, it issued the assailed Resolution22 finding that petitioners’
claims were based merely on hearsay, speculations, surmises and conjectures, and that respondents had
sufficiently explained the reason behind the issuance of the letters of invitation. It thereafter proceeded to
deny petitioners the privilege of the writ of amparo.23
Dissatisfied with the ruling of the RTC, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review24 before this Court,
ascribing grave and serious error on the part of the trial court.25
The Court’s Ruling
We uphold the RTC’s Resolution and deny the instant Petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo26 provides for the grounds that may be relied upon in a petition
therefor, as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
We therefore rule that the alleged intrusion upon petitioners’ ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground to grant
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
On petitioners’ second and third allegations, we find that the barangay captain’s act of sending invitation
letters to petitioners and failure to sign the receiving copy of their letter-reply did not violate or threaten their
constitutional right to life, liberty or security. The records show that Barangay Captain Arcayan sufficiently
explained the factual basis for his actions. Moreover, the records are bereft of any evidence that petitioners
were coerced to attend the conference through the use of force or intimidation. On the contrary, they had full
freedom to refuse to attend the conference, as they have in fact done in this case.1âwphi1

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Thus, to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence27 that their
rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
A closer look at the instant Petition shows that it is anchored on the following allegations: first, that
respondents conducted a raid on the property of petitioner based on information that the latter were
cultivators of marijuana; second, that respondent barangay captain sent them invitation letters without
stating the purpose of the invitation; third, that respondent barangay captain refused to receive petitioners’
letter-reply; and fourth, that petitioners anticipate the possibility of more harassment cases, false accusations,
and potential violence from respondents.
All these allegations are insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ.
On the first allegation, we find that the supposed raid on petitioners’
ampalaya farm was sufficiently controverted by respondents.
Respondents alleged, and the trial court found, that a roving patrol was conducted, not on the ampalaya farm
of Nerio Pador, but on an area locally called Sitio Gining, which was beside the lot possessed by David
Quintana.28
Assuming, however, that respondents had in fact entered the ampalaya farm, petitioner Rey Pador himself
admitted that they had done so with his permission, as stated in his affidavit:
5. Around 8:00 a.m., I saw Tabunan barangay tanod Roberto Alimorin. I greeted him good morning. He told
me that there are reports that marijuana plants were grown at our ampalaya farm and that there is already a
raid.
The fourth allegation of petitioner – that, following these events, they can anticipate more harassment cases,
false accusations and possible violence from respondents – is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on
pure speculations and conjectures. As such, this allegation does not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On a final note, we reiterate that the privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to
address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. "Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations." 32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The 3 July 2008 Resolution
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City, in Spec. Proc. No. 16061-CEB is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION

6. Being innocent and nothing to hide, I allowed Mr. Alimorin to search the ampalaya farm for marijuana
VELASCO, JR., J.:
plants.29

The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
Finally, even assuming that the entry was done without petitioners’ permission, we cannot grant the privilege
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the
of the writ of amparo based upon a trespass on their ampalaya farm. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it
desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
was merely a violation of petitioners’ property rights. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,30 we ruled that the writ of
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature, as
follows:
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these The Case
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.31 x x x. (Emphasis in
July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
the original)
which dismissed their habeas data petition.
 The Facts Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January
2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as
along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves
from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus,
the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among
have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed
that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to
the girls’ Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the
photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following
an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by
the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that
safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children
were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and,
thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation
of the children’s right to privacy.

5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail
the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their verified
ample body exposure.
written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying down the
required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller,
data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation
and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty,
of privacy on Facebook.
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition
for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive
Angela from joining the commencement exercises. portion of the Decision pertinently states:

