Rule 60 Replevin

Rule 60 – Replevin
1. Superlines vs PNCC
G.R. No. 169596; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of
providing public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the
Alabang northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National
Construction Company (PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of
traffic control and security department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The
bus was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of
adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the
PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but
Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same
value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to
pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that the case should have been brought
against the police authorities.
Issue:
Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper.
Ruling:
No. Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of
which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a
depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant
must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the
object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession
thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines‘ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC,
consideration of whether PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed
by the PNCC on the request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right against unreasonable
seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superlines‘s bus, on Lopera‘s request, were
unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without
impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint
of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for
safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial
court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and any other
responsible police officers.
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2. SMART vs Astorga
GR No. 148132, January 28, 2008
Facts:
Regina Astorga was employed by respondent Smart Communication on March 8, 1997 as
District Sales Manager of the corporate sales marketing group. As such she enjoyed additional
benefits among which is a car plan.On FEbruary 27, 1998 Smart launched an organizational
realignment part of it was the outsourcing of the marketing and sales force resulting to the
abolishment of corporate sales marketing group. Smart offered supervisory position in the
customer care department but she refused the offer because it carried a lower salary rank and
rate. On April 3, 1998, Astorga received a memorandum advising her termination of her
employment on the ground of redundancy. This prompted Astorga to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
On May 18, 1998 Smart sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current
market value of the car which was given to her under the company’s car planprogram or to
surrender it to the company for proper disposition, but Astorga failed or refused to do so. Thus
the Smart filed a replevin suit with the RTC. Asotrga moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction because of the pending case filed with the NLRC regarding illegal dismissal
disputes.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over a replevin suit despite the pending illegal
dismissal disputes with the NLRC.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over a replevin suit. The replevin is an action whereby the
owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels
from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken or who wrongfully detains such goods or
chattels.
The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in
denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. Smart demands for payment of the market value of the car
or in the alternative the surrender of the car is not a labor disputes but a civil disputes. It involves
the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such the
dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
3. PCI Leasing vs Spouses Dai

G.R. No. 148980; September 21, 2007
Facts:
Respondents, spouses George and Divina Dai, obtained a loan from petitioner, PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc., evidenced by a promissory note for the sum of P3,352,892 payable in
monthly installments of P152,265 starting. The proceeds of the loan partly financed the purchase
by respondents of a vessel-fishing boat which was named F/B Sea Doll. To secure the payment
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of the loan, respondents executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of petitioner. Both
the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided that, in case of failure to pay the
installments or interest due thereon, the entire amount remaining unpaid shall immediately
become due and payable.
Respondents failed to pay the second and third installments which fell due, prompting
petitioner to file before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for replevin
and damages. In the meantime, petitioner foreclosed the chattel mortgage and bought the vessel
at the public auction conducted for P2,000,000. A Certificate of Sale of the vessel in favor of
petitioner was subsequently issued. Hence, the complaint filed with the RTC’s merits dealt only
with the issues on damages.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent spouses. It held that it is not convinced that plaintiff
PCI Leasing is entitled to recover from defendants attorneys fees and liquidated damages. Said
decision became final and executory.
More than a year and a half following the promulgation by the trial court of its decision
in the previous case, petitioner filed another complaint for deficiency judgment and/or collection
of sum of money before the Cebu RTC. In their answer, the respondent spouses pleaded bar by
prior judgment. The RTC dismissed the second case filed by petitioners upon this ground.
Upon appeal to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC, not on the ground of bar by
prior judgement, but because of res judicata. Hence, this petition. For res jusdicata to apply, four
requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment
or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action. Petitioner denies the existence of
identity of causes of action between the replevin case and the case for deficiency judgment or
collection of sum of money.
Issue:
Whether or not a judgment in a replevin case and/or delivery of personal property would
bar a subsequent action for deficiency judgment?
Ruling:
YES. Section 49 of Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which governed petitioners
complaint for replevin filed on October 27, 1994, and which Section is reproduced as Section 47
of the present Rules, reads:
SEC. 49. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to
the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his
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relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the
thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto.
Paragraph (a) is the rule on res judicata in judgments in rem. Paragraph (b) is the rule on
res judicata in judgments in personam. Paragraph (c) is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
But replevin is, as the above-cited BA Finance Corp. case holds, usually described as a mixed
action.
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a

provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the pendency
of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in nature and
generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is so usually
described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam in rem insofar as
the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an action in rem, the gist of the replevin action is the right of the plaintiff to
obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his being the owner or of his
having a special interest therein. (Citations omitted, italics in the original, underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners complaint for replevin was doubtless a mixed action in rem with respect to its
prayer for the recovery of the vessel, and in personam with respect to its claim for damages. And
it was, with respect to its alternative prayer, clearly one in personam. Hence, petitioner’s second
complaint is barred by res judicata.
4. Rivera vs. Vargas

