1. YRA v.

ABANO
G.R. No. L-30187, November 15, 1928
MALCOLM, J.:

Facts: (For Recit)

These are proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408
of the Election Law.

Marcos Yra, petitioner-appellant is the Vice President elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan while Maximo
Abano is the Municipal President elect.

Antecedent Facts:

Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred
to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter
there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to
Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has considered himself a resident of
Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an application for cancellation of
registration in Manila which was dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials
for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was
elected by popular vote to that office.
Petitioner now questions the qualifications of Abano through a quo warranto proceedings.

Lower court decision– in favour of respondent, dismissed the petition.

The petitioner-appellant assigns and argues four errors to the decision of Trial Court.
The first error is a technical matter, the act of the trial judge in permitting the respondent to retire his
second answer. This does not constitute either prejudicial or reversible error. Third error is the eligibility
of the respondent because it is alleged that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year
previous to the election. The question of residence is largely one of intention. At least since May 10,
1927, Abano has been a resident of Meycauayan or more than the one-year period fixed by the law as a
prerequisite to election. The fourth error assigned is a formal one.

The main issue in the case is the second error, on the alleged non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a
municipal office for the reason that he was not a "qualified voter in his municipality" — not a "qualified
elector therein." It is well to recall that Abano was registered as a voter in Manila and not in Meycauayan
in June, 1928, when the election was held.

Issue:
Whether registration as a “qualified elector” is a qualification to run for a public office.
What does “qualified elector mean?
HELD:
NO, section 404 of the election law states that to run for public office, one must be a qualified elector.
One of the requirements to be a qualified elector is to be a qualified voter. Section 431 states the
requirements for qualifications of a voter, while section 432 states the disqualification. However,
registration to its own municipality and voting is NOT a requirement in order to run for public office.
What is needed is to be a qualified elector and a qualified voter, which Abano complied with. Registration
only regulates the exercise to vote.

Further explanation:
The Election Law, as amended, in section 404 provides that "No person shall be eligible . . . for any
elective . . . municipal office unless, within the time fixed by law, he shall file a duly sworn certificate of
candidacy. Said certificate shall declare . . . that he is a resident of the . . . municipality, . . . in which his
candidacy is offered; that he is a duly qualified elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office." The
Administrative Code in section 2174, in giving the qualifications of elective officers, also provides that
"An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his municipality
and must have been resident therein for at least one year . . . ." Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes
the qualifications for voters, section 432 the disqualifications.

What does “qualified elector” mean?

In the early days of the Philippine Assembly, the election of Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero as a
member of the Assembly from Manila was contested on the ground that he was not registered in his
electoral district. The Committee of the Philippine Assembly reached the conclusion that the words
"qualified elector" meant a person who had all of the qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not
a person registered in the electoral list
So also the Executive Bureau has been of the opinion that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter
does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter (Executive Bureau Unnumbered
Provincial Circulars, May 19, 1925, May 2, 1925 May 7, 1925, cited in Laurel's The Law of Elections of
the Philippine Islands, 1st ed., pp. 32, 33). Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine
Islands, pages 32, 33, summarizes the law on the subject in the following language:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a
duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter
does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a
person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications
prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a
candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a
candidate to be voted for.
SC states that they respect the contemporaneous construction of the law by two departments of the
Government — one the legislative branch responsible for its enactment, and the other the executive
branch responsible for its enforcement.
(Kentucky case was also mentioned for its own opinion)

Short Digest from internet:

YRA v ABANO
FACTS
Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He transferred to Manila to complete his studies
there. While temporarily residing at Manila, he registered as a voter there. After becoming a member of
the bar and death of his father, he returned to Bulacan from May 10, 1927 up to the present. When 1928
elections came, he tried to cancel his registration at Manila, but failed to do so. Nevertheless, he ran as a
candidate for municipal president (Mayor?) of
Meycauayan and won the elections. Petitioner now questions the qualifications of Abano through a quo
warranto proceedings.

ISSUE
Whether registration is a qualification to run for a public office.

HELD
NO, section 404 of the election law states that to run for public office, one must be a qualified elector.
One of the requirement to be a qualified elector is to be a qualified voter. Section 431 states the
requirements for a qualifications of a voter, while section 432 states the disqualification. All of these are
needed in able to be register and vote. However, registration and voting is NOT a requirement in order to
run for public office. What is needed is to be a qualified
elector and a qualified voter, which Abano complied with. Registration only regulates the exercise to vote.
2. AKBAYAN Youth (petitioners) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (respondents) G.R. No.
147066. March 26, 2001. BUENA, J. Consolidated Petitions

FACTS: 1. Petitioners representing the youth seek to direct (COMELEC) to conduct a nationwide special
registration before May 14, 2001 General Elections of new voters from ages 18 – 21 because around four million
youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 – the deadline set by COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189
“Continuing Voters Registration”

Senator Raul Roco - (as COMELEC chairman on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples Participation) sent a
letter inviting COMELEC to a public hearing to discuss the extension of the date of registration

Public hearing (January 29, 2001) was called by the Senate Committee on electoral Reforms, Suffrage and Peoples
Participation headed by Senator Roco

Memorandum No. 2001-027 was submitted by Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion providing for the request by
youth organizations to hold additional 2 days of registration preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001 with following
guidelines:

a. Applicant registering for the first time on May 14, 2001 – shall be 25 years of age or less
b. Registration – places of residences of applicants
c. Presentation of valid identification documents

Rationale for 2 day registration – the renewed political awareness and interest to participate in the political process
generated by the recent political events in the country among our youth.

A consultation meeting was held by the group of Commissioner Borra disapproving the request because under
Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting (120) days before a
regular election and COMELEC has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. 7. COMELEC
Resolution No. 3584 – denied the request for 2 day registration

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus & praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing COMELEC to
conduct a special registration – filed by petitioners assailing the Resolution No. 3584 Petitioner’s contentions: 1.
Section 8 of RA 8189 & Resolution No. 3584 – is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional right to vote
on the May 14, 2001 general elections and caused the disenfranchisement of around (4) million Filipinos of voting
age who failed to register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC 2. Section 29 RA No. 6646 -
standby powers or residual powers of the COMELEC for the Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election
Acts because the act of registration is by its very nature, a pre-election act

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution No.
3584

2. Whether or not the Court can compel COMELEC, through the extraordinary writ of mandamus, to conduct a
special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline
and the May 14, 2001 general elections

HELD: 1. The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all
other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law.

2. The substantive aspect is under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution –

“SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT

OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND WHO
SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE WHEREIN
THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTIONS.
NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL BE IMPOSED ON THE
EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE”
The procedural limitation - a citizen to be qualified to exercise his right to vote is obliged by law to register under
RA 8189 / Voters Registration Act of 1996

Registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement because the act
of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.

The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of
voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.

Section 8 of RA 8189 provides a system of continuing registration –

SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of registration of voters
shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall,
however, be conducted during the period starting (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election.

Section 35 of RA 8189 provides a prohibitive period within which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters
from the permanent voters list as a measure of protection against flying voters and non-qualified registrants –
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List Any registered voter, representative of a political party x x x
may file x x x except (100) days prior to a regular election xxx.

The period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods,
the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application.

Section 3(a) of RA 8189 defines Registration – as the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and
including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board.

Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution
and denying the instant petitions, because the said law provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting (120) days before a regular election.

