PEOPLE VS BUYCO

G.R. No. L-539 January 27, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MELITON BUYCO, Defendant-Appellant.

Appellant was charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Criminal Case
No. 405, now subject of this appeal, wherein the information alleged that on or about February
22, 1946, in the Municipality of Oton, province of Iloilo, Philippines, said appellant, being a first
class private of the Military Police in said province, with deliberate intent, treachery and abuse of
authority, and with a decided purpose to kill, did then and there fire several shots with a
Thompson submachinegun against Irineo Gellangala, Apolonio Ikoy, and Napoleon Zambales,
hitting them on different parts of their bodies and as a result Irineo Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy
died instantaneously and Napoleon Zambales died a few days later. The trial court, presided over
by his Honor, Judge Jose Quisumbing, after due trial, rendered judgment on May 8, 1946, finding
the following facts as proven through the testimony of the eye-witnesses Eusebio Davila, Perdo
Zambales, and Juanito Espera, and that of Doctors Ramon V. Ferrer, who performed the autopsy
of the corpse of Apolonio Ikoy and examined that of Irineo Gellangala, and Manuel F. Cartagena,
who operated upon the now deceased Napoleon Zambales: that during a dance on the occasion of
the feast of the patron saint of barrio Trapiche, Municipality of Oton above mentioned, "between
12 and 12:30 of the midgnight of February 22, 1946", there was a verbal brawl followed by a fist
fight between Cornelio Soliman and an unknown individual who later resulted to be a resident of
Iloilo City; that Eusebio Davila, Chief of the Municipal Police of Oton, and Juanito Espera, a
municipal policeman, who were at the place of the incident, intervened to pacify the fighters; that
the latter had been scarcely pacified when a third party intervened delivering fist blows upon
Cornelio Soliman which knocked him to the ground; that Eusebio Devila attempted to help
Cornelio Soliman to his feet, at which moment the accused Meliton Buyco, now appellant, who
was on patrol with his six companions, fired in the air two discharges from his Thompson
submachinegun; that Eusebio Davila, who saw Meliton Buyco fire, approached the latter end
prohibited him from firing again to avoid personal injury among those present; that Meliton Buyco
replied that Davila leave him alone because he was an agent of the law; that minutes later Meliton
Buyco got hole with his left hand of the back around the left shoulder of Apolonao Ikoy, who was
the one who had boxed Cornelio Soliman, and pushed him forward, firing at him with a discharge
from his Thompson submachinegun which killed him right then and there. Another bullet of the
same discharge by Meliton Buyco found its mark in the body of Irineo Gellangala, who was in
almost a straight line from the spot front which Apolonio Ikoy was; that Irineo Gellangala fell and
died instantaneously; that the accused appilant Meliton Buyco fired another shot aimed at a group
of persons, among them Pedro Sambales and his son Napoleon Zambales, and a bullet of this last
shot bit Napoleon Zambales, who died after six days in St. Paul's Hospital, City of Iloilo; that
Eusebio Davila tried to place Meliton Buyco under arrest but the latter threatened him with his
Thompson submachinegun, and when Eusebio Davila attempted to succor the three wounded
persons, Meliton Buyco warned him to withdraw from the spot, and in view of this attitude on the
part of the accused, Eusebio Davila desisted from his purpose through fear that he might be
another victim of Meliton Buyco.
Upon examination of the corpse of the deceased Apolonio Ikoy by Doctors Ferrer and Cartagena,
there were found three wounds in his body, one which entered the back on the level of the right
scapula, another a little below toward the angle of the right scapula, and a third on the left side
near the lumbar region, which wounds caused the instantaneous death of Apolonio Ikoy (Exhibit
C); on the corpse of Irineo Gellangala there was found one wound in the head penetrating the
upper part of the hind occipital bone emerging through the frontal bone, which likewise caused
the instant death of said deceased (Exhibit D); and in the corpse of Napeleon Zambales there
were found the following wounds according to the medical certificate, Exhibit B:
"A bullet wound allowing entrance of 45 cal. bullet situated at the epigastric region with the bullet
lodging just anterior to the skin of the lumbar region to the left side of the eighth vertebrae;

"Two wounds in the stomach, one at its anterior and another at its posterior aspect; and three
wounds at different loops of the small intestines."

The defense, through the testimony of the appellant Meliton Buyco and of his companions, the MP
soldier Enrique Bernales and Corporal Braulio Taleon, and Lt. Jose M. F. Pelo, and the musician
Antonio Herradura, attempted to prove that on the night in question Corporal Braulio Taleon, the
appellant Meliton Buyco, and Pvt. Enrique Bernales, and four other companions, arrived at barrio
Trapiche from their station in Guimbal, near the auditorium where a dance was being held; that
the jeep used by them developed engine trouble, and while they were fixing it, they heard that a
fight was going on inside the auditorium causing public disorder which the municipal policemen
under the command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify; that the accused Meliton Buyco,
followed by Cpl. Braulio Taleon and Private Enrique Barnales, entered the auditorium, intervened
in the fight to pacify the combatants, but were unsuccessful; that one of the combatants hurled
himself against Corporal Taleon, wrested front the latter his rifle and aimed the same at him, who
had fallen on the ground; that the appellant, upon seeing this, fired a shot from his Thompson
submachinegun at the individual who afterwards resulted to be Apolonio Ikoy, the latter falling
dead; that after these events, and for fear of reprisal which might come from the relatives of
Apolonio Ikoy, the MP patrolmen fled from the place and finally reached their detachnemt station
in Guimbal, where they reported the incident to their chief, Lt. Belo.

The trial judge, who saw, heard and observed the witnesses for the state as well as those for the
defense testify, did not believe the version given by the latter. Below we quote the analysis that
His Honor made of the defense's version as related by its witnesses;

" * * * I just feel he was trying to grab my Thempson, but he was not able to get the Thompson
* * *".