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing
printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a
quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them,
lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means
and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on
Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given the
factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was
indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors
involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the
basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires
the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security
on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas datapetition
will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the
nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside
the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before
addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after
explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right
can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in
possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided
under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged
in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his
or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or
take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business.
What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as
when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small
group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process
decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in
view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is
relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have
at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social
networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical
protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow a
summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to
privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v.
W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing
realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It
is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom."
Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of
habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is
not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other
members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos,
among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions
of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In
his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––
access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her
posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com (Facebook), which,
according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on
in the world, and to share and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a "friend
request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and
"Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore,
allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the
user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy
settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on
his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired
privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit
the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s
point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook
activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put
others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain information as well as to
regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes
more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said
privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy
inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in
this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can materialize
in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post
orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user
uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only
Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such position, if
adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the very intention
of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and
whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the
photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to
Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero
intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos
to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were
under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their
children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from
accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho
uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not
appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls
cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of STC,
who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the
Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account
[sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times
when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to question
the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only
by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to
the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the
minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s
students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by
(1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited
the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this
regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the
post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, A’s
Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook
friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon
B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very
large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user interaction
and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In
fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
"democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends
Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’
Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted.
They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the
photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more
than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial
court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of
the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than
bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with respect to the
photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
"Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit
access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-regulation
on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own
privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or
observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum
to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of
schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every
time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed to in view of their
unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is
believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in their
dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified
in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound
discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers
ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily
surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed access to
such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts,
as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have
been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing
to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the
use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in
the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and bounds of the writ of
habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to
transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her
disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her
of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration
building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The
letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO,
LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent
reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS
Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she
could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer
amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang
and back entails, and violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations
and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these
came from unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently believe,
then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to
speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my
security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer.
Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net
result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the
issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5 for the issuance of a writ of The petition is impressed with merit.
habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
213-M-2008.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her
reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life,
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such data and
informationregarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis and
the purpose for its collection;
underscoring supplied)

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their verified written
return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds that, inter alia, resort
to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which
properly belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer
until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend
not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent
whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data
on the reported threats to her person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is
outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor dispute, petitioners
argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially
questioning the transfer of her place of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her
employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the writs of amparo and
habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment - are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety
amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats
and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And she even suspects that her transfer to
another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC,
Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of the Memorandum
Republic of the Philippines
transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No.
SUPREME COURT
79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Manila

