PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI [G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.

]
BIDIN, J p:
ANDRE MARTI: went to "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying fourgift-wrapped packages. Marti
informed Anita Reyes, the proprietress, that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of
shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ
ANITA REYES: asked Marti if she could examine and inspect the packages but Marti refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Reyes no longer insisted
on inspecting the packages. The packages were placed inside a brown box. Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and
on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape. LLpr
JOB REYES: Before delivery the box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, following the SOP, he opened
the boxes for final inspection. When he opened the box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. He squeezed one of the
bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Reyes reported the shipment to the NBI and
requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. Thereafter, Reyes and
three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila. Dried marijuana leaves were
found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
NBI agents: made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects. NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail. Marti’s address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. Thus,
Marti while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves.
RTC: convicted Marti of violation ofSection 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article II and Section 2 (e)(i),
Article I of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of Marti’s constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Secs. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution)
and therefore should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Exclusionary rule: declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court [1948] wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. It must be noted, however, that in all those
cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its
law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. LLpr
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was
primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. Marti, however,
would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in
prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an
illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable
and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages
to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts.
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcels containing the rest of the
shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and
seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the
people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications
introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of
arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
HARRY STONEHILL, et. al. vs. HON. JOSE DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
[G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.]
CONCEPCION, C .J p:
RESPONDENTS: upon application, a total of 42 search warrants were issued against HARRY STONEHILL, et.
al. and/or the corporations of which they were officers, which directed to any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be
used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
HARRY STONEHILL, et. al.: allege that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents,
books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SC: issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962,
the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents
and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split
into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b)
those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners.
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court [now Sec. 4, Rule 126]: a search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense, to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, which may be anywhere in the Philippines."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded
by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. Thus, the warrants authorized the search
for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.
SC: the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three
residences of herein petitioners are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents thus seized in said residences is hereby
made permanent; and the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents,
papers and other effects seized in the 29 places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution.

LEOVIGILDO MANTARING vs. JUDGE MANUEL ROMAN, JR. [A.M. No. RTJ-93-964. February 28, 1996.]
MENDOZA, J p:
Judge Ireneo Molato: is the presiding judge of MTC of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint
was filed against him and Judge Manuel Roman, Jr., presiding judge of the RTC of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro,
by Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr., who charged them with conduct unbecoming of members of the judiciary. SC
dismissed the complaint against the two for lack of merit, and a motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied.
Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr.: filed a Supplemental Complaint against Judge Ireneo Molato, which charges him with
harassment. It is alleged that because of the filing of the first complaint against him, Judge Molato should have
inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation of a criminal case considering that the respondents in
that case were Mantaring, Sr.and his son. Instead, it is alleged, he took cognizance of the case and ordered the arrest
of complainant and his son, Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., out of hatred and revenge for them.
Judge Molato: denies the allegations against him. He avers that on the application by SPO4 Pacifico Fradejas, he
issued a search warrant which resulted in the seizure from a certain Joel Gamo of a home-made gun, a hand grenade,
five live ammunitions for Cal. 38 and three live ammunitions for 12 gauge shotgun. A complaint for Illegal Possession
of Firearms and Ammunition was filed against Joel Gamo in which Leovigildo, Sr. and his son, Leovigildo, Jr., were
included. Finding that the house in which the firearms and ammunition had been found was owned by complainant
and his son, he concluded that there was probable cause to believe that complainant and his son were guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly ordered their arrest.
Mantaring, Sr.: contends that as the search warrant was issued only against Joel Gamo and Mantaring, Jr. it was
wrong for respondent judge to find probable cause against him on the theory that, as owners of the house in which
the firearms and ammunition were found, they had constructive possession of the same.
ISSUE: W/N it was it wrong for the judge to find probable cause against Mantaring, Sr. on the theory that, as
owners of the house in which the firearms were found, they had constructive possession of the same.
SC: To begin with, it cannot be contended that Leovigildo Mantaring, Sr. could not be proceeded against simply
because he was not included in the search warrant issued against Gamo and Leovigildo Mantaring, Jr., who is
apparently his son. The determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is based solely on the evidence
presented by the complainant, regardless of whether or not the respondent in that case is named in the proceedings
for a search warrant.
SEARCH WARRANT; WARRANT OF ARREST; BASIS FOR ISSUANCE. — The issuance of a search warrant and of a
warrant of arrest requires the showing of probabilities as to different facts. In the case of search warrants, the
determination is based on the finding that (1) the articles to be seized are connected to a criminal activity and (2) they
are found in the place to be searched. It is not necessary that a particular person be implicated. On the other hand, in
arrest cases, the determination of probable cause is based on a finding that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
In this case, the arrest of herein complainant and his son, together with Joel Gamo, was ordered on the basis of
respondent's finding that the place from where the guns and ammunition were seized belonged to Leovigildo
Mantaring, Sr. and the testimonies of witnesses presented by SPO4 Fradejas. Of course complainant denies that the
house in which the firearms and ammunition were found belonged to him and claims that at the time of the search he
was in Manila. The provincial prosecutor subsequently dismissed the case against complainant on precisely these
grounds, i.e., that the house did not belong to complainant and he was in Manila at the time the search and seizure
were conducted. But to say this is not to say that respondent acted arbitrarily or that he abused his powers so as to
give ground for administrative disciplinary action against him. It is only to say that he committed an error of
judgment for which complainant's remedy is judicial.
Moreover, we think it was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against complainant
and his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to prevent a
frustration of justice. It is now settled that in issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the
investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by
searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
In this case, respondent judge ordered the issuance of warrant of arrest solely on his finding of probable cause, totally
omitting to consider the third requirement that there must be a need to place the respondent under immediate
custody "in order not to frustrate the ends of justice." The framers of the Constitution confined the determination of
probable cause as basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants to judges the better to secure the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures. Respondent judge failed to live up to this expectation by refusing
to inhibit himself even when his very impartiality was in question and worse by issuing a warrant of arrest without
determining whether or not it was justified by the need to prevent a frustration of the ends of justice.
MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs. HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR [G.R. No. 82585. November 14, 1988.]
PER CURIAM p:
LUIS BELTRAN: contends (1) they were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case by the City Fiscal was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (rendered moot and academic when the SOJ upheld the finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners); (2) that the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when the RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause; and (3) he question whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against them through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
It may also be added that with respect to Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare
Proceeding Closed", in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law
does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
ISSUE: W/N the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when the RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause;
The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by
the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law", has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the issuance
of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. But this
privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character or the
publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after
receiving the evidence of the parties. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
NICOMEDES SILVA @ "Comedes", MARLON SILVA @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA vs. HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC OF NEGROS ORIENTAL [G.R. No. 81756. October 21, 1991.],
FERNAN, C.J p:
Ranulfo Villamor, Jr.: as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, filed an "Application for Search
Warrant" with the RTC against Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. This application was accompanied by a
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Arthur Alcoran and Leon Quindo.
Judge Nickarter Ontal: on the same day, pursuant to such, issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police
officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Pertinent portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows: prLL
"It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining [under] oath MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr. and his
witnesses Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession and
control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good
and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's
Room (Rgt. side 1st Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are: (Subject of the offense stated
above and Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.) In the course of the search, the serving
officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.
Antonieta Silva: filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only
authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or
refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
NICOMEDES SILVA: filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole
basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by
merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching
questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Judge Eugenio Cruz: who had replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit,
finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by Judge Cruz.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality
SC: YES. We rule for petitioners.Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to
personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. Based on the aforecited constitutional
and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable
cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search
Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he
must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine
the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which
was submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. There were only four questions asked:
(1) Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?" Yes, sir.
(2) Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the
offense, used or obtain or intended to be used as means of committing an offense?" Yes, sir. LexLib
(3) Do you know personally who is the person who has the property in his possession and control?" Yes, sir.
(4) How did you know all this (sic) things?"Through discreet surveillance."
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded
to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and
all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is
highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate
the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of
personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for
personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise
abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void.

ESTEBAN MORANO vs. HON. MARTINIANO VIVO, in his capacity as Acting Commissioner of Immigration
[G.R. No. L-22196. June 30, 1967.]
SANCHEZ, J p:
Chan Sau Wah: is a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China. She arrived in the Philippines on November 23, 1961 to
visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left in mainland China two of her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw
and Fu Yan Kai. With her was Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage, born in Hongkong. Chan Sau
Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted entry into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two
months and after they posted a cash bond of P4,000.
Esteban Morano: a native-born Filipino citizen married Chan Sau Wah on January 24, 1962. Born to this union on
September 16, 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun
obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962.
Commissioner of Immigration: ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before
September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the
confiscation of their bond. Instead of leaving the country, Chan Sau Wah petitioned the CFI for mandamus to compel
the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel petitioner's Alien Certificates of Registration; prohibition to stop the
Commissioner from issuing warrants of arrest pending resolution of this case.
CFI: issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a P2,000-bond. After trial, CFI rendered judgment
granting the petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with respect to CHAN SAU WAH, who is hereby declared a
citizen of the Philippines; ordering the respondent to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other
immigration papers upon the payment of proper dues; and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her
permanent admission, prohibiting the Commissioner from arresting and/or deporting Chan SauWah. CFI dismissed
the petition with respect to FU YAN FUN. CFI took the position that "Chan Sau Wah became, by virtue of, and upon,
her marriage to Esteban Morano, a natural-born Filipino, a Filipino citizen." [Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act 473]
To apply this provision, two requisites must concur: (a) a valid marriage of an alien woman to a citizen of the
Philippines; and (b) the alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized. In a series of cases, this court has declared
that the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must
satisfactorily show that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization
Law. Upon the principle of selective citizenship, we cannot afford to depart from the wise precept affirmed and
reaffirmed in the cases heretofore noted. In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that
Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Because of all these, we
are left under no doubt that petitioner Chan Sau Wah did not become a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: W/N Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is constitutional?
"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commission of Immigration after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: xxx xxx xxx
(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a
nonimmigrant."

Petitioners argue that the legal precept just quoted trenches upon the constitutional mandate in Section 1 (3), Article
III of the Constitution. They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and
that the legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of Rights.
SC: YES. It is CONSTITUTIONAL. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution does not require judicial intervention
in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision
by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation. It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is
not constitutionally proscribed. The petition for mandamus and prohibition is hereby denied
Concededly, Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 15
just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last
paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of
Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Immigration Act.
The gravamen of petitioner's argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino,
Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her
deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by
the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and
ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT vs.HON. COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION [G.R. No. 82544. June 28, 1988.]
MELENCIO-HERRERA,J p:
Andrew Harvey and John Sherman: are both American nationals while Adriaan Van Den Elshout is a Dutch citizen
all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. They were apprehended from their respective residences by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. They were among the
22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two days after apprehension, 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left
the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working
without a valid working visa. Thus, of the 22,only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Seized during petitioners' apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes
shown in salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature
advertising the child prostitutes. Deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable
aliens under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical to public
morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of
the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Andrew Harvey later filed a
Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation". However, it appears that on the same
date that it was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ANDREW HARVEY, et. al.: question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures
since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said
provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they
are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their
arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by
any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
SC: We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not.One of the
constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable
cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof"
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer
or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three months
during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the
seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.Those articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence.
But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal
deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were
issued against them on March 7, 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of theImmigration Act and Section 69 of
the Administrative Code." A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against
their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed.
Where a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed
against the detainee, his petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic". It is a fundamental rule that a writ
of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning. That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS ACHACOSO as Admin. of POEA [G.R. No. 81510. March 14, 1990.]
SARMIENTO,J p:
Rosalie Tesoro: in a sworn statement filed with the POEA charged Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment. Tesoro
alleged that she was summoned by Salazar upon her return from Japan. Salazar took her PECC Card, promising a
“booking”in Japan. Even after 9 mos., Salazar failed to follow through on the promised booking, so Tesoro went to
another company, but Salazar refused to return Tesoro’s PECC Card. Having ascertained that Salazar had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, Tomas Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under PD 1920 and EO 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency and the seizure
of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having
verified that you have: (1) No valid license or authority from DOLE to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

An office order designated a team to implement the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. The group, assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen, proceeded to the residence of the petitioner. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure
order on Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. The team confiscated assorted costumes
which were duly receipted for by Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Flora Salazar.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR: filed with POEA a letter, requesting that personal properties seized at her residence be
immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
She contends that: (1) she has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order violates
"due process of law"; (2) the acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."; (3)
3. The premises invaded are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the
personal properties were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with
grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
RPC. Before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition. POEA filed a criminal complaint against her.
Petitioner then filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli,thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) may validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
SC: NO. Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Article 38(c) of
the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by PD 1920 and 2018 of
the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to PD 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of
the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers “to
recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.” Marcos promulgated PD 1920, with the
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest
and closure powers. Marcos also promulgated PD2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well.
The above has now been etched as Article 38(c) of the Labor Code. The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as
the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process.
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c),of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,
governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We
have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because
of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs.
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to
order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
domain of the courts. Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the
things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of
the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search; 2. The exception is
in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration
may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
NARCISO ALVAREZ vs. CFI OF TAYABAS and ANTI-USURY BOARD [G.R. No. 45358. January 29, 1937.]
IMPERIAL, J p:
ANTI-USURY BOARD: presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the CFI of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that
according to reliable information, NARCISO ALVAREZ kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own
knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in
question, CFI issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition.
With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7:00 PM and
seized and took possession of 19 articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, etc. The
search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of NARCISO ALVAREZ who stated his protest
on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents.
As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner filed a
motion, praying that the Anti-Usury Board be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the
clerk of court. The Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that it be authorized to retain the articles seized for a
period of 30 days for the necessary investigation.
NARCISO ALVAREZ: asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the CFI of Tayabas, ordering the search of his
house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging
to him in his residence, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the
articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him. They
allege that the search warrant issued was illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith.
ISSUE: W/N the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the CFI authorizing the retention
of the books and documents, are illegal?
HELD: YES. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed
by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace
and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and
papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in
favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by
them. Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or
search warrants must be strictly construed.
The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders, No. 58, and it is
said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All
illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured. In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the
oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner
was subjected.
The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation
thereof, the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the
search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavit that the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon
it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at
night.

