Board of Commissioners (Commission on Immigration and Deportation), Board of Special Inquiry,

Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo, Associate Commissioner Jorge V. Sarmiento, Acting Associate

Commissioner Regino R. Santiago, Members of the Board of Special Inquiry, Estanislao Canta, Leo Magahom
and Benjamin Kalaw, petitioners, versus Hon. Joselito dela Rosa, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29,
William T. Gatchalian, respondents.
G. R. Nos. 95122.23 May 31, 1991

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural born mother, Marciana
Gatchalian.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together
with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson Gatchalian. They had with them Certificate of Registration and Identity
issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation,
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his
companions as Filipino citizens and was issued Identification Certificates.

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, reversed the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1961 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case against
them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that the respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of
exclusion be charged with violation against the Immigration Act of 1940.

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner
Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On September 4, 1990, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.

On September 6, 1990, respondent’s wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. That petitioners acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. Respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.

Issue:

Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.

Held:
The very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due
to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.

In matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. A warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for the purpose of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null
and void for being unconstitutional.

Philippine law, following lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian
follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is
likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Section 1,
Article IV of the Consititution.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and
“Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that the
Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore,
the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been restricted.
It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find
no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court
mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
Tenchavez v. Escano

G.R. No. L-19671, 29 November 1965

FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948,
before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However,
the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint
for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on
1958, acquired American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

2. Whether or not the parents of Vicenta alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her
conduct toward her husband.

RULING:

1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law.

Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which
Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of
absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury
upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus
entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.

2. No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted
her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce.

A portion of Section 529 reads: The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the
absence of rights in a tranger to intermeddle in such affairs. …A parent is liable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious
conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives.

Therefore, her parents, in respecting Vicenta’s independent decisions, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of
malice or unworthy motives.
Van Dorn v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn (petitioner) is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton (private respondent) is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after the marriage; they established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties. Respondent asked petitioner is
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

The Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Quita v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998

FACTS:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were
not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued
Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce.
Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the
petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was
celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

RULING:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases. No dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the
decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; nor as to their respective hereditary shares. Arturo was a Filipino
and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. The implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted
the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of
the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

The trial court did not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion
with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
jurisdiction. The question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of petitioner to
inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the
trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.

The petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of
evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of
Arturo Padlan.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

G.R No. 80116, 30 June 1989

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany.
They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before
the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no
longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

RULING:

No. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. While the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the
crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by
law to initiate the action therefor.

Pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)

Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he
is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000

FACTS:

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for
the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization
No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Paula
gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,” with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California,
for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.[11]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. In
the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13]
Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who
did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly
signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will,
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.

Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.

RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January
16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. CA Affirmed

ISSUE:

Who are entitled to inherit?

RULING:

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. Will is valid. SC reversed the decision.
Republic v. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the United States to work. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, obtained a divorce decree
and married another man.

Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a divorce decree acquired by a Filipino from the United States is valid and recognized in the
Philippines

RULING:

Yes, the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the lattertoremarry.

However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of Orbecide that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. Thus, the petition by the Republic of the
Philippines is GRANTED.
Van Dorn v. Hon. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470, 8 October 1985

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn (petitioner) is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton (private respondent) is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and after the marriage; they established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982 and petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties. Respondent asked petitioner is
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the
Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

The Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him, then married again to an
American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again. He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the
children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was
bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC retroactively). Court held
that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity
to the 3rd marriage, thus recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.
However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded in order for the 3rd spouse
to present further evidence on this.

Facts

FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:

1. VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963

2. MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian courts which
was granted in 1973

3. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in California n

1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang residence

-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT
OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati

-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:

1. Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in Makati
(covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)

2. No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was still valid
(Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair their vested rights
in accordance with Article 256, FC)

---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of the ff:

 Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper venue

 Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee - to
prove capacity to sue

RTC Makati: Dismissed petition

CA: reversed and set aside

 Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical habitation so

petition was properly filed

 Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine law

1. WON Venue properly laid? YES

-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.

-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing
the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is,
the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
 2. WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES

 As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985) sufficiently
provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the
Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's book)

-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a
divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again

---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, as
the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC

 Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of administration
as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating that she is considered a
co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband and wife but whose marriage is
void

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry
Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom
he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September
12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was
bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Held:

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue
of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994
Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the
care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits
in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her
marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the
P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground of
psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United
States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another
country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.

2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

RULING:

1st issue:

The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court
found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.

2nd issue:

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married
is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because
at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her
American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid
and subsisting.

The court decided in the negative and reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. Basing from the facts, Fely only
became a citizen in 1988 and acquired the divorce in 1984, marrying Micklus a year after. This means that
paragraph two of Article 26 cannot be applied in such a way that, Fely is not yet considered an alien at the
time the divorce was acquired and therefore she does not have the capacity to remarry and the marriage is
still considered as subsisting. The Civil Code also provides that Filipino Citizen, with regard to family laws and
status are governed by Philippine laws regardless of where they are. Fely, being a Filipino Citizen then, is not
permitted by our laws to acquire a divorce decree since such is not recognized in the Philippines.

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A
DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 15.Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Bayot v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.155635, 7 November 2008

FACTS:

On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had a child
name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which resulted to
judgment ordering the dissolution of the marriage and the distribution of conjugal properties

After obtaining a Department of Justice affirmation of her Filipino citizenship, she then filed a declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity, seeking for
distribution of conjugal properties and support.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss but CA reversed lower court’s decision. According to the CA, RTC ought
to have granted Vicente’s motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved
when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

RULING:

Yes, the divorce is valid.

Article 26 (2) of the Civil Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one,
being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting
American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix’s birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country
which allows divorce. The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by affirmation
of the DOJ Secretary does not invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in
1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the jurisdiction of the
country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.

-------

dECISION OF COURTS:

(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic - ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage
and "leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa
City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the
Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not
a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One. From the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that
Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured
the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other.

As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal
requirements."

The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this
as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce
is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not,
standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on
February 22, 1996.

In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss
and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a
cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010

FACTS:Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization and
was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of his wife. He went back to
Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistic’s Office informed the petitioner that the
marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.

Accordingly, the petitioner subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign
divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil
Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

No, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.

Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a
mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

---------

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.

The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of
res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
Facts: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for
divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo
now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed
to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the
foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to
Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the
latter is no longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be
initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary
to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo
should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said
that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The
violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse
had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as
regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate
against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also
to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is
valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on
divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.