LICO.
COMELEC COMELEC SECOND DIVISION:
GR 205505 September 29, 2015
TICKLER: Two rival groups (Lico Group and Rimas Group) within
the same party-list, Andhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba
(Ating Koop)
FACTS:
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party list. Its highest
policymaking body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National
Convention is not in session
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation to Participate in the Party-
List System for the 2010 elections, the list of its nominees
composed of petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto
Mascarina as second nominee. COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as one of the winning party-list groups. Petitioner Lico
subsequently took his oath and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation, Ating Koop issued a
Resolution, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement.
Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.
In 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention,
during which it introduced amendments to its Constitution and
By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of
the Central
 Committee.
Almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the
Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for
disloyalty. Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement
is a factual basis for disloyalty and cause for his expulsion.
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was
pending, the Lico Group held a special meeting in Cebu City. At
the said meeting, new members of the Central Committee, as
well as a new set of officers, were elected.18 The election was
purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-5-5
equal representation amendment.
The Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in
Parañaque, at which a new Central Committee and a new set
of officers were constituted. Members of the Rimas Group won
the election and occupied all the corresponding seats.
The Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico. It prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second
nominee, Roberto Mascarina. An amended petition was filed,
impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group.
It also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election
conducted at the Cebu meeting and recognize the Paranaque
convention.
upheld the expulsion of and declared Mascarina as the duly
qualified nominee. It characterized the issue of the validity of
the expulsion of petitioner Lico as an intra-party leadership
dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to
register political
parties.
COMLEC EN BANC:
Dismissed the petition for expulsion of Lico in the HR for lack
of jurisdiction, upheld the expulsion of Lico in the party list as
well as the Lico Group.
His expulsion from Ating Koop affected his
qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that
had jurisdiction over the Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that
when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating
Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over
capacity even after their terms had expired. Finally, the
COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the
legitimate representative of Ating Koop
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the expulsion of Lico
in the HR as well as in the party-list?
HELD:
The HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case
upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating
Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his
oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives.
Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction
over the disqualification case.
The Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop,
which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide
member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona
fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing
qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for public
office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements.
They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's
entire tenure
We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be
recognized, and that it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. Indeed, the
COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership
within the party is well established. This power to rule upon
questions of party identity and leadership is exercised
by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers
We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of
Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the amendments
to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not
registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections
held during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference
pursuant to the said amendments, were valid.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the
latter's approval must be obtained through its agent, the
COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC, We declared
that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that breathes
life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is
that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal
contracts entered into by the party-list organization and its
members - the Constitution and By-laws - such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation
requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An
amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization should
become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.
The Lokin case, however, involved nominees and not
incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact
that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of
his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
LOKIN VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808 June 26, 2012
TICKLER: acting-secretary general
FACTS:
CIBAC is a party-list with platform to fight graft and corruption
and to promote ethical conduct in the country’s public service.
It is under the leadership of the National Council, its highest
policymaking and governing body.
Two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC,
submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent in the
2010 Elections. The first was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla,
who claimed to be the party’s acting secretary- general and
another by respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia
Jose as the party’s vice-president and secretary-general,
respectively.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course
to CIBAC’s Manifestation, without prejudice to the
determination which of the two factions.
Respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel
J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC
to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was
certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. Pia Derla submitted
a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners
Luis Lokin, Jr. and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla
affixed to the certification her signature as "acting secretary-
general" of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and
Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC
a "Petition to Expunge from the Records and/or for
Disqualification," seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by
Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented
herself.
The COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the
Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and
declared respondents’ faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.
This was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file
the party’s Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate
matter, exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts,
and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction?
HELD:
This Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period (Petition for Certiorari)
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over cases pertaining to party
leadership and the nomination of party-list representatives.
Petitioners contend that the COMELEC never should have
taken cognizance of respondents’ Petition to Expunge and/or
for Disqualification. They have reached this conclusion by
characterizing the present matter as an intra-corporate
dispute and, thus, cognizable only by special commercial
courts.
Derla purportedly filed the Certificate of Nomination pursuant
to the authority granted by the Board of Trustees of the "CIBAC
Foundation, Inc.
