11. CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

G.R. No. 72873
May 28, 1987
CRUZ, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision promulgated by the

Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the lower court decision in favor of herein
petitioners.

FACTS:
 Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents. One of them
transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale.

 A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”. By
virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an
area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold
to them.

 The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. with their
consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house
on a part of the enclosed area.

 One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen. Another coheir
filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption of her brother.

 Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales.
Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the
sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. Respondent court
reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the
New Civil Code.

RULING:
YES. The decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court
reinstated. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
although no notice in writing was given them.

And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the
14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption.

These are the justifications for this exception. While [courts] may not read into the
law a purpose that is not there, [courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of
it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that
killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law maker’s will.
12. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special
Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA,
respondents.
G. R. Nos. 99289-90
January 27, 1993
REGALADO, J.:

This is a special civil action instituted by herein petitioner to Restrain the

Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with
Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing.

FACTS:
 Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3 (e),
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued
against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond".

 The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash

bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00. Her arraignment was
set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be
allowed provisional release on recognizance.

 The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold

departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made,
which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she
would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University.
She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its
Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.

 She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order
 considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold
departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She
likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.

ISSUE:
1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without any
motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?
3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

RULING:

1. Yes. Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes
of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail
bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by
said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of
said court.

Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations,
she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction
over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. No. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order of Sandiganbayan without

any motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing was a valid
exercise of the presiding court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing sua sponte the hold departure order.

To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's

inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.

3. No. By posting bail, Santiago holds herself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court. Thus, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case and that it is incorrect for her to say that
her right to travel has been impaired.

Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof.

13. HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG: Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III,
Bertuldo Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo
Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita C. Hinog,
Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Hinog, Marilyn C.
Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong, Arlene Lanasang (All
respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III), petitioners, vs.
HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE,
RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE, respondents.
G.R. No. 140954
April 12, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which assailing the decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, of Tagbilaran,
Bohol Reinstating the case filed by herein private respondents.

FACTS:
 The the private respondents (Balanes) in this case, filed a complaint for the
recovery of ownership and possession as well as removal of construction and
damages (moral & exemplary) against the petitioner (Bertuldo Hinog).

 It was alleged that the Balanes are the owners of a parcel of land in Bohol,
which they have rented to Bertuldo for 10 years with an annual rental of
100php. Bertuldo, thereafter, constructed a house of light materials in the said
lot. However, after the expiry of the 10 years, Bertuldo refused to surrender
the lot and even claimed ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale executed by one Tomas Pahac, with the alleged knowledge and
conformity of the Balanes.

 Trial on the merits ensued but Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.

 Consequently, the initial counsel to the case was terminated by Bertuldo III
and designated Atty. Petalcorin to be his new counsel. The latter filed a
motion to expunge the complaint and nullify all proceedings on the ground
that the amount of damages claimed is not stated so the proper docket fee
was not paid by the Balanes hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction.
Under the Manchester Ruling, Non-payment of the correct docket fee is
jurisdictional.

 The trial court granted the motion but later on reinstated the case after the
payment of the correct docket fee.

 Instead of filing for an Motion for Reconsideration, a supplemental pleading

was filed by Atty. Petalcorin appending therein the Deed of Sale of the lot in
 question. The trial court denied the supplemental pleading on the ground
that the Deed is a new matter, never mentioned in the original answer
prepared by Bertuldo’s original counsel.

 Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition

ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioners may challenge the court’s jurisdiction?
2. WON the non-payment of the proper docket fee at the time of the filing of the
complaint automatically causes the dismissal of the action?

RULING:
1. No. The petitioners cannot after recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by
seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon
private respondents, challenge the court’s jurisdiction. They are effectively barred
by estoppel to do so. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the
fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.

It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not
raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees.
Instead, he based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the
proceedings before the trial court. It was only in September 22, 1998 or more than
seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, that
the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the motion to expunge by
Bertuldo's heirs.

Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as
the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred
from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.

2. No. The non-payment of the proper docket fee at the time of the filing of the
complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the action.
The Manchester rule, which postulates that non-payment of the correct docket
fee is jurisdictional has been modified in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs.
Asuncion. In SIOL case, the Court ruled that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment at the time
of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when
the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.

Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was
no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint
was just and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents,
being a real action, prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did not
really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee but simply
contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate assessment because the
clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. They were in good
faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of court.
14. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA,
Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region,
Olongapo City, META TRANS TRADING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,
and HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
G.R. No. 174385
February 20, 2013
BRION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the order of respondent
Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City granting
motion of the herein private respondents to intervene and denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

FACTS:
 Indigo Distribution Corporation and 13 other petitioners filed before the
respondent judge a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for TRO and
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Sec. of Finance to nullify the
implementation of Sec. 6 of RA 9334 (AN ACT INCREASING THE EXCISE
TAX RATES IMPOSED ON ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 131, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145
AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1997, AS
AMENDED) as unconstitutional.

 RTC granted the petitions despite the Republic’s opposition.

 Republic filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR
168584) to annual the judge’s order and the writ issued – petition asked for
TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.

 Republic also asked the judge to suspend proceedings pending resolution of

GR 168584

 Private respondents filed motions for leave to intervene and to admit

complaints-in-intervention.

 Without acting on the Republic’s motion to suspend the proceedings, the

respondent judge granted the private respondents’ motions and
complaints-in-intervention. Respondent judge found the private respondents
to be similarly situated as the lower court petitioners

 Republic moved to reconsider the Judge’s order arguing that it had been
denied due process because it never received copies of the private
respondents’ motions and complaints-in-intervention.
 Judge denied the above motion and the motion to suspend proceedings.

 Judge pointed to the absence of any restraining order in GR 168584.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge violated the Republic’s right to due process
when he peremptorily allowed the private respondents’ motions and
complaints-in-intervention and proceeded with their hearing ex parte despite the
absence of any prior notice to it.

RULING:
Yes. The Republic was denied due process; the respondent judge issued the
assailed orders with grave abuse of discretion.

Due process of law is a constitutionally guaranteed right reserved to every litigant.

Even the Republic as a litigant is entitled to this constitutional right, in the same
manner and to the same extent that this right is guaranteed to private litigants.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, logically
preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is rendered.

A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service, save only for
those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other
parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless
piece of paper that cannot and should not be acted upon.

In the same way that an original complaint must be served on the defendant, a
copy of the complaint-in-intervention must be served on the adverse party with
the requisite proof of service duly filed prior to any valid court action.

Absent these or any reason duly explained and accepted excusing strict
compliance, the court is without authority to act on such complaint; any action
taken without the required service contravenes the law and the rules, and violates
the adverse party’s basic and constitutional right to due process.

Based on factual findings, the OSG had never received a copy of the motions and
complaints-in-intervention. In admitting the motion to intervene them despite the
absence of prior notice, the respondent judge denied the Republic of its right to
due process and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
15. HON. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
BERNARDO LL. SALAS and GEORGE CARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 101041
November 13, 1991
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with restraining order against the
respondent Regional Trial Court Judges herein for taking cognizance of the case
filed against the petitioner for allegedly unjustly ordering direct contempt.

FACTS:
Carlos filed an administrative case against Judge Villamor, charging him with
having issued illegal orders and an unjust decision in a case he was a party of
regarding a dispute on ownership and possession of a certain parcel of land
against Naval. The same was summarily dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Dissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed five criminal cases
against Naval and the same was raffled to the RTC presided by Judge Salas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages
against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order against
Carlos and Attorney Guerrero which the Supreme Court subsequently annulled

RULING:
No. Judge Salas can not take cognizance or pass upon and scrutinize, much less
declare as unjust a judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the
judge thereof liable for damages without running afoul with the principle that only
the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.

To allow the respondent judge to proceed with the trial of the actions for damages
against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit
a court to review and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it
has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of a Court
of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere
with each other's cases, judgments and orders. Only after theAppellate Court, in
a final judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately
and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be
leveled against the latter.

16. DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, QUEENSLAND HOTEL or MOTEL or QUEENSLAND TOURIST INN,
and TEODORICO ADARNA, respondents.
G.R. No. 93262
December 29, 1991
NARVASA, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
nullifying the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao against herein private respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against Queensland Hotel
("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte application for
a writ of preliminary attachment.