Section 28 of R.A. 8436 - certain pre-election acts are still capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the
remaining period before the date of election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under
the law.

It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the operation,
implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these specialized
government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not
do, under prevailing circumstances.

The stand-by power of the COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436 does not presuppose the possibility of its
being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.

While it may be true that COMELEC set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, petitioners were not
totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189.

COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which denied the request to
conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters. COMELEC acted within the bounds and confines of the
applicable law - Section 8 of RA 8189.

In issuing the assailed Resolution, COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, including questions relating to the registration of voters.

The Court cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without transgressing the
time-honored principles in this jurisdiction. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special
registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election,
involves the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
Petitions for certiorari and mandamus are DENIED.
3. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:
Romulo B. Macalintal, as a taxpayer and as a lawyer, filed by a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants
or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution? NO.

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress? YES

(3) Whether or not the Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in
Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution? NO

RULING:
(1) No. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both
a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence
is considered synonymous with domicile.

The Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad
who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and
consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission
provided for Section 2 Article V of the Constitution immediately after the residency requirement of
Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in
construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are
not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement
in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Contrary to the claim of Macalintal, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves
as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to
say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise.
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status
in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus,
without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His
having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law,
he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.

(2)YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by Macalintal, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and
vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

(3)YES. R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), composed of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the JCOC is a purely legislative body. There is
no question that the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189
is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of
its legislation. However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the
JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC, the voting by
mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by
COMELEC.

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections.

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the
Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law
unconstitutional.

The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this
Act for prior approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that it shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically
vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both
provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC.
4. NURHUSSEIN A. UTUTALUM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ARDEN S. ANNI
G.R. No. 84843-44 January 22, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent, Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the last 30 May
1987 Congressional elections for the Second District of Sulu. The election returns from Siasi showed that
Petitioner Ututalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni 35,581 votes out of the thirty-nine
thousand eight hundred and one 39,801 registered voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, Petitioner
Ututalum would have a lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner Ututalum, filed written objections to the returns
from Siasi on the ground that they "appear to be tampered with or falsified" owing to the "great excess of
votes" appearing in said returns. He then claimed that multiplying the 42 precincts of Siasi by 300 voters
per precinct, there should have been only 12,600 registered voters and not 36,663 voters who cast their
votes, thereby exceeding the actual authorized voters by 23,947 "ghost voters." He then prayed for the
exclusion from the canvass of any election returns from Siasi.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu dismissed petitioner's objections because they had been "filed
out of time or only after the Certificate of Canvass had already been canvassed by the Board and because
the grounds for the objection were not one of those enumerated in Section 243 of the Election Code".
While Ututalum’s petitions were pending, one Lupay Loong, a candidate for Governor of Sulu, filed a
verified Petition with the COMELEC to annul the List of Voters of Siasi, for purposes of the election of
local government officials This Petition was opposed by Respondent Anni. Petitioner Ututalum was not a
party to this proceeding.
The COMELEC issued a Resolution annulling the Siasi List of Voters "on the ground of massive
irregularities committed in the preparation thereof and being statistically improbable", and ordering a new
registration of voters for the local elections of 15 February 1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of Ututtalum refers to "obviously manufactured returns," a proper subject
matter for a pre-proclamation controversy and, therefore, cognizable by the COMELEC, in accordance
with Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code

HELD:
NO. It cannot justifiably be contended that the Siasi returns, per se, were "obviously manufactured" and,
thereby, a legitimate issue in a pre-proclamation controversy. It is true that in Lagumbay vs. COMELEC
(L-2544, 31 January 1966, 16 SCRA 175), relied upon heavily by Petitioner Ututalum, this Court ruled
that the returns are obviously manufactured where they show a great excess of votes over what could have
been legally cast. The Siasi returns however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of
Voters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legally cast considering that
only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801 voters. Moreover, the Lagumbay case dealt with the
"manufacture" of returns by those charged with their preparation as shown prima facie on the questioned
returns themselves. Not so in this case which deals with the preparation of the registry list of voters, a
matter that is not reflected on the face of said returns. Basically, therefore, petitioner's cause of action is
the padding of the Siasi List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a listed ground for a pre- proclamation
controversy.
5. JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

FACTS:
-Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time.

-On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented
by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo, his election and proclamation, on the ground that he was not a
Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983.

-In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States but
alleged that 1) he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself as a means of survival against
the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad 2) he added that he had returned
to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy 3) He also argued that
the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have
been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code 4) The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could
not sue under the said section.

-case was set for hearing on the merits. His Motion for reconsideration being denied, a petition for
certiorari was filed.

-Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits
scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

-In their Comment, the private respondents assert that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore
not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on
Elections was not really for quo warranto, the ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their
petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from
Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his
naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing
not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself
alone.

-Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not
repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from
public office in the Philippines. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not
only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for
the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.

-Frivaldo's reply: insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an
American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he
was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation
in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United
States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the
move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: WON Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on as provincial
governor of Sorsogon.

RULING:
-The provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the
State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

-In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983.

-This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless,
as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the
Marcos government through his agents in the United States.

-The court cannot agree that as a consequence of being enemy he was coerced into embracing American
citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary
choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them
subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been coerced —
to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United
States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and
abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I
have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The
martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner,
held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

-The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective
nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar.

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only
one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in
force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its
territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely
connected.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality
laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the
United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as
his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his
naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.

Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open
the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back
their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance
to the Philippines.

-It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But
that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that
meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative
or judicial proceedings.

-The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness
is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to
discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for
public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. It has been established, and not even denied,
that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and
his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

-This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while
owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon
does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.

-It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
6. LABO v. COMELEC (Ramon Labo v. COMELEC and Luis Lardizabal) G.R. No. 86564, August
1, 1989
Cruz, J.

This is a petition to refrain the COMELEC from looking into his (Labo) citizenship as a question for his
qualification as Mayor.

Facts: Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on Jan. 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was
filed against such proclamation but it was alleged that the filing was made beyond the period; the
payment of filling fee being essential to the timeliness of the petition. According to Lardizabal, the
petition was filed on time because at the time of filing, the COMELEC treated the case as a pre-
proclamation controversy- not requiring payment of filing fees. The court resolved that the case have been
filed on time and to brush aside technicalities intending to focus on the original contention; that of
citizenship.

Two administrative decision on the question of Labo’s citizenship. One promulgated by the COMELEC
in 1982 finding Labo to be a citizen of PH. The other promulgated by the Commission on Immigration
(CID) in 1988 which found Labo not a citizen of PH. The COMELEC decision found no direct proof that
Labo’ had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. The CID decision took into account official
statement of the Australian Government that Labo is an Australian citizen as of the date (1984) by reason
of his naturalization in 1976. CID also notes the Oath of Allegiance and Affirmation of Allegiance taken
by Labo.

Labo,
1. did not question the authenticity of evidence
2. did not deny that he obtained Australian passport
3. categorically declared that he’s an Australian citizen in a Sworn Statement
4. sought to avoid jurisdiction of barangay on the ground that he’s a foreigner

The Court rejects the 1982 decision of COMELEC dismissing those items (1-4) as mistakes. Also dismiss the claim
of res judicata ruling that the doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship. On Labo’s claim that he did not
become an Australian upon marriage, the Court rules that such is irrelevant because he became an Australian upon
naturalization. Labo’s claim that such naturalization made him at worst only a dual citizen does not stand under CA
No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725 on the reacquisition of citizenship. Also, his claim is contrary to Art. IV Sec 5 of
the Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizenship is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law”. The bone of contention is that he divested his Ph Citizenship.