Thus, petitioners insist that the group that participated in the
party-list system in the 2004 and 2007 elections was the SEC-
registered entity, and not the National Council, which had
allegedly become defunct since 2003. That was the year when
CIBAC Foundation, Inc. was established and registered with the
SEC.21 On the other hand, respondents counter that the
foundation was established solely for the purpose of acting as
CIBAC’s legal and financial arm, as provided by the party’s
Constitution and bylaws. It was never intended to substitute
for, or oust CIBAC, the party-list itself.
Even as petitioners insisted on the purely intra-corporate
nature of the conflict between "CIBAC Foundation" and the
CIBAC Sectoral Party, they submitted their Certificate of
Nomination and Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
party-list elections. Precisely, petitioners were seeking the
COMELEC’s approval of their eligibility to participate in the
upcoming party-list elections. In effect, they invoke its
authority under the Party-List System Act.
Contrary to their stance that the present dispute stemmed
from an intra-corporate matter, their submissions even
recognize the COMELEC’s constitutional power to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.24 More
specifically, as one of its constitutional functions, the COMELEC
is also tasked to "register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government."
In any case, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to settle the struggle
for leadership within the party is well established. This singular
power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership
is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement
powers
ESTRELLA VS. COMELEC
GR No. 160465 May 27, 2004
TICKLER: Piece meal participation
FACTS:
Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification of the Status Quo
Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc.
In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc, five of the
then incumbent seven members of the COMELEC participated.
Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion voted
for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner Borra
dissented.
Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited in SPR No. 21-2002,
a case pending before the COMELEC Second Division involving
the same parties, thus necessitating the issuance of an order
designating Commissioner Borra as his substitute.
In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order, Commissioner
Lantion stated in his handwriting that "his previous voluntary
inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not in the EAC" and that
"as further agreed in the Second Division, [he] will not
participate in the Division deliberations but will vote when the
case is elevated [to the] en banc.
ISSUE:
W/N the COMELEC Resolution of the Status Quo Ante Order is
valid?
HELD:
Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it
allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation.
To allow him to participate in the En Bancproceedings when he
previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but
legally improper and absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in
the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3)
members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4)
or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained.
The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order, as
required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
Private respondent argues that "[f]ollowing the doctrine laid
out in Cua, three (3) votes would have been sufficient to
constitute a majority to carry the decision of the COMELEC En
Banc as provided by the Constitution and the appropriate
rules."
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the
majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules
of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained.5 Since the above-quoted
constitutional provision states "all of its members," without
any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the
Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from
the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just
three (3) votes out of "all" seven (7) members of the COMELEC.
Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of the
members who participated or deliberated, it would have
clearly phrased it that way as it did. This Court hereby
abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the
COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought
before it by a majority vote of "all its members,"and NOT
majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.
SEVILLA VS. COMELEC
TICKLER: 3-3 voting
FACTS:
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City. The Board of
Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner.
So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that
Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities
in all the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual
revision of the ballots.
The MeTC issued an Order dismissing the election protest. So
filed a motion for reconsideration from, the MeTC denied the
motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading.
So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.
The COMELEC Second Division granted So’s petition. The
COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s ruling in its October 6, 2012 Resolution
In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition
was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that the October 6, 2012
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc was not a majority
decision considering that three Commissioners voted for the
denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others
voted to grant the same.
So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was
deliberated upon only by six (6) Commissioners because the
7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the
President at that time. Considering that the October 6, 2012
Resolution was not a majority decision by the COMELEC En
Banc, So prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be
remanded to the COMELEC for a rehearing by a full and
complete Commission
ISSUE:
W/N the Resolution of the COMELEC En banc has legal effect?
HELD:
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that "each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members,
any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution
In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution of
the COMELEC en banc appears to have affirmed the COMELEC
Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied Sevilla’s
motion for reconsideration, the equally divided voting
between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require for
a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except to convey that the COMELEC failed to reach
a decision and that further action is required.
