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Molo v. Molo
GR No. L-2538, 90 Phil. 37
September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J.

Decedent / Testator: Mariano Molo, died on January 24, 1941

Proponent: Juana Juan Vda. De Molo (Petitioner/wife)
Oppositor: Luz Glizeria Molo and Cornelio Molo (Oppositor/Nieces and Nephew
Type of Succession: 2 Testate (1918 and 1939)

I. Facts:

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, without leaving any forced heir either in the
descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan
Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo.

Decedent left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, and another executed on June 20, 1939.

On 1941, the proponent filed in the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking the probate of the will executed by
the deceased on 1939. On which the oppositor filed an opposing petition. After hearing, the CFI rendered
decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the proponent failed to prove that the same
was executed in accordance with law.

As a result, the proponent filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased
on 1918 in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition. The CFI issued
an order admitting the will of 1918 to probate.

The oppositor filed an appeal on the decision of CFI to admit the 1918 will. Hence the present
petition. The oppositor contend that the 1918 will have been revoked by the revocatory clause provided
in the 1939 will.

II. Issues:

Whether or not, the revocatory clause of the 1939 will is valid despite the denial of the said will in the
first probate proceeding?

III. Ruling:

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.

IV. Ratio Decidendi:

No, the revocatory clause of the 1939 will is invalid because of the denial of the said will in the first
probate proceeding. Hence, the 1918 will is valid and subsisting. The SC applied the doctrine laid down
in Samson vs. Naval wherein they ruled that:

A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed,
for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling
the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
 The SC added that granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed
by the testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt,
under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no
longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say
that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the
revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such
is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
"dependent relative revocation".

This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is
not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the existence of some
other document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a
mistake of law.

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another
will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the
efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent
upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.

This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition
upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive
conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time
a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.

The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted
his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

V. Doctrine/Principle:

Doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Under this doctrine, the established rule is that if a testator
revokes a will with a present intention of making a new one immediately and as a substitute, and the new
will is not made, or, if made, fails of effect for any reason, it will be presumed that the testator preferred
the old will to intestacy, and the old one will be admitted to probate in the absence of evidence
overcoming the presumption, provided its contents can be ascertained.

Digested by: Randel Daquiz