Copyrighted material

CAMBRIDGE TEXT S IN THE

HISTOR Y OF PHILOSOPHY

RALPH CUDWORTH
A Treatise Concerning Eternal and
Immutable Morality
with
A Treatise oj Freewill

C JPYnghied ~
 CAMBRIDGE TEXT S IN TH E
HIST O RY OF PHILO SOPH Y

KARL AMER1KS
!'..f..... of PkliMDl"Y> u,,",",iIy of N",,, Do_
DESMOND M. CLARKE
!'..flUM of P!.iiMD",y. UoiDmily c.l1q, c.".j.

Th< "",in objcdiv. of Cambridr< Tum in II>< Hiiro'y of PIIilooophy ill ,,, up.ond th<
1'Uf<. vori<t:y and qll2lny of 1<... in ,II< h;""'Y of pM"'''phy .. hich ... . "";bbl< in
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philooophy. bu, .... ,,, • ...;,s.,. • ...Jim«: of rndcrs in ,I>< hill."..,. of tcit ...... tho hist...,
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'V' ate
 RALPH CU DWORTH

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and

Immutable Morality

WITH

A Treatise of Freewill

ED1HD 8Y

SA RAH HUTTON

CAMBRIDGE
UN IV ERSITY PR ESS

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 Contents

A(hDlllkJ(tlMfrt. PAAt yi
LiJi ~[d'wrouJlitnu v ..

CII~,,~kla xxxi
F... /.""U;.., xxx ..

A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Mor:ality I

A Treatise ofFrecwill 151

Glm.ry 21 0
[,wit :1 14

•
 Acknowledgements

Then: are three parricul~r debts of gratitude "'hich I ",ould like to

express: fitst TO Erik-Jan Dos, for his .... istance in preparing the tut of
Fr(tlflill; s«ond ly to rhe Uniyen;ity of Utrecht, for il "'lIS during my
tenun: of rhe Belle 'Ian Zuykn Visiting ProfCMOrship rhlt the mllin
groundwork for this edition "015 done. l2sl, bue IH){ leost, I am grateful
10 rhe Uni,·en;;ty of Hcnfordshirc for 3llo.. ing me 1ea.e TO rake up rhe
Belle.an Zuylcn ChaiT.

'VI ate
 Abbreviations

AT tElftIm * Dnf,ffN, cd. C. Adam and P. Tannery, ~v. B.

Rochot (Pari$, '964-76)
TIS Cud ... onh, TJw Trw '~/(IIt(t ...1 SYIWff ~ftlu- UllivnII (London,
, 678)
ElM COO....,.,h, A Trr,tiu C#lOftnlilt: Ett,.,../ Il..a I","'~tdlt M~ •• lily
(London, '7}')
CSM Tilt- PA;I~Jop~ull/ Writilt" ~I /Jrsc1l' IN, tnIU. J. Cottingham,
R. StooIhofT and O . Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 19&4-91 )
Copyrighted ma~rlal
 Introduction

Ralph Cudworth is a philosopher who spans the Renaissance and the

Enli,htenment. In an age of intellectual ferment, when the strident new
philosophies of the seventeenth cmtury announced theiT modernity by
repudiating the past, Cudwonh. i. a figure uf continuity. This i.
symbolized by the fact thl! One of his major pbilosophical ...url<!;, his
T.,df;,,, COtlU .... iro6 Eu ....,,/ O~, I_MM, Mo.,,/ity, ..... puhlid,cd in
the eighteenth <:entury (173'), while the only major work publishro in
his lifetime, hi. Trut [NUl/trW"/ Sy'lmI of 1M U"iw", (1678), i.
steeped in the hUllWlistic scholarship of the Renaissance. If the former
h"" ensured that philosophers still p.:Iy some attention to Cudwonh even
today, the biter h"" helped deler them from dOle acquaintance, f....
Cudworth's reputation for learning h"" gone before him. The encrusta-
tion of erudition which clogs the p.:Igt:S of his Trut l"ttl«rluill Sysultl of
IN U"iwru: h"" re5ultro in hi. being set ""ide in this century "" an
antiquarian.
None the Jess, modem neglect of Cudworth belies the enduring
kpcy which bis writings enjoyro in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centum both at home and abroad. He was held in high regard by
many, including Juhn Locke, John Roy, Shoftesbury, Pri<:e and Reid.
Hi. SYfUItI was reprintro twice, in different formatS, in England in the
eighteenth century.' In 1733 Joban Lorenz Mosheim publishro a utin
translaoon of Cudworth's works in Germany. Mosheim dc1ayro pub-
licaoon of hi. tran.btioo in order 10 be able to indude A TI't_tiM

PirP: ill .. tt "o...d ... . . by rao..w w.. .... <lor bd<, A c...,.-;... .... of A, ......
(Londooo. ' J'OI>. f<!I<. 11 J'~ .......... ill ..... it " . - ...,. n-... _ (L x· , .14).
f<!I< • •1)9).

"
Co~ct",inl £u",./ and J_ldk Morolily, tt.en:by ensuring a Euro-
pean-wide diffusion for Tlct TrtallM alongside Cudwonh's Trw
h/lt/krNal S)'IlntI.l Selections from his works wen: published in
French tranwtion in Jran J..., Qen;'. BiblulIlliqut (},ouit, when", they
became the cemrc-piea of a delute ber.o.·...,n J..., Qen; and Bayle.
Cudwonh's doctrine of 'Plastic Nature' continued to be discussed in
France through the Enligtllmmem and well into the nineu:enth
century.J An Italian tran.~tion of Cudworth', works by Luigi Benedetti
was publislM:d in Italy in ,g23" Continuing interest in Cud"..".th in
nincttenth-«ntury Britain can be gauged from tile publication of an
ed ition of hi. Sy.um ond TU.IIM by John Harrison in ,8,,5, ond the
priming of one of his unpublished monuscripts as A TmlllM of Fru JPiIl
by J . Allen in , 838. Ever since: Marti~u's discussion of Cudwonh in
[886, there has been a sua:eKsion of shan discussio", of ond extracts
from £Im",/ .,..1 J"""Mla~k Mor./jly . The mOSt imponam study of
Cudwonh this antury,j.A. Passmore's Ralph C"","TlII: An I"urpma-
I;"" ('95 ' ) focu.sa on tI\osc writings not published in hi. lifetime, A
Trt.'iu c....«",i"l Eu",.1 ani J"u".udlt M or./iry and tile unpublished
manuscripts on free will.~
Cudwonh is chiefl y remembered today as a kading mc:mbu of the
group of sevmteenth-ccntury philosopher theologians now known ...
the Cambridge Platonist.. This group indud es such figu res as Nathaniel
Culver"'ell (d. ,65'), John Smith ( ,618-52) and Peter Sterry (d. 1672),
as well ... the Olher philosopher of the "",,up .fter Cudwonh, Henry
More ( ,6, ..-81). Their sobriquet deri,·es from the fact th.t they "-ere
all educated at Cambridge ond they all, to diffen:m degrees, dre'" on the
philosophy of Plato and his followers in preference to the Aristotc-
Ii.nism of the schools. As a group they are characterized more by a
common OIItlook thon a rigid set of doctrines. Their liberal theological
temper was malched by a broadly syncretic approach to phiJosophy.
Their insiSI(n~ on the importance of reason in malre,.. of relip,.. was
I S".,.... _~...... __ ....... (.I ..... ' 1;", "",. Lriokn, ,n;)_ t'", III. M b'n
..... ".anoIo"" Cu.d.-"''01 _II ..... and IN .. oat b ..;-wr, ~ Do ......... " . . ~
<d_.
, _ _ " . .. ; Ih((jo ""' "" •• ,6, ,1-
I r... ... SO, ... un;. 'a.,I00 ... Lo ~ _ R 1aC CuoI_, F . -.. aC "" Dobooo _
•

"'""" N_ in .... o...h Lanoat )oo l"' ~' . o:;."~;, ,,, ...... w;' I I'''.' .. ,\',,",
I '••
'<1"". s.. ..
( , ....J ~ hui_It _"•.
huI ........ ~_. ~~(P..;.. ,.~
• S_ ....IIt'INItJt/_d ... ("' .... , I.J~
, P ,... ""p,cd ..... _ Ubtorr, Mol. _ 098 ... .,14. .oS5 '" .... .. "ibv,cd ..
c..d _ __ loy _ .... io ....... "Ole,... 6000 ..... .. "'! mind. \leo, """ .....
,

'VI ate
hamess«llo a lokrant religious outlook. While meir academic learning
ran deep. it w~m hand in h,..,d with an emphasis on practical monliry
and SCTViceoble knowledge.

Cudworlh: life and " 'rilings

Cudwonh was born in Aller, Somerset, in r617. where his father, als<!
called Ralph, was a minister. His f~ther died when he was young,..,d he
was brought up by his stepfather. John Stoughton. In ,632 Cudwonh
was admined pensioner aI Emmanuel Collc-ge, Cambridgl', where his
father had been a fellow, and where he was himSoClf elected to a
fellowship in ,639. Cudworth was to remain a member of me Uni"ersity
of Cambridge for me rest of his life. His elUly academic career coincided
with me turbulent years of the Gvil WIU and its af'erouth. Although he
did not share me rigorous Cah'inism for which Errtn"WlueJ Collegl' .....s
mKed , he Ippea ... to hl"e hId sympathy for the Parliamentary ClUSoC.
The year tf147 was a turning point in his car""r. In thlt yCIU he
preachtd I sermon to me House of Commons, and was appointtd
Master of Clare Holl and Regius Professor of Hebrew. xven yurs bter
he became Master of Christ's College. During the imellegnum h~
evidently enjoytd the pltronage of Cromwell's secretary of state, John
Thurloe, whom he advised on su itable Clndidatos for 'dvill employ-
rnenlll'. He "",,s consulted by Crom"'ell on th~ quostion of the re-
admission of the Jews to England. In t6S6 h~ was nominated to advise
parliamem on a new mmsbtlon of the Bible. His link to the republican
regime of the Conunonwealth did not pre"ent him from retaining his
position as Master of Christ's and as Professor of Hebrew at Ihe
Restonllion, postS "'hich he held until his death in 1688.
Cudwonh had ..,veral children. None of his sons sur.·h·w him - one
died on an upt-dition to India.· It was his daughter, Damaris, later
Lad y Mash:un, who became guardian of his philosophical lepcy. Not
only did she inherit his papers., but she took it upon herself [0 defend
her father apinst his critics, including Lcibniz. She was also me only
one of his child ren to become a philosopher in her own right. As such
she embodies the link betw""n Cudwonh and me En~ghlenrncnt, for
. s..God_·.
LS.
do.,g,<cr. o.o-w;" !Old Loc\.
do _ (<d _~ 11. Coo ",,,._
oi,'" ~ oi her b._,lor lodio io ,"'0.
ofJoluo u.m (0.-. '916), ....... 7J' - v......
..u-.c....~, ... _ ........ ...., _ 0 . IaUodwwthddiolndioio ,"'0.
,;

'I' ate
she became a fmnd of John Locke and proponent of his phiJosophy.! It
was Lady Masham's amnectioo with Locke that led indirectly to the:
hippy accident of Cudworth's manlUCripts being mistaken for pipers of
John Locke'l. As ~ result they were acquired by the British Mu..,um
(now the British Library)! According to Edward o,andler, the first
editor of.lf TrtaliH c.,,..-.,m,,r £1< ..... 1."
IIm"Mldk M.r.lily, it was It
the behut ofWy Masham'l son, Fnncis Cudworth Masham, that the
trelti.., was published in 1731.
The one work which Cudworth published in his lifetime, his
maJisterial Trw IImlkr"..1 Sysum .fl~ U"iwtlt. is an anti-detenninist
tlUlise, which ..,eks an acoommodation of theology and philosophy. It
is in luge part devoted 10 a philosophical n:futation of atheism, and a
demonstration of the true idea of GOO as essenriaJly good and wise. This
..... originally conceived as a ......k containing three hooks, of which th.e
5ea}IId and third wen: to dell, respecri,·e1y, with the: existence in nalUre
of moral absolutes, and with freedom of the will _ the subject maner of
lhe two treltises in the present edilion, A TrtaliH c.,,,unti,,, Eunt.1
.<OJ l _ , . i k M ••• 'iry and A T ...tiu.[ F.~,,,,iJl. In hi. Preface to n~
Trw 1"/tlk",.,.1 S)lSUrn, Cudworth admits to having been surprised at
how long the first book fUmed out to be.' But he defend. iUl cohen:nce
as a lingle volume, in lipite of the fact that he had not completed his
original proiect. And he poinUl out that BooI< t of hi. Sys/ttII touches on
the themes proiected fo.- the recond and third book •. Thus Cudworth's
IlUrises of Mo.aliry and of Prtt../lstand in integral rel..tion 10 his Trut
IImlk"...1 SyJUm, for nO( only do they o'·erlap at some: points with the
latter but, in all probabi~ty, they conmtute the buis of the boob on
morality, liberty and nuessity, originally intended for inclusion in Tlu
Tn« 1"ltlkm••1S:y<um.
Accordin, 10 his Prebce to 1M T.... t htltfkr/~.I Syllrm, Cudworth
certainly intended to publish the unfinished partS of his philosophical
proiect. IO The question why he never completed his S:y<I.", and "",·cr
published any of the manuscript worb i5 impossible to an.WeT
satisfactorily. In the case: of EIt"nt.1 ud imtlMdlt M~r..Jity, the~ is
, See Luioo Si... . mi, 'Droooario c..I_ Mu' m· UN loci, _ "I Itf 1 01; _ ', ;"
S'• .. _ .. E.,.... G... (I'W, ,ga, ~ pp.,,'-45. """ _ H--, ·Oomorio
Cud-"'. Ud, M_, be","" _ ... ....t EnICb....-', _ J-wI Ii< ,.
HiIwy<fn .." ., 1)", , ('9911 _
• See .... I"0 · .......'..cliOollOfAT_ <f""-'iI.
• Tls, p"r........ J· . .. TIS. PI r . . . . . J •.

'"
eviden« that he thought his work hm been undcnnined by Henry
More's publication of his ethical trc:ItiSt: EftrkiriJiDN nkinmoY And the
manuscript eviden« of his work 00 F"tlPiJlsuKlle5U that he could nOl
decide on a suitable formal for presenting his argument: the thrtt
manuscript trellises on the subject overlap considerably with one
mother, md could nOl have been intended for publication logether.
wk of industry was certainly not the problem. In addition 10 the
writings mentioned, he also prepared a monumental commentary on Ihe
Book of Dmic!, which hu still nOl been published." So busy was he
with his studious projects that the ecclesiastical visitors of the Parish
where he hm a li ving complained in 1686 that he neglected his
Henfordshill' living.llit is sometimes suggested that it was Cudworth's
duties u Muter of Grist'. College which dim·acted him from
completing his projects. But public duties did not pll'vent other
contemporaries of his from publishing books. On the other hand,
accordiog 10 his friend and ooUC<lguc, Henry More, it was pressure of
college md domestic business which pll'vented him from publishing a
>CU>tH.l .olumc in 1&]8." ), i. nuL l>c,u",1 tI,C \"..""h ur !",,>i!Jili', tI"'"
• combination of nauve caution along with political and ecclesiastical
flctors served 10 nacerbale hi. pain~taking md prolix mmncr of
argument, md thereby delay publication.
Although he enjoyed the palJ"(>rulgl' of the influemw Finch &mily
(his S)'fIt1tf is dedicated to the Lord OunceUor, Heocagl' Finch), and
retained his mastership of Grist'S College al Ihe Restoration, his links
with the Il'publican repme of the ioterregnum well' nOl forgonen. I J
Furthermore, his libe",] thcologK:al temper was one which was Out of
lune wilh Ihat of the Restoration ecclesiutical regimen: although he
remained a member of the rc-established GuTCh of Englmd, his
utrcmc b.tirudin1rianism, his theological lemings towards the hu.

" So< J. c.....IeJ "'" R.C. au-;,,;. (eds.~ 1l< 1M?' ,oJ
..... (M· • ,·,.Cl>rth-s..;.')""~~""."pp . 1J7-n
c.,,,,,,,o/to« of}oJM w.......... 1
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pvbIioh .... in ,6sf.
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c-n .. '99'j.
0< Hewr M... to Edmund Elyo, "'" J.... ,67f., £. Elyo, LnlM .. s.-.J s.;u~ (I " '
'694~pp. >1-9.
" M.H. Nh' 'OIrioI~ c,' ,...........
t . ... M.,.', M .... !'II.' ' 1[1. '7 (.,'1 J!O~ 1S-
j,J. 0.. .... R ;,..,_Joe, to "'~ in c.. ..
b,jJl~ _ John c ;p..,
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,iii
 lltlr04uuio"

erodox ame-Nicent f.llhu, Crigen, and his strong millenarian ism

proNbly did not endur him ro his peers in the Church hierarchy.
While his anti-Hobbism may have counter-baJm=l his latitudinar-
ianism in the eyes of Restontion Qurch hienrchy, his hisroria>-
philosophical method was soon 10 Ix regarded as ounnoded. 16 Whalever
the Ihwlogical politics of Cudworth's position, in philosophical Ierms,
CUd ...·orth kepI his finger on the pulse of new developments ;n
philosophy: in addilion 10 addressing the philosophy of Dcsl:artcs and
Hobbes, Tlu Trw I"ttlktl~dl SYIINff contains a n-Jutation of Spinoza's
T.dUdIJU Ihtolo:in-JHllilirIU (t67o).
Although A Trtdliu: Om ..,."i,,: EUntdl.nJ /tnltlllldk 1010r.lily "'";IS
not published until l73t. it proNbly cirClllated in manuscripl bcfon:
then. Its publication history Iherefon: ""es ;t a somc"'hat unusual
posilion ;n relation to the hisrory of philoi;oph y because il was published
io a "err diffe...,nl conleXI from that of ;tS original production. It was
retmved from manuscript obscurity by [d,,-ard Qand1cr. Bishop
sU("(:CS5ivcJy of Lichficld and of Durham, and published at a time of
)i"ely dcNte on ethical ntionalism. Ihe natun: of moral obligation and
the foundations of moral ""minry•• deb'le which was sparked by
SiUIlucl Clarke. Boyle lectures.1< Whm Cudworth wrotc EUrndf ."J
''''ltIIIldk M.rdlily. the OlUrch of England had still not rnched a
satisfactory accommodation ...;th religious disstnt. It had nOI worked
OUI the I.ticudinarian compromise, which took it inro the eighteenth
century. The political uphe..u of the Civil W.r and interregnum Wen:
fresh in people'. memories, as were the theological debotcs oca.sioned
by tIte predestinarian Calvinism which cha!"l\Clerized establishment
Puritanism of those years. On the philosophia l front, Cartcsianism "'as
still a ...,lalively ne'" phenomenon, as was the philowphy of Thomas
Hobbes, who already bore the brand of atheist materialiR The Royal

" ... _ " ' " , ... pubb,,"'oJ TIS.CuoI_>• . . -........ ito _ t<h in RicI>atd _ley,
_ _1 •• ~ Cud ....tlo.". Iod. ..t b~ '""" plliIoIorial ...... in IIio E,;u.t. u
... _ oJ '69' . s.. .... <lnIio.. D<fnMn. <f JJu T,~ (c.. ... idp:. M.... "I'I'~ PII. ')-' 7.
On 1h< "" 1 .,,,,,,.c
1h< Pro ....... ,.".. ..,.,..,. b, tIo< ..,., r<1><n,.... oJ [' t'I· ....
_ So H.ltOn. ' _ , Mon. f.dwud S(" ,.:.. " '""" 1h< Do<IioI< oJ M .... .m.w, io II. Ks<oI.
R. o\IhcnIi mol P. z.p.rin (.....1. ~.r......,. Stito<,.oJ 1/....... E.,l<oJ (~.
' ........ l.pp· ~.
" Cloth', IIa)'k - . . ..... ~ ... in '7'>4 ..... '70S. '""" puU. hoc! ... <ftl ,n.d, .
n.-..-.....
11..... , -
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<f ,.,', ,",,1 1/,.;.... ,oJ ,It< T",,~ . 01 c-.""Y '" JJu a.;,o..
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'"

OYI ate
 '"lrodlUlum

Socic1y, founded in 1660, ,,';IS in its infancy. john Locke had not yet
made his mork as. philosoph~r, and l.uc Newton (Tf4~J737) was still
a young Cambridge don. When £Ie",a' a~d Immutable Morality was
eventuaUy published, the Hanov~rian su~ion ,,·as already imo t~
second ~n(T"ation, mon=hical gov~rnment and Protestant oscendancy
thereby 5Kured. Thinking thrologians had had to face 3 new phiJoso..
phical challenge in the form of Locke, whose EJuoy COllu",illX HUMilII
Utukntl$1lditlX (T6o}o) had swept aside the tradiJion31 grounds of
religious apolQgetics and the innatist episJemology thaI underpinned it.
Newton was assured a plo"" in th pamheon of the great and the good,
his sciemific theories having been put to the ..,TV;'" of Anglican
apologetics in the face • new ...,em y, deism. Cudworth, the rational
apologist for religion who was con,·inced overwhelmingly of the
importance of philosophy for theology, re.appeared 3t a time ,,·hen the
philosophers seemed to luve succ<:ssfull)· undermined religious belief.
Cudworth, who had sh.,.pened his arguments on the l1intslOn~ of
Hobbes in the t67os, re-cmeTiw into debates that could be traced bad
to the chalknge of Hobbist relotivism. H~ emerged alongside the elhical
rationalists, a.rke, Balguy and Pri"", that is, as a posthumous partici-
pant in the debncs on the foundations of morality whose terms he had
helped to shape. His first wilor, [dw.,.d Chandkr, indicated the
relevance oflhe TrtahY to cighltt1llh-ttntury issues, as h~ observed in
his Pref."" 10 the '731 witian:
It is _II kno"n, ,lut !he: Ioooe principJes, with regard 10 mo ..lity, tho,
.rt oppoocl in th is book, are defendtd by '00 nuny in our time. It is
hoped .1!KI that the ne... CO<Itrov=;" springing up, th.it h..ove 5Om<:
",,,,ion 10 !his subj«1, may be cleared and shortrned by the rnson.
L· _ .... . .
,,,,"'lIT
pro ......... u.
In ordu 10 und~"'tand how £lnTlal alld lmmutabk Morality could
find a place in such a different "'"GrId, il is important to recognil:e tha,
the Cambridge PlatOni5T laMI which attaches to Cud ,,·orth does not
denote I mystical movement isolated from the pressures of the time,
nOIStalgically taking refu~ in 'he idealism of Plato and the arcana of
Plotinus. On the contrary, the Platonism of the IiObriquet extends 10 the
philosophical rore of Pllto's dialogues and represents only On~ aspect af
the philosophical formation af th~ group "ith which Cudworth is
" ElM , p. • ;.

'I' ate
..!lp<:jated. 1M Cambridge PlatOllists were well acquaimed with d(vcl-
oplTK'nts in seventeenth~tI,..y philosophy and science. They were
whole-hnrted Copernican&, who had read Ibc:on and respceted Galilro
and Harvey. It ,,"1$ a Cambridge Platonist (H(nty More) who _ the
first proponent of Canesianism in England. Cudwonh read and
criticized no!: JUS! Descmes, bUI Hobbes and SpillOZi as well. The
philosophy of spirit which More and Cudworth fonnulated was not a
rerreat from modemi[)" but a comribution (0 comemporuy .:kbaln
about the viability of the meclwlical philosophy.' 9 Cudworth'li argu-
ments for the ""tural basis of morality are directed againS! the
materiali"", and ethical relativism of Hobbes. Although he denied that
the mind was a I.hla Tau, his epistemology contains SOITK' striking
parallels to John Locke.
When reading Cudwonh i( is imponant 10 recognize that h( _ •
theologian as well as I philosopher. For Cudworth philosophy and
theology are intimately interconnected. His theological priorities imerxl
with his philosophy in a number of ..... )"S. First of all, like the orheT
Cambridge PluonislS, he accorded reason a liignificant role in religion.
As a reliPouIi apologist he employed philosophical arwument in .uppon
of the fundamnllals of religjous belief. Secondly, he was profoundly
aware of the theological implication. of philosophical I""'ition. - for
insance, he argued that materialism undermines morality and leads to
lthel"",. Conversely, he saw that theological doctrines had implications
for philosophy: he was especially critical of voluntarism, Ihat i. the
doctrine that the divine will is the fundammtal determinant in God's
government of the world. Against tile voluntarists he ntaintained that
'there is. n'Nre of goodnHS, and a natUre of wisdom ant«:edent to the
will of God, which is the rule and measure of it' (p. ,87). To
subordinate divine wisdom to God'ii win among the di,·ine arnibutes
destroys oertainty and leads to scepticism. This was a position which
Cudwonh ntaintained agaim:r theologians and philosophers alike . Apan:
from a minor figure mentioned in £1"",,/ uJ bfflfluldk Mo.,luy,
Joanne!; Szydlovius, he does flO! name his Calvinist opponents; but he
cou ld weU have had in mind Cambridge theologians like William

~ So< A. C 11#,. "CaoI_. _s.v-

P. 7......... (.... ~ '¥ .( ~I)'.
onoI .... Modlonat
oM ~ .. E......t(C,
AAaloc:r'. ill IlICtoll.l. """'""''''''
'I: • '99>~ PI>- ' ..... , .
T. Co.,.,.·StvoIi .,0·_ _ old oDcnttD: u~ CuoI_ •
I

r'n to·. C"t r', ~

"IJoI""foo ."'"" '. <Ii (,¢1~ p&..ot.

zvi
Pukins ( 1 558-160~) and Anthony Tuckney (1599-1670), The phiJoso...
pher whom he crilicizes for amibuting tOO much to the divine will is
Descartes, The concomitutt of Cudworth's theological anti-voluntarism
is his insistence on ~ fll'l)l\om of ~ will. 20 This ill a tenet ",hich he
sh:m:s with the other Cambridg<' Pl:atonists, and otber liberal opponents
of han:I-line Calvinists, in particular the Dutch Anninians. This
emphasis on freewill is probably indebted to Ensmus. It also accounts
for Cudworth's admiration for Ori~n. Furthmnore, Cudwonh's
ronccm with ,,",ventecnth-ccntury theological issues explains not just
his intc:rcsl in the problem of freewill, but the fact that hi, writings on
the subjea address the issue in scholastic terms, debating topics such as
indifferency of will, and whether it is the will or understanding that
decides how ..... should act.
The dominant themes of Cudworth's writings a«: ones which racked
the Church in England in his youth: debates .bout freewill and
predestination had been such hot topics mat they Were proscribed by
royal proclamation in t636. The apparemly inmlClable theological
e,,]~e
,,·i,h tlle app.:ar.Ul~"1:
prubk"''> uf 'he p...,...ci.il War "':'1uin;:"] a new
of challenging new philosophical forms of determinism: the mechanical
philosophy of Hobbes and Descartes, and the mOlenal pantheism of
Spinoza. For Cudworth, philosophical determinism was the counterpart
of predestinarian voluntarism in theology. Not only did he, like Henry
More, sec these: philosophies as h"';ng atheistical implications, but also
as having implications for moral conduct. Against the rel.tivism of
Hobbes he argued that goodness and the principles of morality are
abwlute:. As he put it in one of his unpublished tmtises on frttwil!,
'one of y' greatest Arcanums bolh in Phylosophy and Morality' is 'y'
then: ill in Nature on mir,; dyaOov ond Ipsum Bonum an absolute: good
ond l"'rfection which is y' stutdard and measure both of Power ond
Liberty and al.., wisdomc' (Add. MS 4979, fol. 38).
One difficulty in reading Cudworth ond ass<:ssing his philosophy is
that he oflen prcs<:Ttts his philosophical arguments in anliqw: dn:ss,
citing precedents from anciem philosophy ond arguinS against particular
classical philosophers. None the less, it is also important not to be

• On _
,934)-. 1\
witt...!
~
,,0'"T.IwIou
.... _I'. Ooklry. c-.,...." , c...-...•..to..Jn(I"""'- N.Y.•
.... sn..tiJt 1_ _';'" ("' _ _ NJ. 19I6~ M.
00In-. om.. Woll-' ,I< ",,,...wI P+;. ,., (u,.,ob! id.., IW4I. 1\100. YJ . 1IoutU. H ;6 ;,
w"''''' n..r~' (N<" Yori<. 196!).
xvii
 b'/TIN/url",,,

deceived 1010 lhillkingli1al Cudworth _ .....,.., mliqllarim, or al bat

I doxognphu. To 1",* inducted ill t'A·entic.>th-cmlllry approaches to
philoiophy, il K>em5 strm~ to discuss issues in conlemponry philo-
IOphy by "&mining ancienl pbibophy _ yel mis is p.ccisdy ... hal
Cudworth does in lhe c:uc, for insun«, of PnxalJOfU, ... hom he
pramf5 as I materialist relatiri$! md 1m115 in ElmuJ .lfi !",_uk
M.,./ity as a kind of stalking hone (or Thomas Hobbes_ linderlying
Cudwonh'. approach is his co.wicrion lhal trum is one md that
philosophy is I IInifin! l)"Item through ... hid! to afTi'-e It knowledJ( of
Ihe trum: 'il is bill (If\( muh and Itno..-ledge lhat is in all lhe
unda-swtdinp;n the ... orld ' -
.-hen innumcnblc crnud und.".l2ndinp direC1 1hmIoe1... to .he
...... emplation 01 tbc 511ft< uniyn.) Ind immullblc lruo/u., tbcy do all 01
them hut I I il -.en: !;j:."" 11) . . . . and tbc same: qin.oI ,.,.;"., of the

tmn>1 ..*10m .hal is nner ..... nl. and tht Itttnl COI'I«plions of thole
truths in Iheir minds, ...., 10,.. lilLe K>mol «hoa of the ......
[.......,prionIJ of .... di";ne inlellcct raoundinl in """"- (_ belo ....
tv""
-'I,is

p , 'la).

So, .... hile Cudworth "1IS r«:C:ptivc to conlemponry philosophy, he did

IIOt accept its cl.inu fO lIOydly. hilt underlined if5 continui ty ...itll tile
POllt. As Pawnore put it, Cudworth·, .icw of philosophical debatt was
'h"
.... conlOiranll milh. ohangt thtir rwne. or milhl imp""'" thti,
'eohnicallppanl.... bullhcy .....1d noIltriously modify.he fulKbmmtal
OInIcturc of thtir UJUm""lI, He .... impreucd hy Ihe recu....,noe of
t:CIUin """mil of philoeopltal ..... tm, .... y; ht "'1$ not impr<:&$CCl by
.he eb;m of hi' conlmlporarico thaI they had "'aken ,httniclvcs r_
(rom l.-..dillon in ...-der to tmboarl upon ... m,erpriK quile !IO.-et. ;n •
...... nn unlJ2mJn(llod by the .,IIHi or.he pat. In . . . . .hi<:-h inrmcd
~ all "pGn oricinali'Y. he inIiolcd "pGn the imponanoe of tndition."

orth·,
Cud .... ""d~dinl of phiJo.ophicaJ tradition ..1IS one '-ery
much moolded by UN: R~ notion of ;1IiJ.t~;It;. ","""is, or
puthnial philosophy. Amonl lhe fi(Ura who did much 10 shape the
history of pllilo5ophy anaching 11) this ideo "1IS, lin! of all, Marsilio
Ficino, who consuum it rather IS • piK. ' ••"J.rM. or ancient throIocl·•
• papn tradition or r1:YOIoed trulh derived from Moscs and imparted by

" "'-- .... "

~ ..
.,
.,
,"'-""."
. . . . . ., . . _ , ...

..,n
••
.•,'- ."
h • •
 1~lroJuclioN

sucettding ~ncr.uions of philosophers. Also important for constructing

this pnIigrtt of ancient wisdom "'as the third-cenIUr)' historical
doxography of phil"""l'hy, o;.,g.,nts Laertius' Liut. of thr Phi"""phm,
the Grcd text ofwhiclt had bttn rero,·e,."d and translated by Ambrogio
Traversari in t47:1. In addition to offering a model for the histoT)' of
philosophy, this was an important SOurce of Epicurian thought and
Stoicism. Besides using Diogcnes Lacrtius as a source, Cud "'orth also
draws on Sextus Empiricus, whom he uses both as a soum: of sceptical
argumenu; and as • means of supplementing his kno,..led~ of ancient
philosophy from sources other than Aristotle and Pla!G. It is CUd ...·orth '.
treatment of all philosophies as participanu; in plrilowpJt;d p..-uit thOl
enabled him to write about Cartesianism in £urndl nil Imm",dir
MO.dlily as. modem mrnifc:station ofDemocritean atomism . Like""ise,
in 11r T""I..,elleu,,"i Sysum, Hobbes is seen as . materialist after the
model of Anaximander. and Spino"" as a hylozoisl. In £Irrn"' "tUI
ImmUluk MO.dliry the debate with Hohbes i. set up, through •
discussion ofPbto's Thurm ... , in which Protagoras figures as rn ethical
,."lativist and matcria~st to boot. It might be added that Cudworth
interprets P10lu wilh (IIIe eye (III Sextus Empiricus, a f.etor which
distinguishes his reading of Plato from that (I( his Renaissance fo,."bears.
Cudworth was conscious ofth. difference between his imerpretuion of
Platonic philosophy and th.t of the g,."at translatOf"S and rditors of Plato
in the Renaissance, Monilio Ficino rnd Jean de Serres, ",ho, he notes,
wrmc befon: the ,""coveT)" of corpuscular philosophy.u
Another important dement in Cudworth'. philosophy is Stuicism.
Although he was highly critical of many aspecfS of Stuicism (such as the
docnine of ,."peated cycles of existence of the "'orld), CUd ...·onh is
indebted 10 the Stoies for key terms in his conceptual HlCabulary. Thi,
is mQSt strikingly evident in the t ....o treatises ""produ~ he,.", that is 10
say, in his epistemology rnd his moral psychology. Three examp~
might be singled OUt ror particular mention: first of an his use of the
Stoic concep! of the common n<>lion. (hi"di ~.."ou.,) or innate
principles of knowledge in the soul. He also adopts the Stuic term
p,."kpsis, or 'anticipation', for the innale prolX'nies uf the mind .... hc,."by
it is predisposed to understand the ....orld. The key concept in his
a<:count !If freewill is that of the autonomy of the indi"idual soul to

.i.
'I' ate
din:cr its actions towards the good, The term he adopts w npress this
concept of 'sdf-po"-er' is the Stoic IItttmON;i-,,", denoong the ruling
principle: of the soul.lJ In Cudworth Stoicism is blended with Pla-
tonism: for enrnple, he integrates the Stoic common notions with the
Platonic theory of rca.>1lection (Ud""'t''''''); in his account of the
oper:nions of the !IOUI he deplo)'5 the terminology of Plotinus; and it was
from Plato that he dni~ed his term u~ 10 '""press the rebtionship of
the phYlical order 10 the intdkctual. Cud wonh undoubtedly foun d a
precedent for combinin, Stoicism and PlalOnism in the early Qun:h
Fathers, notably Origcn. Hi. debt 10 Patristic thought is borne out by
his LI.5<' of the term "linn,
a key term in his epistemology, which he uses
in the Patristic sense of 'relation' rather than the ancient Greek sense of
'condition' or 'habit '.

A TrtllliM Conuming Ellmai and [",,,,utllik M orality

In I~ Cud worth told John WorthinSlon that he ""35 working on •
treatise of 'Natural Ethich ... which I ~n abo\"(. year aKOl".Z4 Thi,
infomution suggests that A TrrlllUt Ca.,um;"t Eltm"I".,,' /",,,,,,Idk
M".,,/ily was probably begun around 1661. The ethical position .... hich
Cudworth takes in the treatise is strongly an ti-rdativist. At the
bepnning he afIUe5 for the nistence of monI absolutes, that good and
CYil, jumce and injustice, 15 "'elll5 'Wisdom, knowledge, an d under-
standing are eternal and self..,.ubsistent things', existing indepen dently
of the mind and of the physical world . This is • position which
Cudworth had main tained from an carly point in his oadetllic career.
(In I~ he had defended the thesis that the principles of good and evil
are etcmal and ind isp"nsable.YS The main emphasis of A TrtalUt
One(",,;", EI""II/lINd /"'IfUII"hlt M or. 1ily is, ho,,-enr, cpistcmolo-

., AIt'-Jh ~'. '" i" ....... s-. .. ror ...... ''''<I0;>0<I Ilun ...............
" ... ~ Ii..... " ,u;I 110< ....... ''"''''_ ,...ia. ' ood •.. ok, . , in ......
"""' . .. .... nbooool ~.- h. I t iy Philip Md...d"..... T1Icir ooutOt .... pt'IIOobiy
Gcono. s..: J.E. l'i0ii. Rq.,.J 1looP< "'" St h" , . ... !LtidotI. '98.~ In ......"', Sooi<
" 'n 'il was ..... up b, ... en! ohloe _1'10 ........ """' .. An," "" '" _ (b.
'JO .... 1. See J. DilIoa, 1lor .<lOlA /"jo...... (I " , ... ' 977~ o:t..,... • . On ...... ,_ ... J.M.
1boc,1lorS..... (IIoo-ttIeJ, U'OAno<Ia ... !, 1 .'<I71J.
.. Seew_.....,n."y .."c."'1 ' ...... .ot. .. p.,~
" 'Don_ ....... ...r; "",,,_ .... . _ .....' •.,..;;..'.', ", ."'}I'ii',~.,'d in ,Os, (_ u...."
"I1l00, , T ....... ).