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance of the writ only
EN BANC
against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or
its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
G.R. No. L-24096 April 20, 1971
ELEGANCE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, AIDA FLORENTINO, RUFlNO TRINIDAD, MARIA IGNACIO,
AURORA TRINIDAD, EMERENCIANA SUÑGA, CEFERINA IGNACIO, LORENZA DIRECTO, ADORACION
FLORENTINO, ARSENIA MANIGAT, ROSITA LAURENTE, GODOFREDA GUEVARRA, EMILIANA OPEÑA,
CARMEN TABOY AND LUCIO JAMUAD, respondents, ELEGANCE EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
UNION, intervenor.
Fabian M. Baltazar for petitioner.
Eulogio R. Lerum for private respondents.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for intervenor.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This petition, filed both as a special civil action and by way of appeal, seeks a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 2379-ULP, ordering herein petitioner to reinstate private
respondents, with back wages until reinstatement.
The facts, as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, are as follows: Prior to the dispute which gave rise to
this case, herein private respondents — fourteen in all — were employees of petitioner Elegance, Inc. and
member of the PES Labor Association. In a certification case (No. 713-MC) filed by the said Association, the
Elegance Employees and Workers Union, one of the intervenors therein, was certified by the Court of
Industrial Relations as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of petitioner. By virtue of this
certification petitioner and the Elegance Employees and Workers Union entered into a collective bargaining
contract on March 2, 1960, containing the following provision:
SEC. 3. — THE COMPANY agrees to a UNIONSHOP; All present employees and workers
in the bargaining unit who are not now members of the Union, must become members
within thirty (30) days after the signing of this agreement as a condition of continued
employment, with the exception of supervisors. If any dispute arises as to whether an
employee or worker is a member cf the UNION of good standing, this dispute shall be
disposed of as grievance in the manner herein provided.
The subsequent events, reproduced below, are narrated in the report of the hearing examiner, which was
subsequently adopted by the Court.
The evidence further shows that after the signing of the collective bargaining agreement,
a copy of same was posted at the bulletin board of the company for all employees to see
and read for themselves. Subsequently, in a letter dated April 5, 1960, the contracting
union demanded from the management to dismiss from work the 14 complainants herein
allegedly for failure to affiliate themselves with the union within the period provided for
in the union-shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement (Exh. "C"). The union
also made threats that should respondent violate any provision of the agreement, it would
not hesitate to institute the appropriate charges. So, in the afternoon of the same day
(April 5, 1960), the Grievance Committee convened and discussed the demands of the
union contained in the said letter together with other matters taken up during that
occasion. As a result, on April 7, 1960, a notice signed by the president of the company
was again posted on the bulletin board, wherein it was announced that effective April 8,
1960 the employees enumerated therein (complainants) were considered resigned from
their employment (Exh. "B").
It is claimed by complainants that their separation from the service which was effected by
posting a notice on the bulletin board of the company was illegal because, although they
were already members of the PES Labor Association, they, however, complied with the
union-shop provision by applying for membership with the Elegance Employees and
Workers Union within the prescribed period of 30 days, through a letter dated March 25,
1960, which they sent by registered mail.
An examination of the alleged letter sent by complainants showed that the same was
addressed to the Elegance Employees and Workers Union, but the registry return receipt
attached thereto does not show the date when the letter was received by the addressee.
The end of the thirty-day period required by the union-shop is April 2, 1960. Considering
that this date is so close to the time when the letter of application was sent by registered
mail by complainants, the probability is that said application must have been received by
the union beyond the prescribed period, hence the intervenor union decided to compel
the company to dismiss complainants. . . .
The trial Judge, on his part, made the following additional observations:
The president of the Elegance, Inc. testified that in the morning of April 5, 1960 he
received the letter of intervenor union, the Elegance Employees and Workers Union,
demanding for the dismissal of the 14 complainants, with the admonition that "the union
will not hesitate to institute proper charges should the management violate any of the
terms of the agreement, . . ." (Exh. 2 Elegance). In the afternoon of the same day, the
Grievance Committee was convened to discuss, among other matters, the said demand of
the union. During that meeting, the company president stepped out to confront
Godofreda Guevarra about her not joining the union. She answered him, in effect, that
she would not join the union. The company president testified that this decision of
Guevarra was that of "all of them". He further said:
"A. Immediately after my meeting with Godofreda Guevarra, I went back to the
(grievance) meeting and it was decided that we can do something about it, we have
acceded to the request of the Elegance Employees and Workers Union since they were the
union."
The decision to immediately accede to the union demand for the dismissal of
complainants, made within several hours of the demand and without having first asked
each one of them after respondent company received the letter of April 5, 1960, whether
he or she has joined the union, was, to say the least, hasty.
