Mitzi Caryl Encarnacion

COMFPOL
11540797 (AB-CDA)
9 November 2017

The China Dream and One Belt, One Road

Hu Jintao’s administration was characterized by unbelievable domestic growth

which changed China’s place in the world. Its’ foreign policy, on the other hand, had
not been equally dynamic since Hu Jintao’s priority was the already booming
domestic economy. Furthermore, the overwhelming progress was difficult to digest
most especially the uncertainty of the duration of it all. Despite all of these, China
was still not the country Hu Jintao wanted it to be. It was in the category of a middle-
income country with inequality rapidly growing to worrisome levels. This created
concern for Hu Jintao, therefore he responded with an ideological campaign to
create a “harmonious society”. The concept in a sense encompassed international
harmony which encouraged China to play a more impactful role in the international
arena. But Chinese leaders still lay lowed given the aftermath of the massacres
around Tiananmen Square and adhered to the tao guang yang hui doctrine. In other
words, China should “coldly observe, secure our positions, cope calmly, conceal our
capabilities and bide our time, keep a low profile, never take the lead and make a
contribution”. But under Hu Jintao, a lot of effort was put into improving the China
image and “brand”. The country had begun to contribute to the United Nations, take
the lead in setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and be a key player in
the BRICS. But these did not mark China’s start on a “clear, coherent, and unified
approach to international relations and the world order”. The country’s foreign policy
must still, in the end, be assessed through actions and not through an expression of
a doctrine.

The idea of the “China dream” had begun to spread during the second half of
Hu Jintao’s leadership. Li Junru, the first to write about the idea declared that “the
Chinese people had had a hundred-year dream of industrialization and
modernization”. It was a dream of a successful, modern China as supposed to
dreams for successful Chinese individuals. The emphasis was placed highly on
economic development which should create a moderately prosperous society in
China. The popularity of the concept created various attempts to explain and
redefine what it truly meant. The dream was, furthermore, used as a motivator and
justification for wanted economic reforms like the efficient use of resources and even
on the care for the environment. During the time the concept was earning
international attention, it was accompanied with China’s rise, an event which had
certain aftermaths. The dream was equated to the possibility of an increase of the
country’s soft power in the world and a vision of a China aiming at becoming
number one in the world, standing up to the United States of America.

During the time Xi Jinping was in office, the China dream had caught on. It
became a concept all on its own and expanded in various directions. There were
disparate interpretations from the public intellectuals presenting a great variety of
interests and concerns. With all the rapid economic and social changes, there was
an unfortunate ideological confusion and confusion in general. Lemos wrote in 2012
that the Chinese people were anxious and unhappy despite all the material
development. The said circumstances bore a dream that seemed to fit Xi’s and the
people’s vision—a narrative that copes with transformation, reform and transition
while maintaining commitment to the statement of a coherent, overarching mission
which appeal not just to people’s material expectations, but their ideals, aspirations,
hopes as well.

The vagueness, aspiration and open-endedness of the new term became the
tool that offered hope to the younger generation interested in long-term future. The
dream encouraged innovation and ambition for a better and fairer life. The very idea
of having a better life was shown to be unobjectionable and irresistible. The China
dream became a “clever negotiation between collective identity and individual
aspirations”. It presented the collective will and identity of the Chinese people but at
the same time showed how individuals and communities are able to see their own
reflection in the dream.

The China dream linked the country, the nation and the people into a group
with a common fate. To trump the great future of China, it is vital that economic
development is considered together with the great historical traditions of China’s
5,000 years of civilization. The dream is not merely a comparison of different
“dreams” and “models” around the world but reflects the fact that the Chinese dream
was superior. China dream is said to be “one of surpassing… the western
development path.”

For the China dream, Xi Jinping has been credited with launching a number of
new foreign policy concepts. One of these is the One Belt One Road (OBOR)
strategy. Eurasia emerged as a major factor in People’s Republic of China’s
contemporary foreign policy through the enunciation of the “One Belt, One Road”
(OBOR) strategy. The project primarily aims to redirect the country’s domestic
overcapacity and capital for regional infrastructure development to improve trade and
relations with Southeast Asian, Central Asian, and European countries through
establishment of a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and a Maritime Silk Road
(MSR). It was argued that OBOR is a strategic way of turning China’s geographic
vulnerability in the West – where its defenses are weak, distances are vast, the
intentions of other powers are suspect, and the allegiances of indigenous
populations are uncertain – into economic and political assets. Hence, in 2014,
China started to establish good relations with virtually every country in and around
the Central Asian region and is generally seen as a constructive and important
partner politically, economically, and militarily.

OBOR is also an expression of China’s interest to stabilize and institutionalize

the current satisfactory status quo in Central Asia by extending its influence,
constraining other great powers, checking terrorism, and expanding economic ties.
The region of Central Asia is geographically surrounded by three major powers –
Russia to the north and west, China to the east, and Iran to the southwest. Other
major powers are more distant but still have influence and interests in the region –
Turkey, India, and the United States. Other lesser powers have interests and
influence in Central Asia, notably Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of these outsiders,
especially Russia and the United States, compete for influence to varying degrees
diplomatically, economically, and militarily most importantly. Beijing seeks to
increase its influence in Central Asia and at the same time limit that of other powers.
 OBOR presents an opportunity for China to “go out” and be implanted in the
new markets as to contribute to the internationalization of the Chinese economy.
Commentators have identified the great potential of China. It has even expressed the
possibility of the renminibi to operate as an international currency and represent a
step towards a long-term goal of making it an international reserve currency. In
addition, it diverts Chinese attention away from the Pacific and towards the west. A
greater possibility for the Eurasian era.

Together with the benefits of OBOR it already presents great risks which can
expose China. The uncertainties with potential partner countries like Afghanistan and
Pakistan could create political instability. China will also be sucked into the problems
of the international arena most specifically that of Israel and the Arab states when it
does not want to even pick a side. Furthermore, there is a danger for the increased
presence of China in the regions that actually fear its rise. For example, Russia
cannot shake off the anxiety that there is a huge possibility for China to create a
long-term plan for Siberia.

In addition to these political risks, there are also potential risks for Chinese
businesses that operate along the economic belt in terms of legal processes. If one
business was receiving unfair treatment, what could China or even the company
itself do as the states included in the project are not very well known for the practice
of the rule of law? Moreover, there is a great problem when it comes to Chinese
businesses possibly putting local companies out of business. It would be difficult to
create a strategy or response to greater protectionism.

The risks of the project are greater than its ambition mainly because the
overall success of the project highly depends on the cooperation of other states. This
creates a vulnerable window that can either make or break the OBOR strategy. The
partner countries involved need to make the overall strategy work and hope they will
respond positively and go for the long run. China is the main actor, indeed, which is
why it creates anxiety for the countries that want to slow or prevent its further rise.
This heightens the possibility of other countries to undermine the strategy and not
cooperate at all.

China is not capable to be the sole actor in making the project possible that is
why it just rests upon a hope right now. The country circles around the fact that “its
vision for a future, and better, world order rests upon a commitment to shun the
hegemonic policies of the United States and instead develop a more ‘democratic’
community in which all nations exercise their right to make a proper contribution to
global governance, and in which they are all treated equally, irrespective of size.” In
other words, China expects other states to go away with narrow self-interest. But
then again, China does not have the power to make other countries give up their
dream for its own. The most it can do is offer and appeal to the governments’ better
natures.

In a sense, it puts some truth to what commentators have continually said that
the “China dream” has to be the “World’s dream”. Without it being the world’s, it’s
only just a dream with great vision and potential that is as vulnerable and one with a
high risk of failure.