On page 70 of the stenographic transcript there appear, indicating the way the trial judge was
impressed by the testimony of the defense witness Herradura, the following question and answer:

There is much in what the Solicitor General says in his brief about the unlikelihood of the
defense's version to the effect that Ikoy attacked Corporal Taleon, felling him down, wrested from
him his Thompson submachine gun, and was aiming the weapon against the corporal when he
(Ikoy) was shot by the accused. Among other things, the Solicitor General points out that Taleon
testified before the fiscal on the very day following the incident to the effect that Ikoy did not
succeed in getting hold of his gun (see also t.s.n., pp. 79-80). That Taleon's gun allegedly wrested
from him by Ikoy was not exhibited as evidence at the trial although it appears that immediately
after the incident it was taken by Taleon with him, is also mentioned by the Solicitor General as
another indication of the improbability of the version of the defense. It is stated in this connection
that if Ikoy really was holding Taleon's gun when the appellant fired at him, it must have been hit
"by the bullets aimed at Ikoy". From the evidence, even that of the defense, it appears that the
accused so fixed the firing mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger
would fire several bullets automatically in succession. It is also pointed out that the admitted flight
of the "MP's" after the fall of Ikoy, from fear of retaliation from the latter's relatives, is indicative
of guilty conscience, for otherwise, for otherwise, since they were all armed with Thompson
submachine guns, surely better armed than those relatives could possibly be, that fact would have
enabled them to stand their ground if they really were legally performing their duty.
It seems very unlikely that Ikoy, a plain citizen, who had had no trouble with Corporal Taleon,
from aught that appears in the record, should assault this officer of the law, who was armed with
a weapon no less deadly than a Thompson submachine gun and was accompanied by several
members of the MPC all likewise armed. And it is still harder to conceive under such circumstances
that Ikoy, not satisfied with allegedly downing the corporal, should wrest from him his gun and
attempt to fire at him with it, within sight and near presence of the latter's companions. For these
and other reasons not necessary to set forth, it is no wonder that the trial judge not only was not
favorably impressed by the version of the defense but positively believed that the witnesses who
gave that version were not telling the truth.

On the other hand, the accused admits the killing and his counsel frankly asserts in his brief (p. 7)
that his client, acting in defense of the person of Corporal Taleon "directed a burst of TG
(Thompson Gun) shots to Taleon's assailant". Here, then, is an admission that the accused
discharged more than one shot at the deceased. Having thus admitted that he killed the victim, it
was incumbent upon the accused to offer a justification satisfactory to the courts to exculpate
him. He endeavored to do this to carry the burden of proof that had been shifted on him through
the witnesses that he presented at the trial and himself. The trial judge who saw, heard, and
observed the witnesses testify was impressed by them in the manner described in his own words
quoted above. A careful review of the evidence and the record has failed to indicate sufficient
reasons for our disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial judge. Defense counsel
strenuously argues in effect that it is unbelievable that the appellant should have killed the victim
if it had not been for the purpose of defending his corporal from the alleged threat of Ikoy to
shoot. However, here is a case where the defense thus setup has failed to be established to the
satisfaction of the courts of justice. In such a case, the killing being admitted, the law presumes
that there was motive therefor (U.S. vs. Ricafort, 1 Phil., 173, U. S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil. 561; U. S.
vs. Reyes, 18 Phil., 495; U. S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil., 578; People vs. Francisco, 44 Off. Gaz., 4847.)
The law must be applied to the facts. In the mind and eyes of the law in such cases, even though
the motive might have been successfully concealed from the human perception of others, and
might be known only to the agent and to his God, still there it was impelling the agent to the
criminal transgression. The defense would have us deem it strange that the appellant should have
willfully killed the three victims above named. But truth is at times stranger than fiction, and under
the established facts the actual case is one of those instances.

As said in the Ricafort case, supra. " * * * In this, as in almost every crime apparently without
motive, the motives which might exist are innumerable motives unknown perhaps to the relatives
of the deceased who testified at the trial and not even disclosed to the three who cooperated in a
certain measure in the crime".

In the McMann case, supra. the court said; "The question of motive is of course very important in
cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the
act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all doubt that the defendant was the one who
caused the death of McKay, it is not so important to know the exact reason for the deed". In the
case at bar the accused admits having caused the death of the victims, aside from the evidence
against him.

In the Balmori case, supra, we find the same idea expressed in a different way thus;

"But, argues counsel, why should they set the fire in the presence of Agapita Rivera, well knowing
that their act was seen. We do not definitely know. Neither did we know, In a case before us
some months ago, why the accused, in apparent cold blood, killed three grown persons and a
little babe in plain view of several persons. We know only that he did it. While motive is generally
of great importance in a criminal case, it is not absolutely indispensable. The evidence in the case
relating to the actual commission of the crime may be so overwhelming that the question of
motive may become secondary." (U. S. vs. Balmori, 18 Phil., 578, 590).

The trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged; namely, triple
murder, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusión perpetua, with indemnity to the heirs of
Apolonio Ikoy in the sum of P2,000, to the heirs of Irineo Gellangala in the sum of P2,000, and to
the heirs of Napoleon Zambales also in the sum of P2,000, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the costs. In this we do not fully concur with His Honor.

The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge, that Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died
from bullets discharged by the same shot which was aimed at the former. It will be remembered
that the shot was fired from a submachine gun and, as already staged, it appears that the
appellant so fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger would fire
several bullets automatically in succession. Viada (Vol. II, 5th ed., p. 629), commenting on article
90 of the Spanish Penal Code, corresponding to article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, gives an
example of the first case mentioned therein of a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave felonies as follows; A person fires a gun against another with intention to kill the latter, and
not only kills him but also a third person who was beside the victim: here, he says, we have a
single act, a single shot, which produces two homicides. In the instant case, as regards Apolonio
Ikoy, the evidence discloses that, while Apolonio Ikoy had his back towards Meliton Buyco, the
defendant-appellant, the latter got hold of the former's right shoulder, pushed him forward and
while Ikoy's body was moving in the direction of the push, Buyco fired at his back (t. s. n,, p. 14).
It, therefore, appears that the aggressor employed means, methods or forms in the execution of
the crime which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself from
the defense which the offended party might make that the act was committed with treachery. This
qualifies the killing of Apolonio Ikoy as murder (Rev. Penal Code, art. 248).