Issue: Whether or not Ramon Labo Jr. is a Filipino citizen and qualified to hold public office in the
Philippines.

Held: No. He lost his Philippine citizenship. And it does not appear that he reacquired PH citizenship by
any of the three methods (Act of Congress, naturalization or repatriation). Such failure to reacquire was
the reason why the CID rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
and the basis for the denial of his claim for recognition as a citizen of Philippines. The Court held that
Labo is not now or on the day of local elections, a Philippine citizen. In fact, he is not even a qualified
voter under the Constitution so he is ineligible as candidate for Mayor of Baguio City pursuant to Sec. 42
of the Local Government Code on Qualification.

People cannot change the requirement of the Local Government Code. The electorate had no power to
permit a foreigner, owing his allegiance to the Queen of Australia, to preside over them as Mayor. Only
citizens of the Philippines have that privilege. On the question on WON private respondent Lardizabal
could replace Labo, the Court rules in the negative. He did not acquire the majority vote. Wherefore,
petitioner Ramon Labo is declared not a citizen of the Philippines therefore, disqualified from continuing
to serve as mayor. And ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the Vice Mayor of Baguio.
7. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
vs
Commision on Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo
248 SCRA 300 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

Imelda Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of 1st District Representative of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,1995.
Private respondent Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate
for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation of COC and disqualification of Imaleda with the
COMELEC alleging that the petitioner did not meet the requirement for residency because she was not a
resident of the First District of Leyte for 1 year.
Petitioner filed a corrected COC claiming that her "error" in the entry of "seven months" be amended to
"since childhood". She said that this was honest misrepresentation and that she always had maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC found Montejo's petition meritorious, declared the corrected COC of Imelda void and her
original COC as cancelled. Imelda filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
COMELEC then issued a resolution which states that, "if Imelda wins, she should be proclaimed." This
was however, reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended even if she wins.
Imelda won the election.

ISSUE: Is Imelda qualified to run for the position?

HELD:

Yes, it is the fact of residence and not a statement in a COC which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution's residency requirement.
The honest mistake in the COC regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence in
a Congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing than a piece of paper.
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law as a result of her marriage to the late Pres. Marcos in 1952. What petitioner gained upon marriage
was actual residence.
The term "residence" in civil law is affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife - which must
be interpreted only to mean "actual residence". When Imelda married the late Pres. Marcos, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicile necessarium.
8. AQUINO v. COMELEC
248 SCRA 400; September 18, 1995
Kapunan, J.:

Facts: (For recit)

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy,
Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm
Village, Makati) for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the
election.

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in
Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l)
year and thirteen (13) days.

On May 2, petitioner made an answer praying for outright dismissal. On the same day a hearing was
conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his
Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1,
1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April 28,1995 7 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April
28, 1995. 8

On May 6, The Second Division of Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition and allowed Aquino to run in the election.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995
resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
On May 16, Aquino made a comment/opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension.
On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Petitioner's raises six (6) errors for consideration, to wit:

1st error- Comelec has no jurisdiction and adjudge the disqualification issue involving congressional
candidates after the may 8, 1995 elections, such determination being reserved to and lodge exclusively
with the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET)

2nd error- Assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction, said jurisdiction ceased in the instant
case after the elections, and the remedy/ies available to the adverse parties lie/s in another forum which, it
is submitted, is the HRET consistent with section 17, article vi of the 1987 constitution
3rd error- The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion, and serious error in directing without notice
the suspension of the proclamation of the petitioner as the winning congressional candidate and despite
the ministerial nature of such duty to proclaim (pending the finality of the disqualification case against the
petitioner) if only not to thwart the people's will.

4th error- The Comelec's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against
the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.

5th error- The Comelec critically erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one
year residency requirement of congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were
only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of
petitioner's district in makati of congressional.

6th error- The comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
board of canvassers to "determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates"
after the erroneous disqualification of your petitioner in that such directive is in total disregard of the well
settled doctrine that a second place candidate or person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and cannot be proclaimed as substitute

The Supreme Court narrowed the alleged 6 errors to three issues.

Issue:
1. Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case. (Not HRET as the petitioner alleged) (Also on
the alleged ministerial function of COMELEC of proclamation of winner)
2. Main issue- Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
3. Whether the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.

Held:
1. On the first issue, the SC ruled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner
conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who
has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution.

While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with
Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus,
petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the
winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of
authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.
2. On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner
could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must
prove that he has established not just residence but domicileof choice is correct. 17

The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

The framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile. The place “where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.

Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.

The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.

The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the
elections in the district in which he seeks election to .

Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His
birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a
registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a
resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new,
residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is
hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner
must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.

3. On the third issue, The Supreme Court ruled that their Order restraining respondent COMELEC from
proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections for
the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to depart
therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Case digest from Internet:

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for
the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party,
and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as
mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium
unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in
Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which
is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence
of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
9. PABLO C. VILLABER (petitioner) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (respondents) G.R. No.
148326. November 15, 2001. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pablo Villaber & respondent Douglas R. Cagas - were rival candidates for Congressman in
District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.

Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy on February 19, 2001 while Cagas filed his on February 28,
2001.

A consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel his certificate of candidacy - was filed by
Cagas with COMELEC

COMELEC Resolution in SPA 01-058 (April 30, 2001) - declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate
for and from holding any elective public office and cancelling his certificate of candidacy applied Section
12 of the Omnibus Election Code. A conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
following the ruling of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.

A motion for reconsideration filed by Villaber was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution of
May 10, 2001.

Contentions of Cagas –
a. Villaber is disqualified to run for any public office under Omnibus Election Code because he was
convicted by RTC and affirmed by CA for violation of BP Blg. 22 and was sentenced to (1) year
imprisonment such crime involves moral turpitude

b. Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for the
office which is a false statement and a ground to deny due course or cancel the certificate under Section
78 of Omnibus Election Code

Contentions of Villaber –
a. His conviction has not become final and executory because the CA Decision affirming RTC’s decision
of conviction was not remanded to the RTC for promulgation in his presence.

b. Even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his
disqualification because the violation of BP Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

c. The Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.

d. The ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in the case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the
Philippines which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals deleting the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and imposing a fine only.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

HELD:

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code –

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

Definition of moral turpitude - an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections - not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to
what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine and depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC - the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there
are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not
a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

The elements of a violation of BP Blg. 22 under Section 1 are:

1 st element - The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2 nd element - The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;

3 rd element - The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda - a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties
he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.

In Tuanda - the Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did
it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not
so when committed by a non-member.

No grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
10. WILMER GREGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997
ROMERO, J.:

FACTS:
On October 31, 1981, Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the Supreme
Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena
Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of
Manila and has been re-elected for three terms. On Basco’s final term, petitioner Grego filed with the
COMELEC a petition praying for Basco's disqualification. Grego argued that Basco should be
disqualified from running far any elective position since he had been removed from office as a result of an
administrative case, pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code)
which took effect on January 1, 1992.

The COMELEC's First Division resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on ruling that he
administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco was wiped away and
condoned by the electorate which elected him. Grego's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was
later denied by the COMELEC en banc in its assailed resolution SPA No. 95-212 promulgated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Humberto Basco was disqualified from any elective position

RULING:
NO. Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government
Code which applies only to those removed from office as a result of an administrative case on or after
January 1, 1992.

The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides
the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so
construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed resolution of respondent Commission on Elections in SPA 95-212 was AFFIRMED.
11. RENATO U. REYES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE CASTRO
G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro. An administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr.
Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00
from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local government
were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer;
and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after
the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found
petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
The Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order
for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice
mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was refused. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner
filed a certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong.
On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160). Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner
Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
On May 9, 1995, the Second Division of COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of petitioner.
On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently unaware of the
disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the re-election of petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him moot and
academic

HELD:
NO. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official
could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the
administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged
misconduct was committed expired. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires,
he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the
ruling in the two Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary
restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on
petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office
of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection
Case # 12
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
-Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853 Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
-The proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.
-COMELEC: In its resolution, granted the petition of Mamaril - ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen (American citizen based on the
record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen) and,
under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position
-Manzano: In his answer admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he
was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen = dual
citizenship.
-Manzano: filed a motion which remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
-the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
-Mercado sought to intervene in the disqualification but was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved.
-on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, reversing the ruling of its Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to
run. The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
1. Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
2. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle
of jus soli.
3. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his
father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
4. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel
document.
5. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued
an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
6. when he attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
7. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, was not yet final.
8. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor.
In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest
court

SO, QUALIFIED.
-The board of canvassers, upon a resolution by Comelec, proclaimed Manzano as vice mayor of the City
of Makati.
-petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.

ISSUE: WON Manzano is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective local position.

RULING
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action
or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission,
in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation,
or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
-Manzano argues: petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect
because he is a defeated candidate who cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if
the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
-The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation. The fact, however, is that there had been
no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
elective local positio. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a
rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
-Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention
only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage is clear
from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere
dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or
citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California, of Filipino parents. Since
the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of
jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995,
and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
-Petitioner argues: that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation
-In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship,
the COMELEC must have in mind the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which
provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for
his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should
he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings.
(13) EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMELEC and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:

DOCTRINE:
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines
unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo
City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.

Respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo,
praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence,
ineligible from running for any public office. Petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at
the same time an American, by virtue of RA No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003). He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the
qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

After the canvassing, petitioner emerged as the winner.

The COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for disqualification. The COMELEC
found that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to
the poll body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition for
certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from
running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.

* Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections, Petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of
candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. According to the SC, the ruling in
Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 which expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman

HELD: NO.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225 states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.(Emphasis added)

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides that
should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. However, Petitioner
failed to comply with this requirement.

As ruled by the COMELEC:

“While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when
he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los
Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted
provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No.
9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law
who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is
renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to
renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary
leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law. For failure of
respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him
disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines.”

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of
Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
14) EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO
O. MARQUEZ, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996.

FACTS: Rodriguez and Marquez were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the
1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed as duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged the
victory of Rodriguez via a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC revealing that Rodriguez left
the USA where a charge is pending against against the latter before the LA Municipal Court for fraudulent
insurance claims, grand theft, and attempted grand theft of personal property. Marquez argued that
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section
40 (e) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160). Comelec dismissed the Marquez quo warranto petition
and denied his reconsideration thereof. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal before the SC via
petition for certiorari, the crux of such petition was whether Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as
contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a
criminal charge against him. The SC ruled in that, “fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (x x x), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.” The case was remanded to the COMELEC
to determine whether or not Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice under the definition given. Rodriguez
sought reconsideration and filed an Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the
Motion for Reconsideration to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration
showing the Rodriguez left the USA roughly 5 months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint
filed against him before the LA court. The SC denied the reconsideration.

1995 elections. Rodriguez v. Marquez for the same position. While the petition for certiorari of Rodriguez
was still pending, Marquez challenged the candidacy of Rodriguez via petition for disqualification before
the COMELEC averring the same allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC
promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for the quo warranto and disqualification cases holding that
Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice based on Marquez’ documentary evidence consisting of (a)
authenticated copy of the LA Municipal Court arrest warrant against Rodriguez and (b) authenticated
copy of the felony complaint which were presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the hearing.
COMELEC considered Rodriguez’ walk-out as a waiver of his right to disprove the authenticity of
Marquez’ evidence. COMELEC held that, “The authenticated documents submitted by [Marquez] to
show the pendency of a criminal complaint against the [Rodriguez] in the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, California, USA, and the fact that there is an outstanding warrant against him amply proves
Marquez’ contention that the Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. X x x The Commission cannot look
with favor on respondent’s defense that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent
was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was
being proceeded against criminally. In a sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he
cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal
complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest,
may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant. COMELEC ordered
Rodriguez “disqualified or ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon
Province. Respondent [Rodriguez] is ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby
disqualified from running for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his
certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is hereby set aside.”

Rodriguez won the 1995 gubernatorial election. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’
proclamation which COMELEC granted. The Provincial Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed
Rodriguez. The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution and Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation
gave rise to the filing of the instant petition for certiorari. Marquez filed an Omnibus Motion To Annul
The Proclamation Of Rodriguez To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers
in Contempt before the COMELEC. COMELEC nullified Rodriguez’ proclamation. Rodriguez filed a
motion to admit supplemental petition to include the COMELEC Resolution nullifying his proclamation.
Marquez filed an Urgent Motion For Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary Injunction which
sought to restrain and enjoin Rodriguez “from exercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of
Governor of Quezon x x x.” Acting favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution issued a temporary
restraining order. Rodriguez' Urgent Motion To Lift Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For
Reconsideration was denied by the SC. In a Resolution, the SC “resolved to direct the Chairman of the
[COMELEC] to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to receive and evaluate
such legally admissible evidence as [Rodriguez] may be minded to present by way of refuting the
evidence heretofore submitted by [Marquez] or that which can tend to establish petitioner's contention
that he does not fall within the legal concept of a fugitive from justice.” The COMELEC, in its report
entitled “Evidence of the Parties and Commission's Evaluation” declared that Rodriguez is not a fugitive
from justice opining that intent to evade is a material element of the definition. Such intent is absent in
Rodriguez’ case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines long before
the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice

RULING: No. The intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. There can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by
the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. His
arrival in the Philippines from the USA, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations
preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the LA Court and of the issuance on even date of the arrest
warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to
have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact
no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such time. The very essence of
being a “fugitive from justice” under the definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of
Rodriguez.

The term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to
run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be
understood according to the definition, to wit: “A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.” Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there
has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.

Instant petition granted. Assailed resolutions of the COMELEC set aside.

