Journal Title: The Tibet journal.

Vol. 14, Is. 1

MonthNear: 1989

Article Title: Broido, Michael; The Jo-nang-pas

on Madhyamaka; A sketch
The Jo-nang-Pas on Madhyamaka: A Sketch

Michael Broido

We summarize the views of .Dol-po Shes-rab rGyal�mtshan (S)

on Madhyamaka according to his Ri-chos Nges-don rGya-mtsho (R).
References are given for straightforward points, but details and
scholarly apparatus are omitted.

1. Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan as a Madhyamika

S refrains from advancing ontological views of a substantialist

kind and so is surely a Madhyamika. On garbha theory he is not an
ontologist, a point on which. he has been widely misrepresented (s�
below). He is not a Cittamillrin, arguing convincingly (lOSa-I09a) that
many "Yogacara" works go beyond Cittamatra. He uses the three
svabMvas epistemically, meaning three nil}svabhavatas (97a4, l03b2;
Sandhini. rmocana ch 7), and stresses the origin of this doctrine in the
PrajMparamita literature, reconciling it with orthodox Madhyamaka by
relating the nil}svabhavatas to the two satyas. He is an aprati�fhitaVl[din
(cf Maitrtpa), and is not a mayavadin. Madhyamaka negation is non·
committing (med·dgag) on sarpvrti but committing (ma-yin-dgag) on
paramartha. This is not established by argument; S is not a svatantrika.

2. Nitartha and neyartha sutras (87a-89b)

The second turning is common (thun-mong) darSana, 84b6, and

neyartha. R deals not with samatha, maitrt, equality of self and others
and the utpattikrama &c, but with distinctions relevant to the vajrayana,
86a2. The third turning is mainly on the ultimate content (don mthar·
thug) of the Great Middle (dbu-ma chen-po) and of the/vajrayana (not
with cittamatra), 89a6. On this view mKhas-grub�rje's claim that the
third turning sUtras are inconsistent is w rong, and his argument that
they cannot be nnartha collapses.

3. Rang-stong and gzhan-stong

The correlations of rang-stonglgzhan-stong with vijnana/jfiana

 TIlE JONANG-PAS ON MADHYAMAKA: A SKETCH in

and with the three svah�vas (97a ff.) are explicitly epistemic. These
senses of "sunyatn" re based on the MPS (94al-95a3) and differ
epistemically (97a3).
In S's usage a siddham(grub-mthn) is a fixed philosophical position
based on axioms and seules of argument; a darsana (lta-ba) is a point
of v i e w in a broad nse .. including what derives directly from
experience. As in thMahnparinirvnJ;lasUtra (MPS), he" calls his
darsana "The Great Mdle" (dbu-ma chen-po), and intends it to be
conn e c t e d with expeence and to be contrasted with dbu - m a
(Madhyamaka) a s a .ddhanta. "gZhan-stong" can stand for this
darsana: the way thinB are taken by one who sees them as they really
. are (don-darn-par, gnaSugs-su). Rang-stong for S, though a siddhanta,
is part of gzhan-stong, ot opposed to it: it is the way Parikalpita and
paratantra are to be takn, namely as both absent (in parini�panna), or
in Madhyarnaka terms the total nonexistence (abh�vasunyata, 95a3,
b6, 9 6 al) o f sa1'J1vri. Thus rang-stong is stronger than m ere
svabha:vasUnyam (abseJce of parikalpita). Opposition between the two
, terms appears only whn we take "gzhan-stong" as a description of
parini�panna, which is nt rang-stong (115a4). This oscillation between
two different (if c()rrelaed) uses of the terms by S is responsible for a
lot of later confusions.
The MPS calls gzhan-stong mi-stong-pa'i stong-pa (R 94a4),
illustrating it by the ab�nce of horse in a cow (95al); but literally, S
says, this is not even kun-rdzob stong;;nyid (101ab). Rather, gzhan­
stong is the stong-gzhi (21bl, 35bl, 96ab &c), abha:vasvabha:vasunyam
(95a-96a), remaining when all philosophical views are abandoned and
all emotions p u rified: sarva:ka:ravaropetaSunyata:, radiant light,
parama:rtha-satya, unchanging tathata:, epistemically present in gnas­
lugs: not the changing dhannas. It "really exists" (yang-dag-tu yod-pa,
97ab) as as31'J1skrta (96b4, 98a4), but this only means it does not come
into or go out of existence (98a3) and is beyond the catu�ko!i (155a-
156b); so when speaking of gzhan-stong S uses a three-valued logic (cf
phung-po gsum-pa, 155b l, IS6ab). Thus to call it an Absolute [H86] or
to call the d octrine an ontology [S63] is inconsistent with S's
e x p l a n a t i o n s ( a n d w ith the general drift of his thinking on
Madhyarnaka); the doctrine is epistemic. gZhan-stong experience is not
a blank or sameness (samahita-jf\ana has no status). It is vital to
vajraya:na (86a, 95a, 116a, 112b).
S often correlates the soterjological duality of visuddhacitta
and a:gantukaldesa with the epistemic duality of gzhan-stong and rang­
s t o n g ( 1 90a6). The purity of citta again has two aspects:
prakrtivisuddhacitta in sentient beings and vaimalyavisuddhacitta in
Buddhas. Stress on prakrtivisuddhacitta fits in well with gzhan-stong, a
. sudden (cig-car) approach to insight (Kong--sprul) and a non-causal
analysis. of goal-attainment, whereas stress on vaimalyavisuddhacitta
fits in more naturally with rang-stong and a gradual (rim-gyis)
88 THE TIBET JOURNAL

approach to insight governed by a causal analysis (as by Tsong-kha-pa).