The killing of Irineo Gellangala under the evidence must be classified as homicide, because the
wrongful act done consisting in the killing of Irineo Gellangala constituted a felony (delito) for
which said agent is criminally liable, pursuant to article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code
(see also U. S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344), which act is presumed to be voluntary (U. S. vs. Gloria, 3
Phil., 333, 335).

"It makes no difference whether the defendant's intention was to strike Dionisio Legara with the
butt of the billiard cue or not, for the blow fell on the head of Cayetano Gomez * * *.

"The same crime would have been committed if the injured man and deceased had been Dionisio
Legara, instead of the defendant's nephew, Cayetano Gomez; the crime of homicide would have
been committed just the same and one man would have been deprived of his life by the criminal
act of another." (U. S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344, 348).

" * * * Although the wrongful act be committed against a person other than the one whom it was
intended to injure, this fact does not excuse the offender from criminal liability for the voluntary
commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor, according to paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Penal
Code" (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code. Per Arellano. C. J., in U.S. vs. Maisa, 8 Phil, 597).

By virtue of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, the murder and
homicide thus resulting from that single discharge should be punished with the capital penalty, i.
e., the penalty for the more serious offense in the maximum period or degree.

As to the death of Napoleon Zambales, the evidence reveals that it resulted from another and
different shot by the same defendant-appellant from the same gun. The evidence discloses that
after discharging the shot which killed Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala, the accused holding
his gun with the barrel pointing in the direction where he was facing, changed his position to face
toward one side and fired another burst from the gun, which shot hit Napoleon Zambales (t. s. n.
p. 5). Six days later this third victim died in St. Paul's Hospital. Under art, 249, in relation to article
4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, the instant defendant must be held to have thereby
committed the crime of homicide. In U. S. vs. Gloria. 3 Phil., 333, 335, this Court held that:

"* * * All acts punishable by the law are presumed to be voluntary in the absence of proof to the
contrary. With respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof."

This last killing is a separate homicide also included in the charge and proven without objection on
the part of defense counsel. The Supreme Court of Spain held in its judgment of January 27,
1876, that one who, after a dispute, discharges four shots from a pistol, mortally wounding with
the first one of the combatants and inflicting with the second physical injuries upon another,
should be punished for the said crimes separately in accordance with article 88 of the Spanish
Penal Code upon the ground that, although the shots were fired successively, they did not
constitute one single but two diverse acts, for the two different persons at whom they were
directed (II Viada, 5th ed., p. 633-634). The same Tribunal in its judgment of February 7, 1879,
held that a person who, posting himself in front of four individuals, fires four shots with a pistol
saying: "toma tú toma tú," wounding two of them, is guilty of four different crimes of discharge of
firearm against a determinate person, two complexed with that of physical injuries, since the four
shots were produced by four distinct acts (II Viada, 5th ed., p. 636).

The penalty corresponding to the killing of Napoleon Zambales, there being neither aggravating
nor,mitigating circumtance, if reclusion temporal in its medium period (Revised Penal Code. art.
249).

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified so that appellant Meliton Buyco, as he
is hereby, convicted of the crime of murder complexed with homicide for the deaths of Apolonio
Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala, for which, pursuant to article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in the
opinion of a majority of this Court the penalty of death should be imposed upon him, but there
being no unanimity in this respect, said penalty is hereby lowared to reclusión perpetua; and he is
hereby convicted of the crime of homicide, without any modifying circumstance, for the death of
Napoleon Zambales, for which the indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prisíon mayor to
14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusíon temporal is hereby imposed on him, pursuant to article
249 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence
Law), as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 4225. In all other respects, the judgment appealed
from is affirmed. So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Parás, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS CARPO CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Ruben Meriales testified that in the evening of 25 August 1996, he saw Jaime Carpo together with
Warlito Ibao and his son Roche all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay’s house which was
about a meter to the south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito,
striding towards Dulay’s hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the
wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche
following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay’s
screams broke into the night.

Ruben rushed outside and ran towards Florentino’s hut where he saw the bloodied Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan lying side by side, both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose head
was oozing with blood.

On their way to the hospital, Norwela who had injuries on her chest and lower appendage died.
Nissan who was five years old, also died later. Noemi luckily survived.

The trial Court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben and convicted Carpo et al. It accepted
his straightforward testimony. Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The
RPC the trial court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and ordered
them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE:
What was the crime/s committed?

RULING:
Consistent with giving due deference to the observations of the trial court on credibility of
witnesses, we agree with the court a quo when it believed Ruben Meriales more than the defense
witnesses. Indeed, the trial court is best equipped to make an assessment of witnesses, and its
factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood or
disregarded important facts, which is not true in the present case.

The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile.

The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the offense
charged. From the detailed account of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the
hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As observed by the trial court, the
presence of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to
Oscar, the group’s preceptor. Surely, the latter was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that
his co-conspirators were not far behind.

Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo, the crime committed may otherwise be more
approriately denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than by treachery. However,
since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial court, the
explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the
wounding of Noemi can only be multiple murder complexed with attempted murder.

The crime committed against Noemi Dulay was correctly denominated by the trial court as
attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending physician even
made conflicting statements in the assessment of her wounds, to wit: although he said that Noemi
could have died from the shrapnel wound in her head, he specifically ruled out the possibility of
“intercerebral hemorrhage” and despite the seriousness of the possible complications of her
injuries she would suffer from physical incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14) days.

