AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT

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Introduction
The psychological writings of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (Ibn
Sina) (d. 1037)are noted for the hypothetical example he gives of the man
suspended in space—the "Flying Man." This example, which left its im-
press on the Latin scholastics1 and has engaged the attention of modern
scholars,2 occurs thrice in his writings in contexts that are closely related,
but not identical.' Its third occurrence, which represents a condensed ver-
sion, conveys the general idea. It states, in effect, that if you imagine your
"entity," "person," "self" (dhataka) to be created at birth fully mature,
sound in mind and body, but suspended in temperate air in such a manner
that this "self" is totally unaware of its body and physical circumstances,
"you will find that it will be unaware of everything except the 'fixedness'
(thubut) of its individual existence (anniyyatiha)."'
What Avicenna intends to show by this hypothetical example is not as
obvious as it might initially seem. For one thing, the roles the "Flying
Man" plays in its three appearances, although closely related and com-
plementary, are not identical. More to the point is the difficulty of Avicen-
na's texts, both in terms of language and thought. The "Flying Man" and
the arguments it includes or relates to in the texts are problematic.
But whatever the difficulties it poses, the example remains an expres-
sion of its author's Neoplatonic soul-body dualism. Before attending to its
three versions for a clearer idea of what they are all about, some remarks
about its relation to other psychological theories—particularly in medieval
Islam—may help place it in its historical setting. Similarities between it and
the Cartersian cogito have been discussed by scholars.5 The notion that we
have certain knowledge of our individual existence is one of the things in-
herent in the example. This notion, as will be seen, is part of Avicenna's
paradoxical belief that we have constant, intimateknowledge of the existence
of our individual selves, even if we do not know this. The primary concern
here, however, is psychology, not metaphysics. Avicenna is not seeking in
this example the certainty of his existence as a premise on which to build a
philosophical system. His metaphysical starting point is not doubt. It is the
certainty "that there is here existence."6
That we have certain knowledge of our individual existence was also
the prevalent view among the Islamic speculative theologians, the
mutakallimun. Both the Mu'Hazilite and the Ashcariate rival schools of
speculative theology (kalam) held this. They included knowledge of the ex-
istence of ourselves among those cognitions that are "necessary" or "com-
pulsory."7 Now Avicenna opposed the doctrine of the self held by these
384 MICHAEL MARMURA

theologians, but not because they maintained that we have indubitable

knowledge of the existence of ourselves. His disagreement with them was on
the question of the nature of the self, or, as the issue was sometimes ex-
pressed, about the referent of the personal pronoun, T . Is this the im-
material rational soul, as Avicenna held, or a material entity as the

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theologians and other Muslims maintained? Thus he begins one of his short
psychological treatises as follows:8
We say: what is intended by "the soul" is that which each of us refers to by
his saying, 'I.' Scholars have differed as to whether what is being referred to is
this body, observed and experienced by the senses, or something else. As regards
the first [alternative], most people and many of the speculative theologians (al-
mutakallimim) have thought that the human being is this body and that
everyone refers to it when saying, 'I.' This is a false belief as we shall show.
The vast majority of the mutakallimim, it should be remarked, were
atomists, upholding a materialist concept of the human soul. There were ex-
ceptions and variations, to be sure. The Muctazilite al-Nazzam (d. 845), for
example, rejected atomism. He maintained that the soul is a subtle material
substance that is diffused throughout the body, rendering it animate.
Another ninth century Muctazilite, Mucammar (d. 835), did not reject
atomism, but maintained that the human soul is immaterial, a spiritual
atom. Most of the mutakallimim, however, were atomists and materialists.
They maintained either the doctrine that the soul is an individual material
atom to which life, a transient accident, attaches, or else, the doctrine that
the soul and the transient accident, life, that attaches to an organic body,
are one and the same.
The more traditional Islamic doctrine of the soul accords with what the
ninth century al-Nazzam held. Accordingly, life meant the conjunction of
soul and body. The soul is a subtle substance that spreads throughout the
body making it alive. Death is the separation of soul from body. The soul,
though a material substance, is immortal and rejoins the body at the resur-
rection. This traditional concept is summed up by the fourteenth century,
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350). He states that the human soul "differs in
quiddity (al-mahiyya) from the sensible body, being a body that is
luminous, elevated, light, alive and in motion. It penetrates the substance of
the body organs, flowing therein as water flows in roses, oil in olives and
fire in charcoal."'
Avicenna is also opposed to this traditional doctrine of the soul. This
concept of the soul as a subtle substance has a striking resemblance to what
he conceived to be "spirit" (al-ruh), namely "the subtle body" that per-
vades the living body, acting as the substratum for the vegetative and
animal soul.10 This spirit, however, is material and, for Avicenna, what is
material (in the terrestrial realm) is corruptible. The rational soul, on the
other hand, is immaterial and hence immortal. Avicenna's "Flying Man",
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 385

as will be seen, is intended, among other things, to indicate the immateriali-

ty of this soul—by implication, its immortality.

1. The Example's First Version

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The "Flying Man's" first version occurs at the end of Psychology, I,
1," an intricately argued chapter whose objective—as its heading pro-
claims—is to establish the existence of the soul and to define it "inasmuch
as it is soul." This latter phrase suggests that Avicenna is referring to the
soul's essence or quiddity. This, however, is not the case. He is only refer-
ring to its functional relation to the body, a relation, he repeatedly tells us,
which is other than the quiddity and which does not indicate the category of
existence, namely, substance, to which the soul belongs.
He states this, for example, at the beginning of the chapter where he
argues in Aristotelian terms for the existence of the soul: The observed
animate activities of organic bodies cannot be due to their sheer corporeali-
ty, but to principles within them. "Soul" is the name for "whatever is a
principle for the issuance of activities that are not of the uniform pattern
that negates volition." This, he goes on, "is the name of the thing, not in-
asmuch as it is substance, but by way of some relation it has." 1 2 Again, in a
lengthy discussion where he differentiates between entelechy and form
("every form is an entelechy but not every entelechy is a form") 13 and
where he maintains that "entelechy" rather than "form" is the more com-
prehensive term referring to the soul, he writes:14

If we have come to know that the soul is an entelechy,. . . , we still do not

know the soul and its quiddity, but have only known it inasmuch as it is soul.
The term, "soul,'' does not apply to it by way of its substance, but by way of its
' being governor over bodies and in relation to them . . . . Indeed, we ought to set
aside another investigation for knowing the essence of the soul.
After further discussion of "entelechy," leading to the Aristotelian
definition of the soul as the first entelechy of a living, acting natural organ,
and a discussion of the difficulty of applying this definition univocally to
both terrestrial and celestial souls, Avicenna gives a last reminder that this
relational definition of the soul does not refer to the quiddity. It is with this
reminder that the last part of the chapter devoted to the "Flying Man" is In-
troduced: 15
We have now known the meaning of the name that applies to the thing
termed soul because of a relation it has. It thus behoves us to occupy ourselves
with apprehending the quiddity of this thing which through the above consider-
ation has become spoken of as soul.16

Avicenna continues:
We must indicate in this place a manner of establishing (ithbat) the ex-
istence of the soul we have by way of alerting (tanbih) and reminding (tadhkir),
386 MICHAEL MARMURA

giving an indication (ishara) that has a strong impact on someone who has the
power of noticing (mulaha$a)1' the truth himself," without the need of having
to educate him, constantly prod him, and divert him from what causes
sophistical errors.
The example of the "Flying Man" immediately follows this statement.

