LEGAL PROFESSION

Atty. Rhoda Irene R. Alvar

LLB 1 (4-YEAR PROGRAM)
JOSE MARIA COLLEGE - COLLEGE OF LAW

II. Admission to Practice

G.R. No. 100113

ABELLA, ROSELYN MIA A.

CAYETANO v. MONSOD
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the said
nomination but petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination contending that
Monsod does not possess the Constitutional qualification requirement to have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years and invoking Section 1, Article IX-C
of the Philippine Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C provides:

(1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years

Monsod, after graduating from the College of Law and passed the bar, worked at
his father’s law office. Then after, he subsequently rendered services to various companies
either as legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. He also served as former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, as a member of
the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) , and as Chairman of Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers. All of these activities were after his signing of roll of
attorney.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Monsod possesses the required qualifications for the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC.

HELD:
YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava it stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court.
It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. To “practice” law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Atty. Monsod’s previous work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-

manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor constitute practice of law. Therefore, since he
possessed the constitutional requirement, that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years , he is more than qualified for the position of COMELEC chairman.

AGUISANDO, MAUREEN D.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO

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 A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

FACTS:
Ruthie Lim-Santiago the complainant is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of
Taggat Industries, Inc. On the other hand, Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio the respondent was the
former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.

Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the

operation of timber concessions from the government. In July 1997, 21 employees of
Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al.
v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat
employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat
after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid
cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.

The respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the

preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing
of 651 information for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

The complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting

interests since he was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
then he knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself
from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and
threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private

practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented
evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of
January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17
and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice
of law while working as government prosecutor. The respondent refuted complainant’s
allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the
criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. He also claimed
that when the criminal complaint was filed, he had resigned from Taggat for more than five
years. In addition he asserted that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21
He also argued that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. Furthermore, Saguico contended that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. The respondent pointed out that complainant did
not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead
complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental
reservation.

Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO a former lawyer of
Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-
240 "Violation for Labor Code".

HELD:

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 The respondent is liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713"). Canon 6 provides that the Code
"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition not to represent conflicting interests.
However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting
interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client
relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. The respondent was also mandated under Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes
violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions.

The complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent

represented conflicting interests. There was no conflict of interests when respondent
handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees
in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected
with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must

be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one
who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily
follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment
with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is
not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her

allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code. The
respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill. While "private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. Respondent
argued that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not
retained as counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument was without
merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers
with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice
of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while
working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments
by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant,
respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

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 However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the
Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one
year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio is GUILTY of violation

of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio was suspended from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of the Decision.

AMPARADO, SYDELYN A.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. Rana

B. M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003

FACTS:
Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21
May 2001, a day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees, a
complainant Dona Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar charged with unauthorized practice of law and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. Thus,
respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel
for a candidate in the May 2001 elections.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a

municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any
court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the
latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the
pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus
does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the Office of the Bar
Confidant that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does

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not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members
of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It
is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained
and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who
has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without
a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Therefore, the respondent engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Respondent also called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Rana is denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

ANCHETA, KEVIN HEINTZIE E.

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, ET AL VS. Atty. Edwin Pascua

A.C. No. 5095: November 28, 2007

FACTS:
Father Aquino, then Academic Head of the Phil. Judicial Academy joined by the other
complainants filed a letter of complaint against Atty. Edwin Pascua, Notary Public in
Cagayan, alleging the latter of falsifying two notarized documents of Joseph B. Acorda,
Doc. No. 1213 and Remigio B. Domingo, Doc. No. 1214 both documents dated on Dec.
10, 1998. Moreover, the complainants further alleged that on June 23 & July 26,1999,
Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, RTC Toguegarao, certified that none of the above entries
appear in the National Register of Atty. Pascua: that his last entry therein was Doc. No.
1200 executed on Dec. 28,1998. In his reply, the respondent admitted having notarized the
two documents on Dec. 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his notarial register due to
the lapses made by his secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edwin Pascua is liable for the alleged falsification of two public
documents.

RULING:
Atty. Edwin Pascua is GUILTY of misconduct and is Suspended 3 months of practicing
Law with a stern warning if repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt more severely.
His notarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his
professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries
public who were found guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their
duties. A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might

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lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession ( Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409). Failure of the
notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts
in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249,
Article 6)

ANDAYA, RYLE RIANN

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, VS. ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F

GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES
G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner,
describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor
on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior
courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority
of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner
to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party litigant

RULING:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where
the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear
in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus in the instant case, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

SORIANO, DALE ALEEKU C.

In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon

AM 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. Atty. Edillon stubbornly refused to pay his membership dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines because the provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel Atty. Edillon to pay the
membership fee to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

HELD:
Yes to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not a violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. The integrated bar is a State-organized Bar, which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The Supreme Court has the power to strike the name
of the lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, also matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision.

III. Lawyer’s Duty to Society

BONSALAGAN, ADAN M.

SICAT vs. ARIOLA

AC No. 5684, April 15, 2015

FACTS:
The municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C Benitez Architect and
Technical Management for the construction of the low cost houses.The SPA was
purportedly by Juanito Benitez, JC Benitez Architect and technical management. The SPA
was notarized January 4, 2001 with the notarial acknowledgement of Ariola declaring that
Benitez had appeared before him acknowledged that the instrument was his free and
voluntary act, however Benitez had died on October 25, 2000 more than 2 months prior to
the notarization and 3.7million paid to JCBATM for services not rendered. Arturo Sicat is
a Board member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Rizal charged Atty. Ariola of
committing fraud,deceit and falsehood in notarizing a SPA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Ariola be held administratively liable for notarizing a SPA?

RULING:
Yes, he should be disbarred for misconduct, Notaries public should not authenticate
documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who execute
them and personally appeared before the, to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. Falsification of a notarized instrument is a violation of a Lawyer's oath.

CABOVERDE, ROCK JHUN CHAN

Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000

FACTS:
Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on
grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with
Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to petitioner,

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Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This
led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail.
According however to respondent, she is a victim in the situation. When respondent met
Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese
woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married
in Hawaii, USAtherefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the real
status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further claims that she and
Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually
accept the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage
contract.