Ontological dualisms do not illumine these distinctions..

4. The two satyas

mana is paramartha-satya, parini�panna and gzhan-stong. S

recognizes (190b5) Candrakirti's contrast of sarpvrti-satya/samyak·
sarpvrti with sarpvrti-matra/mithya-sarpvrti (MMV VI.25: cf W79).
Paratantra is sarpv[ti-satya while parikalpita is mere sarpv[ti-matra; but
both are vijfl.ana, rang-stong, and to be rejected (97b &c). This sharp
rejection of paratantra and sarpvrti-satya and with them the changing
dharmas, in contrast with acceptance of tathata and of the unchanging
Buddha-qualities as paramartha-satya, is the most characteristic
doctrinal feature of R. If the dharmakaya were rang-stong, it would be
totally non-existent� as the Jainas held (94a l ). Perhaps this is trivial; but
equally the same skandhas. dhatus and ayatanas normally said to be
paratantra have an asa1J'lSkrta. parini�panna and gzhan-stong aspect
(96b3). S's vocabulary sometimes seems to harbour a confusion
between different ways of knowing and differences in what is known,
but this impression cannot survive any careful examination of his use of
ontological terms. Here, for instance, he is entirely free of the absurd
ontological view that there are two separate sets of skandhas &c (one
real and one imaginary, as it were). Parini�panna does not have an
identical or different nature or essence from parikalpita and paratantra
(ngo-bo gcig [dang] tha-dad ma-yin, 98a3).
Rejecting sarpv[ti-satya, unlike Padma dKar-po [B85], S has no
room for satyadvayayuganaddha. Hookham [H86, 1.30] says that here
different use of techinical terms conceals similarity of doctrine; but the
two authors views of sarpvrti-satya are too similar for this to be
plausible. S accepts grias-lugs phyag-chen (97b6, 122a1), but as Padma
dKar-po notes (P 84b-91a; B85, p.29), he rejects sarpvrti-satya and
'khrul-lugs phyag-chen (cf. dri-ma'i gnas-lugs, R 101a1). Thus within
yuganaddha, S rejects cognitions with a normal linguistic component
(without attachment or wrong views, of course); Padma dKar-po
accepts them. This is a great improvement, permitting an intelligible
account of the apparent effectiveness of pratityasamutpannasamskrta·
dhannas in the world of sarpsara. The doctrinal difference e �erges
again in their rather different notions of sarvakaravaropetasunyata: for
S the akaravara are only the unchanging gshis-qualities. while for
Padma dKar-pa they include the changing gdangs-qualities [ef B85
p.lO and fn. lOaJ. Modem gZhan-stong-pas follow Padma dKar-po on
this matter, not S: see 7(a).
 TIlE JONANG·PAS ON MADHYAMAKA: A SKETCH 89

s. The status of gar'lha theory

S d e v ot es a great d e a l of attention to clearing u p

misunderstandings in this area. The garbha i s not a n atman, being
bdag-gnyis-kyis stong-pa, but it exists (pre-anlytically), as in the
Lailkavatara, the MPS and the tantras (33b2-34b6, 36a3, 37a3, 38b5,
39b3, 42a-44b, 49t2-5). The point of the celebrated claim that "the
garbha really exists' (don-dam-du yod-pa, sec. 3) is that is survives the
rejection of emotionlism and wrong views and so is found at the level
of experience devol of non-existent essences (abhava-svabhavaSUnya),
viz the gzhan-ston( level. This is a very simple claim, yet is badly
d i st o r t e d in t h e lGe-Iugs accounts u s e d in [ S 6 3]. Hookham
interestingly points out that garbha theory in R is simpler than in
treatments which take the sUtras less literally and introduce artificial
distinctions in the garbha as ground, path and goal. [H86, 2045]. This
simplicity gives it a certain undeniable impressiveness. Garbha theory
figures mainly in ch. l of R; it is not essential to gzhan-stong which
only enters in ch.2.