As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted
murder.

Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely, the
explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case comes
under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48 provides that the penalty
for the more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be
applied in its maximum period. As the crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly
imposed by the trial court.
PEOPLE VS CARPO
G.R. No. 132676, April 04, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO
IBAO AND ROCHE IBAO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The accused might as well have borrowed the famous line of Shakespeare - "How this world is
given to lying!"[1] - when they impute error to the trial court for relying on the testimony of a
single witness in convicting them of multiple murder complexed with attempted murder for the
death of Florentino Dulay, Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay, and the wounding of Noemi Dulay.[2]

The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows:[3] On 25 August 1996 at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening while he was watching television with his family his dogs barked. His
mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded him to check the
disturbance. To allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and trudged the unpaved path
towards his cow that was tied to a mango tree. Then the noise grew louder thus arousing his
suspicion that something was really wrong. After transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went
inside the kitchen, stood atop the concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo slats and
peeped outside to observe. The darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light
from the two (2) bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through
the slats and illumined the surroundings. There was also moon in the sky.

A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao suspiciously
stooping near his barn. He knew Jaime and Warlito very well. Jaime was his uncle and Warlito
lived in his neighborhood. Warlito's son Roche was also there; he was standing by the mango
tree. They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulay's house which was about a meter
to the south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another son of Warlito, striding towards
Dulay's hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled
something inside. Oscar then scurried off towards the nearby creek with Roche following him.
Seconds later, a loud explosion shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulay's screams broke
into the night.

Ruben Meriales, rushed outside. He ran towards Florentino's hut but was deterred by darkness.
He returned home to take his flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside the hut he
was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him - a bloodied Florentino cradled in the arms of
his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by side on a cot both doused in blood, and a
motionless Norma whose head was oozing with blood.

Realizing the exigency of the situation, he left the crime scene to borrow the jeepney of Brgy.
Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for the hapless victims. The neighbors milling around at once gave up
hope on Florentino so that only Norwela, Nissan and Noemi were loaded in the jeepney and
rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On their way, Norwela who had injuries on her
chest and lower appendage died. Nissan who was five (5) years old and the youngest of the
victims died later due to "shock from pains" caused by the shrapnel wounds in her left shoulder,
abdomen and lower extremities.[4] Noemi luckily survived. Her attending physician, Dr. Emiliano
Subido, testified that Noemi was semi-conscious and vomiting although ambulatory at the time he
examined her. But due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospital's lack of facilities she
was taken to another hospital in Dagupan City.[5]
In the course of their investigation, the policemen questioned the people who might have
witnessed the carnage. Fearful however that the culprits would return, Ruben Meriales refused to
give any statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio that he would go to the police
station after the burial.

On 4 September 1996, or a week later, Ruben kept his promise and went to the police station
where he gave his statement to Police Officer Osio. He named Jaime Carpo, Warlito lbao, Oscar
lbao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said that Florentino was killed
because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the murder of his brother Delfin
Meriales.[6]

On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Ruben's testimony, a criminal complaint for the murder
of Florentino Dulay and his two (2) daughters Norwela, and Nissan as well as the frustrated
murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche
Ibao. Warrants for their immediate arrest were issued by the municipal circuit trial court.

On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo was taken into custody by the police, while Roche Ibao eluded
arrest until 9 December 1996 when he was apprehended by police officers in La Union. With
Roche's arrest, Oscar and Warlito realized the futility of hiding and surrendered themselves to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in La Union.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano Subido
and Police Officers Virgilio dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo Osio as witnesses.

Police Officer Osio testified that on the night of 25 August 1996 after receiving a report of an
explosion in Brgy. Baligayan, he together with Police Officers Julius Aurora, Ricardo Lugares and
Jovencio Tapac immediately responded. They were able to gather several grenade shrapnels and
a grenade shifting lever from the crime scene. He spoke with the weeping Teresita Dulay who told
him that she suspected the accused of having perpetrated the assault. He likewise conferred with
Ruben Meriales who named the same set of suspects and who promised to give his statement to
the police after the funeral.

After speaking with Teresita and Ruben, he summoned his colleagues to go with him to Warlito
Ibao's house which was just across the road. Warlito's house was dark and its front door was
locked. He called out but there was no answer. They then proceeded to Oscar's house which was
also padlocked and unoccupied. He went to Roche's house and peeped inside before they left.[7]
Against their positive identification by Ruben, the four (4) accused interposed alibi claiming that
they were somewhere else when the Dulay hut was blasted. They likewise assailed Ruben's
testimony for being a fabrication and insisted that he lied to get back at them because Roche was
a suspect in the killing of his brother Delfin Meriales. Jaime and his wife Veronica Carpo were one
in testifying that in the evening of 25 August 1995 Jaime was at home in Brgy. Libsong, a hundred
and fifty (150) meters away from the house of the Dulays in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the
loud explosion, he summoned his tanods to check whether the blast happened within their
barangay. When he learned that the explosion occurred in the adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went
home to sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is separated from his barangay by a creek and could be reached in
ten (10) minutes. However, on the night of the incident, the creek was neck deep such that one
had to make a detour through a mountainous route for about thirty (30) minutes to reach Brgy.
Baligayan.[8]

Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because the latter was angry at him. Ruben's grudge
supposedly started when Jaime sided with the Ibaos in the murder case instituted by the
Merialeses against Roche for the death of Delfin Meriales. As a matter of fact on 10 December
1996 while he was incarcerated at the Balungao District Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him asking
his forgiveness for having named him as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Ruben subsequently
pleaded with him to reveal the names of those responsible but when he claimed ignorance, Ruben
left in a huff.

Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the night of the explosion their family was having
a farewell party for the family's only girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for Hongkong. They heard
the blast but they did not bother to check. They denied having heard the police officers call for
them an hour after the explosion. Roche further asserted that he did not have a house in Brgy.
Baligayan as reported because he lived with his parents-in-law in Brgy. Libsong. However, on the
night of the blast, he slept at his parents' house as all of his siblings and their families were there.
He only learned of the bloodbath the following morning when they went home to his in-laws. His
wife Jovelyn corroborated his testimony in the same manner that Remedios supported the story of
her husband Warlito.[9]

In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple murder of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi Dulay the trial Court
gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben.[10] It accepted his straightforward testimony and ruled
that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of
falsehood on his lips."[11] Accordingly, in accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The
Revised Penal Code the trial court imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death
and ordered them to solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased as well as Noemi Dulay in the
amount of P600,000.00.[12]

Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of briefs, the
accused filed an Addendum to Appellant's Brief urging that the favorable results of their lie
detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.[13]

A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological changes,
capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not telling the truth. The
Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been
accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.[14]

The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the night of 25 August 1996 resulting in the death
of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi Dulay is an admitted fact.
The identity of the perpetrators, as tenaciously questioned by the accused, depends upon the
credibility of Ruben Meriales.

In this appeal, accused-appellants challenge the veracity of the testimony of Ruben Meriales
primarily on two (2) grounds: first, Ruben's testimony in court is different from and is
contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996; and second, Ruben is not a disinterested witness
because he has a grudge against the Ibaos. Consistent with giving due deference to the
observations of the trial court on credibility of witnesses, we agree with the court a quo when it
believed Ruben Meriales more than the defense witnesses.[15] Indeed, the trial court is best
equipped to make an assessment of witnesses, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed
on appeal unless it has overlooked, misunderstood or disregarded important facts,[16] which is
not true in the present case.

The twin arguments therefore raised by accused-appellants against the testimony of Ruben
Meriales are devoid of merit. A scrutiny of the records reveals that his testimony is not
inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former merely supplied the
details of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that there was any
inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts a testimony given in court the
latter commands greater respect.[17] Such inconsistency is unimportant and would not even
discredit a fallible witness.[18] The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against
the Ibaos for the murder of his brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His
frankness in admitting his resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his
favor.[19] There is likewise nothing unnatural in Ruben's attitude of concealing himself behind the
kitchen wall instead of warning the Dulays of the looming danger to their lives. It is a well-known
fact that persons react differently to different situations - there may be some who will respond
violently to an impending danger while there may be others who will simply assume a cravenly
demeanor. In this case, Ruben was ruled by his fear rather than by his reason, but for this alone,
his credibility should not be doubted.

Apropos Jaime's imputation that Ruben had admitted to him while in jail that he lied in his
testimony, we find this accusation farcical as nothing was ever offered in support thereof. The
lone corroborative testimony, which was that of Roche, does not inspire belief since Roche himself
admitted overhearing the conversation while Jaime together with other prisoners was constructing
a hut outside of his cell at about three (3) meters away. As correctly hinted by the prosecution,
the noise generated by the construction made it unlikely for Roche to hear conversations three (3)
meters away.[20]

The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile. By his own admission, Jaime was
only a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from the scene of the crime. In fact, it would only
take him thirty (30) minutes, at the most, to be at the place of the Dulays.

More so for the Ibaos who acknowledged that they were having a party just a stone's throw away
from the crime scene at the time of the explosion. Curiously though, if they were indeed reveling
inside their house on that fateful night, then we cannot comprehend why they did not go out to
investigate after hearing the blast. Besides, it was rather strange for the Ibaos not to have joined
their neighbors who had instantaneously milled outside to view the mayhem. Their conduct indeed
betrayed them.

Further, the immediate flight and tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union until Roche's arrest cannot
but demonstrate their guilt and desire to evade prosecution.[21]

The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the offense
charged. From the detailed account of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned themselves near the
hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As observed by the trial court, the
presence of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave encouragement and a sense of security to
Oscar, the group's preceptor. Surely, the latter was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that
his co-conspirators were not far behind.

Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo,[22] the crime committed may otherwise be
more approriately denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than by treachery.
However, since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and appreciated by the trial
court, the explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan,
and the wounding of Noemi can only be multiple murder complexed with attempted murder.[23]
The crime committed against Noemi Dulay was correctly denominated by the trial court as
attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending physician even
made conflicting statements in the assessment of her wounds, to wit: although he said that Noemi
could have died from the shrapnel wound in her head, he specifically ruled out the possibility of
"intercerebral hemorrhage"[24] and despite the seriousness of the possible complications of her
injuries she would suffer from physical incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14) days.
As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted
murder.[25]

Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely, the
explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case comes
under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48 provides that the penalty
for the more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion perpetua to death, should be
applied in its maximum period. As the crime was complexed, the death penalty was properly
imposed by the trial court.

At this point, we take exception to the court a quo's award of damages in the "negotiated amount
of P600,00.00." It appears that under the auspices of the trial court counsel for the defense
entered into an oral compromise with the public prosecutor, which was subsequently ratified by
the private complainant, limiting the amount of civil liability to P600,000.00. We note the
discourse between the court and the counsel for both parties regarding the award.
PROS. CORPUZ: x x x x (W)e would like to enter into stipulation the civil aspect of the case.

COURT: Are the accused confident that they could be acquitted in this case? Atty Sanglay?

ATTY. SANGLAY: I think so, your Honor.

COURT: What about Atty. Rafael?

ATTY. RAFAEL: We are confident, your Honor.

COURT: All right. So you can easily stipulate. First of all, how much do you want Fiscal?

PROS. CORPUZ: P1,282,740.00, your Honor x x x x

COURT: x x x x Agree gentlemen of the defense?

ATTY. SANGLAY: P600,000.00, your Honor.