16. TOMAS DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LA
UNION and JUAN T. LUCERO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-24721
November 3, 1925

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus addressed to the provincial board of canvassers of the Province of
La Union, ordering it to annul all the votes in favor of Juan T. Lucero and to to proclaim the petitioner
elected for the office of provincial governor of La Union. Petitioner alleged that the respondent met on
June 22, 1925, for the purpose of counting the votes cast in the election for provincial officers and
certifying the result of the count, and after gathering all the election returns, it found that the petitioner
had obtained 7,662 votes and the respondent Juan T. Lucero, 8,771 votes; that the original of the
certificate of candidacy of Lucero, a certified copy is was not duly sworn to, as required by law, while the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner was prepared and filed in accordance with the requirements of
the law; that notwithstanding that Juan T. Lucero did not file a certificate of candidacy duly sworn to, as
provided in section 404 of the Election Law, the respondent provincial board of canvassers willfully and
illegally adjudicated the 8,771 votes to Lucero and illegally proclaimed him provincial governor of La
Union. According to the petitioner, Lucero has not, and could not have, been a legal candidate for the
office in question, and could not have been certified elected for the office of provincial governor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his
proclamation as the duly elected governor of La Union

RULING:
Section 41 of Act No. 3030, amending section 471 of the Election Law, provides that the provincial board
of canvassers or the Governor-General, as the case may be, shall certify elected for the offices xxx of
provincial officers only those who shall have obtained the highest number of votes, and filed their
certificates of candidacy in accordance with the provisions of section 404 of this law. Section 404, as
amended by section 3 of the same Act No. 3030, provides that no person shall be eligible for the office of
xxx provincial office, unless within the time fixed by the law, he shall file a certificate of candidacy duly
verified. The meaning of the phrase "a certificate of candidacy duly verified,". Petitioner argued that such
law is mandatory and Lucero's irregularity justifies his removal as a legal candidate. The court ruled that
legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have
been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate. But after the people have
expressed their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the respondent
who was certified by the provincial secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor,
has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate
of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the
count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people
cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly
sworn to.
17, Jurilla vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 105436
June 2, 1994; Belosillo, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Eugenio Jurilla, Marciano Medalla, Bernardo Nazal, Rey Medina, Melencio Castelo,
Godofredo Liban, and private respondent, Antonio Hernandez were among the candidates in the elections
for the six positions of councilor for the Second District of Quezon City.
On March 23, 1992, Hernandez filed with COMELEC his certificate of candidacy. In item No. 6 thereof,
he gave as his address “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did not indicate his
Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. In other words, his
certificate of candidacy did not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he
was a resident of the Second District thereof.
Petitioners challenged respondent’s qualification. However, since petitioners only became aware of such
after elections, the petition was made in accordance with Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
authorizing the filing a petition at any day for filing certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
COMELEC denied the petition for being filed outside the reglementary period under Section 5 of RA
6646, which pertains to nuisance candidates.
ISSUE: Was the omission sufficient to cause the disqualification of respondent?
HELD: NO. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of
1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that the candidate must state in his
certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is
enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be
within the district where he is running for office.
In the case at bench, his failure to so state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is
satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a
particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of
Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior to the elections he was already a resident of "B 26, L 1
New Capitol Estates," admittedly within the Second District of Quezon City.

***Additional Issue: Is respondent a nuisance candidate?

The holding of COMELEC that private respondent Hernandez was a "nuisance candidate" is erroneous
because, tested against the provisions of Sec. 69, there is no way by which we can categorize him as a
"nuisance candidate," hence, the procedure therein provided could not have been properly invoked by
petitioners herein. Neither could they apply Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which would
require such petition to be filed at any day after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.
While COMELEC therefore proceeded on the erroneous premise that private respondent Hernandez
should be treated as a "nuisance candidate" as already shown, nevertheless its conclusion to dismiss the
petition and give due course to the candidacy of private respondent he being a qualified voter of Precinct
No. 233-B, New Capitol Estates, Barangay Batasan Hills, must be sustained.
18. PNOC Energy Development Corporation and Marcelino Tongco vs. NLRC and Manuel S.
Pineda. GR No. 100947May 31, 1993
Narvasa, CJ.

FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda began working as a clerk for the Philippine National Oil Co.-Energy Development Corp.
(PNOCEDC), a subsidiary of the Philippine National Oil Co., on September 17, 1981. In November, 1987, while
holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongonan
Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the
local elections scheduled in January 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the position.
Objection to Pineda's being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOCEDC by virtue of Sec 66 of the Election
Code was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. The mayor communicated with
the PNOCEDC to express the view that Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless he officially resigned
from PNOCEDC but this was not acted upon.

Pineda was among the official candidates voted for, and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of councilor.
Some indecision appears to have been evinced by Pineda at about this time. He wrote to the COMELEC Chairman,
expressing his desire to withdraw from the political contest and he also wrote to the Secretary of Justice to seek
advice on whether he was considered automatically resigned and if he can continue his work at PNOC EDC.
Nevertheless, Pineda took his oath of office as councilor-elect and continued assuming his duties with PNOC-EDC.

Opinions and decisions of the PNOC EDC Legal Department, its VP, and the Department of Local Government
were obtained regarding the status of Manuel S. Pineda as employee in view of his candidacy and later taking office
as municipal councilor. All of these, however, ended in Pineda’s termination pursuant to Section 66 of the Election
Code. Pineda lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Regional Branch of the NLRC which ruled in his favor
and ordered his reinstatement. The Arbiter pointed out that the ruling relied upon by PNOCEDC to justify
Pineda'dismissal from the service, i.e., NHA v. Juco, had already been abandoned; and that "as early as November
29, 1988," the governing principle laid down by case law — in light of Section 2 (1), Article IXB of the 1987
Constitution — has been that government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation
Code, the general law — as distinguished from those created by special charter — are not deemed to be within the
coverage of the Civil Service Law, and consequently their employees, like those of the PNOCEDC, are subject to
the provisions of the Labor Code rather than the Civil Service Law. The PNOCEDC filed an appeal with the NLRC
which the latter dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 66 covers employees hire by GOCCs and its subsidiaries even though they be
corporated within the Corporation Code

HELD: YES. Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an
original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In
other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the
Labor Code, as amended.

FURTHER DISCUSSION:

When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, in connection with its deliberations on and subsequent
enactment of related and repealing legislation, it was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution:
(a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of two (2)categories — those with original charters, and those organized under the
general law —
(b) employees of these corporations were of two (2) kinds — those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because employed in
corporations having original charters, and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because employed in said corporations
organized under the general law, or the Corporation Code.
Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees in the
Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy."

Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a GOCC does not lose its character as such because not possessed of an original charter but
organized under the general law. If a corporation's capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operated and managed by officers charged
with the mission of fulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, it is a GOCC even if organized under the Corporation Code
and not under a special statute; and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless
"employees in GOCCs," and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them "ipso facto resigned from . . .
office upon the filing of . . . (their) certificate of candidacy."
19. QUINTO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question
an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition
of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That
any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces,
and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore
unconstitutional.

Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third
and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential
treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law,
because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the
deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power
of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost
respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will
of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of
the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public
service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions
for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the
Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic
Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national
official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-
controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of
law, there would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a
partisan one. For this reason, the over breadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.
20. REP. MA. CATALINA L. GO vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE V. MONTEJO and ARVIN V. ANTONI
G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001

Summary of Facts:
COMELEC declared petitioner disqualified to run for the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte, because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of
her certificate of candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.

Facts

GO filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte (BL), a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of BL. A day later, petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, in Tacloban City, another
certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously, she attempted to file with the
provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay,
Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of BL
where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor.

At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal
thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was 2 hours, petitioner decided to send her
affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at BL and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election
officer of BL at 12:28. The original was received the same day.