Petitioner has assigned two errors in the decision appealed from, namely: (1) "in holding petitioner guilty of
unfair labor practice notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal of the 14 respondent laborers was in
pursuance to (sic) a valid union shop clause of the collective bargaining contract; and (2) in awarding back
wages to the 14 respondent laborers and in not finding that the dismissal of the aforesaid respondents was
done in good faith."
In its brief petitioner does not question that part of the judgment ordering reinstatement, but merely prays
that said judgment be "modified by exonerating petitioner of the charge of unfair labor practice and
discarding therefrom the award of back wages."
The basic issue is whether or not the dismissal of the 14 respondents was justified in the light of the facts and
circumstances. The union shop clause in the bargaining contract is clear enough. The employees must become
members of the union within thirty (30) days from the signing thereof as a condition of continued
employment. In case of dispute as to whether an employee is a member of the union in good standing, the
dispute shall be decided as a grievance in the manner provided, that is, before a grievance committee duly
constituted.
The important fact which cannot be ignored is that the private respondents did comply with the union shop
provision by applying for membership with the union within the prescribed period of thirty days, by means of
a letter dated March 25, 1960 and sent to the said union by registered mail. This is a finding of the court
below, which is not here challenged, although the same court surmised that the letter must have been received
after, the thirty-day period ended on April 2, 1960. In other words, the letter had not yet been received when
the union demanded of petitioner, on April 5, 1960, that the respondents be dismissed for their failure to
affiliate. This fact, however, does not justify the precipitate manner in which the dismissal was carried out,
much less the continued failure of petitioner to reinstate the employees involved.
In the first place, said employees were obviously not given a hearing in the grievance committee. They were
not present during its deliberations as the company president had to step out to "confront Godofreda
Guevarra (one of the respondents) about her not joining the union." The other respondents had not been
similarly questioned. Had they been afforded the opportunity to be heard, it stands to reason that they would
have apprised petitioner of the fact that they had applied for membership in the union by means of a
registered letter posted before the deadline therefor expired, or at least their definite attitude in the matter
would have been clarified beyond any shadow of doubt. In the second place, after the letter of affiliation was
received, the reason for the dismissal ceased to exist and reinstatement should have been the logical step to
follow. Indeed petitioner does not ask in this appeal that the order of the lower court for such reinstatement
be set aside, but only that the award of back wages be eliminated. In other words, petitioner in effect agrees
that private respondents have the right to be reinstated; and it is therefore incomprehensible why up to the
present, according to them, the order of reinstatement has not been complied with. Such failure of
compliance, despite the fact that the said order is not now sought to be set aside, does not sit well with the
plea for exemption from the payment of back wages.
Petitioner tries to justify its actuation by citing the alleged threat of the union to file appropriate charges
against it unless the private respondents were dismissed. Such threat was not a sufficient excuse. If anything,
the filing of appropriate charges would have opened the opportunity for the parties, including the employees
concerned, to submit the question of their status to the Court in the light of the new bargaining contract and
in the meantime avoid the drastic step taken against them. It should be noted that they were already in the
service, when the said contract was entered into, and that only a clear and definite showing of their failure to
affiliate with the union within the period fixed for that purpose would justify their dismissal, assuming that
the union shop clause was applicable to them. Even this point, however, was not altogether free from doubt at
the time, for it ran counter to the spirit of the Industrial Peace Act which recognizes the right of the employees
to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing. And as a matter of
fact the doubt was resolved in the case of Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R.
No. L-16561, decided on January 28, 1961, where this Court, construing a clause similar to the one involved in
the case at bar, said:
The closed-shop agreement authorized under Sec. 4 sub-sec. a(4) of the Industrial Peace
Act abovequoted should, however, apply only to persons to be hired or to employees who
are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already in the
service who are members of another union. To hold otherwise, i.e., that the employees in
a company who are members of a minority union may be compelled to disaffiliate from
their union and join the majority or contracting union, would render nugatory the right of
all employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing, a right guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act (Sec. 3, Republic Act No.
875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, see. 1 [6]).
Petitioner's claim of good faith is belied by the fact that after the decision in the Freeman case was
promulgated some eight months after the present case was filed, petitioner still refused to reinstate the private
respondents, and persisted in its refusal even after judgment was rendered by the trial Judge on October 6,
1964 and sustained by the Court en banc on January 14, 1965.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, but subject to the proviso that