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But before turning to the example, we must pause to consider the above
statement, which is quite basic for understanding the first (and most prob-
lematic) version of the example. The statement, though structurally com-
plex (and difficult to translate), is quite clear in expressing its intention,
namely, to indicate a way of establishing the soul's existence by means of
"alerting" and "reminding."
But what does Avicenna mean by "alerting" and "reminding"? Some
light is shed on his meaning by Psychology, V, 7, where he criticizes and re-
jects various psychological theories, two of which involve the concepts of
"alerting" and "reminding."20 The first maintains that the human soul by
its very nature knows all things: the activities of perceiving and reasoning
simply "alert" it to the knowledge it already has but from which it has been
distracted. The second theory also maintains that the soul has knowledge of
all things, knowledge, however, which it has acquired "previously."
Avicenna does not identify this theory. But the Platonic theory of
reminiscence seems an obvious candidate. At any rate, knowledge is
reminiscence, the activities of perceiving and reasoning acting as reminders
of what is already known.
Avicenna's philosophical system can accommodate neither theory and
he rejects them and their claim that the soul has within it, so to speak,
knowledge of "all" things. But he does not reject.the view that the soul by
its very nature has self-knowledge. The main intention of the third version
of the "Flying Man," as will be seen, is to state and illustrate the soul's con-
stant knowledge of itself. Another statement about "natural" self-
knowledge occurs in al-Tcfliqat, comments Avicenna dictated to his student
Bahmanyar:21
The human soul is [so constituted that] it is by nature aware of existents. It
is aware of some of them naturally; with others, it gains the power to become
aware of them by acquisition. That which is attained for it naturally is realized
for it actually and always. Thus its awareness of itself is by nature, this being a
constituent of it and hence belongs to it always and in actuality. Its awareness22
that it is aware of itself is by acquisition.
In this work, Avicenna does not elaborate: he does not explain how one
is always aware of one's self and yet has to "acquire" awareness of this
awareness. Elsewhere, he offers an answer to the related question of why
should one seek after knowing one's self (and its immateriality) if one
already has such knowledge. In Psychology, V, 7, he writes:23
It is not the case that if you are seeking the existence [of the self] and its be-
ing non-corporeal you are therefore ignorant of this in an absolute sense.
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 387

Rather, you are oblivious of it. Many a time knowledge of a thing is near at
hand, but one is oblivious of it. It becomes within the bound of the unknown
and is sought after from a more distant place. Often knowing that it is near at
hand is of the order of alerting (al-tanbih).
To return to the statement immediately preceding the first version of

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the "Flying Man," it clearly states that the intention of what is to follow is
to indicate " a manner of establishing the existence of the s o u l . . . by way of
alerting and reminding, giving an indication that leaves a strong impact on
someone who has the power of noticing the truth himself." This first ver-
sion is as follows:24
We say: The one among us must imagine himself as though he is created all
at once and created perfect (kamit), but that his sight has been veiled from
observing external things, and that he is created falling in the air or the void in a
manner where he would not encounter air resistance, requiring him to feel, and
that his limbs are separated from each other so that they neither meet nor touch.
He must then reflect as to whether he will affirm the existence of his self
(dhatahu).
He will not doubt his affirming his self existing, but with this he will not af-
firm any limb from among his organs, no internal organ, whether heart or
brain, and no external thing. Rather, he would be affirming his self without af-
firming for it length, breadth and depth. And if in this state he were able to im-
agine a hand or some other organ, he would not imagine it as part of his self or a
condition for its existence.
You know that what is affirmed is other than what is not affirmed and
what is acknowledged (al-muqarr bihi) is other than what is not
acknowledged.25 Hence the self whose existence he has affirmed has a special
characteristic (khassiyya) of its being his very self, other than his body and
organs that have not been affirmed.
Hence the one who affirms (al-muthbit) has a means {lahu sabit) to be
alerted (yatannabah) to the existence of the soul as something other than the
body—indeed, other than body—and to his being directly acquainted (carif)
with [this existence] and aware of it. If he is oblivious to this, he would require
educative prodding.

The last paragraph brings home the point that the process of imagina-
tion and contemplation Avicenna asks us to undertake alerts us ultimately
to the experiential knowledge of our immaterial selves. More specifically, it
states that the one who in the example affirms (al-muthbit) his existence
without affirming the existence of his body "has a means" (lahu sabit) "to
be alerted" (an yatanabbah) to the existence of the self as immaterial and
subsequently to the experiential knowledge of this immaterial existence.
(The use of the term, carif, the active participle of the verb carafa, is very
significant. In Avicenna's vocabulary (and that of the mystics of Islam) it
means "to know" in the sense of having experiential, intimate knowledge,
gnosis.) In other words, we discern here two stages of knowing. The first is
knowing that the self is immaterial, leading to the second, the experiential
knowledge of one's self as an immaterial entity.
388 MICHAEL MARMURA

