First Issue:
Labo vs. COMELEC No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15,
Facts:
For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino
ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City
on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections.
Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC
for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification
proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the
ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed
resolution denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order
which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9,
1992, the Commission resolves that the decision
promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent
Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only
after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18,
Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be
voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on
May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in
the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either
on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu
proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event
he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.On
May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for
review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992
resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment
declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent
Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he
wins in the contested elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the
fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already
become final and executory.Petitioner Ortega submits that
since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order
as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent
Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said
resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega
further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission
shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes
is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the
candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of
votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor
of Baguio City.
Held:
1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already
become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14,
1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner
Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992
and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this
Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on
the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired
finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his
proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner
Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental
qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship
is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the
electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not
necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with
the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the
Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest
number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the
electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was
then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his
subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by
the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally
filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as
SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s
(Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of
Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then,
was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon,
the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain
the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE
ESTUYE, respondents.
FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988.
the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter,
League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo
In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that
he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative
defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections
decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the
case for hearing on the merits. His motion for
reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be
set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the
petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing
on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same
time required comments from the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines
at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial
governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this
petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
HELD : The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article
XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance
at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI,
Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance
at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of
the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications,
a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the
following certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have
done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical
acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of
candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the
formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been
convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner
had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by
legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission
on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-
taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of
governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during
her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality,
would she have a right to remain in office simply because
the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten
days from her proclamation? It has been established, and
not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive
allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected
by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this
case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our
laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be
lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties
and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act,
the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now Divine Word
University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in
Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila
during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when
he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected
as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered
as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of
the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in
an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of
the First District of Leyte.
HELD: Residence is used synonymously with domicile for
election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of
7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s
domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not
mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married
late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after
the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her
domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,
the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election,
Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro,
respondents
Sept, 18, 1995.
Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created)
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate
of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts.,
Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for
a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8,
1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to
1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino,
with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with
35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the
Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for
the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May
15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile
of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the
COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood
as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was
applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require residence in the place not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections.
… Makati City.
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from
the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that
resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
… Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to
have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of
establishing residence in a given area for
meeting election law requirements, this defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through
assent of voters those most cognizantand sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of
the period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.
2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the
district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino
should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in
the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11,
1992) election indicates that he was a resident and
a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more
than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and
his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the
same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice
as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception,
Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati
City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit
in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home in Makati City is evident in his leasing
a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short
length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and
the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of
other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to
acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as
a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile
from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission
on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the
district.
Decision
Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the
next highest number of votes in the congressional
elections of Second district of Makati City made
permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the
disqualification issue involving congressional candidates
after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination
reserved with the house of representatives electional
tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
ceased in the instant case after the elections and the
remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which
is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision
despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of
jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming
arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the
residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is
contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and
jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal
impossibility of enforcing the one year residency
requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created
political districts which were only existing for less than a
year at the time of the election and barely four months in
the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of
the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second
place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the
electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as
substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by
suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was
executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR,
by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a
oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a
domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot
be better.
MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was
declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This
district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He
was elected Representative as a domiciliary
of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative
district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second
term as Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to
be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct
legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility
of PuertoPrincesa City residents from voting for
candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the
position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his
Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio
Maligaya,Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He
subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and
Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to
deny due course or to cancel Mitra’s COC.
Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of
Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor
of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not
misrepresent himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor
of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a
vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a
convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of
effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the
validity of his representation on this point in his COC.
Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally
acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his
COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."
JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO
G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012
Ponente: Abad
Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a
reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province
FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He
migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and
acquired Australian citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the
Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of
reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration
and he renounced his Australian citizenship.
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the
barangay captain, opposed the registration. COMELEC
approved the application and included Jalosjos in the
voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at
the RTC.
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010
elections. Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the
ground of failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back
to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his
brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim
Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that
petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide
intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
HELD:
NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully
proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship
and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to
Zamboanga Sibugay.
The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the
elections. For the purposes of election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile: i.e.
he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place,
but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
The question of residence is a question of intention. To
determine compliance with the residency/domicile
requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines:
 (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere;
(b) where once established, that domicile remains until
he acquires a new one; and
(c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon
city. When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia
became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. On
the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in
November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to
change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that
country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived
nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in
Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation
of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a
man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come
to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying
at his brother's house. A candidate is not required to have
a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in
that place. It is enough that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where
he lives would make property a qualification for public
office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things:
actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it
his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors
who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he
presented correspondence with political leaders and local
and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered
voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court also noted
that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond
in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a
doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS
ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified
petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y.