"
 IlflrNlUliDIf

gicil: the treatise contains the fullest discussion (If innatist epistemulugy
to ="""te from England in the ..,venleenth century.
The treatise is divided imo f(lur books. 1bc fi~t of these poses me
fundamental 'Iuestion asked by Socrates in Plato's EfI,ltyplt",: whnher
God wills things because they are good, or whether things a..e sood
because God wills them. CIIdwonh's position is that God, being
sup. eutely sood, wiUs things because they are good . After a brief history
of the opposing view, where he groups Hobbes with Protagoras md
Epicurus, he denies tNt right and WTOng a..e relati,-e nl)(ions, and tNt
the principles of right and wrong are conventional in meir basi •. He al ...
atKUes aga;JIllt Ih.,.., who, like Descanes, found the principles of right
and wrong, as weU as trulh and falsehood, in the will of God. IJIlltead,
he argues that moral principles are: such by nature: md n(lt by audwrity;
tNt they arc: founded io the goodness and wisdom of God, not the will
of God.
The serond book continues the argument for the immutable nature of
all thiogs by dealing with the scepticil issues implicit in the philosophy
of Protagoras as represented in Plato's TlttlJtlnou. Cudwonh argues that
Prou.goras' sense-based epistemology and his subiective priociple thlt
'man is Ihe measure: of all things' dC5troy all certainty and undermines
the basis of morality. He then gives ao account of the 'mechanical or
atomical philosophy' of Drscanes and Gassendi, which he sees as a
revivaiof ancient doctrines, and which explains all things in tenns of
the primary properties of corporeal extension (shape, size, posioon and
Ri>iHility), deduced by reason and not from ..,n.., impresrioo •. In
CIIdwonh's view, the mechanical philosophy gives an intel~gible
account of the natural world, because it is coherent and accessible to
~"
In the third book Cudwonh commences the acrouot of hi. episte-
mology with a discussion of sense knowledge. Here his debt to
Descartes is most app.>re:m, particularly in his distinction beN"«n sen..,
and intellect, in tools account (If the relation of wul to body, and in his
discus&ion of sense ])t'r«ption. Cudworth's reservations about sen..,
knowledge: are consistent with the undulying PJatooism (If this
thinking. He argues that knowledp' derived from the seoses is not true
knowledge:. Sense impressions a..e rea:ived passively. The data acquired
in mis WlIy can only furnish US with particularities and superficial
appear.mces. Moreover, the senses do not pcraive enemal objects as
 bIINWi,,{/io~

they are, but, acoording to the mtthmical hypothesi" they ",presl:n1

them as mo"emrnts or impressions of one kind Or another. Such data
ha,·t 10 be p~ by the mind before they can be understood.
Knowledge is produced octi"el y from within the mind, nOt received
pass-i"ely from ,,·ithout. A sen.. tion is 'a pusion in the soul', the result
of wrporeal nlO"emems, md perceptible by vinue of the 'natural
s)"mpath{ "'hich the soul has for the body. Such impressions ""'
in" oluntal)': that is, the ""ul has no wntrol o,'er them. At best ..,nsation
is 'a ~rtai n kind of drowsy and somnolent pr!occption' of the soul
(p. 56). Although Cudwonh ",~rds sense-knowledge as inferior to
knDwln!1>" generatn! by the mind. his position is nOI mtHmpiricist.
On the contrary, he spttifically acknnwledges the adequxy Df the
Knses for pro"iding koowledge Dr Ihe utemal world and of the bod y,
as well as for assistin g the mind in framing hypotMscs (see below,
p. 57)·
Book tV is the longest of the treatise, Ionl>'" thm the first th,,,,, put
together. In it Cudworth elaborates his theol)' of knowled l>" in order, he
says, 'to COnfUle Sttplicism or fmtaSticism' (Ihe II1<IlerialiSl view thaI
reduc...: .11 knowled", to <Cnse ,",,~en~). M uch of this $tttion i. an
expansion of arguments sketched at the end of the: T",~ l~ulkrlJl,,1
Syllttl1. Cudworth distinguishes 1"'0 types of per~plion: one belongs to
the lo,,'u p.rt Df the soul as a JIassi"e recei"e, of corpot"Cll impreuiono;
the O{her is a higher 'energy' of tl>e ,"ul, which reflects on itself and its
own ideas, and oompares the intelligible oomponmts of data rettived
via the I;CnKS (what he calls the 'Khescs' Df external ob~). AU
kno"'ledge, he argu es, in"(>Ives the acti"ily of mind; 'knowledge is an
inw.rd and attin energy of the mind itselr (p. 73). The mind i.
furnished "';Ih the conttpts ("O<"ma{,,) ~ded fDr arri";ng at knowledge.
'The mind', Cudworth writa, 'cannO{ know anything, but b)" somothing
of its own, that is natin, domeslie and familiar to it' (p. 74) . Cognition
ent";ls anticipation: Cudworth employs the Stoic term profrpJu but link.
it with Plato's theory of <lum ....,u, for knowing in"oI~es recollection
(rather as when one recognizes the face of a friend in a crowd). But this
is nO{ simply. process of matching the ideas in the mind iIglIinst
utemal obittu. NO{ all kD<Jwledge is external ;n its origins: nuny ideas
(e.g. wisdom, honesty and justi",) are generated by tl>e mind i,""lf.
Knowledge is acqui..w deducti"dy, not inducti,·ely: the mind, to use
Cudworth's expression, UJu~1h toward s particulars; and, in compre-

oc rogntea IT nal
hending the enemal world, the mind pera:ives not the uternal
appcar:mce of things but the n:lationol constants whi<.:h n:"eal their
immutable es5eJ1ce5.
To illustnte the activity of the mind, as opposed to the pauiviry of
the senses, Cudworth employ. several key images: fiBt I dod reflected
in I mirror, seen by on eye, Ind o;ccn hy an eye attached !O the mind
(p. 85). In the fiTS! iI is merely reRected; in the second case, the eye
registeTli the COIOUB as well. But it is the mind which registers the
disJlO'ition of tM pam and their function. By perceiving tM n:lation-
ship between them (for which Cudworth uses the: Greek term sfh'sit),
the mind can recognize the obj.:ct IS I clock and nO! j... t lo;onglomerate
of o;olours and rnttaIs. Similarly, words on a pl~ of I book are just inky
senwl. to on oninul or to on illitente (p. 99), but to IIOmeOnfc who
knows how to sad, the words have meaning. 1bc: ar-gumc:nt has on
aesthetic dimension: to an animal music is mere sounds, to the rational
listener thnt' sounds Ire harmonious. The beaury of a beauriful land _
scape or picture is lost on animals, but apparent to the human mind .
Knowledge of the utemol world is poi&ible bKiu&c the world is
intelligible, it bears ',he stamp of intdlectuolity'. Cud ...·orth ill ...trates
this by extending his book anllogy to become the metaphor oft~ book
of natun:: the Hterate mind could not read meanings in • book unless
t~y had first been put then:. Likewise, the natural world, in its
orderliness and in the disposition of illl parts, contain. meaningful
signatures, the meaning h..-ing bttn placed there by the creator.
Another analogy which Cudworth employs for this is .~hitectural
(p. 92): a pallce is not a pile of hri<.:u but an architecturally designed
edifia:. The order and rci.nionship of the pOTU which make it a
structure rather than a fonuitous heap of rubble an: both evidence tlult
then: "'-as a designer and are what makes it identifiable IS a building to
the observer_This uample also illuilrates the general P~tonic principle
at the heart of Cudworth's philosophy, tbat mind pre<;:cdes the world,
and that reality and tTUC being belong !O t~ metaphysical rather 'han
the physical order of things. Cudworth exp=ses the re~tionship of
tnle being to me created "'orld, the world of sense, in clusically Platonic
term. ofarchrypc and ectypc, form and copy.
Th~ vie .... that mental or inteUccru.tl being is more real than materia!
bein, is consim:nt with Descartes' assertion that the soul is more
kno .....bk than body. It does, of course, raise th~ question or th~

HUI

'I' ate
onlolo(ical stalUS ofllle idcu, or 'conotptions of Ihe mind'. Cudworth
insists Ihal IIIey are not derivw from hody. Nor do they elist
indcpendendy; ralher, they are modificationli of mind or intellect. He
denies thaI they are ~Iy fipnenlS ofthc hullW\ brain, and rnanJW ••
number of arguments, drawn chiefly from s""",eo" 10 demonstrate the
independence of oonaplli from Ihe physical world and senlie experi-
ence. For example, he arJUCS thaI il iii possible 10 deduce the nalure of a
uiangle wilhoot seeing one, by the .ppli<;ation of ElIClidean principb.
Such con<>:ptual entities are not the products of individu.1 minds, bul
are the same in all minds. So absolute is their independence of the
human mind and of the ph y"'=:aJ world , that th ey " ""Id be the same
wcre the world 10 be destroyed and created anew. The mind of which
conceptual mtiria may truly be said to be modifications is the di.·ine
mind, ""hence they derive their veracity, consrmcy, ctcmity and
uni\"CT"S.lity, and whence the human mind deri,·a; its capacity for
knowledge. It is in thil; senliC, th erefore, that the human mind ean be
described as parric:ipating in the divine mind. And our knowledge of the
external world entails. projection of ideas on 10 the world , lead ing
Cudworth 10 the proto-Berkc1cian formulation, IJut 'oorpo1"Cal qualities'
an: nothing more than '001 own shado""s' and the vital passive energies
of our own lOuis' (p. 148). Furthermore, if COfIaprual cntities belong to
true being, C'Wcry clear conception is true, and nothing which is fallie can
be cJcarly conceived II nisting. Thus the n~ of trulh is eltar
intelligibility. Although Cudworth in Ihis way .dopts the Cartnian
principle of the cbrity and diotincmess of ideas as the criterion of
cutainty. he rejects &5 scepticaJ Desartcs' supponing argument based
on the truth of our f:acuhles. It would, he argues be impossible even for
God to construct Ihe human mind 50 that il percci.·cs fahiily as trt.lC -
jWiI as il would be impossible for God to make contradiciions true.
The ethical purpose of A T""tiu C-umml £umll/ " NJ J_u/dk
M o,."h"1y resides in the fllCt thai il su pplies t.. o major aspects of the
theory of mind which underpin Cudworth's cthici. As he put ii, 'the
narure of monJily Cl/loot be understood wilhout some' knowledge of the
narure of the soul' (p. (45). First of all, his metaphysical realism enabb
him to argue for a funrlamcntal connection betwttn Ihe principles of
mor.dity and the principles of knowledge. If mind and intellect arc 'fi"l
in the order of nature', conceplual entities musl have more rcalil)' than
nuterial ones, and justice and morality, IS modifications of mind, arc
more 'real and ",,!>stanoal things than the modifications of mere
IitllliCless maner'. SeI;ondly, with regard 10 epistemology, Cudworth
denies that the principks of monli(y can be deduced from SCAR
knowledge. Acwrdingly he rejccn; the model of the mind as ,,,bill,,
r"s",
and argllCS thai only an innarist epistemology can provide knowledge of
1I00d and evil, just and unjllSt. There is alhird, psychological, aspect of
Cudworth's theory of mind, which is nOi dealt with in this work, but is
treated in his writings on freewill. Cudworth prepares for this at the end
of:1 TrtllIlst Qno,mo;", EIt""'! uJ I".".",dk M"rdf;,y whm M asserts
thai moral principles arc, like immutable ideas, 'anticipations', and thai
these are nOI 'men intellecluol forms', hut derive from Whal he calls
'~other more inward and vital principle'. He does not elaborate on
what this principle might be beyond describinll il as 'a nalural
determination to do 5OfT\C thinp and avoid others' (p. 145). This is a
formulalion which aIlTCSponds ro his a1nctpt of the will as "tl "",,";hll
in A T"_riu ,,[Frttfp;!I. where il is ~nked 10 the life-sustaininll function
of the soul. This underlines Ihe continuity between both treatises, and
ronfirms that Elmo,,/ uJ I".",,,ldk MOT"Hty is more of 1 prologue: 10 a
larger untise on ethics than the discussion of ethics that the otle
implies.

A Tuatist of FrulPifl
The three draft treatises on 'Liberty and Necessity' conlinue: the ~
projca as Elmo,,/ ",.J 1_ldft M orality hy takinll the discussion
fo .....vd to more oh,musly ethical questions. They all deal with the
problem of monl ruponsibilily, and with the psycholOJY of auton<.>-
moIlS action. They can be described as psychological both in the old
Sal.., of living In account of the soul, and in the more: modem sense of
discussing mmtal &ctors which .ffect beha,·iour. For the will is the
ruling principle which co-ordiru.les the functions of the soul and direc:ti
the action. of the individual beinll.
The only one of these treaoses to be published, that printed here: as:1
TrtI.l;u o[ Frttfpiff, is 1M shortest of the three. A5 in the casc of the
olher two, much of it is taken up with technical discussion, theological
as ....,ll as philosophical. ChaPICTS 13-27 deal with the ohjcaions of
detenninists to the freedom of the will, especially those of Hobbes but
also of Pomponazzi and various unnamed ~hers. And chapter 3 raises

'VI ate
difficulties connected "ith a d~terministic position _ many (If them
drawn from Origt:n. In his cOr>a:pt of freewill os a power of the soul,
combining the functions of intelkct and vo~tioo., Cud".-onh di$penses
with traditional fllClllcy psycholugy, which divided the will from intelLect
os separate f....... lries of the soul. He is thus abk t(l sidestep the two main
opposing traditions concerning the relationship of reason and will in
Western thw1ogy: the Thornist vje .... , IIIXXIrding to which the will
foll<>_ the din:ctin, (If the intellect, and the voluntarist positioo. of
Scows and Odham which subordinates intelkct to will. In his critique
of the doctrine of the indifference of the will he und()IJbtedly h.d
Suarez and his follow"rs in mind, although he does not nante his
thwlogialopponents.
For Cudwonh, moral behaviour is r>(II shaped by external incentives
and disincenti~es, but is founded on the principles of ,·inue innate to
the soul. Cudwonh conai,·es of the will os the ..,If-d~termining power
of the .... ul which predisposes it towards the good . This dri,·" to ...&rds
the good is the spring and moti'";Ition of all action. In FruJPill it is
described os a kind of premonition, '. anain vaticirullion, prtSage,
scent. and odour of one IN''''''''''' H",,,,,. One supreme highest good
transcendin, all <nhers' (p. '74). In the manuscripts Ilc also usa the:
term 'instinct'. This innllte tendcncy to"'";Irds goodness may be com-
pared on the one hand to Henry More'. concept (If a 'bonif(IrTTI faculty'
and to Shaftesbury's moral sense. It is this ido of the will as a bias
toward. the good which underlies his length y attack on those who atgIIe
that the freedom of the will is. 'liMny of indifference'. In Cudwonh 's
view the liMny of the will is the prerequ isite for moral ~ponsibility.
We canll(l! M bt:.rned for wrull we do OUt of necessity any more than •
watch can be blamed for nOt working properly. The fault in each case
rests with the external cause, wlut""er forces US (in thc 6rst case), or
the maker of the Wl.tch (in the oeoond). The root concept (If the treatise
is tlul of the wi]] as h~8"fW"ih", or po ...·er of self-determination.
Withoot po ...·cr to direct our own action" We would be little bener than
puppets, 'dead machines mo'·ed by gimmers and wires' (p. 195). The
hq .....,,,iIrD" is noc jmt the foundation of moral responsibility (Wt
which earns LIS 'prtisc or bbme'), but it is ~ principle of individuation: it
is the freedom to act for oneself .... hich also definetl the ..,If. It means
llut 'rom luve something in their o.. n power, add something of their
own, SO that they can change thmtselves and detennine themselves'

'VI ate
 {t,/""iu(/j(j"

(p. ,6J). The Ir'XmIONih" indi"iduates not only by diffen:ntia,ion from

oth~l"S, but by ctI-()I"dinaring the functions of tM soul. Cud ....orth
ronceives of the "";11 as I uniti"e po"'U of the soul. It is 'the soul IS
rcdupliclled upon itRlf, and sclf-oomprehensi.-e' (p. 185). As c0-
ordinator and din:cmr of the '"lIOoUS appetiles and functions of the soul,
tbe ....ill is the ,,·hole perwn. As he puts it in one of the manuKTipt
t""'"tises 'On Liberty and Necessity', it is the unifying soul .... hich
constitules the .df, 'denominates the .... hole man as slIch', and 'deter-
mines all y' passi"e capability of every man's nalUre, and malt.,. every
man such as he is' (Add. M'l 4979, fol. 6) . 11te ..ill is especially
identifiable "";th Ihe individual I"'l"$On in the ""n"" that il is the indelible
mark of QUr humanity. Since it is Ihat .... hich predisposes Ihe soul
towards tM good, it is the.-efore the means 10 improve the &Oul, to
increase the pcrf«tion oftM soul: it is '. KIf-promoting, Rlf_impro"ing
po .... er' (p. 185) . Although, for Cudworth, f''''''''il! is then:fore a
crowning attribute of human beings, as he argues in chpter '3, it i.
none the less a mark of human imperfttlion, since OfTly imperfttl
beings Taluin: perfecting (5« chapter 17). for this reason, since God is
perfttl, fretWill ClnnO! properly be ascribed 10 Him .
A TmJliK of FruJrlill i. the shonest ofCud .... onh'. three .... ritings on
free .... ill. These elabome a number of important clements that an: only
implicit ben:, in particular the pnactical and social aspects of his ethics.
11te unpublished manuscripts make clearer the practical dimension of
CUd ....orth's moral theory, that il is 'Action that gi"es denomination to a
Persone' (Add. MS 41)81, fol. 16). In all thn:e tTellises the <=tral
element is goodnt'SS rather than duty. And goodnt'SS is a disposition of
the .... hole person, 'ye inward disposilions of ye Mind & Will' (4980,
fol. 10). 11te good as such i. nO! defined hen:, Ihal h"'ing been done in
171. T "'. hflrll.rl""/ Syslrm. Then: Cudwonh "Tites unequivocally that
the good is God. God i., he ... )'5 referring to Plalo, 'TIl. Ivy Idr. ~r
&snu. of Goo4' (TIS, p. ~). This is a definition tlut Cudwonh
repeats else .... here, for example in the scnnan he preached before the
House of Commons in 16.t7, ,,·here he Slates 'Thai God is aJso God,
because he is the high.,.1 and most pcrfttl good', and that 'he iii
FncntiaJly the mosl perfttl GooJ'."' In identifying the good with God,
Cudwonh underlines the n:ligious dimension of his philosophy. In

,.. """"'" PI' I ...... .

XlIvii

'I' ate
reli,;o.. as in morals, he: adY'I)Qted a liwtl goodness, not a theoretical
goodness: 'the Lifo of divine U\ltM is ~ler exprcssro in Actions than
in Words,.n The good wncrived by Cudwonh is not merely a
metaphysical moty. Even when defined in tcnTlS of the deity, it unfolds
into moral principles tMt entail the idea of practical action. This
goodness, 'in which the Essence of the Deity princip.olly consisu',
comprises on the Of1e hand 'Benignity' and 0f1 the other hand the
fountainhead of morality:
it romprehmdo Eminently all Vm ...""J",/iu, the Dit·;'" N.,." being
the Fi", P."",, hereof; for which cause V...., .... is dcfiMd to bo, An
A";""I4I"~ ,. 1M Dtily. ;",/itt and I/o.only are no F. "i/;'", Ihinp,
m:a<k: by tho Will and CDmman<I of tm, ""'"' P" .... rful '0 the W..ker,
but they are N.",,, ond ,....firtin. and descend oownward to us from the
Deity. (TIS, p. :lOS)
CUd ....orth'. emphasis on the primacy of goodness among the di,·ine
mnbutcs, and his insistence on an ethics of action, a lived OtriSiianity
guided by the right disposition of hean and mind, place him firmly
aIonpide the DlheT Cambridge Pbtonists. Although he shores much
wi.1I his Cambridse-PlatoniSl rolleagucs, hi. philosophy is the fullest
IUld most developed UUIJJICIlI of the outlook IUld ideas which they had
In common.
Cudwonh', philosophy is onen treated as a historical curiosity, even
among th.,.., wt.o have taken the In>Uble 10 rad him. It is lemptinglO
argue that he had no appreci1ble impact, on Ihe grounds that his S)'Jlt1fI
wu never completed and bis other writings were either neVeT printed or
were published postbumously. The a!"fllmeRt that the conlcnt of
Eft..... / ,,," I_Mldk Morality and FrurPill "'... no{ available 10
Cudwonh'. rontemporvics or immediate succcsson mighl seem com-
pelling until one IlCkno"·Icd~ the possibility of manuscript circulation
of Cudwonh's .... ritings. and also the fact that the basics of Cud .... onh·.
position in these: treatises "'-ere available in the wrilings he published in
his lifClime. Although Cudwonh is prone 10 wordinCliS, he is a
Ihoroughly self-consislent Ihink .... , .... h.,.., poslhumou,ly published wril-
ings devclop I"Chles IUld position. enunciated in earlier writings. In his
TrIM hudlertul S)'Jlt1fI he anticipatcs the ethical position he elaborates
In Elllffa/ . " 1_lule M~r.lity IUld ,,"ves IUl indication of the main

n ioOI .• p. ,0/1.
points of his account of ,,-ill. For example, in the 5)"",,,, he &SS(rts Ihal
'the Differmcu of J/lJ1 and UNjom, HauJI , and DU~allnt, are grater
R~IJfiliN in N.tun: than the Difft rntm of HIJ" and S.ft, J/~t and CAUl,
M~ul and Dry' (TIS, p. 8S8). His second sermon preached Ixr~ the
House of Commons attaCks n-ternalist accounts of moral obliption in
terms which anlicipllte the phraseology of £,..,.,.,,1 ",,4 1".".ul"ltk
M . ,,,lily, 'as if tlHHl and roil, ftm and u"juJI (as SOme philosophers
dreamed) " ere nm I/JOOll but vO!I(j) and JoXg only, had no rc:aIity in
nature, but depend on certain laws, enfofted by outward. punishments
or mere opinions'. In the last pan of the Sym ... , Cudworth adumbrates
th e epistemolosl· more fully stated in EI.",,,I an" I", ..."tdlt MIH'/J/ity.
thai Imo .... kdJ<' is elmW (TIS. p. 826) and thaI mind precedes things
(po 859). He talks in tenns of trly~ and ."~/y~ (p. 853) and denies
that the mind is a/d"l" ,e" (p . 86t )_ He arnlCks 'a Modem Atheistick
Pretender to Wit' (i.e. Hobbes) for reducing mental processes to local
motion of oorporc:al p... ticl ...., and refutes Protagoras' claim that man is
the measure of all things, and that all kno,,-kdge is sense-knowledge
(TIS, p. 85a). Cu<l,,·onh'. account of the ,,-ill is cmbryonic in thc
S)"lnn, as compared with his manuscript writings on the subiecr, but he
employ. the same tenninolog)- for the same fundamental concepts that
he describes in FrttlPill_ He insists that there can he no system of
morality wilhout (n:ewill ( TIS, p. 86<j); con ceives of free,,-;ll as a fonn
of .elf-activity, using the tenn "~/al:inrsu (as opposed to ~tltrOl-j~NU) to
express the idea of the soul'li aU(l)nomy or 'self--«etive po,,·u'. Against
the Hobbesian account that ""'"kJr)" 'is nothing but F,,"iNt and
/Xc"yi", Sr~u, and all our V~litiollJ but Mechanick Motions caused
from the AchOIlJ Or [in)trusions of Bodies u~" /lJ', he denies [hat

Mmtal CMt'11;"" [canl be ..id to be the Amon of BoJin wiihau[ and

th~ mur p_;,,~ ~/IM n;~ktr; . nd least of all [."'1 voli,;"... ouch. th=
bein, plainly here, ...".,mini t.p. ~Jl1V, /. ONr o"'~ P~INr, by mea""
.tK,wf. "-e MOliK' Pmmtk./ Actio. ,. oecoo-dinll)- o;Le,trvina 00 ....
-..lot;'" or Blo_, that;" oomrthing of S'if-A,,"-.;ry_ (TIS, p. 851)

Over fony y....1"$ ag<l Passmore noted Cudwonh'. imporwlI:e for

Locke and more recu,tly Stephen D ... wall has re-opened the question
of Cudwonh's relationship to JUnt, b)" noting parallels between the
two. Cudwonh ...,ruinl)" dese,,-es anemion for his possihle impact on
these and mher philosophen , But he also dese,,-es anemion in h is own

n"
right. By making imporum Statemenlll of his phibophy a",iLabIe in a
readable modem edition, I I>ope 10 incre~ the likelihood of Cudworth
being read on hi. own terms, as well as to lay the ground for I redra ...ing
of tile historical accoum in such a ...oay as 10 <e-integnte Cud"·onh into
the phibophical cW,·elopIMm.. of the early Enlightenment.

•
 Chronology

1617 born in AlloT, Sorn<'rKl.

163> ent~rs 1M Uni •• rsity of CambridV >$ a ",ud.nl a! Em .... nud Collt:gt-.
16]5 gradual.. BA.
1637 lks<2rtH, DiMoo ..., J. "",• .,u.
1639 grad,,"I" MA and is appoinled 10 a fellowship al Emnunu.l College.
16.41 Dnartes, Mi";'.,~.
11">4~ outbreak of Civil Wor.
I~ lbo~tion of th~ ClIurch of EnsJand.
ejtction of ~bridg<: dons "'ho r<:fu .. d 10 subscribe to Ihe co'·en.nl
imposed by P.rliornenl.
Dnartes, Pri..np;. ,MIDl8pkiM.
11">47 Ippointed M .... ' of Cbre Hln and Rtgi~' Professor of Hebu ...~
preach.,. • ...-mon 10 lh~ Hou.. of Common • .
11">49 am.nion of Charles I.
1651 Cudwonh becomes DO.
Hobbes, lLvi.o'.a~.
1652 Hobbu. Dt '0'1"" 101i,itt>.
• 653 OIiv~r Cromwell becomes Lord Proleclor.
165-4 appoinled Mas .. r of ClIris,', CoII<ze (a po5l he held unlil his d.. th).
1655 ad.;... Crom ... n on Ihe ~mi ..ion of th. J..... 10 England . M«,.
Merwsc:h ben !sod.
,660 l"aIonOOn of tho monarchy, and re .... blishment altho (]lurch ofEnsJand.
166-; Henry Mon:, E",/r,'TiIIIH rlAin",•.
1&7" Spinozo, nat/allIS lilto"'ti<~IOIi'inn.
16"]8 Tilt T rIU J~u1lu....1Sy<''''' O[liIt U~it"nt published.
CUd ..... th ;"'lrJled prd>endary of G iouccoter.
'Popish PIoI:'.
1b88 dies.

nxi

'II ate
 Further reading
(All items publi5hed in Lond(ln , unbs othe ..... ise inditated)

If TrtillM y"(""int E/"",,' 41111 ',","lif/l~1t MQrlllily and A Trtll/Ut ~f

FrulI1ill ",en: first printed posthumously. The former appcon:d in '73 I,
edited by Edward Ooandler (facsimile reprin l, Ne.... York, t976). It IO"U
reprinted in the third volume of Harrison 's edition of 1lt T,...,
I"ttl/mllil/ SYSleM .[IM UIfivnu ( , 845). A Latin tnnslation , fA IImm"
" mm...ldifiMu iw/i tI "~IOmi IOI)/uII,ibou ri..,lI14m, by the German
scholar J.L. Mosheim, _ prinled with his manslation of Cudwonh',
Syslm< (see below). Thm: is now a Frendlttanslation by J.L. Bretau
(Paris, 1995). The Trtll/itt is the "wk of CUd ....orth most often
reprinted in nccrpt: L.A.s. Bine, BritWt M~rlllim (Oxford, ,!Ion),
G.R. Cragg (ed.), TIt, c..mMJ" P14"".ist. (Ne.... York, 1\118), D.O .
Raphael, TIlt BrilisJI M~flllisll (Oxford, (969) and J .B. Schnttwind 'i
ancho~, M~fIIl Phiilmlphy ft~". MOIIIIIll"t I. Kt1Il (Cambridge, 1990).
A Trtillitt .[ FrmPiI/, ed. J. Allen ( 18J8), is the shortest of three
treati&eS on liberty and n«usily in the British Library, London (Add.
MSS 4!J78-8l). Then: exist5 one other unpublished manU$Cript, Cud+
wonh's 'Commentary on the Seven ty Weeks of Daniel' (British
Library, Add. MSS .w86-7). The original manuscripts of both the
SyJtttll and the Tr,.'ise UmunWol El'TllIlI
no longer ntant .
II"" I_tdft M",.lily an:

In his own lifetime Cud.'orth published a number of sermons: TIlt

Ulli." ~fC1tml /I"" fM Cbrt"h (.6.p:), A Disullflt Umr,TllUoI/M Trw
Notio" of 1M ~rll 'l SOIPIN' ( .6.p:), A Sm.."" PrtllrMIL Hfort 1M
H""oll,dft HoWl! of c.,""""1U ( .6,.7), If &"...,,, PrtIl'MIL kfore 1M
H4IIollrdft Somly ~f Li",.bur-JII"' ( 16,.7). He also published the thesis
he defended when he graduated BD in 16+4, Dil"IIi' ,"liDllts "'"i II lIIali
••1""", .1 mJispnlJdi!N (16S1). Hi. maior philosophical work, Tlu
Trw 11lIdk(I",,1 SysuIII of I~t UII,vmt (1678), "":os rq>ubliihed by
Thomas Birch ( ' 743, rpL 1839) and by J. Harrison (.145) (with Il(>tcs
from Mosheim'. tnnslatiOIl). II ""35 tnn.bted into Utili by J.L.
Mo&heim, RI"I"lp~j CruI,."m~, 'YII,,,,,, ;"Idfuln/is ~"jus Ii"j,...m {jena,
1733, rq>r. Lciden, 1773) md ill10 Itllim by Luigi BellCdetti SUit",,,
i"ltlltl/l4lf. de/1II0NiO, 5 vols. (Pavia, [823). His Sysum was reprinted in
facsimile (SlImpn-Bad Cann.tan, 1<)64), and in m abbreviated form
by Thomas Wise, wilh Ihe title A C"'folario" of Iltl RIIJS()II .1Ui
P~ibn.plty.fA,~tism H;"S a" Abrils ,mnol or all ImprtlW"'l1f1 of",h", Dr
Qu/fII(),IA Offimi ill Au "Trut 1"llIltrl""f Sysl,,,,' (1706, repro (732).
The """"I important modem study of Cud"'orth i. j.A. PlISSmore,
Ralpll C""fII()rtA, U 1"lerp"'''';'''' (Cambridge, 1951), which focuses on
A T'l"tiK Collumills E""",/ allii {",mli,abl, Morality and the thrcc
treatises 011 libc:ny Ind necenily. Th is has now bc:en supplemen ted by
Stephen Darwall's dupler 011 Cudwonh in H. Bri,islt Mora/islJ alUi lit.
JIlIn"~1 0", .. , (c..",l>.idge, [99~), ch~ple, S. A T".I;;'; 0,"'''";118
EI"""I alld 1_~ldlt Mo.ality is discussed in j. Manineau, TyPN of
Elltie,,1 ThIOry, 2 vots. (Oxford, .&!IS), L .A.S. Bigge, BritiJJo Moralis,., 2
vats. «(hfard, 11197), E.M. Austin, Tit. ElltiN of 1M C ..1IhrUJ,1 PlalOllim
(Philadelphia, 1935), A.N. Prior, usie and Iltt B",is of ElltiN (Oxford,
1949), D.O. RJphael, Bnl"It Alo,,,/isl,, ,650-,800, 1 "015. (Oxford,
[<)69), J.B. Schnccwind, AlDr,,1 Pki/o,opAy /rom Mo~I"ltn. /0 K""I
(Cambridge, t990).
For J survey of Cudwonh'i philosophy _ S. Hutton, '£cj " ... rd,
Lord Herixn of Dlerbury md Iht Cambridge PlalonislS', in S. Bro,..n
(ed.), Brilislt Pllilosoplly ",,11M Enlillt/nomenl, R~"lltd,t Hislory of
Pkj!rJlOplly, vol. v (London, .91)6). For bibliogn.phy prior to '9M, _
G .A.]' Rog"'s, 'Die Cambridge Pbtoniker' md 'RJlph Cudwonh',
U'N1'IHJJ GnlllJrisI ur GescltieAI' ur Plti/owplt~: J~ Pllifo/(Jpltir u, 17.
J.ltrIlWldtm, ,vI. 3. ' (lb5lc, 19M). Sec also G. Giglioni, 'Automata
Com~: Boyle, Leibniz and the D.:bale on the Notion of Life md
Mind', Bnlislr ]ollru/ for Iltt History ~f PlliklJOplly, 3 ([995), 14M8;
S. HullOn, 'Cudworth, Boelhius and Ihe Scale of Nature" in G.A.J.
Ragen, J.-M. Viennt and Y.-C Zatb (eds.), Tltt CambriJt( Pf"I'."11
(Dordrcchl, [996); S. Hutton, 'Ralph Cudwor!h, God, Mind and
Nature', in R. Crocker (ed.), RlI"'''', Rdi, itm "nJ Nat/Itt (forthromillg);

J[J[XII1
G. Musca, " 'Omne genus animalium". Antichiti e Medioe.·o in una
biblioteca privata ingJese del Seicemo', !b<"Ih",i M dirotoli, l5 (rC}88),
ZS- 76 (on Cudworth's library); R.H. Popkin, 'Cudworth', in his Tlu
Third FDru in Srontr~mrll-<mrllry Plrih""phy (I.eiden, 199z) (on Cud~
worth and Scepticism); D. Scott, ' Platon~ Recollection and Cambridge
Platonism', Hmrrarlru/ll, 149 (t99O), 71-97; L. Simonuni, 'Bayle and
I.e Clc:rc as Readers of Cudwonh: Elements of the DeNte on Pfalrit
Nan.rI in the Dutch Lamed Journals', Gmlritlh,.is ""If Ih W.jskt ttrrt
i" N~tkrl4ttd, 4 (r991), 147-05 (which discu"",," Cud worth'sflrrlll"" in
the Enlightenment ); Udn Thiel, 'Cudworth and s.,.·.,me.:nth-e.,ntury
Theories ofConsciou~ness', in S. Gaukroger (ed.), Th~ Um ofA"hfUiry
(Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1991).

ryr ate
 A note on the text

My aim in preparing this edition is to make available CudvlO.th's

philosophy in an accessible (onn. Rt_appraisal of the philosophical
canon plus increasing nnph ... is on a more historial approach to the
philosophy of the p... t h... resulted in rno..., ronsidention being given,
of late, to me less famous figura in the history of philosophy. E,·en in
this moK favounble dimate, Cudwonh is disoldvantaged by the fact
that, unlike those of his fellow-<XIumrymen, Locke and Hobbes, his
writinl{S aTe not ",,,itable in ~ible modem editions. Bom Cud-
wonh's Trt~IUe Qm(tnlmg EuNl/S[ ,.uJ Imtmltd/r Mar,{ily and T,e,IUe
~f F,TT",illaTe ...,btiHly f= of the weight of classial learning which
encumbers TM True 1"lelk(/~,1 Syslml, and (or that relSOIl, me:sc
writings oK ...,lath·ely mo..., accessibk to modem readers. In p...,paring
this edition, I h.,·e .lIempted to pro,·ide enough notes to m.ke the tnt
wmp...,hensible without m·er-burdening it with erudition. I have
followed Chandler nther than Harrison in consigning original-bnguage
quotlltions to the footnotes, retaining only Cudworth's rnnsl.tions in
the main text. This will, I hope, make reading easier in an .ge when a
knowJcd~ of classical JanguagCli can no lon~. be men for granted.
The exception to this prxtice is whe..., Cudwonh 11. ... not provided his
own translations . In such cascs I have kept the original in the teIT, and
given a modem English tnnsIation in "'!uare brackets afterwards. The
OtM. C:Jtception is wheK Cud",vnh uses Greek and Latin tmninology
in apJ>Oll'ition to the English terminology. These terms are taken from
his cJassical sources but are not, strictly, quotations from Greek or
Roman philosophy. Sin~ tlte readability of the English is disrupted by
repetition of such terms, and since Cudworth's habit of inserting Greek
 A 1I~1t ~III'" Uri

tcnns dues not amount to a QOI1sistent philosophical vocabulary, I have

normally n:a.ined ~I.u:t. terms only on meir fiTst appc:aran« in a
puricubr ~gc 2nd have deleted what Sttnt to Ix otiose exotSli. On a
few ocasions I hne inserted an English Innslation after a tenn not
explained by Cudwonh. Cudwonh clearly observed I different sWldard
in quowions from thOK normally observed today. I have tried to
indicate in the now me QCCIsions when: he has nO( been entin:ly
faithful to the original Latin or Greek. This is sometimes nplicable in
tenns of his lOur=, bill often he mUtII wholesale adjustments to 5u;t
the: pmnmatical flo .... of his argument. All such interpolations.,.., placed
in square brackcu. I have based my edition of Fm",;f/ on the Allen
edition of t838, ch«ked against the manuscript (BL, Add. MS 4978). In
me case of A Tn.l. Ctnu:.m;"f £1"""I ...d I"""wahl. M~r.1ily I have
used me OundltT lim edition. Unfortunately there is no num manu-
script apinst which to ch«k it. Spelling and punctu.;n;on have been
modemi%ed mrougl>out . Finally, in me interests of Jl('l"Spicuit y, I ho"e
on QCCIsion taken libenies with CudwOl"th'l baroque sentences, sub-
dividing me lengthier on.., when this can be done wimout distorting his
meaning.

,.
A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality
Copyrighted material
 Contents

Book,
CHAPTU I Tht there have b«n some in ~ll ages, who il2ve main-
tained that good. and evil, jU51 and unjust, wen: nIK naturally and
immutably so, but only by human laws and ~PPQintmem. An account of
the most ancient of them from Plato and Ari!itode; as also from
Diogcnes ~nius and Pluwch. Also in this lOIter age """"" have
affirmed that there is no incorporeal substance nOr any natural
difference of good and evil, just and unjust. The opinion of some
modem theologcn proposed, with its n~ry con~uences, o",ned
by some of them, by otben disowned; bur all a]!'fting in this, tbat
things morally good. and evil, jU$! and unjust, arc nOi so by n>lure, and
antecedent to the di,-inc command, but by the divine command and
institution_ CHAPTER I I That good and evil , just and unjust, honest
and dishonest, cannot be arbitrary things without nature made by will .
Everything must by its own nature be what it is, and nothing else.
That even in positi'-e laws and commands, it is not mere will that
obligcth, but the natures of good. and evil, just and unjust, rc:aIly
existing. The distinction betwixt things naturally and positively good.
and evil, more clearly explained. No positive command mal<es any
thing moraHy good or evil, just or unjust; nor can oblige othetwisc than
by vinue of wil2t is Nlturally just. CHAPTER III Thot the opinion of
those who affirm that moral good and evil, just and unjUS!, depend
upon the arbitrary will of God, implies a contradiction. The essences of
things not convenibll: into nnc annther. Panicular essences depend not
on the arbitrary will of God. That there is in God a nature of gooo:lnes&

,
,.
superior to ",isdom, which measures and detennines hi. ,,-Isdom, as
this does his ,,-ill. A mystical or mipnatical representation of the
nature of God.

Book II

C IIAI'TU I Thai, to a"aid the foroe of "'hat is above demonstratw,

....... philosophers h... e dtoiN that there "'as any immutable nllun: or
esKnoe, affirming all being and knowledgtc to be fantastical and relative,
of wllom Prougoras, the Abderite, ""as the chief: ... hose inlenl in
proposing it, and a tonscquto« thefe(lf " 1lS, lhe destroying of all
moralilY, and 10 di5appmve the absolule and immutable nature of good
and evil, jUst and unjust. C IIAP TU II 1lIe pretenoetl or groundi for
this opinion considered. That il was grounded on the Heratlitical
philosophy, which intmduced a moveoble essen«, affirming that
nothing stood, but aU things moved. Proll~"'" infen:n« from hence,
... ho to the Heraditical added the old IlonUal Phoenician phibophy,
and by this mixture nude up his o"'n. C UAPTU III That the alornical
or mechanical philosophy " "as known to ProugDnlS, who Ii"ed before
Dt:mocritu5. A brief aa:ount of il. That by the motion of panicla all
things are gmerated and corrupted is asserted by him, and thai all
sensible qUlllities are nothing without us, but ooly pusions and sc:nsa-
110m in u... CIlAPTEl IV That the alomical phiboph y is more ancit:nl
Ihan the Trojan war, and ,,<os in,·toted by one Moschus., a Sidooian.
That this Moschu5, the Phoenician, is the same with Moschus the
physiologtcr, ... ho is the same with Moses., the Jc ... i~h la"-givcr. That
Plato and Aristolle ",en: not unacqUllinlw ",ith this Phoenician philo--
sophy, ",hich ...... rejected by Plato, because: abused 10 sapOcism, IS
also by Aristotle; but revi-'ed by Epicurus., ",ho SO blended il wilh
impiety and immorality, that it !lOon sunk apin. It bath been SUO"=~
fully restored in the IlIst age. CIIAI' TEl V That the paradoxes Prot.-
sons and others grounded on this atornical philosophy are absurd and
contradictious, and inconsequent from it; and the assenion thatllOlhing
is .bsoluldy true, but only relati,-ely to him that thinks so, is no less
absurd , and ovenurns i_If. CIlAPTt:R H That these assenions of
Protagoras, ' Knowledgtc is sense, and know1cdgtc is bUI fantastical and
relarive', are efTcctually o~nurned by the atornial philosophy; of
",hich tile genuine /Uuh is, that sense alone is not the: judgtc of ... hat

•
 o",U"""'1 <lCTllal """ j"""ulahk ,"orillity

does rnlly and absolut(ly cxist, but thatthcre is anlMher principle in us

superior to sense.

Bookm
CHAPTER I What sense is, and th.1 il is not knowledge. How sensation
is puformed. Th( soul is passivc in sensation, though not altogether so.
Various kinds of sensations. CHAPTU II That sense is a Cotlfused
pu ceprion obtruded un the ... ul from ",;dlOut, but knowledge the active
energy of an unpassinn.te power in the sou~ which is vitaUy uniled 10
thc body. Th( differttlce oowixi sensin,·c and intellectual cogitllioo,
and thcir different uses in lC'neral. CHAPTER III The difference
ooween ICfISC ur sensalion and intellection of knowledge, described
ItKlre =r.udy in Ii,·e particulan., with a funher nplication and
demonstration from Platu. CHAPTU II' A further proof that sense is
not science, illustrated by ••,,·eral insrances. Sense is otlly a seeming ur
.ppearance of things corporeal existing, which may be thQUgh the
things have nlM a real nistellce. Reasons of this. Phantasms and sensible
ideas .,.., reaJJy ur materially the same things. Phan~ms vu!untary and
in~olunwy. That Phanusms may become sensations, and. con(ra.

Book IV
C IUPTER I That knowledge is an inword active energy of the mind,
not arising from things acting from without. Sense is not a mere
passiotl, bur a passive ptrc:ept>on of the soul, ha,·ing something of vital
energy, and is a cogitation. The immediate ooject:S of intellection not
things without the mind, but the ideas of the mind itself, which is not
weakened by the most radiant and illustrious truths, as the sense is by
what is nteedingly sensible. Hath a criterWn in itself whcuby to koow
whttl it hath fuund what it sought. Two kinds of perceptivc cogitations
in the !IO\II, the one passive, which ore cilher aiufJrjp.afa, 'sensations', QT
o/IavrtitTp.afll, 'inugin.alions'; the other kind.,.., glkd 1'O~p.afa. ThaI
thc vo'ip.ara .,.., 1101 raised oul of the phUllI'lftIIl1I by the mldltrllU
1I1tM. CIIAP TU II Tha' 1""'" ideas of the mind proceed not from
oulW3rd sensible oojects, but arise from the inward activity of the mind
itself. The cause of men's misule herein. How fill" the passion of sense
reaches, and wherc lhe mind's activity begins. Sense 110 comptlnlt
judge of Ihe reality of relative ideas, ..... hich though the)' .... en: men:
notions of the mind or modes of concei"ing, yet it follows not that they
ha"c no reality. They are nOl diSligreeable to the realiry of things, and so
flO! false:. The beauty, the smngth, and ability of natural and corporeal
things depend upon th...., rel.nom .nd proportions. Instances pi oposed
to illustrate this maner. All the ideas of things artificial h"'e something
in them that neyer came from sense. This true of plants and animals.
No essential diffeTmtt Ntwixt natunl compounded and artificial
things. Sen.., has no idea of the rogit:lli"e being joined to rational
animal., nOr of the uniye ..... as it is one corporeal f~, much less of
the ideas or modes of thinking beings. CIIAPTER III That cven simple:
corporeal things, passively perceived by sense, Ire known or understood
only by the active power of the mind. That senSlition is not knowledge
of th...., things, much Ic:ss any secondJry result from sense. Besides
/llJf~1fUI14 and pJo411//U"'M4, there mUlit be 1IotmQIQ Or intelligible: ideas
coming from the mind itself. This confirmed and illust"'tw by "" 'eral
insflIInces and similitudes. TIut then: i. an intelligible idea of a triangle
inwardly exerted from the mind, distinct from the phantasm or sensible
idea; boIh [nl] which nuy be in the mind together. Some sensible ideas
not im!," se1 on the !iOul by Ihings without. Th.t SCllse is a kind of
speech of ou",-ard nalure con.-ening with the mind. Two kinds of
perceptiye po"'en in the soul. Knowledge does not begin but cnd in
individuals. A double error of vulgar philosophers. Immediate obia:ts
of all geometrical science on: the intelligible and universal ideas of I
triangle, &C. cacned from the mind, and romprchended in it.
CHAPTE~ IY TIut individual lIl.aterial things cannot be the immediate
obj«u of intellection and knowledge, besides which there must be
some other kind of beings or <:ntiti.,., as the immediale objects of them,
such thin gs as do not flow, but renuin immutably the same. The
immutable: <:ntitics, what they are, from wh<:ntt, and when: they exist.
That there is an eternal mind, from which all created understandings
are constantly furnished with ideas. Conclusion, that wisdom, U1owl-
edge, and understanding, arc C1ernal and sclf-Iubsist<:nt things,
superior to malleT, and aU sc:nsiblc things. CIIAI'TU v That the
intelligible notions of things, though existing only in the mind, are not
figm<:nfS of the mind, but havc an immutable naWrc. The criteriM of
truth . The opinion that nothing can be dcmonm-ated to be true
absolutely, but ooly hypothetically, refuted. Whatever i. clearly intelli-
,
 COIfUnt;"g ,Until! arul immlllahk morality

gible, is absolutely true . Though men are oflen deceived, and think
they clearly comprehend what they do not; it follows 1M){ that they an
never be certain WI they clearly comprehend any thing. The conclu-
sion with Crigen, that science and knowledge is the only 6rm thing in
tM world. CHAPTU Vt In what sense the essences of things are
CiemaJ and immutable. Every thing is whO! it is, to science or
knowled ge whethu absolutely or reiati,..,ly, unchangeable by any mind.
So WI if moral good and e,-iI, just and unjust, in things so
denominated, as the acrions Or souls of men, the)' mUS! have o;omc
ceruin natures unaJten.ble by any will or opinion. ThaI lhe soul is not
a mm: '/ISII lilbul.i. That it is in order of natUre before the body and
maner, does not result out of it, but commands, governs, and rules it,
The whole COTJIOrcal world a he:op of dust and ato"",. 1"I>ere an he no
luch thing as morality unless there be a God . The commend.tion of
the atomicaJ philosophy successfully revived by Cartesius. Epicurus
taxed for his lIonishness.