When Avicenna speaks of the "means" for alerting the self to this
knowledge, he is referring to the argument immediately preceding the final
paragraph which can be summed up as follows: In the circumstances of the
example where the self is totally unaware of the physical and the bodily, it is
still aware of its existence, not doubting this. It thus affirms its existence

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without affirming the existence of the body. But since what is affirmed is
other than what is not affirmed, the self whose existence is being affirmed is
not the body.
This argument, however, so very central to the first version of the
"Flying Man," is problematic. It operates within an imagined, hypothetical
framework and hence one expects its conclusion to be hypothetical and ten-
tative. But an unwarranted swerve from the hypothetical to the categorical
seems to take place. For the language of its conclusion is categorical. That
Avicenna intended this conclusion to be categorical is also indicated by the
example's other two versions. In this connection, it should be noted that
there are instances in Avicenna's logical writings where he uses a similar
hypothetical example for categorical ends. Thus, he tells us, if a person is
created fully mature and rational, having, however, had no contact with
other humans and human institutions, and is confronted with a commonly
accepted moral dictum and a self-evident logical truth, he will be able to
doubt the first, but not the second.26 The example here is used as a criterion
for self-evidence. Again, he uses this example to define natural knowledge.
This is the knowledge, he states, that a peson born fully mature and rational
but having had no human contact will have.27
Moreover, the argument begs the question. This brings us to its
assumptions which perhaps may help explain how Avicenna treats its con-
clusion in categorical terms. As indicated earlier, he holds that the self has
natural, constant knowledge of itself. In the third version of the "Flying
Man," as we shall see, he elaborates on this. Provided the self is able to
"discern a thing correctly," then whatever the circumstances, it will have
this constant knowledge of itself. Now Avicenna includes as one of these
circumstances in which the self is still able "to discern a thing correctly" the
state of its being totally unaware of the bodily and the physical, exemplified
by the "Flying Man." But once he includes this, then he is already assuming
the very thing to be proven—an immaterial self capable of self-awareness
while totally oblivious of the body and anything physical.
Our concern, however, is not so much with the shortcomings of this
argument as it is with the role it plays in the example. As already hinted at in
passing, it really performs two tasks, not one. The first is to prove that the
soul is immaterial; the second, by showing this, to awaken the self to the ex-
periential knowledge of itself as an immaterial entity. Since the argument's
conclusion that the self is immaterial is in agreement with the experiential
knowledge it helps "trigger off," so to speak, the distinction between these
two related tasks is easily blurred.
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 389

2. The Second Version

This version, which is very short, occurs in Psychology, V, 7. As men-
tioned earlier, this is a chapter in which Avicenna criticizes and rejects a
number of psychological theories. One of these is the theory that the human

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soul cannot be one entity, that the vegetative, animal and rational souls are
three numerically distinct souls. In rejecting this theory,28 he argues for two
points: (1) that the different psychological faculties require something that
binds and unifies them; (2) that this binding entity cannot be corporeal but
must be the immaterial rational soul. In the course of arguing for the second
point, the "Flying Man" reappears, playing a related but different role than
the one it played in its first apperance.
Avicenna argues that there must be a binding entity for the
psychological faculties, relating to them in the way the Aristotelian com-
mon sense relates to the various senses. For each faculty is restricted to its
own kind of act. The sensory acts are other than the appetitive and irascible.
Yet these faculties interact. It is thus that we can make such true statements
as "when we perceived, we desired," and "when we saw such a thing, we
were angered." We can say such true things because there is an entity that
binds and links the various faculties. This entity, Avicenna concludes, "is
the thing which each of us perceives to be his self."29
To show that this binding entity is the immaterial rational soul, Avicen-
na advances three arguments. The first and shortest is that body qua body
cannot be this binding entity.30 Otherwise every corporeal thing would be
performing this task, which is clearly not the case. The second argument31
harkens back to an earlier chapter where Avicenna had given lengthy
arguments to show that the faculty receptive of the abstract intelligibles
must be immaterial.32 Thus at least one of the human psychological
faculties is immaterial. Now the binding entity, he argues, is the one from
which the power emanates on the rest of the psychological faculties. This
entity cannot be material because matter is not the source of emanation, but
the recipient of it. The third argument is the longest.33 It reintroduces the
"Flying Man."
If one supposes the binding entity to be a body, then it would have to
be either the whole of the body or only part of it. Avicenna then proceeds to
show that it is neither, concluding that this binding entity is immaterial. The
"Flying Man" is used as part of the refutation of the first alternative. This
refutation begins with the argument that if the binding entity is the whole
body, then if a part is missing, it follows that what we perceive to be our
selves would not exist. But this is not the case:33
For, as we've mentioned in other places, I know that I am myself even if I
do not know that I have a leg or one of the organs. Rather, I believe these things
to be attachments to my self and believe that they are instruments of mine which
I use for certain needs. Were it not for such needs, I would dispense with them. I
will still be T, when they are not [existing].
390 MICHAEL MARMURA

The second version of the "Flying Man" follows immediately, giving

further support to what has just been uttered: 34
Let us repeat what we've said earlier. We say: If a human is created all at
once, created with his limbs separated and he does not see them, and if it so hap-

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pens that he does not touch them and they do not touch each other, and he
hears no sound, he would be ignorant of the existnece of the whole of his
organs, but would know the existence of his individual being (anniyyatihi) as
one thing, while being ignorant of all the former things. What is itself the
unknown is not the known.

This brief appearance of the "Flying Man" is followed by an elabora-

tion on the idea that the bodily organs are mere attachments to the self, akin
to garments: 35
These organs belong to us in reality only as garments which due to constant
adherence to us have become as parts of our selves. When we imgine our selves,
we do not imagine ourselves unclothed, but imagine them possessing covering
garments. The reason for this is constant adherence, with the difference that
with [real] clothes we have become accustomed to taking them off and laying
them aside—something we have not been accustomed to with the bodily organs.
Thus our belief that the organs are parts of us is more emphatic than our belief
that garments are parts of us.

Avicenna then gives a spirited argument to disprove the second alter-

native, namely that the binding psychological entity cannot be one organ or
a combination of some organs. 36 For if an organ (or a combination of some
organs), then when one is aware of one's self, one must be aware of the par-
ticular organ or organs. This is not the case. For even our knowledge of the
heart, if we suppose it to be the binding entity, comes through experiment.
It is not the thing one perceives to be the self when one has self-awareness.
This argument, as it appers in this chapter, stands on its two feet, quite in-
dependently of the hypothetical example. We meet it elsewhere in
Avicenna's writings without any reference to the "Flying Man." 3 7
To return, then, to the brief second entry of the example, we notice
that it is used conjointly in support of another independent argument for
disproving an alternative statement in a larger argument. We also notice
that its conclusion is categorical. Thus, once again, we encounter
Avicenna's arriving at the categorical conclusion from hypothetical
premises. This version reechoes the first, but there is no indication here that
it is intended to awaken the soul to its self-knowledge. Its task is quite limi-
ted—to help disprove an alternative statement in a larger argument.

3. The Example's Third Version

Avicenna's third (and also very short) version of the "Flying Man" oc-
curs in his al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, one of his late works that sums up his
philosophy. In the title, the term isharat is the plural of ishara,
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 391

"indication," "hint," "directive," "sign," "signal"; tanblhat, the plural

of tanblh, "alerting," "awakening," "drawing attention to," or, as
recently translated, "admonition."38 Avicenna presents his ideas in short
paragraphs each bearing the heading of either ishara or tanbih, although
other related terms are also sometimes used. The paragraph containing the

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"Flying Man" has the heading tanbih. Each of the three subsequent
paragraphs that constitute an argument for the soul's immateriality also
bear this heading. As we have seen with the first version of the example, the
term tanbih is used in a special epistemological sense of arousing the self to
the self-knowledge it already possesses. The heading, tanbih, for the third
version of the "Flying Man" and the related paragraphs that follow sug-
gests that the term is meant to convey the same idea."
The example appears as part of the first paragraph, a first tanbih, in-
troducing a chapter entitled, "On the Terrestrial and Celestial Soul." The
paragraph is as follows:40
Return to your self and reflect whether, being whole, or even in another
state, where, however, you discern a thing correctly, you would be oblivious to
the existence of your self {dhataka) and would not affirm your self (nafsaka)!
To my mind, this does not happen to the perspecacious—so much so that the
sleeper in his sleep and the person drunk in the state of his drunkenness will not
miss knowledge of his self, even if his presentation of his self to himself does not
remain in his memory.
And if you imagine your self (dhataka) to have been at its first creation
mature and whole in mind and body and it is supposed to be in a generality of
position and physical circumstance where it does not perceive its parts, where its
limbs do not touch each other but are rather spread apart, and that this self is
momentarily suspended in temperate air, you will find that it will be unaware of
everything except the "fixedness" (thubut) of its individual existence (an-
niyyathiha).
Thus, according to the opening statement of this tanbih, introspection
shows that as long as the self is able to "discern a thing correctly," then
whatever other circumstance it happens to be in, it will have self-knowledge.
Commenting on this tanbih as a whole, the philosopher-scientist Nasir al-
Din al-Tusi (d. 1274) writes: "Hence the absolutely first and clearest ap-
prehension is a human being's apprehension of his self. It is clear that this
kind of apprehension can neither be acquired through definition (hadd) or
description (rasm), nor established by argument (hujja) or demonstration
(burhan)."*'
The main intention of this version of the "Flying Man" is not to prove
or demonstrate. Rather, it is to point out and illustrate that self-knowledge
is the most primary of human cognitions. Thus, as noted earlier, it states ex-
plicitly what is implicit in the first version. Unlike the latter, it does not con-
tain the explicit argument that the self is immaterial. An argument for the
immateriality of the self, different from the one encountered in the first ver-
sion, however, comes immediately after. This argument, no less than the
392 MICHAEL MARMURA

one in the first version, is open to the criticism that it assumes the point at
issue and that it makes a shift from the hypothetical to the categorical. For
it uses the "Flying Man' as a premise. But this example, as we have tried to
show, already assumes that the self is immaterial. Furthermore, it appeals
to this hypothetical example as though it has established the factual. The

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argument, spread over three tanbihs, is expressed in cryptic language. Its
essentials can be paraphrased as follows:
In the first tanbih,*2 Avicenna argues that self-knowledge is direct, not
mediated, on the basis that the example excludes awareness of anything
other than the self. In the second tanbih,** he argues that the self cannot be
the body since the body is apprehended by the external senses. Now, he con-
tinues, the body has apparent external parts seen and felt by our senses and
internal organs known to us only through dissection. The external parts
cannot be the self. This is because we can be "stripped" of these parts and
because these parts undergo growth and change without our losing our iden-
tity. Moreover, in "the supposition" (al-fard), that is, the "Flying Man,"
the senses are not operative and the activities of dissection enabling us to
have knowledge of our inner organs is likewise excluded. The self hence is
not the body. In the third tanbih,** Avicenna raises the question of whether
self-knowledge is mediated through one's action. This, he argues, is not the
case because, once again, "the supposition" excludes any action. Moreover
action is either general or specific. General action does not lead to the
knowledge of the particular self. The action would have to be particular; for
example, my own individual act. But when I state that I am performing an
act, the " I " is prior to my act. My act presupposes the existence of my self;
otherwise I would not refer to it as my act.
One notices in this argument, not only the appeal to the hypothetical
example as though it has established what is factual, but two other things.
The first is Avicenna's reference to it as "the supposition" (al-fard), a con-
crete indication that he is only too well aware of its hypothetical nature. The
second is that there are parts of the argument, more specifically, in the se-
cond and third tanbihs, that are quite independent of the "Flying Man."
One must also recall that the second version of the example was introduced
conjointly with an argument that is independent of it. To this one must add
that in the Psychology he devotes a whole chapter in an attempt to give a
rigorous demonstration for the immateriality of the rational soul, quite in-
dependently of the "Flying Man" and without once referring us back to this
example.45 All these consideration raise the question: Was Avicenna using
the "Flying Man" to prove in the rigorous sense of "to prove" the existence *
of the self as an immaterial entity?
The indications are that he was not. In introducing the first version, as
we have seen, he makes it quite plain that he intends to indicate "a manner
of establishing the existence of the soul we have by way of alerting and
reminding" and that this way is effective only with those capable of seeing
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 393