ESTRELLADA, Respondents.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor
of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010
elections on 20 November 2009. She indicated therein her
place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality
of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
However the private respondents filed a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in
which they argued that she had falsely represented her
place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born
in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned
her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
On her side the petitioner averred that she had established
her residence in the said Barangay since December 2008
when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she
had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Yap while
the construction of her house was still on going. She also
asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed
by her secretary and nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the
declaration of the place of birth is not a material
misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification,
because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law.
Election day came and the petitioner garnered the highest
number of votes and won the post of the mayor while the
petition for the cancellation of the COC remained pending.
On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly
elected municipal mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that
respondent was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19
August 2010 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of
the Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her
CoC.
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner complied with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.
HELD: Petitioner failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public
office, residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly,
Nuval v. Gura held as follows:
The term ‘residence’ as so used, is
synonymous with ‘domicile’ which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
There are three requisites for a person to acquire
a new domicile by choice. First, residence or bodily
presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain
there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile.
These circumstances must be established by clear
and positive proof, as held in Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC and subsequently in Dumpit Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive
proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with
evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
Moreover, even if these requisites are established
by clear and positive proof, the date of acquisition of the
domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be
established to be within at least one year prior to the
elections using the same standard of evidence. In the
instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by
clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections. There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of
Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,
Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan,
Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew
petitioner to be an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008. However, they declared in the same
Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her
house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas. Second,
construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and
Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction
was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that
six months before the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner
had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas. Third, the
same construction workers admitted that petitioner only
visited Baliangao occasionally when they stated that “at
times when she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to
stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her residential house
was being constructed.”
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the
Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not and never had
been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of
all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and
developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and
that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she
wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the
house. Assuming that the claim of property ownership of
petitioner is true, Fernandez v. COMELEC has established
that the ownership of a house or some other property
does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true
in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily
presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least
a year before the elections, to wit: To use ownership of
property in the district as the determinative indicium of
permanence of domicile or residence implies that the
landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a
property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on
07 September 2010 is hereby LIFTED.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective
Officials, Moral Turpitude)
Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction
of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from
running for any elective local position – i.e. “when the
conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.”
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution,
declared petitioner disqualified from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that
petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral
turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as
the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended
the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other
legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all
the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the
coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an
element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that “the
accused knows or should have known that the said article,
item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by
the “fence” of the fact that property received as stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in
the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree,
both the “fence” and the actual perpetrator/s of the
robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful dominion for gain
– thus deliberately reneging the process “private duties”
they owe their “fellowmen” in a manner “contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals.”
Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral
turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle
that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes
mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or
does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or
as mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstance
PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents.
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Disqualification (Sec 40, LGC; “Moral Turpitude”)
FACTS: Petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas
were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First
District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman
on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28,
2001.
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC Davao del Sur, a
consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the
latter’s certificate of candidacy due to the fact that Villaber
was convicted by the RTC for violation of BP22 and was
sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The check that
bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further
alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence,
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is
disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with
this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
CA’s Decision. However, in its Resolution of October 26,
1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On
February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and
executory. Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false
material representation in his certificate of candidacy that
he is “Eligible for the office I seek to be elected” – which
false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the
said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered
mainly that his conviction has not become final and
executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded
to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.
Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was
already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his
disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not
involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective
position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC,
Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC finding merit in Cagas’
petition, issued the challenged Resolution declaring Villaber
disqualified as “a candidate for and from holding any
elective public office” and canceling his certificate of
candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for
violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following
the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of
People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in
a Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD: The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying
petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman,
the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides:
“Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months,
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
“The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.”
As to the meaning of “moral turpitude,” we have
consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in
the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
In In re Vinzon,the term “moral turpitude” is considered as
encompassing “everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, or good morals.”
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on
Elections that “not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude,” and that “as to what crime involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine.”We
further pronounced therein that:
“…in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC, the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on the circumstances surrounding the case.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he
was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not
the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by
analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which
involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the
following Information:
“That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren
D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine
Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated
February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount
of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time
of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check, when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.” (Emphasis ours)
The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or
she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral
turpitude. We held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg.