,
,.
Copyrighted material
 Boo"

Chapter I
l. As the vulgar galcralJy look no higher for (he original of monI good
and evil, jus, and unjust, than the codes and pandectll, the tables and
ta .... of their country an d re~gion, so there have not W3I1tcd pretended
ph;Ioaop~ .. in all ages who It.'"
assu«d nothing to be good and evi\,
jun and unjust, ... turaUy and immutably (.pUaI:l I(tli M,v.fTWC); b.,1t
th.at aU these: things were )XISiti,-c, arbiu-uy, and &clitia .... only (Oefl/ai,
IIOflIP" 'f'liJ>'opIJ.rt:iJ&t). Such Plato mentions in his tenth. book lk
~ljb... [t... ....], who maintained ,

llLal nothins a, . 0 ..... "oll"".lly jW;! but men ch.nKing !hcir opinion,
mnceming ' hem po:rpe,WIlly, som.";,,,..,!Il1de onc thing j ... l, S<lmcrimes
another; but whatsoever is d" , •• d Ind constituted thaI for the time is
valid, being nude ... by artS and Ia·..... but not by any NlUr' of i!$ o...n,'
And again his TMamr..s:
As to thinp just and unjus!, holy and unholy, nOf only the PnKagOr"""
(of whom ..., ""'" treat aft ...... rd), bUI many oilier philosoph....Iso
confid .... tly aflinn, tho. n.onc: of .ltH< thinp ha •• in naru"" any _n«
of me;, own, but ..hal5oa<r is docrccd by the luthOfi,y of Ih< oily, thaI

T<I (4<).w.-.. 0.\6' 01_ "I ...,.,m.• .""... o.u' W"'fJIrr~ ..... 600:uMY ",,*!.ao;- ~-&i
........"U :do: ... old ,obf. ' '6·6.1'<,_ .......... h o•• ,.n. ........ .....". d"" 1'l" 'y',,,,
ri.PIr "'" ,oJ; ~ oI.U' ~ <Ii '''' ...... (1'10 ... ~ .. s,o..). n.e Loeb .......... Ii.....
... eo Ihinp ; - Ihcy do by ..
110< . . . . . . . . b.>T .................. IIy ;" d..............,
t ......
........... _...nr. t
i" .............. _ ... 01 ... ,A, <I..,. ....... anr ..... ;, .. tIoat
..... ,utlooria<io<; tI>o>oP ;, _ ......- .. '" ond Ii>< b .... ODOI _ WI -r _ .. _ .
-.L4 .... ......,".G, IIooJ (I. ' ., ..... NrwYori, ,~) .

9
 is trUly $uth ... httht. ;t is so d""reed, and for so long time, vi>;. jusl Ot
unjUSl, halyo. unholy. 1

And Aristod~ more than once Iak,,", r>Otice of,his opinion in his Elh;a-.
Thinp honest and full, ,,·hie!> po~tics I •• conv.,.",n! .bou! ha, • .., JH>!
• Vl riety .nd unotl1.linly in !httn, thai ,hey $<:aIl Ie bo: only bl·la,,·, and
no, by natu",'

And afterwards, Book S, ch. 7, after he had divi<kd that which is

politically just (TO & K(}.'OV 1{O,uT'KOV) inlo natural (o;.ooIKOV ), '[ thlt]
whieh has everywhere the same force' (ro If(}.VT(}.lotl n1v ruin, v flOV
&ivtlfl'v), and legal (VOp,KOV), ' which before there be I Ja .... made, is
indifferent, but when once the law is made, is determined to be just or
unjust',' whieh legal ju.<t and un just (as he afterwards expresses it) are
' like to wine and .. hea' measures, as pints and bushels',! .... hich au not
everywhere of an e<:jual bigness, being commonty lesser .... ith t~ tru.t
..,ll and greater with thoise thaI buy; then h~ adds, 'some then: are that
think that there is no other just or unjust, b ut what is made by law and
men , bc<.:ausc that which is natural is immutable, and bath everywhere
the same fora:, as 6re burn. alike here and in Persia; but thel stC that
",r.. and jUltIJ , rights and just things are ev«ywhen: diffcrent'.
2. The philosophers particularly noted fur this upin ion in Ptam are
Prollgoras in his ThCMItNlJ, Potu. and Callicln in his G~rtias,
Thrasymachus, and GJaUCOl"t in his P~fil;".' But Dioge.... [.ae"iu. tells
u. some others, 15 of Arche laus, Socrates' master, that held ' that just
, ·E. ,0/0; ~ K<d 6<Ji~"",. "'" ~ .... 4 ,,.;,,,. illio'."". .,.~_.:.; <>1M I.ni
..",,, ~...:.IIo..ws. • .....wq.,.. .uu ,6 ....., M:•• <Wt~ )'i>onOl d.i I~ ,,,,, ~"'.
,!o;{f "'" &!o> b~ ~ . .... .sa.. 41 !'it ..........." u.. np""") y",~. ~.
""'" &oi>;" ..,. ...,...a-, (1'1010. nn. ..,.. ,,>a).
, To 41""," K<d ... 4I0<000 ~.,. .... ., n...,wi "'"",,,,,", ,,,,,,,,,,.,.IX" ....,poi. ~aJ .hi",•
• U: ~_"".Ipa
(" 1.j .. r...",,,,,_ '0.
""". .
..... """"" 0\lpgI p.I_ d_ ...... 41 '" (AriooOIk, N"-, .... C~jn ,0Mb' 4- I,).
~!I.Uc<' h •• , . - . -';;,,,(iIoioI, "l4h' .... " ). ElM

, ~ ... ~ i«T,.,.;1, . . )oi"fP"k ...-.i ~",poI.; (AriIIoOt. Nw-,.... [,Ibn, 'ISO')' 1l><

.. facI. Etlll (,l4I)'" " .." ... 011< _'*'

.... mb' ... , 01'Il00 I ' I" _ _ Iloo GHd ........ io . """' ....... r I'. __ io .......
Of ..... h,~', bu,;' ......... be .. ';'" .......
• ~ <Ii Moo; ....... '"'" ,-... h, <oJ pt. .........1"" • • ~aJ ''''''~ n;. aoIr~.l;:r..
~". 0-..,. oJ 01\0 "'" _ "'" b fI~ ~";'" Til oW _",~~"
(.'.riRoIIo. Nw-.!w. Etht. "w>",-&' UI<b "'D'~_ by II. RodIIom (London. ',.14)'
·Some _ _ do .... _ 01 .............. ;.ac;.:. ... - . - <un"""tiuouI, , _ _ _ ......
01' ...... io ...,........ Iuo .... _ _ ". .... , . ......... fir< """" .... _ ...... "'" ..
Ptni., Nln .......... ....... to ..., . ~
, Po" ........ c.Jliclos, Throo,.....dlln, G~ Of'. '... 'i,.." ,he .. ",lot, • q(
Socn ... ...... ~ ;, ' i ...........·

'0

'VI ate
 Calterrn;,,/!, rurnal"tId immutdk morality

and dishonest a", nOl: so by nature but by law,;1 and (as I mlll:.,i¥~)
Democritus,9 fOT after he had set down his opinion mnoeming happi-
ness, or the chief end, he adds this os ~rt of the Democrirical
philosophy, 7!011f1<l V01l11l<l £Ivas, which I undcn;w.d thus, that things
accounted just or unjust a", all factitious or artificial things, nO! natunl;
nOl"hing being real or ","!Ural but atorm and ....... um, OS the following
worns are, </JOOtl Ji c'iwllo I«li KtvaV. IO The same is no[Cd by
Diogenes" also mna:ming Aristippus, Plato's contemporary, thai he
asserted 'that IIOI.hing was good or e"il (llhcfWisc, than by law (lr
custom,_ll And Plutarch in the Lip 6/Altxudtt, tells Us (If Anaxardms,
tlut was Arisl<ldc's equal, that when Alexander, repenting, sadly
lamented the death of aiNS, whom he had ruhly ,lain, he read this
leau", in philosophy to him to comfort him, 'that whalS(Xver is done
by the sup",mc: power is i,so [arlO jU&t,.ll And Pyrrho, the ElieDsie
philosopher, and fath~r of the Sceptics, thor was Anaxorcbus' scholar,
seem. 10 have been dogmatical in n<>thing else but this 'that there i.
n<>thing good OT shlltlCful, JUSt Or unjust, and so likewise os to all things,
tlut there is nUlhing SO in truth, but that men do aU things acooTdin( 1<1
law and custom,.!4
1. After these suca:eded Epieurus, IS the ""'i,'eT of the Democririal

• Te _ < I .... mJ ,,) ~ "" "",,,,u.!O ~ (Dqu"" u.,,;.., u... •.'&. 1-'>
......_ by RoO. Ib<b {l. ,~"".nd c-,brid .., Muo_, 'u.I'
"!hot """ ;, .... _ ftI! ;,
boor dqouo<Io _ ""'"' -.'" 100., "I"'" am .... _ ·. A><kIo .. (ft . fikh ~ <m'." .. .....
pufOl.r.o..... _ and • WI to """ ,,""', <. , ' "
• v , of o\bokn (II. '-'11 OC) ...... ,...,N of I.z>o<TI and of An... "_ • ...t .
pop"",.f ........ ;"......,. of " ' _.
.. n;",u . . t-bou .... j . Cud""",,', .... O=l ~......,;".".- Diorm ... ·.. "ok,,,,. oIo!
..,.., __....." n,.,.. mJ ~. "' ... Loeb" ,hriool: 'TIl< quoIiri<o of all ............
.a,mb",. -.............. h... bu'._ .nd ....... ___ .'
....-.tyhr'
"Dio.".. , ,......s.
" ~ (toll,}_ ...... _ , " <>-<M ij ""uO' ~ """'Ii ><oi "'" (V;'.a ... ~ • •.
OJ). M"rippUi of C, ...... P.I "' of t:p;Nrconiora and binder of C""";': ><hooI o!oidl
......' _ .... ... lioo .. .,ooIof"""'''pIooouN_
" .001. TO ~ .... ,0/1 ~,., ••l.".;, ......... d"" (Pk.utd>., .o\Inonolet., .. I'luutdo. /im,
, ...... Y. _ (t - ' _, and N •• Yod, , •••h..-aL 7. ? ... 0.. . .1 . - .... '/n. ><oi
olio .......... ".. ..... d ..... AnnMdt . . of II....... (ft . ...""
V , ..... ..,.!, I.. of",""".
aMU" ... ........
~ o u of

.. ....... ~ ...:;,. oi6tph>. l00<0l4i..-v.o' 100., 01./0"",. "'" o!,omoo;; .... 001 ...... ,..,.. <I..., t~
'Ul'
.u
. ; l!\io, wIj...,& mJ l6o. orOm> ,oio; ,~"'" ' .... '-/L :
II ""'. 1He _ I ....' ..,1IIq ... ...........,. .. dd
~,be held , ........... .. nodIin;....,. ... ,,,.... "'" '0
(!lie,,, .. ~ ...b,). l.ocb
",otoic,,... .. unjtoot. """' ..
• and "",,,,, ' pvcno
- . . .......: f'r<rbo (,. ]/>51)60>-<,"5"70 oc;) _ .... IMha- 01 o...to , . ,. - II.
" r.,;c. ..... (,. :14' - '70 oc) _ •"''l Oil", of 0 < __ .....;"", _ plUlooop/I,. loa ....
• .... Ron.. • .... !Meu", ~ _ p." ,d by J"""'" 1.,;poHn ('5.11-'li<0ii1 and

"

,.
philoiophy. the frame of whose principles must n«di lead him to deny
justice and injustice to be nllural things. And the~fore he dClennines
thai they ariK wOOUy from mutual pacu and covenants of men made fOf"
their own ronven;"na: and utility. and 1:1.... .-.:suIting from thence.
Thost: li .. in, c:tt:I'u .... tha, couJd nor make munw C6venanll '"",1M'
no! 10 hurt, nor 10 be hUrl by one Inmher. could not (or ,his cau.. ha ••
any ....,h rhing os juI' or unj .... , amongst th.tm. And ,here "' the same
""'""" for thoK nlrion. tlu.t elrh.,. ,,;\1 nm. DO" <2nnot make !IUd. murual
wmpo<:!l no! \OJ hUrl on. an<Kher. For I~ is no....,h thinl" junitt
by l...lf. but only in rhe mu,ua] cong' .. of ........ ,,·he.--.e ... lhey
ha,·. m,md to(!:ethcr in,o "".mlnl not to hUrl """ another. "
1be btc compile.- oflhe Epicurean s)~lem upresses Ihis philosopher's
meaning after this manne.-'
1"here ore IiOITK tlu.t think rhot ,,,,- rhinp that ore jUlI Iim'.i. ore j....
lCOlI"ding.o their pr<I!lCI" unnn.d nature. and thai the 10.... do nor make
them just, bu. only prescribe occarding to lhat nature .. hid! ,hey hav•.
Bu. the ming is no! 1<>. tl

Afle.- Epicurus. Cameades, the author of the Ne"· Academy ..

~tius leslilieth ....... also • ualou5 I.$SCrtor of the ...... doctrine. 11
4. And .inee in Ihis laner age Ih-e physiological hypoIhCKI of
DemocriIUS and Epicurus havc been revived, and successfully applied
10 the 50Iving of some of the phenomena of the visible world, Ih-ere hay.
not wanted tllnK that have endeavoured to ,·ml also Ihose other
pandou$ of the same philosoph ..... viz. 'That there is nO incorporeal

..... IIw tho _101

"

" -,-,
u.c-.... «..........
.,
J ..~
..
"
&ubstance, nor any natum difference of good and evil, just and
unjU5f,;l~ and to recommend the .arne under a show of wisdom, as the
deep and profound mysteries of tile atomical Of corpuscular philosophy.
As if senseless mailer and aloms "'eTt the original of all things,
lOCO.ding to that song of old Siknus in the poet:
H. sung th. secret ....d. of nl1ure', fr.un<;
How sns, and cum, and air, and act;". flame,
Fell thrnup. the nli8h,y void, .nd in Ihtir foil
W~ blindly g:lth.rtd in this roodly halL lO

Of this SOt1 is that late writer of ethics and politics, ·.,ho a=rts,
tNtthtre ar. no authmtic dOClrintS COfI<:ttning jUst and uni""', good
and •• ;1, • • ctpllht la.... ,.hid>.", eslablished in tony city: and that;1
concem. """" '0 inquire ,"'h<1h.,. an oction ohan be ",puled i\lSl or
unju.t, ..,00 or evi~ n<:<:pt .uch only whnm the community Iu.,'e
.~ntod «> be the int.rpr." .. of their I.....',

And again, 'Even a Cllrisrian government hath power to determine what

is rightwus, and what is the transgression of il.'/.1 And h. gives Ihe
same o •• r again in English 'In the stale ofmllu", nothing can be unjust;
the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice hne no pla.ce;
when: then: is nO common pow.r, th.re is no law; where no law, no
transgression.' 'No law can be unjust,.Zl Nay, temperance is no more
natural (4'00-1'1), according to this civil (or rather uncivil) philosopher,
than justice. 'Sensuality in that sense in which it is rondemned, hath no
place tillthcTt be laws'?~
.. Not . """"'"". 1><00 .1UIIMIMtJ' of .... ptincipleo of.1I mo,", ' In .. "'" ,..loIi...., M",riooI of.
d<o;.t of.. ...col """""'" oIIud<o .. "Tbomu_.
• Nomq.. canebo,"; rn."".", "... ......
<OKto
Semina "''''''''"l''< ...,;,qu. Mooen~
[,);qIhOdi _;po;,; ... h;' •• otN prim;'
Omnia, .. '-...,., ",uooli """"" .... ortOo,
(V;,pl, Edopt .,)
" "Do<tn.w "" ....... ir ....... hono ............... """" ir ...."'."4'.. <i\Oa", ... d6 ......
.. ~ . .... ouIaI: .. u"",,, 06q .. Ktio iu>to .01 ini ...... too... "'I .... ",,"" Iit,. lI,a .
i""",,,,,,,,, _ ..... ""q,." 011 iii. od quos Iosum """"" io" ...." ........ I _ I
6emondo .... ' (lUI ,EJt.t ~ ... ~d r"" "'.......... "m:., .. ~ HoNn
Mel , Do .... .".. ,Mi., ,I,•• _ /ow.m,.;. .-. ed. W.• \(0100_.
! ..
(I, ' " ••• 1l9->4!~ .01, ... p. ' oS), Cud_ .. ....,.,.. ... '.muI.
l.! ...., " ; ..!'.. .....- . ...... ~"'rioh~;.d6rio ",,01 io;" . - .Ii.. "...,....... ....""
;. ' ;."~. (iMoI., p. }II,). Soc . . . 1M E...W W_ of:r.-, H-., <d,
W. A'-b- "<II.,, __ ( Uooodon. ...t. ... p_.to-J_
,I~f!~

11 I"'...... r. ' ., .1Iool'.m_'loir ' .'. ... E... WW_ ...... OI.P,"J.
.. boI .• p_ ...

.,
'I' ate
 s · But whatsoever W;li the true meaning of Ihese philosophers, Ihar
affirm jU$tice and injustice to be only by law, and not by nalUre (of
which I shall discoUTK afterwardli),'--! tt!Uin it is that divers modem
theol<>gers do not only seriously, but zealously, contend in like manner,
that there is nothing absolutely, intrinsically, and natuntlly good and
evil, JUSt and unjust, antecedently to an y positi'e command Or prohibi -
tion of God; but that the arbitrary will and pleasure of God (that is, an
omnipotent Being devoid of all essential and natural justice), by its
commands and prohibitions, is me first and only rule and measure
therwf. l6 When"" it follo ...·s una"oidably that nothing can be imagined
so grossly wicked, Or SO foully unjust or disl\onest, but if it were
supposed to be commanded by this omn ipotent !kity, must needs upon
that hypothesis fonhwith become holy, just, and righteous. For though
the ancient fillhers of tile Gristian chur<:h ...-ere very aboorrent from
this doctrine (as shall be sho ...·ed hereafter),27 yet it crept up afttrw..rd
in the scholastic age, Ockham being among the first that mainwned
""1/",,,4(/"", "'Q/u'" eSJe ~is; qIIQ/e1/ ... " t:k~ prollibiru .... ClIjI/; """ pG";/
jim H1II<j. si ~ t:k~ p,unpi,,/w,: (t ( (o"VC'no, 'that there is no act evil
but os it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be:
commanded by God. And 110 on the other hand as to good.'18 And
herein PetruS Alliacus and Andreas de Novo Castro, with others,
quickly followed him.211
But this doctrine hath been since chieRy promoted and advanced by
such as think nnming 50 essential to the !kity os unoontrollabk power
and arbitnry will, and therefore mat God could nO)1 be God if there
should be anylhing evil in its own natUre which he could not do; and
who impute such dark counsels and dismal :actions unto God, as cannot
he justified otherwise than by 5a)-u.g that whauoe"cr God can be:

" So. -... Book • • .. O. TIS. Pnf...,.

" CaoI_ ..... _ _ _ .... _, c, ... at .... F ' - ' ' ' £1.'1. Ik ..... dn .. 's .... otly on
.... opinions at~ .. f....;JI. So. -... pp. Ijl. ,6, _l. '75. ,Il.
,. WiOiom atOrl ..... (,...!5-I JoI7/9~F"' · 0:+:0' s..".who, .... O"'Soonor_~ ....
' ' ' _ ' ' ' ' ... ' ...101".... di.... ..;/l...J .... - . . . 6 , r .oIGod. I'wi,· _ .. _
cio:d by Cud_ ... to be bind ;" h. $ _ ,.. _ _ ...... ,,;,_ "J ·r ' • T,
--... __ s', s"" .. d-lJ~ . , .". .c." s..... 'I- '91ft. JO. F.. Orl ......... P. Boehner.
cw • . f'* 'r pl ' 01 W,;,;.,,<E<li;lLJI'....! t 0' r 0,. 't.!7~
.. p""".- (....... "'''';0,) <'JJo--'t><>I I ~"""""'" Nooo
.... ) <II. ,. 'J60~ CooI_",', _ _ at.- """" ond at (ldt, _
c..uo,.......... NNr.:w.-
...... .;.,. dw.
"".....,. •• ,,' .. """...,. .... ...mJatod t ; .., .. F.na\onoI.s.. C.B.SchnIia."....
CO,..oIA......m._ .. If.......,. C.lool(Kjo. ,Mod Moouul, '!oIJ~ pp. 6' ....

"
supposed to do Or will, will be for that reason good Or juSt, beause he
wills it.
Now the nettssary and un ..·oid.ble conse<juences oflhis opinion ore
such as these:
That; to \O'e God is by ",tu",.n indifferent thing. and is moral1y pxI
only, beau.. it is commanded by God; that to prohibit the 10,·. afGod,
ar command 'he hatred of God, is not inron,istrnt .nth the n.tu", of
God, but only with his fl'ft will; th.t it is not inconsistent .nth tM
natural equity of God 10 command bwpkmy, perjury, lying, &C. l1t.a,
God may <:Ommand ... Iu, is "'n,rary, 2$ to .11 tile p"""pts of tM
Decalogue. so especially to ,h. first, second, third; rut holiness is nOf.
ronformi,y with the natu", "fGod; th.t God may oblige nun to ,,·h.t is
impO$libk; th'l God hath no rutunl inclination to 1M good of tho
"""tures; th.t God can justly doom .n innocent <•.,lUre to "'.r",,1
torment:'·
All which propositions. with <>then of like kind, are word for word
asserted by some late authors. Though I think not fit 10 menrion the
name of any of them in this place, excepting only one, Joannes
Szydlovius, who in a book published at Franeke.,!1 hath profcs...wJy
avowed and maint:tined the grossest of them. And )'ot neither he, nor
the resl, are to be thought an y mOf"e blameworthy herein than many
Others, that holding th e ""me premisses h,'-e either dissembled or
di!iOwntd those conclusions which unavoidably follow therefrom: but
rather to be commended for their openness, simplicity, .nd ingenuity,
in representing their opinion n.kedly to the world, .uch as indeed it i.,
withoul any veil or mask.
Wherefore since there are so many, both philosophers and thwlogeri,
o.w. ........... ~ ............., bo,,,,,,, """""""'. """ • Doo iIIbt<l>t,
.. •...mar<
........-. Dei ","'d.. _;p:..
'tl .. Dei ootNm, ...... "".......... Dei ...... ~...t .........

ON' . . . '" _ _

.... _iu"'"
' _F', . .
. .. ..
- pot - _ powno,. __...
""'" " ..... .. hb<n. N ...... _ _ ;..,.; di .......... ~ "_;':Om 1'"""''' On>no..-
.."...,.. b~ ~r..m. ......t.rium. ""'_ o.w. ..- prxrip< .. ronOHriwn •• ,
., ....... _~ __
<o.IM ... Nt. D<i; 0.....-" ,...... ob(;po. >01 ;"'t
_ot' ...
' • "-- ' non _
*'*'; o.w.-...
..-. .,.Ntolan indfttionero .. boo .... o:m~ 0...... ju .. . . - """"""" """'dd
.......... mocioo_ obnuoo«: TIo .... . uunmoo"J ...- til. ....... d .......... SZ .... I0 .... (00<
"'"" ...... ). 1"h<t<;, Nrth.t d""""",,,"'- or.--. ..... ;" Ci.!_,,"', """....,.;po ,,, .:, • ""
h< ",iD.
" .... SzydIo>waiI.}oonn<oSayd_~ V_ _ _ _ ~~.r_
;" ...i ... .,,...... - . ,' ....... . _..... ,_ .. ....,. ",,",",,_
_ _ .r ,..."." a;;" ..........,.JoU-
UuonIu., .•k an...
S~ ( F _ . 'I>oJ) . ... I'0I0 ....... , ..

.... N ...... 1oaoIa, Szy.llo>wai mr. .. _ ~ JoMnn .. 1>1>«0 ...... WiIIWn

T ..... uooIP_.

,;

'I' ate
tbat seemingly and verbally acl,"(lwkd~ sucb tbinp:as moral good and
evil, j\lSt and unjust, tMt contend n(){Withstanding that these a", not by
na!\l", (.pVatl), but mmNtM:>n (8wtl), and that the", is nothing naNrally
(IT inunutably JUSt or unjust; I shaJJ from bence felch the rise of this

ethical disalurse OT enquiry concerning things good and evil, just and
unjulil, budabk and mamc:ful 1Upi nov o:)'UOWv ,,"i
"(lI(WV, &"aiwv
...ai dQi"wv (for so I find these: words frequ~ntly used :as synonymous in
Plato and othcr ancient authors): demonstrating in the fil'llt plaa::, that if
the", be anything It all good Or cvil, JUSt Or unjUSt, the", must of
necessity be something naturally and immutably good and JUSt (&tuov
~1Ki!v "ai .iori"'1TOv). hnd from thence I st"U prC>Cff<l afterward to
show what tbis natural, immutable, and eternal justice is, 6iKalOV
.poolld)v. tiKi"'1TOv. Kal' oJdmov, witb the branches and sptCies of it.

Chapler II

I. Wherefo", in the fi"'t place, it is a thing whicb "" C shall vcry euily
demonstrate, that moral good and evil, just and unjust, honest and
dishonest (if they be not me", names without any signification, or names
for nathiog else but willed and commanded, but ba.·c a ",alily in respttl
of the penons oblired to do and avoid them) canDO! possibly be
a.bill'ary things, made by will without natu",; because it iii univenally
true, that things a", whal they a"" not by will but by natu"" As for
exampk, things ,.,." white by whitcness. and blad: by blackness,
nimgular by triangulariry, and round by rotundity, like by likeness, and
equal by equality, tbat is., by such certain natures ofthcir own. Neither
can Omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) by mere will make a
thing white or black without whiteness OT blackness; that is, withoul
such c:cnain na!\lres, whether 'Oie consider them :as qualities in the
objects without U$ acrording to the Peripatetical philosopby, or :as
ceruin disposioons of pam in respect of nutgnitude, figure, site, and
motion, which belt't those sen5lloons or pbantaSms of white and black
in U5. J.Z Or, 10 inst:aru:e in geoli~triClI figures, omnipotence itself cannot
by mere win make a body uimguLu without having the naNre and

u s...for ..... pk.D ,... ,..,......,''1>."' ..... ..,100 ... ,.,,,..,

"
propenies of a triwgle in it; that is, without having th...., wgles eqwJ [0
two right OOCI nor circular without .he n.mre of a circle:; that is,
without having a cireumfen:n~ equidistant e""'Y where from the Centre
or middle point. Or wtly, [0 ins~ in things relative only: omnipo-
tent win annot make things like or equal one to '!lOthe!', without the
natures oflikencss and equality. The reason whcnof is plain, be<;ause all
these things imply a manifest rontradiction: that things should be whal
they arc not And thili is a truth fundamentally nCO""sary to all
knowledge, that contradictories cannot be true; f(lr otherwise nothing
would be ~nly true (lr false. N(lw things may 3S well be made white
(lr black by mere "ill, wimoul whiteness or blllCkness, equal and
unequal, without equality and inequality, 3S morally good and evil, just
and unjust, honest and dishonest (debi,,, and iliff;',,), by mere will,
without any ruotu"' of goodness, justi«, honesty. For though Ihe will of
God be the supreme efficient cause of all things, and an produce inm
being or existence, or reduce into !lOthing whal it plC3SCth, yel il is nOI
the formal cause of any thing besides itself, 3S Ihe schoolmen have
determined, in these ","Oro5, 'That God hitnKlf cannot supply the pbce
of I formal cause' (De"", ip",,,, 11011 pont tIIppk.t l~fII'" f""S# JDmuJliJ);
and thenfore il cannO( supply the f(lrmal cause, ()I" nature of justice or
injustice, honcsty or di.honCllty. N(lw aU that We have hitherto said
amounts [O!lO more than this, thaI it is impossible any thing should be
by will only, that is without a .... rnre or entity, or that the narnre and
essence of any thing should be arbitrary.
~. And since a thing cannot be made any thing by mere will ",i!hout.
being or rnlture, every thing must be n........·.rily and immutably
determined by its own nature, and the natu", of things be that which it
is, and !lOthiog elK. For though the will and power of God have an
absolute, infinite, and unlimited command upon the existences of all
CJ'CIted things to make them to be, or not to be at pleasure; yel when
things exist, they are ,,·hat they are, this Or that, absolutely or relari""ly,
not by will or arbim')" command, but by the necessity of their own
nature. Then: is no sud! ming as an arbitJU10US essence, mode, or
",brion, that may be made indifferently any thing II pleasure. For an
arbiuarious essence is a being without a nature, I conmdiction, and
therefore I nonentity. Wherefore tile natum; of justice and injustice
cannot be arbitruioU5 things, thai may be applicabk by will indiffer-
ently to any actions or dispositions whatsoever. For the modes of all

"
,.
subsistent beings, and the relations of Ihings to one another, are
immutable and necessarily whal lhey are , and nol arbilrary, being not
by will but by nature.
J. Now Ihe nea .... ry COflse<;Juence of that which we have hithcno
said is this, that it is so far from being true that all mo~1 good and evil,
jusl and unjU'lt arc mere arbitn.ry and factitious things, that are created
wholly by will, th.t (if "'c should spnk properly) we must needs say
that nothing is mo~lIy good Or evil, just or unjU'lt by mere will without
noture, because everything is what it is by nature, and not by will. For
though it ,,;ll be obiected here, thaI when God, or civil powers
command a thing to be done, that ""30 not before obliptory or unlawful,
(<kinl"'" or illiril~"'), lhe thing willed Or commanded doth forth,,;th
become obliptory (Jiov or ddi!" ...), thaI which oughl 10 be done by
creatures and subjects respecti"ely; in which the mrure of mont! good
or evil is commOlll)' rence;"ed 10 consiSl:. And therefore if aU good Ind
e,;l, JUS! and unjust be not the =atures of men: "'ill (as many assen)
yet al lel'il posili\"e things must needs owe all their morality, their good
~nd evil, to mere will without nature. Yet notwith.Luldi"g, if "'c well
consider it, we ,hall find ,ha, c,'cn in posil;"e commands themselves,
mere will doth not make the thing commanded just or nbliptory, or
beget and create any ob~ption 10 obediencc; bUI that;1 is nalu~l juslice
or equity which gives to One tl\(: right or authority of commanding, and
begcts in anolher duty and obliption to obedience. TherefOI"t it is
obser ....ble, thaI laws and commands do not run Ihu. to will that Ihis or
that thing shall bttome JUSt or unjusI, obliplory or unlawful, Or thaI
men sholl bc obliged or bound 10 ~y; bUI on ly to ffi:l.uire 1h<l1
something be done nr no! don<:, or olherwise 10 tnCIUce punishment to
the lransgressors thereof. For ;1 ""IS neVer heard of that anyone
f(}UJ1ded 011 his authorilY of commanding others. and others' obliption
or dUlY 10 obey his commands, in • law of his own making, 1""1 men
should be: ffi:l.uircd, obliged, or bound 10 obey him. Whtl"tforc since Ihe
thing willed in 011 laws is not that We should be obliged to obey, this
Ihing cannot be: the product of Ihe merc will of lhe commander, bUI it
musl proceed from something elst, namel y Ihe right or authority of the
commander, which is founded in natural justi<:e and equity, and an
antecedent obligo.tion to obedien<:e in the s.ubiects. Which things arc not
made by laws, but prcsupposed before oll1aws to make them valid_ And
if il should be: imagined th<lt anyone should make a positiYe law 10

.,
require thill others should ~ obliged or bound to obey him, everyone
would think such J law ridiculous and absurd. For if they wen: obli(ed
before, then thillaw would ~ in vain and to no PUIPOS('. And ifthf,y
were not before obliged, then Ihey could nO! ~ obliged by any positive
law, becauK they ...·ere not previously bound to obey 5uch a pelWll'$
commands. So Ihat obliption to obey all posilive law.; i5 older than all
laws, and previous or anlecedenl to them. Neither i. il a lhing thz is
arbitrarily made by will, or can be Ihe obj-ecl of command, but that
which either is Or is IlOI by nillure. And if thili were not I11oOr.IIly good
and just in its own nature befon: any positive command of God mat
God $hould be obeyed by his creatures, the bare will of God himself
could not beget an obliption upon an)" to do .... h31 he willed wd
corttnunded, beauS(' the naturc5 nf things do not depend upon ...m,
being nO! things that arc arbitr:l.rily made (Yll'vOJ.I£"'"-I) but things thlt are
(5VTU). To conclude therefore, even in positive la .... and commands II is
not mere will that obligcth, but the ""tures of good and evil, JUSt and
unju!<l, really existing in the world .
<4 . Wherefore Ihat common distinction ~twin things naturally and
positively good and evil, or (as otheR express it) betwixt things that arc
therefore commanded beauS(' they are good and just, and things that
an: therefore good and JUSt, Jl beause Ihey are commanded, stands in
need of a right explication, that we ~ not led into a mistake thereby, as
if the obligation to do Ihose thetial and posilh'e things did arise wholly
from will without nature. Wherns it is not the mere will and pleasure of
him tlut C(lmmandelh that obligelh to do positive things commanded,
but the inteUecnul nature of him tlut is corrunanded. Wherefore the
difference of these thingo lies wholly in this, th31 there are oome thingo
which the intellectual nlture obligelh to of itself (~r ... ) and directly,
absolutely, and perpetually, and Ihese things are called naturally good
and evil. OIhe. things there arc which the same intellectual nature
obligerh to by accident only, and hypothetically, upon condition of soow:
voluntary action either of otJr own or IiOITIC other person's, by means
whereof those things which were in their own nature indifferent, falling
under oomething that is absolutely good Of evil, and thereby acquiring a
new relation u> the intellectual nature, do for the time berome ..Jeh
things as ought to be d~ Of omitted (ubi" or iIIicil,,), being "",de
" "111.;' ""' ~ I ,_<>I; rO., - " .. "" .... Ul"~
qo 0.. .. h.s..- _ W .. t- ....
,....
Cood _ _ ""' .....
_oFC. "'(,r.,,~ So. TIS .. !""" p.~.

"

,.
luch not by wiU but by "'"ture. Iu for uample, to keep faith and
perform covenantll i5 that which natural justice obligcth to absolutely.
Therefore. upon supposition (tX J,y~rlltn) that any om mUcth a
promise, which is a voluntary act of his 0\\11, to do something which ~
W;\S not hl:fonc obliged to by natural jUStitt, upon t~ imn'iemion of

this voluntary act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now
under oomc:thing absolutcly good and becoming the maner of promi..,
and covenanl, modeth for the present in a new relation to the rational
nature of the promiSCT, and becometh for the rime a thing which ought
to hi: done by him, or wllich he is obliged to do. Not as If the mere will
or \\'ords and breath of him that coYenameth had any pown to change
the moral natures of things, or any ethical virtue of obliging, but
bec:au.., natural jU5tioe and equity obligc!h to keep faith and perfonn
COVenallli. In lilr.e mannn IUturai justice, that is the rational or
imelkctual nature, obUgcth not only to obey God, but also civil poweR,
that havc lawful authority of commanding, and to obsc"'c political order
amongst men. Aod theref"", if God or civil powers command any thing
to be done that is not unlawful in itself, upon the intervention of tills
voluntary act of theirs, those things that were befonc indifferen t bI:<:ome
by accident (Of" the time obligatory, such things as ought to be done by
us, not for rheiT own sakes, but for the sake of that which natural justice
absolutely obligcth to.
And these are the things that are commonly called po..livt/y good and
evil, JUSt Of" unjust, such as though they arc adiaphoTOUs or indifferent
in themselves, yet natural justice obligclh to accidentally, on supposition
(~;r 1ty,.,llIIn) of the voluntary actioo of oome other person rightly
qualified in commanding, whereby they fall into sometbing absolutely
good. Which things are not made good or Ju~ by the mere will of the
commander, but that rultUral justitt which gives lIim right and authority
of oommanding, md obligeth O{hCl"S to oI>I:y him, ,.;thout whid! oatural
justice, neither COVCJWItIl nor commands, could possibly oblige anyone.
For the will of another doth no more oblige in commands, than our own
will in promises and covenmts. To rondude, therefore. things called
nlturally good and due arc such things as the intellecrual nlture obliges
to immediately, absolutely, md perpetually, and upon no condition of
any voluntary action Wt may be done Or amine.:! intervening. But those
thinp Wt an: caUcd positivciy good and due arc such as narural justice
or the infl!:lIcctua1 nltun: obligeth to accidentally md hypothetically,

'I' ate
upoo condition of ~ voluntary act of another pt:TSOn invested with
lawful authority in romrrwK!ing.
And that it is not the tnerrc will of the COIIUlW1dcr that makes Ihese
positive things to oblige or bcrorne due but the nature of things appean
evidaldy from hence because it is not the volition of every one that
obligeth, but of a pt:rson rightly qualified and invested with lawful
aumority. And because the libmy of commanding is circumscribed
wimin arttin bounds and limits, so mal if any commandCT go beyond
the sphere and bounds mat nature IiCI$ him, which an: indifferent
things, his commands will nOI al all oblige.
s. But if we would speak yet more ac<;uratdy and precisely, we might
rather say, that no positive COI11ITW\ds whaliOCver do make any thing
morally good and evil, just and unjust, which nature had not nude !uch
before. For indifferent things commanded, considered malerially in
themselves., remain snil whalthey WCre before in their own nature, that
is indifferent, because, as Aristotle spcah, 'wiU cannot change narure'
(ro rPiJolll t1Ki"'Tl"Ov). And those things that are by nalure indiffclCDt
(tJ>V<r1ll dt5uirPopa), must needs be as immut:lbly SO as those things \hat
an: by nature JUSt or unjust (rPPat.l OIKllla or ~IKa), honest or Gh:uneful
(Ka.W or WU;oxl). But alllhe moral goodness, justice, and virtue, that is
exercised in obeying positive commands and doing such mings as are
fOrUM only, and to be done for no other cause bUI because they an:
commanded, or in respect to political order, ronsistcth DOl in the
materiality of the actions themsch·cs, but in that formality of yideing
obedience to the commands of lawful authority in them. Just as whon a
man covalaDlcm Or promiscth 10 do an indiffeTCnt thing which by
narural justice he was not bound 10 do, the virtue of doing it COIlliisn::th
II<H in the materiality of the action promiso:d, hut in the formal.i1J of
keeping faith and performing rovcnanlS. Wheref~ in po$itive c0m-
mands, the will of the conunander doth not create any neW moral enoty,
but only diversely modifies and determines that general duty Or
obligation of narural justice 10 obey lawful authority and keep oaths md
rovenmts, as our own will in promising doth but produce IICv~ral
modifications of kcc-ping faith. And mereforc Ihere an: no new mings
just or due made by either of them, besides what was .always by 'U,,""
such, 10 kcc-p our own promises, and obey the lawful rommands of
others.
6. We set: then Ihat it is so far from being true lhat all moral good md

"
,.
~vil. j....1 and unju.1 (if Ih~y be any thing) are made by mere will and
arbitrary tomJIWld5 (as many ton<;cive), Ihat il ;5 not posiiible tNt any
command of God Or man should oblige otherwise than by vinue of [hal
...hich is narurally jusl (4)tiou &Kmov). And though particular promisa
and commands be made by will yet il is no! will but oalUre tNt obligcth
10 Ihe doing of things promiKd and commanded, or makcs Ihem ouch
things as oughl 10 be do~ (demQ). For mere "iU cannot change the
moral nature of actions, nor the nature of intellectual beings. And
therefORe, if there Wert no natur.tl j ....ticc, that is, if the rational or
illlellectlJ.;ll natURe in itself were indetermined and uoobliged to any
thiog, and so destilU te of all morality, il were not posiiibk that any thing
should be ma(\(, mor.tlly good or evil, obliptory or unLawful (dentll'" or
j/ljdlll,.,), or [NI any moral obliption should be begonen by any will or
command whatso<:ver.