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally
divided among the members of the COMELEC en banc, Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandates a
rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and
convince the members of the COMELEC en banc of the merit
of their case
A consultation is a "deliberation of persons on some subject;;"
hence, a re-consultation means a second deliberation of
persons on some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a "second consideration of cause for
purpose of calling to court’s or administrative board’s
attention any error, omission, or oversight in first
consideration. A retrial of issues presumes notice to parties
entitled thereto and opportunity for them to be heard."
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional
evidence, if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their
arguments; whereas, a re-consultation involves a re-
evaluation of the issues and arguments already on hand only
by the members of the tribunal, without the participation of
the parties.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a
majority in the En Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The
Resolution served no more than a record of voters, lacking in
legal effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First
Division Resolution. According, the COMELEC did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing
IBRAHIM VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor
of Datu-Unsay. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas, then
Acting Election Officer, forwarded to the COMELEC’s Law
Department candidates who were not registered voters
therein. The list included Ibrahim’s name.
The Law Department recommended the retention of the said
names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC
to motu propio institute actions against them for
disqualification and for violation of election laws.
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed
Resolution:
1. to disqualify the f candidates for not being registered
voters of the respective municipalities without
prejudice to their filing of an opposition within two (2)
days from publication hereof; and
2. to file election offense cases against said candidates
Ibrahim filed a Petition/Opposition to assail the Resolution.
This was denied by the COMELEC En Banc.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the
Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality,
Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast.
However, the Board of Canvassers suspended his
proclamation.
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment,14 the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for the instant
Petition to be granted:
1. Ibrahim was disqualified as a candidate without prior
notice and hearing and he was given the chance to file an
opposition only after the issuance of the Resolution
2. Jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of
candidacy pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division and
not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can
only take cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of
candidacy when the required number of votes for a
division to reach a decision, ruling, order or resolution is
not obtained, or when motions for reconsideration are
filed to assail the said issuances of a division.
3. Generally, the COMELEC cannot motu propio file petitions
for disqualification against candidates. However, provides
the only exception to the foregoing, to wit, that
certificates of candidacy of those running for the positions
of President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-List maybe
denied due course
4. The MBOC had no authority to order the suspension of
Ibrahim’s proclamation. Upon motion, the suspension of a
winning candidate’s proclamation can be ordered during
the pendency of a disqualification case before the
COMELEC. However, only the COMELEC, as a tribunal, has
the authority to issue orders relative to cases pending
before it. The MBOC cannot substitute its own judgment
for that of the COMELEC’s. The MBOC can suspend a
winning candidate’s proclamation only when an actual
issue within the Board’s jurisdiction arises in the course of
conducting a canvass
COMELEC:
Ibrahim’s name was not stricken off from the certified list of
candidates during the May 10, 2010 elections and the votes
cast for him were counted. Hence, no actual prejudice was
caused upon him as the COMELEC did not even direct the
MBOC to suspend his proclamation. It was the MBOC’s ruling
which resulted to the suspension of his proclamation. Such
being the case, Ibrahim should have instead filed a pre-
proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on
the supposed illegality of the MBOC’s proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it issued the Resolutions?
HELD:
A pre-proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 of the
OEC as referring to "any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition
of parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or
any matter raised under Sections 233,31 234,32 23533 and
23634 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns." Section 243
of the OEC restrictively enumerates as follows the issues which
can be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
canvassers;;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete,
contain material defects, appear to be tampered with
or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same
returns or in other authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this
Code;;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic;; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in
controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of
the aggrieved candidate or candidates.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated
December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality
by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules
of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing
before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do
not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns or to the composition and proceedings of the board of
canvassers. What the instant Petition challenges is the
authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and
of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The
crux of the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can
be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.
The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify
Ibrahim as a candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor of Datu
Unsay.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition
to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC
sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may
only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order
or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only
motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings
of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en
banc.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the
exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which
the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this
case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a
petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the
lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election.
The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because
it denies due process to the candidate
In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein
assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s disqualification even
when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it
be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a
petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which
should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that
his allegedly being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay
disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor.
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to
ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting while
all other questions are to be tried before the court or other
tribunal for contesting elections or in quo warranto
proceedings.