22 “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person….”Thus, paraphrasing
Black’s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow
men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
URBANO M. MORENO vs. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168550. August 10, 2006
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify
Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground
that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her
petition and disqualified Moreno. Moreno filed an answer
averring that the petition states no cause of action because
he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the
case of Baclayon v. Mutia, the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was
thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16
of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final
discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed.
However, the Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code which provides that those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective
local position. Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on
this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of
probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of
his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification
under the Local Government Code applies only to those
who have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law which
applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that
he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his
previous misconduct.
ISSUE: Does Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run
in public office?
HELD: Yes. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he
final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore
to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon
the court's finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result
of his conviction were restored to him, including the right
to run for public office.
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a
penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite
of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the
Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code
is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law
is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It
is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute,
general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior
special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute.
G.R. No. 193237 : October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS,
JR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193536
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner, v. DOMINADOR G.
JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:
Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan
City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to
deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false
material representation in his certificate of candidacy when
he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of
Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate
of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by final
judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted
his conviction but stated that he had already been granted
probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked
Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987.
Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an
Order dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had
duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further
stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied
a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same
grounds.
Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found Jalosjos and his co-
accused guilty of. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed and after
several years filed a Petition for Probation. It was granted
but then, on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos’
probation was revoked and a warrant for his arrest was
issued. Surprisingly, the Parole and Probation Administrator
Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that
respondent Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation. The said Certification was the
one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of
the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa. The
Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan found
Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and
Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December
19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had
fully complied with the terms and conditions of his
probation.
The COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and
cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed
committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible
for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not
by reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the
sentence of which he has not yet served. the COMELEC En
Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration.
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to
hold public office. His proclamation as the elected mayor in
the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission
of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality,
and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
Jalosjos filed his petition on August 21, 2010, docketed as
G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed his petition on
September 17, 2010, docketed G.R. No. 193536. On
February 22, 2011, the Court issued a resolution dismissing
the former resolution. ( G.R. No. 193237). Cardino filed a
Manifestation on March 17, 2011 praying that the Court
take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R.No. 193237.
Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 22,
2011.
On March 29, 2011, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos then filed a
Manifestation on June 1, 2012 which stated that “he
resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan
effective April 30, 2012, which resignation was accepted by
the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty.
Roalando E. Yebes.” Jalosjos’ resignation was made “in
deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jalosjos make a false statement of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he stated
under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that perpetual special
disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving
eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was
not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate
at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a
result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor. A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material
representation which is a ground for a petition under
Section 78 of the same Code. Conviction for robbery by final
judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which
perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of
law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because
robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section
68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only
to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and
not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws
other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a
ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de
Venecia, the Court declared: The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All
other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in
nature.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material
representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión
mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also
be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to
anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt belongs
to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of
ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid
candidacy, and much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was
ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. . The law itself
bars the convict from running for public office, and the
disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies
tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Thus, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is
DENIED, and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED.
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted
former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that
he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political
arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government
Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification
holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon
him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he
be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms
to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of
suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her
intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited
by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII
and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of
the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along
with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions
that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3)
cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it
can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute
cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that
“(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,”
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if
we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC
was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon
granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section
40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of
the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and
hold any public office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate
to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former
President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or
preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at
issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It
is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation
much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to
the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-
Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents - G.R.
No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran
as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City
of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and
assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election.
Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits
filed by his opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his
position.
Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from
running for any elective position since he had been
“removed from office as a result of an administrative case”
pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995.
Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995,
petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May
1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for
the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.
COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
said resolution was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition
for disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do
not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.
The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing
rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not
override, but instead remain consistent with and in
harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry
out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law
itself cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement,
employed the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and
highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the
word “shall” in its rules.
REYES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996
FACTS:
Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an
administrative complaint against incumbent Mayor Reyes
of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes
exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall
holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain
checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and
Development Program of the DILG were never received by
the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of
accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of
cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the
charges and ordered his removal from office.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the
Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an
order for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and to turn
over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused
to accept the service of the order.
Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Comelec but a petition for disqualification was filed against
him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyes’s certificate of
candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the
Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly
disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his
proclamation as municipal mayor. Hence the petition in
G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging
grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground
that the decision in the administrative case against
petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and
therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification.
