Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No.
7136 , August 1, 2007 EmelynManggay) for estafa thru falsification of public
Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee
on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when
his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a
sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary
Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well
as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you,"
or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene
habitually went home very late at night or early in the
morning of the following day, and sometimes did not
go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts,
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so,
complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom,
a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, whichcard when unfolded contained
a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth
to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever
flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the
matter being that their relationship was low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective
families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalouscircumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment.
Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the
practice of Law.
Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between
a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It
is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere
fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit
behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not allforms of extra-marital relations
are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took
beforeadmission to practice law. Furthermore, respondent
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule
7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law."
As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital
affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.
Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006
Facts:Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel
Tansingco, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement, and against others (Duane Stier, and
document. A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May
20, 2003 against respondent Atty.Emmanual O. Tansingco
for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
arose when respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-
charge of perjury against Donton. Atty. Tansingco in his
complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, an owner
and long-time resident of a real property located at Cubao,
Quezon City. Since Mr. Stier is a U.S. Citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name, he agreed that
the property be transferred in the name of Mr.Donton, a
Filipino. Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of
preparing the Occupancy Agreement,
despite knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes
serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Donton prayed that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred. Atty.
Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment
case against him upon the instigation of complainant ’s
counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Aletajan, because he refused
toact witness in the criminal case against Stier and Manggay.
In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred the
matter to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation and for which the latter, through
Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the IBP Commission of
Discipline recommended suspension from the practice of law
for two years and cancellation of his commission as Notary
Public. The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended respondent
’
s suspension from the practice of law for six months. The
report was then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of
serious misconduct?
Ruling
: Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code. The Court ruled that a lawyer should
not render any service or give advice to any client which will
involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and
obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer. Atty. Tansingco had
sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath
and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign
ownership of lands. Atty. Tansingco used his knowledge of
the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. As
such, respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.
Jasper Rodica vs Atty. Manuel Lazaro et al, AC No. 9259,
August 23, 2012
Facts:
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the
respondent Atty. Lazaro on grounds of gross and serious
misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct
and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained
by the Bureau of Immigration for allegedly being involved in
an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud
involving the creation of hundreds of dollars in illegal
securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look
for a lawyer. Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law Office
represented by Atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who
initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation
case.
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation
case may be due to the complaint filed by his live-in partner
Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing
Corporation for recovery and possession and damages
involving a property they have in Boracay which is
represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica was represented by Atty.
Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty.
Manuel met with Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement package
on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the
condition that Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC
of Cebu.
On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a
judgment deporting Strong to leave the country. On June 6,
2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her
complaint against Hillview. Rodica now alleges that after
Strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the
RTC, she was deceived by Atty Manuel et al for over
settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her
after misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before
the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.
It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of
the Lazaro Law office helped in drafting the Manifestation
with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after
Rodica pleaded him to prepare the motion and was
requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro Law
Office including the name of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle
to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised Atty.
Espejo to talk to Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the
RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to
show cause of action but a motion for reconsideration was
filed by Rodica.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the
disbarment of the respondents.
Ruling
The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the
presumption of innocence of the respondents. As a general
rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove
the allegations made against them. The required quantum of
proof is preponderance of evidence which is an evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package,
the court find it without merit because she withdrew her
complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also
evident on record that the said case was already dismissed
even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a
motion for reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that
her withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement consideration
regarding the deportation case of Strong. Moreover, Strong
is not a party to the case she filed before the RTC therefore
there is no connection between these 2 cases.
There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was
presented that the cause of her withdrawal of the complaint
is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According
to Atty. Espejo who helped Rodica draft the motion for
withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal is for the
purpose of selling her property to Apostol. Apostol further
corroborated that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the
property once it is free from any pending case. Rodica
promised him to work on the termination of the pending case
attached to the property to make the sale.
On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she
failed to substantiate such claim despite showing off
withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money
after failing to prove that the said amount was paid to the
respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is not a
client of Lazaro Law Office. They merely handled the
deportation case of Strong.
As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica
for misrepresenting before the court that she was aided by
the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo
explained that Rodica assured him to talk to Atty. Manuel
and Atty. Michelle about including their name on the pleading
but she did not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better
that Atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case
before the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare
said pleading. He also should have known that all pleadings
before the court are acted based on merit or the lack of it
and not by the name of the law firm. However, the court give
due recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed
remorse on his conduct and made a sincere apology to the
RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law
Office and that he was newly admitted to the Bar in 2010,
the court find it proper to give him a warning to become more
prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.
The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.
7. Bengco vs Bernardo , June13, 2012
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO,
COMPLAINANTS,
VS.
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by
complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and
Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against respondent
Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of
the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a
lawyer.
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to
the instant complaint are as follows:
That sometime on or about the period from April
15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo
with the help and in connivance and collusion
with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and
illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to
defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco
and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses,
deceitful words to the effect that he would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to the
Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and they
convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will
finance and deliver to him the amount of
[P]495,000.00 as advance money he would
expedite the titling of the subject land and
further by means of other similar deceit like
misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William
Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the subject
land, who is the owner of Plastic City at
Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he
is the one handling William Gatchalian’s business
transaction and that he has contracts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF
DEEDS which representation he well knew were
false, fraudulent and were only made to induce
the complainant[s] to give and deliver the said
amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession
of said amount, far from complying with his
obligation to expedite and cause the titling of
the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and
illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his personal use
and benefit and despite demand upon him to
return the said amount, he failed and refused to
do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and
Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.
In support of their complaint, the complainants
attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7,
1998 and June 22, 1999 of the Third Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando,
Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause
for the filing of the criminal information against
both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them
with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article
315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his
Comment. On September 24, 2004, the
respondent filed an undated Comment, wherein
he denied the allegations against him and
averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants
between the period from April 15, 1997 to July
22, 1997 for purposes of getting from them the
amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat
whom they contacted and who in turn sought the
legal services of the respondent. It was Andy
Magat who received the said money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and entered
into by Andy Magat and respondent. The
arrangement for titling of the land was made by
Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no
participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render
his legal service is legal and allowed in law
practice.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the
respondent to submit a verified comment
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court as it appeared that the respondent’s
undated comment filed with the Court was not
verified.
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel
requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from
March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005, within
which to comply due to his medical confinement.
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed
a second motion for extension praying for
another 20 days, or until April 22, 2005, alleging
that he was still recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for
mandatory conference. The respondent failed to
appear; thus, the IBP considered the respondent
in default for his failure to appear and for not
filing an answer despite extensions granted. The
case was then submitted for report and
recommendation.
Based on the records of the case, Investigating
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made
the following findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22
July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres
Magat (“Magat”), by using false pretenses and
deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally
committed fraudulent acts to the effect that
respondent would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City,
who were the acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced complainants
that if they finance and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they
would expedite the titling of the subject land.
Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer
of William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City
located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, who was allegedly the buyer of the
subject land once it has been titled. Respondent
and Magat also represented that they have
contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the
Register of Deeds which representation they
knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made
to induce complainants to give and deliver to
them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in
possession of the said amount, far from
complying with their obligation to expedite and
cause the titling of the subject land, respondent
and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the
said amount to their personal use and benefit
and despite demand upon them to return the
said amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by respondent
and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for
Estafa against the former before the Third
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the
preliminary investigation conducted by the said
court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold
respondent and Magat for trial for the crime of
Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was
transmitted to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action
as per Order dated 7 December 1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga
conducted a re-investigation of the case. During
the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to
reimburse to complainants the amount of
[P]200,000.00 because according to him the
amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed
by respondent considering that the said amount
was turned over to respondent for expenses
incurred in the documentation prior to the titling
of the subject land. Both respondent and Magat
requested for several extensions for time to pay
back their obligations to the complainants.
However, despite extensions of time granted to
them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their
promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it
was resolved that the offer of compromise was
construed to be an implied admission of guilt.
The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that
there was no reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge and an Information for
Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat
on 8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court,
San Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint
for disbarment despite due notice on several
occasions and appear on the scheduled hearings
set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrates his
despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer
which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
From the facts and evidence presented, it could
not be denied that respondent committed a
crime that import deceit and violation of his
attorney’s oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which he was bound
to ‘obey the laws of the land.’ The commission of
unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral
turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the
attorney’s oath, grossly immoral conduct and
deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment
of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in
1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16
April 2004. As provided for by the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline,
as amended, dated 24 March 2004, “A complaint
for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the
date of the professional misconduct” (Section 1,
Rule VIII).
