FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2836. December 6, 1949.]
ENGRACIA G. DE PONCE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ALICIA
VASQUEZ SAGARIO, Respondent. FRED RUIZ CASTRO, in his
capacity as Judge Advocate General, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and BERNARDINO JARDELEZA, in his capacity as
Chief of the Finance Service, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Respondents-Appellants.
Fred Ruiz Castro for Appellants.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile, Contreras & Gomez for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;
ARREARS IN PAY AND ALLOWANCES; WHEN REAL DISPUTE EXISTS
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT No. 136. — A fact is properly said to be in
dispute when it is alleged by one party and denied by the other, and
by both with some show of reason. Good faith and some showing on
the part of opposing claimants are the sole test of the existence or
non-existence of a dispute under Republic Act No. 136. It is immaterial
that the dispute is, in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, only
apparent, or that he is convinced that one claim is well founded and
others are not.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING CLAIMS UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT No. 136; DETERMINATION DEVOLVES ON THE
COURTS. — The weighing of opposing evidence and a decision on
questions of law and fact when conflicting claims under Republic Act
No. 136, are presented, requires the exercise of judgment or
discretion. This function is eminently judicial and devolves, as it
should, on the courts of law.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S ROLE UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT No. 136, INTERPRETED. — The Judge Advocate
General’s role under Republic Act No. 136 is purely administrative and
ministerial. This is manifest from the language of the Act, from the
nature of his office, from the express provision of section 3 that his
power to investigate is "subject to the limitations imposed by section
8," and from the fact that the investigation he is authorized to make is
summary.
DECISION
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, in a petition for mandamus in which Engracia G. de Ponce
sought to compel the respondent Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro, in his
capacity as Judge Advocate General, National Defense Forces, and Lt.
Col. Bernardino Jardeleza, in his capacity as Chief of the Finance
Service, National Defense Forces, "to bring to the proper Court of First
Instance by way of interpleader proceedings the conflicting claims
between the herein petitioner and the respondent Alicia V. Sagario for
the arrears in pay and allowances due the late Lt. Genaro Ponce." The
proceedings were instituted under Republic Act No. 136 entitled "An
Act providing for the immediate payment of monies due to deceased
Filipino members of the United States Army, United States Navy,
Philippine Scouts, Philippine Army, etc."
cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry
The facts of the case, which are not in dispute, and the issues are
summarized in the appealed decision as follows: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
Petitioner Engracia G. de Ponce, legitimate mother of Lt. Genaro G.
Ponce, USAFFE, who was killed in line of duty sometime in May, 1942,
at Bacolod Grande, Lanao, filed before the Recovered Personnel
Division of the Philippine Army a claim for the arrears in pay and
allowances due the said deceased Lieutenant Ponce. The claim was
predicated upon the allegation that Lieutenant Ponce was, at the time
of his death, unmarried and had no legitimate or acknowledged natural
children. This claim was endorsed to the Claims Branch of the Judge
Advocate General’s Office for adjudication pursuant to Republic Act No.
136. After the reception of the necessary proofs from petitioner, the
Claims Branch of the Judge Advocate General’s Office made an
adjudication and award in favor of petitioner in the amount of P7,200.
This amount, however, was not paid because of a claim filed by
respondent Alicia Vasquez Sagario, who alleged that she was the legal
wife of the deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce and had a minor daughter by
him born on May 24, 1942, after his death. Upon the conflicting
claims, hearing was had before Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, Chief of the
Claims Branch of the Judge Advocate General’s Office. Both parties
presented evidence in support of their respective contentions.
Petitioner herein predicated her claim on the allegation that the
deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce was not married to respondent Alicia
Vasquez Sagario.
Upon the other hand, oral and circumstantial evidence was presented
tending to show that the deceased Lt. Genaro G. Ponce and Alicia
Vasquez Sagario were really married, although the marriage certificate
or other documentary proof of marriage could not be presented.
Upon the evidence presented, the Judge Advocate General held that
the alleged marriage was sufficiently established under Republic Act
No. 136 and that his office would adjudicate the arrearages to
respondent Alicia Vasquez Sagario and her daughter, to the total
exclusion of petitioner. This was communicated to petitioner on
January 6, 1948.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 136 provides: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph
"Whenever a dispute arises as to who of two or more claimants are the
legal heirs of the deceased, the Judge Advocate General or his
representative shall suspend, the summary distribution of the monies
until the courts shall have finally decided the controversy in an action
for interpleading under Rule fourteen of the Rules of Court: Provided,
however, That complaints for interpleading presented pursuant to this
section shall be exempt from the payment of all filing fees, legal fees,
and costs." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
The lower court held that there was here a dispute within the meaning
of the above provision. It said that there were conflicting claims made
to the same property; an "active antagonistic assertion of a legal right
on the part of petitioner and a denial thereof on the part of respondent
Alicia Vasquez Sagario, concerning a real question or issue."
The respondents rely on section 3 of the aforementioned Act which
reads:jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"The Judge Advocate General or his representative shall proceed to
ascertain by the best means within his power the names and
residences of the persons who are lawfully entitled to the monies
referred to in this Act, and pursuant to the evidence submitted shall
summarily distribute the same to said legal heirs as of the time of final
decree of distribution in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding succession: Provided, however, That in the distribution
cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry
of the estate under this Act, the usufructuary rights granted to the
surviving spouse by the Civil Code shall not apply: Provided, further,
That in the case of inheritance subject to ’reserva troncal’ (art. 811, C.
C.) , the obligation to preserve will not be imposed on the ’reservista’:
And provided, finally, That in order to expedite the disposition of the
monies referred to in this Act, where the evidence does not strictly
conform with the statutory requirements, subject to the limitations
imposed by section eight of this Act, the Judge Advocate General is
empowered to pass upon the sufficiency of evidence of heirship." cralaw vi rt ua1aw lib ra ry
The respondents maintain that under this section the Judge Advocate
General has quasi-judicial powers. They allege that in the exercise of
these powers this officer made an investigation and found from the
evidence that Alicia Vasquez Sagario was lawfully married to
Lieutenant Ponce. It is their contention that in the light of this finding
the conflict between Sagario and the petitioner is "apparent only" and
"does not fall within the category of a bona fide dispute" as this word
is used in the above-quoted section. It is argued that if every denial of
a claim could divest the Judge Advocate General of jurisdiction and
necessitate the forwarding of the case to the court, "the whole
Republic Act No. 136 would be nullified and his (Judge Advocate
General’s) discretion a meaningless thing to be set aside by fictitious,
groundless, dilatory, expensive and malicious petitions for mandamus,
thus substituting the judgment of the court for that of the officers in
whom the law entrusted such discretion." Referring to the evidence
submitted by Alicia V. Sagario, the respondent Judge Advocate General
says that this woman’s marriage to Lieutenant Ponce has been proved
by direct testimony of two witnesses, the widow’s mother and uncle, to
the marriage. He brushes aside the absence of a marriage certificate
by observing that such "marriage certificate are things that may be
lost." He calls attention to the fact that the wife followed Lieutenant
Ponce "through the Visayas to Mindanao, suffering moral, physical and
financial deprivations to be with him because he could not bear such
separation any longer," and to the fact that "Lieutenant Ponce’s co-
officers and superiors knew that she was his wife and treated her as
such, thus creating the presumption of law ’that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage’."cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry
We entirely agree with the trial court that a real dispute such as that
contemplated in section 8 presents itself. According to Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, cited by the respondents, "a fact is properly said to be in
dispute when it is alleged by one party and denied by the other, and
by both with some show of reason." There is as much show of reason
in the mother’s evidence, extracted in the appealed decision, that the
alleged marriage was not solemnized as there is in Sagario’s evidence right to, or are entitled to share in, the benefits.
that she was the decedent’s lawful wife. At any rate, the evidence for
the latter is by no means conclusive, and it is not denied that the The decision is affirmed, without costs.
mother’s claim is bona fide.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and
Good faith and some showing on the part of opposing claimants are Reyes, JJ., concur.
the sole test of the existence or non-existence of a dispute under
Republic Act No. 136. It is immaterial that the dispute is, in the
opinion of the Judge Advocate General, only apparent, or that he is
convinced that one claim is well founded and others are not. The
weighing of opposing evidence and a decision on questions of law and
fact when conflicting claims, like the claims in question, are presented,
requires the exercise of judgment or discretion. This function is
eminently judicial and devolves, as it should, on the courts of law.

