RUNNING HEAD: ON CHILDREN AND THE ROLE OF EXPOSURE MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 1

On Children and the Role of Exposure

Damian Molinari Oppedisano

McGill University

Professor Kevin McDonough

Philosophy in Education

December 17th, 2018

PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 2

EDER 609 is a course in which we participants are asked to apply philosophical

inquiry to notions relating to childhood, and their implications on Education. Many

topics were discussed, ranging from the nature and role of imagination, to colonialist

legacies in education and pedagogical practices. What follows is a discussion based

on a comparison of Alderson’s (2008) chapter, Young Children as People, and

Hannan’s (2018) Why Childhood is Bad for Children. Their works look at the nature of

childhood, and how considering different perspectives on the Child bring to the

forefront, and subsequently challenge many assumptions about a host of related

topics, such as: childhood development, the experience of childhood, spacial and

moral agency, as well as abilities, and how we choose to draw on these abilities for

the child’s supposed overall benefit (Alderson, 2008). What follows is a look at what

is really means to be ‘treated like a child’ in ‘developed countries’. This treatment is

characterized (more often than not) by: a strict segregation between the experience

of being adults and children, similar to segregating two distinct social classes (‘adult’

and ‘not adult’); how this binary has the effect of severely limiting children’s exposure

to ‘adult’ or ‘real’ life situations; and the resulting implications on autonomy and

agency. Although the notion of exposure was generally agreed upon in class

discussions, the nature and extent of this exposure was a contested issue.

Alderson (2008)

Schapiro (1999) describes ‘treating someone like a child’ as interactions

grounded in paternalism, which amounts to treating someone “as if her life is not quite
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 3

her own to lead and as if her choices are not quite her own to make (p.715). This is

the antithesis of ideals regarding adult-adult relationships. That being said,

paternalism in some way shape or form is unavoidable, as young children lack much

of the experience necessary to be completely autonomous individuals. What is being

questioned is the popular notion that children's’ abilities are undeveloped or inexistent

for a lengthy period, and require a heavily paternalistic approach to child-rearing.

Alderson (2008), discussing the notions of the child and childhood in the UK, describes

how we tend to compare child-rearing practices “as if we know how to treat children

properly because we understand what it really means to be a child” (p.112). She goes

on to describe how this assumption is more a reflection of our own upbringing within

a closed-cultural circle. The assumption that we, as adults, ‘understand’ what

childhood is, represents at the very least an incomplete picture. It is premised on

western-centrism and the fact that we ‘know’ how children’s abilities evolve best based

on “theories of the developing mind as if these are factual, and as if children’s minds

develop like their bodies through one universal pattern of ascending growth marked

out by ‘mile stones’ from zero to adult maturity” (p.113).

These theories relating to stages of child development are, to be fair, very

rough generalizations about children’s abilities at different ages. However, Matthews

& Mullins (2018), paraphrasing Matthews (2008; 2009) argue that “a Piagetian-type

stage theory of development tends to support a ‘deficit conception’ of childhood,

according to which the nature of the child is understood primarily as a configuration of

deficits—missing capacities that normal adults have but children lack” (Online).
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 4

Alderson (2008) notes how these theories “have been called ‘misleading and

oppressive’ (Mayall 1994b, p3) because of the way they are used to misjudge, control

and denigrate children” (p.116). This results, in many cases, in an overwhelmingly

sheltered upbringing with the explicit goal of limiting a child’s exposure to situations

and ideas which define ‘real’ ‘adult’ life. As a result, extreme limitations to exposure

have behavioural consequences. In sheltered family settings, temper tantrums are

common, and considered ‘normal’ in age-stage developmental models. Interestingly,

there are many cultural milieux, in which children are exposed to ‘adult’ situations as

they grow, where temper tantrums seldom take place. Temper tantrums may have

much less to do with age, than to child-rearing strategies which forego any exposure.

Yet, when they happen, we wrongly attribute them wholly to the child’s developmental

stage, and consider them natural and inevitable. Considering these stages, such as

the ‘terrible twos’, as universal “not only absolves adults from questioning their own

possible use or abuse of power, but also endorses firmer or harsher adult control, by

suggesting that volatile young children are out of control” (p.117). This stage

universalization amounts to the same as saying: the ‘frightful forties’ (midlife crises) is

an inexorable and innate stage in adult development, when in reality these crises

(when and if they happen) arise as a result of context and biology, just as is the case

with children. This counters the implicitly accepted notion that “adults are somehow

‘developed’, complete, so that in conflicts between them and children, adults are

dangerously encouraged to assume that they are right, and the child is wrong”

(Alderson, p.115).
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 5

If childhood is an oppressive state of being for those enduring it, it is my

contention that it results from a lack of exposure to ‘adult’ situations. These range from

having reasonable adult-child discussions about things which affect the child, to being

allowed to cross the street or go to the corner store for a snack by themselves. This

amounts to an explicit restriction to extremely valuable learning situations which are

vital for children to apply their learning. There is an element of common sense

involved, as clearly, “after their first few weeks or months [or even years] of life,

children are not inevitably and in every way dependent, though many are treated in

ways that stop them from becoming independent” (Alderson, p.121). She expounds

on this in her concluding chapter, when she states “children are often trapped in a

double bind, whether they comply and are seen as good but dependent, and therefore

not responsible, or whether they try to be more independent but are seen as naughty

and therefore irresponsible” (Alderson, 2008b, p.210). This is an oppressive form of

arrested development of autonomy and independence, and by extension, on the

child’s notions of self-efficacy and agency in life.

Hannan (2018)

The title of Hannan’s article clearly lays out its message: Why Childhood is Bad

for Children. The question posed asks whether being a child, all things considered, is

good or bad for children. She notes how conceptions on childhood range from a

‘negative conception’ or ‘predicament view’ of childhood, to the ‘positive conception’,

towards which a majority of contemporary literature points to. Hannan disagrees.

PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 6

Hannan argues that four negative traits of childhood are “sufficiently bad to

outweigh whatever goods of childhood we can reasonably put on the other side of the

scale” which suggests “childhood is bad for children” (p.19). These traits are:

 Impaired Practical Reasoning;

 Lack of Established Practical Identity;
 Need for Extensive Interference and Domination;
 Profound and Asymmetric Vulnerability.

Although they may seem to properly characterize childhood, I believe this

suggested framework to be thoroughly misguided. It perfectly embodies a deficit-view

(Matthews & Mullen, 2018), while the author misconstrues children and childhood, and

falls precisely into the conceptual trap Alderson describes when she warns not to turn

a generalized descriptive average into prescriptive normality (Alderson, p.117). These

four traits describe childhood, not children, and are ‘true’ only if children are “measured

against a norm and ideal” (Alderson, p.119), in this case, the generalized adult.

I believe the supposed innateness of these four traits are both reinforced and

perpetuated by a Western paradigm for child-rearing, in which responsible exposure

to adversity is wholly denied to children. Their reasoning may be impaired inasmuch

as we refuse to engage in reasonable discussions with them; lacking an established

practical identity arises from our treatment of them as not yet having identities; a need

for extensive interference and domination is simply a gross generalization (see

Alderson); and children are vulnerable to the extent we misconstrue the first three

‘traits’.
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 7

The author does, however, bring into focus the elephant in the room with

regards to it being impossible to completely eliminate paternalism in child-rearing. She

describes this as “making trade-offs between their current and future interests” and

that “the value of childhood bears on what we morally owe children. This brings to

mind an interesting comparison: what if the State opted to be as paternalistic towards

its citizens as adults are with their children? Compared to the well-entrenched ideals

which ‘make’ the State, one could argue that adulthood is bad for adults. For example,

impaired practical reasoning is a negative trait of any individual compared to the State

and its ‘practical reasoning’ based on a constitution, or body of law; with regards to a

lack of practical identity, compared to the state all individuals lack, in a certain sense,

‘identity’ as the State is one of the primary sources of identity. The State’s identity is

much more ‘established’ than in individuals. The point here is that if we measure

anybody against a norm or well-entrenched ideal, they will fall short, and a form of

paternalism will be deemed necessary.