6. Sges-rab rGyal-mtshan and modern gZhan-stong-pas: some

differences

(a) Modem �han-stong-pas weaken S's radical rejection of

paratantra las sarpvrti-satya: (see (5». This allows the use of
the two satyas to develop a theory of satyadvayayuganaddha,
which was impossible for S, and leads to a description of the
vajrayana which stays closer to the sources, as well as giving
sllJ!lvrti-satya an intelligible role.
(b) They speak of gzhan-stong as a siddhiinta (grub-mtha), while S
reserves this description for rang-stong. So they are confused
in a way S was not (sec. 3) on whether the rang-stonglgzhan­
stong contrast is one of siddhanta or darSana (for S it was the
constrast between siddhanta and darSana).
(c) They speak of rang-stong-pas, people who hold the r a n g-
. stong view. S did not, since for him rang-stong is a siddhanta,
which he accepts himself, as far as it goes; it cannot apply to
absolutely everything (e.g. dhanna-kaya, secA). So it can be
uncertain or arbitary who is to count as a rang-stong-pa or
what is to count as a rang-stong-pa interpretation of some
doctrine. Given the further confusion (b), the rang-stong­
palgzhan-slong-pa contrast, as used by modem gZhan-stong­
pas (see [KK151b ff], [TN 72b ff)and by their Western
interpreters (cf [H86]), is a source of serious confusions,
frequently issuing 'in the ridiculous claim that the contrast is
one between reason and faith. This misrepresents both parties.
90 THE TIBET JOURNAL

(d) In the tantras they c ombine (a-c) in a the ory o f

satyadvayayuganaddha. Kong-sprul defines rang-stonglgzhan­
stong in the tantras thus: "rang-stong holds that the object is
common with the hetuyIDla, the subject being special to the
mantras, while gzhan-stong holds that the object too is special,
as sarvakaravaropeta" [KKI53b5, my translation; cf. H86
1.12, based on K44b). Note Kong-sprul's typical confusion of
epistemology with ontology. It is unclear why the first view is
rang-stong (compare S's own oscillation in the use of "rang­
stong"). The second view is similar to Padma dKar-po's (in P),
yet is historically anomalous, making him a gzhan-stong-pa
when in fact he opposed Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan in this very
area [B85).
These modifications of Shes-rab rGyal-mtshan's views thus
help to make them seem more similar to traditional bKa'-brgyud
doctrines, but (in some cases) at heavy cost in clarity, coherence, and
doctrinal interest.

References

K, KK: Shes-bya kun-khyab by Kong-sprul (K: Lokesh Chandra ed.

vol. hum; KK: mKhyen-brtse bLa-brang ed. vol.-ml)
M: dBu-ma-Ia-'jug-pa'i mam-bshad dpal Dus-gsum-mkhyen-pa'i
zhal-Iung Dwags-brgyud grub-pa'i shing-rta by Mi-bskyod
rDo-rje (1508-54)
P: Phyag-rgya chen-po man-ngag-gi bshad-sbyar rgyal-ba'i gan­
mdzod by Padma dKar-po (1527-92)
R: Ri-chos nges-don rgya-mtsho by Dol-po Shes-rab rGyal­
mtshan (1292-1361)
TN: bsTan-pa'i mam-bzhag by 'Jigs-bral Ye-shes rDo-rje (1905-
1987)
S63: David Seyfort Ruegg: "The Jo-nang-pas: a School of Buddhist
Ontologists according to the grub-mtha sel-gyi me-long", JOAS
vol. 83, pp.73-91
B85: Michael Broido, "Padma dKar-po on the Two Satyas", JIABS
vol.8 no.2
H86: Susan Hookham, "Tathagatagarbha Doctrine according to the
gZhan-stong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga", Oxford
Ph.D. thesis, 1986
W79: Paul Williams, "Tsong-kha-pa on kun-rdzob bden-pa", in the
Proceedings of the 1979 Oxford Conference in Tibetan Studies
(ed. Aris & Kyi)
CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Williams (D.Phil, Oxford) is Lecturer in Indo-Tibetan Studies at

the University of Bristol. He is the author of many articles and reviews,
mainly o n Madhyamaka Buddhism, and one bo ok, Mahay a n a
Buddhism: T h e Doctrinal Foundations, (Routledge, 1989). He is
currently European Secretary of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies.

Jeffrey Hopkins i!Director of the Center. for South Asian Studies, and
Ass o c i ate P ro f e so r of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies i n the
Department of Relgious Studies at the University of Virginia. He has
established sixten books mainly on various aspect of Tibetan
Buddhism.

Donald S. Lopez, Jr (PhD, University of Virginia, ,1982) is Professor

of Religion at Middlebury College. He is the author of A Study of
Svatantrika (Snow Lion), The Heart Sutra Explained: Indian and
Tibeta n Comm e n taries (SUNY Press), and editor of B u d d h i s t
Henneneutics (University of Hawaii Press).

Tom J.F. T illemans is at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland,

w h e r e h e w o rks primarily on Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka and
Epistemology.

Michael Broido (phD. and M.A. from Cambridge) has worked on the
Madhyamika and Vajrayana thought of India and Tibet since 1973. He
has ,been a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford since 1967, and taught
mathematics there for many years. Currently he is Senior Research
Fellow in Linguistics there.