G.R. No. 165895; June 5, 2009
Facts:
Florencio Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several John Does before the
Regional Trial Court, for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant located in Sariaya,
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Quezon. Vargas claims ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and imported the
same directly from Hyun Dae Trading Co., in Seoul, South Korea, in December 1993.
The equipment was allegedly entrusted to petitioner's husband, Jan T. Rivera, who died
sometime in late 2002, as caretaker of respondent's construction aggregates business in Batangas.
According to Vargas, petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husband's death
despite his repeated demands, thus forcing him to resort to court action. The complaint was
accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin and the necessary bond amounting
to P2,400,000.00.
Summons was served upon petitioner through her personal secretary at her residence.
Interestingly, however, the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by a certain Joseph
Rejumo, the security guard on duty in petitioner's crushing plant in Sariaya, Quezon, contrary to
the sheriff's return stating that the writ was served upon Rivera.
Rivera filed her answer, manifestation, and motion for the acceptance of petitioner's
redelivery bond. In her answer, petitioner countered that the rock-crushing plant was ceded in
favor of her husband as his share following the dissolution of the partnership formed between
Jan Rivera and respondent's wife, Iluminada Vargas (Iluminada), while the partnership's second
rock-crushing plant in Cagayan was ceded in favor of Iluminada. She further averred that from
the time that the partnership was dissolved sometime in 2000 until Jan Rivera's death in late
2002, it was petitioner's husband who exercised ownership over the said equipment without any
disturbance from respondent.
The RTC issued an Order disapproving petitioner's redelivery bond application for failure
to comply with the requirements under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
Without directly saying so, the RTC faulted petitioner for her failure to file the application for
redelivery bond within five (5) days from the date of seizure as provided in the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5 day mandatory period is
erroneous considering the writ was improperly served.
Ruling:
Yes. The writ must satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective. Before a final
judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of
Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a
remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the
remedy is penal in nature. When no attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law
relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and
may be set aside on motion by the adverse party.
The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the
application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide
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proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the court’s
order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the
proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional
guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there
is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.
The writ must satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be
directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who
not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent
of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a
personality on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.
Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin
or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an application for a
redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper
service.
5. Asian Terminals vs Ricafort

G.R. No. 166901; October 27, 2006
Facts:
Respondents were duly-licensed importers of vehicles. Sometime in April and May
1998,they imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When the shipment
arrived at the South Harbor, Port of Manila, the District Collector of Customs impounded the
vehicles and ordered them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI),a customs-
bonded warehouse under the custody of the Aviation and Cargo Regional Division. Conformably
with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District Collector of Customs issued
Warrants of Distraint3 against the shipment and set the sale at public auction on September 10,
1998.The vehicles were seized by virtue of Section 1, Republic Act (RA) No. 8506, which took
effect on February 22, 1998, which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any person to import,
cause the importation of, register, cause the registration of, use or operate any vehicle with its
steering wheel right hand side thereof in any highway, street or road, whether private or public,
or at the national or local x x x."On November 11, 1998, the importers filed a complaint with the
RTC of Parañaque City, against the Secretary of Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief
Executive of the Societe Generale de Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary and mandatory injunction and damages. They contend that the importation of
right-hand drive vehicles is not prohibited under RA No. 8506 provided that conversion kits are
included in the imported vehicles. RTC granted the writ of replevin.
Issue:
Whether or not the replevin issued was valid.
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Ruling:
No. In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and
itsimplementation are void. While it is true that the District Collector of Customs allowed the
release of the vehicles and the transfer thereof to the custody of the RTC upon the payment by
the private respondents of the required taxes, duties and charges, he did not thereby lose
jurisdiction over the vehicles; neither did it vest jurisdiction on the RTC to take cognizance of
and assume jurisdiction over the petition for replevin. As very well explained by the Office of
the Solicitor General, the District Collector of Customs agreed to transfer the vehicles to the
custody of the RTC since the latter had ordered the arrest of those who would obstruct the
implementation of the writ. The District Collector of Customs had yet to resolve whether to order
the vehicles forfeited in favor of the government, in light of the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice that, under RA No. 8506,the importation was illegal.
The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioner’s complaint-in-

intervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction over respondents’ action and over the
shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings before it would be void. The RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss
the same. Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independent action, the dismissal ofthe
principal action necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a
court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-
intervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.
6. Servicewide Specialists vs CA
G.R. No. 103301; December 8, 1995
Facts:
Leticia Laus purchased on credit a Colt Galant xxx from Fortune Motors (Phils.)
Corporation and executed a promissory note for the amount of P56,028.00, inclusive of 12%
annual interest, payable within a period of 48 months. In case of default in the payment of any
installment, the total principal sum, together with the interest, shall become immediately due and
payable. As a security for the promissory note, a chattel mortgage was constituted over the said
motor vehicle, with a deed of assignment incorporated therein such that the credit and mortgage
rights were assigned by Fortune Motors Corp. in favor of Filinvest Credit Corporation with the
consent of the mortgagor-debtor Laus. Filinvest in turn assigned the credit in favor of
Servicewide Specialists, Inc.
Laus failed to pay the monthly installment for April 1977 and the succeeding 17 months.
Servicewide demanded payment of the entire outstanding balance with interests but Laus failed
to pay despite formal demands. As a result of Laus’ failure to settle her obligation, or at least to
surrender possession of the motor vehicle for foreclosure, Servicewide instituted a complaint for
replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John Dee in whose custody the vehicle was believed to be at
the time of the filing of the suit. Plaintiff alleged, among others, that it had superior lien over the
mortgaged vehicle. The court approved the replevin bond. Alberto Villafranca filed a third party
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claim contending that he is the absolute owner of the subject motor vehicle after purchasing it
from a certain Remedios Yang free from all lien and emcumbrances; and that on July 1984, the
said automobile was taken from his residence by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo Bernabe pursuant to
the seizure order issued by the court a quo. Upon motion of the plaintiff below, Villafranca was
substituted as defendant and summons was served upon him. Villafranca moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties
before the Makati RTC. The court granted the the motion but subsequently set aside the order of
dismissal. For failure to file his Answer as required by the court a quo, Villafranca was declared
in default and plaintiff’s evidence was received ex parte.
The lower court later on dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Its motion
for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to CA on the ground that a suit for
replevin aimed at the foreclosure of a chattel is an action quasi in rem, and does not require the
inclusion of the principal obligor in the Complaint. CA affirmed the RTC decision. It also denied
petitioner’s MR, hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not a case for replevin may be pursued against Alberto Villafranca, without
impleading the absconding debtor-mortgagor.
Ruling:
No. Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that an applicant for replevin must
show that he “is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof.” Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the specified property is
so conceded or evident, the action need only be maintained against him who so possesses the
property. In rem action est per quam rem nostram quae ab alio possidetur petimus, et semper
adversus eum est qui rem possidet.
However, in case the right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to
claim such possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt (a contending party may
contest the legal bases for plaintiff’s cause of action or an adverse and independent claim of
ownership or right of possession may be raised by that party), it could become essential to have
other persons involved and impleaded for a complete determination and resolution of the
controversy.
In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. The conditions
essential for foreclosure of chattel mortgage would be to show, firstly, the existence of the
chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of the mortgagor. Since the mortgagee’s right of
possession is conditioned upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the
inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to
allow a full and conclusive determination of the case. Laus, being an indispensable party, should
have been impleaded in the complaint for replevin and damages. An indispensable party is one
whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.
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7. Twin Ace vs Rufina and Company