ISSUE:
Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law?

HELD:
NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath
and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to
the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that something
was amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. Respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her
relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable member
of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his
true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no
intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.

CANOY, JOANNA MECHELLE U.

Barrios vs Martinez
AC No. 4585 442, November 12, 2004

FACTS:
Atty. Martinez was convicted of a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Respondent
Atty. Martinez was also involved in another estafa case relating to his legal services of the
victims of the Doña Paz tragedy in 1987. Respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal
services for free to the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy however claimed an attorney fee
from the compensation that Suplicio Lines issued.

Respondent’s conviction of crime involving multiple turpitude clearly shows that

he is unfit to protect the administration of justice and therefore justifies the imposition of
sanctions against him. On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a

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resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating
Commissioner. On 16 February 2004, a Manifestation and Motion was received from the
complainant’s daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been
furnished with a copy of respondent’s motion and records show that respondent Atty.
Martinez indeed failed to furnish a copy on the said Motion.

Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so.

ISSUE:

1. Is the act that the respondent shown can be considered as a ground for his
disbarment?
2. Is the crime such as issuing a check which has no value creates a moral
turpitude?

RULING:

YES. The court finds the respondent guilty of BP 22 which brought in the deceit
and violation of his Attorney’s Oath and Code of Professional responsibility. Respondent
should abide the laws as what he had sworn. Respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

CATUNGAL KARL FELYPP C.

PETER T. DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

FACTS:
Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru
falsification of a public document against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5
against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:

The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No.
33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own
real property in his name – agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents
that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr.
Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6

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Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his
name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

RULING:
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code. A
lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. By his own admission,
respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.
Yet, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in
his office.

CERNA, LINNAEUS FERDAUSI C.

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino

A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2019

FACTS:
Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Linsangan
alleged that Atty. Tolentino, with paralegal Fe Marie Labiano convinced the clients of the
former to transfer their legal representation to the latter, with the promise of better and
swifter services, in exchange for a long of Php 50,000.00. This allegation was supported
by a copy of the respondent’s calling card which had “with financial assistance” written on
the front. Complainant also presented a sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his client-relations with Linsangan and utilize
the respondent’s services instead. Respondent denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulation of the calling card.

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of IBP
and found that respondent encroached on the professional practice of the complainant,
violating rule 8.02 and other canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent also violated section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. CBD recommended
that respondent be reprimanded with stern warning that any repetition would merit heavy
penalty.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent has violated said rules and canons of CPR and Rules of Court

HELD:
The display of triumph of commercialism in the legal profession should not be
tolerated, lest the grabbing of client from another’s legal counsel. However, with the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the court is not prepared to rule
that respondent was personally and directly responsible for printing and distribution of
Labiano’s calling cards.

The Supreme Court concurs with the decision of CBD for unethical conduct of the
respondent but modifies it. “…Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules
1.03,2.03,8.02, and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby suspended for practice of law for
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of resolution...” Stern warning was
also given to him that for any repetition would warrant a more severe action.

RATIONALE:

10
 The decision of the Supreme Court to modify the penalty is because the violation
and the penalty of the CBD is incommensurate.

The violations are as follows:

CPR Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay a man’s cause. Complainant presented
substantial evidence that respondent has indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referral’s suits.
CPR Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business. Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. This has been proved
to be exhibited by the respondent.
CPR Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
CPR Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
This rule has been violated by the respondent by lending Php 50,000.00 to the clients in
exchange for legal counsel.
CPR CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL
SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. The words “with
financial assistance” on the calling card was used to entice clients to change counsel with
a promise of loans.
Rules of Court Rule 138 Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

DINHAYAN, DORX MESHILLU THERESE G.

Ysasi III vs National Labor Relations Commission

G. R. No. 104599, March 11, 1994

FACTS:
The petitioner, Jon De Ysasi III was employed in the hacienda of his father, Jon De Ysasi
as the farm administrator. Sometime in June and August 1982, the petitioner suffered
various ailments and was hospitalized. On November 1982, he underwent a surgery and
missed work. During the recovery period, he acquired other illnesses such as acute
gastroentritis and infectious hepatitis.

Throughout that period, his father shouldered the medical expenses and he received
continued compensation. While the petitioner was confined, without due notice, he was
terminated and ceased to receive salary. He made oral and written demands for an
explanation of the sudden witholding of his salary. However, both demands were not acted
upon.

Petiioner filed an action with the NLRC for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay,
consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. Said complaint
for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, holding that petitioner abandoned his

11
work. On appeal, said decision was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respective counsel for both parties have faithfully observed their duty to
encourage amicable settlement and avoid litigation.

HELD:
The conduct of the respective counsel of both parties sorely disappoints the Court and
invite reproof. Both counsels may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective
causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility to exert all reasonable efforts to smoth
over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct
and immediate consaguineous lies between their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is
not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
witholding suit. He should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsels herein fell short of what was expected
of them despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.

DULAY, MANUEL ERNICO B.

JONAR SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. EDISON V. RAFANAN

A.C. No. 6252. October 5, 2004

FACTS:
Jonar Santiago is an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and penology. The
complainant filed for the disbarment of Atty. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The petition stated
that respondent, in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to:
a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the
affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make
and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client
and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client.

The IBP Board of Governors modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a
penalty of P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a
heavier penalty.

Contention of the petitioner: He did not Know that the rule is to be applied strictly in
notarizing documents because some of his colleagues are not doing it.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rafanan is guilty in violating the Notarial Law
2. Whether or not a lawyer (in this case, Rafanan) can stand as witness in favor of his
clients.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the notarial law and Canon 6 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties
of notaries public.

They are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them

12
has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized
by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before them
a number corresponding to the one in their register and to state therein the page or pages
of their register, on which the same is recorded. Failure to perform these duties would result
in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. Canon 6 is also violated because
the canon states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of these existing laws and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence which the
respondent failed to satisfy by not.

With regard to the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, the Supreme
Court held that it was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out
the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence
and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his
Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity
of its contents. Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper.

DULFO, MERCEDITA M.