whatever may have been earned by the private respondents in other employment prior to their reinstatement
in petitioner's employ shall be deducted from the back wages adjudged in their favor. Costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 103560 July 6, 1995
GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT SERVICE, INC. (INPORT), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fifth Division) ADELO EBUNA, EMMANUEL
VALMORIDA, RODOLFO PEREZ, ROGER ZAGADO, MARCOS GANZAN, AND REY VALLE, (WILFREDO
DAHAN, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, WILFREDO AMPER, RICARDO ABA, YOLITO AMBUS, FIDEL CALIO,
VICENTE CAHATOL, SOTECO CUENCA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN, BALBINO FAJARDO, ROLANDO
JAMILA, RICARDO LAURETO, RUDY LAURETO, QUIRICO LEJANIO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE
LAURETE, JESUSTUDY OMISOL, ZOSIMO OMISOL, PEDRO SUAREZ, SATURNINO SISIBAN and
MANUEL YANEZ), respondents.
G.R. No. 103599 July 6, 1995
ADELO EBUNA, WILFREDO DAHAN, RICARDO LAURETO, REY VALLE, VICENTE CAHATOL, MARCOS
GANZAN, RODOLFO PEREZ, ROEL SAA, ROGELIO VILLAFUERTE, MANUEL YANEZ, WILFREDO
AMPER, QUIRECO LEJANO, EMMANUEL VALMORIA, ROLANDO JAMILLA, NICOLAS DALAGUAN,
BALBINO FAJARDO, PEDRO SUAREZ, ELPIDIO ESTROGA, RUBEN PAJO, JESUSTODY OMISOL,
RICARDO ABA, FIDEL CALIO, SATURNINO SESYBAN, RUDY LAURETO, OSCAR LAPINIG, FELIPE
LAURENTE, ROGER ZAGADO, SOTECO CUENCA, FIDEL ESLIT, ZOSIMO OMISOL, ANGEL BERNIDO,
and MICHAEL YAGOTYOT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION, and GOLD CITY INTEGRATED PORT
SERVICES, INC. (INPORT), respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of an illegal
strike? This is the core issue to be decided in these two petitions.
Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. (INPORT) filed a petition for certiorari against the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) assailing the latter's decision in "Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v.
Adelo Ebuna, et al." (NLRC RAB X Case No. 5-0405-85) with twenty-seven private respondents (G.R. No.
103599).1 This petition has been consolidated with G.R. No. 103599 where the petitioners are the private
respondents in instant case and the private respondent is INPORT. For the sake of clarity, INPORT shall be
denominated in the case at bench as the petitioner and the employees as private respondents.
Instant case arose from the following facts:
Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action
to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all
members of the Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had
an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike
paralyzed operations at said port.
On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-
Welga") with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a complaint The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there was no
before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in
the nature of "equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and legal basis. In
lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
On May 7, 1985, the National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter,
majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest.2
The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:
Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior screening conducted by
the MLU-FFW before the remaining strikers could be accepted back to work. WHEREFORE, the resolution of January 14, 1991 is Modified reducing the award for separation pay
to six (6) months each in favor of respondents, inclusive of lawful benefits as well as those granted
under the CBA, if any, based on the latest salary of respondents, as and by way of financial
Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) filed a "Motion to Drop Most of the Party
assistance while the award for backwages is Deleted and Set Aside. In lieu thereof, respondents are
Respondents From the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees on whose behalf the motion was filed,
granted compensation for their sudden loss of employment in the sum of P1,000.00 each. The
claimed that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual notices of strike. After discovering this
motion of respondents to implead PPA as third-party respondent is Noted. Except for this
deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of the union officers and members and
modification the rest of the decision sought to be reconsidered shall stand. 11
without the approval of, or consultation with, majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew
their notice of strike and returned to work.
In the instant petitions for certiorari, petitioner alleges that public respondent Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion in awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite the declaration
The petitioner INPORT, not having interposed any objection, the Labor Arbiter, in his decision dated July 23,
that the strike was illegal.
1985, granted their prayer to be excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover,
petitioner's complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and continued with
the strike. On the other hand, private respondents, in their petition, assail the reduction of separation pay and deletion
of backwages by the NLRC as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code,3 the strike staged by
petitioner's workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal.4 The workers who They also allege that the Resolution of January 14, 1991 could not be reconsidered after the unreasonable
participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was no evidence that length of time of eleven months.
they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to
work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work
Before proceeding with the principal issues raised by the parties, it is necessary to clarify public respondent's
without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-FFW).
statements concerning the strike staged by INPORT's employees.

