Garcia v. Drilon
Thus, this
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of
Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus,
pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be
a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of
the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to
Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it
may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not
be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
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situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based
on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only;
and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by
favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The
grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to
due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled
that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce
and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
People v. Genosa
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15 2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every
time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who
testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were
quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to
another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of
death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant
invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial
Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with
an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination
of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the
said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case
to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on
the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
“battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as
part of the records.
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ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women
include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
“cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence
must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated
by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could
satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the
rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life;
and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of
self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the
life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony
of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During
that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a
position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation
were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over
a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful
as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient
to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as
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a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up
by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the
hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months
pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional
and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life
and that of her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination
that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by
the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal
and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
People v. Baldo
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01930, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 73 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-18080 to 00-18082, convicting
and sentencing appellant Elmer S. Baldo to reclusion perpetua for the crime of
rape.
On February 17, 2000, three Informations for rape were filed against appellant and
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-18080 to 00-18082. Except for the dates,
all three informations were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of February 2000 in the City of Antipolo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with a fan knife, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
[AAA],3 against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment on March 16, 2000, appellant pleaded not guilty to the three
charges.5 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
Twenty-nine-year-old AAA, appellant, and Norman Echani were housemates in a
small one-room house in Purok Maligaya II, Mambugan, Antipolo City. Appellant is
her nephew while Echani is her cousin. As AAA recently resigned from her job and
appellant worked during the night shift in a factory, the two were always left during
daytime when Echani was at work.
On February 10, 2000 at 1:00 p.m., appellant professed his love for AAA in their
living room. She, however, admonished him against his protestation for they are
relatives. He then told her that if she ignores him, he would rape her. She pleaded
to him not to do anything against her will if he really liked her. Appellant then held
her left hand and poked a balisong (fan knife) at her, and then removed her pants
and panty while she was seated at a bench. Then he dragged her and laid her on
the floor, removed his shorts and brief, and placed himself on top of her. AAA tried
to resist by kicking him but he was stronger. Thereafter he placed the knife aside,
then held and pressed her thighs. He then fingered her vagina with his right hand
and inserted his penis into it. After two minutes, appellant stood up but threatened
to kill her if she reported the incident to their relatives. As she was in shock, AAA
just stayed in her room. Appellant thereafter left for work at 5:30 p.m.
According to AAA, appellant repeated his beastly act the following day, February
11 and on the next day, February 12, 2000.
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In the evening of February 12, 2000, AAA decided to tell Echani what appellant
had done to her. Echani and his brother, Abraham, then accompanied her to the
barangay hall to file complaints against appellant.
The medico-legal police officer who examined AAA on February 13, 2000 found
"deep healing laceration" in her hymen, "compatible with recent loss of virginity"
but negative for spermatozoa.6 Dr. James Belgira testified that the laceration could
have been caused by a penetration of a hard object like an erect penis. He also
found contusions on AAA’s left arm and thighs.7
Appellant, in his own defense, denied the charges against him. He claimed that he
and AAA were lovers since November 1999, and that she had consented to have
sex with him even prior to February 2000. He contended that she charged him
because her parents were against their affair, and that her parents learned of their
relationship because two of their neighbors saw them having sexual intercourse.
He likewise denied poking a knife at her when they "made love." To prove they are
lovers, appellant presented two witnesses: Benjamin
Eubra, Purok Maligaya Chairman, and Simeon de los Santos, appellant’s uncle
and neighbor.
Eubra and De los Santos testified that appellant and AAA were always together
and held hands when walking. Being part of the barangay investigating team,
Eubra said that the crime scene is a single-room house separated from adjacent
houses by plywood and located in a place where market people usually hang out.
He did not believe the charges because the neighbors could always see and hear
what the occupants inside the house were doing. 8
On September 26, 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty in Criminal Case No.
00-18080 but acquitted him in Criminal Case Nos. 00-18081 and 00-18082.
The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ELMER BALDO y SANTAIN is
hereby found guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 00-
18080 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay to the complainant, [AAA], the amount of Php 50,000
as indemnity.
Criminal Cases No[s]. 00-18081 and 00-18082 are hereby DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.9