The theory that when the Judge Advocate General is convinced that
one claim is well founded he may make the adjudication in disregard
of other claims, is clearly untenable. This theory, carried to its logical
conclusion, would place in the hands of the Judge Advocate General
the power to determine whether a case should be referred to the
proper court or be decided finally and definitely by him. Such
construction finds no justification either in the letter or the spirit of
Republic Act No. 136.

The Judge Advocate General’s role under this Act is purely

administrative and ministerial. This is manifest from the language of
the Act, from the nature of his office, from the express provision of
section 3 that his power to investigate is "subject to the limitations
imposed by section 8," and from the fact that the investigation he is
authorized to make is summary. It would be illogical to suppose that
the legislature allowed the adjudication of contentious matters
involving title to monies in a proceeding devoid of formality before an
administrative officer whose decisions are final and unappealable,
according to the respondents. That would run counter to the universal
policy which secures to the parties the right to have reviewed all
judicial determinations which are to be reached only after a regular
and fair trial in which full opportunity to present evidence was given to
the litigants.

What section 3 of Republic Act No. 136 envisages is the situation

where only one or no claim is filed for monies due. In the first case, it
is the duty of the Judge Advocate General "to ascertain by the best
means within his power the names and residences of the persons who
are entitled to the monies." In the second case, it is his duty to see
that the claimant is not an impostor or that no others have a better

Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission [G.R. No. L-
16704. March 17, 1962]
FACTS
The Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following tenor:
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the
System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee’s remuneration all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration.
All these will comprise the Employee’s remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-
1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one
month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc.,
through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the
circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7, expressly excluding overtime pay
and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and employees’ respective monthly
premium contributions, and submitting, “In order to assist your System in arriving at a
proper interpretation of the term ‘compensation’ for the purposes of” such
computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161 and its amendment and on the
general interpretation of the words “compensation”, “remuneration” and “wages”.
Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of
the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a)
of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend
and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act.”
RULING
No. The Commission’s Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the
approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a
mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or
opinion as to how the law should be construed. The Circular purports merely to advise
employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law,
they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon
which the social security contributions should be based. The Circular neither needs
approval from the President nor publication in the Official Gazette
Facts
The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring
all employers in computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses
and overtime time pay, as well as the cash value of other media remuneration.
The petitioner (Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is
contrary to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.
Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’
and the employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.
The counsel questioned the validity of the circular
Social Security Commission overruled the objections
Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal
Issue
Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a)
of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend
and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act”
Held
Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any
medium other than cash. Except: that part of the remuneration in excess of P500
received during the month; bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and dismissal and
all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do
so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation
— All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid
in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of
P500.00 received during the month. Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the
employers and employees concerned with the interpretation of the law as amended
which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission simply
stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did
not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity. Whereas if it renders an opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets
a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of law is at best merely advisory for it
is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant. So ordered.
HELD:
MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
No,
G.R Nos. 104988, 106424, 123784
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of
Ponente: J. Davide Jr. either timber or lumber.

FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,
shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to
conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members
saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce
the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together
with its cargo and impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue,
Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the
refusal of the owner.
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge
Adriano R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By
virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four
truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber;
and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section
3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
"Processing plant."
Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of
legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of
almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because
the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber
origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the
invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as
opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and
even granting arguendo that lumber falls within the purview of the said section, the
same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by virtue of an
illegal seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber