I.

MARRIAGE and DIVORCE

Marriage
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Family Code

Art. 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or
vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of
the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall
be performed by said consular official.

Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be
necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity
to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials.

Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity
herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract
marriage. (66a)

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse,
or his or her own spouse.

Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the
spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines
and executed in the country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting
property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
(124a)

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court
by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(206a)

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or,
prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or
her own child during minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or
rescinded. (30a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Doctrine of Processual Presumption

The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such
law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.

Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land
as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on
the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.

Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant,
respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability, in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down
in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure is pertinent —

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.

CHARACTERIZATION
The process by which a court at the beginning ofthe choice of law process assigns a disputedquestion
to the proper area in substantive law

STAGES IN CHARACTERIZATION:
1. Determination of the factual situation
2. Characterization of the factual situation
3. Determination of the applicable Conflicts rule
4. Characterization of the Point of Contact or theConnecting Factor
5. Determination between procedural and substantial matter
6. Pleading and proving the proper law

Borrowing statutes direct the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claim based on a foreign law (treats the statute of limitations as a substantive law)
DEPECAGE
The phenomenon where the different aspects of the case involving a foreign element may be governed
by different systems of laws.

Discuss briefly depecage (page 105) buchanan vs doe:

An old technique which has recently acquired the new name of "depecage". This refers to the process
whereby different issues in a single case arising out of a single set of facts may be decided according
to the laws of different states. This has always been the process when procedural matters were held to
be governed by forum law and substantive questions by some other law, even when matters
characterized as procedural had substantial outcome-determinative effect. It has always been
understood that different substantive issues could properly be decided under the laws of different
states, when the choice-influencing considerations differ as they apply to the different issues. The new
development in this area is the currently increased discussion and analysis of the old technique.

The case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law.
EXCEPTIONS:

1. The foreign law is contrary to the public policy of the forum.

2. The foreign law is procedural in nature.
3. The case involves issues related to property,real or personal (lex situs)
4. The issue involved in the enforcement offoreign claim is fiscal or administrativee.
5. The foreign law or judgment is contrary to good morals (contra bonos mores)
6. The foreign law is penal in character.
7. When application of the foreign law may work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the
forum
8. When application of the foreign law might endanger the vital interest of the State.

Factual Situation Point of Contact

celebrated ABROAD between Filipinos GR: Lex loci celebrationis

Exceptions:
(1) Arts. 26, 35 (1),(4), (5) and
(6), 36,37 and 38 of theFamily
Code (bigamous, polygamous
and incestuous marriages)

2) consular marriages

between Foreigners GR: Lex loci celebrationis

Exceptions :
(1) highly immoral(like
bigamous and
polygamousmarriages)

(2)
UNIVERSALLYconsideredIN
 CESTUOUS,
i.e.,
between brothers-sisters and
between ascendants and
descendants

mixed Apply rules on marriages

between foreigners – to uphold
the validity of the marriage

celebrated in the PHILIPPINES between FOREIGNERS National law

(Art. 21,Family Code)
provided the marriage is
nothighly immoral
oruniversally considered
incestuous

mixed National law of theFilipino

(otherwise public policy maybe
militated against

marriage by PROXY Lex Loci celebrationis

Note: a marriage by proxy is (with prejudice with the
considered is considered foregoing rules)
celebrated where the proxy
appears

Reasons for Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction: Forum Non Conveniens

1. the evidence and the witnesses may not be readily available
2. the court dockets of the forum may already be clogged; to permit additional cases would inevitably
hamper the speedy administration of justice
3. the evils of forum shopping

REQUIREMENTS TO PROVE A FOREIGN MARRIAGE:

1. the existence of the pertinent provision of the foreign marriage law

2. the celebration or performance of the marriage in accordance with said law

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under the RP law.

SIMPLY PUT: If valid where celebrated, it is also valid here.

NOTES:
• Insofar as the grounds for annulment or nullity are concerned, it is not the National law that governs,
it is the LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS, subject to certain exceptions.
• The grounds for LEGAL SEPARATION are those indicated in the national law of the parties
concerned, and not those of the place of celebration of marriage. Art. 15 will apply because a suit or
legal separation necessarily admits the validity of the marriage.
• Two Filipinos are married by the Philippine Ambassador to the US inside the RP Consulate in
Washington D.C. In US, let’s say, an Ambassador is authorized to perform marriages, will such
marriage be given cognizance in the RP? Ans: NO. Having been celebrated in the RP consulate in
Washington, the marriage is considered to have been performed in the Philippines. Under our law, the
ambassador cannot perform a marriage; ONLY CONSULs-GENERAL, and VICE-CONSULS can
under the Family Code.
• Since we follow the NATIONALITY THEORY, our courts have jurisdiction to take cognizance of
annulment and nullity suits where the litigants are Filipinos, or where they are domiciliaries of the
Philippines.
• Church annulments of marriages and declarations of their nullity are only for religious purposes, and
are not binding on our civil laws and courts of our country, unless amendments to our family Code are
made.
• Art. 36 OF FC: A marriage contracted by any party, who at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
• Under Church laws, examples of PHYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY will include inter alia:

1. A wrong concept of marital vows and marital infidelity

2. Alcoholism
3. Gambling
4. Womanizing
5. Adamant refusal to give support to a degree incompatible with a mature understanding of
responsible married life

This degree is of course subject to determination by the courts, particularly the SC. And even if these
causes should manifest themselves long after the wedding, said causes are considered to be potentially
existing already at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Cases:

Family Relations and Marriage

Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, March 03, 1922

1. MARRIAGE; PHILIPPINE MARRIAGE LAW; SECTION IV OF MARRIAGE LAW,

CONSTRUED.—Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68), provides that "All
marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which
the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to
this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the
foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by
convincing evidence.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.—A Philippine marriage followed by twenty-three years of uninterrupted marital life,
should not be impugned and discredited, ,after the death of the husband through an alleged prior
Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment." (Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion [1910], 16 Phil., 137;
[1913], 228 U. S., 335, applied and followed.)

3. ID. ; ID.; ID.—A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-
called matrimonial letter, held not to be valid in the Philippines.

4. ID. ; ID. ; SECTION V OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED ; "PRIEST," DEFINED.—

Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marria.ge may be solemnized by either a judge of any
court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel of any
denomination * * *." "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to
the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or
other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained
by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; "MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL," DEFINED.—"Minister of the Gospel" means all
clergymen of every denomination and faith.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; "DENOMINATION," DEFINED.—A "denomination" is a religious sect having a

particular name.

7. ID. ; ID. ; ID.—A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and
Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.

8. ID. ; ID. ; SECTION VI OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED.—Section VI of the

Marriage Law provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the
parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other
as husband and wife." No precise ceremonial is indispensably requisite for the creation of the
marriage contract.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.—The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element
may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts 6f the parties, and habit or repute.

10. ID.; ID.; SECTION IX OF THE MARRIAGE LAW, CONSTRUED.—Section IX of the

Marriage Law provides that "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have
authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality,
irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the, parties, or either of them, that he
had authority and that they have been lawfully married." There is nothing in the curative provisions of
section IX of the Marriage Law which would restrict it to Christian marriages. There is nothing in the
curative provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law which would restrict it to marriages performed
under the Spanish law before the revolutionary authorities. Section IX of the Marriage Law, analyzed
and found to validate marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.

11. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENTAL POLICY.—The purpose of the government toward the
Mohammedan population in the Philippines has been announced by treaty, organic law, statutory law,
and executive proclamation. The purpose of the government is not to interfere with the customs of the
Moros, especially their religious customs.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; "MARRIAGE," DEFINED.—Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION AS TO MARRIAGE.—Every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

14. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETROSPECTIVE FORCE.—Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a
curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should
aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.

15. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ; PUBLIC POLICY.—The courts can properly
incline the scales of their decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the
public policy, That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect.

16. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE.—Held: That a marriage performed according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion is valid.

Facts: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and
left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng
Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in
China in 1885, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in
1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and
Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled
that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter
testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had
been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a
natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial
court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been
adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful
marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court
believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam
as a solemnizing officer and under Qur’anic laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid.
2. Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid

HELD: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng
Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved
and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia
the rights accruing to them under the law. The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public
is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together unapparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is
the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage
laws are in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior
marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended
to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their
decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. That is the
true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. Sec. IV of the Marriage law
provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the
country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign
marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the
Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by23 years of
uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to
produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage alleged to have been
contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the
Philippines.

Tenchavez v. Escaño 15 SCRA 355 , November 29, 1965

1. Marriage; Church disavowal of marriage should be proven—Although it was alleged that papal
dispensation for the first marriage was granted, no such document appears OR record, To be
considered, the Church’s disavowal of the marriage must be sufficiently established.