MAURICIO C. ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

223 SCRA378, June 17, 1993

FACTS:
Mauricio Ulep, the Petitioner prays the Court "to order the respondent The Legal Clinic,
Inc. to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that
of annexes "A" and "B" and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by
law." The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30
am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

The petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the relief sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

13
Respondent argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van Osteen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by
it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

RULING:
The canon of the profession tells us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

Not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions.
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented. Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements
for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, The Court find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona is not applicable to the case
at bar. the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception
to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees
for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or
an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided
for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in
any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,

The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein.

ECHIVERE, MARIE VIC D.

SAMONTE V. ATTY. GATDULA

A.M. No. P-99-1292; February 26, 1999

FACTS:

14
 Atty. Gatdula was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in the private
practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.
Julieta Samonte was the representative of her sister Flor de Leon for the ejectment case
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The execution of that decision
in favor of Flor de Leon was enjoined by Branch 220, Regional Trial Court where Atty.
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court.

Samonte alleged that Atty Gatdula tried to convince her to change her lawyer if she
wanted the execution of the judgment to proceed and even gave her his calling card with
the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices'' which Samonte
attached to her affidavit-complaint. Atty Gatdula, when asked to comment, claimed that it
was Samonte who showed him said calling card and asked him if he could handle the case
but to which he refused as he was not connected with the law firm, though he was invited
to join the firm. The case was set for hearing for several times but Samonte nor her counsel
did not appear. The return of the service stated that Samonte was abroad. Atty Gatdula
testified in his own behalf and vehemently denied Samonte’s allegation. He, however, did
not deny that his name appeared on the calling card or that the calling card was printed
without his knowledge and consent.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from
the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Gatdula violated canon 3.03 for engaging in the private practice of
law while holding public office

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the inclusion or retention of Atty Gatdula’s name in the
professional card constitutes an act of solicitation which is a violation of Section 7, sub
paragraph (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as “Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials or Employees” which declares it unlawful for a
public official or employees to, among others:

“(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with official functions.”

Atty Gatdula is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law. He is

further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged
in the private practice of law.

EDRALIN, SANDY V. LAPAYAG

Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R. Imbang

AC No. 6788; August23, 2007

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The complainant Diana Ramos requested the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang
in filing civil and criminal liabilities versus the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. The
respondent issued a receipt for PhP5,000.00 only for the complainant’s PhP8,500.00
attorney’s fee. As to the complainant’s knowledge, there were 6 scheduled hearings of her
cases against the Jovellanoses but all had been cancelled and rescheduled as informed by
the respondent. For the 6 succeeding “hearings”, Ramos was charged of PhP350.00 in each.
When the complainant checked the status of her case in the trial courts of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna, she merely learned that the respondent never actually filed a case against
the Jovellanoses and that Atty. Jose R. Imbang was a Public Lawyer.

15
As to the Respondent’s defense, he said that the complainant already had a knowledge that
he was employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He issued a receipt for the mere purpose
of safekeeping as requested by the complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.

HELD:
Yes. Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character
required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office
are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.

The following supported the SC’s ruling:

1. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of
public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws,
the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared unlawful (b) Outside employment and other
activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
no (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official
function
2. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility — A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes.
3. Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's
counsel.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the above-mentioned

guidelines for lawyers. He DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount
of ₱5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt
of this resolution.
J

ELMAN, KRIZTIN ANNE D.

Olazo Vs. Justice Tinga (Ret.)

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010

FACTS:
On March 1990, the complainant Jovito S. Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel
of land located in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig, in which this
land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio and it was already segregated and was
already declared open for disposition. Proclamation No. 2476, in which it was issued on
January 7, 1986 and the Proclamation No. 172 later on October 16, 1987. In order to
implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued. The Committee on
Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate and make a recommendation on the applications
to purchase the lands that are open for disposition. It was spearheaded by the Committee
on Awards director and the respondent Ret. Justice Dante Tinga as one of the committee
members, for he was the congressman of namely Taguig and Pateros. The complainant
charged disbarment for the respondent because of violating Rule 6.02,that the respondent
abused his position as a congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards for
exerting undue pressure on the complainants father. Rule 6.03 for alleged persuasion of the
complainants brother to convey rights over to the land to one Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
That on may 1999 the respondent met with his brother Manuel for nullyfing the rights of

16
the land to Rodriguez and that the respondent wanted to transfer the rights to Rolando
Olazo ,the barangay Chairman of Hagonoy Taguig. Complainant stated that the respondent
presented himself as lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. Reportedly,
the complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful conduct for Rodriguez
knowingly is not qualified beneficiary of Memorandum 119. The complainant also alleged
the respondent of violating Section 7(b)(2) of the Code and Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Official and Employess Or R.A. No. 6713 for engaging in the practice of law
even under on a one-year prohibition period for appearing as lawyer of Lee and Rodriguez.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondents’ actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
conduct first while still an elective official and as a member of Committee on
Awards.
2. Whether he was no longer a public official but a private lawyer who represented a
client before he was previously in connection with.

HELD:
No. The respondent did not abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application
because of reported personal interest over the subject land. Also, the complainant claim
shows no records of the said sales application that was brought or advanced his private
interests. No sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position in order to obtain
personal gain. The denial of the complainants sales application form was made by DENR
and not of the Committee on Awards.

No. There was no existence of evidence showing that the respondent interfered with the
application of the complainants land when the respondent , still being a member of the
Committee on Awards. Complainant failed to establish the evidences that the respondent
was still engaged in the practice of law. In Cayetano vs Monsod, the practice of laws as
any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Moreover it was ruled that to engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are the characteristic of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Thus, insufficiency to show evidences of such
claim can never be considered for it will be uncertainty on the respondents side.

CONCLUSION:
Hence, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the following administrative cases filed:

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
poromote or advance his private interest, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he head interviewed while in said
service.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Section 7 Prohibited Acts and Transactions – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

(2) Engage in private practice of their profession unless authorized by the constitution or

17
law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;

THEREFORE, premises considered that the case shall be DISMISS against Ret. Justice
Tinga for the failure and insufficiency of the complainant to present convincing evidences
to the reported unethical practices of the respondent.

SO ORDERED

ENUMERABLES, JED I.

GISELA HUYSSEN v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

[A.C. NO. 6707 : March 24, 2006]

FACTS:
Disbarment complaint was filed by Huyssen against respondent Atty. Guttierez. The latter
allegedly asked for cash deposit which was needed in application of the complainant and
her three children (who were all American citizens) for Philippine Visa in order for the said
application to be acted favorably. The respondent, who was then connected with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, received U$S20,000 on six different occasions from April
1995 to April 1996, telling the complainant that said deposit was to be used as payment for
services rendered for obtaining the visa and the same could be withdrawn one year after.
No official receipts. Personal checks were issued (by the respondent to the complainant
thereafter) but were later dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
After failing to return the sum deposited, a complaint for disbarment was filed in the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) along with
documentary evidence in the form of respondent’s letters to the complainants and petty
cash vouchers issued by the respondent. In the respondent’s Counter-Affdavit, he denied
the allegations claiming that he never physically received the money mentioned nor had he
misappropriated the same, and that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted the
complainant and her children in their application for visa. The respondent presented more
explanations on why money was not returned but none of them was substantiated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s conduct merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING:
Yes, the respondent’s conduct merits the penalty of disbarment.

Decisive on the matter is the pertinent mandate found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any
of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Respondent’s act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latter’s

pending application for visas is an act of deceit and malpractice which violates the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

In desperate attempt to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by issuing

several worthless checks which constitutes gross misconduct: and grossly immoral conduct
for it is tantamount to breaking his private duties he owes his fellow men of society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.

Consequently, issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he did not have
sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the

18
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among
other acts, gross misconduct in office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his
position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said
office. It is submitted that respondent has violated rule 6.02 of canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads: "A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties."

Time and again, it has been declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and
the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his
receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to the Office of the
Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

IV. The Lawyer’s duties to the Legal Profession

FLORES, FRETCHEN BELLE C.

Re: 2003 Bar Examination

BM 1222, February 4, 2004

FACTS:
On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations. Committee was apprised of a
rumored leakage in the examination on the subject. With this, the court decided to nullify
mercantile law examination and hold another examination.

However, petitions were filed because of the emotional, physical and financial burden to
the barristers. The petitions were granted and the exams to the remaining 7 bar subjects.
The court appointed 3 retired justices into a committee to investigate the leakage issue. To
determine and identify the source of leakage and the parties responsible or who might have
benefited to protect the integrity of the bar examination.

Cecilia Carbajosa a bar examinee found the leakage when she obtain a copy of the leaked
questions and found that they were very similar to the questions in the bar exam. Upon
meeting the investigators, she provided a xerox of the leaked questions. It was found that
82% from examiner Atty. Balgos was included in the leakage. He also received reports that
Atty. Danilo de Guzman was the source of the leakage, as he faxed the questions to his
fraternity brother, Ronan Gravida.

Atty. Danilo de Guzman (assistant lawyer in the firm of Balgos and Perez) stole a copy of
Atty. Balgos file on Mercantile Law with the proposed test items thinking that they were
just quizzers.

ISSUE:

19
Whether or Not Atty. Danilo de Guzman be guilty of gross misconduct unbecoming
member of Bar.

RULING:
Yes. de Guzman abetted cheating or dishonesty for his fraternity brothers, and lack of
integrity for copying the exam questions from Atty. Balgos without consent which violate
the Rule 1.01 of Canon1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
member of the Bar.

FULGUERAS, SHANE DENISE A.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO

[B.M. NO. 1370. MAY 9, 2005]

FACTS:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the Supreme Court, requesting his exemption from
the payment of IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. His contention was
that his employment in the Civil Service Commission prohibits him to practice law and he
did not practice the same while in the US. He argued that, him paying for the annual IBP
dues is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer. His removal from the
profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the deprivation of his
property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Is exempted in paying the IBP dues.

RULING:
No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the
judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation,
it may impose a membership fee for that purpose.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of

which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists
for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or
the type of practice, the member is engaged in.

GALORIO, MARYMER F.

Carmelita Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

A.C. No. 4921 ,March 6, 2003

FACTS:
Carmelita Zaguirre (complainant) and Alfredo Castillo (respondent) met in 1996 and had
an illicit affair when they became officemates at NBI during the time when Alfredo Castillo
was preparing to take his Bar Examinations. Upon the admission of Castillo to the
Philippine Bar, Zaguirre learned that he was already married and has three children.

The complainant got pregnant and the respondent, who was then already a lawyer,
executed a notarized affidavit admitting his relationship with the complainant and
acknowledging the child as his with a promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the
child, however, respondent started to refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any
form of support.

After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite

suspension from the practice of law.

20
The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to
support her. In his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his
services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character. His wife even submitted a
handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father despite the affair. More
than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his
willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks
addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php
2,000.00 each.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be
punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent, Atty. Alfredo Castillo, is guilty of gross
immoral conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension. The
attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to
support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which
is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is
a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a
definite suspension of two years. Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further
claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

GEMARINO, RODERICK J.

CONDRADO QUE v. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA JR.

A.C. No. 7054, 11 November 2014

FACTS:
Conrado Que accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr. of tactically delaying the
process of the final judgement of the lower court in favor of his client. He filed a
petition of certiorari before he the court of appeals and two petitions of annulment
of title and annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court, and a petition
for declaratory execution of the lower court’s decision against his client.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated various canons and provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Rules of Court, hence be
disbarred from the practice of law.

HELD:
Yes, the respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, violated various canons and
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and the Rules of
Court.

First, it was found out that that there was an abuse of court procedures and
processes from his part. The respondent filed a petition for certiorari, (docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No: 53892), with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC
for lack of jurisdiction. It was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, yet the respondent
repeated attempts to go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional
ethical rules in defending the interest of his client. In those attempts, the respondent
violated the Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
makes it a lawyer to “observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them the
ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to obstruct the
speedy administration of justice.

Second, there was a filing of multiple actions and forum shopping on the

21
 part of the respondent. The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of professional Responsibility. Both violations constitute
abuse of court processes which degrade the administration of justice.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for

reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment
where he misrepresented to the court his clients what actually transpired on the
hearing. For these acts, the respondent clearly violated the lawyer’s duty to observe
candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. The respondent is liable under
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Rule 10.01,
it stated, a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court,
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by an artifice.

Fourth, the Investigating Commissioner found out that the respondent made
an “unauthorized appearances” which were a violations on sections 21, 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a
litigant without the authority from the latter or from the latter’s representative or,
in the absence thereof without leave of court. This clearly professional misconduct
and warrants disciplinary measures.

Due to the respondent’s multiple violations of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of
Canon 10; Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 10; Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and Sections 21 and 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent ATTY.
ANASTACIO REVILLA JR., from the practice of law.

GUERRERO, HAZNA PEARL I.

Tan and Pagayokan Vs Balajadia

GR No. 169617, March 14, 2006

FACTS:
On May 5, 2005 at 10:00 in the morning there has been a parking accident involving the
petitioners Rogelio and Norma Tan and Maglinayao Pagayokan and respondent, Benedicto
M. Balajadia. On the same day, there were two complaint-affidavits drafted by Liza
Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secratary.

The first draft was made at 10:00 am and it was stated that Balajadia claims that he is a
practicing lawyer with office address at Room B-207,2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City. However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted to the
Philippine Bar.

While on the second draft which was made at 1:00pm, it was stated that he is a businessman
with office address at Room B-204,2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City.

Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting
himself as a lawyer basing on his first complaint affidavit.

In the claims of the respondent he said that he does not review the two complaint- affidavits
because both were drafted by Atty. Aquino's secratary. In line with his claims, Liza
Laconsay, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-
affidavit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

HELD:
No,the respondent is not liable for indirect contempt.

22
Unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without
authority constitutes indirect contempt. Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of the
Court in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because of the deliberate
intent. However, the respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a
practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence thus, cannot establish intent to make him
liable for indirect contempt.

JOHAYR, SALMAN M.

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Atty. Revilla Jr.

AC No 7056, September 13, 2006

FACTS:
This was a case filed by Plus Builder, Inc. against Atty. Anastacio Revilla who was
the legal counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al for gross misconduct.

On November 15, 1999, a decision from the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite

(PARAD) was rendered in favor of Plus Builders, Inc. against Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al
who were asserting that they were the rightful owners of the land. However, as the
investigation progressed, it was found out that Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al were mere
tenants of the said land. Further, when the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, the
decision sustained the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite’s decision. Hence, Atty. Revilla
then tried to prolong the execution of the decision by filing several motions, petitions for
temporary restraining orders and lastly, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Moreover, he also even allowed non-lawyers to engage or deal in the
unauthorized practice of law. However, the respondent denied all the allegations and firmly
believed that what he did were all valid and proper to protect the rights and interest of his
clients namely Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al. and that he just merely exhausted all possible
remedies and defenses he can do in lieu to his client’s rights.

Meantime, as to the allegation that he used his name in the illegal practice of law,
Atty. Revilla said that there was no concrete evidence to prove the same or did he fail to
dispute this, contrary to the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). That he
was the counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the cooperative Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC). But atlast, he added and said that if he was indeed guilty
for violating any of the rules he apologized and prayed that the Court would be lenient on
his penalties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

RULING:
Yes. Atty. Revilla was found guilty of gross misconduct by the court for the way
he handled the case of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.

It is true and indeed the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to
give his full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. In addition, a lawyer’s devotion
to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means
to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law
to enable the latter’s cause to succeed. Lastly, it is under Canon 9, Rule 9.01 that a lawyer
shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.

However, in this case, Atty. Revilla’s desire and way of defending his clients were
poor and uneducated. The act of prolonging the execution of the case clearly violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility that a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding
execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. Moreover, entrusting and

23
delegating the case into unqualified persons violates Canon 9, Rule 9.01 of Code of
Professional Responsibility wherein, a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar
in good standing. Lastly, the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
justice.

Consequently, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct

and is suspended for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is further warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

V. Lawyer’s Duties to Courts

JUMAMIL, VENIZA H.

MALIGAYA vs. ATTY. DORONILLA

A.C. No. 6198, September 15, 2006

FACTS:
Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for Renato M. Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for an action for
damages. During a hearing of a civil case, Atty. Doronilla, Jr. uttered a falsehood in open
court. Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway
asked a number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his
statements in writing and "file the appropriate pleading." Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla
submitted no such pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.The complaint, which charged
Atty. Doronilla with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting in
obstruction of justice," was referred to a commissioner for investigation. Complainant
swore before the investigating commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement
to withdraw his lawsuits. Atty. Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to
present evidence and explain his side, admitted several times that there was, in fact, no
such agreement. Later he explained in his memorandum that his main concern was "to
settle the case amicably among comrades in arms without going to trial” and insisted that
there was no proof of his having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility or the
lawyer's oath. He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement (or, as he put it, his
"alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and therefore caused
no actual prejudice to complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Doronilla violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer
owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 states that a lawyer shall do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice. By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of
ethical conduct.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the
practice of law. The court disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's
suspension from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this
administrative case is to determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal
profession, not his liability as a legal officer in the military service. Thus, it would be
improper to order, as a penalty for his breach of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his
suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate General's Service. Of course,

24
suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well follow as a consequence
of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason to impose it as a
penalty for his professional misconduct. Therefore, the court shall treat the IBP's
recommendation as one for suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

KIRIT, ANGELO

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN vs. ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR

AC. No. 3731, September 7, 2007

FACTS:
Atty. Emily A. Bajar is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance
(BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform who represented Fernando
Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases which raised the same issues. Tanlioco is
an agricultural lessee of a land owned by complainant’s spouse and sister-in-law
(landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case against Tanlioco on the basis
of a conversion order of the land use from agricultural to residential. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) rendered judgment ordering Tanlioco’s ejectment subject to the
payment of disturbance compensation. The RTC’s judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

Respondent, as Tanlioco’s counsel, filed another case for Specific Performance to

produce the conversion order. The RTC dismissed the complaint due to res judicata
and lack of cause of action.
Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The case raised the same issues of
conversion and disturbance compensation.
Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
since she misused the rules of procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the
administration of justice.
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondent to
comment on the complaint lodged against her. After the Second Motion for
Extension of Time to Submit Comment, Bajar submitted her comment.
On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution requiring Bajar to file Rejoinder
within 10 days from notice.

On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered Bajar to show cause on why she should not
be subjected to disciplinary action for failure to comply with the Court’s 25 March
1992 Resolution. The Court also required respondent to Comment on the
complainant’s 2 June 1992 Manifestation.

On February 1993, Bajar filed a Court Manifestation that she substantially

complied with the Court’s order as to her defenses. Bajar advised the Court that she
had transferred to the Public Attorney’s Office and since she was no longer a
"BALA lawyer," the cases involve in this proceeding had become moot and
academic.

On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating that the administrative case
against respondent has not been mooted and nothing set out in her ‘Manifestation’
excuses her failure to obey this Court’s Resolutions of 25
March 1992 and 7 October 1992." The Court had also resolved to impose a fine of
P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require respondent to comply with the 25
March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.
On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution ordering the arrest of Bajar
for detention at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days.
On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The NBI detained respondent
for five days and released her on 25 October 1993. The Court reiterated that Bajar

25
 should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October 1992 Resolutions.
On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution referring the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for hearing and decision.
On 11 November 1993, Bajar filed a Rejoinder. Bajar claimed that complainant had
no legal personality case. Bajar also alleged that she was merely protecting the
interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to do so in her oath of office. Bajar contended
that "she had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of being
disciplined by the latter if only to impart truth and justice.
On 22 November 1995, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating
Commissioner Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the IBP.
Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated respondent’s violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility that rendered her unfit to continue the practice of
law.

1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay which amounted to an

obstruction of justice.

2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts. The duplication or

multiplication of suits should be avoided, and respondent’s acts were tantamount
to forum-shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court processes and
proceedings.

3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted at everybody during the

hearing on 25 May 1995. The want of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful
language used.

On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo,

issued Circular No. 30-99 informing all courts that respondent had been suspended
indefinitely. Atty. Bajar continued to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong
City despite her suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Emily A. Bajar is guilty of the violation of the Rule 10.03
Code of Professional Responsibilty and the willful disobedience of the order of the Court
which is sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

LEDESMA, LORELIE E.

Atty. Barandon Jr. vs. Atty. Ferrer Sr.

AC No. 5768, March 26, 2010

FACTS:
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of
appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr., for filing a
reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper
language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
The document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed at a date when Atty.
Barandon was not yet a lawyer.

Further, On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Daet
before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying,
"Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang
magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines
Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."

26
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty.
Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty.
Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the
plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been
falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also
found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of
other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.

On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, adopting
and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the
penalty of suspension to only one year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred
in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him and if the penalty
imposed was justified.

HELD:
The Supreme Court examined the records of this case and found no reason to disagree with
the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow
lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Atty. Ferrer's actions do not
measure up to this Canon. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence
that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. Moreover,
Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using
offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer.

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all
times. Evidently, threatening with the intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit
Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants before the start of
the court hearing.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated
to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves
honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior,
and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court,
before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers
are sworn to uphold. Hence, the penalty of one year suspension is justified.

TOLIA, AMAL T.

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION

AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN IN L-27654, ANTONIO H.
CALERO VS. VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
[ G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970 ]

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's filed "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." Claiming that it was useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the Supreme Court is composed of
men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

27
The petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion
in the trial court. Further, his appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of
jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru
a minute resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never
serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring this Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely
negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to
go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and
the need therefor is unavoidable.

MILITAR, ELOISA JOYCE F.

Asean Pacific Planners v. City of Urdaneta

G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008

FACTS:
Wildo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed for a complaint for annulment of
contracts for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order against the
respondents City of Urdaneta and Ceferino Capalad of JJEWA Builders, and petitioners
Asean Pacific Planners represented by Ronilo Goco and Asean Pacific Planners
Construction and Development Corporation represented by Cesar Goco.

Del Castillo alleged then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno entered into a contract
involving a construction of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center with hotel costing
Php 250 million. The contracts should be void according to Del Castillo because the land
wherein its was constructed belongs to a oublic domain. Del Castillo also claimed that the
contracts should be void because it was solely awarded to the Goco family.

APP and APPCDC filed an answer claiming that the contracts were valid. Urdaneta City
Mayor Amadeo R. Perez Jr. also filed the city’s answer that the contracts were properly
executed by then Mayor Parayno with the authority of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Ceferino Capalad, through Atty. Sahagan, also filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del Cstillo has no legal standing to
sue.

Urdaneta City then allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claim that inadequate legal
representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in representation and
interests, wherein they are represented by the Lazaro Law Firm. The RTC granted their
motion to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for consolidation with Del
Castillo’s complaint and direct the defendant to answer the city’s complaint.

RTC also granted Capalad’s motion to expunge all pleading filed by Atty. Sahagun in his
behalf. He was also dropped as defendant and his complaint, filed by Atty. Peralta, was
admitted and consolidated with the complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City.

APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appelas. The CA

28
dismissed the petition because there is a defective verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC’s
assailed orders and that there is lack of written explanation why service of the petition to
adverse was not personal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court palpably erred ad gravely abused its judicial prerogatives by
capriciously allowing the appearance off Atty. Jovito Peralta to represent Capalad although
Atty. Oscar Sahagun, his counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in gross
violation of well settled rules and case law on the matter.

RULING:
The argument is lacks merit. Atty. Sahagun represented petitioners who claim that the
contracts are valid. Since Capalad filed for a complaint for annulment of the contracts, the
court expunges all pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun because he cannot represent totally
conflicting interests. It was also noted that there were offensive language used by Atty.
Sahagun and Atty. Escalante in their pleadings before the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals. With this, Atty. Sahagun and Atty. Escalante are imposed on a fine of Php
2,000.00 each payable to the Supreme Court within 10 days from notice. They are also
reminded to observe and maintain the respect due to the court and judicial officers, abstain
from offensive language before the court and not attribute to a Judge motives not supported
by the record.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court prohibits Atty. Sahagun from representing Capalad and
expunge all pleadings that he filed in behalf of Capalad.

MONDEJAR, JENNYLYN C.

JUDGE LACUROM vs. ATTY. JACOBA

AC No. 5921, March 10, 2006

FACTS:

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R.