The Investigating Commissioner recommended
that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO
be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from
receipt hereof from the practice of his profession
as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the
restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within
sixty (60) days from receipt of notice with
Warning that if he does not return the amount
with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then
he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution of the IBP. The respondent averred
that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with
the rules considering that the complaint was
filed more than two (2) years from the alleged
misconduct and therefore, must have been
dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any
misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give
him money to finance the titling of the land; (3)
he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who
transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a
Memorandum of Agreement signed by the latter;
(4) he was denied due process when the
Investigating Commissioner considered him as in
default after having ignored the representative
he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005;
and (5) he long restituted the amount of
P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but
based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresita’s declaration that he had to stop acting
as her legal counsel sometime in the third
quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the
admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony
before the RTC that she received the amount, as
evidenced by photocopies of receipts.
In an Order dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP,
the complainant was required to comment within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In her Comment, Fidela explained that it took
them quite some time in filing the administrative
case because they took into consideration the
possibility of an amicable settlement instead of
a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondent’s reputation as a lawyer; that the
respondent went into hiding which prompted
them to seek the assistance of CIDG agents from
Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondent’s
whereabouts; that the respondent was duly
accorded the opportunity to be heard; and
finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00
plus corresponding interest has yet been made
by the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a
Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a
decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding
the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat “guilty of
conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under
Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years
and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum.”
In a Letter dated March 23, 2009, addressed to
the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the
present action as she was already 86 years of
age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the
Case dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated October
26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for
Atty. Bernardo’s restitution of the amount of
P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy
her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings
and conclusions of the IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s
defense of prescription is untenable. The Court
has held that administrative cases against
lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of
considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise,
members of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for.
Further, consistent with his failure to file his
answer after he himself pleaded for several
extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the
mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As
a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an
officer of the court who is called upon to obey
and respect court processes. Such acts of the
respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous
affront on the court’s authority which can not be
countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are
instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
Lawyers may be disciplined – whether in their
professional or in their private capacity – for any
conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be
done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications
or legal services.
There is no question that the respondent
committed the acts complained of. He himself
admitted in his answer that his legal services
were hired by the complainants through Magat
regarding the purported titling of land
supposedly purchased. While he begs for the
Court’s indulgence, his contrition is shallow
considering the fact that he used his position as
a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants
into believing that he can expedite the titling of
the subject properties. He never denied that he
did not benefit from the money given by the
complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering
is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a
livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.
It is likewise settled that a disbarment
proceeding is separate and distinct from a
criminal action filed against a lawyer despite
having involved the same set of
facts.Jurisprudence has it “that a finding of guilt
in the criminal case will not necessarily result in
a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the respondent’s acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.”
In Yu v. Palaña, the Court held that:
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should
note that administrative cases against lawyers
belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the
same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings. Besides, it is not
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution
of a criminal case before a complaint against a
lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court
will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on
admission to, and continuing membership in, the
legal profession during the whole period that the
criminal case is pending final disposition, when
the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly
disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare and for preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as
an officer of the court. (Citations omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually
convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa
for which he was meted the penalty of sentenced
to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such
criminal conviction clearly undermines the
respondent’s moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. Rule 138, Section 27provides that:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing asattorney for a party
without authority to do so.
In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option
but to accord him the punishment commensurate
to all his acts and to accord the complainants,
especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice
they utmost deserve.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.
Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S.
Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of
P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita
Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this
Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of
compliance thereof to the Court, through the
Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS
therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure to
do so shall merit him the additional penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in his
record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
8. Catalan vs Silvosa, July 24, 2012
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, JR.,
COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I.
Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito
M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three
causes of action against Atty. Silvosa: (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in
the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.
Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No.
