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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 167968. January 23, 2006.]

VICENTE FLORENTINO , petitioner, vs . MARIANO, CYNTHIA, ADELFA,


all surnamed RIVERA and TEOFILA, MAXIMO, CIRIACO, NORBERTO,
FELICIANO, JUAN GENEROSO, ANGEL, NOLASCO and MARCOSA, all
surnamed MENDOZA , respondents.

De Jesus & Associates for petitioner.


People's Law Office for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; THE OPERATIVE PART


IN EVERY DECISION IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OR THE FALLO, AND WHERE
THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FALLO AND THE BODY OF THE DECISION, THE
FALLO CONTROLS. — It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired nality, as in
this case, becomes immutable and unalterable. A nal judgment may no longer be
modi ed in any respect, even if the modi cation is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law. In short, once a judgment becomes nal and executory, it
can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be and nothing further can
be done therewith except to execute it. It is settled rule that "the operative part in every
decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is con ict between the
fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that
the fallo is the nal order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering
nothing." We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco
where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix. Succinctly
stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the
body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body
of the decision." While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some
ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive
portion thereof that nally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION MUST CONFORM TO THAT ORDAINED OR
DECREED IN THE DISPOSITIVE PART OF THE DECISION; WHERE THE ORDER OF
EXECUTION IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH AND EXCEEDS THE JUDGMENT WHICH GIVES
IT LIFE, THE ORDER HAS PRO-TANTO NO VALIDITY. — More emphatically, Light Rail
Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals declares that "it is the dispositive part of the
judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and obligations of the parties,
nally, de nitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent
statements in the body that may tend to confuse." In this regard, it must be borne in
mind "that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part
of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and
exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
MODIFYING THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT,
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SINCE THE MODIFICATION SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
AWARDED TO RESPONDENTS. — It bears noting that in the foregoing cases cited, the
perceived inconsistencies referred to alleged ambiguities found in the body of the
same judgments. It is worse in this case because what the trial court did was to amend
paragraph (cc) of the dispositive portion of its nal and executory October 20, 1986
verdict in order that the same would conform to the disquisitions contained in the body
of the appellate court's judgment which had a rmed in full in the decretal portion of
the decision dated March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784, the lower court's ruling.
Su ce it to state that this is anathema to the above-mentioned rules. Hence, the Court
of Appeals could not be faulted for setting aside the trial court's assailed orders of
September 13, 2000 and October 31, 2000 and ordering said court "to enforce its
Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its terms and conditions." It has
not escaped our attention that this is the second time this case has reached us. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784
Decision, the case at that time had already "been dragging for almost two decades."
What should have been a simple implementation of an October 20, 1986 judgment in
2000 was delayed by the ling of a motion for reconsideration questioning the
computation of damages which petitioner insists should be 16.5 instead of 100 cavans
each year. This issue had already been long settled with the issuance of the April 12,
2000 Resolution in G.R. No. 140927 denying with nality petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST DICTATES THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN
END TO LITIGATION BY THE PARTIES OVER A SUBJECT FULLY AND FAIRLY
ADJUDICATED AND COURTS SHOULD FROWN UPON ANY ATTEMPT TO PROLONG
THEM. — It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule
which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two
grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should
be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the grati cation of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. It is almost trite to say that
execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Litigation
must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and e cient administration of
justice requires that once a judgment has become nal, the winning party be not
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme
calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the February
10, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62080 as well as its April
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26, 2005 Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds
of judicial discretion in reversing the orders of the trial court which substantially
amended the dispositive portion of its nal and executory judgment by reducing the
damages awarded to respondents.
The facts 3 as found by the appellate court are not disputed:
The petition stemmed from a complaint led before the RTC by Mariano,
Cynthia and Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera (hereinafter Riveras) against Vicente
Florentino (hereinafter private respondent) and the latter as third-party plaintiff
against Teo la Mendoza, et al., as third-party defendants (hereinafter Mendozas),
for rescission, annulment, redemption, reconveyance and damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5761-M.