Chapter III

I. But oomc: [here are thai wiU .[iU contend , dUll though i[ should be
vanted that moral ,000 and evil, JUSt and unjust, do nOl depend upon
any created will, yet notwithlitandin, they must n«ds dc-pmd upon the
arbitrary will of God, because the narnre and essc:nca of all thiogs. and
ton5e<juendy all Vcr1lies and falsities depend upon the same. For if the
natura; and essences of things should IlOI depend upon the will of God,
it would follow from hence that something that was not God was
independent upon God. M
2 . And this is plainly asserted by Ihal ingenio .... philo&ophu RenltuS
Descartes, who in his answer to the Sinh Objector apim;t his
Metaphysical Meditations, writes th ....:
11 is • contradiction 1<1 say that the wiD of God wu not from eternity
indifferalllo.1I things ,..hid> .... or e'·a ....11 be don<; ber;:auoe no toad
or evi~ nothing 10 be belie,-ed, or done, or omilled, con be fixed upon,
the id.. w~f '""" in the divine in,dlect befou ,ho, his will
detennined itself 10 effect Wt such a thing ohould be. Neither do I speak
this COI>C<:ming the: pnori,y of time, bu, .,..,n "'ere wu nothing prior in
 ord<r .... by nature, .... by reason .. they call ;t, so as that idea of good
in.c~ncd God to choose one thing rather than another. As r.... nample's
we he Yo'auld the~fore create the world in tim<, because that he sa ..
thai it would be bett.,. SO than if he IwI <mItcd it from .t<Tni,y; neither
wilkd h. thai the three Ingles of I triangle should be equl l to tWO right
angles, beau.. he knew that it could not be oth~. Bu, on the
contrary, beaux he would tmtIC Ihe .. orld;n time. ,herdi>~ it is brn.,.
than if he IwI created it fTom eternity; and beatuse: he: would that the
three ."gI.. of I trian~1e .hould n........ rily be equal 10 ,,.0 right angle$,
therefore Ihis is lrUe lnd no otherwise; [ ... ] and so of oth ... 'hinp. And
thUI the great.. t indifference in God is Ihe " .. tes, I1F'm..." of his
omnipo"""""
.... nd again afterward:
To him thll cotllOider1,he imm .... ity of God ;. i. manifm ,hat th.,.. can
be "",hinll a, all which doth not depend upon him, "'" only nothing
oubsisting, but .150 no ord ... , no b .. , no rasan of truth and goodneu. "

And when he was again urged by the Sia.h Objector,

Could"", God couse: that the natu~ or. triangle should not be Iud, and
how, I pray thee, could he fmm eternity couse: that i, should not be true,
that twice four arc eight>"

H e conf~h inJelluously thai ,hose things were nQ{ intdligiblc to US;

" 'RorpoF'" DU ............. __ ru-. ........... a.!illftm_ '" ........ ~ r.ru ..... au'
_ fitn~ quia " " _ ......." ..1 ........ , ",,!\un G 1 ' . . . m _ _ m
... _ Mp - . ........ Ok< ....«II«:<u di..., prM ....... q""" <iuo ...........
detmn ..... ad dl;,;,,,,dum "' it! ........., ~ ~ i< ~ do po ... ito ...... pori<. otd ..
. . . - prim f"~ ........ m ""'''' m ....... nriocino .. "' ..,.,..~ .. . . - "' ........
itIea impolerit 0...... ad """'" ..,.... """'" aliud •• ', ....... Nem"" ..cmpIi~. - . ideo
_ cr-. m.......... _ ...... q.,;, .;,til sO: ....... foR, q""" ,; " [ ............. 0«
_ _ "'1' .... ....,.~ ......... _ _ ..m.,quia ..., .it ..... fIeri _ _ 1o<.

... _ .. qorit_.........................
Sed _In, quia - . "' .... ""' ........ _ . icIeo Ji< .......... _

jMo hoc ............. fieri _

Ii """"'" I\Iioo«
u .......,," _ _ . - - . _
... poI"",,,_;u do .. ~ .. t, .. l r.. ............ ...wr..en...
.. Doo _ or ....... "" -s - "....
ph' Ih, ........... _
.......-tum· (Do '0, M.~ . • M ,.;-
....... ..,.., ', ... .. _ '''I' ' ...... _ (Am, [400,.
,&71). _ . 6. Po >9[ . AT .... oIJ''''~ ro..to· ' '" EoJljoll ..........., ... CSM ...... ,Il". "Th<
..
- ill . . . ;
or 01" ,. ..... 0 ... ' M .... ,;oo" " r _ ,I"' .";....
...... v~
:.~.:.,,;..:.;.~.. f ...
f" 'f '1.,)"",,0[...... b u _ _ """"' ........ _" 'loci ..,. Marin Ma
.. 'Au ',oi ad 0.; io .., • [a" """ifaoum .... ni1141 """'....... _ . quod'" ipoo-.
"'" '-n. ......... oUh~ ..I . a..,
otd etiono HIkuw .. d........... n.m ....... ....n..n"
.. iUnan "';etboni'(O,i'l .... Mt&........ -., I,AT .....15. CSM .. ... ' ~
" ."'~ ...... (Oe.ot) ponMt <ffi '. O[ .............. ti _ fucrit! [ [ 'I"" _ ..........
... .. , ................. '" -. r. ...........m t.;o q.a ..... ____ (0.- ....
.<Irk.,,-. 5;. .. s., .r~..,." AT .... • ,1. CSM .. >94~

'3

,. ••
but notwithstanding they must be: so beaUM:, 'Nothing in any son of
bring an be, which doth not deJl(nd upon God. ,le Which docU"ine of
Cartesiu. is greedily , wallowed down by some servile foUo.,...,,.. of his
that have lately wrilten ofthe old philosophy (it prilrw p"jl~S()p"i4). J9
3. Perhaps some may make l question fOf all this, whether Cartesiul
were any more in carnest in thi., than when he el"where goes about to
defend the doctrine of tnnSUbswniation by the principles of his new
philosophy beaUK, in his Meditations upon the old philo&ophy
[MIdi/.rioN. ) (where it i. probable he would set down the genuin(: ""n""
of his own mind more und isguisedly, before he ...·os assaulted by these
objecw,.., and thereby fol"ttd to tum himself into "Vern lihapes) he
dlirmetb that the essences of things .,...,re eternal and immutable. But
afterward urged by Gasscndus with this inconvenience, thallhen some--
Ihing would be clernal and inunutablC' besides God, and SO independent
upon God, he doth in a manner unsay il again, and bewes himself 10
Ihis pitiful evasion,

AI'''' poets feign ,har ,he fa,a were ind~ fi>cd by Jupi,er, bu"hal
.. hen they ..ere fixed, he had obliged himoclfro the pi · 'vlng of, ....... ,
so I do nat think tha, 1M asenc:u of things, and ,I>ow: rnaIMrnati(:ol
lnlths which can be kno"", of I........ arc independen' on God. Bu, I
think nc •• n:hcleu, that beca ..... God 10 willed and 10 ordered . ther.fore
they.,.. immutable and e,ernal.-

Which is plainly to make them in Iheir own nature muuble. BUI

whether CaTlesius were in jest or earnest in Ihili business. it matters not,
for his ban: authority ought to be no more valued by us lhan the
.. 'N;Wiolollo _ _ _ _ _ quod'O"'-, ' "(o..a.-,M..,.......-lT ....
4J6. C5.\I ... >6, ), n.. ""iLL"'''
loy I'im< C , .... i ...... ~I<d ...... fi/ih .. 01
Qt; . , .. '''1, :1.1'1« " dOc D "- , __' ..,..,.. c,w.!' , • funher .....
"iDcioo'd _ .... po H,'o' _ .......... ..... ,1,,, ;.....
";'p . ., ' ~ .....
_""",,";"(:1.

~,
p;'-
uk 01
,,d,,,,.,604),
.. '0. ...... ,,1" .. t'··, ...... bolool .... M'.' "
,t ., ._ ........ """ .... _ .....
'''''TIHo._
v~
.;,~p....io""""" ,. .
M _ _ _ F..... P... . , ...,. '";,, .... ~_'.l . , ,

011"' )
..,'1.___
..
_ 0 1 ....
,hr. Cuot-. """''''' , bw , .......' .. '0l0i', Uo. ~. r
io.
..
/U
'., J ,. ..
l" •"P''''-. " . "por,
1 _ _ .. ........ _. . Cud-'" liF "
Can . ,...... K";.q; + ;., .... '"r""'- io . - ....... So. below. "". JI and
'5'· , trod" " _
.. '<l! fiIopao , ,... I . '0 -, ro .. ro'" I.... ...t, 'f'"m.....to Ii><r<
~ ....... , 1", , 0,, · . .......... _ , .......... =d q"' .
_ .... _.It ..... • Ti I . '. _ _ pt!i' Ii. . . Dco; ...t _.;!lao "' ........
0......,-."' .... ,', ,;,,~_ ......._ ....... _(:fT..... JIo~CSM a, >6, .
~uthority of Aristotk ~nd other ancient philosophers was by him, whom
he &0 fncly dissents from.
4. For though the names of things may be changed by any one ~t
plcasure:, os thai a sqll1f'l: may be called a cirde, or a cube a sphere:, yel
thai the nature: of a square should not be necessarily wlut it is, but be
arbitrarily oonvenible into the nalure: of a cin:le, and &0 Ihe essence of a
cin:k into the essence of a spbcre, Of tlut the self same body, which is
""rfeedy cubical without any physical alleralion nude in it, should by
this mcuphysical WlIy of tr.uufonnation of essences, by mere: will and
C1)fI'UtWId be made spherical or cylindrical; this doth most plainly imply
a contradiction, and Ihe compossibilily of oontndiaions deslrOYS all
knowlcd~ and the definite natures (raIKws) or notions Oflhings. Nay,
thaI which implies. contradiction is a nonentity and therefore cannot be
the object of di.ine power. And the reason is the same for all other
things, OS just and unjust; for evtr)' thing is what it is immutably by the
necessity of its own nature. Neither is it any derogation al aU from the
power of God to sa)·, Ihal he cannot make a thing 10 be Ihal which it is
nQ{. Then there mighl be no such thing as knowledge in God him..,lf.
God mighl will that there should be no such thing os kno.... Ied~.
). And as to the being or not being of particular essences, as th.:.t God
might, ifhe pleased, h.ve willed llul there .hould be no such thing as a
mangle or circle, and therefore nothing demonstrable Or knoWllbk of
either of them. Which is likewise asserted by Cmesius, and tOOse that
make the essences of things dependent upon an arbitrary will in God.
This is all one as if onc should say thot God could hoH willed, ifhc had
pleu..... , that neither his own po ....er nor kno .... ledge should be infinile.
6. Now it is certain that if the natures and essences of aU things., lIS 10
their being such or such, do depend upon a will of God that is
essentially arbitrary, there can be no such thing as lICM:nce Of demonstra-
tion, nor the ITUth of any mathematical or metaphysical proposition be
kllOWn by any otherwise, than by a certain enthusiastic or fanatic faith
and persuasion thcrcupon, Wt God would hn'c such. thing 10 be truc
Or false at such a lime Or for so long. And so nothing would be lTUe Or
false rullurally (tjlOOI:I), bUI positi"ely (Owa) only, all truth and science
being mete arbilnriou5 things. Truth and falsehood would be only
names. Neither would there be any more certainty in the knowledge of
God himself, since it must whoUy &""nd upon the mutability ofa will
in him essentially indifferent and undetennined. And if we would speak:

"

'VI ate
pro~rly according to this hypothesis, God himsdf would nOl: know or
be wise by knowledge or by wisdom, but by will."
7. WiH:TefOK as for that UJUmcnt. that unless the esseII<:a of things
and all ~erities .nd falsiries depend upon me arbiuary will of God , then
would be something that was not God, independ""t upon God. Ifit will
be wdl consideral, it will pro~e a men mormo, bugbear, and nothing
SO tmble and formidable: as Canellius seemed to think it.· 2 For there is
no othu genuine oonscqurnce deducible from this assertion, that the
CSRn<:a and veritiell of things arc independent upon the will of God,
but tb.u then is an etemil and immutable wi.dom in the mind of God,
and thence particip,ated by CIl'ated beings inde~ndent upon tt.c will of
God. Now the wisdom of God is as much God as the will of God. And
whet""r'] ofth_ two things in God, thn is, will or wisdom, should
de~nd upon the other, will be beSl detennin.cd from the "",·era! n.turell
of them. For wisdom in itself hath the natUre of a rule and mnsun, it
being a IT>OSI detcnninate and inflexible thing. But will being not only a
blind and dark thing as consideral in itself, but also indefinite and
indetenninatc, h.th thcnfon the natun of • thing regubbk and
measurable. Whenfon it is the perfection of will, as such, to be I"ided
and determined by wisdom and !ruth. But to make wisdom, knowkdge,
and trUth to be arbitruiJy determined by ...ill, and to be regulated by
such I plumbean and flexibk rule (Ka...:iw /loA.iJPJ.W>I;) as tha! is, is
quite to destroy the n.ature of it. For science or knowledge is the
rompreIH:nsion uf that which necessarily is ("atdh7\1"~ tOO 01'1"(1(,;), and
there can be nothing moll' oontradicriou. than truth and hlse:hood
arbitrary. Now all the knowledge and "iOOom tMt is in creatur..,
whether angels or men, is nOfhing else: but a p;lTlicip;ltion of that OIle
eternal, immutable, and increated wisdom of God, or ""ve.... l signotu","
of that one archerypoJ seal, or like so many multiplied nflection. of one
and the same face, made in ""veral glossn, ...·hereof!iOl11e all: clearu,
some obscuru, somc: standing neanr, SOIlX further off.
8. Moreuvet", it was the opinion of me ...isnt philosophers (as we
shall show arterward) that there is also in the scale of being a natUre of
goodness su~rior to wisdom, which therefore measures and determines
the wisdom of God, as his wisdom measures and determines his will,
and which the ancient cabalists wen wont to call .,n~ crown, as being
., ~Tls.P' ¥'
" ... ""KII .

,6

'V' ate
the top or crown of the Deity, of which more afterward. When:fore
allhoulI'li ....,..., no,"elist!;i i nuke a romncted ide.! of God ronsisrin, of
nothing else but will and power, yet his Mture is bettC'!" expressed by
some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinitc circle,
whose inmost centre is sim ple ~ness, the radii [or} ray. and
expanded area (plat) thereof all compre hen ding and immutable wisdom,
the extenOr periphery or interminate circumference, omnipotent will or
activity by which every thing without God is brought forth into
existena:. Whcn:fore the will and po·.... er of God havinl!' no command
inwardly (imjlt""m 4Ii jlflri') either upon the wisdom and knowledge of
God, Or upon the ethical and moral disposition of his nature whid is
his GKntial gondna;,;, but the sphere of its activity is without God
(afT/! Dt-um), when: it hath an absolute command upon the exisTences
of things, and is always free, though oot 3lways indifferent, since it i, its
rrcatcst perfection to M determined by infinitc wisdom and infinite
gondna;,;. But this is to anticipate what ac<:ording to t~ laws of method
should follow afterward in anothu pbcc .
.. c................. """'._

.,
,.
Copyrighted material
 Book II

Chapler I
l. No .. me demon.move .trenlflh of our cau"" lying plainly i. Ihis, Ihll
;t is nol possible thaI anything should be without ..... IUn:, and the
nalUra or e!;Sena:5 of all things being immutable, then:fore upon
su pposition that men: is any thing really just or unjust, due or unb ..ful
(Uhl#IfI or iIJililum), thue must of nca:ssity be something so both
nalUra/ly and immutably, which no la .., decrtt, will, nor custom can
aller. Ther(: have not wanted some :unong the old philosophcn that
",ther than they would acknowledge any thing immutably jusl or
unjust, would nO{ stick to shake the very foundations of all things, and
10 deny lhat men: was any immutable nalUr(: or 1:$SeTla: of any thing,
and by tonKqUalce any absolute ccn:ointy of truth or knowledge,
maintaining this 11l'1IIlge panodOl, that both all being and know ledge was
fanwtial and reluive only, and Ihorefore lhal nOlhing was good or evil,
jusl or unjust, true or false, white or bbck, absolutely and immutably,
bUI relatively 10 every privale person's humour or opinion.
2. The principal assertor of this enravagant opinion was Protagonl$
the Abderite, who, IS Pbto instructs us in bis 1'IIl~eltlru, held
thaI nothing ..... any thing in itself Ibsolutely, but wu II .... ys made 10 ro
oomc thing else, and ew:nc:e or being .,.. '" be mnnvcd from tvtry
.c · ,
",mg.

ooI:IP
(I'l00>.
"_"'"",,0 .w.. "vi"';
Q/T .......
n........ ..... H.N. F_1er
,q>wtIot '" 6'11- ""~
and Ne. yoot. "pl.
(1Andooo
1.:........,.
111'~ 10 thio and ""
. . . . . . II' . Cud_ ........... ,1, •.,tIw.". ....... (loeb ' M'j. P, , : ..
(h. , . .. , oq _ .... "''''' _ _ s.,II ....

'I' ate
In which position of his then: sccms to be these t,,·o things asiCTted: 6rsl
WI ollthinp were in pe'perual motion and nothing had any bo:ing (n:u-)
bm a possibilily !O be (jim"), which thc said Protoguru thus cxpressed:
AU !hingo are made by motion and m"tun: of Ihings together, :and
!herdOr. are AM riJhdy said to hIi:. Por II01hin, ;. bul thin, ;. .,.tty
al .... ys mode. l

S«ondly, Ih.u nothing i. mode ahsoluldy, but only n:lalh'cJy 10 some-

Ibing clse,
Ifany ........ y lha, ony thing rido ... is or is ",.,de. h. mUSt say, ...! il i..,o '0
oomct/oin" or in ,espee! oho,.... body for we Cln_ .lIirm thalony thing
rither ill or ill made absolul.1y in itselfbu! mali"e1y to ........,hinS .Ise.'

3. Now from hence proceeded those known aphorisms of his,

n:cordcd both in Plato and AriSlotk, '1 ....1 those thinp ...·hieh appear 10
cve,), one, arc !O him 10 whom they 'pr:u·. And .gain, 'thar eve,),
fancy or opinion of c"cry body ""as rrue'. And again, 'ThaI man is the
measure of all things whether existing 01" not cxisling.'~ Which sentence
sccmcd so prell:y and orgule to him Ih.1 he placed it in thc "cry r""'l
of his book, as Ploto tells us.' And indud i. ocnnpriscs in it all the
singubriry of his philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this: n(M
only that man taken generaUy is the measure of all things (which in
""'"'" sen.., might be affirmed that our o.... n human faculoo are the
mca5urc of all things unlO us), but also th •• 'c"cry indiyidual lTlIn is
the measure of all bo:ing and truth' respccti"cly to himselr. f or IiO the
following words in PIaIO uplain it:
You, meaninJ (..ilh Socrates) is .his. 1"'1 .. e"o"ery IhinJ lppcars to!roe.
ouch K is to !roe. And .. it oppears to you, such il i. 10 you. both of \IS
being oIik ...... n.'

• '£0: <II "'i ~ « Kol .. ' j. ~ ,...; ~,;.....; .,., .v..u,..... ,;" .. 01• • "'i ~ J.., ....
~ .. a)l o I ,,«ibMI . , . S2D~
, £fro '0; JNI ,,~..,..i("... ".; J ..... ~ " ..... ~ ~ " krJoy ~. d« i f I _ ....6 Ii
~ ....... " ~ &. t iii '", ..... " ' " ~"",,,,.o.' 4.i..I<oT> .u,..,,~ "'''''''".... (ibMI.,
1!Ioe).
• ,. ........... ""~ ,iMa ~oiu- ,.6"11 oj, ........ (ibMI., Islo). c-pa... lpo1
- . . ........io /#n. d! ,Ai<: (So"... ~Ap ....... :II"~" ""J'IOI.
""'c.
• ,.; ...... ~,..,_ . . . .o.d"". , ... ~ ~"""'''''I.m. r<l<o<loll'it"""' . .....
", .. (n-.m., I$ "~
• tid.,16tc.
, Ooloco/io .0..... ant;; ....... 0.; ....... h........ Jp<tI ;..;...... ,_,g. lin" q,d ... :Ii
..... , ·1 ••• _ f "'~:Ii ..... . . (tid " ,poI ~
Wherefore it is elsewhere up""''''' after this IJWIner, 'dUlt every IJWl
is the measure of what is and is MIt, that is t(l himself, and 'tlut every
on<: il the measure of his own wisd"", to himself." Sextus Empiricul
gives a short account of this Proul{Orean philosuphy in a few word.
thus, 'He assoeru that which sums to every one to be, and so makes all
thinp rebtive." Now this was a hi&her strain of madness than the
Pyrrhonian scepticism, which was not SO ucn.vagant as m affirm thaI all
things were fantastical and relative only, but that we could not affirm
what thinp absolutely were in their own nature, but only what they
S«med to us.
4. But that all this was intended chidly "" a bantry Or assault against
monJity, and principally levelled by ProUI{Ora.s against the absolute and
immutable natures of I{OOd and evil, ju!tt and unjust, appearrth also
from sundry p~ of that learned dialogue called n~iUU/I<J,
Tell me therefore, dust thou in Jood camost think Ihot nothinl is Jood
or honest, but i!t always made SO?IO

And .ftefWllrds Prougoras affirms,

that wh.~ver things -.n be Jood ."d jU$> 10 every cily or
\0
commonwealth, the ..me are so to that city or commonwealth SO long >$
they....."..,."

Again,
Whatsoc:,·.. !hings .n y city thinking doth decree \0 be hones!: or
di$honest, ju<' or unjUSt, I>oly "'" unholy, ,host things .,.., ..... lIy or .....1y
ruth to thaI city. And in lu<h things 0.5 these no one printe pn1<>n DO"
city i!t wiser than ano!h ...

B«:ausc:,
None of these things have any nature or ....""" of their own, being
mertly fanl2$ti",1 ""d nlati ••. "
• ~. &<...no. oj,.d>oo 01_ ...... u _ ot4i 1"1 .....,... 01.... ""'IP ~., ""'ol 00 ,14.;;
( _ , 'i6D).
• ,"""', ,01 ~ .......... (~~ ... oM"", dt:oQ)'CI ,. yi>; ,j ,s......
-OU_ofryrrloool"",·, UI6, in S ..... f ,' .... willi .. Eoc6oII ow II ' II by "'G, Bwr.
r.rnv;. ...,
polL(! 'landNewyon. 1911),YO!. I,
It ,cq. ,oJ_ ri.IJ •• d""; llpimra ,,; I"i ".0.... LUoi )'1_""" old oI)aiIO • ...; <a.l6. <1'I0I0,
1ltMUho. 157"~ !MtJ: -n- "1 __ ...... """ .... , tilt don ... p-..)<IO dIM _ ... ;.,
booc . _ , . . .... ,.... pod ... -.;foI .. ""l'of ........... 'I'nN"·

Il
'..,
II "'1· ~''''''r ..ua "'''''''' ...; o;a).oI oloq. _ o;a} <i..., .w.iI. "'"

KoU "".....,; ';'yO, (""';1""""" o;a} .,.,.,. o;a} """ . oi"';' ..... ~. """,,,
",..no.
-..,.i{~ fol*I,
>tM.; ,lr;fI<h I

"
'I' ate
Ludy,lO name no II1I'ln: places,
TIle !hing!hat "'" "tre .hout to $how wu!his that they which made the
natures and cuenca of all things, Rowin3 and mUlOblt, and which heLd
!hat what sctl.ltd to (vttY body, _ !hat 10 whom it so It ",ltd, II they
do maintain this cona:J hinK aU other things, 10 ronct. "ing nothinB mort
thm iu .. and unilUt, II bring unqlteJ.ioMbly tr\te of these, that
.. hllSOe'ler any oi.y Ihink. to be good and ju.. and dta !hem Iud>,
theso thing> arc 10 to that city, 10 long IS they on 10 dca I • d .IJ

Chapter It

, . Wherefo~ sinct in order to the wing ''''ay of the immutable

natures of good and evil, just and unjust, and the ItKInl differences of
humane actions, there was so strange an attempt made by these
philosophen 10 ovenhrow the absolute essences and truths of all things,
let uS in the ntx. place consider what pretences Or grounds they could
po5Sibly have for maintaining 10 wild a pa .... dox as .his.
First, therefore, it is evident from Plato's wrirings that Protlgoru laid
his foundation in the Heraclitical philosophy, at that time in 1fTC'I' vogue
and request in the world, which did, as thll philosopher writes, 'bring
in a IIooiring and movable tsSellce', and maintained, 'that nOlhing Rood,
bu. all things moved and 110"'«1'." An opinion which IOO5t of the
ancients were inclining '0, as appears from .he poets, who made 'all
things to be the offspring ofnu and motion',u in SO much that Homer
himself (as Piaro observes) deriviol the pedigree of the gods, made the
0ctatI their fllher and Tethys their moth .... '·
And there were not any philosophers ofnole besides Parmenidn and

/A7f-. """""" t.wre, m.u. KG! Ii_ rt oI.,Dlii; .... ,' Kai h .......... ".. - . """""'_
""" """",. 1IociK.. """
. . . . ...",oiI
"",y.
q.,. (.... , " ..).
"" ..... Ii_ (...., " ..). «« &n, ;.loa _ __
u ~m_""''''''oO ~ h<i>~ ", ,,,, ,,,,· ,,._. ~nJ
m o/ci _ .......~. ,.or" "'" _ . """" .;. """d. h .... ~ i.Uoo;; MlUoo. ""
~ .uti .,,;,: ...... ....... _ ~ ... ",.1,; .-.u...
I b ti\ftdt ~ oI6{o.,•
..... ,aI)c.""u""_....,., ~ " I<br<"'("', '"c-<» .
" ..,.,,,'" ....... ..,.,..•. 0&li0 .............. 011 KU.Bat (il*!., ,680).
" ........ .,.... Poo!<ldj:.,...·I«nJ'"
,. D!<m";. to _ )i_i', nJ ptripo
........ '(W., 'S>I;I.odI •• "
T..,
j.

,~A>I>'
"-("'., '5"),
'Oc<ot! ... dot oript aI .... pcIo. onoI
all_ ..., ....
T...,.. """"

"
Me1issus., that opposed it, woo also rul into another cxtmne,17 And
therd'ote the fonntr of these Plato facetiously calls 'the flowing
phiLosophers' (f~ .6io»f~) and Ihe Illter, the 'sunders' (01"<1-
"lWf~).lB Now the trUe meaning of this Hem:litical philosophy was
plainly this, that there is no other heing in the world besilks individual
body or matter, and no such thing as sunding intelligible forms (dm7),
tmot is no intellecntal heing. Which matter or corporcal heing ... il i.
liable 10 motion and mutation because of ;IS divisibility, eyery part orit
btUlg aeparable from anoihet", SO by the mutation tmot we find in all
corporcal things, we may «UOI1ably conclude thll ;1 is throughout
perpetwlly moved and agitaICd by streamS and subtle matter passing
the pores of all bodies. Whena it was that they affirmed 'that all things
flowed like a stream', 19 and lmol there WI$ no .tability either of essence
or knowledge any where to he found. For that Cratylus and Heraclitus
endcoyoured to destroy the cenainty of all sclena from this principle is
uident in Ihat !hey maintained that rontmiict(lrK:s might he true
rooaming the same thing, and at the same rime. And indeed if there
were no other heing in the world bUI individual matter, and all knowl_
ed,e p,oa:t<kd from the impleHe5 of that malICr, that heing always
agitated, it is not oolKriY1lbJe how there could he any stability of
knowledge any more than (If CSlCncc found in this npid whirlpool of
corporeal things. Nay, nor how there should he any such thing as
knowledge at aU. Wherefon: acoonIin, to this Hcraclilical philosophy,
Protagons in the first place concluded, 'that knowledge is nmhing else
bm $Cf1SC'.2O'l For 2$ Plalo writes, 'These two assertions come .tIro one,
mat all thinp flow like a s = , and that knowledge and sense are Ofle
and the self same thing. >21
a. But Protagons Went further, and made a superstructure upon lhis
Hem:litical phiLosophy out of the old alOlIlical or Phoenician phiJo...

" Del .• ,s..,s..n...OWIiott • .6s""'~''''I'II'''''''' 5. ...

" n..•• ,... 'a' ...... s... .... "'_,... ~ '4'>. c-p.r. TIS,p ..., - . ..........t
"",noou", __ .p 1'0.;0 ; " ... lrio<o 1'10,.\ _ . Io" .. u. _ .. hdoI d dtinp .. flow •
........, ~"'" ~""' ....... ..". , .... "'"' _ Ih;.p6l_...... "'"'
....... _ M;.,p", .w.;", • _ I , , +~ N...... .. wit,.., EotmoI M.o.t. """""" _

E......t Mod 1trurottobi<TtuEt.<..... F -..Ita..... ....... 'In .... M.......).'

.. """')0<4000'" ...... hi ......... (n.-t.IIo. ,6001) .
.to ,;., 100 .. ,,;...,.., LU.. JJ /onh ~ oIIoBlp< (loOI.). Ari&t«i< _ " " JO II"'di ... ....t
c...p. tIt<..;n. lito, 011 lItin" "" in " ,; . M"",.,... .• J ...
•, ok"';";' .."obmoooafo! [... j .... ;.<,........""""" .. __ I· ··1 "'" ~,.b~
II).w6tu(~ ,6001~
5Ophy, which clearly asserted that all those sensible qualities, as they arc
called, of heat and cold, light and oolours., 5Oundli, odours and saIlOrs.,
fonnally conside...,d arc no( things really and absolutely eximng "ithout
Uli, but only passions, sensations, and phanwms in us, occasioned by
certain local motions made upon the otpns of ..,nse from the obittts
without us, and SO ind«d, but ...,llItive and fantastical things. And thus
Prooogoru made up hi. busin.,. complete from this mixtu..., of Ihe
Heraclirical and alOmical philosophy tDg"ther. For taking it for granTed
aca.>rding [0 Heraclitus' doctrine, that knowledj(e iii nothing else but
sense, and acrording to the Phoenician or acomical philosoph y, [hat the
..,nsible qualit~ arc nO{ things ...,ally and absolutely uimng witboul
us, but appearances Or sensations in us, t.e concluded, 'all sensible and
intelligible things' not 10 N absolute essences, but things mc...,ly
rdative, nnwtical, and i=ginary.u

Chapter III

, . Now that thili otomic:a1, oorpusculllr, Or rnechanic:a1 philosophy, that

solves all the phenomena of Ihe corporal world by those imelligible
principles of magnitude, fip'''''' sitt, and molion, and Ihe...,by makes
sensible lhings imelligible, banishing away those unintelligible oorporeal
forms and sensible qualities, 1J _ kno",.., to Protagoras, who li"ed not
only befon: Plato and Arislode, but a1so Nfo..., Democrirus himself, as
Plutarch testifies (though he abused i, in grounding SO slrange a
paradox upon il), I shall make it undeniably evident from ""'era!
testimonies out of Plalo', ThtMlrtus. For besides that passage afo...,
mentioned, 'ThaI all things arc made by local molion and mixtu..., with
one anotheT'li and what follows after, 'That motion iii that which makes
every thing to seem 10 be, or to be generated',ll he plainly describes the
nalU", of oolours according to this hypomesis, the sense whereof iii thili,

1> ,,,r
~ . . . . . . ...,..d "'" ....",.... Compote TIS. ....t pp. '''''''. 10<. """""""l' vi
P... " .. ..· , . h , o!ou_""'~Ji- ............... """dIaf-.
" c........ TIS, pp. 7-1.
N "" ~ <I "'+_ .<.Ol ~j ' . " y/>f; oI.U>!"" PI"'"' ....... (n... ..... ,~).
.. 'bi
"l1I<_nk, ........ '7J'_ .......... s..,,.,".'SOO, , ·.... ..:;,;.,,,._.,.,...
~ ...... _(Gao. ... ' S7I).
" ,. ~tI_' \lI, "'" <d ,.,_1Iao ~;..,.." ...,q'fl (n-...... ,lJA}.

opvngnted m nal
 LeI: UJ begin first "'illI the ey... or _;v.t. That which is called ...... i!fc
mIour .. IlOl: .ny real quality ... isting eith.,. without the eyes or in the
eyes; for thm il .....,..)d not consist ""Iy in motion and BeJKnrion. But
lIkinl it for """"ted thai rot> ..,,';ble thing .. Judi absolulely in illClf, we
musl lOy thai • white and bbd colour, and every other coklur iI
"'.......ted by certain motions mad. and impressed upon the eye, and
~ colour .. ndther that which mal.. the imp .. :: in" nor thol ... hich
rea1vcth il (that ii, neither ony Ihing in the eye nor in the ob;'CI
absolutely), but I ecruin middle thing between them both.'"
Which can be nothing else but a passion or _rion in us. Elsewhere in
mil dialogue he pro .... Ihis assenion, that colours md the like sensible
things ate no real and absolute qualities either in the sentienl or in the
obitcl because the same obiect seems to ka,·c different qualities to
differenl persons as,
The same wind blowing ootmI cold to OM and ........... 10 Inocher. And the
"""'" wine .... hich 10 OM ;" health oecms ......... , wiD 10 the """'" person
.ppear bin", ond disl2$lcful ifhe be ,ici n
Whence he concluded thai lleat and col d, , weel and biner, were nOl:
things really md abwlulcly existing in the objects ";lhoul, but relative
things, being passions or sensations that may be diversified by til<:
different tempers and complexions of the body.
~. Afterward, we have the sum of this atomicaJ or mechanical
philosophy, more copiously set down afler this manner,
The beginning upon which all 'hingo dq>end iI; this, that the .mole world
if motion and nothing .Ise ba;d .... Now of mo,ion there on: ,wo kind"
each of which containcth innumerable branch.. under K. lIul the """.r
of one .. oc:rion, of !he other I"";"n. From ,he mutwol congress and
contrition of both ....icb togflh .... , .re begottm innumonbic offJprinp
"'hid> may all he reduced 10 th..., 1"·0 gmeral heads, .. h....cof the one [is]
the oa>';ble, ,J-.. other ......, which is .1 .... )". ;o;ncd """ther with !he
.. Ell. (,-6'.,.,_... .,.... """-i ...... ..t I¥¥oa-'" ~,,",,'" &4It .~ ~ .....h.
'" u... ""'" h""", "=...... _<W-I"",. J"Id·h ,-" ~ ~ n.· ...... ~•
.. I<i(f<"" +Io! 1'Y .. (q « "'i- h .-:.. nil """'" . ... ..;..- b h tf 1"""'" ,or-ro.
_:4J..U ...... x... ·r.,\ % <9< lpn.a,.p. ~ "",/I " " ......... , _... ni
;,r...:;,.. ~. ni ....... ni .._ 4UD ~ .. ' .. _~ ........ _
~ n;. .. ........ ~ ......r... ~. I<AI ~ "" a.-.n~. Jwai .."... ~
M. ,~_JljJJJn. M"~ _,.., '6-~"" . ,,",. \1. 4.UO ~6 ,,--... ""'""
(W .• I5.JI).
,.,..«
" n....,,,, '''''''''' U>o!""" ~!'b ..... /qI/•• 6· ... ni .!'b ~.4oa. /I 61 ~~
(W..I5"~

'I' ate
 .. nsible. 'The ocrues han ....,h rwntt • these, .;ght, hcarinl, tastinz,
l<>UChinl, pleuura, pains, desires, fcars, Ind others innumcn.bIt without
names, bul lIWIy lhat h... nama. The SCIUib~ kind doth INwer and
COI",espond to nory OM of ...... To .....ipn.u IIWIner of roIou ..... 10
tM MarinI roundl, and to the other om... other oensibleo, th.,...., ofkin
tv !hem . . . Whm theref= the .ye, and oomc other thinK .n:oJosoo.H to it,
meet together, they bqet whiten, lItd • <:CJUin senu propoo tiooo ..ble
thcmJnlO, neither of which would have bern made, if either oft ..... had
1101 mt1 with ,he other. Thm lhese thinp heinz carried rapectively,
sis!" to tbc eyes, and whit ....... to the object, ..hich did actively bqt1 it,
tM <"ye bccorllotS fuU of .ipo l. lItd - . and is not made oisht in lhe
.bstract, but lit oyc -mI. And thlt .... hich did aonsmerate the colour is
fined with .. hit ....., and is made noI: .mite"... in the absmoct but a
thing ...hit., ... hether ......,.) or KOIW:. The arne is 10 be c:oncciYod of 011
other sensible thinl" .... Iwd and hot, and the like. that nothinl ito by
itself ."""luloly on,. of thctc thinp, but they...., 011 mode &om • mutual
aonvus oftbc ""twud object and tM ......, by mans of mOOon."
3. Here we &« it plainly IOU led, that the .... hole ....,rld is mad. by
nothing else but Ihe ~ioo of particles, by 1I1oeaI15 of which all th;np
are lencTaled and conupled. Neither did Protagon< ..,knowlHlge any
other motion bUI loal, as is plainly inrimated. And thJl all sensible
qualities which .... e tal. norice of by the sevual senses., as oolou~
sounds, upon, odours and the like, arc not thinp really existing
without Uli, but passions or sens;nioos in us, caused by seYeral local

).
motions upon the organs of sense. Which if that be not sufficient that I
have already alleged, is )'et t1'IOI'e plainly expressed after this tlWlner:
Nothing is absolutely In y one thing by ilKlf, neither the agent nor the
patient, but from both of these mcering tog"""'<, an: p .... ttd at onOl:
both the senses ond the ..-nsib~ thinp."
4, These passages which I have cited an: so dear and evident, mat
mey cannot possibly be capable of any other sense. than what I havc
expressed. And merefore diose [WO Latin interpreters, Ficinus and
Scrnnus,JO mat h ed before the restitution of mi. mechanical philo-
sophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expound them .fter the
same manner. The first thus:
Colour is neither the ,i,h, of the eyes, nor the marion of bodies, but a
c:cruin middle thing !"<:SUhing (rom tM . ight and motion, that is ",ell I
pm;"" about the eyes."
The otheT in this manner,
That from the different disposition of me beholder, and so the different
affection of the intermedi....: otnSlbl<: orpn, the nriou. wIoun arc both
made ond seen, but 110 as that they arc all fanu.stical, nor have ony
",bsistellOl: but in the mind, an: varied by the different conJl"CSO of
motion, ....hich is 10 be concludtd conc:erning all the sen ..... Il

Only Protagoras, in order to his scq>ticaJ design, made these sensible

thinK" not only relative to animals in general, but also to individuals,
because it is impossible 10 demonstrate, as he u'1lcs, mat all brute
basIS, nay, thaI any two men have the vay same phantaSms or ideas of

" .1140-..,......,., [. _·l .l-., ..0-;; w,.,.... f,. """""' ....D D a.... ~·.w.D _ _ "
Q(f" ....
~" .LW I( 1;. .......... -""" 1.1.4.1., •• "'" ,.1..,. «<k o/<r6Ijoo..., ...,; n\ ~nI
obo"",_. nI!'h_&r. II,........... ,~o!t..- ..... (ad" ,,,,").
M Manilio f'oritoo ( '4JJ-'19~ FloomoIinc Ii,. ,10., ..... tntosIo ... 0( PIotoo. J... do s.m.,

. .".. ,. . . . ./'to_.,...
__.__. . .
p_ ow ,' olPlolo, _cIodi<>oedloiol'lto _ _ _ , .... _ .. (0......, 'S:rll) 1O
Hr'. ~. I. Cud_ mWot dot ..... p<Mo<. TIS, P. " .
~_O<" "..,...,....t .. _ _
., " 'pm ......k>no: "' ......... <ita 0<\0I0o """,,,,' [F"-' 'fr-'"
T' .... ..t ... oo:iorotio', 0;,,;.; ~ ,......
,11. - _
1' . .
MuooJO 1'".... ; ..
... ,,. ,.
(Fronkl"un .6cn~ P. '0 .. (a..:"""" "'" "GtIot- _ . Iioo f'ociao ~ ' ,1 ' ... ., .. t'< ......
aoe').>TIoe r.... :- ;. oJ F;.m,,·, OW ' ';" ('W"> _ _ _ .... ..... of"" ..........

.. ~ . .:..~-:::.~~:::.::'. \••:~:.... ~~ . . . """' <t o>leri

.. fi<ri, ............ _ _ .... , . • ....,y.. """ nioi ito ...... , • •••• ..no ....... __
... ,.. _ .. "~do,, ••• l ..... low_................ (n.-.soio.io.....,.,..
.. PIoIo, 001. s...-.... ("()ripooI ;" Gr<ot; , )~

"
,.
red Or green, these being idiopathies, and because uJl(rK:nce shows,
Ihal nOI only Ihe I"Ilefuirress and unl"llefulnes& of tastes and smdls,
bUI also Ihal heat and cold aK relative 10 individuals.

Chapter IV

t. Wherefon: we have made il evidenl Ihal Ihal very rne<.:hanical or

atomical philosophy Ihal halh bttn bldy reslored by Cartesius and
Gusendus, as to the main substance of it, was not only elder than
EpicuTWl, but olso than Pbto and Aristotle, nay than ~mocrituS and
Leutipp us also, the cummonly Kputed fathers of iL And themore we
hove"" reason to discredit the report of Posidonius the Stoic, wlto, as
Strabo lells us, affirmed Ihis atomic:al philosophy 10 have been ancienler
than the times of the Trojan war, and fim to hove bttn brought imo
Grccoe out of Phoenicia.
If we may believ. P",idonius the St<Mc, the doctrine of.toms is .ncient...
th.., the timeo of the Trojan WH and ""'" fin" invented &rid ddivcml by
one MOKhus. Sidonian."
Or rather Phoenician, as SextUS Empiricus cites the testimon y of
Posidonius:
Oa'_Tiruo and Epic:uru. inv.nted the doctrine of .torno.
un,"" we
nW:.c thaI physiology '" be ancient.., and dcri,·. it, IS P""idonius the
Stoic doth, (n>m """ MOKhus,. P'-niciln.:H
And since it is ""ruin from what we ha"e shown, that neither Epicuruo
nor yel Democritus wen: Ihe first inventors of this physiology, this
testimony ofPosidoniusth. Sioic ought in reason to be admined by us .
~. Now what can be more prob.ble than that this Moschus the
Phoenecian, that Posidonius speUs of, is the very same penon with

u 11 M1 "",r""", r4> n"" • ,,;,p, r~""'; _Qr"""",~ .. , .............~ L","", ,';'.