G.R. No. 160191, June 8, 2006
Facts:
Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of rhum, wines
and liquor under the name and style "Tanduay Distillers." It has registered its mark of ownership
of its bottles with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer under Republic
Act No. 623. In the conduct of its business, it sells its products to the public excluding the
bottles. It makes substantial investments in brand new bottles which it buys from glass factories
and which they use for about five times in order to recover the cost of acquisition. Twin Ace thus
retrieves its used empty bottles, washes and uses them over and over again as containers for its
products.
On the other hand, Rufina is engaged in the production, extraction, fermentation and
manufacture of patis and other food seasonings and is engaged in the buying and selling of all
kinds of foods, merchandise and products for domestic use or for export to other countries. In
producing patis and other food seasonings, Rufina uses as containers bottles owned by Twin Ace
without any authority or permission from the latter. In the process, Rufina is unduly benefited
from the use of the bottles.
Upon the posting of Twin Ace of the required bond, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 26, issued an Order dated 5 February 1992 granting the application for the
issuance of a writ of replevin.2 Upon the implementation of the said writ, Deputy Sheriff Amado
P. Sevilla was able to seize a total of 26,241 empty bottles marked "TANDUAY DISTILLERY,
INC.,"3 at the address of Rufina.
In its Answer with counter-application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina

claimed that the marked bottles it used as containers for its products were purchased from junk
dealers; hence, it became the owner thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not Twin Ace is entitled to the possession of the bottles.
Ruling:
No. Rule 60, Section 2(a), of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a party praying
for the recovery of possession of personal property must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts that he is the owner of the property claimed,
particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof. It must be borne in mind that
replevin is a possessory action the gist of which focuses on the right of possession that, in turn, is
dependent on a legal basis that, not infrequently, looks to the ownership of the object sought to
be replevined. Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for
replevin must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the
writ should not be issued. In this case, Twin Ace has not shown that it is entitled to the
possession of the bottles in question and consequently there is thus no basis for the demand by it
of due compensation. As stated by the court in the earlier case of Twin Ace Holdings
Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
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“ Petitioner cannot seek refuge in Sec. 5 of RA No. 623 to support its claim of continuing
ownership over the subject bottles. In United States v. Manuel [7 Phil. 221 (1906)] we held that
since the purchaser at his discretion could either retain or return the bottles, the transaction must
be regarded as a sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that discretion and
decided not to return them to the vendor. We also take judicial notice of the standard practice
today that the cost of the container is included in the selling price of the product such that the
buyer of liquor or any such product from any store is not required to return the bottle nor is the
liquor placed in a plastic container that possession of the bottle is retained by the store.”
8. Factoran vs CA
G.R. No. 93540; December 13, 1999
Facts:
Two (2) police officers intercepted a six-wheeler truck, with Plate No. NJT-881, carrying
4,000 board feet of narra lumber. They apprehended the truck driver, private respondent Jesus
Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions
and Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of the DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner
Atty. VIcente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the Discrepancies in
the documentation of the narra lumber:
a. What were declared were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of
narra lumber;
b. As appearing in the documents, the Plate Numbers of the truck supposed to carry the
forest products bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 OR NSN-267, while the Plate
Number of the truck apprehended is NVT-881;
c. the transport should have been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin,
d. The log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup
International as the seller and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not
with Lily Francisco Lumber and Hardware which are in violation of Bureau of
Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a
temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber and the six-wheeler
truck.
Petitioner Factoran, then Secretary of DENR issued an order for the confiscation of the
narra lumber and the six- wheeler truck AND WERE Consequently confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government. They were subsequently advertised to be sold at public auction.
On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of
writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery
of the confiscated lumber and six-wheeler truck, and to enjoin the planned auction sale of the
subject narra lumber. On the same day, the trial court issued an Order directing petitioners to
desist from proceeding with the planned auction sale. On the scheduled date of the auction sale,
private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents
(Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary
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Injunction and a Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ
of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the . . . Narra lumber, original
documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or their
representative.
The trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the
Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount
of P180,000.00. But the trial court did not oblige petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the
Manifestation on private respondents. Petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond
which was, however, denied for the same reason.
Private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the
writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners twenty-four (24) hours to answer the motion.
However, on March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the Orders of the trial court dated March 20,
1989 and March 27, 1989.
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form
of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.
However, on March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the petition. It declared that as the complaint for replevin filed by private respondents
complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the
Revised Rules of court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its
discretion..
Ruling:
Yes. It is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by the private respondents constitutes an
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
First. A writ of replevin does not just issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's
filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an
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affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2, Rule 60 of the Revised
Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin.
• Wrongful detention by the defendant of the properties sought in an action for replevin
must be satisfactorily established. If only a mechanistic averment thereof is offered,
the writ should not be issued.
• In the case at bar, the subject narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were confiscated by
petitioner Secretary pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277.
• As the petitioner Secretary's administrative authority to confiscate is clearly provided
by law, the taking of the subject properties is not wrongful and does not warrant the
issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for by private respondents.
Second. Issuance of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary was a valid exercise of
his power under Sec. 68-A of P.D. No. 705. By virtue of said order, the narra lumber and six-
wheeler truck of private respondents were held in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of
replevin.
9. Serg’s Products Inc. vs PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.

