G. R. No.

L-69401

Alih et., al., vs. Castro

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioners in search of loose firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. Unfortunately, the situation aggravated soon enough, a bloody
shoot-out ensued, resulting in number of casualties. The following morning, the petitioners were
arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their
objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction suit
and restraining order The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but
reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of
the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue: (1) Whether or not there was a probable cause to search the petitioner’s premises
(2) Whether or not the articles seized are admissible in evidence against the petitioners

Held: Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer
as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the
respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty
provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were
entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to
execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there
any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as
evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in
court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioner’s premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby
declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof sre inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings.
G. R. No. L-31685

Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Imelda Marcos

Facts: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations
received, financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be
forthcoming in the future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations
from the private sector and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million
guaranteed by the National Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million
received from President Johnson of the United States in the concept of war damage funds, all
intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The
petition was denied by the trial court arguing that with not a single centavo raised by taxation,
and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of petitioner that could in any wise be
prejudiced distinct from those of the general public.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner have the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the
validity of Executive Order No. 30

Held: No. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was
unavoidable that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from
donations [and] contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the
"requisite pecuniary or monetary interest." The stand of the lower court finds support in judicial
precedents. This is not to retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, foreshadowed by People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully
discussed. It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not
satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that
public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that such kind of an
action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be passed upon. This Court, as
held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it
should be entertained." The lower court thus did not err in so viewing the situation.
G.R. No. 142396

Khosrow Minucher vs. Hon.Court of Appeals and Arthur Scalzo

Facts: A case was filed in violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”, against Minucher
following a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents
accompanied by Arthur Scalzo in the house of the former, an Iranian national, where heroin was
said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court. Later, the petitioner filed for
damages due to trumped –up charges of drug trafficking made by Scalzo. The latter filed his
counterclaim, stating that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties, as an agent of Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Subsequently, he filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that as a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. Attached to
his motion were a Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to Department of
Justice of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Woodwar, certifying that the
attached documents are true and a faithful copy of the original.

Issue: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitles to diplomatic immunity

Held: Yes. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The
consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case
stated as follows: (1) the official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries , (2) certifications from both officials of the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, and (3) participation of members
of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” . These may be inadequate to
support the “diplomatic status” of the latter, but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory
of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of the agent
has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained
the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In
conducting surveillance activities on the petitioner, late acting as the poseur- buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher.
Scalzo can hardly be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

WHEREFOR, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED.