Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
INSTRUMENT CONTROL
AND
SAFEGUARDING PHILOSOPHY
DETAIL ENGINEERING
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 1 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
1 X X 33 X
2 X X 34 X
3 X X 35 X
4 X X 36 X X
5 X X 37 X
6 X X 38 X
7 X X 39 X
8 X X 40 X
9 X X 41 X
10 X X 42 X
11 X 43 X
12 X X 44 X X
13 X X 45 X X
14 X 46 X X
15 X 47 X X
16 X X
17 X X
18 X X
19 X
20 X X
21 X X
22 X
23 X
24 X
25 X X
26 X X
27 X
28 X X
29 X
30 X
31 X
32 X
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 2 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
CONTENTS
1. SCOPE ................................................................................................................................. 7
2. ONSHORE FACILITIES ....................................................................................................... 7
3. CODES AND STANDARDS ................................................................................................ 8
4. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................... 8
5. ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITION ....................................................................................... 8
5.1. ABBREVIATION ................................................................................................................... 8
5.2. DEFINITION....................................................................................................................... 10
6. OPERATING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY .................................................................. 10
6.1. GENERAL ......................................................................................................................... 10
6.2. OPERATING ASPECTS....................................................................................................... 10
6.2.1. ONSHORE PLANT OPERATION .......................................................................................... 10
6.2.1.1. NORMAL OPERATING ASPECT ...................................................................................... 11
6.2.1.2. ABNORMAL OPERATING ASPECT .................................................................................. 11
6.2.2. LOADING AND SHIPPING OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 12
6.2.3. ONSHORE PIPELINE OPERATION (OUT OF CONTRACTOR SCOP OF WORK)........................... 12
6.2.4. OFFSHORE OPERATION .................................................................................................... 12
6.2.5. SOUTH PARS INTEGRATED FIBER OPTIC NETWORK (SPIFON) .......................................... 12
6.3. ONSHORE SYSTEM OVERVIEW ........................................................................................... 13
6.3.1. CONTROL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................... 13
6.3.2. SAFETY SYSTEM .............................................................................................................. 14
6.4. DESIGN CRITERIA FOR AVAILABILITY ................................................................................ 14
6.5. STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT ................................................................................... 15
7. CONTROL CENTERS........................................................................................................ 15
7.1. CONTROL BUILDING ......................................................................................................... 15
7.1.1. CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM (CCR) .................................................................................... 15
7.1.2. INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL ROOM (ITR0) IN CONTROL BUILDING ................................. 15
7.1.3. ENGINEER’S ROOM........................................................................................................... 15
7.1.4. PRINTER ROOM ................................................................................................................ 15
7.1.5. TELECOMMUNICATION BUILDING ....................................................................................... 16
7.2. INSTRUMENT TECHNICAL ROOM (ITR) (SUBJECT TO CHANGE) ........................................... 16
8. OPERATOR INTERFACES)(SUBJECT TO CHANGE) .................................................... 17
8.1. CONTROL BUILDING ......................................................................................................... 17
8.1.1. CENTRAL CONTROL ROOM ............................................................................................... 17
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 3 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 4 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 5 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 6 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
1. SCOPE
The SOUTH PARS Phases 22&23&24 Facilities Project is part of the development of
the South Pars gas field located offshore at about 100km from the Iranian coast. The
Project includes:
Two well-head platforms,
A Gas Treatment Plant located Onshore and two sea lines to be laid between
wellhead platforms and the Onshore plant to transport the reservoir fluid,
An Onshore 56” gas pipeline from the Onshore Plant to IGAT tie-in manifold in the
vicinity of Kangan Refinery
This specification defines the main principles to be considered for the design and the
Implementation of the control & safety systems, the instrumentation of the Onshore
facilities, and the interfaces with the Phase 22&23&24 Offshore facilities.
2. ONSHORE FACILITIES
The new phases 22, 23 and 24 onshore facilities include the following main process
units:
Receiving facilities
Gas trains 1, 2, 3, 4
NGL fractionation units 1,2
Ethane, Propane and Butane treatment and drying units 1,2
Sulfur recovery units 1, 2, 3, 4
Condensate trains 1, 2
Export gas compression unit
MEG regeneration unit
Propane and Butane storages and loading
Condensate storages and export
Sour water stripping
Condensate back up stabilisation
Refrigerant units
Caustic Regeneration
Propane treatment
Butane treatment
Ethane treatment
TGT unit (1 train for each phase)
DMC
Additionally to these process units the Plant includes the following utility units:
Drainage and Effluent treatment disposal
Process water handling
Steam generation
Fuel gas system
Instrument and Process air generation
Nitrogen generation
Electrical Generation & Distribution
Diesel and Emergency Electrical Generation & Distribution
Propane refrigerant storage
Sea lines
Onshore pipeline
See Water Intake
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 7 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
4. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
5.1. ABBREVIATION
IS : Intrinsically Safe
ITR : Instrument Technical Room
JB : Junction box
LAN : Local Area Network
LAS : Loading Arms System
LED : Light Emitting Diode
LFL : Lower Flammable Limit
LP : Local Panel for main equipment (heater, compressor)
LV : Low Voltage
MP : Manual Call Point
MC : Marshalling Cabinet
MCC : Motor Control Center
MLMS : Mooring Load monitoring System
MOS : Meteorological/Oceanographic System
MOV : Motor Operated Valve
MTBF : Mean Time Between Failure
MTIS : Marine Terminal Information System
MTTR : Mean Time To Repair
OCS : Operator Control Station
OCD : Operator Control Desk
PB : Push-Button
PC : Personal Computer
PCS : Process Control System
PDCS : Power Distribution Control System
P&ID : Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PLC : Programmable Logic Controller
PMS : Pipeline Monitoring System
RAM : Random Access Memory
SBS : Ship Berthing System
SC : System Cabinet
SPD 22 & 24A : Wellhead Platform 1
SPD 23 & 24B : Wellhead Platform 2
SDV : Shutdown valve
SDH: Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SLS : Ship to Shore Link
SPIFON : South Pars Integrated Fiber Optic Network
SS : Electrical SubStation
TGS : Tank Gauging system
UCP : Unit Control Panel
UHF : Ultra high frequency
UPS : Uninterruptible Power Supply
USS : Ultimate Safety System
VDU : Video Display Unit
VHF : Very high frequency
XV : Process on/off Valve
KV: Sequence Valve
TGTU: Tail Gas Treatment Unit
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 9 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
5.2. DEFINITION
6.1. GENERAL
The South Pars Phases 22, 23 & 24 Onshore Plant instrumentation and control design
philosophy is based on a distributed concept, integrating:
A permanently manned Central Control Room (CCR) used to operate process
Trains and major utility units from a Distributed Control System (DCS).
A Jetty Control room located on the jetty for local monitoring of information coming
from LPG tankers and of environmental conditions in the vicinity of the berth. One
redundant Fiber Optic communication link (via SPIFON) will be provided to montor
the required information on PCS operating consoles in CCR.
Fourteen (14) unmanned instrument technical rooms (ITR) which contain all the
field interface units.
Inter communication between these locations, by communication networks and by
hardwired links for safety related functions.
Two wellhead Platforms normally unmanned. The Offshore platform equipment will
be monitored on consoles installed into CCR and shared with onshore units
For See Water Intake, the individual control system’s equipments will be installed
inside SS7 in dedicated instrument room. All required information will be
transferred and monitored in CCR by one redundant communication link .
The overall control system must allow the integration and independence of units
considering plant operating and commissioning phasing requirements into a central
control building. In particular the control and safety system shall be designed in such a
way that commissioning of one phase be possible with the other phase in operation in
the same time, and the system integration of this phase shall be possible without the
need to wait for Plant overhaul.
The Phases 22, 23 & 24 Onshore Plant is controlled and protected by an Integrated
Plant Control system (IPCS). The IPCS shall be capable of controlling the plant
during start-up, normal operation, and emergency shutdown.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 10 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Day to day plant operation of the process trains and major utility units will be controlled
from the CCR. The DCS operator consoles shall be the main operating interfaces.
Local panels shall only be used where there is a need to operate, start or test major
plant equipment in the field. As an example, rotating equipment auxiliaries (lube and
seal oil, cooling water systems) shall normally be started locally.
Start-up inhibits shall be carried out automatically as far as possible by the control
system during a start up sequence, or manually from the operator console.
In normal operation, the control system shall aim at a steady, efficient and safe
operation of the plant and should be capable of operating between the maximum and
the minimum design conditions as given in the basis of design.
Roving field operators shall perform such tasks as isolation, observation, changeover
to standby equipment under the supervision of CCR personnel.
CCTV facilities for remote monitoring of some specific areas (flares, ....) shall be
available above Operator Control desk (OCD) in CCR.
Software inhibit functions shall be available for safety systems for testing and
maintenance purposes via dedicated maintenance stations located in ITRs.
While operating the units, the operator shall be informed on safety matters. Sufficient
means such as trend functions, indicators, and alarms shall be provided on DCS
console in the CCR to enable the detection of abnormal situation: abnormal operating
conditions, equipment failure, gas leaks, fire, and automatic shut-down
If the operating conditions approach the mechanical limits of the plant equipment, the
safety system shall automatically drive the plant to a safe condition.
Manual activation of the safety shutdown systems shall be from the OCD in CCR via
hardwired PBs and/or from the field, to initiate shutdowns or activate fire protection
systems.
After trips, return to normal operation shall not be possible unless the safety shutdown
systems have been manually reset. This is to avoid the possibility of an uncontrolled
Plant re-start when the process has returned to a safe condition.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 11 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Condensate
Condensate will be transferred from tanks to ships via dedicated condensate loading
pumps. Selection of tanks and transfer operations will be monitored from CCR OCD.
Transferred quantities will be determined using inventory data given by the tank
gauging system.
LPG
Propane and Butane will be transferred from storages to ships via dedicated loading
pumps, and loading arms located on jetty. Selection of storage tanks, setting of batch
mass/volume, setting of holding/loading modes, initiation and monitoring of loading
operations will be done from CCR OCD.
Transferred quantities will be determined using Propane and Butane metering systems
data.
Local monitoring of LPG loading operation will also possible from Jetty Control Room
on metering systems workstation and local PCS station.
A Marine Terminal Information system will provide the operator with information
concerning the approach of LPG tanker to the berth and the meteorological conditions,
locally in the Jetty Control Room, and remotely in CCR.
All the control and monitoring functions of the pipeline shall be accomplished at the
pipeline area. There is no remote control or monitoring facility by using the electronic
signal transmission.
The Wellheads platforms (SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B) will be normally unmanned.
Monitoring and control of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms shall be performed
from the CCR or locally under supervision of CCR operator. Monitoring of SPD 22, 24A
& 23, 24B is also available in SPQ1.
control and monitoring of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms from DCS
operator consoles in the CCR.
monitoring of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms shutdowns initiated locally
either on the local hydraulic panels or from local PBs
remote initiation of SPD 22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms shutdown via PBs on
CCR OCD
CCTV facilities located above OCD in CCR will also allow remote monitoring of SPD
22, 24A & SPD 23, 24B platforms.
The SPD 22, 24A and SPD 23, 24B platform of Phases 22, 23 & 24 developments
shall be connected to onshore facilities in Assaluyeh through the existing South Pars
Integrated Fiber Optic Network (SPIFON).
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 12 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
The SPIFON Network is designed to connect all offshore platforms to their respective
onshore control building of their current phases of development by fiber optic cable
Initial existing topology of the South Pars Integrated Fiber Optic Network (SPIFON)
includes Onshore Facilities and relevant Offshore platforms ,However the design of the
SDH equipments are fully compatible with the requirement of future phases.
The SDH nodes shall be installed in SPD22, 24A , SPD 23, 24B and phases 22, 23 &
24 onshore Telecom Building with all necessary interfacing equipment in SDH nodes of
other SPDs.
The network shall utilize SDH-STM16 ring configuration and shall be easy to upgrade.
The specification, network configuration and protection, installation, fiber optic cables
and SDH nodes, etc shall be in full compliance with the existing SPIFON.
Consequently remote operation of SPD 22, 24A and SPD 23, 24B platforms shall be
provided by onshore facilities in Assaluyeh, Through SPIFON as well as
telecommunication facilities between platforms and onshore facilities. The voice and
data transmission from each platform to counterpart SDH nodes shall include as a
minimum, the PCS/Safety data transmission (integration into the onshore
communication over high speed Ethernet in SDH nodes). Additionally some important
Production data, F&G, ESD system status/alarms, PABX Connection, CCTV,
Meteorological, and other telecommunication requirements shall be transmitted to the
nearby NIOC Phase 1 Development (SPQ1platform) just for monitoring purpose.
The Integrated Plant Control System (IPCS) consists of control systems and safety
systems.
The normal control & monitoring system is the Process Control System (PCS) that
will allow operational monitoring and control from the CCR. The control and monitoring
functions will be implemented via a Distributed Control System (DCS) linked to other
subsystems such as:
Power distribution control system (PDCS)
Tank gauging system (TGS) for Condensate , Propane and Butane storage tanks,
Propane and Butane custody metering systems (CMS)
Package programmable logic controllers (PLC) for major package equipment
The PCS shall also interface with the following systems provided by others:
Phases 22&23&24 Offshore SPIFON
Phases 22&23&24 Pipeline Monitoring System (PMS)
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 13 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
In the case of any malfunction of the plant equipment or its associated instrumentation
gives rise to hazards for personnel, or leads to consequences of economic loss (e.g.
damage of main equipment or severe production loss), the safety systems will bring
automatically the relevant units or part of the units to a safe condition.
The lowest level of protection generally acts as an additional loop that protects and/or
trips equipment. These actions will be performed on the DCS.
The Emergency Shutdown systems are the detection and logic systems that initiate
shutdown actions and depressurization (ESD/EDP) required by emergency situation
and applicable to the fire zones or the process units. The emergency shutdown shall be
SIL3 rated.
The Ultimate Safety Systems (USS) will be hardwired signals that provide diversified
redundancy of ESD action upon manual activation to avoid common modes of failure
with ESD/EDP systems and systematic failures (e.g. software errors).
The High Integrity Pressure Protection Systems (HIPPS) are the detection & logic
systems that stop a source of high pressure and safely keep the pressure within the
design limits with limited release of process fluid to flare. Those systems are based
upon components of known high reliability and permit on-line testing without reduction
of trip integrity. The reliability assessment of the system shall include the whole loop
from sensor to actuator and shall take into account operation and environment. HIPPS
systems shall only be used where it proves impractical or prohibitively expensive to
provide alternative ultimate protection. This type of system shall be used with POGC’s
approval only.
The Fire and Gas systems (FGS) are the detection and logic systems that monitor fire
and gas detectors and initiate relevant actions.
The IPCS systems and sub-systems shall be designed to minimize the system failure
in order to achieve safe start-up, normal shutdown, emergency shutdown and safe,
continuous, accurate, and efficient operation with minimum maintenance.
The following figures are related to the control and logic, from system input cards to
system output cards.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 14 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
As far as reasonably practicable, Equipment across the plant and packaged units
shall be standardized in the make and model. In order to reduce procurement, Testing
and maintenance costs.
These include. But not limited to items such as Programmable Logic Controllers,
On/Off valves, Control valves, Field transmitters, Relief valves, Valve actuators,
Instrument and tube fittings, for which standardization is mandatory.
7. CONTROL CENTERS
Appropriate facilities, air conditioning systems and lighting including essential lighting
shall be provided in Control room and technical rooms.
Plant operating consoles shall be located in the CCR. The consoles include ancillary
and related equipment e.g. hardwired push buttons, telecommunication equipment, etc.
The ITR0 shall house the following cabinets related to common facilities:
DCS, ESD, F&G cabinets including internal power supply units and distribution,
processors units, input/output cards, communication interfaces.
SPIFON Interface facilities.
Package control cabinets.
DCS historical data storage equipment.
Marshalling cabinets for cross connection between field/MCC equipment and
system I/O cards.
IPCS centralized hardware.
Power distribution panel.
Tank Gauging system.
A separate engineer's room shall be adjacent to the CCR. The primary purpose of this
room is to accommodate engineer workstations of IPCS sub-systems.
The printer room shall house all printers and video copier.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 15 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
The IPCS equipment shall be located in normally unmanned ITR. It includes the
following cabinets for related process units:
DCS, ESD, F&G cabinets including internal power supply units and distribution,
processors units, input/output cards, communication interfaces
Package control cabinets
Marshalling cabinets for cross connection between field/MCC equipment and
system I/O cards
Power distribution panels
Fourteen separate ITRs shall serve the areas and sections of the Plant as follows:
- ITR 0 for common facilities, (refer to § 7.1.2)
- ITR 1 for Gas Train 1,except Diesel storage& chemical storage
- ITR 2 for Gas Train 2,
- ITR 3 for Gas Train 3,
- ITR 4 for Gas Train 4,
- ITR 5 for Sulfur Recovery units 1,2 &TGTU
- ITR 6 for Sulfur Recovery units 3,4 & TGTU
- ITR 7 for Condensate Trains, Reception Facilities and, except Sea water
supply intake and distribution network
- ITR 8 for MEG Regeneration Units, DMC, Diesel storage, Diesel generator,
chemical storage , Propane refrigerant storage & Condensate storage
- ITR 9 for Propane & Butane treatment and drying
- ITR10 for NGL fractionation, Ethane treatment and drying , Export Gas
Compression
- ITR 11 for Waste Water Treatment and all Utilities
- ITR 12 for Fire Water Area,
- ITR 13 for Propane and Butane storage & export & Flare K.O. Drum
System equipment related to Propane and Butane metering & loading (units 149
and150) will be located in jetty building.
ITRs shall have air-conditioning units to maintain suitable environmental conditions for
the installed equipment and occasional occupation.
Refer to appendix 1 for list of process and utility units connected to each ITR. The ITR
and OCD relevant to new or modified units will be defined during the FEED phase,
based on the plant layout.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 16 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Operator interfaces related to control and safety functions shall be provided in several
locations: Central Control Room, Jetty Control Room, Instrument Technical Rooms,
Field locations.
The operating interface will be shared by four operating consoles dedicated to the
following plant areas:
Gas Trains 1 and 2, Condensate Train 1, SRU Trains 1 and 2, Offshore platform
SPD 22, 24A and sealine 1, C2,C3,C4 Treatment TR. 1
Gas Trains 3 and 4, Condensate Train 2, SRU Trains 3 and 4, Offshore platform
SPD 23, 24B and sealine 2. C2,C3,C4 Treatment TR. 2
Emergency Diesel & Utilities
Export Gas and Metering, MEG Regeneration, Utilities, Flares & Blow down,
storages and offsites.
Refer to appendix 1 for detail assignment of the units to the different consoles.
The assignment of the different trains to the different consoles will be interchangeable.
Each operating console will house:
Five operator control station (OCS) for OCD 1 & 2: four for the PCS. one for ESD
and F&G function.
Four operator control stations (OCS) for OCD 3 & 4: three for the PCS. one for ESD
and F&G functions. These stations will be identical and configured in such a way that
they are operationally interchangeable.
An ESD panel with PBs hardwired to ESD systems to initiate critical ESD/EDP
actions or USS actions per fire zone.
An F&G matrix panel that shall display the status of the F&G detection and
protection systems located in the different fire zones. The F&G matrix shall also
allow manual remote activation of the deluge systems.
An audible alarm shall be located in CCR to warn the operators in case of F&G hazard.
General telecom equipment such as UHF and Marine VHF remote units,.., shall be
located on a dedicated telecom console.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 17 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
A building located on the jetty at approximately 100km from ITR0 will include a Jetty
Control Room in which will be installed the Marine Terminal Information system
workstation and the metering workstation with associated ticket printers and will be
connected to the phases 22, 23 &24 Onshore DCS via SPIFON link.
A PCS station, provided for maintenance, will also allow the operator to have a view on
storage and jetty area operations when required.
All Jetty systems (MTIS and LAS) are in Contractor’s scope of supply and contractor
will make provision to interface in the Jetty Control Room the above systems as
follows:
serial I/F between the DCS and the MTIS workstation
serial I/F between the DCS and the Custody Metering System (CMS)
hardwired connection between the ESD/FGS and the LAS
Within each ITR, system maintenance and input inhibit during field item maintenance
operation shall be performed from:
Maintenance PLC consoles for ESD and F&G systems permanently installed in the
each ITR.
The permanent ESD / F&G maintenance console shall also display the ESD or F&G
system status (system fault, line monitoring faults, cycle time,...), the ESD alarm file
with time stamping (refer to §10.7) or the F&G loops status.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 18 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
ESD and F&G system software/configuration modification download and upload shall
be restricted to a portable station, password protected.
This ESD and F&G system configuration portable station shall not be permanently
installed.
For major packaged units such as compressors, dedicated operator workstations shall
be provided as part of the Unit Control Panel. Engineering workstations shall be
provided if these UCPs employ programmable logic controllers.
An alarm panel in Fire fighting station shall provide a general overview of the status of
F&G detection systems for the whole plant.
8.5. FIELD
Shutdown actions may be initiated locally via PBs near equipment, main process
areas,…Manual call points will be installed at strategic locations to provide for manual
initiation of alarm in the control room when a fire and gas emergency situation occurs.
A sea water intake system is to be constructed to provide the required water for South
Pars Gas-Field Development Phases 22, 23 & 24 and other future phases located in
Assaluyeh. Sea water intake system is a vital utility and any accidental or partial or total
interruption in the water supply process generally provokes a process shutdown. And
will be connected to the Phases 22, 23 & 24 Onshore DCS via Fiber optic cable.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 19 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Control, process interlocks and monitoring of the Plant shall be executed from the PCS
that includes the following main functions:
Provide a DCS VDU operator interface for remote control, operation and
monitoring of the Phase 22&23&24 Onshore Plant and Offshore platforms.
Provide the display for all process and auxiliary variables with recorded traces
(Real time and historical trend)
Alarm management
Regulatory control and monitoring
Sequential and control functions
Data acquisition, recording, archiving and trending functions
Measurements and control outputs from/to the field instrumentation shall be connected
to the geographically distributed DCS processors and I/O modules located in ITRs.
Redundant data highway cables shall link the CCR DCS network with the system
electronics in the ITRs.
Besides the control functionality’s, a number of functions shall be available for plant
supervision purposes.
These functions shall be:
Mass balance; integrated values of corrected flows shall be calculated to produce
mass balances per day for each process unit and overall mass balances. These
reports shall also contain figures for usage and production of utility streams.
Logging; hourly averages of process and derived variables shall be stored,
logged and printed upon operator request.
Reporting; a flexible layout of the reporting system shall be available for reporting
selected process and derived variables over selective periods.
The effect of failures of PCS devices shall be kept as low as possible by using fail-safe
design and segregation of functions.
Redundancy shall be provided for critical functions, such as power supplies, data
communication.
For monitoring and control or sequencing functions, redundant controllers with single
I/O channel configuration will be provided.
I/O level redundancy shall be for nominated I/O only and the requirement shall be
further defined during Detail Design.
All control signals or sequencing functions signals shall be provided with redundant
processor & I/O's and monitoring signals shall have non-redundant I/O cards.
Note: As an exception, monitoring signals can have redundant I/O cards based on
project requirements and will be specified during detail design.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 20 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Back up controller shall automatically take over primary controller functions and control
strategy in case of malfunction of the later, and achieve continuous automatic control
without process disturbance or control upset.
Back up communication device shall be permanently tested to ensure it is not out of
service. Transfer to back up device in case of failure of primary device shall be
automatic without disrupting the system operation.
Failure of data communication link shall have no effect on operation of the PCS
controllers or any subsystems connected to PCS through serial links.
Failure of an individual OCS shall have no effect on the operation of other OCS.
For requirements related to safety functions refer to § 10.2 and 10.5.1
A Power Distribution Control System (PDCS) shall ensure the supervision and control
of the distribution system of the whole facilities.
The PDCS architecture shall be based on slave PLCs distributed in electrical
substations and connected via a common network to a master PLC that will
concentrate data and perform load-shedding sequence.
The PDCS shall be capable of interfacing with all the equipment of the power
distribution system (emergency diesel generator's panel, LV/HV switchboards, UPS...).
Normal operation of the electrical network will be performed from dedicated stations
connected to PDCS network and located in CCR.
Only information necessary for process operation will be transferred to PCS via
redundant serial communication link.
Servo operated and/or radar level gauges will be installed on the Condensate, the
Propane and Butane storage tanks. They shall be high accuracy, microprocessor
based systems, suitable for inventory control application.
Level and temperature measurements will be transmitted to the TGS main processing
unit via a single fieldbus and a single communication interface installed in instrument
cabinet. The field network shall be designed so that any failure of one field device does
not interrupt the acquisition of other tank gauges by main processing unit.
The TGS shall include a real-time database. The standard database shall include all
features suitable for the tank farm management and inventory.
Main tank inventory data shall be sent to PCS for display on OCS, which will be the
normal operator interface with the tank gauging system.
TGS workstation in Engineer's room will mainly be used for configuration and
maintenance. It shall also ensure a back up for tank data display in case of failure of
communication link between TGS.
The provision of an Inventory Management system shall be included in tank gauging
system and communicate with the PCS by non-redundant MODBUS protocol. The PCS
will monitor the data from tank inventory management system such as basic volumes.
The PCS will be the master of data exchanges.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 21 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
A Custody Metering System (CMS), shall ensure custody measurement for transfer of
Propane and Butane to LPG tankers. Metering skids will be installed on jetty and
computers will be installed in jetty building with common local operator interface and
ticket printers.
Information will be transmitted to DCS via SPIFON for remote monitoring on OCD in
CCR.
Control and safety functions related to loading arms (Monitoring of arms position,
control of hydraulic power units, emergency release …) will be ensured by a dedicated
system provided by loading arms Vendor.
This system will be connected to general ESD system via hardwired signals to ensure
safety of loading operations and alarm report to CCR. Related system equipment will
be installed in the jetty building.
The Marine Terminal Information System (MTIS) will consist of the following
subsystems:
A Berth Approach system (BAS) used by the tanker pilot and marine operations to
monitor the approach of the tanker to the berth.
A Mooring Load Monitoring system (MLMS) providing continuous monitoring of the
loads on each of the tanker mooring lines
A Meteorological system providing environmental data such as: wind speed and
direction, wave height, water level, water current direction and speed, water
temperature, air temperature...
A ship to shore link via fiber optic cable/IS copper cable shall ensure transmission of
ESD signals … between tanker and onshore ESD system.
Desk top operator station shall be provided in each ITR for pre-commissioning,
commissioning and maintenance operations including monitoring /configuration /
troubleshooting etc. of PCS equipment located in the ITR and field devices with HART
functionality and relevant software in DCS to remotely configure the transmitters from
Maintenance Station as well as provision of remote HART calibrator from marshalling
cabinets.
The Asset Management System shall interface smart/HART instruments with interface
modules located in the marshalling cabinets via serial data links.
The interface modules in the marshalling cabinets shall be provided and installed with
the control system,
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 22 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
10.1.1. GENERAL
with the objective of preventing any consequential effect of the abnormal condition.
Level 1 (ESD1) = Fire zone emergency shutdown. ESD1 activation isolates the fire
zone and brings into safe shutdown conditions all process & utilities systems inside the
zone. It is initiated manually from CCR & from field, or automatically further to Fire &
Gas detection or loss of essential control. As define by the P&IDs and process cause &
effect diagram.
Level 2 (SD2) = Unit shutdown. SD2 activation brings into safe conditions and isolates
a process unit. It is initiated manually from CCR or from field, and automatically in case
of loss of essential control or if operating conditions reach beyond acceptable limits for
safe operation. As define by the P&IDs and process cause & effect diagram.
Level 3 (SD3) = Equipment shutdown. SD3 activation brings into safe conditions and
isolates a process equipment or packaged unit. It is initiated manually or automatically
in case of abnormal operating condition. As define by the P&IDs and process cause &
effect diagram.
The fire zone emergency depressurization and blow down (EDP) allow reducing
pressure from the maximum operating pressure to a specific threshold further to
detection of outdoors abnormal F&G conditions. It will be manually trigged by dedicated
PBs in CCR, which initiate the fire zone depressurization on the condition that ESD1 of
related fire zone has been previously activated (manually or automatically).
Some equipment requires to be depressurized after some fault, e.g. gas compressor
after a seal shaft failure; they will be fitted with depressurization system activated
independently from EDP.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 23 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Automatic initiation
Shutdown systems shall be designed to operate automatically when the process is
outside normal operating limits and when a dangerous situation is likely to occur
before an operator could intervene.
Shutdown should be automatically initiated only as last resort and should generally
be preceded by alarms displayed on OCS, to give operators as much time as
possible for corrective actions.
Shutdown systems will also be automatically activated by the F&G logic.
Manual initiation
Shutdown may be initiated manually, either locally, or remotely from CCR.
SD3 may be activated locally by PBs hardwired to PCS/UCP, or in CCR from the OCS.
Manual activation of ESD1 and SD2 shall be completely independent from PCS so that
PCS error cannot make this activation inoperable. It shall be initiated by PBs hardwired
directly to input cards of ESD systems.
A very few number of Ultimate Safety PBs by passing the ESD logic, allow initiating
main shutdown actions in case of ESD PLC errors. Those PBs shall be directly
hardwired, in marshalling cabinets, to the electrical supply circuits of solenoid valves
that operate the essential ESDVs or BDVs.
The ESD1, SD2 and EDP functions shall be performed on dedicated fail safe PLCs that
will be installed in the ITRs in dedicated cabinets.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 24 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Control valves may be used, on an exception basis as BDVs or SDVs (never ESDVs)
and requires COMPANY approval, in case of Activation of those valves by ESD levels
as follows (refer also to § 14.2):
After ESD1 & SD2 shutdown actions the shutdown systems and field control elements
shall be reset manually to avoid an uncontrolled Plant restart.
The OCS operator shall reset the onshore ESD logic relevant to each ESD level.
The ESD level shall return to normal condition only when ESD cause (s) has
disappeared or has been inhibited and the ESD logic manual reset has been
initiated.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 25 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
SDVs and BDVs shall be of the auto reset type if activated further to SD3 initiation
and shall move to their normal operating position as follows:
Offshore valves :
Off shore ESDV's and BDV's shall be locally and manually reset at valve location.
Valve open command (close command for BDV) shall then be initiated in SPD 22,
24A or SPD 23, 24B technical room.
Start-up inhibit
In order to be able to start equipment or sections of process, it shall be necessary
to inhibit some input to the ESD/DCS systems, as sensor signal may be in an
abnormal state prior to start-up and could cause a shutdown. Such inhibits are
designated as "start-up inhibits".
It will only defeat the shutdown function. Input status monitoring shall remain in
operation.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 26 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Each inhibit function shall be reset automatically either by the sensor signal
reverting to the normal or healthy state, after a dedicated step of the equipment
start-up sequence, after a predetermined time delay, or by a set of process
conditions. If cancelled automatically by the sensor signal, the input circuitry will
prevent nuisance trips being caused by oscillation of the input around the reset
value.
Maintenance inhibit
Maintenance inhibit switches shall be used to inhibit trip initiators to enable
maintenance or on-line functional testing.
The following shall be adhered to:
− When the trip transmitter is inhibited, the operator shall check frequently the
associated control transmitter measurement so that manual actions (remove
the inhibit or activate manually ESD) can be taken in case the process moves
out of limits. Only one trip initiator shall be inhibited per interlock at any one
time to allow the operator to monitor properly the situation.
− Output shall not be overridden or isolated.
− A maintenance inhibit function shall not inhibit the alarm function.
− For reasons of security, inhibit facilities are not allowed on flame, axial
displacement and vibration sensors.
− A maintenance inhibit function is not required for two-out-of-three trip initiator
configurations. For two-out-of-two trip initiator configuration maintenance
inhibits function shall be provided for each of the initiators. Setting of only one
maintenance inhibit function shall create a situation such that the configuration
temporarily functions as a one-out-of-two system.
Maintenance inhibit for ESD system inputs shall be activated from a dedicated
console provided within to ESD cabinet in the ITR. Maintenance inhibit for SD3
system input shall be activated from DCS console located in Engineer’s room.
A hardware keylock or a password shall protect the access of maintenance inhibit
function from unauthorized personnel.
Design guidelines for the DCS or Package PLC subsystems dedicated to SD3
functions shall be as per guidelines for control functions (refer to § 9.1.3) with the
exception of I/O channel configuration which shall be redundant, allowing on line
replacement.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 27 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
ESD systems shall be implemented on high reliability fail-safe and fault tolerant PLC.
The Emergency Shutdown System shall require multiple nodes connected together on
a dedicated safety network. Executive actions shall be transmitted on this network
between ESD PLC controllers as long as it has been specifically designed for such a
purpose and the complete Emergency Shutdown System including the communication
network named safety network meet the appropriate SIL level approval.
Connection to offshore facilities shall be performed through SPIFON.
The Fire & Gas System shall require multiple nodes connected together on a dedicated
safety Network. Executive actions shall be transmitted on this network between FGS
PLC controllers as long as it has been specifically designed for such a purpose.
Data that shall be able to be transferred from FGS/ESD to PCS such as detection
alarms system common alarms, inhibition status, fire fighting systems status, reset
commands,
ESD systems (Logic Solver central parts, I/O cards and communication cards) shall be
based on fault tolerant/redundant, programmable logic controller technology and shall
have hardware architecture that complies with the requirements of SIL3 as minimum.
The proposed system shall use Supplier standard field proven product lines.
ESD system shall generally follow the principle of “de-energize to trip” except for some
specific devices such as ESD PBs. All input/output that are not configured to be fail-
safe shall be line monitored.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 28 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
PLC shall continuously monitor the status of each component. Auto test and internal
diagnostic of major parts (I/O cards, processors, buses, memory, and power supply)
shall be considered as being of primary importance, as well as system faults
monitoring. The PLC "system" faults shall be managed by maintenance station in ITR
with few common alarms transferred to OCS
Definition of valve and … will be studied and revised during detail deign engineering.
Only the ESDVs and BDVs directly tripped by ESD1. The valves which are not directly
tripped by ESD1 but by SD2 or SD3 actions (Cascade or without ESD1) shall not be
tripped by the USS.
The electrical isolation system (EIS) leads to the shutdown of all motors in the fire
zone.
F&G systems shall activate ESD logic, when required, via hardwired signals. No data is
transferred from ESD systems to F&G systems.
Data exchange from/to UCPs will be limited to shutdown activation via hardwired
signals.
Interface with MCC will be limited to motor shutdown activation via hardwired signals.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 29 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Tank Gauging System (TGS) interface to the ESD system shall be via 4-20mA level
Measurements from level gauge 4-20mA output modules and shall be directly
hardwired to the ESD systems for very high/low level detection and shutdown
activation. TGS interface to the DCS for level measurement and indication shall
preferably be by high speed serial link.
A redundant communication link between PCS and ESD systems is required in order to
monitor ESD systems related events. Transmission of ESD data to the PCS via an
integrated redundant data highway shall be considered.
Via this communication link, alarms and status shall be transmitted to PCS to be
displayed on dedicated mimics at OCS, printed on relevant printers, and activate SD3
functions as required, ahead of automatic shutdown via "cascade effect" (§ 10.1.5).
Data that can be transferred from ESD/EDP systems to PCS are:
The following typical data can be transferred from PCS to ESD/EDP systems:
Start-up inhibit
Tests initiation
Reset commands
Valve commands (e.g. close BDV, open ESDV, etc...).
Note: One integrated bus could be used for both ESD & PCS system, only when it
is SIL3 certified.
Time and date stamping of events generated by safety PLCs shall be performed by
the PLCs. The alarm status with time stamping shall be transmitted to PCS via data
link communication, for merging and integration with PCS generated alarms and
display in the PCS Historian module at the CCR, ITRs and printing at the common
system printers. Sequence of Events shall be accessible from a dedicated
printer/Sequence of Event recorder shall be provided in the Printer Room of each
(onshore and offshore) facility to provide a permanent record for maintenance and
operations personnel.
The time synchronization of sub-systems shall be by the PCS, via output signals
from the PCS. The time signal shall be derived from a master GPS clock.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 30 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
11.1. GENERAL
Fire and gas system shall be provided with the following objectives:
Monitoring of all plant areas for fire condition or gas leakage, and activation of
related alarms
Indication on DCS customized graphic display of areas where fire or gas is
detected,
Executive actions (fire pumps, shutdown activation...).
The Plant will be fitted with an automatic fire detection system: heat, flame and smoke
detectors, gas detection: flammable and toxic gas detectors.
In event of confirmed fire or/and gas detection, the system shall automatically initiate
the appropriate alarms, activate relevant executive actions as per the cause and effect
matrices.
Manual call points shall be incorporated as part of the relevant F&G detection system.
Initiation of these call points shall trigger an audible alarm in CCR and a visual alarm
on the OCD F&G matrix panel without automatic action.
Fire alarms, gas pre-alarms, gas alarms per zones shall be displayed on OCS
simplified PCS mimics, representing the plant layout (geographically) for easy tracing
of the hazard.
They shall also be displayed on the OCD F&G matrix panel and on an annunciation
panel located in Fire station. Matrix and panels LEDs shall be activated by hardwired
signals from F&G system output cards to ensure a redundancy of F&G alarms in case
of communication failure.
Audible alarm shall be activated in CCR and Fire station as per F&G cause & effect
diagrams.
For main F&G functions in the system (from input cards to output cards), the probability
of failure on single input demand shall be less than 10-3 to be SIL3.
All logic required to develop F&G safety strategy shall be performed in high reliability
fail safe and fault tolerant PLCs.
If the size of the combined ESD/F&G systems allows it, a common PLC may be used.
In this case dedicated I/O modules and racks shall be used for F&G I/O, but processors
will be in charge of implementing both F&G and ESD logic.
All fire and gas detectors shall be connected via marshalling cabinet to F&G system
standard cards.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 31 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
F&G system will generally follow the principle of “de-energize to trip” for systems. All
input or outputs, which are not configured to be fail-safe, shall be line monitored.
Interface between the different F&G systems shall be via hardwired signals.
For non-process buildings, addressable fire detection panels shall be provided. Only
common alarm per type will be connected to F&G PLCs via hardwired signals for
display on CCR OCS and F&G matrix panel.
Fire protection systems shall generally be stand-alone systems not interfaced with F&G
system. The only exception shall be the CO2 systems within machine enclosures,
activated automatically by F&G logic further to confirmed detection. Related F&G logic
shall be implemented on Vendor/Supplier UCP.
Local manual activation shall be implemented on fire protection systems, deluge valves
and tank foam protection systems.
Remote activation from F&G matrix panel shall also be implemented for deluge
systems via command directly hardwired to related skids.
Fire water pumps will be actuated, automatically from F&G system, or manually from
CCR remote fire water pumps panel or from local fire water pump panels. Signals
from/to the CCR fire pumps panel shall generally be hardwired to/from the local fire
pump panels through the F&G system.
Fire dampers shall be directly controlled by the F&G system. The F&G system shall
also send shutdown commands to the HVAC system via hardwired links so that the
HVAC system perform relevant shutdown actions (trip motors...)
The F&G system shall initiate ESD1, SD3 and electrical isolation via the ESD systems.
The interface between the F&G and the ESD system shall be via hardwired signals
(except in case of combined ESD/F&G systems).
The general Alarm system, consisting of indoor sounders and outdoor sirens, will be
manually activated from CCR and Fire station through FGS.
A redundant communication link between PCS and F&G systems is required in order to
monitor F&G systems related events.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 32 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
The following typical data can be transferred from PCS to F&G systems:
Reset commands
12.1. GENERAL
Packaged units shall have their control and shutdown instrumentation implemented as
follows:
Critical packaged units (loading arms, centrifugal compressors, boilers, etc....) shall
include the Vendor/Suppliers recommended control & safety system.
Less critical and specialized packaged units (water treatment, air and nitrogen
production) may have their control functions implemented in dedicated control
systems connected to DCS by high speed serial links or can be fully integrated into
DCS.
For ESD of packages having few safety critical I/O, the plant ESD systems can be
utilized. For packages which require significant ESD functions, the ESD functions may
be implemented in dedicated system (refer to 10.2).
F&G detection and protection for package units is generally included in the plant FGS.
In some cases, such as turbines, detectors and relevant logic may be included in
Vendor/Supplier scope of supply.
Type "A"
Stand alone packaged unit with no interface with PCS, ESD and F&G systems.
Type "B"
Packaged unit fully remotely controlled (monitoring and control functions) by the PCS
and ESD/F&G systems. There is no Vendor/Supplier supplied control cabinet for these
packages.
Type "C"
Packaged unit fully controlled by the package control cabinet (UCP) located either on
the skid package itself or remotely in the technical room. Type "C" package UCP shall
be connected to the PCS, ESD and F&G systems, for monitoring, control functions and
shutdowns.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 33 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
When a packaged unit is provided with its own control and safety system (type C
package), the interface (remote information, alarms or commands) between this UCP
and PCS shall be:
either via hardwired volt free contacts and 4-20 mA analogue signals when few
data only are exchanged with PCS.
or via a high speed serial link when a large quantity of data are exchanged with
PCS In all cases signals to/from the ESD systems and F&G systems shall be
hardwired.
Main alarms shall be transmitted to the PCS for display on the alarm summary table.
When discrimination time on PCS is not sufficient to allow correct sequencing of
transmitted events and alarms, information shall then be sequenced and time tagged
by the UCP (in memory). Detailed alarm annunciation shall be available on cabinet in
ITR.
A specific register called” first-up register” will be carried to the IPCS in order to detect
the first shutdown.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 34 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Notes:
1) If not prevented by trip condition, ESD logic not reset,...
2) Start/stop per fan - Emergency stop per module - Analogue control
(speed/louver/pitch) per module on PCS
3) Remote operation shall be indicated on P&IDs by Contractor when required
4) Equipment started for safety/emergency reasons will only be stopped or shutdown
manually in the field (local)
5) Only in "local mode"
6) Only in "remote mode"
7) ESD1 Trip via Electrical Isolation System
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 35 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Duty/Stand by selection
In cases where a standby pump is provided as a back up against duty pump
failure, the first pump started by the operator will be considered as the main. No
switch "Duty/Stand by" will be provided.
All signals from ESD and/or DCS/SD3, including "trip" and any other vital or safety
critical signals to Motor Control Centres (MCCs), shall be hardwired.
Motor non-critical signals shall interface with the DCS/PCS via high serial links from
substation PDCS slave PLC. These signals will be typically:
From PDCS to PCS :On/Off status, Unavailable/ Tripped status (grouped)
From PCS to PDCS : Start/ Stop commands as required.
Exchange of non-critical signals from UCP to PDCS will be done through PCS.
Selected operational parameters, main status and alarms associated with electrical
distribution systems shall be transferred to PCS via a communication link between
PDCS master PLC in main substation and PCS data communication network, in ITR
12.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 36 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
The availability and reliability of process control and safeguarding applications shall be
examined according to the direct and indirect disturbances and risks induced by a
failure and according to back up safety brought by other devices.
Electronic transmitters shall be used as a general rule. However for a few local controls
some pneumatic control loops are acceptable which required COMPANY approval.
Transmitters shall be of the smart transmitter type, except those connected to the ESD
system that will be preferably of conventional electronic type. If smart type transmitters
are selected for ESD application they shall be configured as “read only”.
Smart transmitters (2 wires) with digital signal superimposed on 4-20mA signals shall
be the rule. Remote calibration shall be performed from a “pocket” interface at
marshalling level (No fieldbus provided for remote maintenance) or from maintenance
station in ITR if the PCS can support digital communication with selected smart
transmitters as a standard facility.
The following general requirements have to be used as guidelines for reliability and
redundancy of field sensors and final control elements.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 37 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
same initiating device shall not be used for SD3 function and for control or
monitoring function,
Process variables used for initiating the shutdown systems shall be derived, as a
general rule, from the electronic transmitter signals. The threshold function shall be
achieved within safety systems logic. All transmitters shall have line integrity
monitoring and fault reporting by the safety systems,
If control and safety transmitters are provided at the same location the ranges for
both transmitters should be the same. Discrepancy monitoring shall be provided at
the PCS by comparison of the control & safety transmitters measured variables
and an alarm generated if the difference between the transmitters exceeds a pre-
determined threshold. Saturated signals under normal operating conditions shall be
avoided (e.g. a small range transmitter signal for Low Low level detect ion),
Local switch shall be forbidden for temperature, pressure and flow process alarm;
local switches may only be used for mechanical equipment if required by
Vendor/Supplier standard. and will be subject to COMPANY approval,
when switches are used as sensing devices, they shall have normally closed
contact to open on trip condition,
Online testing will be possible for sensors by using maintenance inhibit (refer to
10.4).
failure of instrument or signal shall be monitored and treated in the safety loop
(freezing of signal or safety position ...),
Failure of one element shall not jeopardize the availability of more than one safety
loop. As a consequence, shared component which is common to more than one
safety loop, which may fail and which is essential to the safety, shall be supplied
fully redundant,
SD2 & SD3 final control elements do not have to be redundant except if required
by Process specific requirement and identified on P&IDs.
if a SDV is used for both SD3 & SD2 functions it shall be equipped with two
solenoids, one controlled by DCS and one controlled by ESD system
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 38 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
if a BDV is opened further to ESD1 & SD3 initiation, it shall be equipped with two
solenoids, one controlled by PCS (or UCP) and one controlled by ESD system.
The physical principle of measurement (mainly flow) may be shared with another
loop but the electronic processing must be segregated. For example, a single
vortex meter body shall have two separate sets of electronic or one orifice plate
primary device may be utilized with two transmitters connected to separate process
tapping. This facility is not acceptable for pressure, level and temperature.
Close and open position switches of on/off valves actuated by ESD system shall be
hardwired to ESD non-redundant input cards and discrepancy between command and
position shall be detected by ESD logic and shall initiate an alarm.
ESDVs, SDVs and BDVs, shall be actuated by the ESD systems. Close and open
position switches of on/off valves actuated by ESD system shall be hardwired to ESD
input cards and discrepancy between command and position shall be detected by ESD
logic and shall initiate an alarm.
Where on/off valves are used for several functions (I.e. ESD, PSS and DCS control), a
dedicated solenoid valve for each function shall be considered.
Actuators shall be air spring return or double acting actuators. Double acting actuators
may be applied where single acting spring returns actuators are prohibitively large, or
where 'stay-put' actuators are required.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 39 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
ESDVs shall fail to closed position on air failure and when de-energized.
Gas over oil actuators will be utilized where instrument air or other motive power is not
available e.g. shutting down gas pipe lines, shoreline ESD valves. Use of hydraulic
actuator shall be limited as far as possible and shall be subject to Company approval.
SDVs shall generally fail to closed position on air failure and when de-energized.
Exceptions shall be clearly indicated on P&IDs.
BDVs shall generally fail to open position on air failure and when de-energized. In
specific case, such as on slug catcher, BDV shall be air fail open and energized to
open with line monitoring facilities.
Air back up vessels, sized for three strokes, shall be provided for double acting
actuators and BDVs. (1 stroke to safe position, 1 stroke corresponding to operator
erroneous request, 1 stroke to safe position)
The ESDVs and BDVs will have a local panel with a reset push button and/or test
facilities as described hereafter.
During all testing operations where the ESD system has no longer the possibility of
closing the valve, local closure shall be possible.
XVs and KVs cannot be considered as safety valves and are actuated by the PCS.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 40 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Notes:
1) Additional permissive condition when required shall be represented by Contractor
on P&IDs. Actual valve shall be operated one after the other as per the operating
manual.
2) Partial stroking and solenoid valve test facilities have to be specified for those
SDV’s which are expected to be permanently open and which cannot be tested
during planned equipment shutdown. These SDV’ are to be identified by
Contractor on P&ID’s.
3) Requirement for local command shall be indicated by Contractor on PIDs.
4) Auto reset requirement to be identified on P&ID’s by Contractor.
5) Control system means ESD/PCS/UCP for ESDV’s/BDVs/SDVs depending on
ESD logic. Control system means PCS/UCP for XVs.
6) Open and close commands have to be identified on P&IDs by Contractor.
7) Except if specifically required by Contractor on P&IDs
8) A by-pass operated by means of a special spring return key will allow the testing
of the solenoid valve without moving the valve. Solenoid by pass will be
monitored with PSL displayed in CCR.
9) A spring return key switch allows a partial stroking of the valve
10) When activated by SD2
11) When activated by SD3
12) When activated by ESD1
13) Facilities are described for fail close SDVs. For fail open SDVs, if any, reverse
action shall be considered.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 41 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
15.1. GENERAL
Signal transmission, in the context of this document, refers to how instrument systems
are interconnected, and can be summarized as follows (signals may go in both
directions).
Field to ITR,
Within ITRs,
From ITR to control building
Within control building,
From ITR to substations,
Field instrumentation is connected to junction boxes in the process area via individual
cables run in aerial cable trays.
From the junction boxes, multi-pair/core cables will be routed underground, or aerial on
pipe rack, to the field cable marshalling cabinets in the ITR.
Multi-cables will be segregated according to voltage and signal type (24VDC, 48VDC,
IS...) and service (process, emergency shutdown...) as far as possible.
As a general rule the cables that include F&G and ESD safety signals energized to trip
shall be Fire resistant cables.
Transmitters and contacts from field instrumentation, or Package field UCPs, shall be
powered by the relevant control or safety systems.
Solenoid valves shall not be powered by systems but by an external 48VDC source
wired to marshalling cabinets.
Light indicators managed by PCS in fire fighting station shall be powered by external
24VDC.
The field cables shall be terminated in field junction boxes order in the marshalling
cabinets.
Packaged units such as heaters, compressors, etc., shall have skid mounted wiring
from measuring devices terminated at junction boxes or local panels mounted on skid.
Multi-pair/ core cables shall then connect the signals to the marshalling cabinets in the
ITR.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 42 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
The marshalling cabinets related to "type C" packages will preferably be integrated in
UCP and provided by Package Vendor/Supplier.
The termination on the technical room side of the marshalling cabinets shall be
organized in system cabinet order. Cross connection between field and system order
shall be performed within the cabinet.
Mixing of signals from different units in a same system input/output card shall be
avoided.
Hardwired interconnections between UCP, PCS, F&G and ESD systems shall be via
marshalling cabinets. Contacts delivered by a system to an other system shall be
generally be free of voltage and powered by input cards of this later system.
High speed Serial links will connect UCPs, ESD system, F&G system and PCS
communication interfaces within the same ITR.
Electrical power, signal and serial link cables shall be routed beneath false floor.
DCS data transfer between ITR’s and CCR shall be via redundant communication
channels. They shall follow different routes between the points they serve.
For manual activation of ESD and F&G protection systems, multi pair/core cables shall
be laid between ITRs and CCR OCD.
Multi-core cables shall be laid from ITR to SS for hardwired critical signals connected to
MCC. The interposing relay function shall be as far as possible performed by the
appropriate “relay” type digital output card of the DCS/SD3 and ESD systems. If not
possible, external interposing relays shall be integrated in marshalling cabinets.
Contacts delivered to MCC shall generally be free of voltage and powered from MCC.
High speed Serial links shall connect PDCS PLC in substations to PCS communication
interface in the relevant ITR. ( §13.3)
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 43 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
15.7.1. GENERAL
High Speed Serial links between ESD and F&G systems and the PCS data
communication network shall be via a redundant communication link. Exchange of
data from PCS to ESD/F&G system shall be highly secure and shall be designed to
preserve the integrity of the safety system.
High Speed Serial links between PDCS master PLC and PCS communication in
ITR12 and between PDCS slave PLCs and PCS communication interfaces in
relevant ITR shall be redundant.
High Speed Serial link between UCP and PCS will generally be redundant.
High Speed Serial link between TGS and PCS will be non-redundant.
High Speed Serial link between CMS and PCS will be non redundant
High Speed Serial link between MTIS and PCS will be non redundant
High Speed Serial link between MTU and PCS shall be redundant
High Speed Serial link between PMS and PCS will be non redundant
For a detail list of serial communication links between DCS and other systems
reference is to be made to specification RP 2224 999 1511 002.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 44 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
All control and safety systems located in CCR and ITR shall be powered from 230 V
AC Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system located in electrical substations.
Necessary autonomy requires battery back up for 2 Hours.
Equipment such as PCS, ESD, F&G system cabinets, etc, shall be powered by a set of
redundant UPS feeders (i.e. 2 feeders) for each equipment.
Equipment such as printers, stations, etc, shall be powered by a single UPS feeder.
PCS, ESD and F&G systems shall be equipped with reliable DC generation systems
provided by Supplier. These internal power supplies and distribution systems shall be
redundant.
The 48V DC external source for powering solenoid valves shall be from a dedicated
redundant power supply system supplied by a single feeder.
Package control cabinets will receive 230V AC, 50 Hz, supplied by a single or dual
feeder system (to be defined for each package) and 48V DC power via single feeder.
The existing South Pars Integrated Fiber Optic Network (SPIFON) should be used for
communication between offshore and onshore facilities. The required interface facilities
should be design and developed by contractor in order to have a well arranged
connection to existing network for applicable purpose. The detail of applications for
SPIFON should be studied and defined during detail engineering.
PCS shall interface with the Pipeline Monitoring system (PMS not included in
Contractor scope of supply) through a non-redundant serial link.
Data transmission from PCS to PMS will be typically: sealine flow, pressure and
temperature main parameters.
PMS operator interface shall be the dedicated PMS workstation located in Engineer's
room.
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 45 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 46 of 47
South Pars Gas Field Development – Phase 22, 23 & 24
Note:
1) OCD assignment is preliminary and shall be finalized by the EPC during the detail design
This document is the property of N.I.O.C.. Any unauthorized attempt to reproduce it, in any form, is strictly prohibited.
Page 47 of 47