2. Moral damages; Alienation of affection is incompatible with allegation of contributory

negligence.—Movant plaintiff-appellant poses the novel theory that the parents of the erring wife are
undeserving of award of damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take
proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter from leaving her husband, obtaining a foreign
divorce and marrying a foreigner. This theory cannot be considered, because it contradicts his
previous theory of alienation of affection. Contributory negligence involves an omission to perform
an act, while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive action.

3. Marriage; Refusal to perform wifely duties and desertion of husband.—The award of moral
damages against the wife is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her
denial of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of cases where
moral damage may lie. The argument is untenable. The acts of the wife (up to and including her
divorce, for grounds not countenanced by law), constitute a willful infliction 01 injury upon plaintiff’s
feelings in a manner “contrary to morals, good customs or public policy” (New Civil Code, Article
21) for which paragraph 10 of Article 2219, authorizes an award of moral damages.

4. Same; Economic sanctions to enforce right of consortium are not incompatible with individual
liberty.—While it is not within the province of courts to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other (Arroyo vs. Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54), economic
sanctions in civil cases are not incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty.

5. Divorce; Non-recognition of foreign decree is not an impairment of liberty of abode.—The decision

(declaring the divorce decree invalid) did not impair appellee’s constitutional liberty of abode and
freedom of locomotion. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country and seek divorce in a
diverse forum is one thing, and the recognition to be accorded to the divorce decree thus obtained is
quite another.
6. Same; Foreign decrees in contravention of public policy can not be enforced or recognized.—The
public policy of this forum is adverse to recognition of the wife’s divorce in Nevada. The principle is
well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if
they contravene public policy (Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law, p. 232).

7. Appeals; Question of jurisdiction over the person must be properly raised on appeal.—The issue of
jurisdiction over the person of appellee was not properly brought to this Court for resolution, either on
appeal or by special remedy, when the lower court overruled her challenge to its jurisdiction. Neither
was the alleged error of the court put in issue in her brief as appellee, as it was incumbent upon her to
do (Relativo vs. Castro, 76 Phil. 563; Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852). As the point did not
affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court properly ignored it.

8. Actions; Jurisdiction; When jurisdiction over the person of non-resident citizens is not essential.—
When the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for
instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, Philippine courts may validly try and
decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of
the non-resident is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the
Philippines. (1 Moran 411, 1963 Ed., citing Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254).

9. Same; Withdrawal of objection to court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant.—The award of
damages was merely incidental to the petition for legal separation. For this reason, and because she
filed a counterclaim against plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellee should be deemed to have
withdrawn the objection to the lower court’s jurisdiction over her person, even though she had stated
in the counterclaim that she was not waiving her special defense of lack of jurisdiction.

10. Torts or quasi-delicts; Action based on denial of cohabitation and desertion of husband;
Prescription.—The argument that the action on tort had prescribed because it was not filed within four
years from the marriage in 1948, is erroneous. The marriage was not.the cause of appellee’s wrongful
conduct. Her denial of cohabitation, refusal to render consortium and desertion of her husband started
right after their wedding, and such wrongs have continued ever since, so the period of limitation had
never been completed.

11. Actions; Jurisdiction over person of non-resident citizen in proceedings in rem: Submission to
jurisdiction by asking court for affirmative relief.—The rule stated in the case of Banco Español vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, to the effect that in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem the relief must be
confined to the res, and the court can not lawfully render a personal judgment, was laid down for
those cases where the defendant never submitted to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts. In the
present case, Escaño, while objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court over her person, also f iled an
answer with a counterclaim asking for an award of damages against plaintiff-appellant. She took the
offensive and asked the Court for a remedy, and this after the court below overruled her objection that
she was not within its jurisdiction. In asking the Court for affirmative relief, she submitted to its
jurisdiction.

12. Same; Reason for the rule.—The reason for the rule is that the courts can not look with favor upon
a party adopting not merely inconsistent, but actually contradictory, positions in one and the same
suit, claiming that a court has no jurisdiction to render judgment against it, but has such jurisdiction to
give a decision in its favor (Dailey vs. Kennedy, 64 Mich. 208, 31 N.W. 125; Harvey vs. Bishop, 171
Okla. 497, 43 Pac. 2d, 48; Haverstick vs. Southern P. Co. [Calif.], 37 Pac. 2d. 146). In the case at bar,
although Escaño made a reservation of her former plea of non-jurisdiction when she filed her
counterclaim, such reservation did not remove the obnoxious contradictory positions she assumed.

13. Appeals; Contents of appellee’s brief; Appellee cannot ask for reversal or modification of
appealed judgment.—An appellee can make counter-assignments of error for the purpose of
sustaining the appealed judgment, although it is not allowed to ask that the same be reversed or
modified (Bunge Corporation vs. Camenforte & Co., 91 Phil. 861; Cabrera vs. Provincial Treasurer of
Tayabas, 75 Phil. 780; Pineda & Ampil vs. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930; David vs. De la Cruz, L-11656,
April 18, 1958). In the instant case, appellee failed to do so, and because of this the Supreme Court
had every reason to consider the issue of jurisdiction abandoned.

Facts: Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
However, the two were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were
already estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by
the said tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in California, had several children with
him and, on 1958, acquired American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

Held: No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine
Law to which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties,
deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a
decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of
adultery.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139, October 08, 1985

1. Certiorari; Denial of motion to dismiss may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding in certain
cases.—Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in
a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which,
in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. We consider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

2. Husband and Wife; Judgments; Marriages; Divorce; A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court
between a Filipina and her American husband is binding on the American husband.—There can be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree
is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.

3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines if valid under the national law of such an alien.—lt is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Actions; An American granted absolute divorce in his country
with his Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the
Philippines as conjugal property by him and his former wife.—Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Succession; An American granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is
cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.—To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

FACTS: The petitioner is a Filipino citizen while respondent Romillo is an American citizen. They
married in Hong Kong in 1972 and after their marriage, established a residence in the Philippines. The
parties were divorced in Nevada in 1982 and now, petitioner is married to Theodore Van Dorn.
Respondent Romillo, Jr. Filed a suit against petitioner in RTC Pasay stating that petitioner’s business
in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties and that the petitioner ordered to render an
accounting of that business and that the private respondent be declared with a right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the case of the action is
barred of the judgment in the divorce proceeding in the Nevada Court wherein the respondent had
acknowledged that he and the petitioner had no “common property” as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE: Whether there is an effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.

HELD: It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent after their marriage, whether absolute or relative community property, complete separation
of property or any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is that the Nevada divorce of the parties
that the Nevada Court obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner and private respondent.

De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 345, June 06, 1990

1. Contracts; Statutory Construction; Ambiguous contract is construed against the party who caused
the ambiguity.—Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and
in this regard, the ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e., construed against the
party who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it by the exercise of a little more care.
Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: “The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in
a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity”.

2. Same; Same; Consent; Intimidation to vitiate consent, requisites.—In order that intimidation may
vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the
intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be
given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there
being an evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to
the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded
fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury. Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia
threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits
and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject
to the transfer of certain properties to her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With
respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither is Macaria’s alleged mistake in having signed the
Letter-Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her
and Jose Vicente, the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code, supra. It does not appear
that the condition that Sylvia “will eliminate her inheritance rights” principally moved Macaria to
enter into the contract. Rather, such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof which,
as discussed earlier, is the termination of marital relations.

3. Same; Same; Same; Pari delicto; Article 1414 of the New Civil Code, exception to the pari delicto
rule.—In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws. However, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims “Ex dolo malo non oritur actio” and “In pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis,” which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them
where they are, does not apply in this case. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent Court that “x x x.
[C]onsequently, intervenor appellees’ obligation under the said agreement having been annulled, the
contracting parties shall restore to each other that things which have been subject matter of the
contract, their fruits and the price or its interest, except as provided by law (Art. 1398, Civil Code).”
Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be
applied.

FACTS: The private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were
united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal on October 18, 1969. On August
28, 1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon was born. Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto
separation between the spouses occurred due to irreconcilable marital differences. Sylvia went to the
United States and then filed with the Superior Court of California a petition for dissolution of
marriage, support and distribution of properties against Jose Vicente. On March 16, 1977, Sylvia
succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, Macaria.

On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a
joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership and thereafter issued an
Order approving the petition. Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint for
the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement but was transferred to the-Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. The trial court rendered judgment, declaring null and void the letter agreement and the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco De Leon dissolved. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the Letter-Agreement is void or inexistent.

HELD: Yes, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and the ambiguity
in a contract is to be taken contra proferentem - construed against the party who caused the ambiguity
and could have also avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil
Code provides: "The interpretation of obscure words of stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity".
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: Those whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Since the
Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari
delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be
granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she
was before the transaction was entered into.

