Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120034 August 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:p

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A.
No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No.
94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.

After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995,
the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.

As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is
whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The issue need not
befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al., 1 we already held thru
Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death
penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

It is apparent from these provisions that the judgment of conviction and

sentence thereunder by the trial court does not, in reality, conclude the trial of
the accused. Such trial is not terminated until the Supreme Court has reviewed
the facts and the law as applied thereto by the court below. The judgment of
conviction entered on the trial is not final, can not be executed, and is wholly
without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. In a sense the trial court acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony
and reports thereon to the Supreme Court with his recommendation. While in
practice he enters a judgment of conviction and sentences the prisoner
thereunder, in reality, until passed upon by the Supreme Court, it has none of
the attributes of a final judgment and sentence. It is a mere recommendation to
the Supreme Court, based upon the facts on the record which are presented with
it. This is meant in no sense to detract from the dignity and power of Courts of
 First Instance. It means simply that that portion of Spanish procedure which
related to cases where capital punishment was imposed still survives.

xxx xxx xxx

The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a case in which capital
punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one having for
its object simply and solely the protection of the accused. Having received the
highest penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under the law to have the
sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed
before the highest tribunal of the land to the end that its justice and legality may
be clearly and conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a
second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a
provision of the law that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions.
(emphasis supplied)

The Laguna case interpreted section 50 of General Orders No. 58 as amended, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

It shall not be necessary to forward to the Supreme Court the record, or any part
thereof, of any case in which there shall have been an acquittal, or in which the
sentence imposed is not death, unless such case shall have been duly appealed;
but such sentence shall be executed upon the order of the court in which the
trial was had. The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been
imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, and of all cases in which appeals shall have been taken shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for investigation and judgment as law and
justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of
the Supreme Court within twenty days, but not earlier than fifteen days after the
rendition of sentence.

The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Its section 2(4) of
Article VIII provided for review by this Court of death penalty cases. Both our Rules of Court of
1940 2 and 1964 3 require the transmission to this Court of the records of all cases in which the
death penalty shall have been imposed by the trial court, whether the defendant shall have
appealed or not, for review and judgment as the law and justice shall dictate. It will be noted
that these rules were taken from the second part of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
Section 4 of Act No. 194. 4

Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the
1953 case ofPeople vs. Villanueva, 5 we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death
convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his conviction, viz.:

An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed

to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary criminal case
before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the
case from the jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and
 called upon to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the
withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of
the People's Court final. In fact, as was said by this court through Justice
Moreland in the case of U. S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of
review by this court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of
conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is
wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the
Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by
the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and
sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally
passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic
review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.

The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al., 6 involves the escape of a death convict. In no
uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its
duty of reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case ofPeople vs. Daban, et al., 7 the ponencia of
former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware of

Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: "The records of all cases in which the death penalty
shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant
shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review
and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be
forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days but not
earlier than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in
the form prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be
forwarded as provided in section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing
thereof by the stenographer." The penalty imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon
in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of death, the case was
properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no
finality could be attached to lower court decision. As explained in former Chief
Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: "In this connection, it must be
emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty entered
in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force
or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta;
that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision
has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; and that until it has
been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is
not final and conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme Court is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade." The
mere fact of escape of appellant; therefore, could not be relied upon by
respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief.

Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the death penalty. 8 Section 9,
Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court.
Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of
review. Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court.
Our case law continued its fealty to the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case of People
vs.Saliling, et al., 9 we held, thru former Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not precluded
from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case of People
vs. Buynay, et al., 10 we reiterated the rule that the escape of a death convict will not
automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.

Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. 11 On December
13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous
crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to
the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death
convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option. 12

With due respect to the dissenting opinions of our esteemed colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124
of the Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant
jumps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In death
penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and tone of section 10, Rule 122,
which is the more applicable rule, viz.:

Sec. 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. — In all cases where
the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to
the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days
but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of
denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter.

Similarly, the reliance in People vs. Codilla, 13 by our dissenting colleagues is misplaced. Codilla
is not a death penalty case. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant.
Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the
proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.

Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between ". . . a death convict, i.e. one
convicted to death by a trial court who remains in the custody of the law, and who voluntarily
withdraws his appeal and a death convict,i.e., one convicted to death by the trial court but who
escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal." They rationalize the
distinction by holding:

It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws his
appeal from the trial court's judgment convicting him to death, the appellate
court may still and nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the
convict-appellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to await final
verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused no longer
recognizes and respects the authority of law and the duly-constituted authorities
in general and this Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of an escapee
cannot and should not be taken lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition
 of the authority of the Court is an essential and implicit element in an effective
and credible judicial system.

No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the

justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication via
an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another breath continuing to be
a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very authority of the system whose
protection he seeks and invokes.

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our
review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will
of the court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to
take life must be as error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however
elusive it may be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his
appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty
but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more
speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not
get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation
of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all
death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution.
The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the
innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that
shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed
above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of
the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given
the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective
wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court.
This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all
rights, a matter of societal concern that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The
importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a
problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the
public in the multiplication of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the
changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not
cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution
which recognizes that an accused, even if he belongs to a minority of one has the right to be
right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty (30) days from
notice hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused Josefina A. Esparas.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., concurs in the result.