2. ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, V.

HEIRS OF EUSEBIO
BORROMEO, G.R. NO. 172720, SEPTEMBER 14, 2015
Before Eusebio Borromeo’s death, he was issued Free Patent No. 586681 over a piece
of agricultural land located in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P9053, which he sold within the five-year prohibitory period to Eliseo Maltos,
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerece. On June 23, 1993,
Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title
and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds of
Agusan del Sur because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory period. Maltos Spouses
filed their Answer, arguing that proper party to institute reversion proceedings was the Office
of the Solicitor General.
As ruled by the Supreme Court, the general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is
not automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for
reversion. However, as an exception, Section 29 of the Public Land Act provides: “xxx Any
sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the acquisition and
reverting the property and all rights to the State, and all payments on the purchase price
theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited. xxx”
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there is yet no action for
reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the property should be conveyed by
petitioners to respondents.

10. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. LAMBERTO C. PEREZ, NESTOR C.

KUN, MA. ESTELITA P. ANGELES-PANLILIO, AND NAPOLEON O. GARCIA,
G.R. NO. 166884 JUNE 13, 2012
LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the execution of an Omnibus
Credit Line Agreement between LBP and ACDC. The respondents, as officers and
representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the construction materials,
but ACDC failed to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction
materials subject of the trust receipts; forcing LBP to file a complaint for estafa against the
respondents. The issue is whether the disputed transactions are trust receipts.
A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and
between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in
this Decree as entrustee. There are two obligations in a trust receipt transaction: 1) is covered
by the provision that refers to money under the obligation to deliver it to the owner of the
merchandise sold; 2) covered by the provision referring to merchandise received under the
obligation to return it to the owner. When both parties enter into an agreement knowing that
the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault on the
part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115.
 We cannot consider the agreements between the parties in this case to be trust receipt
transactions because (1) from the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly
be obligated to reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which they were used;
and (2) from the moment the materials were used for the government projects, they became
public, not LBP’s, property.

18. NERY V. ATTY. SAMPANA, A.C. NO.10196; SEPTEMBER 9, 2014;

Melody Nery engaged the services of Atty. Glicerio Sampana for the annulment of her
marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. For the adoption case, respondent, Atty.
Sampana, asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom they could represent as the wife of her alien
adopter, so the adoption case may prosper. Sampana made Nery believe that a petition for her
adoption was filed and that the hearing was already set; however, when Nery discovered in
Branch 11, Malolos Bulacan, no such petition was filed. Consequently, Nery asked for
reimbursement, to which Sampana agreed but claimed a deduction of Php 12,000.00 for filing
fees. Therefore, a disbarment complaint was filed.
Other than the disbarment issue, the issue in this case is whether or not an alien adopter
can adopt petitioner.
As ruled by the Court, if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible because under the Domestic Adoption Act, the alien
adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana neglected the legal matter
entrusted to him. Hence, the Court suspended Atty. Sampana from the practice of law for 3
years.