the truth themselves. Underlying this approach is not only the conviction
that experiential knowledge of ourselves is the most basic of our cognitions,
but that the real object of this knowledge is an immaterial entity, an ' I ' that
is totally other than the body. Some who have this proper knowledge are in-
attentive to it, distracted from it. A thought experiment, not intended,

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however, as a rigorous proof, will awaken them to this knowledge. Others,
the mutakallimun would be an example of this, have been so accustomed to
associating the body with the T that they believe that this primary self-
knowledge we have is knowledge of the body. Such people require a
rigorous rational argument to show them their error.
Turning to the condensed third version of the example, its appearance
in the Isharat wa al-Tanbihat is itself significant. This is a very intimate,
personal work, written at the end of Avicenna's life, that gives the
quintessence of his philosophy. Its mood is meditative, its tone religious,
climaxed in the moving chapter on the stations of the mystics. The work is
intended for kindred spirits, its contents, as he tells us, not to be divulged to
anyone. If we read Avicenna aright, the "Flying Man" reappears in this
work intended once again for "someone who has the power to see the truth
himself, without the need of having to educate him, constantly prod him,
and divert him from what causes sophistical errors."

Michael Marmura
University of Toronto

NOTES

1. See Etienne Gilson, "Les sources greco-arabes de l'augustinisme

avicennisant," Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 4 (1919),
pp. 38-42.
2. The studies most directly pertinent to this paper are the following: R. Ar-
naldez, "Un precedent avicennien du 'Cogito' cartesien?", Annates Islamologiques,
II (1972), pp. 341-49. Th.-A. Druart, "The Soul and Body Problem: Avicenna and
Descartes," Arabic Philosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, ed.
Th.-A. Druart (Georgetown University Press, forthcoming); an Arabic translation
of this article has already appeared in Al-Mustaqbal al-cArabi, 12 (1983), pp.
113-126. S. Pines, "La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez
Abu'l-Barakat al-Baghadadi," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du
Moyen Age, 29 (1954), pp. 21-56. F. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1952). Professor Druart's perceptive article includes com-
prehensive references to modern studies.
3. Ibn Sina, al-Shifa': al-Tabfiyyat (Physis); al-Nafs (Psychology), eds. G. C.
Anawati and S. Zayid (Cairo, 1975), I, 1, p. 11 and V, 7, p. 225; al-Isharat wa al-
Tanbihat, ed. J. Forget (Leiden, 1982), p. 119. These works will be abbreviated
Psychology and Ishat, respectively.
4. Isharat, p. 119.
5. See in particular Druart (cited in n2, above).
394 MICHAEL MARMURA

6. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Najat (Caire, 1938), p. 235. In his al-Shifa', Avicenna
states that "the existent," "the thing" and "the necessary" are primary concepts on
a par with propositional self-evident logical truths. See M. E. Marmura, "Avicenna
on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifa'," Logos Islamokos: Studia
Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, eds. R. M. Savory and D. A.
Agius (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), pp. 219-39.