Cang vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, September 25, 1998

1. Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.—Jurisdiction being a matter
of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when private respondents filed the petition
for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Executive Order No. 91.

2. Civil Law; Adoption; The written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity.—It is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.

3. Same; Same; Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity “insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”—
During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which
amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for
its retroactivity “insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.” As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for
adoption now reads: “Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be
necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the
child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted
children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten
years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latter’s spouse, if any;
and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.” (Italics supplied)

4. Same; Same; The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned
the child.—As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of
written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is
“insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality
with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.

5. Same; Same; Allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written
consent of petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction.—The allegations of
abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of petitioner, sufficiently
vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child by his natural parents is one of
the circumstances under which our statutes and jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written
consent to the adoption of their minor children.

6. Same; Same; The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that
an adoption court must first confront.—In cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily
because his consent thereto was not sought, the matter of whether he had abandoned his child
becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment by the oppositor natural parent is
a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon failure of the oppositor
natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the
petition for adoption be considered on its merits.
7. Same; Same; Meaning of Abandonment.—In its ordinary sense, the word “abandon” means to
forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of
“putting under a ban.” The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus
put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume
or claim one’s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of
abandonment imports “any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means “neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.”
8. Same; Same; Same; Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.—In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not
manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he
was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through
letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

9. Same; Same; Parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the
child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent.—In a number of cases, this Court
has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he could give the child
a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. Thus, in David v. Court of Appeals, the
Court awarded custody of a minor illegitimate child to his mother who was a mere secretary and
market vendor instead of to his affluent father who was a married man, not solely because the child
opted to go with his mother.

10. Same; Same; In awarding custody, the court shall take into account “all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”—The
transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not,
of necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for
adoption. Article 213 of the Family Code states: “. . . in case of legal separation of parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court.” In awarding custody, the court
shall take into account “all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.”

11. Same; Same; Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law.—Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable
and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases
of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent
entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

12. Same; Divorce; A divorce obtained by Filipino citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is
not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to State policy.—As regards the divorce obtained in
the United States, this Court has ruled in Tenchavez v. Escaño that a divorce obtained by Filipino
citizens after the effectivity of the Civil Code is not recognized in this jurisdiction as it is contrary to
State policy. While petitioner is now an American citizen, as regards Anna Marie who has apparently
remained a Filipino citizen, the divorce has no legal effect.

13. Remedial Law; Appeals; Although the Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review
and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the evidence
on record.—As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. This
Court is not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties. However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to
review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it finds that these do not conform to the
evidence on record.

14. Same; Same; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal.—In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, this Court has held that the
exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the trial court are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal are the following: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.

FACTS: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital
affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the
United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of
visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest
the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption,
holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be
adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that
Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING: Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the
Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of
its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of
adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or
hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of
the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was
physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for
his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages
catered to their whims.

Garcia vs. Recio 366 SCRA 437 , October 02, 2001

1. Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce, hence, our courts cannot grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad.—At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.—A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient.

3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.—Respondent, on the other
hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document—a written official act of an
Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.

4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public or Official Records; Requisites.—Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication, or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to object properly renders a foreign divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the court of another State.—Fortunately for respondent’s cause,
when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry
of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification.
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.

6. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipino is no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquires another State’s citizenship.—Compliance with the quoted articles (11,
13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a
defense raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign law validating it falls squarely
upon him.—The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.

8. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws—like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

9. Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory
order—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce—is in effect the same as a separation from
bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense,
divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends
it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional
or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board,
although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may
be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.

10. Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does not raise a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to the civil status of the person presenting it where no proof
has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under the foreign law.—We
also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.

11. Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage
is determined by the national law of the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned
in Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal capacity of a foreign national—a
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.—Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application
for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would
have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an
irregularity in complying with the formal requirements for procuring a marriage license, an
irregularity which will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage
license issued without that certificate.—In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is
merely an irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license.
Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated
on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126;
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez,
The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and
Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).

13. Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal
capacity to remarry—he must still adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal law
governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.—Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

14. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and
void on the ground of bigamy where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was
really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decree—the most judicious course is to remand
the case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal capacity to
remarry.—Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing
marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino who was then naturalized Australian citizen, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife
in Australia. However, an Australian court issued a divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of
Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Starting October 22, 1995, the petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia,
their conjugal assets were then divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. The petitioner then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only that Redrick’s prior marriage to Editha
Samson in November 1997.

Issue: Is the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia an absolute evidence to prove his
legal capacity to contract in the second marriage and be absolved of bigamy?

Ruling: No. Under the Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as he obtained a
divorce decree but then the respondent failed to establish and present in court a certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code and has not submitted it together with the
application for a marriage license. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can
the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence to
show the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and failing in that then the court a quo
declares a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, as there are already evidences of
two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Petitioner was affirmed in her Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on
the ground of bigamy against the respondent.
Petition granted.

Republic vs. Orbecido III 472 SCRA 114 , October 05, 2005

1. Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; The Supreme Court holds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree.—This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private
citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. x x
x We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

2. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry.—We are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry.

3. Same; Same; Same; The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.—We state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was
naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.

4. Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory Relief.—The

requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the
controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief
has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

FACTS: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
married an American.
Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for “Authority to Remarry” invoking Article 26
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.

HELD: Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

San Luis vs. San Luis 514 SCRA 294 , February 06, 2007

1. Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA 189 [1976]), we laid down the
doctrinal rule for determining residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976), we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.

2. Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.—It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say,
there is a distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes
of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
3. Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.”—This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 (1989), where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it
was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

4. Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released
from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

5. Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid
down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented.—Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

6. Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.—Respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property
be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for
18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter,
respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at
the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have
any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters
of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place
of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was
still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court
issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the
trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998

Issues: Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case. Whether or not respondent Felicidad
has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration?

Ruling: The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested person
who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. The case therefore
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

Bayot vs. Court of Appeals 570 SCRA 472 , November 07, 2008

1. Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; A foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce
decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.—The Court has
taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided
the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this
as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.

2. Remedial Law; Actions; Causes of Action; Concept and elements of a cause of action.—Upon the
foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the premises,
cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo, 500 SCRA 242 (2006), explains the
concept and elements of a cause of action, thus: A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A
cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

Facts: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong city; Rebecca an
American citizen. Borned at Guam U.S.A. by both American citizen parents. When Rebecca gave
birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra, there started the soured marital relationship of the couple.
Thus on 1996 Rebecca initiated a divorce proceeding in the Dominican Republic, which was granted,
through decree of divorce order Civil Decree No. 362/96. A year later, the same court issued Civil
Decree No. 406/97 stated there that the "conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage
consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties therein contained
at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is
an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed a petition, at the Muntinlupa City
RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity. Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application
for support for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly
support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, the grounds of lack of cause of action due to
the prior judgment of divorce; but Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid
divorce to speak of.
Vicente contracted another marriage. Led Rebecca to charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
On the other hand Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
RTC granted Rebecca’s petition ordering the respondent to remit the amount (Php 220,000.00) a
month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
Following the denial Vicente went to CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. CA granted the petition
and dismissed the civil case for failure to state a cause of action.
Rebecca moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Court Ruling
On RTC: the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support
the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her
from receiving legal support.

On Court of Appeals: Rebecca’s marriage with Vicente have been dissolved by the foreign divorce
decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
Rebecca’s argument as to the nullity of their divorce decree for being Filipino Citizen at the time of
divorce was rendered dubious.
Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign
divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was a Filipino citizen when the decree of divorce was issued.

HELD: No. When divorce was granted to Rebecca, she was not a Filipino citizen and was not yet
recognized as one. Bureau of Immigration issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995 for her
Filipino Citizenship and it was affirmed by DOJ on June 8, 2000.
But noticeably the petitioner acquired already an ID certificate upon the issuance of recognition from
the Bureau which was deemed questionable.
Under immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ
of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
How can a Bureau issue an ID certificate without the confirmation of DOJ?
No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice.
As to the validity of divorce being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. The property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 after
Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No.
406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas 628 SCRA 266 , August 11, 2010

1. Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce; The Family Code
recognizes only two types of defective marriages-—void and voidable marriages—and in both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and
voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws
do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

2. Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.-—We hasten to point
out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry—one for recognition of the foreign decree
and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

3. Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry-—a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry; The Rules
of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108
of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the
civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may
be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

4. Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration-—there must first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can
be given res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.—But while the law requires
the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National
Statistics Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982—both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

5. Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms.-—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering
the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.

6. Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case where the foreigner
seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign
law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial court to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign divorce law, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife’s obvious conformity with the petition.-—In Gerbert’s case,
since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records
are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can,
at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this
latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of
a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws-—the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may
be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

8. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; The
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip such aliens of legal interest to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree-—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment.—We qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence,
serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct
involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In
a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

9. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code-—the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.

10. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree-—if the court finds that
the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the
court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by
the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

11. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.-—As the RTC correctly stated,
the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.” The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to
this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.

12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 (1989).-—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and
an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989).
In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a
foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the
foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses.

Facts: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Petitioner
returned to Canada and when he came back, he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
affair with another man. He returned again to Canada and and filed a petition for divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court.

ISSUE: whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not
recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse."
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
However, , the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies
of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

Fujiki vs. Marinay 700 SCRA 69 , June 26, 2013

1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court.-—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification
may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.

2. Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.-—The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not
run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.-—
Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right between the parties.” Upon recognition
of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.

4. Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.-—Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

5. Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign Judgments; The principle in
Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the foreign judgment
is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated-— the foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the Family
Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to
declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can
remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

6. Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Foreign Judgments; Divorce;
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.-—Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic
v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”
under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

7. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition for correction or cancellation
of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.-—To be sure, a petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,
support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is located.” In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is
an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of
the foreign court.

8. Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can
file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage.-—Article
35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil
aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect
of protecting his marriage.

9. Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife”-— it refers to the husband or
the wife of the subsisting marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

10. Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact.”-—Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
“[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared that “[t]he recognition
of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact.”

11. Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.-—Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43
(1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of
a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.

12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court,
it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”-—Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a “presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence
of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.

13. Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage.-—A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under
which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

14. Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.-—A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.

Facts: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC for the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for
the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such
annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in
the trial court for further proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the
first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castroand Nil v. Bayadog which declared that "the
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition. Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

Held: RTC decision is reversed.

Ratio: Proof of foreign judgments relating to the statues of a marriage where on of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country; AM 02-11-SC not applicable to petition for recognition of foreign
judgment
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as
a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may
be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-
trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues. “The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rada, this Court explained that "if every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."

Republic vs. Manalo (Resolution on MR) G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

Summary

Subject: Divorce in the Philippine jurisdiction; Article 26, Family Code; Article 26 applies even if it is
the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce from the alien spouse; Interpretation of Article 26 should
give effect to the intent behind the provision; Nationality rule cannot be invoked if it will lead to
unequal application of the law; Divorce is not prohibited under the 1987 Constitution; Divorce Law
history in the Philippines; Japanese law on divorce must be proved

Facts:
On January 10, 2012, Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court.
The RTC of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing. Manalo moved to amend the petition as one
for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
The RTC denied the petition. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law “does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country” and that unless Filipinos “are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties.”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband.
Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn vs. Judge Romillo, Jr.8 where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Held: Divorce in the Philippine jurisdiction

1. Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vincula matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et tharo, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
2. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

a) Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
b) Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
c) An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
d) In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

Article 26, Family Code

3. As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

4. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e. g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the Spouses, must
still be determined by our courts.

5. In Republic v. Orbecido III (2005), this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a
case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were both Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. The court stated therein that “the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time
a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Article 26 applies even if it is the Filipino spouse who filed for divorce from the alien spouse
6. Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under Article 26, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. We rule in the affirmative.

7. The fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized
and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our previous rulings. In Van Dorn vs.
Romillo was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, the court held that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad, and dismissed the alien divorcee's
Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction. In Fujiki vs.
Marinay, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. The court held that a husband or
wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (see also Dacasin
vs. Dacasin and Medina vs. Koike)

8. There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short
in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the
right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

Interpretation of Article 26 should give effect to the intent behind the provision

9. The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, but of the
Philippines.

10. We beg to differ. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. ” Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does
not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

11. Assuming that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.

12. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse
is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in ‘like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter's national law.

Nationality rule cannot be invoked if it will lead to unequal application of the law

13. Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. ln fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have
the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

14. While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification, the deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial
scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to
prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.

15. “Fundamental rights” whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause
are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. It includes the right to
marry. On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It essentially involves a public right
or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take
precedence over the latter.

16. The differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is no real and substantial
difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained
a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign
laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

Divorce is not prohibited under the 1987 Constitution; Divorce Law history in the Philippines

17. The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State. Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.

18. Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective March 11, 1917,
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature. On
March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the
Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an EC. No. 141 (“New Divorce Law "), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed
or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity. When the Philippines was liberated and the
Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed. From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil
Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer
recognized.

19. Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, H.B. No. 7303
entitled “An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines " or the
Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population and Family
Relations on February 28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading.

20. The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development. It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women
and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence.

Japanese law on divorce must be proved

21. If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible as a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.

22. Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The burden of proof lies with the “party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.
23. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.

ADOPTION

Definition and Purpose of Adoption

Adoption – the process of making a child whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general the
rights accorded to a legitimate child.

Prasnik v. Republic, L-8639, March 23, 1956 - the modern trend is to consider adoption not merely an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and affiliation, but also an act which endows the child with
a legitimate status.

Ynigo v. Republic, G.R. L-6294 - Adoption supplies solace to those who have no children or to those
who have lost them so that the void which exists in a childless home may be filled.

Governing Law on Adoption

1. Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), February 25, 1998 – the latest law on
adoption, the domestic adoption act governs adoption in the Philippines and repeals or modifies any
law inconsistent with it.

2. Republic Act No. 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995), June 7, 1995 – the adoption rules
governing adoption of residents among countries, this is a special law and prior laws inconsistent to it
are repealed or modified accordingly.

3. Generally, Executive Order No. 209 (Family Code), August 3, 1988 – the Family Code contains the
general provisions on adoption and its provisions are applicable in so far as they are consistent with
the abovementioned laws.

4. Adoption is governed by the law at the time it is made – As long as the petition for adoption was
sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the
court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
[Republic vs. Miller, G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999; Republic vs CA and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992]

The Family Code on Adoption

Article 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt,
provided he is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping
with the means of the family.

Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is
allowed in this Title. In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be
adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate
parent of the person to be adopted. (27a, EO 91 and PD 603)

Article 184. The following persons may not adopt:

1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the
approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;

2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime

involving moral turpitude;

3. An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

4. The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;

5.The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent
and the latter's spouse, if any; and

6. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, EO 91 and PD 603)

Article 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or 2. her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, 3. EO 91 and PD 603)

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, EO 91 and PD 603)

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a,
EO and PD 603)

Article 187. The following may not be adopted:

1. A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or,
prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or
her own child during minority.
2. An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
3. A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or
rescinded. (30a, EO 91 and PD 603)

Article 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
1. The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,
2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;

Article 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
1. Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall
inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
2. When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with
the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants
and the other half, by the adopters;
3. When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters,
they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the
illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters.
4. When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted,
they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children,
one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters;
5. When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
6. When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession shall apply. (39(4)a, PD 603)

1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD
603) intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to
legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.

An illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father. [In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, G.R. No.
148311, March 31, 2005].

Rights of Adopted Child (Sec 18, RA 8552)

a. Section 18. Succession. – In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
b. Limitation: While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.[Sayson vs Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 89224-25,
January 23, 1992].
Adoption; Nature of Adoption Proceedings
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.

Adoption is a juridical process; mere agreements to adopt do not create any legal relationship between
the adopter and the adopted. One cannot be adopted through administrative proceedings. It is
governed by the substantive law in effect at the time of the adoption. [Santos-Ynigo vs Republic, G.R.
No. 6294, June 28, 1954]

Article 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially
rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental
acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the
adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption on the
same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant. (40a, PD 603)

Article 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of
the following cases:
1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of
the adopters during minority for at least one year, 3. or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated
the adoption. (41a, PD 603)

Article 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial
rescission of the adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the
parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall
appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or
mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or
property or both.

Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the
adopters and the adopted arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise
lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries. (42a, PD 603)

Adoption; Legal Effects of Adoption

1. Parental Authority (Sec 16, RA 8552)
a. Section 16. Parental Authority. –
Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).
2. Status of Adopted Child (Sec 17, RA 8552)
a. Section 17. Legitimacy. – The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. [Lazatin vs Campos, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979]
To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the
adoption is an absolute nullity. [Lazatin vs Campos, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979]

The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence. [Lazatin vs Campos, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979]

The destruction by fire of a public building in which the adoption papers would have been filed if
existent does not give rise to a presumption of adoption nor is the destruction of the records of an
adoption proceeding to be presumed. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been
said to evolve a presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an
adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the evidence by which such
adoption may be established. [Lazatin vs Campos, G.R. No. L-43955-56, July 30, 1979]

Adoption; Consents Necessary for Adoption

Section 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. – After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of
the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said
adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. [R.A. No. 8552]
5th Session / 12th July 2019 Adoption; Rescission of Adoption
Section 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of
the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the
adopter(s):
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
(c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code. [R.A. No. 8552].

Grounds for Rescission of Adoption

a. Repeated Physical Abuse
b. Attempt on the life of the adopted c. Sexual assault or violence
d. Abandonment

Who May Rescind?

a. Only the adopted; Adopters may not rescind.
b. Nevertheless, adopters may disinherit the adopted for grounds under the civil code.
c. While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it
remains, nevertheless, the bounded duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the
hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an
adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the
grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and
testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposabportion of his estate. [Lahom vs
Sibulo,
G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003].

Section 20. Effects of Rescission. – If the petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's
biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee
is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee
to each other shall be extinguished.

The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and
restore his/her original birth certificate.
Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to 3. adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of
judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial
rescission shall be respected.

All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties
imposable under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. [R.A. No. 8552].

Effects of Rescission
a. Parental authority by biological parents over the adopted is restored
b. Reciprocal rights of the adopter and adoptee are extinguished
c. The certificate of birth of the adopted shall be cancelled
d. Successional rights revert back to pre- adoption status but vested rights prior to judicial rescission
shall be respected
e. Penalties may be imposed

Adoption; Paramount Interest Of The Child

1. In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN)
Convention on the Rights of the Child; UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,
Nationally and Internationally; and the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Cooperation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption. Toward this end, the State shall provide alternative
protection and assistance through foster care or adoption for every child who is neglected, orphaned,
or abandoned. [Section 2 (b), R.A. 8552].

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. [Landingin v. Republic, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006].
While the bonds between a mother and her small child is special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or
her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.” [Cang v.
CA, G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998].

Related Reference(s)
• Cang vs. Court of Appeals 296 SCRA 128, G.R. No. 105308 | 1998-09-25
• Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164948 | 2006-06-27
Abandonment Of Children (Termination Of Parental Authority And Adoption)
Article 229 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 229 Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates:
xxx Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose. Upon final
judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority. Upon judicial
declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising.

It is worth noting that under the above article--

First, abandonment must be judicially declared by a competent court in a proceeding specifically
initiated for that purpose.

Second, the termination of parental authority is not intended to be permanent or irrevocable. Parental
authority, which is understood to be a natural right of parents, may be revived by court order.

What constitutes abandonment?

Notably, although abandonment of the child is provided as a ground to revoke parental authority, the
Family Code does not provide for a definition of abandonment nor cite instances amounting to
abandonment.

Nonetheless, the concept of abandonment with respect to loss of parental authority can be related to
the provisions of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998",
on abandonment:

"Abandoned child" shall refer to one who has no proper parental care or legal guardianship or whose
parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at least six (6) continuous months and has been
judicially declared as such. [Section 3 (e) of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 and also Section 3(g)
of the Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998]

For purposes of adoption therefore, abandonment of the child occurs if (1) the child has no proper
parental care or legal guardianship or (2) the child's parent(s) has deserted him/her for a period of at
least six (6) continuous months.

However, for a child to be deemed abandoned, there must be a judicial declaration to that effect in a
court proceeding duly initiated for that purpose.
The court also had occasion to state in Diwata Ramos Landingin vs Republic of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 164948, June 27, 2006 that:
"Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.The term means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence,
love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance,
the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Foundling
A child abandoned by the parent/s to the care of orphanage centers and other similar institutions is
more properly considered a "foundling":

"Foundling" shall refer to a deserted or abandoned infant or a child found, with parents, guardian, or
relatives being unknown, or a child committed in an orphanage or charitable or similar institution with
unknown facts of birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Register as a "foundling." [Section 3
(h), Rules and Regulations to Implement the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998]

[Note: The term foundling is not defined in the statute itself, i.e. Domestic Adoption Act, but only in
its implementing rules]

Domestic Adoption
Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:
(a) Any person below eighteen (18)
years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a
qualified adopter to improve
his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to
the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her
own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be
initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). [R.A. No. 8552].

Inter-Country Adoption
• Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country
adoption. [R.A. No. 8043]
• Legally-free child means a child who has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department, in accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code. [Section 3 (f), R.A. No. 8043]
Adoption (Domestic Vs Inter-Country); Who May Adopt
A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION
(i) Adoption by Filipino Citizens (Sec 7, par
(a)) Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and
who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family.
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's
parent [R.A. No. 8552].

(ii) Adoption by Aliens (Sec 7, par (b))

Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until
the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office
or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country,
and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouse. [R.A. No. 8552].

Adoption by Guardian (Sec 7, par (c))

Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife
shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other [R.A. No. 8552].

Adoption by Husband and Wife (Sec 7, last par.)

Section 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. [R.A. No. 8552].

B. INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION Sec. 9. Who May Adopt. — An alien or a Filipino citizen

permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if
he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or the spouse of such parent;
(b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his
national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her
country;
(d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
(f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and
example to all his children, including the child to be adopted;
(g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement
the provisions of this Act;
(h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government
maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her
national laws; an

Conflict Rules on Adoption

1. Whether or not the status of adoption has been created depends on the national law of the adopter.
Art. 15, Civil Code. “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”

2. If adoption takes place in the Philippines, our country’s procedural requisites must be complied
with in accordance with the theory of lex fori in procedural matter.

3. In the Philippines, the following, among others, are not given the right to adopt:
5th Session / 12th July 2019
Art. 184, Family Code .The following persons may not adopt:
(a) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relation;
(b) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(c) An alien, except:
1) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt
a relative by consanguinity;
2) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of his or her Filipino spouse; or
3) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse
4) a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter- country adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

4. In the Philippines also, an alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no
diplomatic relations may NOT be adopted.
5. The rights and obligations of the adopter and the adopted are governed by the national law of the
adopter.

Recognition of a Decree on Adoption

The Philippines recognizes the principle of foreign adoptions validly rendered and recognized where
affected. However, such adoption is still subject to municipal law i.e. the obligation to register said
adoption in the civil registry. EXCEPTION, such adoption shall not be recognized if it is contrary to
public policy or residents’ interest forbids its enforcement (Agpalo).

Cases

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA v. LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT. G.R. No. L-

24006, November 25, 1967

FACTS: Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the CFI- Madrid,
Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez
Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. The court
granted the application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment
becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption document.

On November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies the court order of
adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed before
Notary Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau
instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y universal heredera de todos sus bienes,
derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.

In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion (deed of adoption) was, on December 10, 1953,
authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who
issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.

The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The
Registrar refused to register it on the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had
through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding,
it is not entitled to registration. Petitioner went to CFI- Manila on mandamus. The lower court
dismissed said petition and decided that what is registrable is only adoption obtained through a
judgment rendered by a Philippine court.

Solicitor General argues that petitioner’s case does not come within the purview of Article 409 of the
Civil Code, which states that:
“In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the
preceding article it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to
the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning”, and Section 11 of Act
3753, which reads:
“Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. — In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment,
adoption, naturalization, and change of given or family name, or both, upon the decree of the court
becoming final, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to have said decree recorded in
the office of the civil registrar of the municipality where the court is functioning.:”

ISSUE: WON the order of adoption issued by the CFI- Madrid can be registered in the Philippines.

RULING: Yes. The cited provisions refer to adoptions effected in the Philippines. Article 409 of the
Civil Code and Section 10 of the Registry Law speak of adoption which shall be registered in the
municipality or city where the court issuing the adoption decree is functioning.

We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were incorporated into the statute books merely
to give effect to our law which required judicial proceedings for adoption. Limitation of registration
of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a broader view allows us
now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition where the
law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil
Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable.

No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and adoptee, or any other person for that
matter, would ensue from the adoption here involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any
rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons
interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides
that: “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.”

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the
principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will
be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the
proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of
its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in
Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption “remains
subject to local law.”

We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the
corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such
adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.

The lower court’s decision is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila is hereby
directed to register the deed of adoption (Escritura de Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of
petitioner Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida.

CONFLICTS RULES ON ADOPTION

1) Whether or not the status of adoption has been created depends on the national law of the
adopter.
 2) If the adoption takes place in the Philippines, our country’s procedural requisites must be
complied with in accordance with the theory of lex fori in procedural matter.
3) Adoption cannot be allowed without judicial approval.
4) The following are not allowed to adopt:

- The GUARDIAN WITH RESPECT TO THE WARD prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;
- Any person who has been CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE;
- An ALIEN except:

a) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity

b) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse; or
c) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative
by consanguinity of the latter.

Note:

An alien with whose government of the RP has no diplomatic relations may not be adopted.

Adoption of a foreigner does not grant said foreigner Philippine citizenship.