GR No. 137705; August 22, 2000
Facts:
Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum
of money with an application for a writ of replevin. Respondent Judge issued a writ of replevin
directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI after 5 days and
upon the payment of the necessary expenses. In the implementation of the said writ, the sheriff
proceeded to petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with word that he would return for the
other.
Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of the court to
control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for
the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI Leasing,
on the ground that the properties were still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a
writ of replevin.
The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the
remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from
taking the rest.
Issue:
Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by Serg’s became real property
by virtue of immobilization.
Ruling:
The petition is not meritorious. The machines that were subjects of the Writ of seizure
were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were
essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of
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them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by
destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. In that sense
petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real property pursuant to Article 415
(5) of the Civil Code. But the Court disagrees with the submission of the petitioners that the said
machines are not proper subject of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently stopped from
claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppels, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. Clearly then, petitioners are stopped
from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under
circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that the Court’s holding-that the machines should be
deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement-is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third
persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject
machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that any specific third party would be
adversely affected.
10. Torres vs Cabesuela

A.M. No. P-00-1391; September 28, 2001
(Formerly AM OCA IPI-98-506-P)
Facts:
Complainant Torres alleging that she is one of the owners of San Antonio High School in
San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Said school is the owner of a Mitsubishi Pajero mortgaged to Philam
Savings Bank, Inc. The school failed to pay its obligation so the bank filed a complaint for
replevin and damages. MeTC, Branch 9, Manila, granted the bank's prayer for a writ of replevin.
After Judge Fabros came out with the writ of seizure, Respondent Sheriff issued the
"Sheriffs Deputization" addressed to the Chief of Police of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija requesting
for assistance in the implementation of said writ. According to him, he "deputized" the police
officers only after he attempted to implement the writ and found the vehicle at a local motorshop
undergoing repairs; that he was not familiar with the place and for said Chief of Police to seize
the vehicle; that complainant was a very powerful and influential person as shown by her ability
to remove the vehicle from the motorshop without seeking the permission of the court; and that
he issued the "Sheriff's Deputization" in good faith although he admitted that his act was
unlawful.
Complainant filed her opposition and/or comment thereto contending that the act of the
respondent in deputizing the police officers in implementing the writ of seizure did not find
support in law and in the Rules of Court.
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Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of “Sheriff’s Deputization” in order is legal.
Ruling:
No. The act of respondent in issuing the Sheriff’s Deputization is without legal basis.
Under Administrative Circular No. 12 (5) it is provided that "No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall
execute a court writ outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing and
seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place".
Respondent's act of implementing the writ in Nueva Ecija when his territorial jurisdiction
is confined only to Manila is a clear violation of the law. The proper recourse would have been
to seek the assistance of the sheriff of Nueva Ecija rather than deputizing the police officer of
said place.
Furthermore, in Tordesillas vs. Basco (108 SCRA 551,556) it was held that under
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, it is the personal duty and responsibility of the
sheriff to personally implement the writ and it constitutes serious misconduct and gross
negligence for a sheriff to delegate his primary role in implementing a writ of seizure.
Respondent's absence during the seizure of the subject vehicle by the police officers falls
squarely within this prohibition for which he should be held liable.
As a ministerial officer, respondent sheriff should have known that it was his duty, in the
absence of instructions, to faithfully perform what was incumbent upon him to do.
Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution
of court writs and processes in the reorganized courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and to
better serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 5 of said
Circular is clear and self-explanatory. "No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ
outside his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the assistance of
the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place."
Officers of the court and all court personnel are exhorted to be vigilant in the execution of
the law. Sheriffs, as agents of the law, are therefore called upon to discharge their duties with due
care and utmost diligence. They cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in
implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice.
11. Gomez vs Concepcion

G.R. No. L-23921; March 30, 1925
Facts:
On 10 March 1996, Sabino Ramos, while driving his owner-type jeep, figured in a
vehicular accident. The vehicle was bumped by a passenger jeepney, with Plate No. DLZ-588.
The offending vehicle, the passenger jeepney, turned out to be under the custody of respondent
Sheriff. When required to comment on the complaint, he averred that the passenger jeepney was
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carnapped in front of his residence, which incident he immediately reported to the Philippine
National Police of Cabanatuan City.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent – sheriff is guilty of dereliction of duty.
Ruling:
Yes. Sheriff‘s residence was not considered a safe place‘ as contemplated by the Rule.
Sec. 4, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides: When the officer has taken property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for it and ultimately deliver it
to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and
keeping the same.
The cannot find a valid explanation why the passenger jeepney under custodia legis
should be placed infront of respondent's residence without taking into account the problem of
safety and security. He unduly exposed the jeep to undesirable elements, making it an "easy
prey" for thieves and carnappers. Evidently, the respondent was remiss in the performance of his
official duty and responsibility to safely secure the property in his custody until its delivery to the
party entitled to it, as mandated by the rules. The vehicle could have been deposited in the
premises of the court where it is secured, or, at any other place where the required security is
provided for and available. For after all, the respondent should have known that his office could
have charged the party entitled to it, allowable fees for storage, necessary in safely keeping the
property in custodia legis.
12. Spouses Bautisa vs Sula