Mo._ "'" _ T~ :ue-. """M-O<; (s...bo, , ........ ~ s.. S,...." " - H. LIoy<I
.t-. B ...... (t · . -, .-.I _ rool, '911-J') ..... .... p. '7' . c...tou tit', Grodr. 40
trill. that .. t..u.. c..utto..., _ , SooJ. ; ..... _ , . . . , . . liM ... , _
v', ' ..........(0 k ,,,'s&7).P.j.IoJ .
.. tI~""o<; 61 "'" ...... ; , . , ........ 01
... I.<qoo- 6 L"I • •\; n..",... : ltd
'*' ",,-",/po, ~ 8ttrw. ,,,. 41>: ••••. oj
M~ ">«"~ ~ ••"', ;tllIl'
(S..... Em ... · -,1\('''''''' 1'It~ 1.,J61).

"
that Moschus the physiologer, that Iamblichus mentions in the Life of
Pythagoras, whefe he affirms that Pythagoras, Jiving some time at
Sidon in Phocnecia, convened with Ihe prophetS that were the
sua:o:uon of Mochus Physiologer, and was instI'\Icted by them. 'He
converwd with the Prophets thaI were the sUCQ"Ssors of Mochus lOd
other Phoenician pricsu;.'lJ And "'hat can be more certain than thai
both Mochus and Moschus the Ph~ician and phiJosop~ "'lOS no
other than Moses, the Jewish lawgiver, as Aroc-rius rightly guesses: 'It
seems that it ought 10 be read Moschu .. unless they h.ad rather Tad it
Mochus or Moses.'lIi Wherefm-e according 10 the ancient mdition,
Moschus or M()I;CS the Phoenician being the first aUlhor of the atomical
philosophy, it ought to be calLed neither Epicurian nor Democritica.l,
but Moschical or MOSltica1.
J. It must be acknowledged that neilhn of Ihese IWO flUTlOll. and
renowned philosophe .... Plato and Aristotle, had the good hap to be
righlly and thoroughly instructed in this ancient Ph~ician lOd
Moschical or Mouical philosophy. Protagoras so much abusing il to
Kepticism and the tlking aw;ly of the natural discrimination of good lOd
evil, might probably beget a prejudia: in PlalO against it, though he
doth rIIH confule Ihe physiological part of it in all his Tlu:QtUrvs, ...t.ere
good occasion was offered him. And yet in his 71",.. .... he hath a little
smallering of it/' where he endc::.'·ours 10 resolve the differenca of the
fOllr dements, fire, air, wa ter, earth, into the different geometrical
figures of their inocnsible p:ms, making the small panicles of the earth
10 be cubical, by rcuon of their solidity and mobilily, bUI Ihe ~re,
pyramidal, 'It is reasonable that thaI figute which hath the smalest
basis, should be attributed 10 that body which is ID05t moving, cutting
and piercing,.lI And tl\;ll he doth not mean mystically in this bUI
physically, appcan from his own explication of it concerning the
insensible parts, 'These cubes and pyramids in the earth and the fire can
only be pcroci ..ed by the mind and understanding, sina:: the single

H rol;" H AI.
~ (I'
,oil _~ .... 11 .... 010.,0 .... ...,; ,.",.
I,,,, 0.
tt" "'1')<..,....-
i.if., ...-. Gibn a.....
ol.UDo;"";"'''"''''''''
(J...i'''pooI ,98<1)' p. I).
" .At<trioto AI~ ' C nm qu;. AI~:t"" \'d A I _ . . _ . In TIS.
-1" '"
I _ .

p. '>' Caol_1I> AI", ' ..... fino pubIMn oflunbtido .. •• _ _ "ppm,od of

lIMo ""' 11»1.....
1>", _ .. bo ..... _ .. M-.
i> r-"nL
,. r~ (.u<o) ' - 6",;",... """'" .......,..no,,"" 0"""'" - ' -. ,_.......... .. 4<"""'"
~. d", 101..... (ibOI., s6-0~

19

,.
particles alone arc not Knsibk, but only the agg,eption of man y of
them together.,J9
... But Aristotle plainly n:jecn; it. Jacobus Carpcntarius, in his notcs
upon Alcinous, treating of the naWn: of universals writCS thus,
Some do 001 .lwtlWm dtny uni.tr$:Ils, but .,.;][ hIve il !h.ol they only
.'" whtn!hey Ire understood, but thaI lhere is nolhing in nalu", ... hi<h
'M,"" to the moti<:m of Ihe mind. Which to me: indeed is the same
thins IS if they should say lhal coloun .'" not in meir ...,Un: "",...Uy
lIlytlting, but Ire mode such when they arc in very deed ....." which
opinion also hath i!$lS$(T'''"'' but is con<kmMd by AristotJc.-
This opinion thaI colours an: not actually u istent according to those
very id.-as that we have of th<:m hefon: vision, is the mystery (arcullm)
of the old atOmic:a1 01" Mosaical philosophy which Carpetttarius under-
stood nO! . Which makcs them not qualities absolutely existing without
us, but passions and KnsaUons in Uti. And indeo:d this philosophy is
condemned by Aristotle in his third book IX anima [0.. Ih~ So~/], ch . l,
and that as the received doctrine of the ancient physiologists before his
lime:
The former phylioloJis!$ (.. ith he),..-m:, smcrally, miwdrn in this, in
thot mey thoughl blackness and whitcncsf wae no absolute q..... litia
without the ';Bh' nor ' '''CCI &nd lOur withOUllhe wte."
Apin, he end~vours 10 confute the same philosophy which n:solvcs

.. m_ "",,&1 . . . 4oo00<l0(i\u . _ , . .,;,...... """ b

W~I"""""''''~'' \ . ",.~' ........
_4."" . ,. . . . . ,.,
~
. ........ ''O';~GOIr<lw
"....aj ' "' " ... .Io!
,Co::
lvi, k· (il*I .• s60:)·

_0
.. 'QII( ......1 uni................... q ., • _~ .............. _
....1Iipntur, dIiI ..... hobm ;" """",, ~ ...1io
.... ... -,><,; ~ di"" ....
Q!Io< ...... opioio ..... _ ~
_i , '. ' .
_1< ... _ . 'ro. _ _
-.... ..
· I···J ~ _ _
nio~ """ _, .... .u..d!iri, .. 010 rripu'-"'.
...............

__ ~ .. __..,.. ,H'.,H·
n ', .. A, ' .... '" ,' ..... ioIHo .. ' "ou ....... Iooob; c..pu. ..... oN, ........" ..
,_,.rio. 0- .... _
1 " ' - oJ " ' .. I'M"';' . ._ ....., .• ..,. ..,..... I ...
no, .. AInONo'
c..,-...
(P.... ' S7J~
p. >OO), ("00 •• 001 hoo ' ,,1. .. .. diorm' b- 'd ........ ' ..1)· J......... c.. ... ' ...
( J _ Oous ..., ,~ .. -7~ ) _ .. _""""" r....di. ph] .s .....U · ' ....... .
n 'n phiS t ' " ...... ......,.j ... _ =""Y .... He _ "",,- .. tho Ef<I- '"
/liW,j.-, .. _ o..!_ ....... boo< ,...t,.. ..... ;,.
t ..........., ;,;,., _dJ- john
0;lio. hoo ..... n . .pd F _....... . , ,b.' ;., .. AI<. .. ...... Albin ... Socloio " "f ~"'"
.. AS· ,n.H .. e + .{ I'Io' ... (o..tiotd, ,,,». ....
u.pioh_",,",_bJ"
John r.a ... p<inkd .. '667. TIoonuo S-Ity _tid" .. Eoislioh InnSIoIiooo .. ~ in hio
H~""' " !~ (>&,I:; . .... .dn, 1 _, ,1:111 P'P' . ....... '
.. '" 016,.,... ....
#W~ ,..:Itt> ooI.....u..,; ll<Joo., ~ .fI" , .. M. ""'-'l • .,;..........
~ ,._, _~I_,..;-...;(_,n.._ ,~
1_
those sensible qualities into figures, siu, and motion of particles, nIX
only attributing il to Democrilus, but also making it lh~ ITI05I g~ly
reOOvtd physiology before his time:
Democriru5 and lII05I of the Phy.ioIogon commit. 1""" absurdity in
this, in that they moIr.~ all omlll: to be ..... th, ..hid> is. thinl at 61'SI oishI
plainly impoa>blc. Mo.."","Cf, thcy do no! dininpish belw;"t the ubjcclJ
~ 10.u the IICII .... and !host: which are propel and peculiar to the
~~nl _ .pan. F",. ""'lfnitudc and figutt, "","'ness and <mOOth-
neso., oharpnea. and bluntnas. ",hich b<lonK 10 bulk, are ",,",mon to all
the seru:a, or if _ 10 all, yet to sight and touch. WIM:reu our om"" is
deceived a>nceI~",,!IH:se common obi:.!s' bUI it is no! deceived about
wIouB, nor the ht:arinl about $!>Undo. But _ of tht """;'n,
pbys;ologistJ r.r.... lhex proper objects 10 the common wui/i., ..
Democritus. who as for ,,'hi,e and blad, makes ..... or th"", to consist in
" " ' ' ' ' _ and TUII"dncs. (n ...... "'). the o<htt in smoothnou on<!
evr:nneoo of pans. H. also mluceth 5IJIOI"" 10 firures, though il belonJ
chiefly to sight to 12k. cosniance of figures and ","",itude, and the 6ke.

_ . -"0"
,,~ ~ ,,, ICI 0 ,.< "
Whw'1 accord"" to th;' philosophy, d.. _
I ",an.
of touch wouLd be the

Aristotlol: there: roncludes this di5<XIurse with twO general arguments

>.pinS! Iha1 philosophy (that made the Knlible qualities 10 be propcorly
senurions in us, and nlXhing else in the oo)ects without us bUI
nu.gnirude, filS"re. sile of pam and motion) in mis manner:
Th:at there: ;. <:O<ItrIDcty in q""lioi<:s, bu, DOt in figun:s, and .... , the
nriny of figura beinS infinit., lUtes, wIouri and the res! would be 00
~kewioe.<J

Whidl arguments. though !hey be handsome and ingenious {Ihal 15

... AlfllM<I''''' '

.rIi\r'" ni 01 • .!don....... ...... ;: ,.." 1... 1...-.....,,;.,, _
hnI .......... [ .. _I !"Ai,.. Ii ni ",,"Q
rimo,.,
. «I
..:i-tw;; J.t*. J,tl..-. M' ni _ ol.I.Itr>o
","Bj ow . . . ,~ i ~ .0; I.ttt ._401 bt, lo-t, oIrIoioa.Q •• 00.1:"" "', ... " h Tt, Ii n>I;
_~ ,.;.. olo8oj, ' " , - . . uiIJ_ OJ( I6i..;. N~ ,., ni ""t"' ni";.pdlj> ni
,6 ...... tT, ,1/ '" 01(. ni '" ~ ,6 to ,"'" ~"'" ~_ ..,. . h Vj'" ..... , .. M.";
......... tu.I ~,...... ,.. .... ...,.. [ .. .101401 «11600 1.._ i ..,...".;;"'.., d ......""'"
To". ' G' .... .,; ........ hl""'~..,m <1_ ,'Ii ......
...... z.....,:.;. Kdit.. ,!! , J6;; , .-;.AD.
.... )df.~ so. .... TIS, ~ p. " Afoot _
* tho _
lJ; Ii "''' L '4.007<f
o!:,._ "" ~"' .. ,......0:.,. I"'" ,Ie fA..-
(Mr. nun..!) ................... - ' ,
<If Cud ""I,.. o...t _ ~
.. '!:" .. ,... "'101','........ q .. !.co"...." . ...... to~, TiiI~" ,.; '-n. .... to
.l'f"'k '" 1~ '" .......... "l'IJOO oN "l'PoU .. _ _ _ 100-....... ,i.. .,., """
""'""""'" ,~.~ i <K!.com:.: "[ u 6";"- """'" "'" "l"","""" .~ ~... , ....
~,;_ .. ,;,,-.,,( ........... 0. .......... '5-20) .

.'
'I' ate
Aristotclical) to prove tlut Ihere are such entities as qualities "isible,
ungible, ClSleable and the like, really u i5ting in the obiects without u•.
Yet as thc). will nOI counterbalance: the weight of thOS<" OIher argulTl(nts
Ihat militate on lhe conlr-uy side, so Ihal they ..·mwithout any difficulty
be an.wered by the a5SCrtors of this No,·antique philosophy.
s. BUI after Plato's and Aristotle's time. this old ph ysiology was
.gain revived by Epicurus, but so blended with immor:>.!ity and
imp~y as th.t it soon sunk .gain, there being nmhing left of.ll those
voluminous IrcatiliCS of Epicurus concerning it, sa,·ing .... hat is pre-
served in ~nes Lacrtius.... nor no other system thuwf transmined
to posterity but "'hat is comprised in the poem of Lucmius CaruSo 4j
So that the ..·orld was S"nerally seized .... ilh • detp and profound
obhion of this ph~iology, there being only SOme obscure fomsleps
and dark intimations of it now and thm found in Ihe .... ritings of some
learned .uthors. & ",hcn Senus tells us that some of thc Stoics hdd
'thaI sensiti,'e things ..·ere rclati,·c to animals and depended upon our
sensation' and 'thaI nO! lhe things themscl,·es "'ere comp rehended by
sense. but only our p;wions from them';" and .... hen the Pyrrhonian
SttptK:s themselves offirmed, 'thot all things are rclati"e, thot is, to
that "'hich judges of them, and cverything appears to be acmrding to
sense . ."
And .... hen Plotinus makes a doubt ,,-hether sensible things did really
uist in the objects .... ilhoul us. or were only passions .... i'hin us,
it may be ..... n doubted concerning .. nlible Ihings then, .. h'co. lhal .. e
Sttm '" h ..,( 'he Jr<:I'cst _ uran<'e of. ",h., htt ,hey mlly u i;n in III<
obje<l5 .. ilh""l us, or ... lI<lh .. lhey be pouiol\$ in u<."
6. BUI in this laSt age it hath been so successfully restored by the
writings of SOll"\tc learned authors. and the ,ruth thereof SO convincingly
evidenced by many Olher cxpc:riments bc'lides tlul of the glassy prism
.. D'clu,," u.m.... ".'50.
Ltr.... whi<ll _ ...... [p;c.NO' .50<',.." ~b.""·, s.. """" pp, "
and ' ..... , 'sand ,6.
" I.oo<r<tioos, lJ.,..- .., ...,
.. """"""p.; __
roohrIlofrol <1_ .pIt( fl • • 001 hi ..,;e" pO ... St" .... Az.;'" 'M ~ ...

" "'m<"_ ,.,«;roi>tl<"

'-'9'-

4,(1_0'. I«U
""".." ."... TO •.~ ..... .In 0,.... ""'" TO C..... I«U T~.& ....
",~ .. 1>.--'0'""'41. Th. ___ to bo . ...... irioo olSn- .
Oar...., ' .'Jl "'" , ]6.
...£.o.oi I«U f<I bri 'ok ~ 46i"""d ' ."'''1''' iMjo)O,,,.,.,,.. ob ..,drGr I"iUT<.o.:
t. T<>I; .......... ..,,0\ .... o.u. t. ,~ . -. In Tlj • .,..'-., ........""' •• • «i """ 4<l .,
6oT"';"; """ ~... """",. (Ph' .. E___ '-I.'. I)- I.).

••

'I' ate
and rainbow, that men is link doubt left cooCffTling il." And indeed
unler.s mi. phibophy be acknowkl\gW to be trut, Wt must of neassiry
.ffi.nn, tltat the oensiblt: and corporeal world is ahogethu uninttlligiblt.
For as Timaeus Locrus long ago om.,n·ed, that sensible things (ra
aitrlhrr6.) could nOl be apprehended :lI1). oth~r wa)· than 'by sense:ll1d •
certain kind of lipurioos reason',5O so it iii most certainly true tltat we
cannot po$<ibly have any clear and intelligible ideas of hell :lI1d cold,
light and 00101.1 ... as liuch qualities really uisting in ,he objects of sense
without UIi, bUI as passions and sensations in ourseh· .... " ·c may. Whcrc-
fore unless "-c will 'SS !] I lhat these Io"-cr sensible mings Ire utterl y
inromprehcnsibk (<iK(l.r<V-'11fra) to our understanding, whillil il is able
clearly to comprehend things of a higher n.l Iure, we must rondude Ihis
old atomical, Mo,;chial Or Mosaical philosophy to be true.

Chapter v

1. But though this uld OIomi,,"1 philooophy be mosl solidly and

subsTantially lrue, the paradu~es thaI Protagol&S and uthcn cndea-
voured tU ground upon it, are nOI only ridiculously absurd and
rontradicrious in thcrnsdvcs, bUI also altogether inoonscquent Crom the
urn!.
For as for those ~rtions, th.! whate,-cr seems is, and thot C\"CI)"
f.mcy is [rue, though th ey seem ridiculously absurd, yet those t..m
learned philosophers, plato and AriOlotic , ,-ouch$lCe Ihem a serious
confutation. Plato from hence in his Tht'UItIMS, because thaI Ihe Cancics
of them that drcorn would be as true and real as the sensations of those
thOl arc ...ne, and thOl all men would be alike Vl-ise, and the opinions of
the most mitente idiots in gtthnetry as true as any grometrical
theorems, and all predictions of future things alike true, and Ih.t in lhe
actions of human life it would be indifferenl ,,·hat any man did in order
to any end, and so all deliberation and ronsulution ttlSt.
But Arinotlc, in his metaph ysics, with some mi~lUre of facetiousness

~-
.. aiue.j.,,~.J oiJ8q>u,-.......' ~
1 ....

r....... !,D.
. . ... "
.. I'n>bol>ly . "k,u,," .. D "eo, iM,orito, ... . ,"J Diotoursco ...... s ...... M""",,-
NoM rn I . s...100 R. lUll, no. R...."" ..... Shnu. ,..--,,..,«" ' " '98j~ PI' >6,0-
7'. 0" ',,..' -"of= " ,;"'~, Cood_'._~_of_'

'I' ate
also writes aCter this manner: 'To those: that PUt their finger under their
sight Of between their eyn, it will be both two and one'.' ! But SeXIUS
Empiricus bestows Il10TC subtlety upon it th1n eithn of them,
If "try fancy be true. thm WMn one fancies that every fancy ;. no!. tnK,
Ihll must be true IIso, Ind 10 then this proposilion tNl every fancy is
trW, will be fw ....

3. Whertt~ Ihe meaning of Ihese assertions, that whate-·er seems is,

and e,·ery fan~y is true, W"Ii no other than this, that nothing was
absolutely true at aU., but that all truth and koowlcd~ "'el"l: but
occm.inll", fantastical and reLative thinp. And beau"" one occm.inll" or
appearance ;5 IS true IS another, therefol"l: they "'el"l: all equally true,
that is 10 say, none of them true at all. This Aristotle elsewhere rightly
apprehended, 'He that soith that allthinp;s Ih31 appear.,..., true, makes
aU beinSS 10 be l"I:1.ui,· • .'1)
But if nothing be absolutely true, but only reLath·ely to him that
thinks 50, then thi5 very opinion of Protagoras, th."I1 nothing _
absolutely true, and thai IT\3n ""U the measure of aU things, was oot
itself absolutely true, but only seemingly and r.latively to Protagoras.
Whereas this is asserted for an absolute truth by him, that nothing is
absolutely true.
And what a ridiculous foUy was this in one that "ould be acooumed
a philosopher, to take a great deal of pains in "Titing • IorJC volume,
and to endeavour industriously to convince the "'orld, that nothing
was absolutely, but only rcJati,·ely and fantastically true. Sin"" it must
needs follow from thence that this very thing itself """OS oot absolutely
tru., but only relatively to those that thought 10, and the COnlnry
alt.ther IS true to thosc: that thought other,,·isc. For it would 00
more concern the world to know that this ,,""os reLatl,·ely and nntastl-
cally true to Protagoru that noI:hinll" """os Ibsolutely true, than to know
what Protago\"2S dreamt of the Wt night. For since according to him,

" T~ 0..; ..;.~ .... ;. " .;; ....,

1,.,.1 ........ ..; ... _
""...,..,..H
"" "" nU ....
W.-.
Ir ,...t;; )'O¥!'I'i
j,,- , . . Pok .......... 0100. &;;..
~, ....... , to;. ~ .... '" ........ ,.;
10. (",........... nMul. [ArioooII<. M".,..:pia 104J07-10). A..... '" .,.10. ........ ~ io.
M",M7M. 10""5.
,., D ()OI,) ..... " " ' _ .....1•• <, Pj •• .,.; ,6 ", ......... _ ..._ ~ . .. ,.
" " ' _• ......6;0<_ ....... "$~ ~w""" '" ...... ""'......... ,;.., ~ ,...;."",
..~(s."""""",,"1 14.. ", I.NO~
" ·0 u,.. ho ...........,..... Ii.., ~ .......... .".., ni ~"'" ""'" u {Arioood<.
M...."':pia ,., "' ...... ~
'thlt every ITllIn does bUI Ihink'>i his o"n trutbs, it cannot concern
my man 10 know mother'i opinions any m()~ than bis dreams. And
thc...,fore Prougoras had done mo..., wisely if he b.d spared his pains
md kept thllK pri>"ate rellitive trulhs of bis own, th.1 is his dream or
imagination, wholly to himself.
But by this industrious endeavouring to con,·ince the ,,·oTld of this,
Ihal nothing _ .bsolutely true, but only ...,llItively, he plainly confuted
his own doctrine in asserting tho! this was absolutely true, tbat nothing
was absolutely true, wbich is a ITllInifest contradiction. The~ need be
the less pains taken in confuting sapticism md flntasticism, since it
always too cas;l)· oonfutes itself.
3. For if nothing be absolutely true, then not so much as tbis oould
be absolu tely true, Ihat ;t &eCmed to Protagons that nothing ""as
absolutely true. And it could only &eCm to be true. Nay, it could not be
absolutely true that Protagoras, to ,,·hom III truth &eCmW to be relative,
had any real existence, much less thai the..., are my obicc'" without
from whence the impressions or motions are made upon our senses; Or
thai there is my such Ihing as magnitude, motion, figu..., and .ite of
part&, or 'that maTter is floating' md that 'the reason. afall appearances
llfl' faunded the~in,.i! Which things, as Plato and Sextus tell us., we~
dogmaticallyaffinned by Protagaras.

Chapter Vt

I. Again, as this scepticism Or fant3Slicism af Protl.goras is most absurd

md oonlradictious in itself, so there is not my foundation for it al aU in
the aid atomical pbil()S()phy, but oontrari wise, notbing doth mo~
effectuaUy md dClI .....lstrltivcly overthrow both these assertions, tbat
knowl!:dge is sense, md tbat all truth md knowledge is but fmtastical
and relative, Ihm Ihis "Iamical pbilosophy dotb.
For first, since no sense can judge of itself, or its o"n appearances,
much less make any judgcmeOis of the appearances belonging 10
another SCl\se for,

.. ...'" '" ...0.1_''''' pO ... ~"'... c-.po« 11<0<,,,,,, '7<'-' c.

" ..;. ~;-on" ,,_ .,.; '''''' ~ ...... ""v·'''' ,.;."". iA, uk PSI to ....,
(SH..... o..-.' .»6 .. d "1~

'I' ate
 those: thing< which an pc:rtti.'td hy one of our P''''"eR, i, is ;mpoosibk '"
pc:..mv. ,hem by another, .. ,h~ objn:.. of hear;ng by I;ghl. or ,Ite
objms of sighl by htmnl and <he ~k~. No
The sight cannot judge of lIOunds which belong to the hearing nor Ihe
hearing of light and eolours. Wherefore thaI which judges of all the
senses and meir sevenl objects. cannOt be ilSelf any s.ens.e. but s0me-
thing of a superior nature.
~. Moreover, that wh ich judges mal appeMOl1cl$ of all the senSotS
have someming fanla5tical in them, cannot possibly be ilSelffanlDticol,
but it mU", be something ...·hich hath a power of judging what really and
absolutely is Or is not. This being not a relat;"e, but an absolute truth,
mat :oensible appeMOl1ca have something fantasrical in them. Neither
could p~ ever ha,~ arrived to the knowledge of this truth if he
had not h:ld some faculty in him superior to s.ense, that jud~th of what
is and is not absolutely.
Now Ihis same ntiona! faculty, that disco"en. acwrding to the
atomical philosophy, that there is liOIllething in our sensations that is
merely fanla5tical and rdati.'e, doth lSSUI"C us alSQ not only mat men:
.re absolutely and really such ]>#SWnl, affectionl, and seerninp in UI,
but mat they that do percei"e (Wlnrrj, h"'e an ab50lute and re<ll entity.
For though it should be supposed mat Our s.enses did deceive us in all
their representations, and that there ...·ere nO !iun. no moon, no emh,
that we had no hands, no fect, no body, as by sense"'l' stem to h..'e, yet
reason tells us mat of necessity that mu," be liOIllething, to wllom Ihese
things sean to be, beaus.e nothing can seem to Ihat that is not. This
being an absolute and immutable truth 'that of nothing Ihere is not any
either action or passion whatJiOever' (NjAiI nul"'", we IUfW dCli<J_
N~'I"r p.uj",umj, but alSQ that when we lire awake and use Our senses,
there are corporeal objects really nisting without us, ,,-hich make those
50tIIsible impressions upon us, and mat those corporeal objects have
absolutely and really as many oorresponden\ ~2ricti<:s in them in ""'pee!
of magnirude, figure, site, and motion. as there are varictin in smsible
ideas and phanla5l11S that we take nota of by memo For PTOUgOras
bimsdf, acmrding to the old atomicoJ philosophy, acknowledges that
local motion, magnitude; figure, and site of pans, absolutely are in

.. iI ",'""" ",",t n; _ ... , ~"'''''' l<i_l ", .~ , _ "'iIOo90.. .... .

6t .......,., 6t .~__ t i1 6t. ~ ........., "' ....."'" (Plato, n......... ,!~ ~

.,
oorporeallhings Ihemsdves, only liut colour and such OIher things are
relative. Therefore all being and truth ~c<:ording 10 PnMagoras himself,
i. not fanwtical and relalive, bUI there is some absolute.
J. Wherefore, tile propeT and genuine result of Ihis old alomical
philosophy, which ;s Ihe triumph of reason O,'er sen"', is nothing .1..,
but this, that..,n.., alone is nOllhe criterion or judge of what does redly
and absolulely e xist without us, but that there is • highu and superior
intellectual beulty in U' that judges of our ..,noes, which disco"en; "hat
is fallacious and fantastical in them, and pronounces what absolutd~ is
and i. not. And Democ:ritus, " 'ho did more thoroughly and perfectly
understand this atomical philosophy Ihan Protagor:lS, nukes this to be
the proper result and ron..,quencc of iI, the in"alidoting the judgement
of sense oonceming bodies themSl:I\'es, and the assening • higt.er
facully of reason in uS to delennine whot is absoluldy Irue and f;>ls<:,
which is wonh nOI;ng. For so SeXIUS, Ih" philosopher. wriles ron_
cerning Democrirus,
Democritus dOlh discndil om"", altributing oot lrulh to it but onl~
appearance and that r..lly nothing exis" in the co'l"',.,al ....,rld bw
atom&:and vacuum."
And Democritus' o,,'n words concerning it.,., these,
Swttt and biner, hot and cold, colours and the like, arc by Jaw and
opinion, atoms and vacuum ,.,ally. Tn .. ,,-hieh ;. suppo<cd and fanci<d
to be arc sensibles, But th..., a,., nol according to truth, only atonlS and
,'XUum."
Sextus Empiricus likewise in an(){her place writes thus oonceming
DelilOCritus,
Democrirns in his ""nonS ..ith. lhat then: are IWo kind< of koowkdrc,
the one by the omsu, the ""'or by the mind, of which that by the mind
1M: calls k"" ..1edge, attounlin! il that which lIUy be 1TIISted for th.
judgff»<n. Qf lru.h. Th.t by lbe sen..,. be ",1I ... h dar!< and obseu ....
<knyms ;••" ha", ""Y oorlainty .. '0 lhe kno""led!e of .ru.h. H.. 0"".
words an Ih_: 'Ofkno..-ledgc th .... an lwo kind<, the OM !C'Iuine, the

" "'IJWo'''''''' 16« /1<'1 M.....poI fi "'''''''''" ,01; ~"'''' . '''; , ........ .<i,.o.,.!t•
... _ . "fi 4<Ij6ao" o.u;. "",,,' ""'0 60<~" oI.iJr6il; U /. ,~ ".;.,. Uftpl'" ,6
.,....... u.... ..i ....,;,.Is...... £.in ... ·· _, At...~ 'W lAp ...,. "'ll~
.. Ni1;toI!, ..1 ,lori .-Gi ......" ~"''''''' o6fM» 8<p,<C • • ,.; ......" ",,~., ,.."... ;uq<O ' ..,q ~
~,_ u l ....,;-,.(ibio1).

,.
 other d .. k and obscure, To the duI: kind of k........ ledge ..e referred
.....mg, hearing, smcm"", wtinl, rouching. Bur the lenuine knowledge
it more hidckn:and """""",ir.than t!oio'"
Now, this concerning Der ..octilus I note the rather more carefully,
breausc Epicurus aftmo>llTd do!:ingly fumbling about the s:ame philo-
sophy, matk senses to be the only criterion oftrulh and falsellood, and
consequmtly abused this old atomic:al philosophy to atheism and
immorality. Whereas, if rightly understood, it is the most impregnabk
bul"'llrk apinll both . For this philosophy, discovering lhat the ideas of
sense anc fantaslical, must needs oL'P P""'C another principle in UI
superior 10 sense, which judges what is absolutely and not fantastically
or reiari,'ely only tr\Je or false .
.. •f:> .Ii .-; >:0""" """ ~. u..u , - .n;. ,,,. ,.;. 60i .... old~,_, '''' .Ii 60i ' ok
6oi ...... , ... ..;. ,.;. ioi "" 6oi ...... ".r..", ' ."7<' :v-~ 06T, TO ••,,6. d;
. ! j ' . • qiIn., TIj • .It 60i ..... ok Bid...........,. 6",..10: ... d;"'P"·j . "'1" ....t;; TO oi»;
oW;> ""JOT ,oil ~ ........ .u,a It ."".1 iJ/.... r.dJjJ.,..Ii IW """' "llIw. oj ,.;.
)"IIrif• .oj .li _ "', Koi """"iop;- i>h' nI It ...... mI -v,....
~ .Ii """" b ......,.,\ h~ .Ii"""'(_'. ", )8).
:.I""", nM, rdlon;, ..-_ ..

"
 Book III

Chapter I
I. Now, ahhough whall have a1n:ady said may possibly seem a sufficient
confUtalion of PrQIlIgor2S' objections apinst the immutable and absolute
natures Of esscna:s of a1! things, from Ihat \"cry atomical physiology
which he appeals 10, which, if rightly understood is the mosl rompliable
with true metaphysics and Ihe most liubservient 10 i[ of any; yet
notwithstanding, I think i[ "ery proper to Ihe busine.<S which I ha\"e in
hand, 10 l'unch out further into [his argumenl, 10 show Ihe different
natures of sense and intellection, or knowledge, nol only Iha[ I may
thereby Ihe mon: fully confute Ihis scepliosm, Qr rather fanwricism Qf
Prolagoras, and also assert Ihe immutable natures Qr essences of things,
but a1 ... for other purposes, which I shall give an lCC()unl of in Ihe ck>se
of this discourse, and I hop<: then 10 mne it app""r lha[ this was nQ
impertinent digression.
a. I shall begin with SCOIie, 10 sho ..· what it is, and that il is not
knQwlcdge.
First mcn:fQTC it is acknQwlcdgw by all, thai senlie is p;w;inn. And
then: is in a11_rion without dispute, 61"Sia p31iSion in the body oflhe
sentient, which bodily passion is nothing else but Ioc:al morion
impressed upon the lIff'Ies from the obj«u without, and thence
propapted and communicated [0 the brain, when: alllieMarion is nude.
For then: is no other action of one body upon another, nor other change
or mutation of bodies COllOI'i,"bk or intelligible besides local molion.
Which mQ(ion in thai body which mQves anomer, is called action, in
tha[ which is mo\"cd by anmher, p3SSion. And therefore, "'hen a
corpornlobject ,·ery remotdy distant is perceived by us, since it is by
SOITIt passion nude upon our body, theK must of necessity be a
continued pr~gation of some: local motion or pressure from thence
unto the "'"Pn. of Our ""n... , or nt"·...,:and ~ unto tht b .... in . As .... hen
Wt Stt many fixed 5ta1""5 5parlding in a clear night, though they be .n of
them ~ nun )" thousand ""mi-di:amt ttn of the earth distant from us, ytt
it muSt of necessity be granted, that there are local motions or pressures
from them, wh ich we oil the light of them, propagated continuedly Or
uninterruptedly through the Auid hn'·ens unto our optic ne,,·n;, or cl""
In (ould n01 set them. And that motion or pressure by which I.'e...., all
other opaque bodies, is nmhing but the pushi ng (avrtpt,apaj against
each other of the (,hCKal globulous panicles C8I~/,,) &tTi,·ing to mo'·c
outward fr"Ofn the cent", of the mniccs "",i§lcd or ",jected from the
~~d superficies of tllem. In Ihc same nunncr as we f~l things at a
distance in thc dark by thc resistaney which tlley nukc upon the further
end of the staff that .... e hold in our hands.' And ,,·hen .... e hear the
sound of a bell or <;:annon a , .......t way ofT, the t",mulous ,·ib .... tion5 of
tht air, likt tht (irclin gs of the water ,,·hen a stone is Aung into it, .'"
from thence continually propagated to OUr ean; Or acoustic nencs, the
undul>tions still growing the wider and ,,·.. ker, tht further they go.
J. But for.wnuch as ""n"" is not mere local rn<Xion impr.....,d from
one body upon another, or a body's bare rtaCfion or resistance to thaI
rn<Xion of anmher body, as ..""e hnt fondly ronceited , but a cogitation,
rtalgnition, or vital perception :and consciousnnos of th(I;C motions or
passions of the bod y, therefore, there muSt of necessi ty be .nmher kind
of passion al~ in the ~ul Or principle of life, which is ,·itally un ited to
Ihc body, to make up !;Cnsation. Which passion tlOXwith5tandiog is of a
different kind or species from the former. For the soul, thot is a
cogitati>·c being, is su pposed to be such a thing as <;:an penetratc a body,
and therefore cannm be conai,·cd to be m<wed by the local motion of
the body. For we Stt that light which 1'C".. d... lhe air, though it be ..
corpornl motion, yet it is not mo,·ed or shalen by the agitations of the
air, because: il is nm a body far I1""II:IK subtle than the air, that runs
through the spon gy pores of it. Wherefore the soul, though it be
conceived to be an nlended substance, yet being penctrative of body,

Dcocon .............. kIcY 0( find .......', "'r in ,lit 0.<\ by ,lit aid 0(, ..' " in M. 0,,;'"
[Mmo .. . So. ,IT..., 4; 0.\1 ~ 'll.

;'
nOl by filling up the pores of ii, bUI co-exisling in the same place with it,
canlJO{ be locally mo~ed by the motions of it.
Neimer is mis passion of lhe soul in sensation a mere naked passion
or suffering, because il is a rogitiloon Or perception which hath
something of active vigour in it. For Ihose ideas of heat, light, and
00100.., and olher sensible things, being nOl qualities really existing in
me bodies withoul us, as me atomicol philosophy instructs us, and
therefore not passively swnped or imprinted upon me GOul from
without in the same manner Iha[ • sign.ture i. upon a piece of wax,
must needs arise parll y from some inward vital energy oflhe soul itself,
being phmtaSms of the soul, or se.-ef1ll mode:'! of cog>r.otion or pe"",p-
tion in it. For which couse some of the PLatonists would nol allow
sensations 10 be passions in [he ooul, but only ac[iye knowledges of me
passion. of [he body (lIa8oi>v y""","",).
4. BUI as I said before, sense is a JnSsion of the soul also, viz., such.
passion as • vila! md COJi[a[i,'c being i. cop.ble of, because we find by
experience: rut il is no! elicited from the soul itself, bUI obtruded upon
;1 from widlOUI. So that the soul cannOl cboose but have such
sensatlons, rogitiltions, or affections in it when such or such enemal
objccrs are presenled ro [he oUlWlrd seJISCI. The soul receiving its
inform'"ion from without by sympo.thizing with the passions of its own
body concerning wh.1 indi"idual bodies exisl round aboul iI, and the
general modes of them; which no innale reason of ilS own could possibly
discover 10 it. And therefore the soul being ntttSsarily determined to
exc" such rogitillions within itself when such 10<::01 motions are
impl"eSsed upon ~ body which she is ,;la!ly united to, these sensations
are cemin kind. of passive encrPcs of the soul. For the GOul and body,
by reason of Ihat vitll union which i. betwixl them making up one
compound «(~'"lOsill"'l) or animal, do of ll«USity mutually suffer from
each other. the body being variously moved by the soul, and [he soul
apin ,=iously affecred from the body, or the motions .... hich are made
upon il . Neithn doth Ihe soul s ufTer indifTc",ndy from any body, bu.
all sense arises from that natural symp~lhy Of compassion which the
soul hath with that individual body with which it is vila!ly united. And
had no! the soul such a passive principle in it, it could nor ",,"ibly be
vitally united to any body, neither could there: be any such thing OS on
animal or living creature.
MOTeO""r Ihese sensitive COJiutions, OS we shall .how afterward, do

,.
'I' ate
pbinly differ, in the mode of them, from those pur<: cogitations that aK
the actions of the soul itself; then: being a '-ast differ<:n", ~tWttn the
~ of hunger and thirst, and mere "olitions in the soul to eat and
drink, likewUc ~rwixt that grief and ... dness that arises from some ill
ridinp told and understood by the mind (though then: ~ something of
OOIpOieal passion consequent or concomitant here also) and befwilt a
sense of pain when the body is hurt. And in lih manner in tlloR otmr
sensations of light and colours, heat and rold, the lIOul doth not mer<:ly
know or un<kntand the figur<: and motions of those corporeal particles,
but hath certain confused affections and phantasm. within itself by
reason of them. From whcna it is e"idelll, that th.cse IC""iti"e
cogitations an not pure actions springing from the soul itself, but
compassions with the body. And therefore that opinion of the Platoniots
is no ,... )" to ~ admitted, thot ..,nsatio"" are nO( pasions, but knowl-
edgn of the passions (noOWv rl'wO"w;), actions (If the soul, or released
and unpassionate knowlcdgn in it of the pasion. of the body.
S. WherefoK sensations formally considcrt<:l aK certain passions or
affections in the soul fatally conntcled with some Ioc;al motion, in thc
body, "-hereby the soul pc:f(civelh ........ thing el... besidn those
immediate COI"pOreaI motions in the ner'ocs, spirits, or brain. FOI" though
the soul do only "ympathiu "'ith the motion. of illl own body, yet by
sense it doth not akc immediate cognizan", of tlloR "cry motions
themseh·es., in tile brain, spirits, and ner~cs, pc:rttiving them ai they arc
in th~lves, but it is S«TCdy i""tructed by nature 10 like nuticc of
some other thinp thereby thot may """cern the body.
For first the soul is ........ rimes so affected by r<:iISOII of those local
motions of the blood and heart communicated by the neu'es unto the
brain, as that it pc:rce-i"cs something "'ithin itself, viz., cemin passions
~1.nftIIl.) of joy 01" pleasantness, dulln ess w .. dness, or comrisutioo,
iraociblc and concupiicible indinations, ...·Ilen we know no rational ause
for them "ithin oursch'cs, and therefore they could not spring from the
soul itself:
Again, the soul is lij)metimc:s SO affected by motions communicated
from the nerves that ~long to the stomach and windpilJC' (_P.llfllS),
[him in t~ parill of the body, and [he like ...... y ~ soid of the other
pains or pleasures., prllrKnces and titillations of th e body, which the
...tll pc:rceives as thinp existing in some ""ruin parill of the body itself;
when the nerves are'n a certain ..... y moved.

"
 Lastly, the soul is frequently SO affected by Ihe motions of tllose 6~e
olher oonjuptions ofnenes, os IhOi by n.lUral inmnci it mes notice of
some COrporeallhings existing witlloul our bodies, whence llut motion
upon Ihe nerves comes, os light, colours, sound, he'll :and rold, liard.
nes&, sormes&, gTlI~itr, levily, odours, 5'lPO"'. The objecu being many
times TemQ(ely di.mlll from us; though il does nol pcrcci,·e them in the
same manner ,.. tlley absolutely e:Ost withoul us.
No .. thougll all these three kinds mentioned be equall y passions and
sen5'l00ns in Ihe soul, yet tile u~ of spccclt Iutll appropri.ted tile
denomination or passions only to the former, and styled the two laneT
by tile nome of sensations, [he first of Ihem being rorrunonly called
internal corporeal senses, tile scrond cxtemil. Wherefore corporeal
scnses in general !Ny be thus defined, to be .fftctions in the soul
caused by certain local motion. mode upon SOfTIe parts of tile body, by
reoson of the viml symp.thy betwixt tile !IOUI and body, whereby the
soul seems 10 pttcci'·c rorporcal tllings u isting without itself, either in
its own body, or else at. distance from it.

Chapter tl

I. Wherefore, ""nSC being. passion in Ihe ..... 1, Or a compassion with its

own body, wllkll it ;5 ~itally united to, that is di~ersified ac:oording to
the diffcrcncc both of local motions ... d of bodily organs through which
those motions arc ronveyed. There being a necesSary ... d faml ronnec-
tion between ""m.in rootion. in some parts of the en~vened body, and
certain affections or sympathies of the soul, which Ocmocritus seem. to
intinute in those words, 'By law a thing is rold, or by law hO["ltMt hot
and cold, and the like werc pas:&ions or ph ...= fatally connected with
ecrtain local motions in the body. S<:nSl: is a kind of dull, confused, ... d
stupid perception obtruded upon the soul from without, wllercby it
ptlecives the alterations and motions within its own body, ... d mes
cognizance: of individual bodies uisting round about ii, but doth not
dearly comprchend what they arc, noT penetrate inlo the naturc of
them, it being intended by naNrc npix; l.pQav. 00 7fpix; yvWo"w as
Plotinu& &pc:aks,J not so ProIXTly for knowledge as for the use of the
body_ For th e soul suffering under that ,,-hicb it perceives by way of
passion, I:2nnot master or conquer it, that is to say, rno '" or understand
iL Fo r SO AnaxagolOS in Aristotle .-ery fid)' upresses tbe n.tu.., of
knowledgtc and intellection under the notion of conquerinl\" (Kpatelv).
Wh • ..,fo..,;t is n=-,y, .in~ the: mind understand. In thing>', thlt ic
should bc: fTtt from mixtu.., Ind pas$ion. for thi. end, .. Anaugo","
<peak • • t .... t it "",y bc: .ble to nwt., and conq ... , ito objecu, t....1 is to
"y, to know or understand them:
In like manner, Plotinus, in his book of Stnse and ,\ Iemory, m i kes 'to
s uffer' (IU:io"X£lV) and '10 be conque..,d' (Kpatel110w) all one, as .1"" 'to
know and 10 conquer' (y'y..w,,-,.-t/v KIJ; ,.-pattlv) for whicb ~'ause he
concludes thaI thaI which sufTc", doth not know: 'Th'1 whicb w. make
10 suffer', ~D nDmine, 'in saying so', 'we make il not 10 know, beause to
know is to oonq u<r, Ind not to be maste..,d or conquered'.' Stnse, Ibat
sufTers from cxtemal obj.ects, lies as it were prostrate under chem, and is
on,COInI: by tb.m: wh.refo .... no ..,n.., judges either of its own passion,
or oflhe passion of any olher sense, bUI judgtcment o. knowledgtc is the
acti"e enerll")' of an unpassionate po"-. ' in Ihe soul.
1 _ And for Ibis ause AnslOde himsel f teUs us, Ihat the soul is •
heterogeneous Ihinl\", and bath se"eral parts (pOpI<J) in it of a very
diff.rent n.tu.., from on. another." Firsl, a hil\"her and acti,·. part,
"'bicb he ails TO XWPIOTOV Kai dlraOD;, th:n ,,-hich acts separately from
the matler, and is impassible, and Ib is is TO WllII" O., Ihat whicb knows
or unde",tands. The other [is] a lower, pass;'-e, or S)'mpathel;al part
whicb suff.rs from witbout and acts in O)njunction ,,'ith the body, and
this is TO aJofJrrrIKOV, Ibat to which sensalion belongs. So Ihat knowl-
edgtc and intellttt;on arc Ihe clear, serene, and unpassionale pelttplion&
of tbat bigher ]).trt of the soul whiCh acts alone, by and from ilsdf.
~tions a .... the en~'lies of that lower, passi ... , and symp.!hrtical
pari, whereby th. soul is "itally united to the body, and clea,-ing 10 it,
, I"IotinI>t. r-.....;..... Not . _ ....

--,
• '"''"''''' «i>o. tw .. '"'~..,;. ~ <i_.<h ...... """"" ...,..•• ""ou(.~. I ... ~,..oi,
,ooh~ 6'",,, j .. pwpO;, ( ~_"fk _ ""' 7-'W' (lnl< ' , ..,.,,!
front I'f<'".....

, II..,xu. 4l.i' "" ,,,, ,,,,, .. ...~ '"'" .".. 'JI", btl ~I""dv6<60,,,.. OM' W ~,...~
(l'Iorinus, E,,,,", ". '; .•.1-11 ~.
• A_Ie, fk ...... u .. ,S. .0.100 +J.... sff., w..... II< dio< .... _""""" ,he ..non.t, _ _
...... n"';';,. ' ...~ ' .."i o,tho _I.

opvngnted m nal
nukes up onc .ninul witk it. Or else tkey may be said to be tke
rogit:nions of Ihe wkok compound «Dmpositum) or .nimol which is the
reason th~ are so cloudy and confoundtd, beau.., they ori.., from the
"ery millUre (<T/Un) md confusion of tke soul and body as it "",re
blended t~ther.
]. For though the soul be • distinct substance, .nd of. different
nature from the body, yet not.... ithst.nding in e"ery minul it is
intim.tel y conjoined with the hody, and du,·cs to it in such a manRer,
as th.1 both together compound and nuke up one thing. And there~...,
it is not presenl ",ilh it only as a mariner with •• hip, that i. merely
locally, or knowingly and unpassionardy pr"""nt, they still continuing
t....o distinct things; but it is ,-itolly unittd to II, and passionately presenl
with il ..... nd therefore .... hen the body i. hurt, the soul dolh not
unpassion.lely know or undenaand it, as when. nuriner knows tlllI a
ship halh sprung a leak, or when. man is informed th., his neighbour's
house is.." on lire. But it feels a strong and vehement pain, and hath a
dolorous..,nse or peroeprion of it, as being one thing wilh il. So in like
manner when Ihe body wanls eitker meO! or drink, tke soul doth not
unpassionately know tkis as an inditTe...,nt by-st,m der, and therefore
rationolly onl y ",il1 or desi..., meat and drink for it, bm it feds a
possionate "'nSC of hunger and thirst in itself, as being intima:ely
concerned in Ihe bu&iness. Now the same is true 01 ... in those other
sensations in which Ihe animol !jttms to be less concerned, as of light
and colour, he.t and cold, sounds and odours, that they are nOf simple
kno"'ledges or inlellections of that p;!.rt of Ihe soul .... hich acts alone by
itself, bUI Ihey arc lhe peroeplions of IhO! which is "i,"Uy unittd wilh
the body, and symplthizing wilh the motions and passions of it nukes
up one compound (rolff/>6silum) wilh il. Wheuforc though all COJita-
lions of Ihe soul, as of lhe m;xtd (TO IlIKTO~) or both t~ther
((1V'Wi4WT~PO~), as Plorinus calls ;1, the compound of soul and hod)',
or as thaI philosopher will h"'e it, of the 'body and • certain "iviliclting
light imparted from the soul to il'. !"nd therefore, u he obsl:rveth out
of Aristotle, 'As it is .bsurd to say the soul we",-eo,7 (or indeed the
bod)" either, wea,;ng ~ing a mixtd acrion of the man and ..-ea'·'ng
,nstrumen15} so i, is absurd to say that the soul alone doth co,-et, grieve,

, n.v, ~, •..,. "" I"ri> ......... """ on ."'" q...... O"'. PIorin.., t -......~ .• 5.
~_n.'_""L3·

"
,.
01' perceive ((6~(Jjpis<ere, <lokre, or Mlllire ), these things proettding from
the compound Or the coalescence of soul and body tOJC'thcr, being not
pure mental, but corporeal cogit2tions of the soul, as it "itally informs
the body and is passiolUldy united ro it.
4. SenK therefore is a cernin kind of drowsy and """,nolent
pert:l'ption of that passive pan of the soul, which is as it ,,-ere asleep in
the body, and acts ooncntely with it. So PJorinus expresses; it 'Sen.., is
of that parr of the soul that sleeps. for that of the soul that is immersed
into the body, is as it were as1eep ..8 It is an energy arising from the
body, and a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended
rogerheT with it. The perceptions of which compound (wnpos'".mj Or of
the soul as it were half asleep and half awake (dJlilllJlt Mmilo",~is) are
confust:d, indistinct, turbid, and encumbered cogimiom, '~I)' diffeTeni
from the energjes of the noe-tica.l part that acts alone, without s}'mpath y
with the body, which arc free, clear, ..,rene, urisfacrory, and awakened
cogitations, that is to uy knowlcdges.
And that these cogitations of the pasoi"e parr of the !lOul called
..,n ... tions an: not knowl<:d!"S or intellcaioru:, is evident by experience
aiso, not: only in the ..,n5eS of hunger and thirst, pain and rorpor ....1
titillation, but aI!lO in aU those other perceptions of light and colours,
h(:;lt and cold, sounds. odours, and "pors. For if they were knowl-
ed!"S or intell«tions, then all mm "'ould rest utislied in the Knsib1c
ideas or phantasmS of them, and nenr enquire any fureher, at least
when the stroke or impression made upon sense ...-ere Strong and
vigorous, as when we sec the clear light of the mend;",n sun, or hear
the loud noise of thunder, whereas the one dot:h but dazzle our eyes,
the other dcofens our cars, but neither mlightm nor inform our
understandings. Whereas, on the COntrary, the minds of men arc
rnlkssly inquisitive after some further intellectual comprehension of
all these things that we pertti" e by our Kveral 1CI\5eS. Neither is it
true of the vulpr only, but it is very observable that the most lCuTe
philosophers in all ages have complained of their ignorance of these
things, and indeed have ronfCS!;Cd tllf:rns.,l,·es mor<: puukd and at a
loss about these ocnsible things, than those abstract immaTerial thi np
which are remote from bodily sen..,. 'The essences of light and
colours', saith Scaligff, 'are as dark to the understanding as they
• ro ... _rj: .. ...,z+;- In, • .,,;,j. i: '" """ • .,., to "".,......"1"t;. ,<>iI'D """ IP'ooIBo ...
C. . . . •. ..;.6.J"O~

,6
memselves:ue [0 the sight. H Nay, undoubtedly so long as we consider
these thinp no othuwist: than ~ represents Ihem, mal is as really
uisting in the objects without us, they:ue and must neros be eternally
unintdligible. Now when ill .... n narul"2lly enquire what m.,.., mings
. re, what is light, and what,.,.., colours, me meaning her...,f is nothing
elsl: but this, thai men would fain know or comprehend mem by
som.ething of Iheir own which is native and domestic, OOt foreign to
them, some acti,'c nenion Or alllicipalion of their 0"'" minds, as T
shall show aflerwards.
Wherefore though sense be adeqll1le and sufficient for mat end
which naNre hath designed it [0, viz. 10 give ad"ertisemclll of corporeal
things uisting without us, and their motions for the usc and conco:m-
ment of the body, and such general intimations of me modes of them, as
may give the understanding suflicielll hints by its ol"n ggacilY to find
OUt their natu...,., and inl'em intelligible hypotheses to solve those
appeanntu by (for omerwise reason alone withOllt sense could nOi
a""luaint us wim indi,;dual uistent mings wimout us, Or assure us of
the existence of any thing besides God, ",'ho is the only necessarily
existent being). Yet notwithstanding sense, as sense, is not knowledge or
intdlection. Which I shall stili nu.ke funher appear by th.,.., following
more particular considerations.

Chapler III

I . For first, sense only suffering and rcaiving from without, and having
no active principle of its own, to take acquaintance with what it reaives,
it must needs be a stranger to that which is altogemer adventitious to it,
and mere fore cannot know or understand it. For to know and under_
stand a ming is nothing else but by some inward anticipation of the
mind, mat is native and domestic, and SO familiar to it, to take
acquaintance with it; of which I shall spn1 rnore afterward.
1. Sc"", is but the offering or presenting of some obiect 10 the mind

,.",,,.m.....
, j ..... C - S"I;o=.
H~ c..J._
Cud_do', al Ih' ;", _!Ix
c.Ntrit<_ /W. ....... It"'- Jt "1, '6.,,, oJ
(Poris, 'S51. "" publiohod 's.ol. no. 3>S, - . I. p. 4)S>.
ubo of"'" ,66S F __ "", «I;';"" p. '.'S' '!wnin . . .
................. ,.. ...... ;"ldIo<tui _ _ _ _ • _ .. n';po ....; ...... f<ooo •.

'I' ate
 COMurn;"g rurnal aM jmmllldl~ moraluy

1('gi •.~ il an occasion 10 exe..,ise it!; 0 ...." in"'<lrd ""'Iivily upon . Which
two Ihings bo:ing many times nearly oonjooined together in lime, Ihough
Ihey be very dilT~renl in nalUn: from One another, yel they an: .-ulg:arly
mistaken for one and the &aTJ"M: Ihing, >s if it .... ere all noth ing but men:
sensalion Or passion from Ih e body. When:as sense i!Self is bUI the
passi,'c pcr~ption of some individual malc,;,:!! forms, but to know Of
understand, is actively to compn:hend 3 Ihing by somc .bt;rracl, flft,
and uni'-ersal reasonings ('ario"n) from when the mind, 'as il wen:
looking down'. >s Rocthius cxpresseth il. 'upon the indi" muals below iI,
,-iews and understands them '.'o But sense wh ich 1;0 flal and gro'-elling
in the ind i,·iduals. and is stupidly fixed in the maler;"l form, is not able
to rise up or os«nd 10 an .bt;lract uni"ersal nOlion _ For which ause ;1
ne,-er affirms or denies any thing of its object, beause (os Aristotle
obsfnCi) in all affirmation and negalion al leasl, lhe predicate is .l ......y.
uni,·ersol. The eye which is plac>:d in a level with the se;t, and touches
Ihe sur&cc of iI, Clnnot take any brg~ prospect upon lhe sea, much less
see the whole amplitude of iL But an eye elevaled to a hi gher station,
and from Ihen~ looking down, may comprehcll5i'dy "iew the whole
sea al on~, or al least ... much of il IS is within our horkon. The
.bstract uni,-crsal reasons ( ralj~" .. ) .n: 1n.1 higher "'Iion of Ihe mind
from ...·hence looking down upon individual things, il hath. com-
manding yin' of Ihem. and IS it were a prion' comprehends or knows
Ihern.
But sense which eith .... lie:!; in the same Ie "d wilh thaI p:lrlicular
.runerial obj.ect ,,-h ieh ;t pcrcci,-cs, o r rather under it and bo:neath ;1,
cannol emerge 10 any knowledge or trulh cooccming;1.
3. Sense is bUI • sl;ghl and 5up<:rficiol p<:m:pcion of the outside and
:accidenlOls of a <>Jrpon:al subslana, it doth nOl p<:nClrale into lhe
profundilY Or in""arC! csscocc of il. For a body may be changed as to aU
the several senses., and rem.in really the same Ih. 1 il was before.
When:fore, Ihough men .re <>Jmmon!y s;aid to know Ihings when thty
,. .~...; """I"" >po<W>O ""~ . .... _ 'I'- .. bwn, d;;..t;c.'·. Boo~ ' ". 0. " H .....
"..+ ,,,F,,., pr .... no. r... .w. part of t!.. _ ..... ;, Ion... "'"" til< ....... U.......
to,"';' .... ;. ........ ..m,- ... _ _ "-n'. boo, ;. ;, dow ""'" til< _ltu., Cood_th'.
Enpoto h 1 " . . . . . . ,"""" bnn.r_;",_ 1,odo _ ... (b, SJ _T ..... ~ •• p< . .. .....
'>1"-'''' ' tho .... n;p.c:..• ~ ....., Ioobn, .so..-. fmm ""'''. b)" ~... !'.....
diotioopiohH all til< ,h'" aoIoi<rt .. tho, Fam, boot oaIy boeo_ of "" nl it.. ... I ,,.
"" f .... itodf". onp,aI .... ria: 'wd .. tollisomtio - ' ""-' _ _ ox".. _ quo<
......... eDom <IIIt<U d~ oed eo
MOdo _ fomwtt ;p.-, _ n.'~ ........ .-
"....... oomp ..... ..tio'. Cud_ r<fon .. .,.. ..... _ apiA, below, pp. lJ and SII.

;'

'VI ate
 o.II((1'"i"l (/(ntll/II11/ immulahk morillity

sec and fer] them, yet in truth by their bodily sen",. they pe...,.,i,-e
nothing but their outsides and external indumcnts. JUSt iii when a IlUn
looking down OUt of a window into the strttts, is said to "'" r:ten
walking in the IIIrttU, when indttd h. """",i,'es nothing but haUl md
cioxhes, under which, for au~ht he knows, there may be Daedabn
statues walking up and down.! Neither is this spoken onl y in ~pea o f
tlut d efect of'ight (to omit the mher senses) which is a lillie ulie,'ed by
microscopical glasses, )-et it cannm pe""'i"e the figures and contextures
of those minute particles oot of wh ich bodies a~ compounded, nor
penetnte beyond the su""rficies into their corporeal profundity, For
though our sight were SO much mo~ than Lyncean , that it coold
discover the "cry po~ in glass through which the light posses, as
Aristmle romplain. it cannot, nay though it rould diSttm the ""rticuLor
globulous partides I.Ilobut.) in th. motion of which light consisteth, md
the triangular spaca between them through which the smallest IIId
most subtle .triated mailer passes, yet not.... ithstmding it ,,'oold not
reach to the essential profundity either of body or sphcrical ness, or
triangularity, .... hich nothing but the subtle sharpnC5S (.. , ....,) of the mind
can penetrate into, SO as to romp~hcnd the immutable reason (rMio) of
an y of them, And therefore it is rightly pronounced b y that .~cellent
restorer of the old atomical and Moschical philosophy,
That ."en bod ies Ih ...... ],-es.rc nIX proptrly pcrrnvnl b)' the SCfIse:< or
by th. imarination, bUI b)' tM understanding alone; nor arc th.",f.....
p",c.ivnl b.c>us. th.y aK !t>u<h«l Dr ..... bu. only lxaus. .My art
understood. 'I
• . Th. essence of nothing is reached unto by the sen&e& looling
OU[Ward, but by the mind's looking in ward into itself. That which
whoUy looks abroad outward upon ;15 object is nm one ..-ith that which
it pcrcci,'cs, but i. at a distance from it, and therefore canna! know >lid
comp~hcnd it. BUI knowl.dge and intellcction doth not merdy look
0111 (jrtl,piuu) upon a thing al • distance, bUI mol<es an inward
" 0 1 .... ..,-1I00I G.ui .., ....... ..1"'.... .. 0........... bl<-liU " ' ,..... no. I L"
doodr"o ' I,d ... o..c..-. M.-..-, LA T. '" 'J.; OM, ., ", '0." """ ;f11ooO .... of
"'" o.doo _ _ , . . U' " "" __.• , .... h>pptn to "'.. _.I.........or ..,
tho,
, _ tht """ 11... _1 ... .. . Yeo do I ..... , . . . ,,- 110 .. _ . - . . . - "",Id ____ ,
............... tjt./ptho,they .........'
" ·t_ "" .............. ;. ...........I ob ~ r.c.","_ oed . .... inl<lornt
poKipi ........ pttripi, quod ....... ,.... .. , .-ru" I<d ... """ .. "'. quod ""Biron .... '
(1)0000 _ .</,Ii" , .,. AT. ... .u, CSM... "-

"
,.
rdkction upon the thing it knows, and alWrding!o the etymon of the
word, Ihe intellect (illulkmu) doth read inward characters ... nnen
wilhin i!$elf (u. u.ltri~rib/U kXfft), and intellectually OOtnpuhend ilS
object within itself, and is the saJTIf: .... ilh it. For though this may be
conceived 10 be true of individual things known (although the mind
understands them also under abstne! nOlions of illl own) yet at least in
Arim>tlc'li seme, it is unquestionably true, 'In abstraet things them-
selves', which are t~ primary obiects of scienoe, 'the intellect and the
thin, known are really one and the same'.1l For those ideas or objects of
intellectioo are nothin!!" doc but Ihe modifications of the mind i!$elf. Dut
sense is tlut which is without (al<1lhtal>: toil £.:'«1), sense wbolly puo
and pds abroad, and therefore doth no! know and comprehend itA
object, b«:ause it is different from it. 'Sense is a line, the mind is a
circle.''' Sense is like a line which is the f1ul ofa point runnin!!" oul
from itself, but intellect like a circle thot keeps wilhin iw:lf.
5. Sense apprdlends individual bodies without by IOmethin!!" derived
from them and SO • IOlln'iori, 'The senses being WI arc the images of
the thinp,.I S The sensible ideas of things are bUI umbr.ltile and evanid
images of the sensible thinp like shadow. projecled from them; bUI
knowledge is a comprehension of a thin!!" proleptically, and as it ,,'ere,'
prWri. But now, to lay aside metaphysics, and speak plainly, all that
.... hich comes from the individ ual object of sense from witoout (as we
lu"e already declared) is nothing at all but local motion or pressure,
when an enli\-ened body is inned nr thruSt upon by ~ mher body
wilhoul. BUIIO receive or fecI a jog", knock, or thru§! from withoul made
upon Ihe body which Ihe soul is uniled 10, this is nIH 10 know, no nol so
much as what local rnlHion is, much less 10 know all mher things. For
knowledge i. not a knock or thrust from witoout, but it romISlelh in the
aWllkening and uciting of the in,,-anI active powe .... of the mind.
6. This poinl which I luve hitherto insisted upon concerning the
slullowncss, dullness, and blunrncss of sense, in thai il cannol pcnetnte
10 the essences of things, is very ingeniousl y and philosophic:aUy
hand led by Plato, in his T,"UItIIU, where he dcmonstntes against
Prougons, that science is not senK, bue tlut there is anmher power in

" '£<.1 (pO')"O.o1 '''''"~ .... ....,. ,~ .... /m-, nl - . Koi'~ _ •.,'•• ....
, (....-... Ll< .....
'JOO5~
'; "lotio .. " r~ .. ~oj ow; .......... ~ PIoo..... c-u.. " .;.7.1 and ' .";;.(1.. '0.
, 7....,... ........ ofo'i: ,,, ........... Compo .. E_...... ,.,"I-,..
60

'I' ate
the soul besides that of scosc or passion, to which scientc', knowJcdge,
and intellection is to be referred after this manner, Fim, ~ta
obeains this from ll~IJ(I(IW, that scnsc i. when the soul, by or through
several organs of the body, rakes wgnizantc' of corporeal things without .
And se<:ofIdly, that ooe serue or orpnical pelixprion canna( We
cognizantc' of the object of anoth~, as sight cannot sec sounds, nor the
hearing hear ~ght and colours. And therefore, where we think of the
objects of sever3J senses comparing them together, and considering of
some things common to them all, this cannot be sense or orpnical
pcloeprion, be<:ause one sense annot consider the object of another
sensc, 'If :any thing contc'ms both, it cannot percei.·e it by either
organ.'l. As ..·heo we coosider sound :and colour together II once, :and
attribute sevcnlthings to them in common, as, fint of all essence, and
then that in each of them is identity with itsclf, and diversity to the
other, that both of them,.,.., two :and each of them one; that they arc: oot
like but unlike to one another. What 5Cn5C or organ is there by which
the soul pc=ives all these things., viz. essence :and non-ascnce,
identity, diversity, unity, duality, similitude, dissimilitude, things
common both 10 sound and colour? Surely it cannot be neither by the
senses of sight or of hearing, be<:ausc these cannot consider one
anotl>.r's objects. Neither can we find any other organ in the body by
which the soul nuy passively W e cognizance of all these things, :and
consider the objects of both those other scnses of sight and hearing.
Wllercby he nukes Thcactetus confess that these things the soul doth
nOl organially perttive by an y sense, but by itself alone witt.out any
bodily orpn. And therc:fore, 'Some things the soul perceives by itself,
or by its own active po .... CT',17 as essence, similitude, dissimilitude,
identity, alterity, p><>d and evil, honest and dishonest. Other things it
perceives by and through the orpn. of the body: as for example:, by the
sense of loucb the soul percci~es nDlhing but the hardness ofthlt which
is hard, and the softness of that which is soft, and the like. But essence,
and what hardness and softness is, and their contrariety to one another,
and again, the CSSCTlce of contrariety itself, the soul alone by itself
discoursing endeavours to judl{C of. Wherefore there is this difference

" f1" yo • ~.;,n/pw> 6tto .... <>i« ~ . . . '" ,.0 ........ ~ oIrii_ 4. (.........
_""5-<1,
" T. ~.,;q.. "'. ,..;,;); l""ll"'ri> b""KD""". ,. oIi ,o..,~ .....'''' """""""" (.........
n,u",,,, "1').

6.

'I' ate
Ixfw«n those Ihings Ihal rome: into lilt &QuI by Ihe passion& of Ihe
body, and thQ5( things Ihat aris<: from lhe ntiocinO!ive power of the
soul i[«lf.
""t both men and bcws do n.atunlly pe.cei"e .. lOOn .. they he born
u..... things that"""'" into the: _I by the paS<;""s of the body. But
n tiocinations "",cemin! these things .. to the natu .... Ind ..... nces of
them, ond !hei, urilitia, are llowly by labour and help or inotitution
a".in<d unto,'"

Now, that which dOlh not ruch 10 th essence of anyth in g, cannot

meh trut h or knowledge. Wh=ro~, he concludes thaI
th= ;. no kno .... dg. or scion« in pusion. but in th. discou .... of the
mind upon them. ror in {his Ian • • way it is possible to reach to !he
....... "" and tl'Uth or thinp, but imp<>i<Sib .. in the f"""",,,

And tho! we oughl not

to .... k kno .... dge ""y mo,.., in ......., but in th1t of the 5Oul, .. h.atsOC"tt
it he called, " 'hich doth alon<: by inc:lf ""'t<mplate th inp th.at a,.." ..

Chapter {V

I. But I have still something more 10 add concerning this ill"gutnent

befo~ Tdililttiss it . Wherefore in the nexl place:, I shall mab il funhe.
appear, that sense is nO{ science or inl.lI~ion, because the $(luI by
sen .. doth not percein Ihe things lhelTlUl,''''', or the absolute narur"" of
Ihem, bUI only her own passions from them. Thi& &xtus the philoso-
pher took notice of: 'The 5m!it'S do nOt reach 10 the obittts that an
plaoxd without bullO their own passions alone.oM And this is that which

" 111 "'" _ ,"' ,.'0; Po, ... ..:- __- . 4.tJ"o-;" .qJ~. """ w,~
....... '''' .......... a; TJj.1"'ri> «l.... ,. <Ii.". , ...... 6"" ,",1"'''''''''' .......
row,... "",.
><al .... ' .... ,.v,; ><al l.lJIOhy 4o:L ......... """"",,,,,,.-..1 >rtU!Irlo;; ......

.. •E> .... ¥t ,"" 79,

""' ...... )'Ir¥orf.. (ilIioI" .86<:),
T . """ "',,. .. , ... ~, h<li*..,. i.c" ..... ....v.." ........;.;;
1Y "'" " .9 !,: I" rrh ....... - . ","",01>- a. _ !tw. 11<11 <Ii ~, •• (illiol .•• 860).
~r: &r: ...,' l;t'<o • ..-ri, .m:.
,.,. ~
dr, """
o.;p..t "'" h; to. t.r<... z",<1o lhart....,.] b- oJ, Ai"" ,d ........., oI.U' h b<d"<P . .
dtoi> .....,.,..,...,""..,. ,~ &,,'" tb,l.,
• AII.I<I oJoPj ... ,. i.cr.., _ ...... "" ""'''',&i_.,... ",.... tJ .... roi _ HIIr!
t Sa -.o..:-'<f~t •.,.,.).

6,
Prougoru M much insisted on, that all our sensible ideas (ra aioOt,ra)
afligllf and colouB, IiIHJndli, odouT'li, sapan, heat and cold, and the like,
are 1'10'1 absolute but relative things. For neither ,s ..ensarion (aToOt,OIC)
any thing of the MU] considered absolutely in ,tself: ,t being no pure and
sincere cogit:uion of the soul alone, neither is the ..ensib!e idea (n;
a/"ihtrov) any absolute quality of the object without, but both th=
(viz. sense and sensible) are amin middle thiogs begoI:ten betwixt the
agent and the patient, and resulting from the activity of the object
without and the passion of the mind withio and se ,·eraUy respecting
each of them. Or, as he expressed it,
F""" the congrns or collision of these '''·0 toreth .... a", generated at
once both ........, and the ...... ib\e. For the scnsible (fonnally considered,
occonliflg I<> that 'd.. !h.t ".., h.... of it) halh no ""Istence btof\), •
....... rion, but is bcgoll"" with it."

And therefore, 'Colour and the rest is neither an)"thing in the Mul itself,
but a middle thing betwixt both',2l that ,s a passioo. Which is the ,·ery
same with that which Aristode imputes to 'he ancient physiologers as a
paradox, that hlack and white were n<M without the sight.
The truth of which iii so evident in SOme instances, that none can
possibly gainsay it . For when the body is either pricked with a n~dle or
wounded with • sword, no nun can im.gine that those paimi that result
from thence were such real and .bsolute qualities existing in the needk
or sword before our sensation, hut that they are OUr own passions, and
so relati ,·e things to us, or perceptions of the motions of the needle or
Iword relati,·ely to the enlivened body, and as they are hunfuJ to it . And
the same is vuJprly acknowledged in those coloun that are therefore
called fantaStical, as in the .,.;nbo...· (im) and the prism, whereas in
reality all rolours are as fanwtical as the ooloun of the "';nbow, and the
coloun of the "';nbow as real as any other. And it is likewise true of the
<Mher proper objects of the se'·eral scrues. For as 5exlU5 the philosopher
obu;,." .., ' Honey '$
not the same thing with my being .wectcncd, nor
wormwood the same with my ha,·ing sense ofbillemcss.,ll That whi,h
" .& (_1 ' .... ,_.,;;",; .. ~ , ,..,""'" IlpIJi; 4W,"" ,;r-... (·..1'A .... oIog",ol •. ~ <II
ok 6Ij'I{;. oi.<j . . . -_ _ ~ ~ """ , . . . ' 6Ij ... (7\tu,_ 'l(o,o).
u 'O.it -."" JOdI . . . . ~ ..:it, '" .,.."fJ/WAJ• .m, .6 _P-""r ,6, ..... o.u;.
/O<fII(o" jno.."'"' 'w). !.<>do .... 0' .,,,: ...... ,",icIo ... <>I - . ...... in _ . .,.,
............ _ ""pi"""..... ,.....bido ;. impios<d_ ........,....... in boo,.wo".
n ~ I10Yl ,~ oem; "", '0 ....... "" yi.<:odC_ ,... '«Ii '" 6.,ioo6oD • .... ~",pat,_ (s...,uo
Eo"... · ofJo,_ of"',,! . :•.1.7».

6,

'I' ate
we know by Soense concerning honey and wormwood, is Qnly mat our
taste is so affected from than. But what absolute mode or disposition of
parts in them [which] causes these different sensations in us, bekmp 10
IKMtlC olhef" faculty of the soul to discover. And hence it comes 10 pass,
that though the natures or tsSCnces of things be simpk, yer one and the
same thing perceived by ou r se,·enJ senses begetS se'·eral pusions and
phanta5m5 in U$. Flame, which is norhing bur a ,;oleOl agitltion of the
small panicles of a body by the rapid subtle: matter; the sarno< fT1<Kion
communicated 10 the eye or oplic nem:1i ~ts onc kind of sensible:
idea or phantum alkd light, but 10 the neT\'CS of touch anolher quite
different from it aIled heat. Therefore neither light nor heat, :acmrding
10 those sensible ideas tlull we ha'·c ofth=, arc 1"t:I1Iy and absolutely in
the flam. without, which is but One kind of motion or agitltion of
manu, but only fantaStically and Il:latively, the one to our sight, the
OIher 10 OUr touch. And hence it proceeds also that sensations all:
diversified from the same thing to se,·en] indi,·idU.1ls of the ume kind,
and to the same indi,;duallt se'·eral times, by reason of some difference
in the idiooyncrasy or proper temperamenl of the body, .. (to omit the
instance of those thO! arc icterical) appears pLoinly in the degrees of heat
and cold . the gralefulness or ungntefulnrss of se,·cra[ tastcs and odours
to seven] individuals, or to the same considered bolh in sickness and in
health. Which things could not be if all sensible: ideas wen: absolute
qualities in the thing itself, and so taken notice of by sense. And it is
worth tile while: to _ how Prou.go .... philosophized about 'his J.11er
instance, improving ;1 to this purpose,
When [ drink .... iM, being in health, it oppea.. pleasant and ...«t . F",.
th~ oK<'nt and the ",tiall bctwiu them liege. both .. n.. and ..... tneN,
... vcraUy .... pcc1ing the agenl and the pal;'nt. For senst '''pcc1inl the
pati<nt. m:akes and denomina.es the tongue .. nlient, and o1l"fttrKM
respecting the agcnl (mu is, the ,,;nt) mak .. ond dcnontinata thaI
""'«\, ntH absolulely but .... pcaively to the '''"P
of ...... thOl is in
heaI.h. Bu, ...I><n the pa.iau is alltred by sickn.,.., and bc:uw.K. diffe=t
from .. hal il ...... lhen il ~'U quite another Wk than formerly, for it
.... , .... to a very different patient. Q!lile diffcrmt thinp an: pTOdw:ed by
the person ond ,he drinking of II>< wiM. Rapcc1ing the 1O<tgue a.." ..
ofbittcrn, 55, and as to the wiM its being made and d(norni ... ,~ lh .. t f.14

,. -Qt•• {oIil - - -'_ 'J_',.".

~ I"" [ ... ·"'..1ni 1.......· (.. .J.£-,<. it , rY oIj {. . ·1
,~ '" _ _ """ ~ -I'>' , ........,..; n: •• ~" ..... Iv\ ' .... AA4>O<..,.. .(.oi",...
 When:fon since by sense the soul dOlI! not pl'rco:i,"c oorporeal obj<:<:ts
as they Ire truly, really. and abs.Jlutely in tl\cm5Ch"cs, but under some:
fanwtical «t'rao:nlOlion. and dt.!Ui.u, ..,n.., canl1{){ be knowledge,
which oomprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the soul had no ocher
power in it bo,u only this of possion or sensation (as Protagoras
suppo;>:SCd), then there could be no such thing al all as any absolute truth
(IT knowledge. BUI that hypothesis of his, as we have a1rndy showed,
plainly OOntndicts and confutes itself. FOT that which pronounces WI
our sensible ideas of things ~ fantulical and relative, must n...ds M
somc1hing in US superior to sen"', that is, nO{ relative or r""tastical, bUI
that judges what rally md absolutely is and is not.
l . BUI w strike this buriness horm, I sllall in the Ills! place funher
observe that sense <=no! be knowledge, nor the certainty of a11thinp
ultimately resolvable imo sense, as m:my men beside: Protagoras
conceil"C, for this reason, becauSt: the nature of ieI\S( consists in
noching elK but men: Sttming or appeannce. This _ intimated
before in that de6nition that "'-e gave of Ile'nlle', thn is a passion or
affection (iv up OoKfiv Or iv rfj! ¢aivwOas) in me soul whereby it
RmUi to pcraive some corporeal things existing. That is, sense is when
the soul is so affected as ifmere were such a corporeal thing existing. So
mat all me reality mat is Il......suil}· required to Ile'nlle' is only this., that
there be rcallya passion in the lOul, nr that the lOul be rcally so affected
as if there wue such a thing. That is., thot it ha"e rcally such a """"'ing
or appearance, but not thot the thing . ... lIy be, as it appeaR. For as to a
thing's being such or such, its hl,;ng such a mode Or quality, "'-e have
already demonstrated by reason, that in this respect most of our sensible
ideas are fantastical things. And the same may be evinced and made
evident also by senile' itself. For it is as true and real a sensation when a
man looking upon a staff mat is partly in the air, and partly in me WIICT,
sees it crooked (though it be really straight), as when he looks upon it all
in me air, and sc:es it straight as =lly it is. For we an: as Teally affected
_<_, ...... ,_
_4j<>" .."' ................,.......... ,__".. '_,_a,&..N .." '_. 0'",
.i
->- ~_ • ·A • •••• " _ .
_,... ,"" __ ....,.; ...6.... ; , .iooiw , ... oi...... .,...--.,. ,i' o. Ih" "'1
!. ~ ~
.. _ .... ,,'_, . (. __ 1-0...&/ _,,",_lil.o n po" ,0,·, .. ,<lor oVtoI.
~ .,....~.

__ ....... . . ,.; "'" *'

v..jko, 4. 'I .... .,y 60j ... : : ~i6c(.I. I , ..17:""" 60j aU I,. .. I' If,.
1 .. ,- .... ~ ; ' "
,1JIm •• 0109"" .,~,6fo<..., ....,.; oW ,~ • .mr.~ . ....
,.", hij ' """""'~. I n . - 'i'iD), It ;, ... p,mr......
'q ' _
but Soct.o ... who ;, ..,.Mdta "
thr~.r"';'q . n ; .. , Cad _ _ ....... .rn
k"•. lk _ _
o.ti<:o~.... _ .. "'" u.pot. '" Ill< Gtotl . .......... h . ..... of d....,... _ _ ...
•w '1""-

"
,.
and there is as much a S«IIling in one as in the otOO. And innumenble
instantts might bC' given in this kind, to pro'·c thaI as to thinp bC'inll"
such or such, the~ is no other truth or =Iily necessarily requi~d in
sensation, but only tbat of appeannce.
Buttbis is nOl: :all, for I sh.tll observe in the nUl pl~ Ihatthe~ is not
so much as tbe reality of boing or exi",en~ of the obiect necessarily
Tequi~ to senAOOn, buttbe~ may bo a true sensation, though there bC'
no object at all really existing without the 5OIJ1. A known IUld appro,·ed
instance whereof"", han in th"", thOl, after they had tbeir arms and legs
cut off, ha'l1: boen sensible, .... ben they .... ere awake, of a slrong violenl
pain in their fingen and toes, tllough really mer had no such members.
And .... e have all constant experience of the same in our drnms, whicb
are as true ..,nsations, as th"", which we have when ....e are awake, and
.... hen the objects are reall)· existent without us. Bcc:ouse thc soul is as
really affccted, and hatb as lively imal{CS, ideas, and phantasms of sensible
Ihings as nistenl [things] thm, as whm .... e are awake, and many limes is
really sensible of ,·iolenl IUld exquisite pain, which is a real sense, though
it be but a fantasli""l thing, and immedialely ,·anish .......... y Upor1 Our
awakening. Becousc there " .... nothing =lIy in the body, that by Ihe
motions of the OCrvCS could beget a real pain.
3. Now the reason of this, that the soul may be passively affected in
Ibis msnncr, wben there iii no object al all =lIy uisting witbout iI, is
from hena:: because b)· §IOnse the 5OIJ1 dotb not suffer immedialdy from
Ibe objects them..,lvcs, but onl)" from its own body, by reason oftha!
narural and vital sympalh y whicb it hath with ii, neilher dOlb it suffer
from its own bod)" in every pan of iI, or from tbe OUtward organs of
sense immediatdy - as from the eye when We sec, Ihc tongue ,,·hen "'e
taste, or the exterior parts of the body wben we fed, bUI only in tbe
bnin, or from me motions of the spirits tbere.l1 But so as that it doth
not uke immediate cognizance of those ,·cry motions immediately ••
they are in thernsd,'cs, but by thc S«rct inlitinct of nature doth by
means of Ihem uke cognizance of those corporeal things existing
without us, from whence the origin:al of the motion C(lmcs: as for
eurnplc of the litars tmat are so vastly distanl when we look upon the
heavens. Wbence;t coma; to pus tbat iftbat body from which tbe soul
immediately suffers, and that is the .pirits in tbe brain, be so mo"cd as
" o.mp... D .............. , . I.')! ' •• P.... .. _ .... '1Io1[ (CS.\\ ~ ',,"_J. aT...rr..!
c..d_ <Ion ............ r..t pain •• hu< ... b< >«<d "p"" ••
it would be mo~ed by the ne.,-es .... hen any out ....ard obj«u make their
se:~eral imprnsions upon the organs of se:nse:, the soul must neab ha~e
the same passions, affectiom, and sensations in it, as if the objcl;l5 ""n:
really existing without. No .... this may ~ to pas:< either by the
fonuitous motions or agitations of the spirits themselves, casually falling
into the same figurations, that tbe motions of the ner~es .... nuld imp,ess
upon them from some outw:aro objects, or else: by the spirits rushing
against certain printo, traces, or marks in the brain made by fOlTlCr
sensation. when we ....ere awake, .... hereby their motions an: determined.
Or, lastly, by the fantwical power of the soul itself, .... hich as it suf:"ers
from the body, so it can liltwise ace upon it, and according to our
customary actions or inward affections, inclinations, or desi res may
move the spirits variously, and bc¥t di,-ers phmtasms in us.
And that dn::ams are ..... ny times thus begQuen or excited by the
fantastical power of the soul in itself, is evident from the orderly
connection and coherence of imaginations, .... hich many limes are
continued in a long chain or series; ..-ith the fiction of interlocutory
disrouTSCll and dialogues consisting of apt answers and replies made
interclu.ngcably to one anOll>er, and contain such thingli as ne"cr "en:
befon: printed upon the brain in such a series or order. Which therefon:
could no{ proceed either from the fonuitous dancings or liuMullllti:ll1S
of the spirits, or from the determination of their motion, by antecedent
prints or tnces made by former sensationli in the substance orthe brain.
of. And the dre:ams that we ha"e in our sleep are really the same kind
of things ...·jth those imaginations that .... e hive many times when we are
a"''lIIke, when tile fancy, being nOl comlTWlded or determined by the
will, ro,'es and ....anders and runli at random, and spins out a lnng th read
or concatenated se:ries of imaginations or phantasms nf corporeal things,
quite different from those things .... hich our out ...... d sc:nses at the Arne
time take norice of. And some persons then: are to whom these waling
dreams are vcry ordinary and f.m il iar.
And there i$ linle doubt to be made but if ...... n should suddenly fall
asleep in the midst of one of these ..-a1<ing dreams when his fancy is
roving and .pinning out such. Ioo g series of imaginations, those "cry
imaginations and phantaSmS would of course, ')Io/llm, become dre:wns,
and run on, and appear nm as phantasms or imaginations only of things
feigned or non -uistent, but iIS perceptions of things really uistent, Ihat
is as scnsations.