Doctrine of Immutability of Status

- theory that the STATUS OF A CHILD- HIS LEGITIMACY- IS NOT AFFECTED BY ANY
SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN THE NATIONALITY OF THE PARENTS.
- However, the national law of the parents will be changed should the parents effect a change of
nationality: the rights and obligations of parents and child will now be determined by the new
national law.

Example: A Filipino illegitimate child who becomes a legitimated child of his Filipino parents by
virtue of recognition by both parents and their subsequent valid marriage, continues to be a
legitimate child even if the parents should subsequently embrace another nationality.

The parental and filial rights and obligations will now be governed the NEW nationality, but the
child is considered still a legitimated child, despite any contrary rule under the new nationality.
Moreover, the new rights and obligations will be effective only from the moment the new
nationality is embraced, not before.

CONTRACTS

Contract
- a meeting of the minds between 2 persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service.
- An agreement which creates an obligation
- Agreement upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing.
- May be express or implied.

Express Contract
- the agreement is formal and stated verbally or in writing
- the terms of the agreement are declared by the parties in writing or verbally at the time it is entered
into
Implied Contract
- the agreement in fact is presumed or inferred from the acts of the parties
- may also arise from mere consent
- where one party rendered services to another, and these services were accepted by the latter, in the
absence of proof that the services were rendered gratuitously, an obligation results to pay the
reasonable worth of the services rendered upon the implied contract of hiring, under the principle of
facio ut des, i.e., I do that you may give.

Tort
- a legal wrong committed upon another’s person or property, independent of a contract

LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS

- law of the place of the celebration or execution
- governs generally all transactions insofar as FORMALITIES OR SOLEMNITIES are concerned.
- One important exception to this rule is whenever property is involved, in which a case it is the lex
situs that should control.

CONTRACT
A. Lex Loci Contractus
GENERAL RULE: The law of the place where the contract is made or entered into governs with
respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation.

EXCEPTIONS:
1. When parties agree as to the choice of law
2. Lex rei sitae - in case of contracts affecting land or title thereto
**Lex loci contractus governs only with respect to the forms and solemnities of the contract (extrinsic
validity). Intrinsic validity is generally governed by the national law of the parties.

B. Choice of Law by the Parties and Exceptions

GENERAL RULE: The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In
adopting a foreign law as choice of law, the foreign law shall be deemed to be incorporated into the
contract “as a set of terms.”

EXCEPTIONS:
1. Where the foreign law chosen is contrary to peremptory provisions dealing with matters impressed
with public interest

2. Where the relationship of the contracting parties affects public interest in the country of one of the
parties

3. Where the substantial contacts arising therefrom point to the law of another country as the
applicable law

CONTRACT STIPULATION: PHILIPPINE LAW OR LAW OF REGISTRY, WHICHEVER IS

HIGHER
Norse Management Co. vs. NSB, G.R. No. L-54204, Sept. 30, 1982

FACTS:
The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents
and served as such in the vessel, “M.T. Cherry Earl.” While at sea, he suffered apopleptic stroke and
died four days later. Complainant widow thus filed a claim for death benefits and contended that in
determining amount of the claim, the law of Singapore, where the vessel is registered, should be
considered. For its part, the respondents argue that Philippine laws should govern considering that the
law of Singapore was never presented and the NSB cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in the case

HELD:
SC held in the affirmative.
On the issue that Singapore law was not presented before the NSB, SC held that NSB, being an
administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not bound strictly by technical rules It has always been the
policy of this Board that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the
course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered.
Moreover, the employment agreement stipulated that compensation shall be paid under Philippine law
or the law of registry of the vessel, whichever is higher. Thus, the amount under Singapore law being
higher, the same should apply in accordance with the stipulation.

CONTRACT IS LAW OF THE PARTIES

Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-66006, Feb. 28, 1985
FACTS:

Pancho was hired by Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corp. as an oiler on board the M/V Olivine, a vessel
registered in Hong Kong. While the vessel was docked at Gothenberg, Sweden, he suffered a cerebral
stroke and was rushed to the hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines where he died later
on. His widow filed for compensation benefits with the NSB, which Board awarded her the disability
compensation benefits under the employment contract. NLRC, however, modified the decision and
instead applied the law of Hong Kong, awarding a higher amount of benefits to the widow.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Hong Kong law should be applied

HELD:
SC held that the employment contract should be applied, not Hong Kong law. The case of Norse
Management cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in
that case that the workmen’s compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with the
Philippine law or the Workmen’s Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered,
“whichever is higher.” Such stipulation is not found in the employment contract between Pancho and
Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corp.

EXCEPTION: WHEN CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY

Pakistan International Airlines Corp. vs. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990
FACTS:
Pakistan International, a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed two
contracts of employment with private respondents for their services as flight stewardess. The contract
had a term of three years but also with the stipulation that, notwithstanding any provisions to the
contrary, the employer reserves the right to pre-terminate it at any time. Before the expiration of the
three-year term, Pakistan International sent notices of dismissal to private respondents, prompting
them to file this case for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the stipulation in the contract as to the right of the employer to terminate
employees at any time should be respected

HELD:
SC held in the negative.
A contract freely entered into should be respected, since a contract is the law between the parties. The
principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an absolute principle. The rule in Article
1306, NCC, is that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as they may deem
convenient, “provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public
policy.” Thus, counterbalancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties is the equally general
rule that provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little differently, the governing principle is that
parties may not contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing
with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and employment is
clearly such an area and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships
from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.
C. No Agreement on Choice of Law
If there is no express contract, the courts of the forum will apply any of the conflict of laws rules, such
as lex loci celebrationis (see Bagong Filipinas Overseas, supra) or

State of the Most Significant Relationship Theory.

In cases involving claims of Filipino workers on account of injury or death during employment or in
the course of services in a vessel owned by the foreign employer, the law of registry of the vessel, if
favorable to the worker, is applied.

D. No Agreement or Treaty
The plaintiff makes the choice of the forum, or the court where the action or complaint is filed. Thus,
in Saudi Arabia Airlines, infra, there being no choice of law clause in the employment contract, the
plaintiff chose to file her case before the courts of her home country and the Philippine court applied
the State of the Most Significant Relationship Theory to resolve the case in her favor.

E. Lex Loci Contractus or Place of Performance

The law of the country where the contract is to be performed generally governs the liability for breach
of contract by the obligor to perform his part of the obligation.

PLACE OF CONTRACTING vs. PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

Triple Eight Integrated Services Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. no. 129584, Dec. 3, 1998
FACTS:
Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with the latter’s principal,
Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment
contract (originally as “food server” but later changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines
but was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous
tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as a waitress. In
time, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo surgery and weeks of
hospital confinement. But when she returned to work, GCC informed her of her dismissal, allegedly
on the ground of illness.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed from work

HELD:
There was illegal dismissal.
GCC argued that the requirement of medical certificate from public health authority was physically
impossible to comply with since Osdana was employed in Saudi Arabia and not in the Philippines so
there was no way for them to get the alluded medical certificate from a Philippine public health
authority.
But SC held that the rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health authority”
and not a “Philippine health authority.”
Also, the argument that Saudi Arabia laws should apply is not obtaining. Established is the rule that
lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There
is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor
apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any
foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.

WARSAW CONVENTION IS CONSTITUTIONAL; PLACE OF DESTINATION vs.

AGREED STOPPING PLACE;
WHERE ACTION FOR DAMAGE MAY BE FILED

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA)
is a foreign corporation with principal residence in Minnesota, USA and licensed to do business and
maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in
San Francisco, USA. On Dec. 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San
Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he
was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be
wait- listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the Constitution
so as to deprive the Philippine courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:
Art. 28(1). An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or
before the court at the place of destination.

SC held that the Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. On the question of
jurisdiction, SC found that the foregoing provision of the Warsaw Convention enumerated the four
places where an action for damages may be brought. Petitioner contended that since Manila is his
place of destination, then the action was properly filed. But SC held otherwise.

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms
of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier.
Examination of the petitioner’s ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although
the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that
NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco to Manila. Manila should therefore be
considered merely an agreed stopping place.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with
the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the
parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of
destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a “place of
destination.”

2-YEAR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO TORTS AND WHEN LAPSE IS
DUE TO AIRLINES’ DELAYING TACTICS

United Airlines vs. Uy, G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

FACTS:
Willie Uy is a passenger of United Airlines, bound for San Francisco to Manila. While in San
Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight limit, for which a
United Airlines personnel rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him
to repack his things. But even after repacking, his luggage was still overweight, forcing Willie to pay
for the excess with the use of his Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO). United Airlines, however,
refused to honor it on account of some discrepancies in the figures, so Willie had to use his American
Express credit card instead. Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been
slashed and its contents stolen. Willie sent a letter of demand to United Airlines, which only offered to
pay him the value of US$9.70 per pound (the limit). Willie, however, rejected the offer and sent two
more demand letters, which were ignored, thus prompting him to file a complaint for damages with
the Philippine courts based on tort and the loss of his luggage. United Airlines moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw
Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by prescription

HELD:
SC held that although the two-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention had already
lapsed by the time Willie filed the complaint for damages, this did not preclude the application of
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based on tort
which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As for the action pertaining
to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well within the bounds of the Warsaw
Convention, SC found that there was an exception the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period –
that is when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.

OVERBOOKING OF FLIGHT IS BAD FAITH; LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS – LAW OF THE

PLACE WHERE TICKET
WAS ISSUED GOVERNS

Zalamea vs. CA, G.R. No. 104235, Nov. 18, 1993

FACTS:
The Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of the
spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full-fare ticket. All
three tickets represented confirmed reservations. Once in New York, however, they found that their
flight back to Manila was overbooked, as a result of which they had to be wait-listed. Out of those
wait- listed, the ones with full-fare tickets were preferred. Thus, only the Zalamea husband, who was
holding his daughter’s ticket, was able to get on board while his wife and daughter had to wait for the
next flight. However, it turned out this next flight was likewise overbooked, forcing the Zalameas to
purchase tickets from another airlines. Later, they sued TWA for breach of contract in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not TWA is liable for breach of contract

HELD:
SC held in the affirmative. Overbooking of flight amounts to fraud or bad faith, entitling plaintiff to
an award of moral damages because of bad faith attending the breach of contract. The holding that
overbooking was allowed under US Federal regulations was found erroneous because: (1) this
regulation was not proved and our courts cannot judicial notice of it, and (2) even if such regulation
was proven, the rule of lex loci contractus negated its application. According to this rule, the law of
the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline.
Since tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law. Under our jurisprudence, overbooking of flight is bad faith. Moreover, the hierarchy
of tickets practiced by TWA was evidence of its self-interest over that of its passengers, which SC
held to be improper considering the public interest involved in a contract of carriage.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

A. Law Governing Torts

DAMAGES ARISE FROM:

1. Delict or crime
2. Quasi-delict (Tort)
3. Negligence
Lex Loci Delicti – the law of the place of where wrong was committed governs the actionable quality
or nature of acts causing death or bodily injuries as tortuous
**But in order to recover, the tortuous act which ripened in another state must be actionable in the law
of the place of wrong and in the law of the forum.

1. Lex Loci Comisii – the law of the place where the injury, wrong or death took place governs

FOREIGN LAW MUST BE ALLEGED AND PROVED

Wildvalley Shipping Co. LTD. vs. CA, G.R. No. 119602, Oct. 6, 2000

FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., arrived in Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela, to load iron ore. After loading, the vessel was about to leave port when Vasquez, an
official pilot of Venezuela, boarded the vessel in order to navigate it through the Orinoco River. As
the vessel was navigating the Orinoco River with Vasquez as pilot, it ran aground, obstructing the
ingress and egress of vessels, and the vessel of Wildvalley Shipping was unable to sail out of Puerto
Ordaz on that day. Claiming damages, Wildvalley Shipping filed an action for damages against
Philippine President Lines in the Manila RTC. The trial court held Philippine President Lines liable
but, on appeal, CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Venezuelan is applicable to the case

HELD:
SC held that the pilotage law of Venezuela was not alleged or properly proven.
A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial (where the said law was published) was presented in evidence as
an official publication of the Republic of Venezuela. Likewise, only a photocopy of the rules on
piloting the Orinoco River, as published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela. As foreign public documents, there should have been a certificate that Captain Monzon,
the attesting officer, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of his office
accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate could be found in the records of
the case.
In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be
the same as the domestic law and this is known as processual presumption. Thus, applying the Civil
Code, there being no contractual obligation, the master of the Philippine Roxas is obliged to give only
the diligence required of a good father of the family. This was exercised by showing that the vessel
sailed only after the “main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries” were checked and found to be
in good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the
bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the
inspection of the vessel’s double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.

2. State of the Most Significant Contacts Rule (see Saudi Arabia Airlines, infra)
3. Agreement of the Parties as to Applicable Law

CONTRACT STIPULATION NOT SUPERIOR TO LAW

Suzara vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. L-57999, Aug. 15, 1989

FACTS:
Filipino seamen, petitioners; Magsaysay Lines, Inc., private respondent.
into a contract of employment with private respondent which was verified and approved by the
National Seamen Board (NSB). In the port of Vancouver, petitioner, through a special agreement,
received additional wages under rates prescribed by the International Transport Workers Federation
(ITF). Alleging that petitioners used force and violence in extracting the additional wages under the
special agreement, private respondent filed a complaint against them with the NSB. Later in Nagoya,
Japan, petitioners were made to sign an agreement in consideration of the dismissal of the case filed
against them in the NSB. It appeared that the line “which amount/s was/were received and held by
crew members in trust for shipowners” was inserted, therein, thereby making it appear that the amount
given to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages based on ITF rates were only received
by them in trust for the private respondent. When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent
demanded from the petitioners the “overpayments” made to them in Canada.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from private
respondent representing additional wages as determined in the special agreement

HELD:
SC held in the affirmative.
The Court found nothing to show for the alleged force and violence employed by petitioners to secure
the special agreement in Vancouver, Canada. There was no need for any form of intimidation coming
from the Filipino seamen because a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an international labor
federation, was actually doing all the influencing. Moreover, when the petitioners entered into
separate contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic wage for able bodied seamen
ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00, whereas as early as 1976, the ILO already set the
minimum basic wage at US$187.00. Even so, it was only in 1979 that NSB adopted this international
wage rate in its memorandum circular. Thus, it is not the fault of the petitioners that NSB not only
violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code but also seeks to punish the seamen for a shortcoming of the NSB itself.

As for the allegedly inserted line in the agreement executed in Japan, SC found that it was an
intercalation added after execution of the agreement, and thus, not binding.
(NOTA BENE: It is clear from this case that in controversies between workers and their foreign
employers, Philippine agencies and the courts should take the workingmen’s interest and that of the
nation as a whole. This policy on labor protection is deemed read into any labor contract.)

B. Overseas Employment of Filipino Workers

GENERAL RULE: Law of the country where the physical injury or death of a person occurred
governs the liability of the person responsible thereof or of the employer of the injured or deceased
person, as well as the amount of compensation which the injured or the heirs would be entitled.

1. Kilberg Doctrine – the forum is not bound by the law of the place of death as to the limitation on
damages for wrongful deaths because such rule is procedural and hence the law of the forum governs
on this issue
LAW OF THE FORUM GOVERNS LIMITATION ON DAMAGES

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow
filed a complaint for damages against Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum
Circular No. 2 issued by the latter. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both
foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.
Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular and contended that Saco
is not an OFW but a domestic employee and, as such, is entitled only to the death benefits under the
Labor Code (lower amount).

ISSUE: Whether or not the widow is entitled to the death benefits under Memorandum Circular No. 2

HELD:
On the issue of validity of the memorandum circular, SC held that it was valid. The law creating the
POEA, provides, among others, that it “shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen.” Clearly then
POEA has such delegated power to promulgate the questioned circular, as an exception to the Non-
delegation Principle.

As to whether Saco is an OFW, SC found that Eastern Shipping Lines performed at least two acts
which constitute implied or tacit recognition of the nature of Saco’s employment at the time of his
death in 1985. The first is its submission of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing,
formalization and approval in the exercise of its regulatory power over overseas employment under
EO 797. The second is its payment of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the
Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers.
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of
P514.42 since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social
Security System. In addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from
the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private
respondent's claim against the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of
employment for Filipino seamen under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984.

EMPLOYERS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE EMPLOYEE’S CLAIM FOR

INSURANCE IS ALLOWED; CONTRACTS FAVORABLE TO EMPLOYEES ARE VALID,
EVEN IF NOT APPROVED BY POEA

Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Balatongan, G.R. No. 82252, Feb. 28, 1989

FACTS:
A “crew agreement” was entered into by Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply
whereby the latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel “Santa Cruz” (renamed
“Turtle Bay”) with a monthly salary of US$300.00. This agreement was approved by NSB. While on
board said vessel, the parties entered into a supplementary contract of employment, which provided
for benefits in case of death or permanent total disability caused by accident. Later, Balatongan met an
accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was permanently disabled. Thus, he
demanded payment for his claim of total disability insurance in the amount of US$50,000.00, as
provided in the supplemental contract, but his claim was denied for having been submitted to the
insurers beyond the designated period for doing so. Balatongan, however, was able to obtain award of
the claim from the POEA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer can raise prescription of insurance claim as a defense to thwart
recovery by employee

HELD:
SC held in the negative.
On the supplemental contract not having been approved by the POEA, SC held that while the law
requires for such contracts to have prior approval of POEA, the purpose is to insure that the employee
shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum
standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. However, there
is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee that those required by
law. Thus, in this case where in a “supplementary contract” was entered into affording greater benefits
to the employee than the previous one, and although the same was not submitted for approval of the
POEA, the public respondents properly considered said contract to be valid and enforceable.