On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the
corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989 after complying with the
requirements which included the payment of an attachment bond of
P4,600,513.37.

On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of
attachment was served upon Queensland and Adarna.

Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment on the ground
that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the
trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the
persons of the defendants.

ISSUE:
WON the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

RULING:
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

According to the Court, it is incorrect to theorize that after an action or proceeding

has been commenced and jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff has been
vested in the court, but before the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant (either by service of summons or his voluntary submission to the
court's authority), nothing can be validly done by the plaintiff or the court. It is
wrong to assume that the validity of acts done during this period should be
dependent on, or held in suspension until, the actual obtention of jurisdiction over
the defendant's person.

A preliminary attachment may be defined, paraphrasing the Rules of Court, as

the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff or other party may, at the
commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the
adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of
any judgment that may be recovered.

It is a remedy which is purely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict
construction of the provisions granting it. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.

In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are not
prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose
of the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties
before the writ can be issued.

A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it.
In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment
is matched by the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a
counter bond, or by a showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second
means of defeating a preliminary attachment, however, may not be availed of if
the writ was issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant's
cause of action.
17. CESAR JARO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB),
and ROSARIO VDA. DE PELAEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 127536
February 19, 2002
CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for certiori and seeking the reversal of the three resolutions of
the Court of Appeals (Eleventh Division), dated October 23, 1996, November 15,
1996 and January 6, 1997, that dismissed the petition of herein petitioner for
failure to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 and Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
FACTS:
 On November 12, 1992, Private respondent Rosario Vda. de Pelaez filed a
complaint for prohibition before the Provincial Adjudicator against the herein
petitioner.

 She alleged that she and her late husband, the late Igmedio Pelaez were
instituted as tenants of a parcel of coconut land originally owned by the late
Rosenda Reyes y Padua.

 In 1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes, the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to
petitioner who, respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the
land.

 In his Answer, petitioner countered that respondent is not and had never
been a tenant of the land for respondent never shared in the harvests nor was
respondent given any share as payment for her work. In 1978, when
petitioner purchased the land from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to
remain on the land allegedly with the understanding that petitioner could
remove respondent’s house at any time if petitioner so desired.

 On October 6, 1993, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner. In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the Provincial
Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as evidence were conflicting
and the inconsistencies therein were material to the resolution of the case.

 The Provincial Adjudicator also held that the joint affidavit executed by
respondent with her husband on May 15, 1978 was an admission that they
were not tenants of the land. In that joint affidavit, the spouses stated that
they are mere occupants by virtue of the landowner’s generosity, and they
are willing to vacate the same in case it is sold to another person.

 Respondent appealed the adverse decision to the Department of Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board in Diliman, Quezon City ("DARAB" for brevity).

 On April 22, 1996, the DARAB issued its decision reversing the decision of
the Provincial Adjudicator. The DARAB ruled that the private respondent is a
tenant of the subject land, ordering the petitioner to recognize former as a de
jure tenant therein.
 On August 23, 1996, the petitioner filed for a Motion for Reconsideration but it
 was denied by the DARAB.

 Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal on certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

 On October 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing

outright the petition for two reasons. First, the appeal was not in the form of a
petition for review as required by Supreme Court Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95. Second, the annexes attached to the petition were neither
duplicate originals nor were they certified true copies. The annexes were only
certified as true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority
or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in
contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

 Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the amended appeal of the
petitioner on the ground of technicalities.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals is not correct in dismissing the amended appeal of the
petitioner solely on the grounds of technicalities.

To recall, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two reasons. First, the
appeal was not in the form of a petition for review as required by Supreme Court
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. Second, the annexes attached to the
petition were neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true copies. The
annexes were only certified as true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not
by the authority or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity,
in contravention of Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition deserved to
be dismissed, the amended petition filed by petitioner should have been given
due course. Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form,
accompanied by annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the DARAB.
This is more than substantial compliance.

The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original
petition had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition.
Petitioner did not wait for the filing of his motion for reconsideration to do this.
Petitioner filed his amended petition with the attached certified true copies of the
decisions and other supporting documents even before receipt of the resolution of
the Court of Appeals dismissing his original petition. Petitioner again manifested
for the admission of the amended petition in his motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner had demonstrated willingness to comply with the requirements
set out in the two circulars.