COURT: Do you agree Fiscal?

PROS. CORPUZ: Yes, your Honor.

COURT: All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed liquidated amount in case of conviction without
necessarily having to interpret this stipulation as admission of guilt on the part of any of the
accused. All right so we will dispense with the testimony on the civil aspect x x x x

COURT: x x x x Are you the private complainant in this case?

TERESITA DULAY: Yes, sir.

COURT: If the accused get convicted and I will hold them severally liable for you of damages in
the liquidated sum of P600,000.00 as agreed upon by the counsel, will you be satisfied? x x x x

TERESITA: Yes, sir.

COURT: So let that be of record. Will you sign the note so that there will be evidence.
(At this juncture private complainant Teresita Dulay affixed her signature at the bottom right
margin of the stenographic notes page 2 hereof).[26]
Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the attorney's
power to compromise. Under Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of attorney is necessary
"to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a
judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already
acquired." On the other hand, Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing,
and in taking appeal, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without
special authority, compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of their
clients' claims but the full amount in cash."

The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly given,
by the principal to his lawyer specifically authorizing the performance of an act.[27] It has not
escaped our attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had no special power of
attorney from their clients to enter into a compromise. However, insofar as Teresita was
concerned, she was apprised of the agreement and in fact had signed her name as instructed by
the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the same. As for accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue
between the court and counsel does not show that they were ever consulted regarding the
proposed settlement. In the absence of a special power of attorney given by accused-appellants
to their counsel, the latter can neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability. Consequently,
since Atty. Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no specific power to compromise the civil liability of all
accused-appellants, its approval by the trial court which did not take the precautionary measures
to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to be deprived of their property
without due process of law, could not legalize it. For being violative of existing law and
jurisprudence, the settlement should not be given force and effect.

In light of the foregoing, the award of damages must be set aside and a new one entered with all
the circumstances of the case in mind. For the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay, civil
indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a total amount of P50,000.00 is awarded to their heirs. This is in
addition to the award of moral damages at an aggregate amount of P150,000.00 for their
emotional and mental anguish. With respect to Noemi, an indemnity of P30,000.00 would be just
and proper. All taken, an award of P330,000.00 is granted.

Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a
majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly
imposed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME CARPO,
OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime of multiple murder
with attempted murder and sentencing them to the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that they are ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino, Norwela
and Nissan, all surnamed Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each death or an aggregate amount of P300,00.00. In addition, accused-appellants
are ordered to pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for her attempted murder. Costs against
accused- appellants.

In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon finality
of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President
for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS PINEDA
G.R. No. L-26222 July 21, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte;
and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.

Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 — murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 — murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his
investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress
trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and
Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle,
caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house.
Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered
therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, — all minor children of the couple —
and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed — Tomas Narbasa and
Tambak Alindo — moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that
"said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed
the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246.
He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the
docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground
that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was
killed." The defense opposed.
On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that
the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not
by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as
one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information
for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came
to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple
homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito
complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of
two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime
defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed
another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died
instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double
murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result
that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted
is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate
and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines
and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and
wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there
were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder — with the use
of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law wife, and
their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense.
This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single
act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts
"may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as
separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary
school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons
lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that
there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones.8 And
finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and
Maxima Capule — who were asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a
second burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were killed. The
accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal,
this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders."9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There,
on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that
there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate
the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge
conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material here,
therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by
each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half
of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal
impulse is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five
cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases
instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial
judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge
could easily be remedied.12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five
separate informations — four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the
witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the
acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance
thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48,
which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed.13
If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain
personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the
shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had
reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that
offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to
kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation.
With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the
Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A
prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular
criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments
thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the
possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to
recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his
conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in
our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's
right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be transgressed. So it is, that in
People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical
that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should
determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the
prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a
criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry
made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did
not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the
defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be
subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be
blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement
of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent
the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid
multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper
cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the
record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.1äwphï1.ñët

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to
tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and
frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that
matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion
should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of
respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void,
and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent
insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes
his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they
were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.

PEOPLE VS TABACO CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
The group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena while
the accused Mario Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of
the arena about more than three (3) meters away, from the place where the late Mayor and his
group were seated when he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge
Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the
shooting to death of Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo
Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers
cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of
Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co’s canteen, saw the accused going
out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. He tried to pacify Tabaco.
Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo,one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the
Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun
reports coming from inside the cockpit arena, and saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the
cockpit arena. They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun
towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and
in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who
happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his
legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot;
(2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario
Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints.”

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all
counts.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.
Whether the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all
four murder cases.
What penalties shall be imposed?

RULING:

1. After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb
the trial court’s assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to
accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his
companions.

Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.

2. We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court
explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

“Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar
Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been
prosecuted under only one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. ‘When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as
amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).’

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito
complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which
should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been
prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more
grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto).

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths of Oscar
Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, were the result of one single act of
the accused Mario Tabaco, the penalty — is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense.

The more serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the
victims were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against
Mario Tabaco’s sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree, but as the death
penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA for the four (4) murders.

Accordingly, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused
Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more
serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal.

There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is
10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito
Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun used by the accused, is admittedly an automatic
powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can
penetrate even more than five persons resulting to their deaths.
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since “the
evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)” does not hold water.

“In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of
each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each
of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one
simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were
fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into
consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims,
corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally
liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every singe act that produced the same.
Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet
each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate
crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two
cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally
speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses.”

Furthermore, the trial court’s reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine
enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused
by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a
doubt, to the accused-appellant.

3. Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for
each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.

No reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-appellant guilty of
four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences
of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
PEOPLE VS TABACO
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo
Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in
these four (4) cases identically read:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one
[name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.