On the question of prescription, SC held the employer responsible for the delay in its employee’s
claim. The private respondent met the accident on Oct. 6, 1983. Since then, he was hospitalized at the
Suez Canal Authority Hospital and thereafter he was repatriated to the Philippines wherein he was
also hospitalized from Oct. 22, 1983 to March 27, 1984. It was only on Aug. 19, 1985 that he was
issued a medical certificate describing his disability to be permanent in nature. It was not possible for
private respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the insurance company within the one-
year period from the time of the injury, as his disability was ascertained to be permanent only
thereafter. Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private respondent to recover payment of his
claim from the insurance company. They did not even care to dispute the finding of the insurer that
the claim was not filed on time. Petitioners must, therefore, be held responsible for its omission, if not
negligence, by requiring them to pay the claim of private respondent.

2. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act

PARTIES TO A CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE:
1. Shipowner
2. Shipper
3. Ship agent of the vessel
4. Cargo owner
5. Consignee
6. Insurance company, which insured the cargo or the vessel

MATTERS UNDER COGSA:

1. Liability
2. Who is liable
3. Extent of liability
4. Burden of proof
5. Applicable prescriptive period
“LOSS” OR “DAMAGE” UNDER COGSA; PRESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines LTD. vs. CA, G.R. No. 119571, March 11, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner Mitsui OSK is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by its agent, Magsaysay
Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage through Meister Transport, an international freight
forwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corp. to transport goods of the
latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. However, the delivery was delayed, with the result that the
consignee allegedly paid only half the value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in
France until the “off season” in that country. Thus, Lavine Loungewear filed a case in the RTC for the
damages incurred. For its part Mitsui OSK filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the claim against it
had prescribed under COGSA. RTC denied the motion to dismiss, which order was affirmed by CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent’s action for “loss or damage” to goods shipped is within the
meaning of COGSA

HELD:
SC held that the goods becoming “off season” is not the “loss or damage” as contemplated under
COGSA so that any action based on such loss or damage is not barred by the one-year prescriptive
period under COGSA.

Under COGSA, “Loss” contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made by the
shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in such a
way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered. Conformably with this concept of
what constitutes “loss” or “damage,” this Court held in another case that the deterioration of goods
due to delay in their transportation constitutes “loss” or “damage” within the meaning of COGSA, so
that as suit was not brought within one year the action was barred. Said one-year period of limitation
is designed to meet the exigencies of maritime hazards.
However, in the case at bar, there is neither deterioration nor disappearance nor destruction of goods
caused by the carrier’s breach of contract. Whatever reduction there may have been in the value of the
goods is not due to their deterioration or disappearance because they had been damaged in transit, but
to other causes independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in their market
value.

The question is not the particular sense of “damages” as it refers to the physical loss or damage of a
shipper’s goods as specifically covered by COGSA but petitioner’s potential liability for the damages
it has caused in the general sense. Thus, the question of prescription of action is governed not by the
COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a prescriptive period of ten years.

3. Law of Country of Registry of Vessel

The Philippines adhered to the rule that Philippine ship or airship is an extension of the territorial
jurisdiction of the country.

Law of the Flag – law of the country of the vessel’s registry governs
GENERAL RULE: Foreign vessels entering Philippine ports or waters are beyond the jurisdiction of
the courts of this country, in matters concerning discipline and all things in the foreign ship affecting
only the vessel and those belonging to her.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. Matters which affect the peace and tranquility of the country (e.g. crime or torts) 2. Acts committed
on board the vessel produce pernicious effects within the territory 3. Offense against the law of
nations (e.g. piracy)
4. Wrongful act or omission caused injury to the country’s citizen
5. Local law is designed to protect seamen in Philippine ports
French Rule – crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, UNLESS their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory
English Rule – based on territorial principle; crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in
general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed; followed by the US
and the Philippines

EXCEPTION TO LAW OF THE FLAG: PERNICIOUS EFFECTS TO THE COUNTRY

People vs. Wong Cheng, G.R. No. L-18924, Oct. 19, 1922

FACTS:
Wong Cheng is a Chinese national on board a merchant vessel of English nationality anchored in
Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. He was caught illegally smoking opium,
an act violative of the Opium Law of the Philippines. The defense was that since he was on board a
vessel registered in England, the Philippines has no jurisdiction over the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over cime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD:
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

WHERE THE COLLISION OCCURRED IS IMMATERIAL; LAW OF THE FLAG

GOVERNS

National Development Company vs. CA, 164 SCRA 593 (1988)

FACTS:
NDC and MCP entered into an agreement by which NDC, as the first preferred mortagee of three
ocean-going vessels including the one with the name “Dona Nati” appointed MCP as its agent to
manage and operate said vessels in its behalf. E. Philipp Corp of New York loaded on board “Dona
Nati” in San Francisco, CA, a total of 1,200 bales of American New Cotton consigned to Manila
Banking Corp and the People’s Bank and Trust Co., acting for and in behalf of Pan Asiatic
Commercial Co., Inc. who represents Riverside Mills Corp. The vessel figured in a collision at Ise
Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel, as a result of which the aforesaid cargo was lost and/or destroyed.
Plaintiff Development and Insurance and Surety Corp, as insurer, paid to Riverside Mills Corp the
amount of the damaged and lost cargo, the latter being the holder of the negotiable bills of lading duly
indorsed. As a result of such payment, said insurer filed an action to recover the amount from NDC
and MCP. MCP contended that it cannot be held solidarily liable with NDC because it is not a ship
agent but a mere managing agent, and as such cannot be held liable if it did not exceed its authority.
NDC likewise denied liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not NDC and MCP are solidarily liable with each other

HELD:
NDC and MCP are solidarily liable. Where collision is imputable to the preserve of a vessel, the
owner of the vessel at fault shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert appraisal.
Moreover, if the collision is imputable to both vessels, each one shall bear its own damages and both
shall be solidarily liable for the loss sustained by their cargoes.

The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough
to inherit the concept of shipagent in maritime law. In fact, MCP was even infused with all the powers
of the owner of the vessel, including the power to contract in the name of NDC. Consequently, under
the arrangements, MCP cannot escape liability. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and
severally liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a portion act
and did not arise from contract. Consequently, the agent, even though he may not be the owner of the
vessel, is liable to the shippers and miners of the cargoes transported by it.

(NOTA BENE: Although the collision occurred in foreign waters (Japan), the court applied Philippine
law because the vessel was of Philippine registry. NDC and MCP are thus held to be common carriers
who, by reason of public policy, are duty-bound to observe extraordinary diligence.)

Limited Liability Clause

The stipulation as to the amount of liability for damage to cargo is binding, unless the shipper declares
a greater amount in their agreement.

DECLARATION MUST BE MADE A PART OF THE BILL OF LADING

Everett Steamship Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 122494, Oct. 8, 1998

FACTS:
Private respondent, Hernandez Trading Co., imported three crates of bus spare parts from its supplier,
Maruman Trading Co., a foreign corporation based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were shipped
to Manila on board a vessel owned by petitioner’s principal, Everett Orient Lines. Upon arrival in
Manila, one of the crates went missing, prompting Hernandez Trading to file a formal claim in an
amount equivalent to that stated in the invoice. But Everett offered to pay only the amount stipulated
in the limited liability clause contained in the bill of lading, which amount is lower than that stated in
the invoice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the limited liability clause in the bill of lading is valid HELD:
SC held in the affirmative.

The questioned stipulation is reasonable and just. In the bill of lading, the carrier made it clear that its
liability would only be up to Y100, 000. However, the shipper Maruman Trading had the option to
declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.
Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had itself to blame for not
complying with the stipulation.
On the issue that the bill of lading is a contract of adhesion, SC ruled that such contract is not invalid
per se. SC held that Maruma Trading, having been extensively engaged in trade, cannot be said to be
ignorant. Everett, even if only a consignee and thus not a signatory to the contract, is bound by it. SC
likened the contract of carriage to that of a contract entered in favour of a stranger (contract pour
atrui). Moreover, by seeking recovery for the loss of the goods, Everett is necessarily trying to enforce
the contract. So it cannot now reject the stipulation.

Lastly, the higher valuation in the invoice is irrelevant. For the shipper to recover a higher valuation,
the declaration must be in writing and inserted in the bill of lading. Thus, the higher valuation in the
invoice is of no moment since the same was not made a part of the bill of lading.