Director Balbuena of the Law Department,-COMELEC recommended the deletion/cancellation of Go’s from the
certified list of candidates both for Mayor and Governer. COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation.

Issues: Is the disqualification of GO correct?

Ruling: No.

The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., was a substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law. We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte
was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.

There is nothing in Section 73, BP 881 which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where
the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the
office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.

While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A,, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the
election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for
convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a
law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay
with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy.

********
SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath.

No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for
more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of
certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
21. Luna vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007
Ponente: Carpio, J.

FACTS:
Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for
Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Private respondents filed a
petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. They claimed that
Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was
invalid. Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on Election Day and,
therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna. COMELEC
agreed that while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for substitution, Hans Roger was not a
valid candidate for vice-mayor, who could be substituted by Luna.

ISSUE:
Is the COMELEC correct in ruling that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger?

HELD:
NO. The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same
prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. Section 77 of the Election Code
prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies,
withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy. In
this instant case, since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that
Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute
for Hans Roger.
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in case a person
filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny
due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed. If Hans Roger made a
material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may
only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans
Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and,
thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of
candidacy. Hans Roger already withdrew his COC before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid
candidate.
22. G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
JOSE P. MONSALE, protestant-appeal, vs. Pauline M. NICO, protestee-appellant.

FACTS:Nico appealed the decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo which declared Monsale as elected municipal
mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947. Monsale withdrew his certificate
of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal.
The commission on Election, however, rules on November 8 that Monsale could no longer be a candidate in spite of
his desire to withdrawal.

A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate,
Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor
had not been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed
elected.

ISSUE: whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his
letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of
such certificate.

HELD: No. the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act.
He can no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal.
By own voluntary act and deed he has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the light of the election laws such
certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence non existing."

Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless,
within the time fixed by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy."

Section 36 provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special
election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary, who shall
immediately send copies thereof to the polling place concerned, to the secretary of the provincial board and to the
Commission on Elections."

Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a
certificate of candidacy duly filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a
certificate of candidacy for the office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance
with the preceding section on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should
occur between the day before the election and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any
board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the case of candidates to be voted for by the
entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit
therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the candidate among whom
they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if
the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly registered candidates, there might be as many
person voted for as there were voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to
identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.

The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit
for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes disqualified.

The herein protestant, not being a registered candidate, has no standing before the court.
23. ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor
represented by her father ROLANDO CIPRIANO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004
Puno, J.:

May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and
administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy
on the ground that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law? This is the issue that needs to be
resolved in this petition for certiorarifiled by Ellan Marie P. Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of
Barangay 38, Pasay City, whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the COMELEC motu proprio
on the ground that she was not a registered voter in the barangay where she intended to run.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with COMELEC her certificate of candidacy (COC) as Chairman of SK. On the date of
the elections COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 to deny due course to or cancel the COC of several
candidates for the SK elections, including petitioners, because they were not registered voters in the
barangay where they intended to run. Petitioner was, nonetheless was allowed to vote and her name was
not deleted from official list of candidates. Petitioner was proclaimed the as SK Chairman and later took
her oath of office.

Petitioner, after learning of the Resolution, filed with COMELEC motion for reconsideration of said
resolution. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5781 resolving petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It
cited Resolution No. 5584 which reads as follows:

ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED

VOTERS IN THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event that the disqualified candidate is proclaimed the winner despite his
disqualification or despite the pending disqualification case filed before his proclamation, but which is
subsequently resolved against him, the proclamation of said disqualified candidate is hereby declared void
from the beginning, even if the dispositive portion of the resolution disqualifying him or canceling his
certificate of candidacy does not provide for such an annulment.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:

1. To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC Resolution No. 5363 and any other COMELEC
actions and resolutions which are intended to summarily oust and remove petitioner.
2. To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions sitting en banc which does not have authority
to decide election related case, including pre-proclamation controversies, in the first instance.

Contentions:
Petitioner - deprived of due process when the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 canceling her
certificate of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was intended to oust her from her position as SK
Chairman without any appropriate action and proceedings.
COMELEC - invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer election laws. Thus, in the
exercise of such power, it may motu proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of candidates
who are found to be unqualified for the position they are seeking.

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 5363 of the COMELEC is valid.

HELD: Petition is impressed with MERIT.

The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the
COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioners
certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed
in due form is ministerial in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the
certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body. Nonetheless,
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
therein is false.

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of ones certificate
of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.

The determination whether a material representation in the certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the
determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of
fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the
resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case,
ones right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the
proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It
should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be
allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.
24.
ALFREDO ABCEDE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO IMPERIAL, GAUDENCIO GARCIA, and SIXTO BRILLANTES,
Commisioners Elections,respondents.
G.R. No. L-13001 March 18, 1958

CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed, with the Commission on Elections, his certificate of candidacy for the
Office of the President of the Philippines. Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the
Commission on Elections to appear before the same, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy
should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their
failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said certificates of
candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto.

After due hearing, at which Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a
resolution, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of the persons therein named, including that of said
petitioner, "shall not be given due course."

A reconsideration of such resolution having been denied, Abcede filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, praying that the resolution be annulled and that his aforementioned certificate
of candidacy be given due course.

Insofar as petitioner herein is concerned, the action taken by the Commission on Elections is based upon
the following facts, set forth in its said resolution, from which we quote:
Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes were nil. In
this election he presents his candidacy for President of the Philippines, with the redemption of the
Japanese war notes as his main program of government. It is of record that the Bureau of Posts, by Fraud
Order No. 2, dated November 2, 1955, banned from the use of the Philippine mail matter of whatever
class mailed by, or addressed to, theJapanese War Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and
its agentand representatives, including Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede, which order was
based on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice,
that said entity aid its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede, are engaged in a scheme to
obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced
that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to
obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.

In holding that it has, under these facts the power not to give due course to petitioner's certficate of
candidacy, the Commission on Elections gave the following reasons:

The Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon the
commission the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the law leaves to
the Commission a measure of discretion on whether to give due course to a particular certificate of
candidacy should it find said certificate of candidacy to have been filed not bona fide. We also believe
that a certificate of candidacy is not bona fide when it is filed, as a matter of caprice or fancy, by a person
who is incapable of understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election and
without any political organization or visible supporters behind him so that he, has not even the tiniest
chance to obtain the favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, or when the one who
files the same exerts no tangible effort, shown by overt acts, to pursue to a semblance of success his
candidacy.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC should give due course in the certificate of candidacy filed by petitioner?
HELD:

YES.

Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that 96 certificates of candidacy of candiddtes for
President . . . shall be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the preparation and
distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines. . . .
It further provides that said certificates shall be distributed as follows:

. . . the Commission on Elections . . . shall immediately send copies thereof to the secretary of the
Provincial Board of each province where the elections will be held, and the latter shall in turn
immediately forward copies to all the polling places. The Commission on Elections shall communicate
the names of said candidates to the secretary of the provincial board by telegraph. If the certificate of
candidacy is sent by mail, it shall be by registered mail, and the date on which the package was deposited
in the post-office may be considered as the filing date thereof if confirmed by a telegram or radiogram
addressed to the Commission on Elections on the same date.

Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code:

The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal secretary, in their
respective cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates of candidacy referred to in the
preceding section and to immediately acknowledge receipt thereof.

The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to
petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial"
duty to receive said certificate of candidacy.

Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said certificates
to the secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this requirement, evinced by the
imperative character generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the peremptory connotation of
the adverb "immediately."

Whether or not the Commission on Election should incur the expenses incident to the preparation and
distribution of copies of the certificates of candidacy of those who, in its opinion, do not have a chance to
get a substantial number of votes, is another question of policy for Congress, not the Commission, to
settle. When the Revised Election Code imposes upon the Commission the ministerial duty to receive
those certificates and provides that said Commission shall immediately prepare and distribute copies
thereof to the offices mentioned in section 36 of said Code, it necessarily implies that compliance with the
latter provision is, likewise, ministerial. If the Commission believes, however, that the effect thereof is to
unnecessarily impose a useless burden upon the Government, then the remedy is to call the attention of
Congress thereto, coupled with the corresponding proposals, recommendations, or suggestions for such
amendments as may be deemed best, consistently with the democratic nature of our political system.
Needless to say, the vigilant attitude of the Commission on Elections and the efforts exerted by the same
to comply with what it considers its duty, merit full and unqualified recognition, as well as commendation
of the highest order. In this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner's
certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void.
Wherefore, the aforementioned resolution of the Commission on Elections is hereby annulled, insofar as
petitioner Alfredo Abcede is concerned, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued made
permanent, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
25.Gr no 122872 september 10, 1997
Pendatun Salih vs Comelec, omarhassim abdulmunap and fawsi alonzo
J. Hermosisima jr.

Facts:
Pendatun Salih, Fawi Alonzo and Omarhassim Abdulmunap ran for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Tandubas, Province of Tawi-Tawi. Five of the election returns were contested. Since no sufficient proof was
proffered to warrant their exclusion as defective or fraudulent, the Municipal Board of Canvassers ruled to canvass
the same. Still no winner was proclaimed.

On appeal, the Commission on Elections ruled to include three of the questioned election returns and to exclude the
remaining two. As a result, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as winner of the mayoralty
elections. Such proclamation was, however, nullified by the COMELEC en banc. It also ordered the inclusion of the
two election returns earlier excluded and directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to rconvene and proclaim the
winning candidate.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the said en banc decision and a declaration of his
status as the duly elected mayor.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion
(2) Whether or not the two election returns previously excluded should be included.

Held:

1) No.
Rather than find the COMELEC en banc guilty of grave abuse of discretion, the Court held that the Second Division
of the same commission exceeded its powers in terminating an appealed case in which motions for reconsideration
were pending and remain unacted upon.

Petitioner was proclaimed by the MBC of Tandubas during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Alonzo in SPC No. 95-237 and petitioner Abdulmunap in SPC Nos. 95-234 and 95-237, it appearing that
the results on Precinct Nos. 10 and 19-A would affect the election. The pendency of such motions rendered
ineffective the resolution of the Second Division ordering the dismissal of SPC No. 95-237. The right of private
respondents to ask for reconsideration of a decision that aggrieved them cannot be defeated by the mere expediency
or careless measure of ipso facto terminating the case without finally resolving the pending motions for
reconsideration.

2) Yes.
As the election returns from Precinct Nos. 10 and 10-A, which were excluded by the Second Division of the
COMELEC, are undisputedly prima facie regular and untampered on their face, the COMELEC en banc correctly
reversed the Second Division and ordered the inclusion of said returns in the canvass of the votes cast in the
mayoralty elections of Tandubas, Tawi-Tawi.

The records of this case are utterly wanting of evidence of sham and fraudulent voting. On the basis only of the
election returns which, on their face, appear regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration, or
other similar vice, the Second Division could not justifiably exclude said returns on the occasion of a pre-
proclamation controversy whose office is limited to incomplete, falsified or materially defective returns which
appear as such on their face. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear as normal
through falsification of the returns, such grounds are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-
proclamation controversy.

As long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot
look beyond or behind them to verify the allegations of irregularities in the casting or counting of votes.

(Note: alonzo would win if the two were included)

26. BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN
UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR EDRIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93986 December 22, 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner Loong filed his COC on 15 January 1990 (The last day for filing the same), the election for officials of the
Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region (MMAR) being on 17 February 1990; but private respondent Ututalum filed
the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days from the date
Loong's certificate of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election itself.

Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On the other hand, private respondent Ututalum alleges that
SPA No. 90-006, though filed only on 5 March 1990, was filed when no proclamation of winner had as yet been
made and that the petition is deemed filed on time as Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure states
that the petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds of ineligibility "shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation."

On the part of respondent Commission, it held in its assailed resolution that the petition in SPA No. 90-006 was
timely filed, applying Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act No. 6646, and Section 2, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure which states that the petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed
within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was
filed within the period prescribed by law.

Held:

Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person running for the office of Vice Governor for the autonomous
region shall be at least thirty-five (35) years on the day of the election.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the COC of the person filing it shall state, among others, the
date of birth of said person

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a person filing a COC has committed false
representation, a petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25) days
from the time the certificate was filed.

No, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to disqualify petitioner Loong on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall
under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which
allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later
than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a
constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
which is a legislative enactment.

It cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time
within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in
Section 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called
"procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative.
The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the
Legislature to decide and remedy.
27. Henry Lanot v. COMELEC & Vicente Eusebio
G.R. No. 164858, Novemeber 16, 2006

Carpio, J.
Facts: On March 2004 petitioner filed a petition for disqualification under Sec. 68 and Sec. 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC. He alleged that Eusebio engaged in
campaign in various forms and in various occasions outside the designated campaign period. Eusebio
denied and branded such allegations as a harassment case. Dir. Ladra of COMELEC NCR conducted a
hearing when evidenced are received.
Ruling of the Regional Director
Petition is granted pursuant to Sec 68 (a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code, respondent Eusebio shall
be disqualified to run for the position of Mayor in Pasay City for violation no Sec. 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code; and recommends that the case be referred to the Law Department of COMELEC.
Ruling of the COMELEC
The resolution date 5 may 2004, 5 days before election, is adopted
May 8 : In a very Urgent Advisory, 2 days before election, Chairman Abalos informed the election
officers of the Resolution of COMLEC 1st Division.
May 9: Eusebio filed a motion for reconsideration
Election Day: Chairman Abalos issued the 1st of the 3 COMELEC issuance. In a memo, he enjoined Dir.
Ladra from implementing COMELEC 1st Division Resolution due to Eusebio’s motion for
reconsideration.
May 11: Petitioners filed a motion to suspend the counting and canvassing of votes. COMELEC partially
denied the motion but since the evidence of guilt is strng, ORDERS to SUSPEND until further orders, the
proclamation of Esebio on the event he received the majority vote.
May 12: Eusebio filed his opposition
May 21: COMELEC issued second questioned issuance. Resolved to declared Eusebio as Pasig City
mayor and resolves to lift and set aside the order suspending Eusebio’s proclamation.
May 23: Eusebio was proclaimed Pasig City Mayor
August 6: Lanot filed a motion to annul Eusebio’ proclamation and order his proclamation instead.
August 20: COMELEC en banc promulgated its 3rd questioned issuance in justifying the annulment of
the resolution disqualifying Eusebio and referring the case to the Legal Department. The resolution
disqualifying Eusebio was set aside.
Issue: Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by Eusebio.
Held: No. There was a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the August Resolution. A review of factual
findings shows that there is no basis to disqualify Eusebio. Sec 80 – Election Campaign outside the
election period- used as basis by Dir. Ladra does not apply. Public expressions and allegation against
probable candidates proposed to be nominated is not construed as part of any election campaign. Essential
elements in violation of Sec 80: (a) person engages in an election campaign; (b) act is designed to
promote the defeat or election of a candidate; and (c) the act is done outside the campaign period. The
acts of Eusebio and the speeches happened before Eusebio deemed to have filed his certificate of
candidacy. Eusebio is not being a candidate then, is not liable under Sec 80.
Wherefore, we dismiss the petition. There is no grave exercise of discretion in the Advisory Opinion
suspending the disqualification. The Court Set Aside August 2004 Resolution because Eusebio did not
commit acts which would disqualify him as candidate in May 2004 elections.
 28. ADIONG VS. COMELEC
207 SCRA 712; 31 MAR 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts:
On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
The resolution provides (particulary Sec. 15 (a) and 21(f)) that decals and stickers may be posted only in
any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
validity of the Resolution. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. The petitioner believes that with the ban on
radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to
suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition wherein it is his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate.