SORIANO MATA vs. HON. JOSEPHINE BAYONA [City Court of Ormoc] [G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984.]
DE CASTRO, J p:
SORIANO MATA: is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that he
offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any
authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."
Mata challenged the validity of the search warrant issued by JUDGE JOSEPHINE BAYONA for its failure to comply
with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. Mata contends that the search warrant was based
merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully
subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on
the part of the Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of the
Criminal Case.
Mata claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led petitioner to file a motion to quash
and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4
of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
JUDGE JOSEPHINE BAYONA: denied the motion, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo Goles and Reynaldo Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of the Police
District II INP. The court made a certification to that effect, and the fact that documents relating to the search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.
ISSUE: W/N the subject search warrant is invalid, and consequently all the articles confiscated under such warrant
are inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
SC: YES. The search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such
written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no
"deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore
quoted. Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man,
woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She
claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to
conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement
verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a
witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the
testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer,
in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. The searching questions propounded
to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long
as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one
authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit
the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing. LexLib
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro vs.
Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO [G.R. No. 109633. July 20, 1994.]
MELO, J p:
Judge Arturo de Guia: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP, he issued in the morning of
September 4, 1991 a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the premises of Normando
del Rosario’s house located at 828 R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City. However, the search warrant was not
implemented immediately due to the lack of police personnel to form the raiding team.
At about 9:00 PM of that day, a raiding team was finally organized. In the final briefing of the raiding team at the
police station, it was agreed upon that PO1 Venerando Luna will buy shabu from del Rosario and after his return
from del Rosario’s house, the raiding team will implement the search warrant. A marked money consisting of a P100
bill was given by the Station Commander to PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook. PO1 Luna with a
companion proceeded to appellant's house to implement the search warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at appellant's house.
They found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, plastik .22 caliber atop the TV set, three used
ammunition in a cup and three wallets, one containing the marked money. They also found inside a show box
aluminum foils, napkins and a burner. The seized items were photographed thereat. SPO3 Untiveros issued receipts
for the seized items with Barangay Capt. Maigue and appellant's sister Norma as signing witnesses. He also made a
return of the seized items to the court.
At police station, the seized items were taped and initialed. The next day, it was forwarded to NBI Forensic Chemist
for laboratory analysis of the aluminum foil containing suspected shabu bought by PO1 Luna from appellant in the
buy-bust operation as well as the aluminum foils containing suspected marijuana which were confiscated by virtue of
the search warrant. The findings of NBI Forensic disclosed that all the specimen submitted to her for laboratory
analysis gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride. Normando del Rosario was charged before the
RTC Cavite City with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs, under two
informations. RTC: found del Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the above-entitled cases.
ISSUE: Normando del Rosario may be convicted of the offenses charges.
HELD: NO. Foremost among the inadequacies of the prosecution is its failure to call to the witness stand PO1
Verando Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer. There is, thus, a total absence of evidence to establish the purported sale of
shabu by accused-appellant to Venerando Luna, the supposed poseur-buyer. The omission to present the poseur-
buyer casts serious doubts that an illegal sale of a dangerous drug actually took place.
According to the version of the prosecution, during the alleged buy-bust operation, accused-appellant handed over to
Luna, the alleged poseur-buyer, a quantity of shabu, and Luna in turn paid accused-appellant a marked 100 bill and
then returned to the police station and informed the raiding team that he had already bought the shabu from accused-
appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house of accused-appellant to implement the search warrant.
The version of the prosecution is highly incredible. The usual procedure in a buy-bust operation is for the police to
arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is the
every reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust" operation. The police poseur-buyer "buys" dangerous
drugs from the pusher and "bust" (arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over the drug to the police officer.
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or confiscated at the
residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much-
delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police officers found him
lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of
the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in only after the
policemen had already entered accused-appellant's residence, and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample
time to plant the shabu. Corollary to the constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is the rule that in order to convict an accused, the circumstances of the
case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly
seized at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the information alleging that the "accused,
without legal authority did . . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containing Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride
. . .". Sale is totally different from possession. Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of a crime which is not charged
in the information for to do so would deny him the due process of law. Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only
the search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu
and its paraphernalia". WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is
hereby ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GABRIEL GERENTE [G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.]
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
Gabriel Gerente: at about 7:00 AM, together with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking
marijuana in the house of Gerente which is about six meters away from the house of Edna Edwina Reyes, the
prosecution witness, who was in her house that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention to kill
Clarito Blace. She heard Fredo saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy allegedly seconded
Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Gerente allegedly agreed: "Sige, papatayin natin mamaya."
The three carried out their plan to kill Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Fredo struck the first blow against
Blace, followed by Totoy and Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace behind the house of Gerente.
Patrolman Jaime Urrutia: at about 4:00 PM, received a report about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela
District Hospital where Blace was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival.
The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Urrutia, together
with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident
took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They
were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of Gerente who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and
they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse in his pocket
which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the NBI for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana. Only Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects,
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. Two separate informations were filed against Gerente for Violation of
Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder. Upon trial, the court rendered a decision convicting him of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of Gerente’s
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized
from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.
HELD: NO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. The Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a
piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness,
Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed Gerente as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating
that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. LL
People vs. Malasugui: To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens
of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless
he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for
concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or
within his immediate control may be seized."
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL, and NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE vs. FIDEL RAMOS
[G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.]
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the
similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents
to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without
further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not
available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in
court against them. LexLib
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the
persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and
that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or
instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, which provides:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
en offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or
when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated
by this Court in the case ofPeople vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have
been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed
against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of
the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31
January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred
to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando
Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified. cdphil
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto Umil,
Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the
respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural,it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
"From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is, therefore,
without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and
existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-
violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to
quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of
violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a
rebellion or insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while
any of these contingencies continue cannot be less justified. . . ." 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double
Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as
held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
"In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the defendant was actually in
court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To
this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we
find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been
released on a writ of habeas corpusor now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need
not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error."
II.
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is also
justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and
other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in
Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit
or authority to possess. LLpr
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who
had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as
"Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia" a staff member in charge of
finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He also pointed to
a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-
NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988,
pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service,
National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1 ) Colt M1 6A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK 8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transceiver SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1 ) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of
Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a
regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato
Constantino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka
Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.
Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number of
Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead
provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August
1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents
and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted a search in the
presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals,
vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition for
a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and
a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the
voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of them. As a
result, the said other occupants of the house were released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an information
charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against
Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at
P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot
and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution. LLjur
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and or members of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention
must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/ or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was
justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to possess
them.
III.
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is
also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried
firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T.
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was
still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When
frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license
to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live
ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing five (5) live
ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "KaTed", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by
their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the Provincial
Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The
cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the
informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary
investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a
Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous
warrant of arrest, is without merit. The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a
preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first
conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer,
a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the
corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused may
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:
"This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of
the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is
reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court.
Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.
IV.
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since she
had with her an unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988,
agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by
Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at
Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head
of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya armed in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result,
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not
produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD
1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It
was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary
investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is
justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to
waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
V.
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did
not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no
evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to
accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers
of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely nothing
in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of
P15,000.00 on each on their heads.' " 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the
petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
". . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful
search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave
St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing
expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads
provided by former members of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. To
date, nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication equipment,
firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his group were
coming to his place, reasonably conducted a 'stake-out' operation whereby some members of the raiding team were
left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra
arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities,
found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and
Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino's residence considering that Constantino's
information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the
part of the military agents, not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested
thereat?.
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without warrant
considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's
telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and
Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place and circumstances
of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioners' arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e,
firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but were arrested in such
time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving
utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.".
VI.
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is
detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng
Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the
Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection. cdll
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home
located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a
group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him,
but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was
interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent
Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since
petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a
press conference at the National Press Club.
"Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988, to force the government to give in to their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan
ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president
Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on
November 23, 1988." 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen
the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
"Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi
binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa
ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na." 10 (emphasis supplied).
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to
police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the
Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he
may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However,
we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso Nazareno that
he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the
morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and
Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who
was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up
Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's
guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2)
others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case
is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731. cdphil
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the law.
Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil
Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs.
Ancheta: 12
"The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the
existence of an act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person
sought to be detained participated therein."
VIII.
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against
the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
"Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment." (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners' plea for the Court to re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement
in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the person
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment is issued by the court where said information has been
filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to
enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides with the
basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible
the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a
petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the
courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an
obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the Rules
of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As
the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the
answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained
person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but
rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into
every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention — from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment
the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is
what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for
petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO [G.R. No. 93239. March 18, 1991.]
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act, under
an Information which reads:
"That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of
Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
acting as a pusher or broker in the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and - or
distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law
have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried
marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold
one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer." (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence with
the period for which he has undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All the
items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State." (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning the following as
errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4",
TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT THE SAME
WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS
NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF
PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND SENTENCING
HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF P20,000.00.
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:
"On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi,
Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2, 1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer,
Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to
a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported
the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30
P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant. (pp. 18-19, ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team
caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon
seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp 6-8,
TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison
Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the
corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside
the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory
Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all
found positive of marijuana. (pp. 4-7, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is
lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted under Section 2,
Artilce III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a
search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the activities of the
accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is
considered lawful. The rule states:
"Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;" (Emphasis supplied).
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an
arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516
[1910]).
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor the activities of the
accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro talk to some
persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the
time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was caught throwing the
marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly
indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of
which the police officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious
activity. cdphil
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police officers have
personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the
accused. Thus, it stated:
"When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take place and while positioned at
a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty
meters away from them (the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a
wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while
Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies were based on their actual
and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within
hearing distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on hushed tones, but they were certainly
near enough to observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all
law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the
contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of
Sucro's activities even prior to the former s joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three
days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after Fulgencio
joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that
because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in
such activity. However, because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday,
he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is
paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, et al. (G.R. No.
88017, January 21, 1991):
"In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which
appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of
arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case."
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
"There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at
checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more
reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant
who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband."
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,
143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that the evidence obtained
therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence. LLpr
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could be
merely to escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:
"The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his
willingness to testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from
his lips. As explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are usually their customers,
especially if as in this case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We accept
this observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law
enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the real felons in our society. We have observed
the demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his
declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and disposition to tell the truth" (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it
being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position
to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, et al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA
745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970])
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers Fulgencio and
Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish
their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers
perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on
Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986])
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the items seized were all
positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's defense is alibi which is unavailing
considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and cousin distributing
handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was
present in the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet
Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the appellant as the seller of the
prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])
Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged.
The trial court's decision must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Sucro, G.R. No. 93239, [March 18, 1991], 272-A PHIL 362-371)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DON RODRIGUEZA [G.R. No. 95902. February 4, 1992.]
REGALADO, J p:
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, finding accused-appellant
Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and costs. 1
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of criminal cases,
recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's
Brief) filed with the Court. We have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary evidence in this case
and we find said recommendation to be well taken. cdrep
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia and Antonio
Lonceras, with allegedly having in their custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a
buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of P200.00. 2
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At the trial, the prosecution
and the defense presented several witnesses after which the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia
and Antonio Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein appellant as hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court and the evidence presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of
the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Moliñawe, CIC
Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem, when a confidential informer
arrived and told them that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major
Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was given P200.00 in different denominations to
buy marijuana. These bills were treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory
(PCCL). Sgt. Moliñawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel
Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and
when he returned, he was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don, herein appellant. 3
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio
Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object
wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran
returned to the headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana. 4
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the
evening of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Moliñawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested
appellant, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest
when they apprehended the three accused. The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for investigation. 5
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza,
father of appellant. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized by any search warrant. 6
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant was detained. An affidavit,
allegedly taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no
counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation. The arrestees were also examined by
personnel of the PCCL and were found positive for ultraviolet powder. 7
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the evening of July 1, 1987 listening to the radio. Later, he ate his
merienda and then went out to buy cigarettes from the store. While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him.
Several armed men alighted therefrom and ordered him to get inside the jeep. He refused but he was forced to board
the vehicle. He was even hit by the butt of a gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was investigated and was repeatedly asked regarding
the whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the
camp. He was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet powder. When he was taken to the PCCL and
examined, he was found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to sign some papers but he did not
know what they were all about. 9
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City.
He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother arrived and told him that
their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. Appellant went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived
there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about
the marijuana incident, to which question he answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00
bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and
was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of
marijuana. 1 0
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in (1) admitting in evidence the
sworn statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of
the crime charged despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves allegedly bought from him were not
properly identified; (3) convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution
is weak and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling or at least acting as
broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 11
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for his acquittal. In disposing of this case, however, we
feel that the issues raised by appellant should properly be discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught
redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based
on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC
Taduran immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of
CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the
natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on
his part to let appellant escape without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a
dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by appellant was squarely placed in issue and, as
correctly pointed out by the defense, said sworn statement is inadmissible in evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him."
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel during custodial examination. He was also asked if he was waiving his right to be
assisted by counsel and he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a person under custodial
investigation may be waived, such waiver must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but also in
the presence and with the assistance of counsel. 13 In the present case, the waiver made by appellant being without
the assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to invalidate said sworn statement. 14
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in admitting in evidence against appellant the
articles allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. cdll
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by the proper government authority. 15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed government
authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises
waives his right against such incursion; 16 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 when it is made on
vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18 when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing
violations of smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; 20or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a search
may be validly made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not
authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the aforementioned
cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been
their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and
other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were
submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following
items:
"One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. 'A' — Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. 'B' — Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic
labelled 'Robertson'.
Exh. 'C' — Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of
seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. 'D' — Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a
total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. 'E' — One plastic syringe." 22
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the
basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24 this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the
dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must
be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. cdphil
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness will not affect his credibility. It even
enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has not been rehearsed. 25 However, when the inconsistencies
pertain to material and crucial points, the same detract from his overall credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious flaws and material inconsistencies rendering the
same incredible. 26
CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of the place where the buy-
bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he did not even know the exact place and the identity of
the person from whom he was to buy marijuana leaves. Thus:
"FISCAL TOLOSA:
Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?
WITNESS.
A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although we occasionally passed there.
Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that afternoon?
A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already been conducted (sic) surveylance (sic) in the vicinity.
Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?
A By the road, sir.
Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at Tagas?
A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.
Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?
A According to him, we could get some." 27
The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he declared that they arrested
the three accused all at the same time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987. But, in his cross-examination and as
corroborated by the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 28 submitted by him and Moliñawe, it appeared that Lonceras and
Segovia were arrested on different times and that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were arrested.
Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a much later time.
With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to give more credibility to the testimony of appellant
Rodrigueza. While it is true that appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a
criminal prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth in his testimony. Firstly,
the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night
of July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that appellant Rodrigueza was not with them when they were
apprehended by the NARCOM agents.
Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in prosecuting the accused was also revealed during the trial
of the case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia,
testified that Sgt. Moliñawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed from the service, asked for P10,000.00 from each
of them in exchange for the liberty of the accused. 29 This allegation was never refuted by the prosecution. Hence, the
rule laid down by this Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit 30 has no
application in the case at bar.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 31 As clearly shown by the evidence, the
prosecution has failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to appellant.
This being the case, appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and imaginary imputations against
him.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-
appellant Don Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is hereby ordered that he be immediately
released from custody unless he is otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Rodrigueza, G.R. No. 95902, [February 4, 1992], 282 PHIL 829-842)

ROLITO GO vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 101837. February 11, 1992.]
FELICIANO, J p:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was
driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson
St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson
and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car,
walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol.
Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come from; they
were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a
facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of
the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot
Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt for
petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed
petitioner, in the Presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that
he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute
any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court,
the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). prcd
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did
not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was filed. Petitioner also
prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, acting on the omnibus
motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection to petitioner being granted
provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date,
approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation 8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that petitioner
had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who also agreed to
recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of petitioner's omnibus
motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1) the 12 July
1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to surrender
himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation was
recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11
July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was,
however, denied by respondent Judge. LLphil
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to the
Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on 23
August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit
petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In view, however,
of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The trial court then set the criminal
case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in view of
public respondents' failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a
month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus. 13 The petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his
arraignment on the ground that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2) petitions, on
the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
"freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police
station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one
witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right to
preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had the
inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by the trial
judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the Provincial
Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court issued a
Resolution directing respondent Judge to held in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders
from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful warrantless
arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether petitioner had
effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim. LLphil
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been validly
arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had
been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police
Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc. v. Ramos et al., 17 where a majority
of the Court upheld a warrantless arrest as valid although effected fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection
with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for murder even without
preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not
been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had
been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not apply in respect of
petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case,
misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of
petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen (14) days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that
such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed
organization like the New Peoples Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested was
murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in time and space. No
one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantless "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section
7."
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously were not
present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just
been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which
the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that
petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out
to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of
Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
"Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for
an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party,
peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of
the offended party or arresting office or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer,
a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the
corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. Cdpr
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."
(Underscoring supplied).
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state
that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain
Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required
petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and
that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been arrested;
with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we note
that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As earlier
pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner filed
with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General
contends that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that
petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that
waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The
preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the
time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the Regional
Trial Court; it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion
was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v. Mogul, 19 this Court held:
"The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is
true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court
or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in
the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of
the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. . . ." 20 (Citations omitted, underscoring supplied).
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a
reinvestigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the trial
court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation
(attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in
effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary investigation on
the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was five (5)
days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in
factgrant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken)
supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-
day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been substantially complied with. LexLib
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component
part of due process in criminal justice. 20 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound
over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere
formal or technical right; it is asubstantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged
anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant case
considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 21In the instant case,
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely
asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, 22 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." 23 In the instant case, petitioner Go
asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner
and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation
on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate
one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary investigation,
while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not
impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 24
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was equivalent
to an acknowledgment on the part of the prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was not strong.
Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and
requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering
that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to respondent Judge that
could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It follows that petitioner was entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the merits has
already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's
right to a preliminary investigation and secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be
entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain
entitled to be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary
investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in
abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 25 It is true that the prosecutor might, in
view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand,
the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of
probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner was notaccorded what he was entitled to by
way of procedural due process. 26 Petitioner was forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without
preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment and trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking. During the
proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before
arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because
of the denial of preliminary investigation. 27 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protest and
objection that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace
him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, just before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through
counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation; petitioner's counsel
made or record his "continuing objection." 28 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his
detention. 29 If he did not walkout on the trial, and if he cross-examined the Prosecution's witnesses, it was because
he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficioselected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being
held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.
In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released on bail
as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of
the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be
up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.
To reach any other conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail
were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the deprivation
of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to
dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to
accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out ultimately to be
largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any case, it would not
be idle ceremony; rather it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of its own people and a re-
affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court
dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
September 1991 hereby REVERSED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the
charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15)
days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court may
issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary
investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Go y Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, [February 11, 1992], 283 PHIL 24-58)