A.M. No. P-04-1920; August 17, 2007
Facts:
Ruth B. Bautista (Ruth) borrowed P300,000 from Ceniza C. Glor (Glor). To secure the
loan, Ruth executed a chattel mortgage over her Honda CRV in favor of Glor. Despite the
repeated demands, Ruth refused to pay her debt, or surrender possession of the vehicle. Thus
Glor filed with the Regional Trial Court, civil case for judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin. - trial court issued a writ of replevin - directing
Ernesto L. Sula (respondent), Sheriff IV of the trial court, to take possession of the vehicle and
keep it in his custody.
Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 60, complainants required the return of the vehicle to them
by filing a counter-bond and serving Glor a copy of the counter-bond. Because the trial court
failed to approve complainants counter-bond within the five-day period provided in Section 6 of
Rule 60, Glor, in a letter asked respondent to deliver the vehicle to her. In a letter, complainants
asked respondent not to deliver the vehicle to Glor because (1) pursuant to Section 5, they had
required the return of the vehicle to them and filed the corresponding counter-bond; (2) the
vehicles delivery to Glor was not justified under Section 6; and (3) there was no order from the
trial court directing the delivery to Glor.
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On 27 May 2004, respondent filed a sheriffs manifestation asking the trial courts
guidance on whether he should deliver the vehicle to Glor or keep it incustodia legis - However,
Without waiting for the trial courts instructions regarding the vehicle, respondent filed his
sheriffs return on 28 May 2004 stating that he had already delivered the vehicle to Glor.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent sheriff was remiss in his duty.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent went beyond the call of his duties when he delivered the vehicle to
Glor. Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 provide that: SEC. 5. Return of property. If the adverse party
objects to the sufficiency of the applicants bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot
immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time
before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the
court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the
property as stated in the applicants affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such
delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against the
adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant.
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of
the applicants bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the
property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an
approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is
not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
Under Section 5, complainants may require the return of the vehicle by (1) posting a
counter-bond in double the value of the vehicle and; (2) serving Glor with a copy of the
counterbond. Both requirements must be complied with before the vehicle is delivered to Glor.
Under Section 6, the vehicle shall be delivered to Glor only under the following
instances: 1. If within five days after the taking of the vehicle, complainants do not object to the
sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon; 2. If within five days after the taking
of the vehicle, complainants object to the sufficiency of the bond and the trial court affirms its
approval of Glor’s bond or approves a new bond; or 3. If within five days after the taking of the
vehicle, complainants require the return of the vehicle and their bond is objected to and found
insufficient and they do not forthwith file an approved bond.
In the instant case, complainants duly complied with all of the requirements under
Sections 5 and 6 for the return of the vehicle. Respondent took possession of the vehicle on 17
May 2004. On 20 May 2004, complainants filed their urgent motion for the return of the vehicle
and submission of counter-bond and, on 21 May 2004, they filed a motion to withdraw the
urgent motion and change the same with an omnibus motion. Both the urgent motion and the
omnibus motion were filed before the delivery of the vehicle to Glor and before the expiration of
the five-day period. Later, the trial court approved complainants counter-bond. Thus, respondent
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committed an irregularity when he hastily delivered the vehicle to Glor. Under the Rules of
Court, the sheriff should not immediately deliver the property seized under a writ of replevin to
the plaintiff. This is because defendants have every right to be respected in their possession and
may not be deprived of it without due process.
Rationale of the 5-day period: To give defendants in a replevin case a chance to require
the return of the property by filing a counter-bond.
13. Allandale Sportsline Inc. vs. The Good Development Corporation

GR No. 164521; December 18, 2008
Facts:
Allandale Sportsline Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan from The Good Development
Corporation (GDC) subject to a condition that should ASI defaulted, GDC, as mortgagee shall
have the absolute right over the mortgaged properties without need of prior notice or judicially or
extrajudicially foreclose the properties. Among the properties subject of the mortgage are the
shares of stocks owned by ASI and furniture, fixtures, appliances and equipment found in their
establishment. When ASI defaulted, respondent GDC files an action for the issuance of a writ of
replevin over the mortgaged personal properties. The court granted the issuance of the writ.
The petitioner’s properties which were seized by virtue of the Writs of Replevin were extra-
judicially foreclosed and sold at public auction by respondent and the proceed thereof were
deducted in the loan obligation of petitioner. However, the amount realized from the auction sale
was insufficient to cover the unpaid balance, interest, attorney’s fees, costs of the suit and other
expenses incidental to litigation.
Thus, respondent GDC files an action for a collection of sum of money to collect the balance
due. Petitioner argued that since respondent has already availed the remedy of replevin and
judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure, they are no longer allowed to avail another remedy which
in this case, collection of sum of money.
Issue:
Whether or not the election of respondent’s extra-judicial foreclosure as remedy
constitutes a waiver of another remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.
Ruling:
Yes. By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively
adopted and pursued the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure,50 using the writ of replevin as a
tool to get hold of the mortgaged properties.51 As emphasized in Bachrach Motor vs. Icarangal,
one effect of respondent’s election of the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure is its waiver of the
remedy of collection of the unpaid loan. Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to
grant respondent the relief of collecting from petitioners the remaining loan balance.
Further, the Court held that another effect of its election of the remedy of extrajudicial
foreclosure is that whatever deficiency remains after applying the proceeds of the auction sale to
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the total loan obligation may still be recovered by respondent. But to recover any deficiency after
foreclosure, the rule is that a mortgage creditor must institute an independent civil action.
However, in PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Dai, 533 SCRA 611 (2007), the Court held that the
claim should at least be included in the pre-trial brief.
14. Yang vs Valdez