Invoking the ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos,
petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar
to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to
Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The
Comelec en banc denied Garcia’s prayer.
ISSUES:
1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not
yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.
2. WON petitioner’s reelection rendered the administrative
charges against him moot and academic
3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified.
HELD:
1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of
petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated
attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes
personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to
receive the decision. If a judgment or decision is not
delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service
is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be
considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the
attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for
his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyes’s refusal to
receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a
waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather
than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner
did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30
days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the
elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The
filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent
the administrative decision from attaining finality. An
original action of certiorari is an independent action and
does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the
running of the reglementary period involved in the
proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action
during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there
must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower
court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining
order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary
injunction was subsequently issued. The temporary
restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that
moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service
of the decision upon petitioner.
2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could
not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior
term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of
the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because
in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of
the administrative decision removing petitioner could be
decided, the term of office during which the alleged
misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot
extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public official is not
removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer
be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.
This is the rationale for the ruling in the two Aguinaldo
cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here,
although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the
decision in the administrative case, the temporary
restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed,
with the result that the decision was served on petitioner
and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He
was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40
(b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from
running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were
decided there was no provision similar to § 40 (b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective
position on the ground that he has been removed as a result
of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient
opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so.
Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be
presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But
on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that
this was because he had filed a motion for postponement
and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the
pattern of delay he employed to render the case against
him moot by his election.
3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received the other votes would
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The
second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or
plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes
cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief
that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be
treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent
finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of
the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
● Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the
service of final orders and judgments either personally or by
mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or
constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a
copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it
in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his
residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon petitioner’s
counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also
made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the
decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed
completed five days after the last notice to him on March
27, 1995.
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for
reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed
and the judgment or decision will be considered validly
served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver
it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel’s
refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioner’s counsel knew that a decision in the
administrative case had been rendered is evident in his
effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and
his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional
Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision
may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have
a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the
party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is
duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to
protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or
apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision
becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of
a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite
party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him
to its legal effect.
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of
the decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the
service, he should have received the decision and taken an
appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A.
No. 7160, § 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly,
the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the
first service upon petitioner.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May
26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were
both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11,
1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the
facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino
and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared
Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective
position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en
banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed.
Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship
when he attained the age of majority and registered himself
as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano
was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City
on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold
public elective office in the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the application of the different laws of two or more states,
a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an
individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution
provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of
which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their
status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of
view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual
has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That
is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization
takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other
country or government and solemnly declares that he owes
his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization
Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative
of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of
respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated
his American citizenship and anything which he may have
said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance
to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of
Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss
of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Eugenio Eusebio Lopez vs. COMELEC - 23 July 2008 GR No.
182701
FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for
the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio,
Iloilo City held on October 29, 2007. He was eventually
declared the winner.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition
before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of
Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez because he
was ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He
said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay
Chairman.
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez from
running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to
qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have
made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez
resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him
from running and assuming the office of Barangay
Chairman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC for disqualifying petitioner.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the
Barangay elections of 2007.
Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship.
He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before
those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a
public office in the Philippines.
Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws
of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of
the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance
before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s
Office in Los Angeles, California; the same is not enough to
allow him to run for a public office.
Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as
proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the
contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of law.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been
born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December
13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing
to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225
otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved
and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before
the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated
September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an
Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La
Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again
sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this
time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the
highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13,
2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar,
Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8 (private
respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and
that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that
since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian
citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently
complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act
of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her
Australian citizenship.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring
Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of vice
mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as
the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but
the appeal was dismissed y the second division and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an
Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no longer
held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when
she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007
elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship" imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply
to her.
Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective
office due to failure to renounce her Australian Citizenship
in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
Ruling:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian
citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the
same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of
Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer
oath.
The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her
Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath
before any public officer authorized to administer it
rendering the act of Condon void.
Maquiling vs. COMELEC
Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.
However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of USA, he lost his Filipino
citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegianceto the RP on
10 July 2008. On the same day an order of approval of his
citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued in his
favour. In 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to
RP and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del
Norte. Respondent Linog Balua, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and
presented a record indicating that Arnado has been using
his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.