Another aspect of Hannan’s conception of childhood is trying to determine

whether there is any ‘good’ that is uniquely associated with childhood. Something

which make childhood a good thing, which cannot be equally enjoyed by adults. This

is the basis of any positive conception of childhood, but why? Why impose this

arbitrary separation between what can be enjoyed by children, on one hand, and

adults on the other. This implies that the ‘difference’ between adulthood and childhood

is a matter of type as opposed to a matter of degree. This conceptual ambiguity

resonates strongly with the point Alderson makes, when she states that:
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 8

feminist scholarship on the division of labour and

respecting the equal moral worth of all workers
and their work [Mayall 2002], research on the
intermediate domain between the public and
private, and feminism’s concern with women as
an oppressed minority group --- all these also
apply to children. (p.119)

What is especially disconcerting is the fact that Hannan explicitly conceptualizes

childhood within the bounds of an age-stage theory of childhood (of which Alderson

offers a strong critique) and of children as a class:

there are also features of childhood, conceived
of as a series of developmental stages, that are
common to all children, albeit present to different
degrees. The question here is whether these
general and definitive features of childhood
make childhood, all things considered, good or
bad for children as a class. (p.13)

In her chapter, Young Children as People, Alderson touches upon the fact that

the Western paradigm for raising children amounts to a self-proving and self-

perpetuating system of thought. Children are seen as children in the pejorative sense;

i.e. not adults. Most of us assume there is a single, universal, appropriate way of

raising children which leads to the best possible outcome. Generally, this amounts to

limiting a child’s role to a minimum in order to protect them by making their growth as

easy to bear as possible. But easy to bear for whom, really? The child or the adult?

Does an ‘easy’ childhood really prepare children for the inevitable adversity they will
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 9

face? Alderman describes three frameworks which define the adult-child relationship:

“the providing adult and the needy child; the protective adult and the victim child;

mutual respect between the participating child an adult” (p.113). Child-rearing in

‘developed’ countries falls somewhere between the first two, while in ‘developing’

countries the latter is not uncommon. While toiling for 14 hours a day, as described by

William Blake, is tantamount to child-abuse in the eyes of modern society, the value

he placed on the independence it afforded him speaks volumes (Alderson, p.112). At

seven years old, he was demonstrating behaviour we consider virtually unattainable

in children of a similar age, namely that he understood the value of overcoming

adversity, as the act of overcoming it was autonomy and independence. Space and

time thus affect how we conceive of childhood, children, their capacity to bear roles

and responsibility, and how strong a relationship there is between exposure to

adversity and autonomy.

Exposure to Adversity

Many parents and adults in the west have largely avoided exposing their

children to the ‘dangers and risks of real life’. This is, admittedly, a laudable reason

for sheltering children and limiting their autonomy. We adopt paternalistic mindsets

because we believe this is what’s best for our children, for them to be safe. This

purported safety, however, comes at a great cost, as noted by Alderson, in that it

comes at the price of children not being exposed to the experience of freedom.

Because we shield them from the realities of life, we consider childhood to be a boon.

And of course, we know this is the right thing to do. Because we know it’s the right
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 10

approach to child-rearing, and we know children have it ‘better’ and ‘easier’ than us

BECAUSE we shield them from adversity. This would be great if it weren’t a self-

induced hallucination.

Human beings have the longest period of ‘childhood’ development of any

species on the planet, which means the role which adults play in the lives of children

is a crucial one. As is stated many times, a form or another of paternalism is required

for children to survive. The more protective one is towards children, the more beneficial

it is for them in terms of survival. But it is my hypothesis that we have conceptually

coupled this means survival with enabling a child to thrive in life; we assume that

heavily shielding them actually makes childhood, and life, better. We have even

convinced ourselves that children can’t handle any of the realities adults do, which is

patently wrong (Alderson, 2008). Adults’ roles must go beyond simply protecting

children by severely constraining their liberties. We must paternalistically define the

boundaries of exposure to adversity, while encouraging children to go beyond their

‘comfort zones’, especially since we have the bad habit of defining those comfort zones

for them. This is what we morally owe children. Childhood, for the reasons mentioned

above, can be bad for children, because we make it so. But that doesn’t have to be the

case.
PHILOSOPHY MOLINARI OPPEDISANO 11

References

Alderson, Priscilla. Young Children as People, in Young Children's Rights : Exploring

Beliefs, Principles and Practice, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2008. ProQuest
Ebook Central,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=350390.
Alderson, Priscilla. The Key Messages from the Evidence and Experience, in Young
Children's Rights : Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice, Jessica Kingsley
Publishers, 2008b. ProQuest Ebook Central,
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=350390.
Hannan, S. (2017). Why Childhood is Bad for Children. Journal of Applied
Philosophy, 35, 11-28. doi:10.1111/japp.12256
Matthews, G., & Mullin, A. (2018, November 26). The Philosophy of Childhood.
Retrieved from https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/entries/childhood/
Schapiro, T. (1999). What Is a Child? Ethics, 109(4), 715-738. doi:10.1086/233943