ROMEO POSADAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 89139. August 2, 1990.]
GANCAYCO, J p:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members
of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his
attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade 3 a and two (2)
live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In
the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and
the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after
a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the
offense charged as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged.
It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68,
par. 2), he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the
costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court
is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City." 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision
was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and
seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against
him. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest
without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
(6a, 17a)"
From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or
private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers
and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance
with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee
they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. llcd
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded
by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
"Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to
determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should
prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis supplied)."
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former,
it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and
it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too
late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:
". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions. Thus
in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot
be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure becomes
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured."
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General: cdphil
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two
men repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third
man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated that
they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked them for
their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and frisked him.
Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The United States
Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to
occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo while
obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated." 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Posadas y Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, [August 2, 1990], 266 PHIL 306-313)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE [G.R. No. 87059. June 22, 1992.]
CRUZ, J p:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the
stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon
was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the
poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial
judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to
side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from
them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division. LLpr
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T.
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified
the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13,
1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the
articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the
firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted" on him at the
time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B and C and admitted over the
objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction
for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident
of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The
defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and
should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding
for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which
itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that
the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of
the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may without a warrant, arrest a
person: Cdpr
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of
this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-
appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts
"created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had
been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could
possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not
exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been
different if Mengote had been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a
darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly
after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the
clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the
noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from
side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the
prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that
there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard.
The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending
crime. LLpr
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was
a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind
the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he surreptitiously
examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure
that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred
from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the
other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution
has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of
the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the police
headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein.8 As for
the illegal possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion)
that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledgeof the fact. The offense must also be committed in is presence or within his
view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a
crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be
committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the
arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis
supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his
abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person
with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it.
This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to
sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote
(which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed
to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the
brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional
rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward
makes her representation even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution
of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better
of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the
vital evidence they had invalidly seized. LLpr
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons
who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by
those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and
ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Mengote y Tejas, G.R. No. 87059, [June 22, 1992], 285 PHIL 642-651)

SAMMY MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997.]
SYNOPSIS
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner was charged with violating Section
3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for keeping, possessing and/or acquiring a hand grenade, without first securing the
necessary license and permit from the proper authorities. On arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court a quo found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under the said law and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum and not more than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the
record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision. Unable to accept conviction, petitioner filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent court
erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and legal.
The Supreme Court finds the petition impressed with merit. For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in
criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the
penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to the Court and not the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the challenged decision immediately fall in jurisdictional grounds. Additionally, the Court is convinced that
the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty. First, serious doubts surrounds the story of
police office Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify in
court the grenade he allegedly seized. Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier
he was with the group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to the police officers. Lastly, even assuming
that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation police officer Serapio, such
admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. Verily, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. In view
thereof, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside for lack of jurisdiction and on ground of
reasonable doubt.
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866, 2 as follows: LLjur
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license
and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," 4 while the
prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the
time they arrested petitioner. 5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the
arresting officer; Josefino C. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station
No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard
near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]their eyes . . . moving very fast." 6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes.
The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul
Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No.
3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was
going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former
were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the
corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion,
since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner. 9
Josefino C. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were
brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects,
informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite
Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of
a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer available,
wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and
booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action
Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was inadmissible in
evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among other things, the
examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt.
Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the
subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination
of the grenade, he "found that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all
present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification
stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the
Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch
a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen
searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two
others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer
showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer
then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me."
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police
officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found
on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a "stop and frisk," where a
"warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information."15 Probable cause was
not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation,
hence to require probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions
were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of
evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously,
considering the time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in
different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a
limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to
pursue his investigation without fear of violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since
petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury
Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However,
the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a
notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE
INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND
ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the conditions provided for
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand
grenade seized, inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision
be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner
abandoned his original theory before the court a quothat the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second,
the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an
issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from
petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there
was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and in the company of other
suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d]
been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need
not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site especially during times of
political upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply
too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased
petitioner two days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was
about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to
mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent
persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that
there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in saying that the probable
cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of
everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which petitioner relied upon, was
inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street
[would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to
put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a
bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot patrols for about
seven days to observe suspicious movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no
personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before
he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT
FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest and
search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the
evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally,
petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the
Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial
court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as
minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OFRECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully possess grenades
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period toreclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the
minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should
have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
(B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in
view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's decision to this Court, yet the trial
court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the
appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the
comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties
as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed to establish
petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over
to his commander after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate
this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what
the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but
nearly seven (7) months later or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo
received was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade
passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to,
identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized
from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so
crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a group about to detonate
an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that
Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then
unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note
that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern
petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police
officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and
Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid
as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid,
as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in
flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and
(6) a "stop and frisk." 35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the
grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the
nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search
the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing
violence. 38
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner
could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of
outer clothing for weapons," as laid down inTerry; thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40 it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by
any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this
likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to
further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of
five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and
his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly
declared on cross-examination: cdrep
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any commotion?
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir. 42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon.
None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that
petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was
tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his person. 43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2
and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988
is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10
February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y
MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention
is justified for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Malacat y Mandar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, [December 12, 1997], 347 PHIL 462-492)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN [G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]
CRUZ, J p:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found
guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and
finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a
"thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted. 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by
name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis
of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of
a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed.
His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged
to have been carrying was not properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room
of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to
Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending
P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret
pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers
nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 1 6 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and
gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he
said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate
access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of
tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose
the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant
fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really
beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or
realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been
allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and
searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against
him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed
this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section
6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they
had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before
the arrest, 20another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the
declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follow:
"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer, prior to
June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal
gambling operation.
"COURT:
"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also receive any
report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin?
"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
"Q What were those activities?
"A Purely marijuana trafficking.
"Q From whom did you get that information?
"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and we cannot
identify the person.
"Q But you received it from your regular informer?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. LLARIZA:
"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
"A Marijuana, sir.
"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days
before you received the intelligence report in writing?
"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days before?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that Aminnudin was coming?
"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time
when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he
has already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
"COURT:
"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you sure of that?
"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered information to the
effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
"A Only on the 23rd of June.
"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence
report?
"A No, more.
"Q Why not?
"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant anymore?
"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme
Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by
him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention
of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law.
The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it
has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of what are popularly called "buy-bust"
operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused
was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a
judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship,
when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only
ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution
and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying,
that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he
will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That
evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the
marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search
was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our
law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible
youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for
the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers
with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some
criminal should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is
innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so
ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT [G.R. No. 91107. June 19, 1991.]
PADILLA, J p:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused)
was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-
0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch
the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City,
then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a
Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint
at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be
a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped
to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain
hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the
same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of
his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that
the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom
he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other identification
papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing, among others, his
passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the
bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was
told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not
give credence to accused's defense. LibLex
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such
defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform
the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months
after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article II ofRepublic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 425, as amended.
SO ORDERED." 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the
search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need
to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances. 6
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
(6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime. LLphil
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. 8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 9
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence
of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. 12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way
to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian
travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search
warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located
at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on
information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an
informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused
was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only when one of the
officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to
present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed
to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an
innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when
required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the
NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal
effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as
well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the
NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM
agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, [June 19, 1991], 275 PHIL 447-472)
RODEL LUZ vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012.]
SERENO, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 2and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),which sustained the version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic
enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who
was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle
without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to
come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-
station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance,
he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he
told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1)
Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other
hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.
In its 19 February 2009 Decision, 4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs 5 committed
on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic
violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later
found to contain shabu.The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13)
years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper
disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED. 6
Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC's Decision.
On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 1 September
2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
(i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
(iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN
COMPROMISED.
(iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE
DOUBT (sic). 7
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the
finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with
violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the
search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and
Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle
drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself
admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down
and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he
could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. ....8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised
as errors. 9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner.When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. 10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. 11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized
by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto,
or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate
a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The
period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle
his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of
his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual 12 provides the following procedure for flagging
down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. — This rule is a general concept and
will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: ...
m.If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report
(TVR).Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicle's
occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner
into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest,
by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of action" of the driver and
the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman's
signal to stop one's car or, once having stopped, to drive away without permission. ...
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent.
Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations
in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts
upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced "to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely,"Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S.,at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a
traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes.
A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a
short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may
then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect,
questioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is
prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators
the answers they seek. See id.,at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police.To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge
that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the
detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. ...
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop," see Terry v. Ohio,392
U.S. 1 (1968),than to a formal arrest....The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains
the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such
stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
xxx xxx xxx
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated
with formal arrest." California v. Beheler,463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam).If a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical purposes, he
will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason,429 U.S. 492, 495
(1977) (per curiam).(Emphasis supplied.)
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while
still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been
apprised of his Miranda rights),and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional
equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his
traffic citation was being made.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a
crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need
not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a
corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down
for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were
not complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against
them. 14 It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only afterpetitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
In Berkemer,the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a person apprehended due to a
traffic violation:
The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive
suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures" "generated by the custodial setting itself,"
"which work to undermine the individual's will to resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as they are by
questioning of persons suspected of felonies.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and
while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second time — after
the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs — as he was already in their custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15 None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner's pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. 16
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence. 17 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of
his pocket. 18
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a
secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the
questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given. 19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the
morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid
consent to a warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. 20
In Knowles v. Iowa, 21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for speeding and
correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to
conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-blown search when the
officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown:
In Robinson, supra,we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. ...But
neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the
present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale — officer safety — is "'both legitimate and weighty,'" ...The threat to officer
safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we
stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the
taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U.S.,at 234-235. We recognized that
"[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty,
and not from the grounds for arrest." Id.,at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief
encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ...than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty,468 U.S.
420, 439 (1984).See also Cupp v. Murphy,412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest ...a person might well
be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See
Mimms, supra,at 110; Wilson,supra,at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the
"minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the
often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges,
officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they
may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra,at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra,at 414; perform a
"patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v.
Ohio,392 U.S. 1 (1968);conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable
suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long,463 U.S. 1032,
1049 (1983);and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant
to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton,453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest — the need to discover and
preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to
prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the
person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his
arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of
the accused. 26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region,
Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. nPetitioner Rodel
Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED. The bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is CANCELLED and RELEASED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Luz y Ong v. People, G.R. No. 197788, [February 29, 2012], 683 PHIL 399-415)
RODOLFO ESPANO vs.COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo
Espano for violation of Article II Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. The records of the case reveal that herein petitioner was caught in possession of and under his
custody twelve plastic cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana which is a
prohibited drug. In his appeal before the Supreme Court, petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred
in convicting him because (1) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (2) the superiority of his constitutional
right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) he was denied the constitutional
right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (4) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant
and not properly identified. CIScaA
The Supreme Court finds that there was no compelling reason to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate
courts. In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the
defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by
reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
his official duty must prevail. Furthermore, the defense of alibi set up by petitioner deserved scant consideration. He
simply contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. Lastly, the two cellophane bags of
marijuana seized were admissible in evidence because he was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers. However, as for the other ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's
residence, the same are inadmissible in evidence considering that the said bags were seized at petitioner's house after
his arrest, hence, do not fall under the exceptions provided under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. In
view thereof, the instant petition is denied and the challenged decision is affirmed with modification as to the penalty.
ROMERO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16,
1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner
Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. aisadc
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
"That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines the said accused, not being authorized by law to
possess or use any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana
weighing 5.5 grams which is prohibited drug.
Contrary to law." 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that on July 14, 1991, at
about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy
of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm
reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged
buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two
plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his
house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner
was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991,
petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4
Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified that the articles sent
to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain Rodolfo Espano for examination tested
positive for marijuana, with total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner that on said evening, he was sleeping in house and was awakened only when the
policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his brother-in-law Lauro, and when they
could not find the latter, he was brought to the police station for investigation and later indicted for possession of
prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version of the prosecution "more
credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria
guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared fortified in favor of government and shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
without delay.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed the decision of the
trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the following: (a) the
pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent
over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to
compulsory process; and (d) his conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason sufficient to reverse the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of
respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to
determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any
clear showing that he had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than those of the defense
must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other
than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of
prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
which provides:
"...Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in
mulcting or other unscrupulous activities who where motivated either by the desire to extort money or exact personal
vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice, when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the
part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, as in this case, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty, ...,must prevail over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
appellant that she had been framed." 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was in
his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses;
and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime of its commission
and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a defense
that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to prove,
and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act." 9 No clear and convincing evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant in court cast a reasonable
doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since failure of the prosecution to produce the
informant in court is of no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust
operation had indeed been conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner,
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught in possession of prohibited
drugs. Thus,
"We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no compelling reason for
us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the prosecution,
was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The testimony of a sole witness, if credible and positive and
satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict." 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner indeed committed
the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Court provides:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
xxx xxx xxx."
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of
Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer.
After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful
and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same inadmissible in
evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III, Section 2
which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said
exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:
"As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the trial court correctly ignored it apparently in
view of its inadmissibility. While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the warrantless search
made inside the appellant's house became unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant.
Such search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the same being limited to body search and to
that point within reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing
violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it
can hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or control."
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a
lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond
the reach and control of petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II, Section 8, in
relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is
six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousands pesos. With the
passage of Republic Act No. 7659, with took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on
the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, and as interpreted
in People v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the imposable
penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual
delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750
grams, the penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision
correccional,which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day six (6) months
of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor,as minimum of TWO (2) years, FOUR
(4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional,as minimum.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, [April 1, 1998], 351 PHIL 798-809)

UNITED LABORATORIES, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES and/or OCCUPANTS,
Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila [G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005.]
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Rolando H. Besarra, Special Investigator III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), filed an application, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, for the issuance of a search warrant concerning the first and second floors of the
Shalimar Building, located at No. 1571, Aragon Street (formerly No. 1524, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila) occupied
and/or used by Shalimar Philippines, owned/operated by Ernesto Isip; and for the seizure of the following for
violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 8, of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8203:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia
used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts
and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit
REVICON multivitamins. 1
The application was docketed as People v. Ernesto Isip, et al., Respondents, Search Warrant Case No. 04-4916 and raffled
to Branch 24 of the court. Appended thereto were the following: (1) a sketch 2 showing the location of the building to
be searched; (2) the affidavit 3 of Charlie Rabe of the Armadillo Protection and Security Agency hired
by United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB), who allegedly saw the manufacture, production and/or distribution of fake
drug products such as Revicon by Shalimar Philippines; (3) the letter-request of UNILAB, the duly licensed and
exclusive manufacturer and/or distributor of Revicon and Disudrin, for the monitoring of the unauthorized
production/manufacture of the said drugs and, if warranted, for their seizure; (4) the letter-complaint 4 of UNILAB
issued through its Director of the Security and Safety Group; and (5) the joint affidavit 5 of NBI Agents Roberto
Divinagracia and Rolando Besarra containing the following allegations:
2. When learned that an Asset was already placed by ARMADILLO PROTECTIVE AND SECURITY AGENCY named
CHARLIE RABE, who was renting a room since November 2003, at the said premises located at No. 1571 Aragon St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila. MR. RABE averred that the owner of the premises is a certain MR. ERNESTO ISIP and that the said
premises which is known as SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES, Shalimar Building, are being used to manufacture counterfeit
UNILAB products, particularly REVICON multivitamins, which was already patented by UNILAB since 1985; SacDIE
3. Upon verification of the report, we found out that the said premises is a six-story structure, with an additional floor
as a penthouse, and colored red-brown. It has a tight security arrangement wherein non-residents are not allowed to
enter or reconnoiter in the premises;
4. We also learned that its old address is No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and has a new address as 1571
Aragon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; and that the area of counterfeiting operations are the first and second floors of Shalimar
Building;
5. Since we cannot enter the premises, we instructed the Asset to take pictures of the area especially the places
wherein the clandestine manufacturing operations were being held. At a peril to his well-being and security, the Asset
was able to take photographs herein incorporated into this Search Warrant Application. 6
A representative from UNILAB, Michael Tome, testified during the hearing on the application for the search warrant.
After conducting the requisite searching questions, the court granted the application and issued Search Warrant No.
04-4916 dated January 27, 2004, directing any police officer of the law to conduct a search of the first and second floors
of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The court also directed the police to
seize the following items:
a. Finished or unfinished products of UNITED LABORATORIES (UNILAB), particularly REVICON multivitamins;
b. Sundry items such as tags, labels, boxes, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia
used in the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of counterfeit REVICON multivitamins;
c. Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts
and documents used in recording the manufacture and/or importation, distribution and/or sales of counterfeit
REVICON multivitamins. 7
The court also ordered the delivery of the seized items before it, together with a true inventory thereof executed under
oath.
The search warrant was implemented at 4:30 p.m. on January 27, 2004 by NBI agents Besarra and Divinagracia, in
coordination with UNILAB employees. No fake Revicon multivitamins were found; instead, there were sealed boxes
at the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building which, when opened by the NBI agents in the presence of
respondent Isip, contained the following:
QUANTITY/UNIT DESCRIPTION

792 Bottles Disudrin 60 ml.

30 Boxes (100 pieces each) Inoflox 200 mg. 8
NBI Special Investigator Divinagracia submitted an inventory of the things seized in which he declared that the search
of the first and second floors of the Shalimar Building at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, the premises
described in the warrant, was done in an orderly and peaceful manner. He also filed a Return of Search
Warrant, 9 alleging that no other articles/items other than those mentioned in the warrant and inventory sheet were
seized. The agent prayed that of the items seized, ten boxes of Disudrin 60 ml., and at least one box of Inoflox be
turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. 10The court issued an order
granting the motion, on the condition that the turn over be made before the court, in the presence of a representative
from the respondents and the court. 11
The respondents filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash the Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence." 12 They contended
that the implementing officers of the NBI conducted their search at the first, second, third and fourth floors of the
building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where items in "open display" were allegedly found. They
pointed out, however, that such premises was different from the address described in the search warrant, the first and
second floors of the Shalimar Building located at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The respondents,
likewise, asserted that the NBI officers seized Disudrin and Inoflox products which were not included in the list of
properties to be seized in the search warrant. HICATc
UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the motion, insisting that the search was limited to the first and
second floors of the Shalimar building located at the corner of Aragon Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
They averred that, based on the sketch appended to the search warrant application, Rabe's affidavit, as well as the
joint affidavit of Besarra and Divinagracia, the building where the search was conducted was located at No. 1571,
Aragon Street corner Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They pointed out that No. 1524 Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz,
Manila was the old address, and the new address was No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They maintained
that the warrant was not implemented in any other place. 13
In reply, the respondents insisted that the items seized were different from those listed in the search warrant. They
also claimed that the seizure took place in the building located at No. 1524-A which was not depicted in the sketch of
the premises which the applicant submitted to the trial court. 14 In accordance with the ruling of this Court in People
v. Court of Appeals, 15 the respondents served a copy of their pleading on UNILAB. 16
On March 11, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 17 granting the motion of the respondents, on the ground that the
things seized, namely, Disudrin and Inoflox, were not those described in the search warrant. On March 16, 2004, the
trial court issued an advisory 18 that the seized articles could no longer be admitted in evidence against the
respondents in any proceedings, as the search warrant had already been quashed.
UNILAB, through the Ureta Law Office, filed a motion, in collaboration with the NBI agents, for the reconsideration
of the order, contending that the ground used by the court in quashing the warrant was not that invoked by the
respondents, and that the seizure of the items was justified by the plain view doctrine. The respondents objected to
the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, contending that the latter could not appear for the People of the
Philippines. The respondents moved that the motion for reconsideration of UNILAB be stricken off the record.
Disputing the claims of UNILAB, they insisted that the items seized were contained in boxes at the time of the seizure
at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue corner Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were not apparently incriminating on
plain view. Moreover, the seized items were not those described and itemized in the search warrant application, as
well as the warrant issued by the court itself. The respondents emphasized that the Shalimar Laboratories is
authorized to manufacture galenical preparations of the following products:
Products:
- Povidone Iodine
- Chamomile Oil
- Salicylic Acid 10 g.
- Hydrogen Peroxide 3% Topical Solution
- Aceite de Alcamforado

- Aceite de Manzanilla 19
In a manifestation and opposition, the respondents assailed the appearance of the counsel of UNILAB, and insisted
that it was not authorized to appear before the court under the Rules of Court, and to file pleadings. They averred that
the BFAD was the authorized government agency to file an application for a search warrant.
In its counter-manifestation, UNILAB averred that it had the personality to file the motion for reconsideration because
it was the one which sought the filing of the application for a search warrant; besides, it was not proscribed by Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure from participating in the proceedings and filing pleadings. The only
parties to the case were the NBI and UNILAB and not the State or public prosecutor. UNILAB also argued that the
offended party, or the holder of a license to operate, may intervene through counsel under Section 16 of Rule 110, in
relation to Section 7(e), of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
UNILAB prayed that an ocular inspection be conducted of the place searched by the NBI officers. 20 In their rejoinder,
the respondents manifested that an ocular inspection was the option to look forward to. 21 However, no such ocular
inspection of the said premises was conducted.
In the meantime, the BFAD submitted to the court the result of its examination of the Disudrin and Inoflox samples
which the NBI officers seized from the Shalimar Building. On its examination of the actual component of Inoflox, the
BFAD declared that the substance failed the test. 22 The BFAD, likewise, declared that the examined Disudrin syrup
failed the test. 23 The BFAD had earlier issued the following report:

PRODUCT NAME Manufacturer L.N. E.D. FINDINGS

1. Phenylpropanolamine Unilab 21021552 3-06 - Registered, however,

(Disudrin) label/physical appearance
12.5 mg./5mL Syrup does not conform with the
BFAD approved
label/registered
specifications.