Contrary to Law. 1

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex
crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:

That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge
Siriban, Jr., caused his death.

That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim
Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his own will.2

All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.

The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:

In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under
then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting,
at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.

This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards
to maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo;
(2) CIS Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andres Semana,
INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to
have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the
presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing
with him his M-14 issued firearm.

Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta
of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3)
Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company
with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey;
(5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.

At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor
Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions
were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita, Jr. and/or five
(5) of them including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western
part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar
Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3)
the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the
bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters
away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the place where the late Mayor and
his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular
inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than three (3)
meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.

At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as
described above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor
Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire,
resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run
passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside
the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the
accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat.
Retreta is a relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He
tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that that happened again Mario."
Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain
peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking
snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena.
In a little while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena.
Raquepo advised Tabaco — "Mario relax ka lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood
face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt.
Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and
in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban
who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived
his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — injured
on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his
right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and right shoulder. But, the
three, did not file their complaints. 3
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant
is as follows:

Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the

maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan,
Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued
M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena
on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena
to make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the
said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and
were seen in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother
to verify as to why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of
his impressions that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate
of the cockpit would surly have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief
then that they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to
help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated
himself at the lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon
Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.

At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated
at the lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he
heard a gun report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be
known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning
shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena.
After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming
from different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to
leave and rush outside, holding his M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards.
As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta
and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to relax lang.
Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to
relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena
was nothing to said persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing,
Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and grabbed said
gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said gun went off,
hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of such
incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the family
of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused
surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by,
not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito
Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he surrendered, but
on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito
Raquepo.4

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant
guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of
accused-appellant, it found that:

From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense
cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the
Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject
victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco
 who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody
else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of
the cockpit arena.

In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. "Where
there are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search
for the truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be
used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony
for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial
evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908,
May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November
21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349,
November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180).

Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely:
Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to
death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo
Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito
Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3)
eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres
Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in
both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in the above findings of facts,
prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw the accused
Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in port arm position
directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at
the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun
shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton
and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman
Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which
was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well lighted at that time.

Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was
seen coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta
and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused
Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again Mario," while the latter told him —
"Mario relax ka lang keep calm." After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the
possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to
stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as
corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process of disarming the
accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge
Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo. 5

The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was
heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt.
Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.

The court a quo said further:

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it
had a magazine that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.

Q: Do you have the magazine now?

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.

Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?

A: Yes, sir, I examined it.

Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?

A: No live bullets, sir. (TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45,
March 26, 1990 session, stenographer L. Tamayo).

Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:

PROSECUTOR ATAL:

Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you

surrendered this gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live
ammunitions in the magazine?

A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.

Q: How many bullets in all?

A: Twenty, sir.

Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?

A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct

examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L.
Tamayo).

MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found

inside the cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158, record).

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know whose picture is this?

A: Picture of spent shells.

Q: How about Exh. "R-l", do you know what is this?

A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose
Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the
accused, is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily
surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin
Bautista (Exh. "S", p. 188, record).

Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending
case for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. "T", p. 187, record).

The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses
namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who
narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and
convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the
deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar
Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and
the late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).

Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo,

PC Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the
cockpit arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and
automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused
shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their
corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so
as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel,
147 SCRA 251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances
proved reasonable leads to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA
92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these
circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused,
as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very
nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and
under conditions where concealment is highly probable, and to require direct
testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and would deny the proper
protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).

As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author
of the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence
adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC
personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule
that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5(M), Rule 131,
Revised Rules of Court).

Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused,
even as it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.

The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he
could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the
cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower
elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot aforesaid
victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No.
2, inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
 The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they
saw the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the
group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at
the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could
have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit
west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face
with the accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera,
where the gun shot wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were
on the left portion of his forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his
left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound
No. 4, on his left thigh downward.

In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left
side of his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited
at the upper shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower
abdomen and his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of
the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2,
the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the
victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.

It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from
the gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface,
on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the
Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets
RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the
cemented railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high
so as to obviate the possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola,
especially as in this case, when the accused stood up from his seat and fired at his
victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on his face and right
abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard which
was hit by the bullets.

In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to
gunshot wounds — inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh.
"K").

The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify
against the accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and
positively identified.

All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge
Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo. 6

The dispositive part of the decision reads:

 WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear
judicial conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of all the crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge
Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving
four (4) murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one
Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code,
the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by
law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims — Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,000.00
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees if
collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. However, in
Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by
way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the
appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both without subsidiary
imprisonment in case insolvency.

2 In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused
Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10)
years and one (1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs
of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death
indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses
incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket
fees in case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. "K" and "K-2") the corpus delicti, presently deposited with
117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is
peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the
said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.

4. The accused to pay the costs.

5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29,
NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341;
People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).

SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours)

Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present
appeal on the following grounds:
 (1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in
connection with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and
Romeo Regunton.

(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of
Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.

(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant
Tabaco.

The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that
when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial
court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the
case of People vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:

In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or
the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted
in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger,
or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed
and reasoned verdict. 11

After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the
trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-
appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.

1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-
appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction
hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.

Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

COURT:

Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.

ATTY ARRIOLA:

Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?

 A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)

Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those
gun reports come from?

A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.

Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?

A: I had to seek shelter, sir.

Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir.

PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:

Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of
weapon did he use if you know?

A: M-14, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what

happened to Regunton?

A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.

Q: Was that all you gathered?

A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Three (3) shots, sir.

Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or

automatic?

A: Successive, sir.

Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was
seated on his right side?

A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun
when you first heard gun shot, will you please describe the stands
(position) of the accused?

A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing
on a forth (port) arm position).

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?

A: He fired the gun, sir.

Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?