Veneracion in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos. The
Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but
Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution
reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.

On July 30, 2001, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba filed a Motion for Reconsideration
with Request for Inhibition. Judge Lacurom ordered Atty. Velasco-Jacoba to explain why
she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and
humiliating" contents of her motion. Atty. Velasco-Jacoba claimed that her husband
handed it over to her and without reading, she signed it in "trusting blind faith" on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on September 21, 2001, this time directing
Atty. Ellis F. Atty. Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt. Atty. Jacoba
complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that
he typed or prepared the motion.

On October 22, 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against
respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Respondents did not file an
answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP despite sufficient notice.

ISSUE:
WON the respondents are liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
YES. The respondents’ actions give rise to different liabilities. There is no dispute
that the genuine signature of Atty. Velasco-Jacoba appears on the July 30, 2001 motion.
Atty. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the

29
Rules of Court.

The Court cannot easily let Atty. Jacoba off the hook. His Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Atty. Jacoba
impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired
at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the motion greatly exceeded the vigor required
of Atty. Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words
and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner,
and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a

citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.

NAVARRETE, CHERRYL D.

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO vs. ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO

A.M. No. AC 4762, June 28, 2004

FACTS:
Mrs. Linda Vda. de Espino filed a letter-complaint with the Court Administrator
Alfredo Benipayo for "having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to
honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of
P763,060.00" against Atty. Pepito C. Presquito (respondent). Mr. Espino and the
respondent entered into an agreement for a purchase of land by the latter from the former.
The price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on a staggered basis and by installments.
Respondent issues post dated checks as payment. Respondent then entered into a joint
venture or partnership agreement with Mrs. Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land
into home-size lots and its development, with a portion of the land retained by respondent
for his own use. The land was eventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs.
Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36 lots. The 8 post-dated checks issued by respondent were
all dishonored. Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the
latter refused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried to
collect from respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerous pleas
remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997. Respondent denied any
wrongdoing, and said that the allegations that he had employed "fraud, trickery and
dishonest means" with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. Respondents
claim that he and Mr. Espino, agreed that Mr Espino will not encash the checks until the
right of way problem has been resolved. In addition, respondent claims that the balance
would be offset with the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal
case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s refusal payment of the eight dishonoured checks failed
to act with candor and fairness towards the complainant?

HELD:
Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was
an agreement between respondent and complainant’s late husband for the sale of the latter’s
land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with said agreement; (3)
these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold had an existing

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road-right-of-way.

The responded failed to prove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he
was entitled to legal compensation. Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of
Rule 12.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the 8 dishonored checks, respondent’s

indifference to complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct unbecoming of a member
of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct towards complainant and
her late husband, first by allowing the 8 checks he issued to bounce, then by ignoring the
repeated demands for payment until complainant was forced to file this complaint, and
finally by deliberately delaying the disposition of this case with dilatory tactics.

It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred

for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar. A lawyer may be disciplined for any
conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who
issued worthless checks, respondent’s reprehensible conduct warrants suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.

Wherefore, respondent Atty. Presquito was found guilty of gross misconduct and
was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately
account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land, which had been
subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner.

OSTAN, FRANCES COREEN SHANE A.

ATTY. VAFLOR-FABROA V. ATTY. PAGUINTO

AC No. 6273, March 15, 2010

FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Iluminada Vaflor-Fabroa received a Notice of Special General
Assembly of General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
considering removal of four members of the Board including herself who was the
Chairperson. This Notice was signed by the respondent Atty. Oscar Paguinto.

During the Special General Assembly, PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito Gerangco declared himself
as Chair even though he was not a Board member. Respondent, who was also not a member
of the Board, was appointed by Gerangco as Board Secretary.

The removed directors were then sent removal notice letters, advising them to cease
discharging their duties. Among them was complainant.

Complainant filed a complaint with the Cooperative Development Authority – Calamba to

annul proceedings during the Special General Assembly, to which the institution decided
to declare it as null and void for being violations of GEMASCO's By-Laws and the
Cooperative Code. However, this was vacated for lack of jurisdiction.

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Complainant Atty. Vaflor-Fabroa filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Paguinto for
disbarment to which the latter filed a motion for extension of time to file Comment.
Respondent never filed any.

The Court then referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Paguinto violated lawyer's duties to the courts

RULING:
Respondent Atty. Paguinto violated lawyer's duties to the courts, particularly Rule 12.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 12.03 states that “a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.”

In Sebastian v. Bajar, repeatedly ignoring orders of the Court is an utter disrespect to

judicial institution and indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. This jurisprudence
provides that “a court resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Grave responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.

Considering that respondent had already been previously suspended from practicing law
for six months, in this case, he had been given a more severe penalty – a suspension of two
years from practice of law.

PERTURBOS, VON TROTSKEI T.

Bugaring and RBBI vs. Hon. Espanol

G.R. No. 133090, January 19, 2001

FACTS:
Rexie Efren Bugaring is guilty of direct contempt of court. Bugaring was a counsel for
Beatriz and Luis Alvaran for the Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific
Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, presided by respondent judge
Dolores Espanol.

During court in session, Bugaring was caught, with his assistant, filming the hearing. Judge
Espanol pointed out that he should not be recording, as permission to film in court is a
prepared process. Bugaring insisted, after sending out his assistant, that it was the
assistant’s problem, despite sending him out only after the court noticed him recording.
Bugaring then also kept on speaking out of turn and pushing evidence, disregarding orderly
procedure in the process and proceeded to act in an arrogant manner towards judge Espanol
in court and uttered words insulting to the court, such as he knows his laws better than the
court, and that the judge was deliberately being antagonistic towards his client. He was
then declared in direct contempt of court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has neglected his Duties to the Court as a Lawyer.

RULING:
Yes, the petitioner has neglected his Duties to the Court as a Lawyer. First, the petitioner
did not show candor or fairness, as seen in his covert filming of the court proceedings, and
his denial of involvement in it, despite observations of the court of his actions implying

32
otherwise, and the petitioner prioritized himself over the order of the proceedings, in spite
of the presiding judge’s warnings toward his conduct. Second, the petitioner had also
neglected to give the court and the offices the respect they should be afforded, by insulting
the court and injecting undue sarcasm in his manner of speech, and third, had not assisted
in speedy and efficient administration of justice, as the petitioner’s frequent acts of
disobedience and unseemly conduct caused frequent disturbance in the court display, and
lastly, was blisteringly improper in conduct as a lawyer and a representative, which
influenced the proceedings of the court. The logical conclusion to all of the petitioner’s
actions, is that he has neglected his duty to court as a lawyer by going against the Duties
of a Lawyer to Court.

REBAGAY, JOHANNA PAULA H.

RENERIO SAMBAJON, RONALD SAMBAJON, et al. v. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING

A.C. NO. 7062: September 26, 2006

FACTS:
Complainants filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), have sought
the disbarment of Atty. Jose A. Suing on the grounds of deceit, malpractice, violation of
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainants were the complainants in NRLC Case Microplast Inc. vs Ardan, et

al., for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), Illegal Dismissal and Illegal Strike, while Atty. Suing
was the counsel for the respondents.

On August 29, 2001, Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos charged the respondents
guilty of ULP due to the lack of merit on the legal strike case. The Labor Arbiter Santos
ordered the respondents to reinstate all complainants to their former position with full back
wages and subsequently issued a writ of execution against Microplast, Inc.
Herein complainants, four of the seven who purportedly executed the Release
Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter the
said documents or having received the considerations therefor. Hence, spawned the
administrative complaint at bar, alleging that respondent, acting in collusion with his
clients Johnny and Manuel Rodil, “frustrated” the implementation of the Writ of Execution
by presenting before the Labor Arbiter the spurious documents. Complainants also filed a
criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent.

During the administrative hearings before the IBP Commissioner, it was apparent
that Atty. Suing was coaching his client to prevent himself from being incriminated. It was
also revealed that the Release Waiver and Quitclaims allegedly signed were not the same
documents originally presented to the employees to be signed.

ISSUE:
WoN the acts of Respondent Atty. Suing is an act arguably violative of the Lawyers’ Code
of Ethics and may be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four (4) alleged Release
Waiver and Quitclaim by herein complainants who claimed that the same were falsified?

RULING:
Respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months,
with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his delings
with his client.

The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia)
or that ―extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their rights. All that is required is ordinary
diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater familias.

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RIZALDA, KHRISTIANSAND B.

PNB VS UY TENG PIAO

G.R. No. L-35252, October 21, 1932

FACTS:
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment
in favor of PNB and against Uy Teng Piao for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per
cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 percent of the sum amount for attorney's fees
and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount within three months, and
in case of failure to do so the properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264
and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law. Uy Teng Piao failed
to comply with the order of the court, and the two parcels of land were sold at public auction
to PNB for P1300.

On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a
waiver of his right to redeem the property in No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold
said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600. The other parcel of land, No. 7264, was resold
by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of
P11,300. In other words, the bank realized they credited the defendant with the full amount
when it resold the two parcels of land.

The defendant alleged that he waived his right to redeem the land due to an
agreement between him and one Mr. Pecson that the bank would not collect from him the
balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant
from the complaint. The defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of
the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The bank ought to have
presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing in Manila at the
time of the trial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Pecson should be a witness despite being an attorney to the
plaintiff-appellant, PNB.

RULING:
Although the law does not forbid the lawyer to be a witness the courts prefer that it
not be done unless it was necessary and should withdraw from managing the case. Canon
19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters,
such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the
trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

The defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. If Pecson

had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, he would have required the
defendant to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land, and that the defendant would
have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement in writing. The defendant waived his
right to redeem the land, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to
pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount of
the sale.

If there was such an agreement as the defendant appellee claims, Pecson would not
be authorized to do so on behalf of the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons
empowered by the board of directors could make such an agreement. There is no merit in
the contention that since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot repudiate the
alleged agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it
at the instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount
of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his
right to redeem.

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 The decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is condemned to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent per annum
from August 1, 1930.

SAMONTE, GARY E.

In re : De Vera
385 SCRA 285 (2003)

FACTS:
The respondent here, Atty. Leonard De Vera, is a member of the Equal Justice for
All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement. Quoted hereunder
are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty. Leonard De Vera
concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before the Court.

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from
Supreme Court insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality
of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to
inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to
monitor the prosecution of Estrada.

"We are afraid that the Estrada camp’s effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the
justices ---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab
that May-will most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague, "

On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the a resolution directing
respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect
contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the
case involving the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080).

While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied

having made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring
it into disrepute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. De Vera is guilty of indirect contempt of court for
uttering statements aimed at influencing and threatening the court in deciding in favor of
the constitutionality of the plunder law?

RULING:
Yes. The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to
settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights,
and to afford redress of wrongs for the violation of said rights must be allowed to decide
cases independently, free of outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is
essential to the maintenance of democracy, as well as of peace and order in society. Further,
maintaining the dignity of courts and enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are
necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.

Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to
hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the
dignity or authority of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which
tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of

35
court and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be
paid within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

SENDAD, NORHANNA KINUNA

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
FACTS:
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an
association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right
of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be recognized,
served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court
proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also
serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due
process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not media coverage of plunder case be allowed.

RULING:
The petition is denied. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the
weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand,
along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair
and impartial trial.

A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before

the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan,
under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such
portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule
119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously
inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations
of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of
the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases
against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other
sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-
visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the

36
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.

CULLO, DAN AN
DRE B.
FOODSPHERE INC. VS ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO JR.

FACTS:
A certain Alberto Cordero bought canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As
Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the
spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. This was
complained before the BFAD. After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the
petitioner, the Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of
their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent,
Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later
wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints
were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. Despite the
pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative
to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and
its products.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon
of Professional Responsibility which reads: “A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”

The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the

integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said
Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in
handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate
said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings
is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to “uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Respondent defied said
status quo order, despite his (respondent’s) oath as a member of the legal profession to
“obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.”

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the
exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity
and the dignity of the legal profession.”

There is always the danger of suffering from the mediaman’s ACDC syndrome (“attack
and collect; defend and collect”).
If you are a trial lawyer, focus and concentrate on it. And be honest in your dealings and
simple and modest in your lifestyle.

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