2. Ofloxacin (Inoflox) Unilab 99017407 3-05 - Registered, however,

200 mg. tablet label/physical appearance
does not conform with the
BFAD approved
label/registered
specifications. 24
On May 28, 2004, the trial court issued an Order 25 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by UNILAB. The
court declared that:
The Search Warrant is crystal clear: The seizing officers were only authorized to take possession of "finished or
unfinished products of United Laboratories(UNILAB), particularly REVICON Multivitamins, and documents
evidencing the counterfeit nature of said products. The Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized pursuant to the warrant
does not, however, include REVICON but other products. And whether or not these seized products are imitations of
UNILAB items is beside the point. No evidence was shown nor any was given during the proceedings on the
application for search warrant relative to the seized products. ACTESI
On this score alone, the search suffered from a fatal infirmity and, hence, cannot be sustained. 26
UNILAB, thus, filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where the
following issues are raised:
Whether or not the seized 792 bottles of Disudrin 60 ml. and 30 boxes of Inoflox 200 mg. are INADMISSIBLE as
evidence against the respondents because they constitute the "fruit of the poisonous tree" or, CONVERSELY, whether
or not the seizure of the same counterfeit drugs is justified and lawful under the "plain view" doctrine and, hence, the
same are legally admissible as evidence against the respondents in any and all actions? 27
The petitioner avers that it was deprived of its right to a day in court when the trial court quashed the search warrant
for a ground which was not raised by the respondents herein in their motion to quash the warrant. As such, it argues
that the trial court ignored the issue raised by the respondents. The petitioner insists that by so doing, the RTC
deprived it of its right to due process. The petitioner asserts that the description in the search warrant of the products
to be seized — "finished or unfinished products of UNILAB" — is sufficient to include counterfeit drugs within the
premises of the respondents not covered by any license to operate from the BFAD, and/or not authorized or licensed
to manufacture, or repackage drugs produced or manufactured by UNILAB. Citing the ruling of this Court in Padilla
v. Court of Appeals, 28 the petitioner asserts that the products seized were in plain view of the officers; hence, may be
seized by them. The petitioner posits that the respondents themselves admitted that the seized articles were in open
display; hence, the said articles were in plain view of the implementing officers.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petition should have been filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) because factual questions are raised. They also assert that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the
petition involving the validity and the implementation of the search warrant. They argue that the petitioner merely
assisted the NBI, the BFAD and the Department of Justice; hence, it should have impleaded the said government
agencies as parties-petitioners. The petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
behalf of the NBI and/or the BFAD, because under the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, the OSG is mandated to
represent the government and its officers charged in their official capacity in cases before the Supreme Court. The
respondents further assert that the trial court may consider issues not raised by the parties if such consideration
would aid the court in the just determination of the case.
The respondents, likewise, maintain that the raiding team slashed the sealed boxes so fast even before respondent Isip
could object. They argue that the seizure took place at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 220778, and not at No. 1571, Aragon Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila covered by TCT
No. 174412 as stated in the search warrant. They assert that the ruling of the Court in People v. Court of Appeals 29 is
applicable in this case. They conclude that the petitioner failed to prove the factual basis for the application of the
plain view doctrine. 30
In reply, the petitioner asserts that it has standing and is, in fact, the real party-in-interest to defend the validity of the
search warrant issued by the RTC; after all, it was upon its instance that the application for a search warrant was filed
by the NBI, which the RTC granted. It asserts that it is not proscribed under R.A. No. 8203 from filing a criminal
complaint against the respondents and requesting the NBI to file an application for a search warrant. The petitioner
points out that the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not specifically prohibit a private complainant from defending
the validity of a search warrant. Neither is the participation of a state prosecutor provided in Rule 126 of the said
Rules. After all, the petitioner insists, the proceedings for the application and issuance of a search warrant is not a
criminal action. The petitioner asserts that the place sought to be searched was sufficiently described in the warrant
for, after all, there is only one building on the two parcels of land described in two titles where Shalimar Philippines is
located, the place searched by the NBI officers. 31 It also asserts that the building is located at the corner of Aragon
Street and Lacson Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. 32
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is applicable in this case because the boxes were found outside the
door of the respondents' laboratory on the garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the members of the
raiding team — precisely because these were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The boxes in which the items
were contained were themselves so designated to replicate true and original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine.
Thus, on the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes 33 the letters "ABR" under the words "60 ml," appeared
to describe the condition/quality of the bottles inside (as it is with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the
same brand). The petitioner pointed out that "ABR" is the acronym for "amber bottle round" describing the bottles in
which the true and original Disudrin (for children) is contained. CTAIHc
The petitioner points out that the same boxes also had their own "license plates" which were instituted as among its
internal control/countermeasures. The license plates indicate that the items within are, supposedly, "Disudrin." The
NBI officers had reasonable ground to believe that all the boxes have one and the same data appearing on their
supposedly distinctive license plates. The petitioner insists that although some of the boxes marked with the
distinctive UNILAB logo were, indeed, sealed, the tape or seal was also a copy of the original because these, too, were
marked with the distinctive UNILAB logo. The petitioner appended to its pleading pictures of the Shalimar building
and the rooms searched showing respondent Isip; 34 the boxes seized by the police officers containing Disudrin
syrup; 35 and the boxes containing Inoflox and its contents. 36
The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether the petitioner is the proper party to file the petition at bench;
(2) whether it was proper for the petitioner to file the present petition in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court; and (3) whether the search conducted by the NBI officers of the first and second floors of the Shalimar building
and the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid.
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioner's contention that a search warrant proceeding is, in no sense, a criminal
action 37 or the commencement of a prosecution. 38 The proceeding is not one against any person, but is solely for the
discovery and to get possession of personal property. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made
necessary because of public necessity. It resembles in some respect with what is commonly known as John Doe
proceedings. 39While an application for a search warrant is entitled like a criminal action, it does not make it such an
action.
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to procure
relevant evidence of crime. 40 It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public prosecutions. 41 A
search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant must issue in the name of the
State, namely, the People of the Philippines. 42
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or maintaining mere
private rights. 43 It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action involving the rights of
private persons. 44 It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution. 45
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government agency charged
with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear, participate and file pleadings in the search
warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility
of the properties seized in anticipation of a criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration
with the NBI or such government agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant
issued by the court, or a motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash. 46
In this case, UNILAB, in collaboration with the NBI, opposed the respondents' motion to quash the search warrant.
The respondents served copies of their reply and opposition/comment to UNILAB, through Modesto Alejandro,
Jr. 47 The court a quo allowed the appearance of UNILAB and accepted the pleadings filed by it and its
counsel. CacTIE
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of
the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 48 the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC)
to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case even held
that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule is that it is only the
Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the
Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there appears to be grave error
committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants therein
as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and will
allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned order in lieu of the Solicitor General. 49
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the
Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it. 50 In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of the
issues raised by the parties.
The Court does not agree with the petitioner's contention that the issue of whether the Disudrin and Inoflox products
were lawfully seized was never raised in the pleadings of the respondents in the court a quo. Truly, the respondents
failed to raise the issue in their motion to quash the search warrant; in their reply, however, they averred that the
seized items were not included in the subject warrant and, therefore, were not lawfully seized by the raiding team.
They also averred that the said articles were not illegal per se, like explosives and shabu, as to justify their seizure in the
course of unlawful search. 51 In their Opposition/Comment filed on March 15, 2004, the respondents even alleged the
following:
The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is limited to the determination of whether there is a legal basis to quash the
search warrant and/or to suppress the seized articles in evidence. Since the articles allegedly seized during the
implementation of the search warrant — Disudrin and Inoflux products — were not included in the search warrant,
they were, therefore, not lawfully seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se, as it were, like an arms cache,
subversive materials orshabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful search, or being in plain view or some
such. No need whatever for some public assay.
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the Disudrin
and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from respondent's place were counterfeit. All the relevant presumptions are in
favor of legality. 52
The Court, therefore, finds no factual basis for the contention of the petitioner that the respondents never raised in the
court a quo the issue of whether the seizure of the Disudrin and Inoflox products was valid.
In any event, the petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the March 11, 2004 Order of the court a quo on the
following claims:
2.01 The Honorable Court ERRED in ruling on a non-issue or the issue as to the alleged failure to particularly describe
in the search warrant the items to be seized but upon which NO challenge was then existing and/or NO controversy
is raised;
2.02 The Honorable Court ERRED in its ruling that "finished or unfinished products of UNILAB" cannot stand the test
of a particular description for which it then reasons that the search is, supposedly unreasonable; and,
2.03 The Honorable Court ERRED in finding that the evidence seized is lawfully inadmissible against respondents. 53
The court a quo considered the motion of the petitioner and the issue raised by it before finally resolving to deny the
same. It cannot thus be gainsaid that the petitioner was denied its right to due process.
On the validity of the seizure of the sealed boxes and its contents of Disudrin and Inoflox, the Court, likewise, rejects
the contention of the petitioner. DSAacC
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
officers of the law are to seize only those things particularly described in the search warrant. A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as not to be general or explanatory.
Nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. 54
Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized by
him. However, the seizure by the officer of objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant cannot be presumed
as plain view. The State must adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove the confluence of the essential requirements
for the doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or
otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence
inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. 55
The doctrine is not an exception to the warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be
a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some other legitimate reason for
being present, unconnected with a search directed against the accused. The doctrine may not be used to extend a
general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. It is a recognition
of the fact that when executing police officers comes across immediately incriminating evidence not covered by the
warrant, they should not be required to close their eyes to it, regardless of whether it is evidence of the crime they are
investigating or evidence of some other crime. It would be needless to require the police to obtain another
warrant. 56Under the doctrine, there is no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and there is no search within
the meaning of the Constitution.
The immediate requirement means that the executing officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the facts
therein available to him, determine probable cause of the object's incriminating evidence. 57 In other words, to be
immediate, probable cause must be the direct result of the officer's instantaneous sensory perception of the
object. 58 The object is apparent if the executing officer had probable cause to connect the object to criminal activity.
The incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search, without the benefit of any
unlawful search or seizure. It must be apparent at the moment of seizure. 59
The requirement of inadvertence, on the other hand, means that the officer must not have known in advance of the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it.60 Discovery is not anticipated. 61
The immediately apparent test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of
evidence. It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to
associate the property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a viewed object and criminal activity. 62
Incriminating means the furnishing of evidence as proof of circumstances tending to prove the guilt of a person. 63
Indeed, probable cause is a flexible, common sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer
would warrant a man of reasonable caution and belief that certain items may be contrabanded or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime. It does not require proof that such belief be correct or more likely than true. A practical,
non-traditional probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. The evidence thus collected
must be seen and verified as understood by those experienced in the field of law enforcement. 64
In this case, Disudrin and/or Inoflox were not listed in the search warrant issued by the court a quo as among the
properties to be seized by the NBI agents. The warrant specifically authorized the officers only to seize "counterfeit
Revicon multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents used in recording, manufacture and/or
importation, distribution and/or sale, or the offering for sale, sale and/or distribution of the said vitamins." The
implementing officers failed to find any counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized sealed boxes which,
when opened at the place where they were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin.EcAHDT
It was thus incumbent on the NBI agents and the petitioner to prove their claim that the items were seized based on
the plain view doctrine. It is not enough to prove that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents;
evidence should have been adduced to prove the existence of all the essential requirements for the application of the
doctrine during the hearing of the respondents' motion to quash, or at the very least, during the hearing of the NBI
and the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April 16, 2004. The immediately apparent aspect, after all, is central
to the plain view exception relied upon by the petitioner and the NBI. There is no showing that the NBI and the
petitioner even attempted to adduce such evidence. In fact, the petitioner and the NBI failed to present any of the NBI
agents who executed the warrant, or any of the petitioner's representative who was present at the time of the
enforcement of the warrant to prove that the enforcing officers discovered the sealed boxes inadvertently, and that
such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the NBI
agent/agents who enforced the warrant had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were
incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. 65 There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the
contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened.
In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove the essential requirements for
the application of the plain view doctrine.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the Regional
Trial Court are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (United Laboratories Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL 342-364)
RICARDO PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila vs. REMEDIOS MAGO [G.R. No. L-27360. February 28, 1968.]
ZALDIVAR, J p:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction, filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of
Police of Manila; Juan Ponce Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of
Manila; and Martin Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion
Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the annulment of the order
issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of March 7,
1967, which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in
connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code, but which were claimed by respondent Remedios
Mago, and to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said Civil Case No.
67496. Pending the determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case No. 67496 and
from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and
loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate
No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales
of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed
ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry
No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and
Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or
preliminary injunction," docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that Remedios Mago was the
owner of the goods seized, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga; that
she hired the trucks owned by Valentin B. Lanopa to transport the goods from said place to her residence at 1657 Laon
Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search
warrant issued by a competent court; that Manila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for
Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then Customs
Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because the goods were no
longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming them to
have been misdeclared and undervalued, were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported
illegally; that the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police Papa had arranged with the Commissioner
of Customs regarding the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their constitutional rights would be
violated and they would truly suffer irreparable injury. Hence Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa prayed for the
issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents,
from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks,
as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in
Civil Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this Court — from opening the nine bales in
question, and at the same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction on November 16, 1966.
However, when the restraining order was received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been opened by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city
fiscal and a representative of herein respondent Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as
party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police
Department. Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods
and the trucks and of their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of
First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of
action in view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and
Customs Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods because the full duties and
charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department had the power to make the
seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and that the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and
Customs Code could effect searches, seizures and arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the
said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court
below that the writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was not entitled to the main reliefs she