COMELEC issued an order requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer. After Arnado failed to answer the
petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. In 2010
election, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and
was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for
Mayor. It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed
his answer. COMELEC first division ruled for his
disqualification. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate
for mayor of Kausawagan, and who garnered the second
highest number of votes, intervened in the case and filed
before the COMELEC En Banc a motion for reconsideration
claiming that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and
the nullification of his proclamation, him, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest lawful votes should be
proclaimed as the winner. COMELEC En Banc held that it
shall continue with the trial and hearing. However, it
reversed and set aside the ruling of first division and
granted Arnado’s MR. Maquiling filed the instant petition
questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to
run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that he be proclaimed as the winner
in the 2010 mayoralty race.
Issue: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amount to undoing a
renunciation earlier made.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the use of foreign
passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s
nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath
of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an
elective position. Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions: xxxx (2)Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. xxx Rommel Arnado took all the
necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took
the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign
citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, he became eligible to run for public office. By
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be
solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing
the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office. Between 03
April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship,
and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used
his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the
affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using
his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring
before immigration authorities of both countries that he is
an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges
granted by the United States of America. The renunciation
of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the
foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted
the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is
not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No.
63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado
used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days
after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted
his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself
of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America." We agree with
the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using
a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it
effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
elective local position. The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to
attack. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a
badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and
political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain
allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who
acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to
be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office
demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and
to no other. We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US
passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has
recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation.
He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but
even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate,
his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect
except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted
already and he was already proclaimed the winner. Arnado
being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.
Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN v. COMELEC, GR No. 207105, 2015-
11-10
Facts:
1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America (USA).[3] On October 5, 2012,[4]
he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to... be
contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.[5] As the
official candidate of the Nacionalista Party,[6] he declared
in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking
to be elected to; that he was a natural born
Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.
respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate,
filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or
to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin,
docketed as SPA No. 13-023 (DC),[8] alleging that... the
petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his
CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the
Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having
registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012.
CONSTITUTES MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION FOR THE
TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic) HE HAS NOT RESIDED AS
REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR IN THE
LOCALITY
HE SEEKS TO BE ELECTED.[9]... petitioner countered that the
one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter
registration; that residency was not dependent on
citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business
purposes did not violate the residency requirement
pursuant to... prevailing jurisprudence; and that as regards
citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of
Renunciation of U.S./American Citizenship executed on
October 2, 2012... candidate's status as a registered voter is
a material fact which falls under the same classification as
one's citizenship or residence. While they are under the
same classification as referring to a... candidate's
qualification for elective office, the requirements are
different. The requirement that a candidate must be a
registered voter does not carry with it the requirement that
he must be so one year before the elections because this
refers to the residency... qualification.
could not be said that respondents falsely represented the
length of their residence in the municipality simply because
they became registered voters thereof only fairly recentl
Pillos moved for the reconsideration of the January 28, 2013
resolution with the COMELEC En Banc.[14] He underscored
in his motion that the certification issued by the Bureau of
Immigration reflected that the petitioner had... voluntarily
declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the
USA; that when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6,
2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation
of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his
CoC on October 5, 2012,... in which he declared that he was
a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and
that the petitioner's declaration of his eligibility in his CoC
constituted material misrepresentation because of his
failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements.
ssued its assailed resolution cancelling and denying due
course to the petitioner's CoC, observing as follows:
Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the
burden of proving through his evidence that he complied
with the statutory requirements imposed upon dual
citizens... election day, May 13, 2013, the name of the
petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on
proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte for obtaining 5,020 votes,[21] the highest
among the contending parties.
Issues:
core issue involves the eligibility of the petitioner as a
candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Nort... secondary issue concerns the
propriety of Pillos' claim as the rightful occupant of the
contested elective position.
Ruling:
Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no
material misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is no
legal or factual basis for the cancellation of the CoC. Even
so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual... citizen. With his
disqualification having been determined and pronounced
by final judgment before the elections, the votes cast in his
favor should not be counted. Accordingly, his rival,
respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor
for obtaining the highest number... of votes in the elections.
On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was,
therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him
eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all
intents and purposes of the election laws because he did
not make therein any material... misrepresentation of his
eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte.
Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En
Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted
for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It
is not disputed that on October 6, 2012,[36] after having...
renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his
CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby
representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued
using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad[37]
despite having been... already issued his Philippine passport
on August 23, 2012.[38] He thereby effectively repudiated
his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time
he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA
citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he... could be
considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four
days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen
of the USA through using his USA passport after the
renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his
earlier status as a dual citizen.[39] Such reversion
disqualified him from... being elected to public office in the
Philippines... resent case falls under the first situation
Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest
number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected as
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the
2013 elections.
