ALAWI VS ALAUYA
“counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel
Facts:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to
avail of a contract for the purchase of one
housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd.,
a real estate and housing company. Shortly
thereafter Alauya wrote to the company
expressing his intent to render the contract void
ab initio. He claimed that his consent was
vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence. He also wrote similar
letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the
Vice President of NHMFC.
Several correspondences ensued, all of which
were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar
and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.
Alauya claims that he does not use the title of
counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a
local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed
the title of attorney before his name.
Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya,
alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the
title of an attorney which is reserved only for the
members of the Philippine Bar.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya's membership in the
Sharia Bar endows him the title of an attorney.
Ruling:
HELD: No. The title is only reserved to those who
pass the regular Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,”
this Court has already had occasion to declare
that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction. Respondent’s
disinclination to use the title of “counselor” does
not warrant his use of the title attorney.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September
1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age,
holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not possess
the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceeding, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure
of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for
the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to
Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to
the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as
against to what he calls a tribunal “peopled by
people who are calloused to our pleas for
justice…” He also expressed strong words as
against the judiciary like “justice… is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The petition
rooted from the case he lost due to the absence
of time and place in his motion in the trial court.
His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals
by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again
dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the
disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial
move. He claimed that this petition to surrender
his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain
the title again as soon as he regained confidence
in the justice system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given
disciplinary actions for his acts.
HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed. It has been
pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is
no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself
because of his negligence. Even if the intentions
of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the
truth and alleged injustices, so as not to
condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already
caused enough damage and disrepute to the
judiciary. Since this particular case is sui generis
in its nature, a number of foreign and local
jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references. Between
disbarment and suspension, the latter was
imposed. Indefinite suspension may only be
lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen
may be able to prove that he is again fit to
resume the practice of law.
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is
known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title
of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks
for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and
including 1955.
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have
no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed
that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 R.A. No. 972 was declared
unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not
being embraced in the title of the Act. As per its
title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers
of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite
time. It was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact
that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was
declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The
portion that was stricken down was based under
the following reasons:
 The law itself admits that the candidates
for admission who flunked the bar from
1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was
very close to the end of World War II;
 The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates;
 The law is an encroachment on the
Court’s primary prerogative to
determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess
of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules
laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed
to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and
 The pretended classification is arbitrary
and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the
Court could not muster enough votes to declare
it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to
take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke
existing Supreme Court resolutions denying
admission to the bar of a petitioner. The same
may also rationally fall within the power to
Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of
admission to the practice of law.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
49 SCRA 22

FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in
September 1971, ordaining “Within two years
from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court
formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in
December 1972, the Commission earnestly
recommended the integration of the bar. The
Court accepted all comments on the proposed
integration.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine bar?
2. Would the integration of the bar be
constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the integration
of the bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first
adopted the definition given by the Commission
to “integration” in this wise: “Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
This requires membership and financial support
(in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term
“Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons
whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An
Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so; the
State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the
setting up by government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as
an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of
the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may
integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following
constitutional rights: freedom of association and
of speech, as well as the nature of the dues
exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the
Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
1. Integration is not violative of freedom of
association because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any
group of which he is not already a
member. All that it does is “to provide an
official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer
is already a member.” The lawyer too is
not compelled to attend meetings,
participate of activities, etc. The only
compulsion is the payment of annual
dues. Assuming, however, that it does
compel a lawyer to be a member of an
 integrated bar, the court held that “such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of
the police power of the state”
2. Integration is also not violative of the
freedom of speech just because dues
paid b the lawyer may be used for
projects or programs, which the lawyer
opposes. To rule otherwise would make
every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer
is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.
3. The dues exacted from lawyers are not
in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the
timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored
integration.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378
FACTS:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this Court "to
order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes
`A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law.”
The advertisements complained of by herein
petitioner is as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
Please call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251522-2041;
521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members
of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits
the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in
the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly in the light of the
caseof John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decidedby the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised
by it constitutes practice of law and, in either
case, whether the same can properly be the
subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the services
offered by the respondent constitute practice of
law. The definition of “practice of law” is laid
down in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as
defined:Black defines "practice of law" as:"The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with
thelaw." The contention of respondent that it
merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering.
While some of the services being offered by
respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs
for the efficient management of law offices, or
the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule. What is palpably
clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory
and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real.
In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption,
it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for
the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With
its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services
it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority
holds, is not limited merely to court appearances
but extends to legal research, giving legal advice,
contract drafting, and so forth. That fact that the
corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtueof the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this
proceeding. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. (SEE CANON 2) A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession,
advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services
or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is
a profession. The canons of the profession tell us
that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is rightand proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda.
Valencia vs. Cabanting
FACTS: On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted
by Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, filed a complaint
against Paulino for the recovery of possession
with damages. On January 22, 1973, the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered
a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia
Raymundo. Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition
for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging
that the trial court failed to provide a workable
solution concerning his house. While the
petition was pending, the trial court, on March 9,
1973, issued an order of execution stating that
"the decision in this case has already become
final and executory on March 20, 1973, Serapia
sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to
her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting, on April
25, 1973.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Cabanting
purchased the subject property in violation of
Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code.
RULING: The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of
another:
(5) xxx this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of
the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended
to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon
his client. Greed may get the better of the
sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness.
Any violation of... this prohibition would
constitute malpractice
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
concerned, applies only while the litigation is
pending.
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty.
Arsenio Fer Cabanting purchased the lot after
finality of judgment, there was still a pending
certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in
litigation not only if there is some contest or
litigation over it in... court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial
action of the judge. (Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35
Phil. 81).
Logic dictates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the
petition.
Principles: Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for
purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has
terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a
certiorari connected therewith is still in progress.
Thus, purchase of
the property by Atty. Cabanting in... this case
constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491
and the Canons of
Professional Ethics.