177 SCRA 141
Facts:
Respondent spouses Morante brought an action in the RTC of General Santos City
against petitioners, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. Morante spouses alleged
that they had actual use and possession of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them during
the period from 1982 to 1984. The trucks were, however, registered in the name of petitioner
Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses' business of buying and selling
corn. The spouses were allegedly deprived of possession of the vehicles in the morning of 3
January 1985, when petitioner Yang had the vehicles taken from where they were parked.
Petitioner contends that the replevin bond was merely an undertaking of the bondsmen to
pay the sum of P560,000.00, that no tangible security, such as "cash, property or surety," was
placed thereby at the disposal and custody of the court. It is argued, secondly, that the replevin
bond was defective considering that it had been filed by only one of the two (2) private
respondents and that the bondsmen thereon had failed by its terms to undertake to return the
cargo trucks to petitioner should he (the petitioner) be adjudged lawful owner thereof.
The cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985. Petitioner
Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed on 25 January 1985 was approved by the lower court.
Petitioner further contends that since the respondent spouses are not the registered owners of the
cargo trucks involved, the writ of replevin should not have been issued.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Replevin Bond sufficient.
2. Whether or not the seized properties be returned to the Petitioners by their filing of
counter-replevin bond.
3. Whether or not the registration is necessary to grant the replevin.
Rulings:
1. Yes. A bond that is required to be given by law is commonly understood to refer to an
obligation or undertaking in writing that is sufficiently secured. It is not indispensably
necessary, however, that the obligation of the bond be secured or supported by cash or
personal property or real property or the obligation of a surety other than the person
giving the bond.
A "bond" is an obligation reduced to writing binding the obligor to pay a sum of money
to the obligee under specified conditions. At common law, a bond was merely a written
obligation under seal. A bond is often, as a commercial matter, secured by a mortgage on
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real property; the mortgagee may be the obligee, although the mortgagee may also be a
third party surety whose personal credit is added to that of the principal obligor under the
bond.
The sufficiency of a bond is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
which must approve the bond. In the case at bar, the replevin bond given by the
respondent Morante =spouses was properly sered by the sureties themselves who
declared their solvency and capacity to answer for the undertaking assumed.
The fact that the other respondent, Ricardo Morante, did not act as surety on the same
bond as his wife did, does not affect the validity or the sufficiency of that bond. The
replevin bond put up by Milagros Morante and Bayani L. Calonzo stated that it was given
"under the condition that [they] will pay all the costs, which may be adjudged to the said
defendants and all damages which said defendants may sustain by reason of the order of
replevin, if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiffs were not entitled thereto."
2. No. Petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already prescribed. A lower court which
approves a counter-bond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its
jurisdiction.
A defendant in a replevin suit may demand return of possession of the property replevied
by filing a redelivery bond within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.
Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the
plaintiff" require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5)
days after the taking of the property by the officer." Both these periods are mandatory in
character.
It is honestly believed that the five-day period spoken of by the Rule begins from the
taking of the property by the sheriff and not from the service of summons to the
defendant, for even if summons was already duly served to the defendant but the property
has not yet been taken by the sheriff, the provision above cited does not apply. Hence, it
is clear that the prescriptive period for filing a counter-replevin bond must be counted
from the actual taking of the property by the sheriff, subject of the replevin bond and in
this particular case on January 7, 1985.
The decisional principle on the filing of counter replevin bond to entitle the defendant to
the redelivery or retaining possession of the property, is compliance with all the
conditions precedent pursuant to the rules, and failure to comply therewith entitles
plaintiff to possession, and the initial steps in obtaining redelivery must be taken within
the time limit provided thereto.
3. No. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the
applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be holder of
the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ of replevin, he
is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession thereof."
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15. Adoma vs Gatcheco

A.M. NO. P-05-1942; January 17, 2005
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against respondents for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and conduct unbecoming a court employee
which resulted for Complainant Alibsar Adoma to claim that a writ of replevin for the recovery
of an L-300 van was issued in his favor.
On the same day, respondent sheriff Romeo Gatcheco implemented the writ. He was
accompanied by respondent Eugenio Taguba, a process server of Branch 2 of MTCC, Santiago
City. After the two respondents seized the vehicle, they demanded payment of P8,000.00,
allegedly promised by complainant but the latter was able to give only P1,000.00 and another
P1,000.00 the following day.
The writ of replevin stated that the vehicle will be delivered after 5 days from the
implementation thereof. But on its 7th day the vehicle was still undelivered, complainant
threatened to file an administrative case against respondent sheriff. On August 29, 2003, the
latter was forced to release the vehicle to complainant. However, respondents continued to
demand P6,000.00, hence complainant filed the instant administrative case.
Respondents, denied soliciting and receiving any amount from the complainant. They
admitted, however, that complainant promised to give him P10,000.00 if the vehicle will be sold.
On September 10, 2003, the Court referred to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Executive Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation. In her investigation report, Judge
Madrid found the testimony of complainant which was corroborated by two witnesses, to be
more credible. Upon receipt of the report of Judge Madrid, the Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation. In its Memorandum, the OCA affirmed
the investigating Judge’s report.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent sherriff Gatcheco served the writ of replevin in contrary to
the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
Yes, under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the procedure for the execution of
writs and other processes are: First, the sheriff must make an estimate of the expenses to be
incurred by him; Second, he must obtain court approval for such estimated expenses; Third, the
approved estimated expenses shall be deposited by the interested party with the Clerk of Court
and ex-oficio sheriff; Fourth, the Clerk of Court shall disburse the amount to the executing
sheriff; and Fifth, the executing sheriff shall liquidate his expenses within the same period for
rendering a return on the writ. Any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction which renders him liable for grave
misconduct and gross dishonesty.
In the instant case, respondent sheriff totally disregarded the aforecited procedure. He
failed to make and submit estimate of the sheriff’s expenses. The amounts received and
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demanded by him are therefore unauthorized fees. His acts of accepting and soliciting said
monetary considerations make him liable not only for conduct unbecoming a court employee but
also for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place

complainant in possession of the vehicle after five days from the implementation of the writ
because the latter failed to give the whole amount he promised. Since the adverse party did not
object to the complainant’s bond nor posted a redelivery bond to recover possession of the
vehicle taken under the writ of replevin, respondent sheriff is under obligation to deliver the van
to complainant. However, it took respondent sheriff 13 days before he released the vehicle to
complainant, a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides: SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff.—If within five (5) days
after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency
of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does
not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any
reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse
party.
Sheriffs are indispensably in close contact with the litigants, hence, their conduct should
be geared towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the court, for the image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work thereat.
16. Paat vs CA
G.R. No. 111107; January 10, 1997
Facts:
On May 19, 1989 the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to
Bulacan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources personnel
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) issued on an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner
thereof fifteen days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989, Regional
Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of
confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Pending resolution, a suit for replevin, was
filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
with the Regional Trial Court which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with
the trial court contending, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners
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with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order ruling that the
question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present petition.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the
trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid
the operation of this principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the
doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the
chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Issue:
Whether or not an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the
subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources.
Ruling:
No, a suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck
taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A
of the P.D. 705, as amended. A suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant
wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. "To detain" is defined as to mean "to hold or keep
in custody," and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful
meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of
authority or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient.
Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show
by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is
wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been
taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the property. Private respondents miserably
failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant
case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products without the required permit of the DENR. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally
permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
17. Citibank vs CA
G.R. No. 61508; March 17, 1999
Facts:
Citibank filed a verified complaint against Douglas Anama for the collection of the
unpaid balance on the promissory note and for the delivery and possession of the chattels
covered by the Chattel Mortgage preparatory to the foreclosure before the CFI of Manila. The
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trial court upon proof of default of Anama in the payment of the said loan, issued an Order of
Replevin over the machineries and equipment covered by the Chattel Mortgage. However,
despite the issuance of the said order, actual delivery of possession did not take place because
negotiations for an amicable settlement between the parties were encouraged by the trial court. A
pre-trial conference was held and the lower court issued an order for joint management of
Anama's business for 10 days, after which Citibank would be appointed receiver for the said
business. Citibank took over Anama's business as receiver. When further proposals to settle the
case amicably failed, the lower court proceeded to try the case on the merits. Citibank presented
a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Seizure which was later granted by the trial court.
On Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction, the CA ruled that the provision of the
Rules of Court on Replevin and Receivership have not been complied with, specifically no
Affidavit of Merit accompanying the Complaint for Replevin; the bond posted by Citibank was
insufficient; and there was non-compliance with the requirement of a receiver's bond and oath of
office.
Citibank’s contentions:
1. Although there was no affidavit of merit accompanying its complaint, there was
nonetheless substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court as
all that is required to be alleged in the affidavit of merit was set forth in its verified
complaint.
2. It complied with Section 2, Rule 60 requiring the replevin plaintiff to post a bond in
double the value of the properties involved when it filed a bond in the amount
P400,000.00 which is twice the amount of P200,000.00 declared in its complaint; and
3. There was no error when the trial court granted the Alias Writ of Seizure and allowed
receivership despite non-compliance of a receiver's bond and oath of office.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of
Court although there was no affidavit of merit accompanying the complaint.
2. Whether or not the bond posted by Citibank is sufficient and not questionable.
3. Whether or not the property taken by the sheriff may be restored to Anama.
4. Whether or not Anama may object to the sufficiency of Citibank’s bond.
5. Whether or not there was no error when the trial court granted the Alias Writ of Seizure and
allowed receivership without the requisite oath to Citibank despite non-compliance of a
receiver's bond and oath of office.
Rulings:
1. Yes. The petitioner is correct insofar as it contends that substantial compliance with the
affidavit requirement may be permissible. There is substantial compliance with the rule
requiring that an affidavit of merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint
itself contains a statements of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and
the complaint is verified like an affidavit.On the matter of replevin, Justice Vicente
Francisco's Comment on the Rules of Court, states: “Although the better practice is to keep
the affidavit and pleading separate, if plaintiff's pleading contains a statement of every fact
which the statute requires to be shown in the affidavits, and the pleading is verified by
affidavit covering every statement therein, this will be sufficient without a separate
157
affidavit; but in no event can the pleading supply the absence of the affidavit unless all that
the affidavit is required to contain is embodied in the pleading, and the pleading is verified
in the form required in the case of a separate affidavit.” (77 CJS 65 cited in Francisco, Rules
of Court of the Philippines, Vol. IV-A, p. 383)
In the case of an attachment which likewise requires an affidavit of merit, the Court held
that the absence of an affidavit of merit is not fatal where the petition itself, which is under
oath, recites the circumstances or facts constitutive of the grounds for the petition.
The facts that must be set forth in the affidavit of merit are (1) that plaintiff owns the
property particularly describing the same, or that he is entitled to its possession; (2)
wrongful detention by defendants of said property; (3) that the property is not taken by
virtue of a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment
or, if it is so seized, that it is exempt from seizure; and the, (4) the actual value of the
property.
2. No. the Court held that the petitioner stated the value of subject properties at a "probable
value of P200,000.00, more or less". Pertinent rules require that the affidavit of merit should
state the actual value of the property subject of a replevin suit and not just its probable
value. Actual value (or actual market value) means "the price which an article would
command in the ordinary course of business, that is to say, when offered for sale by one
willing to sell, but not under compulsion to sell and purchased by another who is willing to
buy, but under no obligation to purchase it".
Since the valuation made by the petitioner has been disputed by the respondent, the lower
court should have determined first the actual value of the properties. It was thus as error for
the said court to approve the bond, which was based merely on the probable value of the
properties. As there was a disagreement on the valuation of the properties in the first place,
proper determination of the value of the bond to be posted by the plaintiff cannot be
sufficiently arrived at. Though the rules specifically require that the needed bond be double
the value of the properties, since plaintiff merely denominated a probable value of
P200,000.00 and failed to aver the properties' actual value, which is claimed to be much
greater than that declared by plaintiff, the amount of P400,000.00 would indeed be
insufficient as found by the Court of Appeals. The Rules of Court requires the plaintiff to
"give a bond, executed to the defendant in double the value of the property as stated in the
affidavit x x x ." Hence, the bond should be double the actual value of the properties
involved. In this case, what was posted was merely an amount which was double the
probable value as declared by the plaintiff and, therefore, inadequate should there be a
finding that the actual value is actually far greater than P200,000.00. Since the valuation
made by the petitioner has been disputed by the respondent, the lower court should have
determined first the actual value of the properties. It was thus as error for the said court to
approve the bond, which was based merely on the probable value of the properties.
It should be noted that a replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any
loss that he may suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the
disputed property pending trial of the action. The same may also be answerable for
158
damages if any when judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against
whom a writ of replevin was issued and such judgment includes the return of the property to
him. Thus, the requirement that the bond be double the actual value of the properties
litigated upon. Such is the case because the bond will answer for the actual loss to the
plaintiff, which corresponds to the value of the properties sought to be recovered and for
damages, if any.
3. Yes. The Court held that in a prior case that the remedies provided under Section 5, Rule 60,
are alternative remedies."x x x If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the
property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should, within five days from such taking,
(1) post a counter-bond in double the value of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a
copy thereof, both requirements as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period
mentioned — being mandatory." This course of action is available to the defendant for as
long as he does not object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond.
4. Yes. The Court held that the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond,
or of the surety or sureties thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require the return of the
property" by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Section 5 and 6.
5. No. The Court held that under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ
of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. This is because a possessor
has every right to respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it without due
process.
18. Smart Communications vs. Astorga