Since the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review. Pursuant to People v.
Mateo,10 however, we referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On July 4, 2006, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision. Its fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
with MODIFICATION by ordering accused-appellant Elmer Baldo y Santain to
likewise pay [AAA] the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount
of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence this instant petition based on a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN [PROVEN] BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.12
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the crime of rape,
particularly the element of force or intimidation, has been proved sufficiently.
Appellant insists that he and AAA are lovers and what happened between them
was consensual. He likewise capitalizes on AAA’s admission that he was no longer
holding the knife when he inserted his finger and subsequently his penis into AAA’s
vagina. Thus, she had all the opportunity to resist his alleged sexual assault.
Appellant further claims that AAA’s failure to make an outcry to call the attention of
their neighbors, as the partition between the rooms was only made of plywood, and
to immediately disclose the incident to her cousin Echani, showed she consented
to the sexual congresses. As he was not covering her mouth, she should have
made her protestations in a voice loud enough for others to hear.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that findings of fact of the trial
court deserve respect and that witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer
information. It stresses that the elements of simple rape, to wit, carnal knowledge
and force or intimidation, were proven during trial. Even granting that appellant and
AAA were lovers, such fact was not a valid defense as a man cannot force his
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sweetheart to have sexual intercourse with him. The OSG adds that AAA’s account
evinced sincerity and truthfulness and she never wavered in her story, consistently
pointing to appellant as her rapist. Besides, no woman would willingly submit
herself to the rigors, humiliation and stigma attendant in a rape case if she was not
motivated by an earnest desire to punish the culprit.
In our considered view, the prosecution has proven all the elements of the offense
of simple rape, including the use of force or intimidation. We affirm appellant’s
conviction.1avvphi1.zw+
For conviction in the crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)
that said act was accomplished (a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b)
when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the
victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.13
In this case, the presence of the first element is undisputed since
appellant admits his sexual congress with complainant. While making such
admission however, he contends that there is no force or intimidation to speak of
as it was consensual. Appellant alleges that AAA willingly participated in the sexual
act because they are lovers. He even presented two witnesses to corroborate his
claim. Their testimony, however, leaves us unconvinced of appellant’s alleged
innocence.
The "sweetheart theory" or "sweetheart defense" is an oft-abused justification that
rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience.14 For the
Court to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by
compelling evidence.15 The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in
support of the theory, as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such
as tokens, mementos, and photographs.16 There is none presented here by the
defense.
Moreover, even if it were true that they were sweethearts, a love affair does not
justify rape. As wisely ruled in a previous case, a man does not have the unbridled
license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires. 17
In a desperate attempt to prove the alleged consensual nature of the sexual
intercourse, appellant capitalizes on AAA’s failure to offer resolute resistance
despite the fact that he was no longer holding the knife while consummating the
sexual act. Appellant also points to AAA’s failure to shout or make an outcry so that
their neighbors can come to her rescue.
AAA’s failure to shout or to tenaciously resist appellant should not be taken against
her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her
submission to appellant’s criminal act.18 In rape, the force and intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims
react the same way.19 Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. 20 Some
may offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all.21 Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape.22 A rape victim
has no burden to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force or
intimidation employed upon her.23 As long as the force or intimidation is present,
whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point. 24 In this case, the
presence of a fan knife on hand or by his side speaks loudly of appellant’s use of
violence, or force and intimidation.
As to the civil indemnity and damages, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, correctly awarded ₱50,000 civil indemnity and ₱50,000 moral damages in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.25 Likewise, the award of ₱25,000 exemplary
damages due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon (fan knife) is proper.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01930 is AFFIRMED.
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA
These are 3 consolidated cases for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming
with modifications the decision of the Office of the President dismissing from the
service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala
(Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed
a Complaint against Rayala for alleged acts of sexual harassment like pinching her
shoulders and tickling her neck which suggest sexual desire before Secretary
Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The OP dismissed Rayala. The latter filed before the CA a certiorari under rule 65 but
the same was denied. CA subsequently modified the ruling holding Rayala liable with
the penalty of suspension for 1 year and not dismissal from service.
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Domingo, OP and Rayala filed petitions for review. Domingo and OP argued that the
dismissal was proper and within the prerogative of the President as Rayala was a Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
presidential appointee. Rayala argued that he is not guilty of sexual harassment. Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance57and where only aggravating and no mitigating
ISSUES: circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.58 Hence,
the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one
A. Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? (1) year.
B. If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Decision affirmed.
HELD:

A. Yes, It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement
of a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand,

request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or
for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts
result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.

B. Only 1 year suspension as enshrined in AO 250.

It is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority,
who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of
Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase
"for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that Rayala
was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive
did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the
penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable
penalty for the first offense of either the administratisve offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the
Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from
the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a
second offense.

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