Principles:
person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a
public office in the Philippines.
COMELEC Second Divisio
COMELEC En Banc
The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use of... his USA
passport after his renunciation of... foreign citizenship
rendered him disqualified... from continuing as a mayoralty
candidate... valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a
person's declaration of his intention to run for public office
and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the
position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the
person making the declaration a valid or official...
candidate... two remedies available under existing laws to
prevent a candidate from running in an electoral rac...
petition for disqualification... petition to deny due course to
or to cancel his certificate of candidacy... petition for
disqualification,... petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC
]he denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is
not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that
the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which may relate to the qualifications required of the public
office he/she is... running for.
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons arc
disqualified from running for any elective local position:... x
xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;... petitioner was declared
disqualified by... final judgment before election day; hence,
the... votes cast for him should not be counted.
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an... election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during... the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
two situations... before the election... final... after the
elections
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O.
MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent
Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for
brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of
Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won
and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto
before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending
case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus
disqualified for the elective position.
Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”,
which includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded
as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term
In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a
“fugitive from justice” under the definition thus given was
not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on
the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the
directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably
with the MARQUEZ Decision.
Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same
position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before
the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ
Decision definition of “fugitive from justice”, found
Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged
as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for
the position of governor.
Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’
proclamation which the COMELEC granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending
Rodriguez is valid?
Held: No
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an
intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted
indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez)
and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the
instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the
Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The
instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC
resolved the latter jointly (Marquez’ petition for the
disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the
MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And
we specifically refer to the concept of “fugitive from justice”
as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision,
which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but
which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed
expanded definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.
To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment
instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink
dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground
for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to
run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision
A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore
be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the
time of flight.
Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post
Caasi vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
in the local elections of January 18, 1988.
His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi
on the ground that under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of
the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48 provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied
that he is a permanent resident of the United States. He
argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in
order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there.
He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan and that he voted in all previous elections,
including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held
that the possession of a green card by the respondent
Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether a green card is proof that
the holder thereof is a permanent resident of the United
States such that it would disqualify him to run for any
elective local position.
Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and
permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a
green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the United States.
In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and
Alien Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own
handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila
before his departure for the United States in 1984,
Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his
"Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state),"
Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green
card that was subsequently issued by the US Department of
Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel
identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On
the back of the card, the upper portion, the following
information is printed: “Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States.”
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go to
the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there. He entered the US with the intention to live there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in
November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for
mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988 local elections,
waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States
Held: No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the
Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have "waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute
a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant
of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country.
Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office."
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent
residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card
attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent
clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of
Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, the
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public
office.
Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.
Held: Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which
proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of
the United States, but the records of this case are starkly
bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before
he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on
January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he
was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
Hence, his election was null and void.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for
elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing
his certificate of candidacy is one of the qualifications that
a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel
did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in
Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year)
after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and
before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,
1988.
● In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens
who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign
country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear
policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public
office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties
and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its
citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without
mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The
assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign
country are incapable of such entire devotion to the
interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on
their public duties here, they must keep another eye on
their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their
choice in order to preserve their status as permanent
residents thereof.
● Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to
change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990)
PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.
G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002
Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita
Lazaro succeeded to the office of the Governor of Laguna
when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the
DILG. Upon assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro
publicly declared her “intention to run for Governor” in
the coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she
ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs, volleyballs,
chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other
sports materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded
79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat
Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition for
disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature campaigning.
Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in “ordering the purchase of
various items and the consequent distribution thereof of
Laguna, in line with the local government unit’s sports and
education program” is not election campaigning or
partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly
prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the
allegation that public funds were released, disbursed, or
expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided
under the law and implementing rules. Absent such clear
and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC
cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the
constitutional body tasked to decide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.
G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992
BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM
and ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, respondents.
FACTS : On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous
Region in the election held on 17 February 1990 (15 January
1990 being the last day for filing said certificate); herein two
(2) private respondents (Ututalum and Edris) were also
candidates for the same position.
On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent
Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission (Second
Division) a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-006)
seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional
Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false
representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age.