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could not
In its resolution dated January 14, 1991, the NLRC held that the facts prevailing in the case at bench require a
have possibly been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for they were active participants in the
relaxation of the rule that the formal requisites for a declaration of a strike are mandatory. Furthermore, what
conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be
the employees engaged in was more of a spontaneous protest action than a strike. 12
accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner.5

Nevertheless, the Commission affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision which declared the strike illegal.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby ordered that the strike undertaken by the officers and
the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A labor dispute includes any
majority union members of Macajalar Labor Union-FFW is ILLEGAL contrary to Article 264 of the
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
Labor Code, as amended. Our conclusion on the employment status of the illegal strikers is subject
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
to our discussion above.6
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. 15

Both petitioner and private respondents filed motions for reconsideration, which public respondent NLRC
Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to
treated as appeals.7
press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by
concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.
On January 14, 1991, the NLRC affirmed with modification8 the Arbiter's decision. It held that the concerted
action by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents, including the six
The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the
union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of
strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263) paragraphs (c)
the strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The decretal
and (f) of the Labor Code. 16
portion of the Resolution reads:

The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to be
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with modification in accordance with the
filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective bargaining
foregoing resolution. Complainant INPORT is hereby ordered, in lieu of reinstatement, to pay
agreement with INPORT.
respondents the equivalent of twelve (12) months salaries each as separation pay. Complainant is
further ordered to pay respondents two (2) years backwages based on their last salaries, without
qualification or deduction. The appeal of complainant INPORT is Dismissed for lack of merit.9 Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting
requirements.
Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution on December
12, 1991. 10
As we stated in the case of National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera, 17 the language of the law leaves
no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were
intended to be mandatory. 18
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without first having
filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry. (Emphasis ours)
In explaining the above provision, we said:
In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to
provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE to exert
all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement' during the
cooling-off period. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as
prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition
is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that
they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 19
From the foregoing, it is patent that the strike on April 30, 1985 was illegal for failure to comply
with the requirements of the law.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code, make
a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
their employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike.
A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in
an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union
officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to
submit to the "screening" required by the company. 21
The question to be resolved now is what these remaining strikers, considering the circumstances of
the case, are entitled to receive under the law, if any.
Are they entitled, as they claim, to reinstatement or separation pay and backwages?
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ordered INPORT to reinstate/accept the remaining workers as
well as to accept the remaining union officers after the latter sought reconsideration from
INPORT. 22
The NLRC on January 14, 1991, modified the above decision by ordering INPORT to pay private
respondents the equivalent of twelve months in salary as separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and
two years' backwages. 23
On reconsideration, public respondent modified its original award and reduced the separation pay
to six months, deleted the award for backwages and instead awarded P1,000.00 as compensation
for their sudden loss of employment. 24
Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages when he is
unjustly dismissed. 25
Reinstatement means restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or
separated. Reinstatement and backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally
dismissed employee. 26
Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to strained
relations between employer and employee.
It is also given as a form of financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to have been
suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited by law. 27
Separation pay is a statutory right defined as the amount that an employee receives at the time of
his severance from the service and is designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during
the period that he is looking for another employment. 28 It is oriented towards the immediate
future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must undergo before locating a replacement
job. 29
Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled to separation
pay. 30Well-settled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the
employee is validly dismissed
for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. 31
Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of
unlawful dismissal. 32
It is clear from the foregoing summary of legal provisions and jurisprudence that there must
generally be unjust or illegal dismissal from work, before reinstatement and backwages may be
granted. And in cases where reinstatement is not possible or when dismissal is due to valid causes,
separation pay may be granted.
Private respondents contend that they were terminated for failure to submit to the controversial
"screening" requirement.
Public respondent Commission took the opposite view and held:
As the evidence on record will show, respondents were not actually terminated from the
service. They were merely made to submit to a screening committee as a prerequisite for
readmission to work. While this condition was found not wholly justified, the fact
remains that respondents who are resistant to such procedure are partly responsible for
the delay in their readmission back to work. Thus, We find justifiable basis in further
modifying our resolution of January 14, 1991 in accordance with the equities of the case.
We shall therefore recall the award for backwages for lack of factual and legal basis. The
award for separation pay shall likewise (be) reasonably reduced. Normally, severance
benefit is granted as an alternative remedy to reinstatement. And since there is no
dismissal to speak of, there is no basis for awarding reinstatement as a legal remedy. In
lieu thereof, We shall grant herein respondents separation pay as and by way of financial
assistance in the nature of an "equitable relief". 33
We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to accept them back
to work after the former refused to submit to the "screening" process.
Applying the law (Article 264 of the Labor Code) which makes a distinction, we differentiate
between the union members and the union officers among private respondents in granting the
reliefs prayed for.
Finally, there is no merit in INPORT's statement that a Resolution of the NLRC cannot be modified
upon reconsideration after the lapse of an unreasonable period of time. Under the present
circumstances, a period of eleven months is not an unreasonable length of time. The Resolution of
the public respondent dated January 14, 1991 did not acquire finality in view of the timely filing of a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the Commission's modified Resolution issued on December 12,
1991 is valid and in accordance with law.

In sum, reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be
sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while
terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may
the union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay,
be declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union
their expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the
members committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union
same impossible.
members among private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause
for their dismissal.
The NLRC's award of separation pay as "equitable relief" and P1,000.00 as compensation should be
deleted, these being incompatible with our findings detailed above.
However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred,
we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and
appropriate. WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 ("Gold City Integrated
Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.") is GRANTED. One month salary
for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers as
No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their
separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 ("Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations
participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of
Commission, et al.") is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award.