A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and
returned, when you returned, what did you see?

A: I saw two dead persons, sir.

Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?

A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.

Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A: Less than a meter, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the
person passing as you mentioned?

A: They have similarity, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola,
you and your companions?

A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.

Q: Where were you facing?

A: We were facing south the arena.

Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

 A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.

Q: From what direction?

A: Infront of us, sir.

Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He was in the first row of seats.

Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: Somebody was killed, sir.

Q: Who was that?

A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: Many, sir.

ATTY. VILLENA:

Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature,
was there in succession or automatic?

A: Automatic, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: An army man, sir.

Q: How long have you been employed with the army?

A: Five (5) years, sir.

Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with a M-14 being fired?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you
run, would you say that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-
14 rifle?

A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.

Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun
shot?

A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12

On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was
on the first seat downward, is it not?

A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.

Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?

A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you
went to hide yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?

A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.

Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive
shot, is it not Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to

the first gun report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?

A: He passed by our back, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late
Mayor Arreola was shot?

A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.

Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13

For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:

ATTY. ARRIOLA

Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go

with Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.

Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the

cockpit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were they arranged?

A: In rows, step by step, sir.

COURT:

Q: How many rows?

A: Four rows, sir.

ATTY. ARRIOLA:

Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.

Q: And how about you?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.

Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective
position of the place where you stayed?

A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of
the fourth step, sir.

Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?

A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

 A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do

you remember if there was untoward incident that happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola,
sir.

Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late
Arreola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm?

A: M-14, sir.

Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot
him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?

A: Because I saw it, sir.

Q: What did you do also?

A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I

was also wounded.

Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened to him?

A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle I was also wounded."

Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".

Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.

 xxx xxx xxx

Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon
the person of Mayor Arreola?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena
did you see the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: Before the shooting, sir.

Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario
Tabaco for the first time prior to the shooting incident?

A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.

Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused
herein Mario Tabaco?

A: He sat on the first row of the seats.

Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the
cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?

A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.

COURT:

Q: How far?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.

Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the
western part of the cockpit?

A: A little to the west, sir.

Q: An you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the
western part of the cockpit?

A: We were on the northwest.

Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not

directly in front of you?

A: A little bit west of us, sir.

 Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your
position with the late Arreola on the northwest when you according to
you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he
allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you
mean?

A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.

Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction

where you were together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco
was on the floor of the cockpit arena?

A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.

Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the
accused Mario Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late
Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct examination you
immediately sought cover?

A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired
three (3) shots.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know
that Mayor Arreola was dead already?

A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already
dead.

Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards
Mayor Arreola?

A: Yes, sir, in our place.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: In our place, sir.

Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me
and told me that he was also hit.

xxx xxx xxx

 COURT:

Q: You don't know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.

Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir. 15

The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of
another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:

PROSECUTOR ABAD:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that
gun?

A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.

Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?

A: Inside the cockpit, sir.

Q: Where were you also?

A: I was at the stairs, sir.

Q: When you saw him what happened if any?

xxx xxx xxx

A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was
the time when I got down, sir.

Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.

Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?

A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench
between them, sir.

Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?

A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the
time I got down to hide myself, sir. 16

On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:

 ATTY. CONSIGNA:

Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you
heard gunfire?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside
the cockpit arena?

A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor
and the gun went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the
cockpit arena?

A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside. 17

Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the above-named
eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against
him. As between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the
bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to
greater weight than his bare denial and explanation. 18

Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any
ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against
accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well settled is the rule that where there is no evidence
and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit. 19

2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth
when they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-
Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-
mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the ex-mayor shows that the
assailant was on the same level as the ex-mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that
the assailant was at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit.
Appellant states that he was seated at the first row which was the lowest while the ex-mayor and
his companions were seated at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is
untenable.

Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of
the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed
his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them. 20

The above-quoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of
Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at
the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola
had a point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down
when his wound was inflicted. 21

Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of
Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and
policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the
gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit
arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming
from inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused
pointed his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting
him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who
was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.

Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in
part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of
March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant
rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from
inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he
noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at
the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance
and position, he heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant:
"What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position
from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle
of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and
also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun
from accused-appellant.

Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was
not as lucky.

Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt.
Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no
apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.

Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his
gun from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-
appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22

Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the
near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of
firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce,
is equivalent to criminal intent.

Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court
explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:

Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings
of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively,
should have been prosecuted under only one Information.

The law provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48,
Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People
vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of
murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4)
victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4)
murder victims.

The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst
of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a
complex crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a
single act of shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People
vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.

Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say — as the deaths
of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of
the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the
penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder,
the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely
taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's
sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs.
Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same
is hereby reduced to a single Penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4)
murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989).

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and
it appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito
Raquepo, was the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable
penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious
 offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal,
which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that
should be imposed, and which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is
10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day
of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical
expenses of Benito Raquepo.

It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN No. 1492932, "K-2" —
magazine of M-14 and Exh. "L" — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by
the accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-
16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five
(5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to
witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard
separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds
on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty
shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23

We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for
all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the
evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold water.

Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated
in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People
vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one
bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes,
resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces
two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet
expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the
prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine
gun. 28 He fired the weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously.
When the rifle was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several
spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People
vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the
ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case killed five persons with a
Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing
continuously. As stated therein:

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical
injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article.
Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short
space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each
death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct
and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for
as many offenses as those resulting from every single act that produced the same .
Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of
seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim,
respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the
 fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were
committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing
that would connect one of them with its companion offenses. (emphasis ours)

In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the
trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person
firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually.
Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. 30

The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case of Pineda provided us with a
definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art.
48, was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually
several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have
seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . . doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying
the applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated
in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be singularity of criminal act;
singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of
several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes
several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.
There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The
killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held
that:

Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.

Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is misplaced. The
doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual
deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond
a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for
each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated
Homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.