In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz , where the formal requirements were liberally

construed and substantial compliance was recognized, we explained that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid application of
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided.
18. SUNNY MOTORS SALES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE OSCAR L. LEVISTE, as the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 97, Quezon City, and MS. LOLITA L. SANTIAGO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 119900
August 16, 2001
PARDO, J.:
This is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 97,
denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
 Private respondent Lolita L. Santiago entered into a contract of lease with
Ludivina L. Genito from a portion of a 4,398 sq. m. property which she used
as warehouse for scrap metals. The parties stipulated that the lease was for a
period of two (2) years with a monthly rent of P10,000.00 Santiago paid
advance rent equivalent to one (1) year, or P120,000.00, at the inception of
the lease. The lessor expressly warranted lessee's peaceful possession of
the leased premises. Immediately, respondent Santiago entered into
possession of the leased premises and stored thereat hundreds of tons of
scrap metal.

 On December 16, 1994, barely three (3) months after the lease commenced,
petitioner Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., employing guards from Enriquez
Security Agency, suddenly entered into possession of the whole 4,398 sq. m.
property of Ludivina L. Genito, including the portion leased to respondent
Santiago and barred the latter from entering and using the same, thereby
effectively dispossessing respondent Santiago of the leased premises without
any prior notice.

 Petitioner Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., claimed that it was the new owner of the
property including that portion leased to respondent Santiago having bought
the same from Ludivina L. Genito and/or Balm Construction Co., Inc., of
which she owned a major interest.

 Respondent Lolita L. Santiago filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City a complaint against Ludivina L. Genito and Sunny Motor Sales, Inc., for
damages with temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.

 Petitioner Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., filed with the trial court a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It explained that the complaint
was one for forcible entry hich falls within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. RTC denied the motion.
 Petitioner Sunny Motors Sales, Inc., filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the order of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals promulgated its decision,affirming the jurisdiction of RTC and
dismissing outright the petition of the herein petitioner.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the regional trial court has jurisdiction over the complaint for
damages with temporary restraining order, and/or preliminary injunction.

RULING:
No, the Regional has no jurisdiction.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction
over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim
asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither
can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by
the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

The allegations of the complaint reveal that petitioner's cause of action is for
forcible entry with damages. In forcible entry, the deprivation of physical
possession of land or building is effected through force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.

Clearly, respondent Santiago alleged that petitioner "employing guards from the
Enriquez Security Agency suddenly entered into possession of the whole 4,398
sq. m. property of defendant Genito, including the portion leased to plaintiff"
(respondent Santiago) and that "the entry of defendant Sunny Motors (petitioner)
into the leased property and consequent dispossession of plaintiff thereof is a
glaring violation of the latter's rights and interest provided under the lease
contract." She still remained in possession of the leased premises but such
possession was disrupted following her forcible eviction therefrom. In her
complaint, respondent Santiago was seeking to be restored into possession of
the leased premises with damages on account of Genito's breach of her
obligation under the lease contract and Sunny Motors Sales, Inc.'s entry to the
property through force.

In this case, respondent Santiago's cause of action as presented in her complaint

is for forcible entry over which the regional trial court has no jurisdiction.

19. PAULINO ZAMORA, LAURENTINO MEJORADA, PLACIDO JOSON,

AGAPITO MEJORADA, EZPERANZA ALAMBAN, CELEDONIO RINAN,
POLICARUSO T. BUSIG, FRANCISCO T. PILAPIL, JR., CELSO CABUNGCAG,
RICARDO CUGDAN, GERARDO TABON, TERESA MARTEL DY, LINO
CACAYAN, PACIENCIA D. MEJORADA, GREGORIO OUANO, JUSTINIANO
BAJAO, ROMULO PADILLA, PEDRO ALBA, ANANCORITO B. TAN, BRAULIO
REGIS, SEGUNDO ANG, CERUNDIO ACERO, ROSARIO D. TANG-AN,
COCOMIA CANETA, EDILBERTO G. BAJAO, EUGENIA N. PUPOS, JACINTO M.
BALISTOY, VIDAL T. AGUILAR, LUCIO R. AGUILAR, ESMAEL T. WAHIMAN,
ALUD PABULARIO, LEONILA LLORENTE, BERNABE BATAHOY, MODITO
JUMARITO, AGUIDO REMEGOSO, ANTONIO TAGAYLO, EMELIANO LAGBAS,
BRIGIDO AYUMAN, NATIVIDAD CABALDO, BERNARDINO DACAR, NICOLAS
E. YALMORIDA, DAMIAN LAGBAS, HILARIO MAGALLANES, FELIX ABAD,
SERVANDO SIMON, GALMACIO BACHARPA, GIL GACATGAT, DEMETERIO
JAGAPE, EUSEBIO PADERO, VICENTE MANZANO, JOSE CO, PEDRO BALILI,
petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MEDINA RECREATION CENTER, INC.,
FELOMINO DELEGENCIA, JUAN PANKIAN, MELECIO BERSABAL, CATALINO
IPANAAG, MATEO DELEGENCIA, DEMOSTENES LIMBACO, respondents.
G.R. No. 78206
March 19, 1990
CRUZ, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals decision upholding the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange over a case instituted by the herein
petitioners.

FACTS:
Petitioners organized an unregistered partnership called Medina People’s
Cockpit Association in 1967. A decade after their establishment, a corporation
called Medina Recreation Center Incorporated was created, where the properties
of the former unregistered partnership was transferred.

Petitioners alleged that there are irregularities in the transfer of properties. They
(petitioners) filed a complaint against the private respondents first in the Security
and Exchange Commission, and later, with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental. Petitioners first claimed that they are
stockholders of the said corporation but they later withdrew their complaint from
the SEC and amended their original complaint in the Court of First Instance, as
allowed by the trial judge, to make it clear that they were suing not as
stockholders of the corporation but as members of the association.

The defendants moved to strike out the amended complaint and also to dismiss
the original complaint for lack of jurisdiction. These motions were denied and
the defendants filed their answer, where they reiterated their motion to dismiss
and reserved the right to question the jurisdiction of the court.

On January 23, 1985, the court placed the disputed properties under
receivership.

On March 13, 1985, the defendants reiterated their motions for reconsideration
and to dismiss but these were denied by the CFI.

The defendants (private respondents herein) filed a petition for certiorari,

prohibition and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. CA issued a
temporary restraining order on October 7, 1985, enjoining the trial court from
further proceeding with the case.
ISSUE:
Which between the Regional Trial Court and the Securities and Exchange
Commission has the appropriate jurisdiction.

RULING:
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and
decide a case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or by law while jurisdiction over the person is acquired by his
voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its
coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by actual constructive
seizure placing the property under the orders of the court.

The Court affirm the finding of the respondent court that the petitioners are
actually suing as stockholders of the corporation and not as members of the
association. This is clear from their opening statement in the letter-complaint they
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission where they categorically
declared that they are bonafide Stockholders.

It has also been shown that they received stock and even cash dividends from
the corporation, although they said they later tried to return these. From these
findings, we conclude that it is really the Securities and Exchange Commission
and not the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental that has jurisdiction over the
case in question.

And as it has been established that the petitioners are suing as stockholders of
the Medina Recreation Center, Inc., there should also be no question that their
claim against the private respondents, as the officers of such corporation, comes
under the concept of an intra-corporate dispute. In their complaint, they allege
that the private respondents fraudulently transferred their properties to the
corporation and are now managing them to the detriment of the petitioner's
interests. This is undoubtedly a matter falling under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A,

The petitioners can no longer, deny that they are suing as stockholders of the
corporation. It is thus immaterial that the petitioners amended their original
complaint in the Court of First Instance to delete their allegation that they were
suing in that capacity. Although they had a right to make that amendment
because the defendants had not yet filed their answer, the fact is that the
statement made by the petitioners in their complaint with the SEC was still
binding on them as to estop them from alleging otherwise. Finally, it should be
remembered that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on
appeal, as by the petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction, filed
by the private respondents in 1985. The record shows that when the original
complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in 1980, the
defendants immediately moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
While it is true that the defendants did not pursue this ground until after four years
later, such failure did not constitute laches and prevent them from raising the
question again in the said petition.
20.