On October 20, 1986, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered for the


plaintiffs Riveras and third parties defendants Mendozas and adversely to
the defendant and third-party plaintiff Florentino

(aa) declaring the lease contract (Exh. 'G' also marked Exh. '2')
terminated;

(bb) ordering the defendant Florentino to turn over the


possession of the leased premises to the Riveras, with
Florentino being permitted to take all removable
improvements at his expense in accordance with the lease
contract;

(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease rental


of P500.00 for the year 1982 up to the time possession had
been delivered to the Riveras and to compensate in cash or in
kind the Riveras' claim for damage for unrealized annual
harvest of 100 cavans from 1978 up to the present;

(dd) ordering further Florentino to pay the Riveras and the


Mendozas attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00;

(ee) dismissing for lack of merit the counterclaims in the


original complaint and the third-party complaint of
Florentino.
SO ORDERED. 4
Aggrieved, private respondent appealed the foregoing decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15784, which a rmed the same in a
decision dated March 29, 1996. Undaunted, private respondent led a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC), docketed as G.R. No. 140927,
which the latter denied in its Resolution dated February 9, 2000. Per entry of
judgment 5 issued by the Supreme Court, the said Resolution became nal and
executory on June 1, 2000 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment[s]. ESCTaA

Consequently, petitioners led before the RTC a Motion for Execution 6 of


its decision dated October 20, 1986 which the latter granted on August 14, 2000. 7
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Dissatis ed, the private respondent moved for a reconsideration 8 on the ground
that the decision sought to be enforced is vague and contrary to the
pronouncement made by the CA in the body of its decision that the petitioners
were deprived of only an area of 1,650 square meters or an annual harvest of 16.5
cavans.
On September 13, 2000, the RTC granted the said motion, the decretal
portion of which reads:
"All told, going by the explanation enunciated by the Court of
Appeals, which this Court must pay obeisance to, paragraph (cc) of the
decision rendered by this Court on October 20, 1986 is hereby CLARIFIED to
such extent that the quantity of the damages which defendant Florentino
must pay the Riveras for unrealized annual harvest is 16.5 (instead of 100)
cavans from 1978 onwards.

SO ORDERED." 9
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was
denied in the Order dated October 31, 2000.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling thus:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED . The
assailed Orders dated September 13, 2000 and October 31, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Branch 9, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The RTC is
ordered to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its
terms and conditions.

SO ORDERED. 1 0

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
modifying the dispositive portion of a nal and executory judgment, since the
modi cation substantially reduced the amount of damages awarded to herein
respondents, i.e., from 100 cavans to only 16.5 cavans of palay, annually.
A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in
a Resolution dated April 26, 2005. 1 1
Dissatis ed, petitioner led the instant petition insisting that the challenged
judgment and resolution of the appellate tribunal is not in accordance with law or
applicable decisions of the Court because there existed an ambiguity in the dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision and the text of the appellate court's judgment.
According to petitioner, the orders of the trial court "merely clari ed and quanti ed" the
decision sought to be executed.
Considering that the crux of the controversy centers on a perceived vagueness in
the fallo of the trial court's decision, it is necessary to restate the guidelines on the
contents of a proper dispositive portion enunciated in Velarde v. Social Justice Society ,
1 2 viz:

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should


state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the speci c relief
granted, and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First,
the parties should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know
how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should
be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case
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should be terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually
depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights
and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

In sum, petitioner argues that in substantially reducing the amount of damages,


by way of unrealized income, from 100 cavans to 16.5 cavans of palay annually, the trial
court was merely 'clarifying' an ambiguity between the appellate tribunal's
pronouncements in the body of its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784 which states that

While it may be true that the only portion of the adjacent riceland that was
affected by the waste water coming from the piggery is only 150 square meters, it
must be noted, however, that this 150 square meters was counted from the
peripheral fence of the piggery and poultry farm which is occupying 5,000 square
meters of prime agricultural land. In the nal analysis, the Mendozas, and later
the Riveras, were deprived of an opportunity to cultivate 1,500 square meters of
"encroached" land plus 150 square meters of land contaminated with decaying
piggery sludge. 1 3

and paragraph (cc) of the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment which, among
others, dictates that it is —
(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease rental of
P500.00 for the year 1982 up to the time possession had been delivered to the
Riveras and to compensate in cash or in kind the Riveras' claim for damage for
unrealized annual harvest of 100 cavans from 1978 up to the present. 1 4

We disagree.
It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired nality, as in this case,
becomes immutable and unalterable. 1 5 A nal judgment may no longer be modi ed in
any respect, even if the modi cation is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law. 1 6 In short, once a judgment becomes nal and executory, it can no longer be
disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be 1 7 and nothing further can be done
therewith except to execute it. 1 8
It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive
portion or thefallo, and where there is con ict between the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the nal order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." 1 9 We expounded
on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco 2 0 where, reiterating the
earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, 2 1 we said:
More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the nal
judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all
seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be
distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views
of the court and cannot prevail against its nal order or decision. While the two
may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment.
So, . . . there is a distinction between the ndings and conclusions of a court and
its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition
of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more
than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the
judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the
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premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of
writing nis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of
the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give
unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study
judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from
which the results purport to ow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial
Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the
grounds of a decision fail to re ect the exact views of the court, especially those
of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial
decisions, lapses, ndings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear
on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered
result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the
decision.

Succinctly stated, "where there is a con ict between the dispositive portion of
the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what
appears in the body of the decision." 2 2 While the body of the decision, order or
resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning
preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that nally invests rights upon the
parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations. 2 3
More emphatically, Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals 2 4 declares
that "it is the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the
rights and obligations of the parties, nally, de nitively, and authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to
confuse." In this regard, it must be borne in mind "that execution must conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the
order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life,
the order has pro-tanto no validity." 2 5
It bears noting that in the foregoing cases cited, the perceived inconsistencies
referred to alleged ambiguities found in the body of the same judgments. It is worse in
this case because what the trial court did was to amend paragraph (cc) of the
dispositive portion of its nal and executory October 20, 1986 verdict in order that the
same would conform to the disquisitions contained in the body of the appellate court's
judgment which had affirmed in full in the decretal portion of the decision dated March
29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784, the lower court's ruling. Su ce it to state that this is
anathema to the above-mentioned rules. Hence, the Court of Appeals could not be
faulted for setting aside the trial court's assailed orders of September 13, 2000 and
October 31, 2000 and ordering said court "to enforce its Decision dated October 20,
1986 in accordance with its terms and conditions." 2 6
It has not escaped our attention that this is the second time this case has
reached us. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15784 Decision, the case at that time had already "been dragging for almost two
decades." 2 7 What should have been a simple implementation of an October 20, 1986
judgment in 2000 was delayed by the ling of a motion for reconsideration questioning
the computation of damages which petitioner insists should be 16.5 instead of 100
cavans each year. This issue had already been long settled with the issuance of the
April 12, 2000 Resolution 2 8 in G.R. No. 140927 denying with nality petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the
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parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule
which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two
grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should
be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the grati cation of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. 2 9
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life
of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party. 3 0 Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and
e cient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become nal, the
winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put
an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. 3 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 10, 2005 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62080, and its April 26, 2005 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
ISTCHE

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 26-32. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in
by Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.

2. Id. at 33.
3. Id. at 27-28.
4. See also CA rollo, pp. 53-54. Penned by Judge Jesus R. De Vega.
5. Id. at 84.
6. Id. at 82.
7. Id. at 87. Penned by Judge D. Roy Masadao, Jr.
8. Id. at 88-91.
9. Id. at 34.
10. Rollo, p. 31.
11. Id. at 33.
12. G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 313.
13. CA rollo, p. 18.
14. Id. at 53-54.
15. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Estrella, 453 Phil. 45, 51 (2003).

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16. Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114, 119 (2003).
17. Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 164914, October 5, 2005.
18. King Integrated Security Services, Inc. v. Gatan, 453 Phil. 293, 296 (2003).
19. Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 664,
676-677.
20. G.R. No. 155108, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 400, 427-428.
21. 78 Phil. 570, 577-578 (1947).
22. Olac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84256, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328.
23. Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, 438 Phil. 756, 765 (2002).
24. G.R. Nos. 139275-76 & 140949, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 125, 136.
25. Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, 428 Phil. 208, 223
(2002).
26. Rollo, p. 31.
27. CA rollo, p. 19.
28. Id. at 56.
29. Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 27, 41.
30. Garcia v. Yared, 447 Phil. 444, 453 (2003).
31. Ho v. Lacsa, G.R. No. 142664, October 5, 2005.

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