,.
 Whereas these imaginations that we ha" e of individual rorporeal
things .. hen ..e all' awake, and our outward smlit:ll employed upon their
sevm objects, do lIOI!;et:m to be sensations oflhings ruJly uisting and
pr~nt as Our drums do, but (O be certain faint, cnnid, shado"),, and
umbrarile thinp in comparison of those ... nsations which we ha"e at the
same time with then when we =
awake, that is, !Wt as things ex'Slent
without us, but as our own cogitations. The reason whereof is, beau...
tllough they be both of the Ame kind, yet th""" motion. of the spirits
wh ich all' caused by the nenu, from the objects ,,·;thou! when we are
.wake, being more vig(lTOul, durable, conSlant, and pre'1Iient, do
naturally obscure or extinguish those OI:hcr weaker phanla!im. or
imaginations which we have at the same time. And reason interposing,
brings in its vmlict for tllose stron~r phantasmli also whose objects are
durable and pelll"\allent, by means whereof the iaue, only seem to be
real sensations, the former counterfeit and ficlitious imaginations or
mere picture and landscape in the soul. And this Aristotle long agn
obsc:r¥ed in this manner:
In tho: d.y they are shut <>lit and disappn •• tho: oenses and undt:ntanding
'0
...... kin ....... ~ ~,. is ma<k dmp!","' by ,ho SUO" ' . and omaU
sricf.! and pleuures by va' ontI. Bu, ,.h"" ..... an:.,
res, in our bed!,
the leut pbanw.ms ..... ke impressions upon us.'"
In the day-rime when we are a"'1Ike, those more fleeting &ncies and
imaginations which proceed !Wt from the motinns of the nerves callSCd
by the objects ""ithout must needs yicld and gi"e place:, as being harned
and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting motions that
come from the nerves, caused by permanent obiecrs. reason also
carrying it clearly for Ihe latter, by means whereof the former cannot
appear as real things or """,,"lions. But when we are asleep, the"AlRC'
phmtasms and imaginations are more strong, vivid, and lively. beau...
lhe nerves are relaxated , there are often no motions transmined by them
from the outward objects inlo the brain, to confound those !lXJ(ions of
the spirits within, and disrract the soul's anemion to them. JUSt as the
same loudness of a voice in a sriU evening will be hcard a great dtal
further and clearer, than in the day-rime ...·1Ien the air is ,gialed wilh

.. }.II~. iu...,... ....... ~ , .... ok ~i' .... n ; ,ok _ ....... w ~.;c.........

....... ...,.. ~... """ u., ..... q j ....... ...; ~ ~IK"; .pqjl.oi;. ••""1/ ' .... , <It
"'",.J.«a nI "''''""''" r," ' ~ . 0. 0....... 06"' -5).
many conlrary motions crossing and confounding one anolher. But 0010'
there are no OIher motions of Ihe spirits besides these which cause
d=ms to compare ...·ith IlIem, an d disgrace them, or PUI them OUt of
countenance, and, as it "·ere, by their louder noise and clamours, so 10
pcmss I~ animadven;ve put of the SO\l!, that tht weaka- murmun of
the olhcr cannot <>buin to be heard, as il is when .... e are a....ake, or in the
day-time. And themore in sleep the mind naturally admits these
phantasms as sensations, there appearing nOne other to contradict tlll1
verdict.
s. When:fore, phantasms an d sensible ideas are =lIy or materially
the s:arM thing, .... hicll Aristotlc intimates, affirming tllal fancy is a weak
kind of se~ (f/Javruoiu is aiofhtoir; nr; do6~,*) and tllat phantasms
are as sensation. (f/JavrMpata are oia uloOJipumj." For both phan-
tums and 5CTIsation. are passions or sufferings in the soul from the
body. And yet notwilhstanding e..ery pllamasm d011l nO'! seem 10 be a
corporeal Ihing realJy existing .... i,houl Ihe soul, as a imSation (uTolhtIlO)
doth. Wherefore Ihere arc 1....0 cases in which a phan tasm doth n1H Kem
to be a sensation. First ...·hen a phanlasm is raised Or excited purposely
and ,·(,]untarily, by the Imre imperium, command, or empire of O\Ir
own will, as by experience we find il often is. For il is in O\Ir po .... er 10
fancy what corporeal thing or person (formerly known to us) .... e please,
though ;1 be absenl from us. Nay, and to compound such things as we
never saw before, as a golden mountain, a centaur, a chimera.. Now in
th is ClSI:, when Ihe soul is conscious to itself; that Ihese phantasms arc
arbitrarily raised by it, or by its own activity, il cannot look upon them
as sensations, Or things really existing without itsoC lf, bUI only as evanid
im;IJes, pictures and Ildumbmions of Ihings w;lhin itself. And sucll
phantasms as thc:sc: do usually KWmpany most of our OIha- cogitationl.
Wherefore phantasms (P';QII/_Q/Q) do nn! seem to be sensations or
pem:ptio"" of things as really existing ...;thoul the soul, when they are
volunwy, or when the soul is ;n ....ardly conscious Ihal they arc raised
up by 1($ own llCIivity.
Snxmdly, neither doth cvery in volun tary phantasm, or luch II Ihe
soul is not conscious 10 itself to MVC purposely excited or nised up
within itself, 5eeITI to be a sensalion or pe=plion of the thing as cristing
without us. For lhere may be straggling phantasms which come into the

'I' ate
mind "'e know noc how and bubble up ofthemseh'es, which )'el the soul
may distin,uish from sensalKms or IloeI\%PtionS of things as existing
rally without it, because of some other phantasms the s:ame time in the
soul, whose vigoun and lustre do clood and eclipse them.. for when
the"" are phantasrT15 of se"eral kinds at the s:ame time in the soul, or
such as arise from different motion. of the spirits, the soul silently
com!»ring both IOgethn naturally looks upon Ihe more vigorous,
Siron" and pamanent of those phantasms only as real existences, but
the more faint, flining, and transitory, as iINginary things. Now there
arc Iwo kind. of involuntary pmnlasms, as I hU'e alrudy inlimalro , in
the soul when we are a.... ke. One thaI proceeds from such motion. of
the spirits as are olJS(d by the nnves ffiO"ed from the obiects without
Another that proceeds from Ihe spirits of Ihe brain, otherwiso: moved
Ihan by Ihe ner.·es. And the""fore ilt VWfu., when we are arue, and
have phantasms that arise from lhe mOlian. orthe neT'l<:S causnl by the
obicw wilhout, appearing "ery diffcn:nt from lhose mher phantasms
Ihal arise from the spirits olherwise moved than by the nerves, both in
Iespu::t of their vigour and consrancy, do thercfore 10 aU such persons,
as arc not dinempercd cither in body or in mind, naturally seem 10 be
real, or things existing without the soul, but the latter iINginary.
Whereas in sleep, when lhe nen'es bein, reb u ted, mmmunicalC no
mIltion 10 lhe spirits, the "ery same phantasms (there being now no
olhn and sO'Onger to compare ",jlh Ihem and discredit or disgrace
them) do naturally appear to the soul as sensations of things really
exisling without the soul.
6. No .... the lrulh oflhis maIle r dOlh evidently appear from hence, in
Ihal by reason of some disease either of body or mind, men's spirits may
be IiO furiously, violendy, and ,",onpy agit:lled tml th"", phanlOrT15
which do not arise from the motion of the nerves, being mosl prevalent
and predominant, e\'tn when they are aW<lke, may bcoome sensations
and appearances of thinp as rcally existing wilhoul Ihe soul; thai men
INy confidently believe they hcar, see, and feel !hose things !hal are
nOl, and be imposed upon in all their SCI\!iCS. Which is I thing that
frequently mppen.., not only in phrenetical, maniac, and hypochon-
driacal persons, of which there are many instances recorded, but also in
others posfCSSCd with "rong passions offear, love and the like. Where_
fore as sense, that is lhe phantasms thai arise from the motion
commUnicaled 10 the .pirits of the brain by the nen'cs, do ordinarily

,.
'VI ate
baffle and confule imaginations and fancy, that is, those: phantasms thaI
arise from Ihe spirits othu wisc moved Ihan by Ihe nel"'CS, SO likewise
imaginations growing wild, rampant, md exorbi(ant, may in 1M same
manner baflk and confute all our &en .....
7. Which exorbitanc)' of fmcy or imaginalion pre"ailing o\"er ocnse,
Or those phan tasms which arise fonn the morian conununicaled to tm
brain from Ihe objects wilbout by tM nen'es, may either procttd
originally from IiOfI1C distaSC: in the body, when:by Ihe animal spirits
~ing furiously he,ued and agitated may ~ carn..d wilh so pat. force:
and career, as th.1 the motions caused from 'he obiters by the nerves
~ing weakened, may yidd md give pl.", to them, and their phmtasms
be in a manner siknt vmquist.ed md obliter.lted by Ihem. Thosc:
SITOIIger ph.ntasms tha! ari..., from lhe agil;u)on of Ihe spirits Ihrnl-
...,h·es., POS- iSing the place of them, the affection or .nimadversion of
Ihe .....1 being ab....y. " '011 by Il\osc: phmtasms that make the loude!lt
no;"", or have the gn:'at""t vigour. Or else .he same .hing may plOCt<d
originally from some di...,aso: or distemper in Ihe ..,..,1 i!Klf. When the
Jo"'eT, irrarional, and pass;"e pan of the soul (in which concupiscible
md irascible affections an: seated), and so by conscquen<:e, 'he fan wn.
power of the soul (the some po ...·er that begets in us thosc: WIlking-
dreams before-mentioned) grow. excessi,'c1y md exorbitantly pn:domi-
nant, insomuch thaI il doth not only weaken md extinguish the noeticaJ
powers, which an: ol""yl proponionably debilitaled as t his il in';JO-
raled, bu t also pn:"cnt the power of the soul iuclf, the immoderale
activity of t"" (mcy I>Ot permitting the soul to .uIT.r from, or ~ passi".
to the action of the objects: upon it, nor '1uiet\y to recci"e the
impressions of them, witllaut ruffling and confounding them. And this
is th., sad md lamentable condition ,hat Ih. soul of man is liable and
obl>Oxious to, by its o\"crmuch indulgm<:e to that pass;". and irrational
and corporeal part in which the affections, appetites, and desires ~
seated - a condition which, if it contin ue 0.1 ..... )"5, is worse: thm death
il$Clf, or perfect annihilation. To ha'·. not only n:ason dtgnded and
dethroned, but "'en sense itself pen·etted or extinguished, and in the
room thermf boistcrollS phantasms protruded from the irrational
appetites, passions, and affections (now grown monstrous and enor_
mous) to becotm 'he "ery sensations ofir, by means whereofit is easy 10
conoo\"e that 'he divine "engeancc (nemesis) may make Ihe &Qui its own
tormentor, though thet"C wet"C no orher hdl without it, not only by

,.
'I' ate
",pres.enting mo&t Joamsomc: and affri,htful, dismal, and tragical """ Li es
of minp to i!Self, but also by cruciating i!Self with exquisite and oensiblc
pains. And the RnouS oonsidemion hereof should make us very CI.",ful
how we let the reins loose to that passive irntional pIn of Our soul
which knoW!! no bounds nor measures, lest thereby we unawarea
prropiute and plun~ ourselves headlon, into the most Ad and
deplorable condition that is imaginable.
8. I shall not discourse here of that po"'er also which evil !>pirits
<le"i,) may possibly have upon rI>ose that have eimer mancipated
them§clves into them, or otherwise forfeited that ordinary protection
which divine providena: commonly affordem tQ all, by acting immedi-
ately upon the .pirits of the brain, and thereby endeavour to !;ive an
account of those phenomena of wizards and ",itclln ~ulgarly tall;«I or,
their Keming transportations in the air, nocturnal ronventides and
jun keting&, and odM:r such like things, u seem plainly rontradictious
and irreroocilablc to philosophy.lS But we have already J;Oi.d enough to
prove that Rnse is nothing but IIttming appearance. And therefore we
can ha\"e no a:nainty by sen§c alooe eimer coneeming the absolute
naturea of individual corporeal thinp without us, nor indeed of their
existence. But all the assurance that we have thereof arises from reason
and intcll«t judging of the phantasms of appearanoe:s of §Cn..:, and
determining in which of mem there is an absolute reality, and which of
them are but me",ly relative Dr fantaStical .
.. H• .-... ..... _pho _ _ _ .... "'... iowir<hoo ......... ",_tndCIpIo" ; 1.,.
Tllil _ ....... Wt«I by !til m...d -.l
0; ,mft ......... . ;; .." .... olJhoOll ..
s..I(I -- I
_.1c.JI"'''''...
Henry M...... ..... ocId ..... _ _ ol

, .659) ..... hi l . - ~A_(1.cIncIooo,

""'........-ioo/_IIo>«'..
.I-sJl.-'-""G"">il _ ....
...... io hilS"", k ]; . "."", .. r.U ..ilf'Ioio £.-.,, 0........ .... . _
w~
AHo_(J ........ 6I. )·
 Book IV

Chapler I
I. Having hirh~rro showed IMrsen"" or passion from corporeal thinp
exislenl "ithoul the soul ill nO!: inlellection Or knowledge, SO IMI
bodies Ihemsel" 6 an nOI kno"" or understood by sense, il must needs
follow from hence that knowledge is an inward and active energy of the
mind iw:lf, and the dillpbying of its own inruol~ ,igour from within,
wheTeby il doth conquCT (Kpouiv). masler. and command its ob;ecu.
and 50 begetS a clear, senne, victorious, and satisfactory sense wilhin
iw:lf.
Whm:fon though it be vulgarly conceived thot kno,.-Iedge :arises
from Ihe force of Ihe rhing known ,cling upon thaI which kno ..'s from
without, yel contrariwise il ill most cemin, 10 UK Bocthius' "pression,
that inrd1enion and knowledre do nol arise (rom 1M fOftt and acti",;'y
of !he thing known from w;rhour. upon thar which knows. bul from the
innrd po"""'. """"r and O<tivi<y of !he mind th.t, knows actively.
Comprehendin! the ob;":, within ilKlf. and subduing and pre'.-ailing
Mer it,'

So tha, knnwkdlJ" i. n<>t. pas<i<m from anything wi,hout 'he mind, but
an active exertion (If the inward strength, vigour, and power of the
'Jd .,..... ocirur, . - ............... """ .. d ..,· .rio'; .. &n' ..... ociri..c c. i'
~ .... Dt, ' ,' lB· "-,, v, 1", iv, _71-1), 'The ~ _;0. io _ <XO<I
- ' .... nab ' ......... ...u, iii .... IMin .. ~ ... , 'The ...i..o1 ..... 'Oauoc cnim """"
S ' •• - . 1«'11"""'" .... im ..., "" ' . _ "booM poWo um .. d" ........
r.c.bttm.' Loeb ........tioo: 'f... .... ,d'ir\I..toicto .. In.... io 1' " ' .... _ite to ill
own _ "'" _ _ ite WI .... • .. 'T j " ' . - ""'" _ . ,' s.. ........ p, A "'"
TIS,.,. Jll.

,
mind, displaying i!Self from within, and the imelligible fonns by .... hich
things are understood or known are not stamps or impressions pass;'·ely
primed upon the liOul from witoout, but ideas ,·itally protended or
.eli,·ely exerted from wilhin i!Self.
~ . A Ihing which is merely passive from Wilhoul, :and ( .. hieh] doth
only rreei..., foreign :and ,uh·cnlilious forms, cannot J>OO5ibly know,
understand, Or judgc of Ihill which il rreeins bUI must n..,ds be a
strangcr 10 ii, having nothing wilhin itself 10 know il by. The mind
annOI kno .... :an ylhing, but by SQrnelhing of its o .... n, Ihat is native,
d<>mesIK:,:and familiar to il. "''hen in a great throng Or cro ....d of people,
a man looking round about, ......,15 with innumc ... ble Sll":l.nl!" f~ IhOi
he neyer sa,,· before in all hi. life :and at 1""1 ch:anccslo espy the f:ace of
one old friend or acquaintance, which he had not !ittn or thought of
nuny y~ before, he would be said in Ihis """" to h..·c known Ihat one,
and only that one face in aU thOi cum",ny, because he had no in""rd
previous or anticip.ucd form of any other face, that he looked upon in
his mind. BUI U soon as ever he beheld that one face, immcdilltc1y lhere
re,;ved and started forth a former anliei",lcd form or idu of il
treasured up in his mind, thOl, os il "·ere laking acquainlance .... ilh rhat
newly ~ved form, made him know it or remember it. So when
foreign, '!nIlge, and adventitious forms arc exhibited to the mind by
sense, the liOul cannox oxheT'o\;se know Or understand them, but by
something domestic of its own, some active :ant,ci",tion or prolepsis
..;thin itself, that occasionally revi,;ng and meeling ...·ith iI, makes it
kno ..· it or take acquaintance .... ith il . And this ;s Ihe only true and
allowable sense of that old assertion, that knowledg<: is reminiscence, I
not Ihat it is the rememb ... nce of something which the liOul had some
time before actually known in a prc-existent state, but because it is the
mind's cotnprcllending of things by &OmC in ..-ard anticipolions of its
o .... n, SQmet:hing nOlive and d<>meslic [0 ,t, or IiOmcthing acriycly e xerted
from within itself. And thus Plotinus, when he coda,·ours to pro'·e that
the irnnM:diate objects of knowledge and imclltttion arC not things

, n.io - . .. !'1m., ,-,. of . .. _ .... - , . of ' '''' • ....,. • "" .. ... ...
"," e ,.... ,. , ;" M.- I .. ,. and "'-* 7"'. In....-. .. bo\ ... .. .. tt.e
- , . ....... ~~ of _10., (;.od..- ;, _ ",1>O.w.;.t CooI...-wdI ....... l""'r
~Ioo. . c:.n.....n .• tItp .. • ~ I~._J a;. ....' .. /*- ~ "NoJ_ It t/6s>;
".

","" II _ b)" U . ........ and H. M<UUum. T.......... /'11') .. " . th;, 110m....
Hcnry . ....... b}"_ ....... rtUinedit ... hnotl ·.in ...... ""',.... ' ..... """,./ ..i ·
po;m ... ..;.... io _ (and ;')1><1" h .

,.

'I' ate
withom th~ mind .<:ring upon ;t .t a distance, but contained and
comprehended ..ithin the mind itself,
Other"A_ how should the mind know ,IT judg<' when it Iud ,.,.1Iy
IWrehend<d any thing thot is good, that is honest or jUiI, tt.... things
being.lI .. rangers to the mind, and coming inlO it m:.n withou, . So tho,
the mind could root ha.e Iny principles of judgement within ilS<:lf in thi,
cue, but these would be without it. Ind .hen thl: truth mUSt need, lit
without it .Iso.)

3. If ;ntellection and knowledge we" mere passion from "-;thout, or

the bare reception of exttlUlCOUIi and ad"entil;ous forms, then no reason
could be given .1 .U wh y . mirror or looking-j:1ass sh"uld !WI und.,.-
stand. w~ it cann'" SO much IS ..,nsibly percei'-e those images
... hich it rec:ei,-es and reflecrs ID us _ And therefore ..,nse of itself, IS w;lS
bef"" intimated. is not a mere passion, but a passi"e perception of the
soul, which hath something of ~ital energy in it, beuuse it is •
cogitation. To which vital energy of the soul those ..,nsible ideas of
light, oolours, heal, and the like, owe oil their entity, Much less
thucfore can intellection be I pure passion. But if intellectioo and
knowledge ...·ere a mere pass,,'e perception of the soul from without and
nothing but ..,nse, or the result of it, then what reason oould be gi~en
why brute animals th •• haye all the same senses that men have, and
some of them more acute, should not h.'-e intell«tion also, and be as
capable of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics, and ha..., the same
notions of morality, ofa deity and religion that men han! Wherefore it
must ofnecessi.y be grAnted, that besides passion from oorporeallhings,
or the p;tSSin perception of ..,n.." there is in the souls of men another
more active principle Or an innate cognoscitive power (m (Dt~OS(l,,­
"'n"" ",,,,m mal"), whereby they are enabled to undeTiitand or judge
of "'hat is ..a;vel! from without bl' sense, And some. that would
otherwise make the soul ;IS naled a thing IS i. JXlI<'ible, are forced to
odnowlc:dge thus much, And hereby they grant.1I that we contend for
and they deny though considering not in the mean time what they say.
for this innate c:ognosciti'-e power in the soul (;;I,n be nothing else but a
power of raising intelligible ideas ond oonceptions of things from within
itself. For it is not possible th~t any kno ...·ledge should be without an
""'" ,II o;ai I ~ : ' "'" .., o..w.o,/ln. ~"""" .w.; ,II .., .;090. " ...,~, .; .., -"'"
,
_.; ·c,..".. .,., ,..m". Uio
.""""'.., u u
.... oiI ,-..; "'" .. ooi-:4> ai *"
o;ai ~ l{.. o;ai'; 4Lj !I", /',d (1'Iooinus, ~ ., . " , >t-J ) ~
><! ' ,'" o,p
f
~

'I' ate
objective idea or con~ption of SOIDelhin, kno ...." included in iI, or Ihal
the intellection (vOI/O,';) should be in one &culty, and the con<:eplion
(>'6,,~a) in another, OI1e in Ihe intellect:, and the other in lhe fancy. That
knowledge shoold be actively produ~d from ...·ilhin. and the conception
or objecti'·e idea passively recei,·ed from without, that the mind shwld
exe" an.ct: ofkno .... ledge or intelkct:ion without an object, or upon an
ob;ea without i_If, and not compn::hended by it, that the idea of the
thin, known should n.oI be compKhwded in Ihe kno .... ledge of it.
W~rns, as Aristotle hi~lf Iuth obse ..·ed, ' Acrual knowledge is in
realilY the Iial1"Ioe with I~ thing kno .... n, or the idea of it': and therefore
insepanble: from it. It heing nothing but the mind's being conscious of
some intel~giblc: idea within itself.
4. And t~rd"OK, whueas the only objects of sense are individual
corporeal things aisting ...-ithoul t~ mind, which the soul percei,·es by
looking OUt from itself upon Ih.1 from whil:h it suffers, not actively
compKhended within itself; the primary and immediate objew of
intellection and knowledge, an' not things existing wilhout the mind,
but ideal of t~ mind i_If activel y aened, that is the intdligible:
rnsonl (.4/U1...-s) of things. 'The in~lleclion is nol of what ;....·ithout, as
sense is.' And 'the immediate objects of in~ll«tion oK not without the
mind that understands'.! 1lley an' assertions Ihat PIOlinus al large
demonstrates. And Arililotle frequently asserts the s:amo:: 'In abstracted
things thaI .... hich understand. and tlut ...·hich is unde ... tood an' the
s:amo:',6 for Ihe theoretial science and the kno ..... ble: (Kihil~) or ob;ea of
knowledge are all OI1e.7 And 'Ihe mind altogether is that which under-
stands things'." Thc:sc being all but several modifications of intelled.
For as hard and SO", hIM and cold, and the like corpoTelI qualities aK
but several modifications of maner, so the several objective ideal of t~
mind in scientifial specul.ation an' but se,·eral modifications of the mind
knowing. Whffefore individual things aisling without the '-'luI, are but
the secondary objects of knowledge and intellection, ...·hich [~ mind
unden;W1ds oot hy Iookiog out from itself OS sense doth, but by
•
,
,
,,
"
reflecting inwardly upon itself and comprehendin~ them under those
inteUigible ideas or reasonings (r..I;" ..... ) of its own, which it prolTUdcs
from within itself. So that the mind or intellect may well be caJled
(though in another sense than Prot:l.goru meant il) 'the measure of all
things' (TO pirpo~ I'!tivrwv) ,
s. For tke soul having an innate cognosciti~e po~r unin naUy
(which is nmhiog else but a pow"r of raising objective ideas .. ithin
itself; and intelligible reasons of any thin!!") it must need. be IfJ"Inr..<! that
it hath a potential omniformity in it. Which is not only asserted by the
Platonists, that th" """I is 'aU things iolell.,.;ruaJly' (IItivta ~), but
also by Arismtle himself; 'That th" ""u l is in a manner allthings ..9 TIt"
mind being a kind of notional or represent:l.tiv" world, u it w~ a
diaphanous and crystalline sph~, in which the ideas and images of aU
things exi.tin!!" in the real uni""IX may be reflected or represented. For
uthe mind of God, which is the archetypal intellect, is that whereby he
always actually compTOh<nds himself, and his own fecundity, or the
extent of his own infinite goodness and po~r _ that is "'" possibility of
all things - so aU crr:ated intellecu being ootUn tttypal models, or
derivati ve compendiums of the same. Although they han nO{ the actual
ideas of aU things, much less aTO the images or sculptures of all the
several specia of exisrent Ihings fixed and engn ven in a dead manner
upon them, yet they ha,·e them all virtual ly and potentially compn:·
hended in Ihal one cognoscit;'-e power (vir <apitriJe) of the 50\1~ which
is a potential omnif(lrmity wheKby it is enabled u occasion serves and
oUlWlIrd oh)ecrs in ,·ire, gr.ad ually and successively 10 unf(lld an d display
itself in a vital manner, by framin!!" intelligible ideas or conceptions
within itself of whatsoever hath any entity or cogitability. As the
spermatic or plastic po~r doch virtually cont:l.in within itself, the forms
of all the sever:al orpnical parts (If animals, and dispillys them tp'adually
and successively, framing an eye h~ and an ear lheI"t:.
6. Now because intelle<:tioo and knowledge an: not passion[s] from
without, but an KIi,·c exertion of the mind from within itself; hen~ it
comes to pass, as Aristotle hath observed, that the mind by kno .. in,
that which is exceedin,Jy inteUigiblc (cr,poopo. l'O'ITOV), the most r:ldiant
and i11ustriuu. truths, is not debilit:l.tw thereby or overpowered, as

• ,~ . ...rio a_ ri _ ~ 101",. <n. ..0.. 41' 1»4). <OriPut ...... oj ...XIi ri &"' ......
I<m ",.,..,) (Loelo, "!ho.......... !Iot ooul;' 1lI ......iotio¢ un; ..... ·. c _P''' n. .....
'JO'I'~ .......
_ I t ...... of .. ind <~)...- INn ..... l .. ".ri~

'VI ate
Knse is in perceiving that which is exettdingly sensibt.. (<1"'oopa
aio/l1rrov),'o as the brighrness of the 5un; but contr.ariwise the more
invigorated Ihel"(by, and thc better enabled to compl"(hend lesser and
smaller tnlthS; beau"" though KnK is passion and organical, yet
knowledge is inorganical and an iIClivc power and strength of the mind,
which the I1'lOIl' it is exerted, iii the mol"( thereby invigorated and
enlarged.
From hence likewise it is, as the IiamC Aristoo:le hath observed, 'ThaI
thoK knowledges which al"( mOl"( abstract and I"(mote from matter, are
mOl"( accurate, intel~gible, and demonstrable, than th""", "'h ieb are
oon,"ersant about concrete and material things, as arithmetic than
harmonics',11 which arC numben conCI"(IC .... ith sounds; and so likewise
geometry than astronomy, or the mixed mathematics. Whereas if an
knowledge did arise from oorporcal things by way of sense and passion,
il must needs be COIlmri"ise [rIlC, that thc mOl"( concretc and sensible
things were, the more knowable they would be. Mo~ver, from hence
it is also as experience tells us, Ihat scienritical knowledge is best
acquired by Ihe soul'. abslraction from Ihe outward objects of sense:,
and retiring into it<elf,lZ ,hat so it may the better attend to its own
inward notions and ideas. And therefore it is many limes observed, that
ovcr-much I"(ading and bearing of ocher men's discourses, thougb
lnmed and elaborate, doth not only distract the mind, but also
debilitates the intellectual powers, and males the mind passI"e and
sluggish, by calling it 100 much ou\lO--ards. For which cause that Wlsc
philosopber Socrates altogethcr shunned that dictating and dogmatical
,,-ay of teaching usal by tbe sophisters of that age and ehose rather an
aporetical and obstctricious method. Becau"" knowledge was noo: to be
poured into the soul like liquor, bUI rather to be invited and gendy
drawn forth from it; nor the mind so much to be tilled therewith from
,,;thout, ~ke ;l >'CSI'I:1, as to be kindled and awakened. Ludy, from hence
is that strange parturiency that is often observed in the mind, when il is
solicitously oct upon the in"""tigation of SOme [rIlth, whereby it doo:h

.. n..u..rl....".~1fom AridocI<.n.._ ..,pJ.nd..,p,.

,. M~' [61 ~' '* ~ "'" I"i ><all' _~
.... ~,...;.,~ ~"""""" (ArioIoIIo. - . ; , . ~ on ... H . T,,'
* .-eIJ>_.....--
. • (t = 1

" "H:''IObtOis'' M_ .. ,q6.0 . ' 7). u..rl ...... _ '" C· d.

" Com.,...}oM s......·w. "'_ ""', "" boicl'>t .,.. ofs........,.j op<fI "'" bOP'" El" of ....
Und" ' ''-.' (7lt r- W,y of A'....... DWiot K _••• in S<J", DOo ..,., (,660).
"",. in 7lt c" ',w" 1'14";"'. ed. U . "'_ (C. ",b.idF. ,96t). p. , .. ).

,8

'VI ate
cndea~our, by ruminating and revol~ing within it~lf as it ,"'ere to
conceivc it within itself, to bring ;t (onh out of;B own ""omb (jkorlurirt).
By which it is c"idenl, that the mind is naturall y con!icious of its own
acD"C fecundity, and al.., that ;t hath a mtcrion within i~lf, which will
enable;t to kllOw when it hath found that "'hid, it sought.
7. When:fore it is evident from whot we ha"e dedarcd. thl tlKre are
two kinds of perceptive cogitations in the soul: thc One passive when the
soul ptr"CC'ives by ~uffcring from it. body. and the objects without; the
other activc, when it percei,'''' by excning its own nati,'c "igour from
within itself. The passi"e perccption. of the soul ha"e two ~"cnl name-;
gi~ UItfO them. For when Ihe soul, by symp>thizing ,,;th the body,
seems to perceive corporeal things, as prestnt and rcally existing
witbout it, then the)" are ailed sensations (aiuOri/lara). But when the
passin afftaion. of Ihe soul are Iookw upon nOI as things really
existing without Ihe mind, bU I only as pictures of sensible thin]{S in the
mind, or more crass or corporeal cogitalions, then Ihey arc called
phantasms (,pavtM/oIara) or imaginations. But these phantasms and
iCltsarions being =ll y Ihe same thin]{S, as " 'e ... id before, both of them
being passions or afftnions in lhe 50\11, cau~d by SOme local motions in
the body. and the difference bctwttlt them being only accidental.
insomuch thot phantasms may be: changw into iCltsarions. and some-
times also sensalions into phantaSms, Ihcrcforc allthc:sc passi,'c perccp-
tions of Ihe soul may be: called in general phanwms (4'avtaopara). But
the Icti"e pcrccptions "'hich ri.., from the mind it..,lf without the body,
are commonly ailed cona:plions of thc mind (V()~/lara). And so we
have the !'1m species of pcm:pti"e cogit:ltions. the one phanwms and
Ihe other conceptions of the mind.
S. Now Ihat all Our pcrccpti"e cogit:l1ions are not ph.ntasms, as many
contend. but Ihlt then: is another species of perccpti,'c cogit:llions
distilKl from them, arising from tile acti"e vigour of the mind itself,
which we thercforc call conceptions of the mind, i. dcmonsuably
cvidml from hence; because phantosJru are nothing else: but sensible
ideos, images o. pictures of out" ",rd obiccts, such as .re cau""d in the
soul by sense. Whence it (0110,,'5, Ih>1 nothing is the object of fmcy
(<f><iVtuoparov), but whac is al!iO Ihe objta of sense (uiofJTJllurov), [andJ
nothing can be: fmciw by tbe 50\11 but what is pcr~ptibl( by sense. But
Iherc are mmy objects of our mind, which we can neither 5«, hear, fecI,
smell nor taste, and which did nc,'(T cnter into it by any iCltse; and

"
'I' ate
Ihe...,fo..., we can have no sensible pictu"", or ideu (If them, drawn by
the pencil of th~1 in .... rd limncr or painter which borrows all his ooloun
from sense, which we coli fancy. And if we reflect on OUr own
cogitation. oflhcw things. we shall KTlsibly perai", thaI they a..., not
fanwric:al, but noematical. I\s for exampk, justitt. equity, dUly and
obligation, cogitation, opinion, inlellection, volition, memory. verity,
falsity, COLW:, efTa;t, genus, species, nullity, Cl)ntinllerK:)', possibility,
impossibility, and innumerabk more such there are that will occur 10
anyone that shaU tum over the vocabularies of any language. none 0
which can h.ye any scnsibk picture dra,,'n by the IXncil of the fancy.
And there ~ many whole propositions likewise, in which there is not
anyone \V()rd or notion that we can h.,·c any genuinc phanwrn. of,
much less can fancy reach to an apprehension of the necessily of the
connection of Ihe terms. I\s for example. N~tlr;"t (a~ ... a",1 ~ot ... at tlr.
,a_ too (NiAil poWt tnt tt 'WI tnt toit", ItMport). What proper and
genuine phantasms can any percei"e in his mind either of'nothing', or
'can' or 'be' Or 'and', nr 'not be', or 'at the same', or 'time'l u
9. Neither was ;1 asserted by 1\';510tk, as some: have taken fOT
granted , Ihat all our percepli,'c cogitations are phanlasmll (<#J<lVTM-
paTa), bUI contrariwise, thaI there a..., cooceplions of the mind
(\IQ"pata) which:are distinct things from phantasmS, only thallhe Latter
were aI....ys indiridual companiol\5 of the f(lnner. This appears from
thoIie words of his, 'oonttprions of the mind somewhat differ from
phantasms, Ihey :arc not phantasms, bUI neither are they ,,;thoot
phantasms',t+ Where he inclines to this, thaI the ronttptions of the
mind are nor phantasms bUI thaI they h" 'e phantasms al,,;&ys joined
with them. So again afterwards he asks, 'Whether intellection be fancy,
or rather. different thing from (ancy, bUI such as ne'"er goes without
il.'t~ Which indeed he affirms in other places, that the mind doth neyer
conceive (\lQtiv) with<Jut • phanwrn.. Now this is true of sensible and
corporeal things, thaI we neVel" understand Ihem, but we have also oome
confused phantasms or other of them in oor mind, and yet besides the
phantasms the mind exerts conceptinns also UJXHI m.m, or dsc it oould
not understand th",", phanWInlI being but imperfect, inrompkie, and
" I. ,be ,¥ odiriool. ,be ... ; .,. ... Lotio. -.I rn.m !lot ....... ;. . ..od" .. - t _
t:.poh _ io thio Iiot. .
" ........ ,. ,,.; - . <011
Dt._....xr!'>''''
. .,.,...-jOi.... (.... . ~.
!iii ... <i_ " ..:.lI ....................
+1"'1).0ririn0I1ooo ,.u. for ....... .
w' """ ,_I
" '" - . ... rTGrio. t!sit 01_ .......... (.bOI •• +OJ09~

'I' ate
superficial cogitations, which sometimes go befo~, and invit~ or call in,
meanwhiJ~, the pelceptions of the mind, and sometimes follow and
attend upon the conception. of the mind, as tbe shadow upon the
lubsrance, but never wmpreltend the thing. And indeed, as we
oUr&oClves cons;st of soul and body natul'lllly united logethu, so are the
rogitations that "" hn·e of corpo~a1 things usually both noemarical and
phantasmatital together, the one being as it were the IOUI and the other
th~ body of them. For wben a geometrician considers a triangle, being
about to demottstNte that il hath Ih~e angles equal to two right angles,
no doubt but he win have the pha[n]tasmatical pictu~ of some triangle
in his mind . And yel notwithmnding he hath also a ooematical
perception or int~llectual idea of it too, as appears from hence, br:cause
every express picru~ of a triangle mUSt of necessity be eilher olllusan-
gubt oT rtttangular, or aCluangulu, but that which in his mind is the
subi«t of this proposition thought on is the reason (,,,,;'') of a triangle
undetermined to any of these .pecIes. And the like might be observed
also of the word angles in the same proposition. In like manner,
whenevu We think of a phantasmatieal univenal, or universalized
phantasm, or a thiog which "" han no clear intellection of _ as for
example of tbe nalU~ of a rose in general - the~ i. a complication of
something nocmatical, and something phantasrrtatical rogcther. For
phantasms in themselves alone, as weU as sensations (aluOIjpara) are
al ..... ys individual things. And by a rose we mean a thing which so
affects our sen.., in <e;pec1 of figun: and colour.
10. But as for thO&( mher objects of cogitation which "" affirmc:d
hefon: to be io themselves neither the objects of 5CTISC (alt1B1tni) oor the
objects of &ncy (,fIavraoTci), but only things understood (l'Olfrci), and
the~fo~ can have no nalUnl and genuine phantasms properly be-
longing to them; yet it is true notWithstanding that the fmastic ]lOwer
of the soul, whicb would never willingly be altogether idle or quile
excluded, will busily intend irsclf here also. And the~fo~ many times
wben the intellect or mind above is e%Crcised in ab$tractcd intellections
and contemplation... the fancy will at the same time busily employ itself
below, in making some kind of apish imillltions, counterfeit iconisms,
Iymbolical adumbntions, and ruemblances of thO&( intellectual cogita-
tions of sensible and c:orpornl things. And hence it comes to pass, that
in speech, mcuphors and allegories do so exceedingly pk:asc, because
they highly gratify this fantastical power of passive and corporeal

••

'I' ate
cogitation in the !iOul, and !i«ill thereby also """"'thing to ra;'" and
ITfll'Sh the mind itself, othnwisc lazy and ready to £ain! and be tired by
o'-erlong abmaeted cogitations, by taking its old companion the body to
go along with it, as it were to rest upon, and by affording to it certain
crass, palpabk, and corporeal images, to incorporate those abstl'llCled
cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to see those still more silent
and subtk notions of its 0"-", sensibly refle<;ted to itself from the
corporeal glass of the fancy ,
Sometimes also thelT are other spurious phantaSms tlUli do link or
not:hing s)'mbolu.e with the noctiol cogitation ... that yet are arbitrarily
Or cw;tQm.1rily anne<;ted to them, melTly h«:ause the fantastic power
would not sland wholly idle and unemp loyed. So tbat when the mind
thinks of such an intelligible idn, the fancy will presenlly hold fonh
such • customary phantasm before it, 'as those that use artificial
memory, make oenain phanwms at pleasure,16 to signify certain
ros itarions,
But lastly, rather than the fancy shall quite stand OUI and do ju",
no'hin!! .t ..n.
it .. ill sometime. cucci>c itsc:lf (c'p«u.l1 y in 'p«ch) in
nising phantasms of the '-cry sounds and namrs, by which the notions
of the mind arc signified l'CSpe<:linly. So that it is vcry true both that
there are active coginllions of the mind distinct from phantasms; and
such of which there an be no natural and genuine phantasms or
sensible picrures; and yet, according to Aristotle's opinion, that fre-
quently those coru;cptions of the mind <at least in the vulgar, that arc
little accustomed to abstracted cogitation) h..·" !iOme kind of spurious
and counterfeit, or ,-crbal and nomin al phantasms joined wilh and
accompanying of them.
11. As for that opinion, that the conceptions of the mind and the
intell igible ideas or reasons of the mind should be raised out of the
phantaSms by the strange chemistry or an agent inrelligcnce;t7 this as it
is founded on a mistHe of Aristotle's meaning, ,,-1>0 nevcr dreamed of
any such ch imerial agent intelligence, as appears from the Greek
in(c1l'rctcrs that best understood him, !iO il is "ery like to that other
.. ""'- 01 I. TM; ~""",,""'oI; To!/Iii<,_ nJ _ , •• 'I I, [Ii (OIl .. <l7b"),
"
and ...._rid lIo-""',..._ .. __
In Ot . . . . " ' _ ! " I _ _ btl .
inl<1Ioct (.....
Ihroam,mtdl«t{......... .,"""'_ .... _ )

boot .... _ _ ..,...,.; ....... powero(.l, , ...... ,br _

.-.wrihr)_ n.. d......in". _ .....,
uniYcnoIOOIII<n'._tod
from _ ""1'1' -...,, _ in .... ..-., p .. rio< to di,<lJ<'" in _ _ 0( ....
...... intdlocll .."IIm., .,,..,), See ...... p. "\.

g,
opinion called peripatetical, that asserts the eduction of immaterial
forms OUt of the power of m<ltu:r. And as b<:Mh of mem arise from me
wne sottishness of mind mat .. ould make srupid and lietueless matter
the original source of aU things, SO there is the same impossibility in
both, mat perfection should be raised OUI of imperfection, and Ihal
vigour, activity, and awakened energy should ascend and emerge out of
dull, sluggish, and drowsy passion. But in deW. mis opinion anributes as
much activity to the mind, if at k2st me agent intelligence be part ofit,
as ours doth. As he would armbute as much activity to the sun, Wt
should say me Sun had a power of educing light OUt of night or Ihe dark
air, as he tbat should say tile sun had a power of exerting light out of his
own body. The fOm1Cr being but an im proper way of upressing the
same thing, which is properly signified in the latter way. Bu t that other
opinion, that asserts that the abstnct and univ=a1 reasons of things as
distinct from phantasms, are nothing else but me~ names without any
signification, is so ridiculously false, that it deserves no confutation
at aU.