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7. cAbd al-Jabbar, Sharh al-Usul al-Khamsa, ed. A. A. Uthman (Cairo, 1965),
p. 50; al-Baquillani, Kitab ai-Tamhld, ed^R. J. McCarthy (Beirut, 1957), pp. 9-10.
'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025) and al-Baqillani (d. 1013) are representative of the Muc-
tazilite and Ashcarite schools of kalam, respectively.
8. Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ahwal al-Nafs, ed. F. Ahwani (Cairo, 1952), p. 183.
9. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Kitab al-RUh (Hyderabad, 1963), p. 310.
10. Psychology, V. Viii, pp. 232-33.
11. Ibid., p. 11.
12. Ibid., p. 5.
13. Ibid., p. 7.
14. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
15. Ibid., p. 13, lines 4-6.
16. The Arabic corresponding to the relative clause beginning in the translation
with "which through . . . " is not entirely clear and I have given what I think is the
general sense. Arnaldez' translation of the sentence as "II convient done que nous
nous occupions de saisir la quiddite de cette chose qui, du point de vue de l'enonce
verbal (bi^tibar al-maqut) est devenue Tame'," is a recommended alternative ex-
cept that he reads bftibar in the indefinite, instead of the definite bi al-citibar as
given in the Cairo edition. Arnaldez, cited in n2, above, p. 344.
17. Psychology, p. 13, lines 6-8.
18. For a discussion of this term, see Arnaldez, cited in n2, above, p. 344.
17. Psychology, p. 13, lines 6-8.
18. For a discussion of this term, see Arnaldez, cited in n2, above, p. 346.
19. Alternatively, "the truth itself." What follows shows that "the truth himself"
is intended. Gramatically both alternatives are possible.
20. Psychology, pp. 221-22; 227-28.
21. Ibn Sina, al-Tcffiqat, ed. A. A. Badawi (Cairo, 1973), p. 30.
22. Shuc'ur. Pines translates the term as "l'aperception." For his discussion of
this term, see Pines, (n2, above), pp. 30ff.
23. Psychology, p. 226, line 19; p. 227, line 1.
24. Ibid., p. 13, lines 9-20.
25. J. R. Weinberg relates this statement to Aristotle's Topics, vii, 2. 152 b34. J.
R. Weinberg, "Abstraction in the Formation of Concepts," Dictionary of the
History of Ideas, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), vol.
I, pp. 3-4.
26. Isharat, p. 59. Pines (n2, above) p. 22. Pines in his article stresses this
epistemological aspect in Avicenna.
27. Ibn Sina, al-Najat, p. 62.
28. Psychology, pp. 223-27.
29. Ibid., p. 324, line 3.
30. Ibid., p. 324, lines 5-8.
31. Ibid., p. 324, lines 6-20.
32. Ibid., pp. 187-96.
33. Ibid., p. 225, line 1; p. 227, line 5.
34. Ibid., p. 225, lines 2-6.
35. Ibid., p. 225, lines 7-10.
36. Ibid., p. 225, lines 10-14.
 AVICENNA'S "FLYING MAN" IN CONTEXT 395

37. Ibn Sina, Risala Adhawiyya Fi Amr al-Mcfad, ed. H. cAsi (Beirut, 1984),
pp. 127-131. Parts of this argument, however, occur, as we shall see in Isharat, pp.
120-21, where it is related to the "Flying Man."
38. Ibn Sina, Remarks and Admonitions: Part One: Logic, translated by S. C. In-
ati (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984). See the translator's
Introduction, p. 1. A. M. Goichon, entitled her translation of the work, Livre des

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directives et remarques (Paris: Libraire Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1948) while J. Forget
gives the title of his edition of the arabic text in French as Le livre des theoremes et
des advertissements. See also Pines (n2, above), p. 28, n3.
39. The philosopher Qutb al-Din al-Razi (d. 1374) in_his Commentary on the
Isharat answers the criticisms of the theologian Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209) who in
his Commentary on the same work maintained that Avicenna in this tanbih had not
demonstrated his statements. Qutb al-Din argues that the tanbih is not intended to
give a demonstration, that this is the reason it is given the heading tanbih. In other
words, the tanbih (at least in this instance) is intended to draw attention to what is
known intuitively and which cannot be demonstrated. Ibn Sina, ql-Isharat wa al-
Tanbihat mcfa Sharh Nasir al-Din al-Tusi was Qutb al-Din al-Razi [with the Com-
mentaries ofNasir al-Din al-Tusi and Qutb al-Din al-Razl\ (Tehran, 1959), Part II,
p. 259. This work will be abbreviated as Commentaries.
40. Isharat, p. 119.
41. Commentaries, p. 293. This comment is also directed against Fakhr al-Din al-
Razi. See n39, above.
42. Isharat, p. 119.
43. Ibid., pp. 119-20.
44. Ibid., p. 120.
45. Ibid., pp. 187-96.

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