On 15 May 1990, the respondent Commission (Second
Division) rendered the now assailed Resolution 3 (with two
(2) Commissioners — Yorac and Flores concurring, and one
Commissioner — Dimaampao dissenting), holding that:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission
on Elections (Second Division) holds that it has jurisdiction
to try the instant petition and the respondent's motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is hereby
denied.
Denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
above-cited resolution, the respondent Commission issued
Resolution dated 3 July 1990, 7 stating among others that
— of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by
While the Frivaldo case referred to the questioned of
respondent's citizenship, we hold that the principle applies
to discovery of violation of requirements for eligibility, such
as for instance the fact that a candidate is a holder of a
green card or other certificates of permanent residence in
another country, or, as in this case, that the candidate does
not possess the age qualification for the office.
On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly
elected Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous
Region. 8 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by
petitioner on 9 July 1990 to annul the aforesaid resolutions
of respondent Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July
1990, issued in SPA No. 90-006.
ISSUE : SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate
of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed within the period
prescribed by law.
HELD : The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong
filed his certificate of candidacy on 15 January 1990 (The
last day for filing the same), the election for officials of the
Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region being on 17
February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum filed the
petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on
5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days from the date Loong's
certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and
sixteen (16) days after the election itself.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person
running for the office of Vice Governor for the autonomous
region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the day of
the election
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for
brevity) provides that the certificate of candidacy of the
person filing it shall state, among others, the date of birth
of said person. Section 78 of the same Code states that is
case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed
false representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of
the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25)
days from the time the certificate was filed.
Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's
contention that the petition for disqualification, as in the
case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for
filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date
of proclamation, applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedures.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the
respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner Loong on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule
25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of
candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the
filing of the petition at nay time after the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date
respondent Commission which, although a constitutional
body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a
legislative enactment.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a
disqualification case which may be based on grounds other
than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects
referred to in Section 6 applicable to disqualification cases
filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in Section 6
and 7 Rep. Act. No 6646 is mentioned made of the period
within which these disqualification cases may be filed. This
is because there are provisions in the Code which supply the
periods within which a petition relating to disqualification
of candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already
discussed, and Section 253 on petitions for quo warranto.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to
disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave
him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise
the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for
quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of
the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of
the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the
election of any regional, provincial or city official on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the
Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition
may be filed within ten (10)days from the date the
respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
In sum, SPA No. 90-006 was filed by private respondent
Ututalum beyond the 25-day period (from the filing by
petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy)
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code. It follows that the
dismissal of said petition for disqualification is warranted.
Further it would appear that we can not treat SPA NO. 90-
006 as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253 of the Code)
for when it was filed with the respondent Commission, no
proclamation of election results had as yet been made, it
was premature.
Gonzales v Comelec G.R No. 192856 March 18, 2011
Facts: Petitioner Fernando Gonzales and Reno Lim both
filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd district of Albay in the May 10,
2010 election. Lim was the incumbent Congressman while
Gonzales was the former Governor of Albay. On March 30,
2010 a petiton for disqualification and cancellation of
certificate of candidacy was filed by Stephen Bichara on the
ground that Gonzales is a Spanish national, being the
legitimate child of a spanish father and a filipino mother,
and that failed to elect Philippines citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act no. 625. And that his certificate of
candidacy contains misleading information. The Comelec
second division division disqualified Gonzales in the
forthcoming National and Local elections. Gonzales thru
counsel, received a copy of the aforesaid resolution on May
11, 2010. Lim petitioned the Provincial Board of Canvassers
to consider the votes cast for Gonzales as stray or not
counted and/or suspend his proclamation, citing the second
division’s May 8, 2010 resolution disqualifying Gonzales as
a candidate. PBOC dismissed the petition stating that the
period for filing the of a motion for reconsideration of the
comelec resolution has not yet elapsed, and hence, the
same is not yet final and executory. Based on the results of
the counting, Gonzales emerged as the winner having
garnered a total vote of 96000 while Lim ranked second
with a vote of 68701 votes. On May 12, 2010, PBOC officially
proclaimed Gonzales as the duly elected Representative of
the 3rd district of Albay.
Issue: WON the Comelec has jurisdiction over a
Representative which was officially proclaimed as a winner.
Held: We have constantly held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the house of rep. the
comelec’s jurisdiction over election, returns, and
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
We declared that the court does not have jurisdiction to
pass upon the eligibility of the private respondent who was
already a member of the house at the time of the filing of
the petition for cerctiorari.