prayed for; that the release of the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs
Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining
order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of
the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau
of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-
named persons filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that
since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be
released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the
court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to order the
release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of the goods, as
shown in the inventory, were not declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition was
filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods
had been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, and the determination of all questions affecting
the disposal of property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings should thereby be left to the
Collector of Customs. On January 30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the estimated duties, taxes and
other charges due on the goods amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein respondent Remedios Mago filed
an urgent manifestation and reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding
bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed
by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition petitioners allege, among others, that the
respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent Remedios Mago of the disputed
goods, for the following reasons: (1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent Judge, had no
jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the negligent and/or illegal acts of its agents in not collecting
the correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their
answer, respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by
respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967, because
said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure and identification proceedings against the nine bales of
goods in question were instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could no longer go after the goods
in question after the corresponding duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and
were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago is a purchaser in
good faith of the goods in question so that those goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings; (4)
that the seizure of the goods was effected by members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside the control
and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and effected without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and
detention; (5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued by the Collector of Customs is illegal and
unconstitutional, it not being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no authority to seize the goods in
question because they are not articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped to institute the
present action because they had agreed before the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection to
the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8)
that the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing
the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful
revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and
customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and
customs laws. 1 The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected on Informal Entry." 2 As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full. 4
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General 5 wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the
report of the appraiser of the Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts
of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon
examination and inventory, 6 shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the
payment of duties thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of duties collected) states that there
were 40 pieces of ladies' sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the "compliance") states that in bale
No. 1 alone there were 42 dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in Annex B, only 100 pieces of
watch bands were assessed, but in Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of men's metal watch
bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal watch bands (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's metal
watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears
that there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens
in bale No. 8, and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were,
therefore, subject to forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
And this Court has held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, 7 and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture. 8
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau
of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle
on November 4, 1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief,
Ricardo G. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had
regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the
Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for
mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 9, 1966.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of
seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been issued
by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, et al.," G. R. No. L-24037, decided by this
Court on April 27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De Joya case, it appears that Francindy
Commercial of Manila bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of assorted textiles and rags, valued at
P117,731.00, which had been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose Commercial shipped the goods to
Manila on board an inter-island vessel. When the goods were about to leave the customs premises in Manila, on
October 6, 1964, the customs authorities held them for further verification, and upon examination the goods were
found to be different from the declaration in the cargo manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial
subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good
faith of those goods; that a local purchase was involved so the Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods;
and that the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964, Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs of
the port of Manila to compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the
goods because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it was not liable for duties and taxes because the
transaction was not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands of the importer nor subject to said
importer's control, nor were the goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's) knowledge; and
that the importation had been terminated. On November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a
warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The court of
first instance held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending decision on the merits. On December 14,
1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of preventive and mandatory injunction, on prayer by
Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00. The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs
sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The
Court of First Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them to comply with the preliminary and
mandatory injunction, upon the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of P50,000.00. Said customs
authorities thereupon filed with this Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction. In resolving the question raised in that case, this Court held:
"This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute
forfeiture proceeding against them? and (2) has the Court of First Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
mandamus to compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
"Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the Court of First Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964)
ahead of the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on November 12, 1964), the Customs bureau
should yield to the jurisdiction of the said court.
"The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy
Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Customs
duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23, 1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for
the same were found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port (Petition Annex 'L'). As to goods imported
illegally or released irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff
and Customs Code (RA 1957).
"The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others, to collect revenues from imported articles, fines
and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec.
602, Republic Act 1957).
"The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been released
irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which
comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act 1937.
"Said proceedings should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526,
Nov. 20, 1966). From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as
provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First
Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities
under the Tariff Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdictions. As this
Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature,
while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that
the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities."
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control,
even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question
on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then
would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs
had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. 10 And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in
question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of the Manila Police Department, could not seize the
goods in question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police
Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any
box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein
of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. 13 It cannot be
doubted, therefore, that petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police
officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what
happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to
make the interception of the cargo. 15
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant
issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through
or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search
and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and
search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace . . ." 17 It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering
a legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and Customs Code, said as follows:
"Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the
following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation
and concealed in a movable vessel, where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant . . ."
"Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at L. 231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for customs
officers not only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining districts, but also to stop, search, and
examine any vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise which was
subject to duty or had been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by the person in
charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon, which
they had probable cause to believe had been so unlawfully brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and
the vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Stat. at L. 315, chap. 100),
for a year and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat.
at L. 441. The substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at
L. 178, and was thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp. Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
1161. Neither § 3061 nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as unconstitutional. Indeed, that section
was referred to and treated as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U. S. 215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540,
541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503 . . ."
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any
search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and amended petition, in the court
below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a search. 18 All that they complained
of was,
"That while the trucks were on their way, they were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle
and taken to the Manila Police, where they were detained."
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been held that:
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained
and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a
warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." (47 Am. Jur., pp. 513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S., 132, 69 L. ed., 543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R.,
790; People v. Case, 320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel
was whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched without search warrant or other process and
the goods therein seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the prohibition laws of the State. Same
counsel contended the negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court said:
". . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly prohibits search and seizure without a warrant, as is
sometimes asserted. Only 'unreasonable' search and seizure is forbidden. . . .
". . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and
not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable, all of the circumstances
under which it is made must be looked to.
"The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development, which has multiplied by quantity production
and taken possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal- drawn vehicles, with their easily noted
individuality, are rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity
for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of silent
approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police
control and reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than
their use in so-called "bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which is itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense
of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is
not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without
process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees,
from those against morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common
knowledge. Upon that problem a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws.
Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under
which it is made."
Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
We have thus resolved the principal and decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it necessary, for the
purposes of this decision, to discuss the incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U.
Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967 restraining respondent
Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila; and
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
It is so ordered.
||| (Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, [February 28, 1968], 130 PHIL 886-905)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARI MUSA [G.R. No. 96177. January 27, 1993.]
ROMERO, J p:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990, 1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
"That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves, knowing the
same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against the
appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM
team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic
Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the prosecution was
summarized by the trial court as follows: LLjur
"Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a
NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to
conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from
civilian informer was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another
NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa
to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also described to him the
appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. 'E') for P10.00.
Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga.
Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the
poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga. The buy-bust money had been
taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga
signed a receipt (Exh. 'L' & 'L-1'). The team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged
signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The
two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt.
Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group
positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see
what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of
his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00
marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents.
Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The
two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned
to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy,
and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with
the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped
away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari
Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife (who
had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the
kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned
over to Sgt. Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. 'C' &
'D'). LexLib
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name -
Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the
one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which
had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for
laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a letter-
request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. 'B'), which was stamped 'RECEIVED' by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. 'E-1')
on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens
subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the presence of
marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December
14, 1989, (Exh. 'J', 'J-1', 'J-2', 'J-3', 'J-4' and 'J-5'). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper wrapped
marijuana bought at the buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written
with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. 'C-1' and 'D-1'). She also identified the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana
bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. 'E-1'). Mrs. Anderson also identified her
Chemistry Report (Exh. 'J' & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial, the words 'buy-bust'
and the words 'December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M.' (written on Exhs. 'C' and 'D'). Belarga also identified the receipt of the
P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. 'L'), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh. 'L-1'). He
also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. 'B') and his
signature thereon (Exh. 'B-2') and the stamp of the PC Crime Laboratory marked 'RECEIVED' (Exh. 'B-1')." 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa,
his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
"[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City.
With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin
named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the
one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as
NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM
agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The
NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The
NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he
did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his
father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when
Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City.
Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was reduced
into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the
marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the
marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel,
although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed
which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was
maltreated, he said his wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination
Mari Musa said it was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The
fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was
brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents
because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office. cdll
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had
received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was afraid that
was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very
small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and
pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00,
the latter imposed without subsidiary imprisonment." 6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust
operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and
(2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy
operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported the
successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to
organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain
Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian Compound,
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and
Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the
house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more
marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two
paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that there
were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his
right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents
searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he
gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation,
which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and
forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is
without merit. The day before the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a
wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's
confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation.
Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for
quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell
marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime of selling
prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller
will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, 19 these
factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other people
inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not
report him to the authorities. cdll
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant
submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he
could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v. Ale 20 where the Court observed that from
a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the
type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant
contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were certain
that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette
sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
"This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with
contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes because according to him,
the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the
distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15 meters." 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to
Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The relevant portion of
T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 2 2
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house near the road and he was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the
time wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa
and went inside the house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of
90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the
appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which
the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga
instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City on
December 13, 1939; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation
and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents
who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be
used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt.
Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned
themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the
Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly
what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's
case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is
sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug. cdll
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the
NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the
other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve
the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his
wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a
"cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its
contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant
questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling
that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares
inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule
are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest, thus:
SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a
search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission
of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence
or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause." 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation
conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of
the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but
found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a
corner. LLjur
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. 41
In Ker v. California, 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant
husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to defendants'
apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged
from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen,
a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he
recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of
the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after
observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the
defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the
officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view." 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless
seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized
drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." 46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag
in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to
justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the
plastic bag. Unlike Ker v. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen
and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the
obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to
its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they
opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag
had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic
bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution. cdrep
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga
and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the
appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Musa y Hantatalu, G.R. No. 96177, [January 27, 1993], 291 PHIL 623-642)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.SANTIAGO PERALTA [G.R. No. 145176. March 30, 2004.]
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation. The lawyer's role
cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores
y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as well as their co-accused — Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin
Jr. y Granados — were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas,
Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime
of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with interest thereon at the
legal rate from the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until fully paid." 2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992, 3 appellants and their co-accused were charged as follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due for shredding
in the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as represented by Pedro Labita y
Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito
de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at
the time employed as Currency Reviewers, Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party
and as such they had free access to the property stolen." 4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992. Appellants, however, obtained
two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their
filing of a cash bond to secure their appearance whenever required by the trial court. 5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels, pleaded not guilty. 6 On
September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta were at large, because they had failed to appear
in court despite notice. 7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the appealed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines (CBP) [now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and Robbery Section of Western Police District Command
(WPDC),and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr.,Ulysses Garcia,
Miguelito de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in
P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash
Department during its cash counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The
punctured bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of
the BSP Cash Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills were
actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured because they were no
longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the above-
named accused.
"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden Gate
Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was brought to
the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three separate statements
admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified the other named accused as his cohorts
and accomplices and narrated the participation of each and everyone of them.
"On the basis of Garcia's sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for questioning at the police station
and were subsequently charged with qualified theft together with Garcia." 8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from 1978 to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.,a man who had identified himself as a police officer arrested
accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger bus in front of the Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City.
He was arrested without any warrant for his arrest. The police officer who had arrested accused-appellant Garcia
dragged the latter across the street and forced him to ride ...a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he was made to bend with
his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him and he heard some of the occupants of the car say that he
would be salvaged if he would not tell the truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he told
them that he does not know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and ...up and down ...the stairs. While being dragged out of
the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told them that he does not know his
co-accused. ...Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused, somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody
poured water on accused-appellant Garcia's nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that had
been poured on his nose [at first],but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he decided to cooperate with the
police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, 'may nakikinig.' Suddenly his two ears
were hit with open palm[s]....As he was being brought down, he felt somebody return his personal belongings to his
pocket. Accused-appellant Garcia's personal belongings consisted of [his] driver's license, important papers and coin
purse.
"He was forced to ride ...the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were removed when he was at the
office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter's name, age and address. The arrival of Mr.
Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines, interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita
instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel
supposedly found three pieces of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia's wallet and the former insisted that
they recovered the said perforated notes from accused-appellant's wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down the statement of
Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellant
Garcia's alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and ...November 6, 1992. cASIED
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell of the Theft and
Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m.,he was brought to the office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where
his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders
of each of his co-accused, upon being requested, and Mr. Labita took ...pictures while he was doing the said act.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney's Office on November 4,
1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4 Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-
appellant Garcia and told him that Atty. Sanchez would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not
agree to have Atty. Sanchez to be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accused-appellant
Garcia had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly signed ...the
alleged three (3) sworn statements.
"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist
accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia, and that he signed ...the three (3)
sworn statements only as a witness thereto.
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4 Coronel's warning that if he would
not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
"SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon, Loyola, [Flores] on the basis of
the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was effected on November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and
SPO1 Redelico.
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty Inquest Prosecutor assigned at
the WPDC Headquarters." 9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned to the Security and
Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr.,De Leon, Flores and Loyola were laborers assigned to the Currency
Retirement Division. Their main task was to haul perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the
basement of the BSP building for shredding.
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency notes placed in a coin
sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to someone waiting outside the premises of the
building. The trial court held that the coordinated acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had
conspired to pilfer the perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP.
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was "an eleventh hour
concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced
confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from
Garcia's wallet and the flight of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Hence, this appeal. 10
Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of Accused-appellant Garcia and
the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2. The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft." 11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors:
"1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of Accused Ulysses Garcia
(Exhibits 'I','J' and 'K') and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes (Exhibits 'N' to 'N-2') over the objections of
the accused-appellants.
"2. The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon, Loyola and Flores;
"3. The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the demurrer to evidence;
"4. The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-appellants, consisting of
exhibits '1','2' to '2-B','3' and '4' and the testimony of their witness, State Auditor Esmeralda Elli;
"5. The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft." 12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants, including the admissibility
of Garcia's confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their
demurrer to evidence.
The Court's Ruling: The appeal has merit.
First Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by Garcia and the three
perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest. Appellants, however, contend that these pieces
of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the assistance of counsel —
in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,incomunicado,or other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public Attorney's Office, duly
assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions 13 that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez.
The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court
and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the
former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. 14
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that Garcia had
expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements without the assistance of counsel.
The lower court's action is manifest error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress and other undue
influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law specifically requires that any waiver of this
right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain
that the confession is voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise
and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating officer until the
signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession,
even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. 15 The accused is entitled to effective,
vigilant and independent counsel. 16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough. Without the
assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. 17 The Constitution states that "[a]ny confession or
admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12] shall be inadmissible in evidence. . . ." Hence, the trial
court was in error when it admitted in evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on
the basis thereof. The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot. CADSHI
Perforated Currency Notes
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") allegedly confiscated from
Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence, inadmissible in evidence.
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their arrest when
they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills
would not alter the findings of the trial court.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after being
pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not
committing, and was not about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a
reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without
a warrant under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is
deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not
extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the
search.
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures 18 of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant,
these are allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk
situations, and (6) consented search. 19
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. 20 Any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary
rule. 21 In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a
warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general's argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the
illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia
who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it. 22
Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for retirement. It failed,
however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as the authors of the crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar access to the
shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault. 23 Appellants were pinpointed by Labita because of an
anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained
increase in their spending, which was incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did not submit sufficient
evidence to support his allegation.
Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly
inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
Second Issue:
Demurrer to Evidence
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence filed by Appellants
Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the prosecution and admitted in evidence by the
RTC established the alleged qualified theft of perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed
appellants' participation in the commission of the crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge's determination of the sufficiency or the insufficiency
of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against the accused. Unless there is a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss may not be
disturbed. 24
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent until after Atty.
Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the person of the former were held to be
inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that
basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of
Corrections is hereby directed to submit his report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued
detention within five (5) days from notice of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Garcia y Tupas, G.R. No. 145176, [March 30, 2004], 470 PHIL 305-321)
RICARDO VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
(ULAP) vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND
[G.R. No. 83988. September 29, 1989.]
SYLLABUS
SARMIENTO, J.,dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; BEDROCK OF THE REGIME OF LAW AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM. — The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects.
(CONST.,art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock — the right of the people to be left alone — on which the regime of law
and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort
and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say that it is, is — so I submit — to trivialize the plain command of
the Constitution.
2. ID.;SEARCH AND SEIZURE; BURDEN OF PROVING REASONABLENESS INCUMBENT UPON THE STATE. —
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a right personal to the
aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit
that in that event, the burden is the State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo
Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra, 4) in all
their gore and gruesomeness.
3. ID.;ID.;ABSENCE ALONE OF A SEARCH WARRANT MAKES CHECKPOINT SEARCHES UNREASONABLE. —
The absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint searches unreasonable, and by itself,
subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is, "checkpoints",have become "search warrants" unto themselves —
a roving one at that.
4. ID.;ID.;CASE AT BAR NOT SIMPLY A POLICEMAN ON THE BEAT. — The American cases the majority refers to
involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause".What we have here, however, is not simply a policeman on the
beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no
provocation and without batting an eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face.
DECISION
PADILLA,J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and
banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of
checkpoints, for the protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer, member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP),and resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates
for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-
ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for
their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the
checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the
checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims
that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to
search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to
show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners'
right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP) vs.
Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights were
violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose
rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and
seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant
by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which amount
to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures
are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in
media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonablyconducted,
the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner
that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National
Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, [September 29, 1989], 258 PHIL 838-848)