Issue:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes.

Whether the prohibition is unconstitutional.

Held:
The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds.

First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of
restriction involved in this case.

The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed
is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The
posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any
substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to
justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and
present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought
to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying
it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.

Second — the questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth. A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms." The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law
Third — the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to
inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and
stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
significance.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.

Short Digest Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Constitutional Law – Right to Free Press)

FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers on
“mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the
posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and print
political advertisements.

ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.

HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which is
unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the prohibition.
29. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (petitioner) vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (respondent)

G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000. PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: 1. COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 (April 21, 1998) – resolved to approve the issuance of a
restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting
such exit survey and to authorize COMELEC Chairman to issue the same.

2. The Resolution was issued upon the information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN has prepared a
project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, & results of
which shall be broadcasted immediately.

3. A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court – filed by petitioner assailing Resolution
No. 98-1419 to which the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order & directed the COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing the assailed Resolution.

Contentions of ABS-CBN: a. As a responsible member of the mass media, it is committed to report

balanced election- related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys
conducted in fifteen administrative regions."

b. The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting their results are valid exercises of the freedoms
of speech and of the press.

c. In precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated the petitioner's constitutional rights.

Contentions of COMELEC: a. Such project might conflict with the official Comelec count and the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel).

b. It had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

c. The issuance of Resolution was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean,
honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections" and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot."

d. The conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters and that the surveys were
designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers]
in the election" which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy"

e. The "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots" as
the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article 5 of the
Constitution & provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.

f. The constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the
State in the legitimate exercise of its police power"

Contentions of Solicitor General: a. The filing of the petition is moot and premature because of
petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the Comelec Resolution and because the May 11, 1998
election has already been held and done with b. The exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised
by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. c. The polls would sow confusion
among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission and
the quick count undertaken by the Namfrel.

ISSUE

1. May the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, totally ban exit polls?

HELD:

The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election.
By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections.

An exit poll - is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals
for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly
selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The
results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance
overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our
electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

The freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and stands on a higher level than substantive economic or
other liberties. The freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other
form of freedom.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of
securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the
balance between stability and change.

The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police
power. While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has
limitations: “clear and present danger" test and "dangerous tendency" doctrine.

The Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. Whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is
treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption
is against its validity. It is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption.

The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be
curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.
There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the
right to know are unduly curtailed.

The contention of Comelec that the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility
and integrity of the electoral process are purely speculative and clearly untenable.

First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the
results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count.
Exit poll consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has
probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.

Not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate
and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter.

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any
alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit polling.

There are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of avoiding or
minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.

ABS CBN has its precautions, which together with the possible measures, may be undertaken to abate the
Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably stilling the people's voice.

The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential
part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise
of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections.

Exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-
fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize
or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the
fundamental rights of our people.

The Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998 is
made PERMANENT.

Assailed Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
 30. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571; May 5, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act). Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and
published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days
before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor
historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile
voting process posed by election surveys.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys
just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results
during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon
effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3)
the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the
last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does
not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Respondent claims that in National Press
Club v. COMELEC, a total ban on political advertisements, with candidates being merely allocated
broadcast time during the so-called COMELEC space or COMELEC hour, was upheld by this Court. In
contrast, according to respondent, it states that the prohibition in §5.4 of RA. No. 9006 is much more
limited.

ISSUE:
Whether or not section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 is violative of the right to freedom of speech

HELD:
Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press as it Iays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of
fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election. The
prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and
substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech. Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free
expression is only incidental, section 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion of the O 'Brien test, namely,
that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. In sum, Section
5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression
of freedom of expression.
31. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 162777 August 31, 2004
AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Chavez entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products.
Thereafter, Chavez filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-asa.
On January 6, 2004, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained the assailed provision of
Section 32 that states:

“All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio
station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules;
otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted
premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.”

Consequently, Chavez was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELEC’s Law
Department. Chavez replied asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section
32, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as
paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is valid
(2) Whether or not Section 32 is a violation of the Fair Elections Act

RULING:
YES. It is true that when Chavez entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he
acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However,
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image
assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the
COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required Chavez to discontinue the
display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office
whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same
chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name
and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention
of the rule against premature campaigning

Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides that the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.

(2) NO. The Solicitor General rightly points out that the assailed provision does not prohibit billboards as
lawful election propaganda. It only regulates their use to prevent premature campaigning and to equalize,
as much as practicable, the situation of all candidates by preventing popular and rich candidates from
gaining undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity.
Moreover, by regulating the use of such election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely doing
its duty under the law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election propaganda are
subject to the supervision and regulation by the COMELEC:
SECTION 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. -- Election propaganda, whether on television, cable television
radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby allowed for all registered political parties, national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of
candidates and political parties observance of truth in advertising and to the supervision and regulation by
the Commission on Elections.

For the purpose of this Fair Election Act, lawful election propaganda shall include:

3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials the size of which does
not exceed eight and one half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;

3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular political party or
candidate for public office;

3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area not exceeding two(2) feet
by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing
the holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size, shall
be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five (5) days before the date of the meeting
or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally;

3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the advertisements shall follow the
requirements set forth in Section 4 of this Act; and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code or this Act.
WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is declared
valid and constitutional.
Case # 32
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:
-On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
-On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
-COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures.
-OMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final the earlier decision
-Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc which denied the petition in a Resolution
-petition for certiorari was filed

ISSUE: Won petitioner is considered a candidate, hence liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures

RULING:
-Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections
and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes" provides as
follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidat xxx
shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the
Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election.
xxx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for
which the offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine .
Xxx
-To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC
promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral
Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on May 11, 1992).
The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are: Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures:
Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law
Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the
provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or
registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections.
Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with said
obligation (Emphasis supplied).
xxx
-Petitioner argues: that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost"
-Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex
non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where
none is indicated.
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a
candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in
a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if
public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved.
-The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true
will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions
and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and
expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections.
In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes,
expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting
the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of
campaign contributions. These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in
the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted by candidates to the
furtherance of their ambitions. These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on
behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of
elections.
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all
too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not
have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a
statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect.
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.