G.R. No. 166040 April 26, 2006
In the instant
NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
On September 22, 2002, Debbielyn (a 9 year old at that
time) on her way home, as she neared the vacant
house, the petitioner (Neil Llave, 12 year old at that
time), suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks
which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little
light from the lamp post, Debbielyn resisted, but the
petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement.
Petrified, she complied and thereafter the petitioner
removed her shorts and underwear, and got on top on
her. The victim felt that the petitioner’s penis is being
inserted in her vagina, he kissed her, and then she felt
the pain and cried.
Then, Teofisto came out of their house and heard the
victim’s cry. He rushed to the place and saw the
petitioner on top of the victim. He shouted at petitioner,
then the latter fled from the scene. The petitioner hid in
his grandmother’s house but later arrested by a
barangay tanod.
Relevant Points for the Case Build-up:
- The petitioner was an honor student and one of
the outstanding students in the grade school
and received awards such as Best in
Mathematics.
- Neil Llave was a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime.
- He fled and hid after the alleged rape was
committed.
Lower Court Decisions:
RTC: Found Guilty of Rape with special mitigating
circumstance of minority.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC with modification.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner, who was a MINOR ABOVE 9
YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE at the time of
the crime, ACTED WITH DISCERMENT?
HELD
Petitioner’s arguments:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old
at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is
presumed to have acted without discernment under
paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of
proving that he acted with discernment.
case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence
presented by the prosecution to show that he acted
with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from
criminal liability.
SC Decision:
Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code is defined as follows: "the discernment
that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen (15) years of
age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited
by law, is his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong" (People v.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine
but below fifteen years of age, he must discern the
rightness or wrongness of the effects of his act
(Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26,
1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal
Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that "discernment is
more than the mere understanding between right
and wrong. Rather, it means the mental capacity of a
minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act"
(People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in
judging whether a minor accused acted with
discernment, his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, which may be
known and should be determined by considering all
the circumstances disclosed by the record of the
case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior
and conduct, not only before and during the
commission of the act, but also after and even
during the trial should be taken into consideration
(People v. Doquena, supra).
Proof of Petitioner’s Discernment:
1. He FLED and HID - His flight as well as his
act of going into hiding clearly conveys the
idea that he was fully aware of the moral
depravity of his act and that he knew he
committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he
was indeed innocent or if he was not least aware
of the moral consequences of his acts, he would
have immediately confronted private
complainant and her parents and denied having
sexually abused their daughter.
2. Being a CONSISTENT HONOR STUDENT,
BOLSTERED that he ACTED with
DESCERNMENT - The fact that petitioner was a
recipient of several academic awards and was
an honor student further reinforces the finding
that he was possessed of intelligence well
beyond his years and thus was able to
distinguish, better than other minors of his age
could, which conduct is right and which is
morally reprehensible. Hence, although
 appellant was still a minor of twelve years of
age, he possessed intelligence far beyond
his age. It cannot then be denied that he had
the mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong. This is important in
cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to
note that the basic reason behind the enactment
of the exempting circumstances under Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code is the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent on the part of the accused.
SC DECISION: Affirmed the lower courts’ decision
with MODIFICATION.
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO
KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C.
AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.
SYLLABUS
PRESUMPTION; CHILDREN BELOW NINE YEARS
OLD, CONCLUSIVELY PRESUMED TO BE
INCAPABLE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE;
CASE AT BAR. — Anent the negligence imputed to
ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that
favors children below nine (9) years old
incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, (I
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 70-71 [1993]),
former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction,
a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on
that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability
obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen
years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a
quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed
to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under
fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our
law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine
years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the
owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City
(Syvel's), while the private respondents are spouses and
the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. While Criselda and her
child Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's, a terrible
accident happened, which caused the life of the six-year
old Zhieneth. She was pinned by the bulk of the store's
gift-wrapping counter structure which collapsed.
Fourteen days later, Zhieneth died at the hospital, which
was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Private
respondents filed a complaint for damages||
RTC dismissed complaint.CA ruled in favor of private
respondents, that petitioners were negligent in
maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. It also
declared Zhieneth, who was below seven at the time,
was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort.|||
ISSUE
W/N petitioners are guilty of negligence – YES
W/N Zhieneth is guilty of contributory negligence – NO
HELD
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the tragedy which