SO ORDERED.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional
reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from Republic of the Philippines
employment. 34 SUPREME COURT
Manila
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the
screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and EN BANC
prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost
his employment. 35

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic
disruption and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions
prescribed by law. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot be effected in
view of a manifestation filed by INPORT dated May 15, 1987. 36 In said Manifestation, it attached a
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Certification by the President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW) to the effect that the
private respondents/remaining strikers have ceased to be members of said union. The MLU-FFW
had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT containing a union security clause. Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
Article 1, Section 2(b) of the CBA provides:

The corporation shall discharge, dismiss or terminate any employee who may be a
member of the Union but loses his good standing with the Union and or corporation,
upon proper notice of such fact made by the latter; provided, however, . . . after they shall
have received the regular appointment as a condition for his continued employment with
the corporation. . . . 37
Since private respondents (union members) are no longer members of the MLU, they cannot be
reinstated. In lieu of reinstatement, which was a proper remedy before May 1987 when they were
dismissed from the union, we award them separation pay. We find that to award one month salary
for every year of service until 1985, after April of which year they no longer formed part of
INPORT's productive work force partly through their own fault, is a fair settlement.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March
4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and
from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on
March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed
the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as
Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A",
pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr.
(Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting
Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because
demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses
those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in
of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not
the morning of March 4, 1969;
directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M.
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2)
Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad
Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as
employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that
as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that
they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the
the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the
accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration,
five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period
who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike;
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining
the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV:
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed
shall be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be
within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or
primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel
order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order
dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the
Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as
office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1"
follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
and "K-2", rec.).
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89,
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
rec.).
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
I Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is
the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person."2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles."3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and
property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the
happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be
judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the
ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas
cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the
liberties of all are protected.7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through
their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or
agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow
specificity."9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co.
vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice
Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule
formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with
private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in
particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what
they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that
they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently
their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its
workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its
workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged
oppressive police who might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to
further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they
were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this
basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social
justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate
happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular
working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts
deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation.
Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it
legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at
bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex
"F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration
and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report
for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union
members as well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects
of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of
the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be
apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it
might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4,
1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts
in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration
held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress
of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm
on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with
immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come
within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's
brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration.
However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because
they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could
happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they
were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired
relief from police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of
their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint
and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant
circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to
whether it lost expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were
exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase
orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own
equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel,
water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits
or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding
with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice
likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution
imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of
the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the
Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional
guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
"meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is
enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining
and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at
bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and
directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and
as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even
long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an
individual, who is convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for
twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these
basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise
and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to
the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms.
The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the
staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned.
Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the period
for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can
defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to
pay for competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should
filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed
within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated,
these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative
delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September
22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have
filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute
or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and
superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not
implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the
point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule,
promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the
authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to
meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51;
Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for
reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates
the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the
ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60,
rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp.
70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from
the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the
resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was
filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and
unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a
constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of
Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the
institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights. 30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo
in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in
court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari
and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records
before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the
court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the
appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond
the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to reverse in a certain proceed in any
error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of
jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the
errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being
jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it
choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as
mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose
basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights
of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar,
no actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied
upon by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the
Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for
the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new
trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for
the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of
Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers
as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any
duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged
from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders
as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No.
46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these
reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent
court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority
was founded on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered
evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578).
(emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule
in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary
of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed
his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice,
for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr.
Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910].
The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84
Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy,
14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it
deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this
Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124
[1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never
"sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view
them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with
which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the
administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly
opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial
rights of a litigant in altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As
succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the
situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest
decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843)
... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor,
the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13)
officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the
firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the
Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20,
respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work
on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any
damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the
same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to
destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow
their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however,
is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has
the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection
against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that
our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and
good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the (2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed. separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank
dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and
favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro,
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
We ruled:

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that
the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group
of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected
by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that
collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324
U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education
Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The
Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a
retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.
(Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings
case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September
15 and October 9, 1969; and