Hazard Identification

(FMEA & HAZOP)

Prof. Ir. Dr. Mohd Sobri Takriff
Dept. of Chemical & Process Engineering,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

FMEA

1
 What is FMEA?
FMEA is an acronym that stands for
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

 Identifies the potential failure of a system

and its effects
 Assesses the failures to determine actions
that would eliminate the chance of
occurrence
 Documents the potential failures

The History of the FMEA

1963 1965 1975 1977 1980 1986 1990 1996 1998
NASA Aeronautics Nuclear Presentation Standard- Use in Use in Further Increased
and space Engi- of the FMEA ization in the auto- the different development use in the
travel neering to the auto- Germany motive branches of to the system automotive
motive industry industry FMEA industry
industry (first of all, (since 94
(Ford) suppliers) at AOAG)

QS 9000

2
FMEA

Oriented towards equipment rather than

process
Paticularly suited for mechanical and electrical
systems
FMEA systematically
 identifies the consequences of component failure
on that system
 determines the significance of each failure mode
with regard to the system's performance

Applications & Benefits?

May be applied at various stages
 Concept
 Design
 Process (operation)
 Service and Maintenance
Improvements in:
 Safety
S f t
 Quality
 Reliability

3
FMEA - Methodology

y
define the system ,;
to be evaluated,;

establish the level of analysis

Failure Analysis
 identify failure modes, causes and consequences
as well as design and operating provisions against
such failures
Reporting

FMEA System Definition

define the extent of the system to be

analyzed
usually performed in relatively small steps
Requires analysts / personnels with a
knowledge of the system
 the functional relationships of the parts of the
system and their performance requirements

4
FMEA – Level of Analysis

based on the functional structure of a system

the failure modes are expressed as failure to

perform a particular subsystem function
 primary function is that for which the subsystem
was
as p
provided
o ded
 secondary function is one which is merely a
consequence of the subsystem's presence

FMEA – Analysis of Failures

premature operation
failure to operate when required
intermittent operation
failure to cease operation when required
loss of output or failure during operation
degraded output
etc

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FMEA – Analysis of Failures

Based on Failure modes

 looks at the likely causes and the effects on both
the components and the system

 consideration is given to the relative importance of

the effects and the sequence

 safeguards against such failures and methods of

detecting them are then examined

FMEA - Reporting

identifyy the most significant

g failures in terms
of their effects on the overall system

decide whether or not the existing safeguards

and detection devices are adequate

more detailed analysis on the “weak link“

6
FMEA - Reporting

p g format;; typically
No standard reporting yp y covers
 The unit/system
 Failure mode
 Consequence of failure
 Symptoms
 safeguards
 Corrective action

Example 1
Household Water Supply system

7
FMEA – Household water supply system

W t Supply
Water S l System
S t FMEA

No Component Safe
Failure mode Failure effect(s) Symtoms Actions
Description Guards

Water
 Install flow
1 Kitchen Tap Fails open Kitchen Flooded continuously
- control valve
flowing out
 Install water
Inlet pipe No water at filter
2 Blocked Water Tank Dry
(2 in PVC) kitchen tap -  Clean filter
periodically

Example 1
Household Water Supply system

8
Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA)

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
 Criticality is defined in the same way as risk - that
is, a combination of the severity of an effect and
the probability or expected frequency

 simplest approach requires a form of ranking or

quantification in
 effect / consequence
 frequency

Failure Mode Effect Analysis

(FMEA)

Effects are normally ranked into one

of the following categories
 loss of mission due to inability of equipment to
perform
 economic loss due to lack of output or
function
 damage to plant or third party property
 injury to operating personnel or the public
 death to operating personnel or the public
and/or significant damage to the environment

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Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA)

Alternative ranking for effect (reverse

order or severity)
 catastrophic - may cause death or total
system loss
 critical- may cause severe injury or
damage
 major - may cause some injury or damage
 minor - requires unscheduled maintenance.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis

(FMEA)

quantification of frequency
q q y depends
p on the
data available and may again be a simple
ranking, such as one depending on failure
probability during the operating time interval
 extremely unlikely

 remote

 Occasional
O i l
 reasonably frequent

 frequent

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Failure Mode Effect Analysis
(FMEA)

Example
 extremely unlikely - 0.001

 remote - between 0.001 and 0.01

 occasional- between 0.01 and 0.1

 reasonably frequent - between 0

0.1
1
and 0.2
 frequent - 0.2.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis

(FMEA)

CRITICALITY MATRIX
5 A C C D D
4 A B C C D
3 A B B C C
2 A A B B C
1 A A A A A
1 2 3 4 5

A B C D
ACCEPTABLE  UNACCEPTABLE

Threshold value = 10

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FMEA

Corrective Action And Follow up

Follow-up
 reduce probability that the cause of
failure will result in the failure mode
 reduce severity of failure by redesign
or add pprotection redundancyy
 increase probability of detection

HAZOP

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HAZOP
HAZOP is an acronym for HAZard and
OPerability studies

The term 'HAZOP' originated in ICI and

first appeared
pp in the literature in the
early 1970s

HAZOP
Skelton, B, 1997
formal systematic,
 a formal, systematic critical,
critical rigorous examination to
the process and engineering intentions of new and
existing facilities to assess the hazard potential of mal-
operation or mal-function of individual items of
equipment and the consequential effects

W ll G,
Wells, G 1996
 HAZOP is formal, systematic examination of a
processing plant in order to identify hazards, failures
and operability problems, and assess the
consequences from such mal-operation

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WHY DO HAZOP??
Generates a list of identified p
problems,,
usually with some suggestions for
improvement of the system

improves safety, reliability and quality by

making people more aware of potential
problems.
problems

help to sort out loopholes and inconsistencies

in procedures and force plant personnel to
get their instructions up to date

HAZOP
Basic philosophy
 if a process operates within its intended
design philosophy then undesired
hazardous events should not occur

The objective
j of a HAZOP
 mainly to identify how process deviations
can be prevented or mitigated to minimize
process hazards

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Basic Ideas of HAZOP
to stimulate the imagination of a review
team, including designers and operators, in a
systematic way so that they can identify
potential hazards in a design

to let the mind go free in a controlled fashion

in order to consider all the possible ways that
process and operational failures can occur

HAZOP
Outcomes
 recommend necessary changes to a
system to meet company risk guidelines

 recommend procedures or changes for

eliminating or reducing the probability of
operating deviations.

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HAZOP
application at the correct stage in a
project means that problems are
identified and can be rectified during
detailed design.

provide a considerable amount of useful

material for inclusion in the plant
operating instructions

HAZOP Terminology
Design intent
 the way in which the plant is intended to operate.
Deviation
 any perceived deviations in operation from the
design intent. Cause - the causes of the perceived
deviations.
Consequence
 the consequences of the perceived deviations

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Hazop Terminology
Safeguards
 existing provisions to mitigate the likelihood or
consequences of the perceived deviations and to inform
operators of their occurrence
Actions
 the recommendations or requests for information made by
the study team in order to improve the safety and/or
operability of the plant.
G id words
Guide d
 simple words used to qualify the intent and hence discover
deviations.
Parameters
 basic process requirements such as 'flow', 'temperature',
'pres-sure' and so on.

HAZOP COMPONENTS
Team
Procedure
Guide words

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Hazop Team
normallyy comprises
p g
between four and eight
members,
 each of whom can provide knowledge and
experience appropriate to the project to be
studied

The team needs to be small enough to be

efficient and allow each member to make a
contribution, whilst containing sufficient skills
and experience to cover the area of study
comprehensively

Hazop Team
Two types of person are required in a
Hazop team:
 those with detailed technical knowledge of
the process;
 those with knowledge and experience of
the HAZOP technique and the ability to
chair and report upon technical meetings

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Hazop Team
typical member of a Hazop team
 chairman or team leader
 secretary
 process design engineer
 control engineer
 operations specialist
 project engineer
 Other specialists may be consulted or be
available for specific points

Hazop Team
chairman or team leader
 selected for his or her ability to effectively
lead the study
 should have sufficient seniority to give the
study recommendations the proper level of
authority
 knowledge and experience of the Hazop
technique

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Hazop Team
Secretary
 should have a technical appreciation of the
project and be familiar with the HAZOP
technique

technical members
 usually part of the project design team

Hazop PROCEDURE
1. Begin with a detailed flow sheet. Break the flow
sheet into a number of process units.
 eg the reactor area might be one unit, and the storage
tank another. Select a unit for study.

2. Choose a study node (vessel, line, operating

instruction).

3. Describe the design intent of the study node.

 eg example, vessel V-I is designed to store the benzene
feedstock and provide it on demand to the reactor.

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Hazop PROCEDURE
4. Pick a process parameter:
 flow,
flow
 level,
 temperature,
 pressure,
 concentration,
 pH,
 viscosity,
 power,
 Inert
 etc

Hazop PROCEDURE
5. Apply a guide word to the process parameter to
suggest possible deviations.
deviations
 NO
 MORE
 LESS
 REVERSE
 etc

6. If the deviation is applicable, determine possible

causes and note any protective systems.

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Hazop PROCEDURE
7. Evaluate the consequences of the
deviation (if any).
any)

8. Recommend action
 what?
 by whom?
 by when?

Hazop PROCEDURE
9. Record all information.

10. Repeat steps 5 through 9 until all

applicable guide words have been
applied to the chosen process
parameter.
parameter

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Hazop PROCEDURE
11. Repeat
p steps
p 4 through
g 10 until all applicable
pp
process parameters have been considered for
the given study node.

12. Repeat steps 2 through 11 until all study

nodes have been considered for the given
section and proceed to the next section on the
flow sheet.

Hazop PROCEDURE

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 Hazop GUIDE WORDS
Guide words Meaning Comments

NO, NOT, The complete negation of the No part of the design intention is achieved, but
NONE intention Quantitative decrease nothing else happens.
MORE, HIGHER, Applies to quantities such as flow rate and
GREATER Quantitative increase temperature and toiattivities such as heating and
LESS, LOWER reaction.
All the design and operating intentions e achieved
AS WELL AS Qualitative increase along with some additional activity, such as
contamination of process streams.
Only some of the design intentions are achieved,
PART OF Qualitative decrease
some are not.
Most applicable to activities such as flow or chemical
REVERSE The logical opposite of reaction. Also applicable to substances, for example,
poison
i instead
i d off antidote.
id
No part of the original intention is achieved - the
OTHER THAN Complete substitution
original intention is replaced by something else
SOONER THAN Too early or in the wrong order Applies to process steps or actions.
LATER THAN Too late or in the wrong order Applies to process steps or actions.
Applies to process locations, or locations in operating
WHERE ELSE In additional locations
procedures.

Hazop Worksheet
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY REPORT
P j Title:
Project Ti l
Project Number; Date:
P&ID Number: Chairman:
Line Number: Study Team:
Action
Guide
Deviation Cause Consequences Safeguards Reply
word Number By Details
Accepted

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Hazop Worksheet
HAZOP ACTION SHEET
Project: Project no: Action no:
P&ID no: Date: ref:
Action on: Date for reply:
Description:

Reply:

Signed: Date:
Review comments:

Accepted/rejected (Leader) Date:

Issued Returned Complete
Return completed form to:

Example 3
Household Water Supply system

25
 Example 3
Household Water Supply system
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY REPORT
Project Title: household water supply system
Project Number; 2008-101 Date: 25 Oct 2008
Drawing Number: Myhome-101 Chairman: Mywife
Line Number: Line No 1 ( pipe from water tank Study Team: MyHusband, Maid, eldest son
and kitchen tap)
Item: Kitchen Tap Paramter: Flow
GUIDE
DEVIATIONS CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION REQUIRED
WORDS
Water flow Valve (kitchen tap) Install flow control
REVERSE Kitchen flooded none
continuously fails open valve

No water supply Install tank cleaning

NO No Flow Pipe Blocked none
to kitchen system

Pipe partially Reduced ater Install tank cleaning

LESS Low flow none
Blocked flow to kitchen system

MORE

Example 3
Household Water Supply system
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY REPORT
Project Title: household water supply system
P j t Number:
Project N b 2008 2008-101
101 D t 25 O
Date:25 Octt 2008
Drawing Number: Myhome-101 Chairman: Myhusband
Line Number: Line No 2 (main valve, pipe & Study Team: Mywife, Maid, eldest son
tank)
Item: Water Tank Paramter: Water Supply
GUIDE
DEVIATIONS CAUSES CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS ACTION REQUIRED
WORDS
House owner forgot Water tank
More water than
MORE to close water overflow, house none Install level controller
tanks capacity
supply valve flooded

NO No water Pipe blocked Tank dry none Install water filter

Low water
Low water level Pipe partially pressure to
Less none Install water filter
in tank blocked bathroom and
kitchen

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Example 3
Household Water Supply system

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