GR No. 148132; January 28, 2008
Facts:
Regina M. Astorga (Astorga) was employed by respondent Smart Communications,
Incorporated (SMART) on May 8, 1997 as District Sales Manager of the Corporate Sales
Marketing Group/ Fixed Services Division (CSMG/FSD).
As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual

performance incentive equivalent to 30% of her annual gross salary, a group life and
hospitalization insurance coverage, and a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00.
In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more

efficient operations. In the process, Astorga was terminated of her employment on the ground of
redundancy.
On May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current
market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan
program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. Astorga, however,
failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on August 10, 1998.
159
Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of jurisdiction; (ii) failure
to state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the
regular courts have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a
benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the
labor tribunal and not in regular courts.
RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss: replevin is to enforce right to possess
CA: Labor tribunal has the proper jurisdiction over the case. he car plan privilege is a
benefit arising out of employer-employee relationship. Thus, the claim for such falls squarely
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters and the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals was correct in holding that the regional trial court has
no jurisdiction over the complaint for recovery of a car which astorga acquired as part of her
employee (sic) benefit.
Ruling:
No, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its
discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss.
SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the
surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and
creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of
possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in
specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate
rights to the title or possession of personal property. The question of whether or not a party has
the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has
wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale
of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the other. The
determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession of the car and
whether petitioners can deprive the respondent, as the legal possessor of the car, of that right to
possess is addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or

chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or
who wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to
possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the
property. The term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. Contrary to the CA’s
160
ratiocination, the RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its
discretion in denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market
value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It
involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations.As such,
the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
19. Agner vs. BPI Family Savings Bank Inc.

GR No. 182963; June 03, 2013
Facts:
Spouses Agner obtained a loan from Citimotors Inc by executing a promissory note and
secured by Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport. The credit was assigned by Citimotors to ABN-
AMRO Savings and later on to BPI Family Savings Bank. Spouses defaulted the payment of
installments so the BPI Family made a demand letter for the outstanding balance or the surrender
of the motor vehicle. The spouses refused to pay. BPI Family filed an action for replevin before
the RTC which the latter granted. Despite the filing of replevin suit the motor vehicle was not
seized. The RTC ordered the spouses to jointly and severally pay the outstanding balance due.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in ordering the spouses Agner to pay the due and
demandable obligations despite the replevin suit filed in court.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC was correct in exacting fulfillment of the obligations against the spouses
despite the replevin suit. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and
delivered to BPI Family despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that
transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the
mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure.
Certainly there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.
20. Hao vs Andres

A.M. No. P-07-2384; June 18, 2008
Facts:
Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin while respondent is
the sheriff who implement the writ of replevin. Complainant Hao filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent and alleged the following: (1) Andres gave undue advantage to the
replevin applicant in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the nine motor
vehicles in an oppressive manner; (2) the day after the seizure, the seized vehicles were kept in a
compound owned by the applicant; (3) allowed applicant’s lawyer Atty. Macadangdang to get a
keymaster to duplicate the vehicles’ keys in order to take one motor vehicle; and (4) eight of the
nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing. Investigating judge found Andres guilty of
serious negligence in the custody of the nine motor vehicles.
161
Issue:
Whether or not a property seized pursuant to a writ of replevin may be kept in a place
owned by the applicant for purposes of safekeeping the following day immediately after the
implementation of the writ.
Ruling:
No. Section 6 of Rule 60, of the Rules of Court provides that: If within five (5) days after
the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of
the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court
affirms its approval of the applicant’s bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does
not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any
reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse
party.
In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to
give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or
sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This,
he failed to do.
It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely for safekeeping as
stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be
immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property
for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after
seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal
justification.
162

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Rule 60 – Replevin

3. PCI Leasing vs Spouses Dai

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a

4. Rivera vs. Vargas

5. Asian Terminals vs Ricafort

The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioner’s complaint-in-

7. Twin Ace vs Rufina and Company

In its Answer with counter-application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rufina

9. Serg’s Products Inc. vs PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.

10. Torres vs Cabesuela

11. Gomez vs Concepcion

12. Spouses Bautisa vs Sula

13. Allandale Sportsline Inc. vs. The Good Development Corporation

14. Yang vs Valdez

15. Adoma vs Gatcheco

As correctly found by the OCA, respondent sheriff deliberately failed to place

18. Smart Communications vs. Astorga

As District Sales Manager, Astorga enjoyed additional benefits, namely, annual

In February 1998, SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more

RTC: Denied the motion to dismiss: replevin is to enforce right to possess

Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession of goods or

19. Agner vs. BPI Family Savings Bank Inc.

20. Hao vs Andres

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