27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held
Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of
action and recommended the penalty of
reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP
twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation:
first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10,
Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case
No. 10256-00, “People of the Philippines v. SPO2
Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al.” (Esperon case),
for the complex crime of double frustrated
murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of
the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took
issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of prosecuting
the case, and requested the Provincial
Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan
accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared
as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact
that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives
and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa
displayed manifest bias in the accused’s favor.
Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial
of the Esperon case by arguing against the
position of the private prosecutor. In
2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo Ching
granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty.
Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC
rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16
November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty.
Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the
accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending
finality of judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a
case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s
brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed
the findings of the investigating judge and
downgraded the offense from frustrated murder
to less serious physical injuries. During the
hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio
testified that, while still a public prosecutor at
the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her .30,000 to
reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa
of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse
(Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa
before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide
case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio
Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in
detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa
demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the
dismissal of the case and for the release of
Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation
for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program
Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered
and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense
of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty.
Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case
No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M.
SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of direct bribery and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one
month and eleven days of prision correccional,
as minimum, up to three years, six months and
twenty days of prision correccional, as
maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php
10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for
under the law.
SO ORDERED.
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty.
Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The
trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies
any relationship between himself and the
accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa
dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as “self-
serving” and “purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan]
and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.”
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa
admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that “conviction
under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not
amount to a crime.’” He further claims that “it is
not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted,
but his capacity as a public officer, the charge
against respondent for which he was convicted
falling under the category of crimes against
public officers x x x.”
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15
September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and
prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear.
[Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No.
10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize
his role in said case would be unavailing. The
fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted
himself with the facts of said case and has made
himself familiar with the parties of the case.
Such would constitute sufficient intervention in
the case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty.
Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case
only to file a Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending
Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule
6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a
lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain
difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this
instance, the conflicting allegations are merely
based on the word of one person against the
word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement
denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio
stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take
note that the alleged incident occurred more
than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before
this disbarment case was filed on November
2006. Such a long period of time would
undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity of the
allegation. Even the existence of the bribe
money could not be ascertained and verified
with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly
points out that herein complainant has no
personal knowledge about the charge of
extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a
party in said case nor was he ever involved in
said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are
not binding upon this Commission. The findings
in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been
presented relating to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that
[Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge
in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board
of Governors increased the penalty of Atty.
Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to
two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant
received the notice of the Resolution and the
records of the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the
first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third
causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states
that “A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.”
Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01
which provides that “A lawyer shall not reject,
except for valid reasons the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed” and on Canon 14
which provides that “A lawyer shall not refuse
his services to the needy.”
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty.
Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that “A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of facts.” Atty. Silvosa’s attempts
to minimize his involvement in the same case on
two occasions can only be described as
desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the
arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as
collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa
will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v.
David:
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged
in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor — when he is listening to his client’s
preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the
existence of the bare relationship of attorney
and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest
practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well
to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, on good
taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing.
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of
conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted
in good faith.
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of
bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint
before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there
is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the
facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty.
Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling,
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa
made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and
failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14
June 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt,
and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran,
then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter.
There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make
false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty.
Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution.
When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him. He must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this
respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the
filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically
exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses
do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the
act complained of and the time of the institution
of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of
the Court.
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated
by any interested person. There can be no doubt
of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention
of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences. Section 1, Rule 139-B
reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of
any person. The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of
any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those
in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and
that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not
presented as a witness in the present case.
There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s
judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter
of public record and is already final. Atty.
Catalan supported his allegation by submitting
documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty.
Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest,
that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which
a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. –
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer
review a final judgment of conviction.
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
In Magno v. COMELEC, we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or
receives a gift or present by himself or through
another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or

present be received by the public officer with a
view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing something which
it is his official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform

or which he executes is connected with the
performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third

element. The fact that the offender agrees to
accept a promise or gift and deliberately
commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of
the offender to renege on the duties which he
owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also,
the fact that the offender takes advantage of his
office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct
clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right
and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting

interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros.
Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.
Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of
direct bribery clearly falls under one of the
grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule
138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of
Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are
constrained to impose a penalty more severe
than suspension because we find that Atty.
Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and
betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and
Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise
this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M.

Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.