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu propio suspended Ibrahim’s
proclamation when the issue of the latter’s eligibility is a
matter which the board has no authority to resolve. Further,
under Section 644 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC and not the
MBOC has the authority to order the suspension of a winning
candidates’s proclamation. Such suspension can only be
ordered upon the motion of a complainant or intervenor
relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy pending before the
COMELEC, and only when the evidence of the winning
candidate’s guilt is strong.
JARAMILLA VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Antonio Suyat and Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position
of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates as well as 8
members of the Sangguniang. In the tabulated results, it is
shown that respondent Suyat obtained 4,779 votes and was
ranked no. 9 while Jaramilla ranked 8.
Upon review, Suyat discovered that Jaramilla was credited
with only 23 votes per Election Return from Precinct No. 34A1.
However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement
of Votes by Precinct, petitioner was credited with 73 votes
which is 50 votes more than what he actually obtained. If the
entry were to be corrected, the affected candidates would be,
Suyat will ranked 8 while Jaramilla will be the 9th.
Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a
Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. This was granted by
the COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE:
W/N COMELEC en banc can validly grant the said petition?
HELD:
Election cases including pre-proclamation controversies
should first be heard and decided by a division of the
COMELEC, and then by the commission en banc if a motion for
reconsideration of the division is filed.
It must be noted however that this provision applies only in
cases where the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers, and not when it merely exercises purely
administrative functions.
Accordingly, when the case demands only the exercise by the
COMELEC of its administrative functions, such as the
correction of a manifest mistake in the addition of votes or an
erroneous tabulation in the statement of votes, the COMELEC
en banc can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional
function to decide questions affecting elections.
The Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors in the case at bar
alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election
return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Such an error in
the tabulation of the results, which merely requires a clerical
correction without the necessity of opening ballot boxes or
examining ballots, demands only the exercise of the
administrative power of the COMELEC. Hence, the Commission
en banc properly assumed original jurisdiction over the
aforesaid petition.
CAGAS VS. COMELEC
TICKLER: Creation of Davao Occidental
FACTS:
Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative
district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista,
House Bill No. 4451, a bill creating the province of Davao
Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic Act
No. 10360.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the
holding of a plebiscite. “plebiscite to be conducted and
supervised by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within
sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.”
R.A. No. 10360 was passed by the House of Representatives on
28 November 2012, and by the Senate on 5 December 2012.
President Benigno S. Aquino III approved R.A. No. 10360 on 14
January 2013.2 R.A. No. 10360 was published in the Philippine
Star and the Manila Bulletin only on 21 January 2013.
Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect 15 days after
its publication in at least two newspapers of general and local
circulation,3COMELEC, therefore, only had until 6 April 2013 to
conduct the plebiscite.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A.
No. 10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all
plebiscites as a matter of policy and in view of the preparations
for the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC extended the policy on suspension of the
holding of plebiscites by resolving to defer action on the
holding of all plebiscites until after the 28 October 2013
Barangay Elections. During a meeting, the COMELEC decided
to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental
simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections
to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition:
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to AMEND or
MODIFY Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by mere MINUTE
RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS who can validly
amend, repel [sic] or modify existing laws.
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to hold a
plebiscite this coming October 28, 2013 because Section 46 of
Republic Act No. 10360 has already lapsed.
ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October
2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
HELD:
The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the
power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed
by law.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360, however, specifically provides
that the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental be held within 60 days from the effectivity of R.A.
No. 10360, or until 6 April 2013. Cagas claims that R.A. No.
10360 "did not confer express or implied power to COMELEC
to exercise discretion when the plebiscite for the creation of
the Province of Davao Occidental will be held. On the contrary,
said law provides a specific period when the COMELEC should
conduct a plebiscite." Cagas views the period "60 days from
the effectivity" in R.A. No. 10360 as absolute and mandatory;;
The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly
and honest elections." The text and intent of Section 2(1) of
Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and
incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."Sections
5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus
Election Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set
elections to another date.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with
the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on
13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered
impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the
province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as
scheduled in R.A. No. 10360
The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so
close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and
unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881.
The COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October
2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
FRANCISCO VS. COMELEC
TICKLER: Prior judgment – Poe doctrine
FACTS:
Nieto was elected as mayor of Cainta, Rizal in 2013. Nieto filed
a certificate of candidacy to signify his bid for re-election for
the 2016 National and Local Elections.
Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Disqualification against Nieto, respondent made financial
contributions out of the government coffers for the asphalt-
paving of the road entrance along Imelda Avenue of Cainta
Green Park Village. This, according to petitioner, amounted to
the expending of public funds within forty-five (45) days before
the 2016 polls and to illegal contributions for road repairs.
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the Petition, it is clear
that a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding
that he or she is suffering from a disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution. To be sure, in order to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of
a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution. The same was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC acted in grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that a petition for disqualification under
Sec. 68 of the OEC cannot prosper without a prior judgment
finding the respondent guilty of an election offense? 

HELD:
Petitioner is correct in his contention that a prior judgment is
not a precondition to filing a Petition for Disqualification.
1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests, thus removing any vestige of exercising its
adjudicatory power as a court and correctly aligning it with
what it is a quasi-judicial body.
 As enunciated, the
COMELEC's adjudicative function over election contests is
quasi-judicial in character since the COMELEC is a
governmental body, other than a court, that is vested with
jurisdiction to decide the specific class of controversies it Is
charged with resolving. In adjudicating the rights of persons
before it, the COMELEC is not just empowered but is in fact
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion
in a judicial nature. This is simply in congruence with the
concept of due process that all administrative adjudicatory
bodies are enjoined to observe.
The COMELEC is, thus, fully-clothed with authority to make
factual determinations in relation to the election contests
before it. This has been the thrust of the decade’s worth of
constitutional revisions that transformed the COMELEC from a
purely administrative body, whose scope of decision making is
limited to those incidental to its duty to enforce election laws,
to a polling commission that also exercises original and
exclusive, as well as appellate, jurisdiction over election
contests.
Considering the historical evolution of the COMELEC, the Court
now declares that the polling body has full adjudicatory
powers to resolve election contests outside the jurisdiction of
the electoral tribunals. To rule otherwise would be an act of
regression, contrary to the intent behind the constitutional
innovations creating and further strengthening the
Commission. There is no novelty in this pronouncement, but
merely a reinstatement of Our consistent jurisprudence prior
to Poe.
It must be stressed that there is a world of difference between
the remedies availed of in Poe and in the instant case. What is
involved herein is a Petition for Disqualification under Sec. 68
of the OEC, whereas Poe was initiated by multiple Petitions to
Deny Due Course or Cancel COC under Sec. 78 of the OEC.
that there be a prior final judgment; it is sufficient that the
Commission itself made the determination. The conjunction
"or" separating "competent court" and "the Commission"
could only mean that the legislative intent was for bot/1
bodies to be clothed with authority to ascertain whether or
not there is evidence that the respondent candidate ought to
be disqualified.
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well
as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the
ascertainment of the guilt or innocence of the accused
candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a
full-blown hearing and the quantum of proof required to
secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral
aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the
offender should be disqualified from office. This is done
through an administrative proceeding which is summary in
character and requires only a clear preponderance of
evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, petitions for disqualification "shall be heard
summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we
are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate
may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.

The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec.

68 of the OEC is to bar an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office based not
on the candidate's lack of qualification, but on his possession
of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a
competent court, or as found by the Commission. The
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited
to those enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC.

Meanwhile, for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC

under Sec. 78 of the OEC to prosper, the candidate must have
made a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or
qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as
the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal
qualification necessary to run for elective office26 enumerated
under Sec. 74 of the OEC.27 Moreover, the false
representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.28 The relief is granted
not because of the candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but
because of his or her false misrepresentation of possessing the
statutory qualifications.

The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for

Disqualification. A prior court judgment is not required
before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC can prosper. This
is highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates of
two scenarios: first, there is a final decision by a competent
court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense and
second, it is the Commission itself that found that the
candidate committed any of the enumerated prohibited acts.
Noteworthy is that in the second scenario, it is not required