befell Zhieneth was no accident and her death could
only be attributed to negligence. The physical
analysis of the counter by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on
record revealed that it was not durable. Criselda should
be absolved from any contributory negligence. The
petition was denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
FACTS
John Philip Guevarra, an 11 year old, was playing with
his best friend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and three other
children in their backyard. They were target-shooting a
tansan using an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the
course of their game, Almine was hit by a pellet on his
left collar bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After the preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal
exculpated Guevarra due to his age and because the
unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident.
Almine’s parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against Guevarra
for Homicide through reckless Imprudence.
Guevarra filed a motion to quash stating that the
information contains averments which if true would
constitute an excuse or justification. His primary
argument was that the term “discernment” connotes
“intent” under the exempting circumstance found under
Art. 12 sec. 3 of the RPC (9<x<15 exempting except if
acting with discernment). If this were true, then no minor
between the age of 9 to 15 may be convicted of a quasi
offense under Art. 365 (Criminal Negligence).
ISSUE
W/N discernment is same as intent – NO
HELD
Intent is defined as a determination to do certain things.
On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong.
They convey two distinct thoughts. It is therefore
incorrect to say that since a minor above nine but below
fifteen years of age acted with discernment, then he
intended such act to be done.
The second element of dolo (deceit) is intelligence;
without this power, necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
crime can exist. That’s why we have article 12.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of
culpa (fault), three (3) elements are indispensable,
namely, intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is
necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age be possessed with intelligence in
committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his negligent
act.
As such, Guevarra was not exempted and the
case was remanded to the lower court.
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
Sarcia was charged with rape. AAA was the five year-old
victim. Some rape details: In 1996, appellant removed
AAA’s shorts and underwear. He also removed his
trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie
down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant
made an upand- down movement("Nagdapadapa tabi"),
AAA felt severe pain and exclaimed “Aray”. Sarica’s
conviction was then affirmed upon appeal, crediting
AAA’s testimony and her cousin’s as well, despite
certain inconsistencies.
Relevant Fact: Meanwhile, when accused appellant was
detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome
of his appeal before this Court, (R.A.) No. 9344, the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on
May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January17, 2003 and July 14, 2005,
respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of
conviction of accused handed down by the RTC was not
suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time,
in accordance with Article 192 of (P.D.) No. 603, The
Child and YouthWelfare Code, etc. He is now 31 years
of age. Thus, the retroactivity of RA 9344 is at issue
which affords the accused , so long as he was under 18
at the time of the criminal incident. Automatic
suspension of sentence is also available even if the
child reached 18 at the time of the promulgation of
judgment(Sec. 38).
ISSUE
W/N RA 9344 applies in favor of the accused - NO
HELD
NO. But death penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Case remanded to court a quo for appropriate
disposition under Sec.51.
Firstly, Section 38 does not distinguish WON child is
guilty of capital offense or a lesser one, and so
automatic suspension of sentence can be afforded even
in a heinous crime. Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A.
No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still
be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child
reaches the maximum age of 21. Since he is now
already 31 years old, the question on the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.
However, he is still entitled to the disposition measure in
Section 51 which reads:. Confinement of Convicted
Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities.—A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by theBUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response
(RACER) in Butuan City received a report that
Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a
buy-bust operation, two informations was filed against
Mantalaba which was later on consolidated. Mantalaba
pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and was penalized of reclusion perpetua to death and
fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally
possessing shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in
application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum and 8
yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
present appeal.
Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting
him and that there was no evidence of actual sale
between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust
operation. He also claims that the chain of custody of the
seized shabu was not established.
But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated
Mantalaba's minority as privileged mitigating
circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the
rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of
reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

ISSUE

W/N accused is guilty; W/N his minority exempts him

from the crime

HELD

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the

following: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefore. From the above
testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well
established that the elements have been satisfactorily
met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented.
The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which
the buy-bust operation was conducted.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team

with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its
non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal
or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-

bust operation but was of legal age during the
promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA
9344 took effect after the promulgation of the RTC's
decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code) and Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in
People vs Sarcia, suspension of sentence can still be
applied but NOT when the offender upon the
promulgation of judgment is 21 yrs old. or older.
Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension of
sentence is already moot and academic.