Dlapter II

t. That Ihe~ are some idCOIS of the mind which ~~ not stamped Or
imprinted upon it from the sensible objects without, and Ihe~fo~ must
needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the mind itself, is
e vident, in that the~ are, first, ideas of such things as neither arc
affections of bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by an y local
motions, nor can be pictu~d at all by Ihe fancy in any sensible colours
(sucb as are Ihe ideas of wisdom, folly, prudmce, imprudence, knowl-
edge, ignorance, verity, falsity, virtue, vice, honC5ly, dishonesty, justice,
injustice, volition, cogitation, nay of sense itself, which is • species of
cogitation, and which is nol p"''''priblc by any senoc, and many other
such like notions as include something of cogitation in tllem) or refer to
cogitative beings only. Which ideas must needs spring from the active
po ....er and innate fecundity of the mind itself, because the corporeal
objecrs of serue can imprint no such things upon it. Secondly, in that
Ihe~ are many ~lative notions and ideas, attributed as wdl to corporeal
as incorporeal things that ptocecd whoUy from the activity orthe mind

'J

'I' ate
comparing one thing with anothe.-. Such IS ue au.." effect, mean.,
rod, order, proposition, similitude, dissimi~tude, equality, inequality,
aptitude, inaptitude, Iymm«ry, asymmetry, whole and pan, genus and
,pecics. and the like.
z. But that which imposes upon men 's judgements here, '" as [0
make them think, that theK are all passi~e impressions IruIde upon the
soul by the objects of ... n..., is nO(hing else but this, Bcausc the nOlions
both of t"'- relative ideas, and also of those O(her imlrulteri.al things (as
virtue, wisdom, the 50\1[, God) an: InO$t commonly excited and
.wakened occasionally from the appuJsc of outward obj.ects knocking at
the doon of OUr 1tTI5CI. And the.., men nOl: d islinguishing bet .... ixt the
oU",'ud oc....ion or inviution of those rogiurion" and the immedi.lte
active or productive eauso: of them, impute them therefore all alike, as
well these intelliliblc, lIS the>:c othcT ... n,ible ideu, or phantasms, to the
efficiency or activity of the outward obj.ects upon us. Wherefore that ....e
lruIy the bcm:r undenbnd ho,,' fu the passion of sense reaches, and
when the activity of the mind beg1ru;, ... e will compare these three
things together: lim, a mirror, looIting-slass or crysul globe; secondly, a
living eye, that is. KCing or pem:ptive mirror (If Iooking-Slass; thirdly,
a mind (If intellect .upendded to this living eye or seeing mirror.
J. F iBt therefore, when the same ooieas ore equally exposed or held
before a crysul gIoIx Or looking-glass, and a living eye, there are all the
ume impwdons IruIde upon the erYlwglobc, that there ore upon the
living eye. Which appears from hence, heauso: the eye looking upon the
crysul globe or mirror, wiD see all the same ilrulges rellected to itself
from tbence, that it perceived before immediately from the objects
themselves. The moI:1on and pressure of the ethereal globulous particles,
in which the n.ture of ~ght is (XIn~"ed [0 con.in from every opaque
obiea, bearinl alike e"ery ""'y upon that .... hich resists, and therefore as
much upon the mirror as the eye: '" th.ac there is e~ery jot as much
COl poreal passion in the mirror or crysul globe, as in the glassy part of
the living eye; for, as ...e said befon:, the corporeal part of the eye is
indeW nothing ebe but a mirror or Iooking-Slass. And yet notwith-
standinl' tbe mirror or crystal globe doth not _ or perceive anything
as the eye doth; from whence ..e learn, Ii ..t thai things are never
perceived merely by their Own force and activity upon the percipienl,
but by the innate force:, poWU, and ability of that which PClce;'·es. And
then:fon:, secol1dly, thai sense itself is not I men: corporeal passion, bUI
 C",,,:,,,,i,,, ~u"",1 ~ItJ imltluldle mo,alily

I perception of the bodily passions procttding from sorm: pnwer and

ability supposed 10 reside in a ICI1sitivc soul, vitally united to that
I especlivc body. Which perception, though it ha,"e something of cneTg)'
in iI, as being I cogitation, )..,t it is rightly ClUed. passion of the soul,
because it is nOl: I clear intellective or cognoscitive per~ption of the
motions of the body, bUI a passi\'C or sympatherial perceplion only.
WheTeby, ICCOTding to nllu~'s instinct, it hath sevcral s«mings or
IppcarviCCS begonm in it of those miisting objects without it at a
distan~. in respect of colour, magnitude, figull', and local motion; by
rnIiOn of tlte diffcrcn~ of those rectilinear motions communicated from
them by the intermediate globulnus particles, .nd impTCSSCd upon the
optic nerves.
Whcll'foll' the living eye immediately perttives nothing but these
corpnreal passions ...·hich .,., nude ~ually upnn it, and the mirror or
crystal globe alikc, by the motion of that intermediate or subde body
which Cluselh ~ght; which oorporcal passions being also passively
pet~ivcd by thaI vital principk called the sensitive pnwer residing in
the eye, all passion from the outward object thell' ceaseth, and goes no
fulther. BUI thaI power of the soul that nUt fullo .....,th, which is the
Ihird thing thlt we mentioned befo~, the intellect begins immediately
10 exert and display its acth'ity upnn thc object passively perce;'·cd by
sense.
4. But the bener to iUustnte the business in hand, leI us .gain
suppose some ingenious piece of mechanism, or artificial ""'~ltIaIO~, as
for example, an horologe or Wltch,11 at on~ held before the mirror or
crystal globe, and aim exposed to the p:anicular view of the living or
sentient eye, both in the outside and interior fabric of iI, so thlt as e\'Cry
pan in it is ~nCCled from the mirror, so it nuy be oonsciously per~h-ed
also by the sentient eye, in a particular successive view. Now the
KIItXnI eye "ill be conscious or perceptive of Mthing in all this, but
only itll being variously affected from different colours, figures, protu-
benncies, Clvities, sculprurcs, local motions one .ftcr another, aU the
wnc things which well' impressed on the crym.1 globe or mirror, and
reflected from it, there being no diffcrcn~ at all betwixt the one and the
"st_ll1.tridl_ .... _ ..."" ....... "'''I\I<Orot .... .........,. ... pII"I ,1,. ;,
J>Uti<tobr ~ b au;,,;... I . ; ' ... 1m A Bn.f A..- of .. N", SNt of
~ M ... (t ,/06.). Th. book .... _ _ .. dooko ...... ...
7 • • do"'" like
! ... ...

Cud "'to.s.. .... !.. ',,· ,.'TkQ,d~....!P"'I'!'= , !lorInl_"'~

... f.n;IioIo M.d I .. ,0 .1 Tloou;Ioo ,""-,6IIJ".A_ ofs.v.u ... ('066), 1l-''''

"
'I' ate
other, bUI Ihal tile eye was conscious or perccpli,'c of ,,-hal il suffe..,d,
but Ihe mirror not, nUt now tile mind or intellect being supcndded fa
tllis sentient cye and exening its acti,'c and mo.., comp..,hensiy. power
upon all mat wllicll "'lL'l reflected from the mirror, and passi,-dy
percei,-ed by the sentient eye as it doth actw.lly and intellectually
comprehend the same things oyer .pin which sen.., had perceived
before in an(){her "",nner (of which "'e muO! speak afterward), SO) it
proceeds (unher, and compares all the several pans of this ingenious
machine or self-mo"er one with an.other, taking notitt first ohhe spring
as the original and cause of all motion in it, of the cllain or lilring by Ihe
medialion of .. hich mat motion is rommunicaled to the fusee, of the
balance 11111 rrciprocating moderales the motion of Ihe &e"em wh""ls
!iOTOe greater, some lesser, prop.gating the motion from one to anotheT,
of Ihe horary circle di,-ided into equal pans, and lastly of the indcx l9
moving round abou1 the cin:le through "lual space in equal time, all
thest in their &e,'m ..,lllion. (Ith'ln) to one anIKher and the whole.
Whe..,upon the intellect besides figure, oolour, magnirude, and motions
raiotS and ncitts with itself the intdligible ideas of caU&e, effect, mean.,
end, priority and posteriority, equality and inequality, order and
proportion, symmetry and asymmetry, aplitude and in"p'irude, sign and
thing signified, whole and pan, in a manner all the logical and ..,lative
notions that arc. Whereas the &entient o)'e by which this whole
m«hanism "-as rcpresenled 10 Ille intellcct perceived none of all tllest
things. ndther "'us/: nor effect, nor equality nor irrcgubrity, nor orda-
nor proponions, nor symmetry nor asYTtUT><try, nor sign nOr thing
signified, nor whole no. part, since tllere is no oolour nOr figure in any
of these things. And if the &entient eye could dispute with the mind or
inlellect it "-ould oonfidently avow and "",intain thai there were no such
entities as thOK in this self-mo"ing machine (u/Q""'/.m) and that the
undersWlding was abused and d~ived in those .pprchensions, since
.11 thaI was 1m!,>, sed from the object W1'l by the sentient eye faithfully
tr.Insmitted to it, and the intellect recti,-ed all its intelligence 0.-
informalion from it. And to make lIS cause good, sense: would appeal 10
the mirror or crystal gJobe standing by, in which Illere WffC no images
of an y of those invisible ideas 01" logical n(){ions reflected. Wh~,..,fo.."
since sense doth freely concein:and ingenuously own tbat non~ ofthesc
" Tho, ;" _of""' _ _n.. r... .. "'" _ of , ...1dI .. do<k,","", _ _ ,11< ' - ; '
_od....! "" wII;do ,II< P"W"' of"'" ~J;' ~.

"
ideas are passi~ely md phantasmatically stamped upon it from the
objects without, be: they ",hallhey "'ill. real or nOI real, certain it is that
Ihey are the objects of the inlellect, md they must of necessity be nised
in il by its own innate vigour md :acrivity.
S. Indeed though it should be gnnted thaI Ihe relations (schem) of
cause md effect, whole md pam;,."d the like. "''CCre mere: notions of the
mind md modes of concei"in, in us Ihat only signify ..,hat things are
reLllively 10 intellect, yet it would not follow from hence that they had
no lU~ty at all but were ,"""lute non-entitics beause intellect, being a
rcaJ thing md thaI which indttd hath more of entity in it thm matter.
or body. the modifications of intellect must needs be as real things as
the modificalions of maner. And therefore cause and efftct, whole and
part, sYlIUIlCtry and asymmetry and all the otller logical nOl:ions would
have as much reality in them as hanl md soft, moist md dry, hot md
cold, which though but modifications ofnuner arc looked upon as very
real things, and such intelltctuals as ""cre relati¥c to intellect be as real
as thOR sensible phantasms which are relative to sense. But this muSI
not be granted. that the modes of conception in the understanding
(where: all truth is) are disagTeCable to the reality of the Ihings conoei"ed
by them and so, being unconformable, arc thereforc false. Wherefore,
that these relations (schem) arc nOI (though sense doth not perceive
them) mere notions or figments of the mind, ",-ithoul any fundamental
reality in I~ things themseh-cs without us corresponding to them,
appears from hence: because an and wisdom arc most rcalthings which
beget real effects of the greatest moment md consequence: in n.ture md
human life of m y thing, md yet arc conversont aoout nothing else but
only ~ relations, proportion s, aptitudes of things to one mothcr, md
to ce:rtain ends. No",- if these were all mere figments and nothing but
logical nOl:ions or beings of reason (e~liII ,a/wllis), then there could be
no such realities produced OUI of them. Nay. Ihen art and wisdom
themselves mUSI need be figments md fancies. And likewise il ""ould be
indifferent whOlever a man did in order to my end or effect. And all
men (as Protagons held) W1)uld be really alike wise and skilful. Then
theTc would be no other cxmmiical causality of my effect: but that of
efficiency, force, or power, which, in oorporeal things, is nothing else
but Ioal motion. And no s uch thing as the causality of dill md an (thol
is commonly called ~ enmpw-y cause) discinct from force, power,
md blind impetuoSity. N.y, tltcn virtue. justice. hontSty muSt of

'7
necessil)' be fig",enes also, lxause: rnor:tI good and e vil are schetical and
relatiye thinp, and, whi<.:h is more yct, ntemal convenience and
inconvCl1itl'lcc, utiliI)' and inutility thcms.eh·cs, be nothing else but
fancies also.
6. But though the venlict and testimony of SCnSC oUlI'ht to be
admitted IS luthentic in this porricular, as to ",-hat is or is not passively
imprCSKd upon us from wilhou[, beausr: it i. not possible that anything
should be impressed upon the intellect from sensible things, but it must
needs pISS through the medium of RnR, and 110 be tf3n.mi ned thcn:hy
umo the undermmding, which cannot be, unles& Rnse be conscious
thereof. Yet, notwithstand ing, sense is not.t all to be heard as to the
reality 01' non-reality of these relative ideas, it being no mmpctcnt jud~
in that controversy. BeeauR since the knowlcd~ of things doth not
arise from the activity, enel'JY, and radiation of the objects without upon
us passively received by ~, but from the active and comprehensive
energy or activity of the mind itself, as we have already om.,rved,
Th' in knowing all things it rather ""'th il$ 0'"'" po • ..,r thon that of
things .. hich arc mown. For sina: all judg<:lhent is II>< OCt of him that
iud,..", itmust n«d. be tkat every one pc1'form
the po ..... of anoch .... but by his o.. n bculty,1O
h .. 0 ..........k ...... by

as the aforc-commended Boethius uprcsseth it. We ought not to

oonclulk that thosr: relative ideas arc therefore mere figmenes or modes
of conceiving in us because: sr:nsr: is not oonscious of any such things
passively impressed upon it from wimout, and because thl' lower and
narrow faculty tonlprehcnds them nor, but ... ther acquicscc[s] in the
oenriment of thai larger and more comprehcnsi,'c faculty the intellect
that judges of things by nening its own active po...-"r upon them.
7. Wherefore, if We w. U consider it, we s1toIl find ,hat not only the
beauty and pulchritude, but also 'he strength and Ibili,y of natur.ol md
corporeal things thcmsch'cs depend upon these relalions m d propor-
tions of one thing '0 mother. For what is pulchritude in visible objects,
Of' harmony in sounds, but the proportions, symmetry, md commen-
suration of figures :and wunds 10 one mother, whereby infinity is

.. '[" I· h """'"- .... pobuo r... _ _ ...- _ :i :" "" ... , ori, Coon: .....

·<_....
_j04' io..,io<Iic>n ... """' ....... :-
....... io&cu........ r.: .. Dr,
............ "";:1"• ....,.". """ ........ 0001
• . "'( ,..-....... O..-;(;a,d_'.
u" t .... ). Cod _ _ .......... rpur ........ ...-..ivdy;" TIS :,;. . ..... ;., p. Ssfi, 1M
_ _ .... _ _ 018: c';'._.PI'.s!moIn

88

,.
measured and detemtined, and multiplicity and VlIriety ,..anquished and
lriumphed o\'C:r b)' unity, and by thai means Ihey bcrofTlC' grateful and
pleasing objeclS to the ear and e)'e of intellectual auditors and spectators,
dlCre being as ;t "'eTc cenain ludicrous imf100ni and iymoolial
resemblances of an and wisdom, nay, and vinue tOO (as "l: shall show
afterward) th.t is of inteUecruality in genenl appearing in them,
whereby the mind behold. as it "'ere ilS own foce and image rdlccred to
itself from • corporeal glass.
But because: many will be rndy to say here that beauty is nothing but
a fancy neither, and therefore annot :argue any reality in these sehetial
things. I add thot even the strength and ability of corporeal thinp
thcm..,lvcs depend upon the mutual relations (...IIlsn) and proportion.
of one thing to anolher. And this all mom "ill be &ensible of as
sofTlC'thing. And the truth hereof evidently appears from the mechanical
powers. Nay the health and strength of the body of animals:ui..,. from
the configuration nf the orpnical pans and the fil cootempcn.tion of
humours and insensible parts with one another. So tJut if this
harmonicaltemperature (<rdSU) of the "'hole body be disturbed and put
OUI of rune, wealtness and languishing will immediately ociu upon it.
Nay, doth not all the strength, as well as the comeliness and beauty, of
an onny consist in order? And therefore if we should .uppose oomc
subtle sophister and popular ontOr sent from the quaners of an enemy
into a "ast, numerous, and pui5.sant anny, thaI should insinuate to the
common soldiers so rar as gener.1I1y to persuade them Ihal order was
nothing but a mere fancy or logical notion, a thing craftily deviRd by
their commanders fI1C1l:ly to keep them in s ...bitttion tJut they might
the bener tyrannize over them and rule them as they please, insomuch
that they should all at length altogether nqlllect their ranks and files, and
put themseh'cs wholly into disorder and confusion, and in this fashion
prepare thet1tselvcs to encounter their approaching enemy, ",ould they
not hereby be betrayed to ~rtain ruin thoogh the enemy should be but
a small handful of men, but well ordered and ,,·dl commanded ? For
order is thll which makcs things with unired forca (jU Ne/a vjribau) I/)
coospire all 10 one end , whereby the whole hath the fnrce and ability of
all the sc:venl particular srrensths conjoined and united into one.
8, Therefore I say, in the nut plaoe, returning 10 our former instan~
of an automaton or horologrc, that thoogh Iha&e sc:veral relative ideas of
cause, effect, symmetry, proportion, order, .... hole and pan, and the like,
consid~red formally as con ceptions ofth~ mind (WI/flam) be only in
th~ intellect itsdf (as the ideas and co"","ptions of all other things
likeww, art), yet, OOIwithstanding, the intellect doth not forg~ or falsify
an ything in apprthendin g of them in that ma.eri:ll sdf-mo" er (4fUI .....
"""M) rq>re&emed to it by sen&e, bec:ausc .ll the several rt!at;""s
(leA...,,) are fund""",ntally and rc~lly in the same, though they could not
be stamped upon scnse materillly, and uui"ed passively from it. An d
t~TTf~ that the: true natUTT, formal rtoson (,,,,';'), t"SSCnce, and idea of
this self-mover (UIU''''OIf), watch or horologe, is really compounded
and mad e up ofthosc several rtbtions (trlmtl) as ingredienlll into it, SO
that it cannOf possibly be understood without them, though &ense could
nOl rtach to the comprehension of ony one of them, much less of this
"'hole logical sy$lem or oolkcrion (eo",p"Krs) of them. It Ming impo$-
sible that the nature of a ""If_mover (aulo",al ... ), horologe, or "'atch
should M OIherwi&e understood thon by th~ comprthcnsion of these
relative ideas, ond by such a logical uniti"e, comprehensive pow"r ond
activity as can fram" oU! oftMm one id.,. oftM whole. For an oorologc
or w",ch is !>Of meTT si!>·e. or gold, brass and "ttl any way jumbkd,
mingled, or oonfound ed togeth"r. But it is such an apt ond proportion_
able disposition of certain quantities of tOOse sevenl ""'terials in to
several parts of such «rtain figures, contemperated together, .. may
harmoniously OOIlspirt to rruo.kc up one equal and un ifonn motion .
Which running as it Wert paralkl with the motion (If tilM. and passing
round the h(lnny circle, and being mcasu rtd in that horary circle. may
also measure out and distinguish the quantity of that silent IlIld
successive fiux, whi<:h, like a stillllIld deep ri"cr, carries down atlthing.
along with it indi5Cemible, and witooU! Iny noi.." and ...·hieh in its
progressive motion trtads SO lightly and softl y thlt il leaves no traa:5,
prints, Or footsteps at all behind it.
9. WheTTfore the eye of..,n.." though it M fixed never so much upon
the material outside of this self-mover (.u/O",,,lon), yet it never
comprehends the formal nature of it within itsclf, as it is a whole (/olllm)
made up of se"eral parts, un ifcd not SO much by corporeal OOIlfatl or
continuifY, as by their TTbti" e conspintion to on~ «'lUin end. Sense,
being like one ofthosc narrow telescopes by which the ~)"~ looking upon
the moon, can nucr vicw it all at once IlIl d see the site and configuration
of all the several mountains and valkys and seas in it, IlIld Iu"e one
comprehensi,"e idea of the whole, but uking it in the l'ie«'mcal pan

'VI ate
after p<lrt leaves the intelligent spa;mar after .... ards ta compik and nuke
up CII1e ('Ittire draught ar map af 5tenogr.lphy out af all those sevel1l1
p<lrticular or partial "iews,
So that if .... e .... ill spe;ok propc:rly, .... e cann'" uy that the e)... st:eS any
machine (ma(h;Na) or self-mo"er (aulomal",,), for it is but variously
affected from the nuterial p<lrt ofit, pc:r<:eiving se'-e,,11 passians in itself
from the several colours and figures of it, being so far from compre-
hending the fonn.l reason (raIW) of it, as it is • whole (lalum) made up
of sevel1ll !'Mes, :according to ..,veral relations ("hrs~.) and proportions
contributing thereto, that it cannot rach to any on • ..,Iative idea,
neith.r dO{h In.., nncy go any further than sense, Or elK the
differenct' bet"· .... n intellect and senK nuy be """",,bled by the
differcnct' betwixt the sen.., of sight .nd touch . For touch groping
pc:rceives but os it ....en: • point .t once, the .ye oompn:hends the
whole supc:rficies. &nse seC!; particular things absolutd)'; intellect
compares them according to those n:1.tions they h.,·. one to anoth.r,
has a comprehcnsi"e idea of ..... hol. (tolum) made up of sevel'lll parts as
one thing. And thcn:fore tlK fonn, reOSOll (ral'o), or intelligible id ea of
• self_mover (aulomaloN) or horologe, was ne"er stampc:d or impressed
upon the SOIJI from .... ithout , but upon IKcasion of the sensible ide.
excited and exerted from the in ....ard active and oomp ... hensive power
of the intellect itself.
I D. Then: a... many other such ideas of the mind, of ct'rtain wholes
{IOIU"" (lit» nude up of several oorporcal parts, which, thaugh some-
times locally discontinued, yet are joined t~ther by rel'lions (uhml)
and iIlIbitudes to One another (founded in some .ctions of them as th.y
an: cogit.tive beings) and by order an conspiring into one thing, which
[ideas], though they .... altogethu impcrct'ptibl. by sense and therefon:
were never stamped or impressed upon the mind from the ob~
without, yet notwithstanding a... nOi mere figments or beings of reason
(tNlia ralioNis), but things of the greatest reality, founded in ct'min
actions of thinking and oogitati"e beings; ,,-hich [ideas] a... nO{
altogether impc:rceptible by sen5O' and then:fore could no)t possibly be
outw:ardly stamped upon the mind. As for uample, • polity or
oommon ....ealth, called an onificial man , which is a company of many
united togetl>cr by amsent Or OOnlract under one government, to be
regulated by SOme amin laws os it were by one .... ill for the good of the
whole; where though the eye may sec the particular persons (or at least

9'

'I' ate
thcir outsides) that are IDe res)XCrive members thereof, yel it can
ncitll(,r K(: the bond which unites them together, which is nothing but
relation, nor comprehend the whole (1~l1t"') that is made up of them,
that is a polity Or amunonweaJth, according to the formal nature of it,
which is an idea that procttds merely from the unitive POWeT and
activity of the mind itself.
In a word, all the ideas of things called artificial or mechanical contain
something in them that never c:ame from sense, nor InS eYer Stamped
upon Ihe soul from the objects without, which, though it be not merely
notional or imaginary, but n:ally belongs to the nature of that thing, yet
i~ no otherwise than intellectually comprehendcd. As for eumplc, an
house or paba: is not onl)· stone, brick, mortar, timber, iron, glass
heaped together, but the very essence and formal reason (.alw) of it is
made up of relath·e or schctial notion., it being a cemin disposition of
tho5c "",·cnol materials into a whole (IDI ..IIf) Or coUection (n!1II"K~')'
consistinf of several pans, rooms, stail"5, passag .... dOOf"S, chimneys,
windows convmient for habitation, and fit for the ""veral uses of men;
in ..·hich there i. the Iogie of whole and p;lrtS, order, proportion,
sytnIJlCtry, aptitude.. roncinnity, all compliCl.ted with wood, Stone.. iron,
and glass, :as it weu informing and adorning the rude and ronfu~
mas.s of malter, and making it both beautiful and ""rviceable. And
therefore, for thi. cause, no man that is in hi. wits ....iII Ay Ihat I Stately
and royal p;lbce hath therefore less reality, entity, and substantiality in it
than an heap of rubbish confusedly cast t"!ethu, becaU5C fOrsQO(h the
idea of it pardy consists oflogieaJ notions, which are thoufhtto be men:
imaginary thinf', whcrus thc wbole is all solid mmer without this
notional form. For this logical form (which is til(, pasoivc stamp or print
of inlcl~ality in it, the lirst archetypes contained in the idea or skiU
of the architect, and thence introduced into the rude mattCT, SUcces-
sively with much pains and labour) is the only thinf that distinguishes it
from mere din and rubbilih, and givcs it the essence of an house or
palace. And it hath therefore the more of entity in il because it partakes
of art or intdlcctualiry. But til(, cye or sense of a brute, though it ha,·c IS
much passively imp,' 'I'd upon it from without IS the soul of man hath,
whm it look. upon the most TOYII and magnificent palace, if it sh(luld
see all the inside also as well:as the ouc.idc, aMlld nn! comprehend from
thence the formal idea and naturc of an haUl'<' or paba:, which nothing
but an active intellectual principle can reach unto.
 II. Neither is this trl)( of such things only as are commonly caned
artificW, but also of nalural compounded things, such as planlS and
animols lIT. And indeed. if we ron.ider things philosophically, we slu.1I
nIX find any such c:ssenn..1 diffen:nce as is commonly suppo&(d, oowixt
things called artificial and nalural. For Ihen is a natun: in all artificial
things and again, an artifice in all rompounded things. Plan", and
animols being nOlhing elso: bUI artifici.1 mechanisms, the Ialler of .. hich
especially are contrived wilh infinitely mon: ";1, ,·ariet)·, and curio:>ity
lhan any mechanisms or ••M-movers (au/""",/SI) that ,,1:1"( e\'ff y(1
produttd by human an. Wherefore the true form of an animal, if "'e
a[[end only t(l the mechanism of the body (for we must ocknowlclge
so"",thing clso: not only in men but also in brutes, if they ha"e ""y
cogiurioo besides mechanism. which is a substance of another nature,
or I cogiutive being united {(I the body)" is an idea that includes mlny
rel.ti"e and 1<>gicallK>ti(lns in it, and thcrefort could never be sumped
upon the soul by sen&<!. For sen&<! only takes notice of $everal rolours
and 6gura citheT in the outside or the inside of Iny animals, but doth
not sum thmt up in one whole (fo/um). BUI the idea of iI, as collected
inlo one mechanitaJ self-mo"cr (QulomQ/olfj, ronsisling of many Olga-
nical pans fitly proponioned tog<:ther, and all harmoniously conspiring
1(1 one end, to make it e"ery way. first habiution for • cogiutin
substance to reside in, in n:spe<;t of nutrition, loc:a.l motion, sense, ""d
all other functions of life: such an idea, I sa)", that hath something of
logic in it, i. only conceivable by the uniti"e, acti"e and rompn:hens;"e
PO"1:' of thc> intell«t.
The same is to be affirmed of th.l hUy and vast aUlo_IM, w~ich
some will h.."" to be an animollike"'ise/ the visible " 'orld or mot.,.,.1
univene, the world, commonly called ro.mOJ or l1UI~d",. from the beauty
of it. Whether we mean thereby that one single "on"", {(I which our
planeury earth belon~, or I system of as nuny "ortices as We!lCC fi.ed
staMi in the heavens, J their central SunS and circumferential plnets
mo,-ing round about them respectively. Now sense looking round

" C>ct_, Iik< Iknty Mo... 6m;.d 110. Co ...... _ _ _ ....... b ............ """"I
.-......... Iocb>!: . ..... 1.
U A ","uO« .. rho ........ .,of ..... I01.,.,r. Sr< PIa!D, T_)Ob I. ...... Wo I.
"
... !pn.,._.
In c..-... , .. ..,.. 110. ........ " t.o.t;.. ..... ..-ft...t _ mo .... io • ...;.. of , .. "",u
~ h• ......tm., C>ct_ . !I........... dftrtl, to ~ - . . .

,.
.bool, and making many p,trticular views, s«s now one fixed liur, and
Ihen another; now the moon, then thc sun; hcre a mounuin, Ihere a
vancy; al (lIIC lime: a river, al aoothcr a sea. particular ~egclablcs and
animals One after aoother, But it <:mnO{ Sum up or unite altogelher, nor
riK ro an y oomprchensi" e id... of the "'hole at once, as it is one or many
mechanical sdf-mo"ers most curiously and artificially framed of innu-
mcr.o.blt p.rts; in which Ihere are all manner of logical relolions (,drtlls)
possible offered to the mind, but . Iso fitly proportioned wilh such
.dmirable symmetri.,. . nd rorrcspondencies in respect of (lilt another
and the whole, that they perfectly conspire into (lilt most orderly and
harmonious fonn.
Hitherto therefore we han setn that thc rel.t i,·c ideu that wc h"t in
OIJr mind arc nOf passions impressed upon t he soul from thc obiects
wi"IOUt, but .ri.., from the innate activity of thc mi nd it..,lf. And
tM refore, becau"" the =cnas or ideas of all thin gs thems.,],·""
whether artificial 01' n.lural, that is whethcr madc by the artifice of men
or n.ture, always necessaril y include tt.esc logiel1 reutions in them. We
hl"e demonSlrati vely proved from thence, that 1\0 corpor<:al oom-
pounded thing what....,,·~r is understood by stn"", nor 1M idn of it
passively stamped upon th~ mind, from the objecu wilhout, but
comprehended only by the !orge uniri"e po"-cr of thc intellect, and
uerled from the innatc acth'ity thereof.
12. But the case is still d"arer con""",ing th!151: other ideas Mfore-
mentioned, of the "",·...1 modes of cogitari,-c Mings, o r such iii in"o['-c
Of include some relation w them; that these arc not by the passi"c
impresses from out"'al'd objn:u by sen..,; .lthough they are often
occasionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we shall illustrate
by the former instancc of an .rtificial ""If-mover exhibited fiTS{ ro thc
view of sense, and afterw:...l acti"ely comprehended by the under-
standing. After the mind hath framed a clear idea of this ..,If-mo,·cr
within icsclf, the end Or design whereof is 10 measure the equal motion
either of the sun and hea,-ens. Or emh (according w different
astronomical hypothesis)" by the equal motion of Ihis sdf-mo,·cr. and
so to distinguish or mark out to us tM quantities of th.t silent and
undi!iCCmed flux of timc; an d ,,-hen it hath considered how apdy
conduClbk e"CT}' pan of this IT\eChanism is to that dmp!, and how
there is ndlher the leasl redundancy nor deficiency in any thing in
oroeT thereunto, and oflhe Mauty and elegancy of the fabric, making a
further and a more inw:ard reflection upon the same, il plainly pera:ivt\<
Ihis lIXunle oontri'.nce to be but a passive print or s~mp of some
.cri"e and lirinl{ arl or skill upon iI , Wherefore the ide:as of art and skill
ue upon this ocasion natuully nerted from it , Neither doth it rut in
oonsidering of art and skill absn'actedly, bUI bcause tllese are modes of
an existent cogitali"e being, il think.. presently of some particular
intelligent being, the artificer or author of this curious fabric, and
lookinl{ further into it, finds his name also enl{ra,'cn in ICl{ible ch.racten
upon the same, wllereupon he forthwith pronounces the sound of it.
When::as the hing eye, thaI is, sense alone in its antecedent "jew, :as it
could nO{ espy any logic:al .,dalions or notions there, so neithr can it
perceive any ideas of art or skill in it, they ha"ing neither figure nor
oolour in them, nOr of author and artificer, an y more than ;t could _
the sound of the artificer's name in the cngra"en sculptu res or
clu.racrers of it , For Ihe eye could sec no more Ih.n ..-:as represented in
Or renecled from Ih crys~1 globe or mirror, Wherefore the ideas of art
and sk ill, aUIIlo. and artificer were not passi"ei y imprinted upon the
intellect from the matcrillJ self-mover (Qu/omQlon), but only occasionally
invited from the mind itself, :as the figuus of the engra,'en Icuel'S did
not p:assiveiy impress the sound of the artificer's nome upon him, but
only ocasion 111m to exert from II;' OWn .cri"ity,
lJ. Just in the same nunne.;1 happen s many times in the contempla-
tion of that great self-mo,'cr ("II/om.. i6n) of the nuterial uni,'erse, which
is the artifice of GOO (Oroii t eXvaujlo), lhe artifi ce of the best mechanist,
tllough then: M nO more pa..i,·e1y impressed upon u. from iI, than
there is upon the diapllanous air, Or liquid meT oontigunus to all solid
bodies by local motion, of which only scnsiti,'c beings ha"e a oonscious
pereeption; yet there is a wonderful scene of various thoughts and
motions ....i~ in the mind t~reupon, which are only ocasionaUy
invited by those: stamps and impressions made from tile nuleriaJ f.r.bric,
and its "ariow: furniture ",llIout, but Owc thdr true original and
efficiency to nothing else but the innate "igour and activity orthe mind
itself. Some of which ..e ha,'e already inst:ln""d in {he ideas of those:
relalive considerations (,,"~u.) of corpousl things themsch'os and their
pam 10 one anmher; by means of which the intellect riSCl; up to {hat
comprehensive view of thc na!\lus of panicular corpousl rhings, and

'I' ate
 CoNumiN! ,Untlll uti immlllllbk 1fIOrillily

t~ uni>'~ mundan<: system within its<:lf all at once; which KIl&e

ptlce;vin, only by link an d link, and luing in as il "l'~ point .fler
poinl, arlnO( sum up its partial pe=ptions inlo the tnrin idea of any
ont whole (IDlllm). But Ihe intellect doth ROt rest here, but upon
N'C"Km of those corporeal things thus comprehended in Ihem&et.'cs,
natunlly rioes hi,her to tht framin, and exciting of cerain ideas from
within itielf, of OIlier things nOi ni~ng in thost KIlsible obieru, but
absolutely incorporeal. For being ravished ,,;th the contemplalion of
this admirahle mechanism and mificial conrri~ of the material
uni,'CTSC, forthwith it narurally conceives it to be nothing el&e but the
pass;"e Slamp, prim, and signature of lOme living m and ...isdom, as
the ponem , archdype, and 5tal of iI, and so exciles from within itself In
idea of that di"ine an and ,,·isdom. Nay, considering funber, how all
things in thili greal mundane machine or animal (illi the ancients would
h,,'e it) are COIIlti,·ro, nOl only for the bnuty of lhe whole, bUI also for
the good of e,'ery pan in it, thll i. endued ,,-ith life and sense, it exertS
another idea, v'z. of coodneu and Mni",ity from ..ithin its.elf, beside!;
that of IlrI and wisdom, as Ihe queen regent and empress of art, w~reby
an is employed, regulated , and determined . Now both these things
whermf the fif!;t is m, wisdom, and knowledge, the oe(:Ond, goodness,
benignity, and morality, Ming looked upon as modes of some intellec-
Tual being Or mind in which lhey exist, il from hence presently makes
up an idea of God, as the luthor or architect of this great and boundless
machine, a mind infinitely cood and wi"" and so as it "'C~ resounds
and rc echoes back the greal creator's nill'll<:, which from thost yisible
characren impressed upon the nulerial Uni,·CTSC, had piet"a!d loudly
inlO its ears, but in ,uch an indi'<CCtOible nunner, that sense listening
never SO attenri'-ely, could not perceive th e least murmur or whisper of
it. And this is the most nltural ocaIe by which the intellectual mind in
the conlempl.tm of corporeal things asa:nds to God - from the
passi"e prints and si",aTures oflhat one an and "iKlom thalappean in
the univeru, by win, nOI>C:C from Thence of the exemplary 0<
archetypal ClU2, one infinite and eternal mind setting his,;cal upon all.
Fo<:as he that hears I conson of musicians playing a lesson consisting of
six 0< eighl sevenl portS, all conspiring to make up one h.armony ..... iII
immediately conclude that there wu some OI:her ClU2 of Ihat harmony
besides those oc,'ua] panicular efficit:nt5, thaI struCk the 5tven.l insuu-
menlS, for every one of them could be bUI a ClU2 of his 0"11 pan .... hich
 C"'l(tnri~llttnr"/ aTld il1/1tlulablt IfIor./ity

he pb)~. But th~ unity of th~ whol~ harmon y, into which all th~
RV~r.ol putS conspire, must ntt..!s proct:ed from th~ art and musical
skill of~ one mind, the CI~mpLary and archetypal cause of mat vO<.<lI
harmony, which wOS but a pus;'-e print or sump of it. So though the
ameW miKht possibly persuade himself that e.-cry particular cr<:ature
"-as the firsl author or efficient of that pm which ;t pla)·w in the
un;'~rse, by a certain innate po"·er of its own, yet all I .... parts of the
rnunrume system oonspiring into one perf~ct harrrKKlY, there must of
necess;ty be §OfllC one uni,·ersal mind, the archetypal and eumplary
cau ... of the whole mundane music, OS one entire thing mad. up of &0
many se...eral pam ...ithin himself.
14. But thai ofTenTimes there is more W:V1 notice of and pereei ... w by
the mind, both in the ""nsible objects Ihenw:I,-cs, and by occasion of
them, thll1 was im pressed from them, or pUsi"dy re<:e;,'C<! by ""nse,
which merefore must needs plOtted from liOI11e in"";Itd acli-'. principle
in mat ",hi<;:h perai,..:s, I shall mak~ ;t funher appear by &Ome other
instances,
For, fi:st, let a brUle and man at the same lime be made spectators of
one and the same: artificial statue, picture, or landscape. Her. Ihe brute
will passively ~ive .lIlh., i. imp ....ed from 'h e outward object upon
sc:nsc: by local motion, OS well OS me man. all the se,·...1 mlours and
figures of il. And )"el the man "ill presently percei'·e something in Ihi.
IiUtue or picture, which th. brute to kes nO! notice of at all. viz. beauty
and pukhrilude, and symmC1ry, besides ,h. hdiness of6. dfigits and
me portniture. The cye of the brute being c'-cry jot as ~ OS a Klass
or mirror, and perhaps enduw wilh a more perspicacious sense or
power ofpassi,·. perception, than thaI of a man.
0.. agin, let both a man and a brute at th. same time hear th. WIl.
musical ;airs, I~ brUle will only be sensible of noise and sounds. But the
man will a1&O pcrtti"e harmony in th.m. and be "cry much delighted
with it; nay, e.... n enth usiastically lransporlw by il. Wherefore Ihe brule
perceiving III Ihe sounds as \\"ell :IS Ihe ITWl but nothing of me
harmony, the difference must ntt..!. arise from some ,n"";Itd active
princi ple or antici pation in the man, which (he brute hath no\.
.... nd indtt..! the reason is Ihe same both in visibles and audibles . For
Ihe sense of a man, by reason of its vicinity and neighbourhood to
reason and int.llectua1ity, lodged in th. sam. soul wilb iI, must need. be
coloured ..·;m some tincture of it; or ha,'~ ..,me passi,-~ impre.sts of me

"
,
~ upon it. And therc:fore when it finds or meets with insensible
obiens any foot5teps Or resl:mblan<:es thc~f, anything that luth
cognation with intellectuality, as proportion, s)'mnmry, and order Iu'·e,
Ming the pusive stamps and impresses of art and skill {which are
intelle<:tual thinp) upon maner, it must needs M highl y gr:l[ificd with
the sarno. But the soul of a brute having 1>0 intdle<:tual anticipations in
it. but barely suffering from the corporC<lI obiens withour, can luve no
sense of anything but what their activity impress.eth upon it.
Nay further, the man will also espy some symbolical resemblances of
monlity, of virtue and vi« in the variously proportioned sounds and
airs. For there are rlltU:1I1 {Q8tKW) (as Amtnde hath obsen'w) as well as
ml/tu,ia,l;clIl ItllntfOIf;n (tYBovalOlTUKoi OppO,·iOl), as the physiogno-
mists in lih manner obser"e signatures of morality in the counten ances
of men and their pictures, which it is )'e( less possible that a brute
should be .. nsible of, these differences arising not from the absolute
namre of the obieclS withoUI, Or their bare impression which they make,
but [from] the differrnt analogy which thcy h,,'c to some in...-ard and
acti..., anticipations whid! they meet withal in the percipient. For the
man hath certain moral anticipations and signatures stamped in...-ardly
upon his soul, which makes him presentl y take notice of whatsoever
symbolius with it in corporeal things. But the brute hath none.
'S- And this "'ill still further appear if we again compare the
judgement of some ex«lIent artists in painting and music with that of
an ordinary vulgar person, thot hath not any acquired skill in either
multy. For the skilful and expert limner will obse1""c many elcpncie$
and curiosities of art, and be highly pleased ",·;th ..,enl strokes and
shadoWll in • picture, wheT<! a O)mTnOn eye (:;In diSttm nothing at aU.
And a musical artist hearing a consort of exact musicians playing some
excellent composure of many parts, "" ill M exceedingly nvished with
many hannonical ai rs and touches, tlut a "ulga< car will be utterly
inSCIIsible of. Nay such an one perhaps would be more pleased with the
slreperous noi .. of J single fiddle, or the rusti(:;ll music of the IXHJntry
bagpipes., or the dun humming of a Jew's trump than the fullest and
most exquisitely composed harmony.
And the reason is the same with what was Mfore suggested, because
the artistS of either kind have many inward anticipations of skill and an
in their minds, which Ming a...-akencd by those ~ive impressions of
the same skill or art in the outward obiens that strike upon their senses,
 C"tr'nt;Ng ,Until! ~nd immuluk """,,lily

the", arises immedineiy an innrd grnerul sense and sympathy from

the conupondence and analogy that is hetwilt them, art and skill in the
mind of the musical ht'all'r, finding &Om<:!hing akin (<1t»')'tv~ ,,) 10
i!SOlf in those harmonious airs, oomc: footsteps and • ,ambiance of iuclf
~tefully dosing .... ,h them. Of whi~h vial sympathy the", is vulgarly
thought to he some resemblance in nature, when upon the striking of.
string on one viol, another SI, ing, Ih~t is in unison to it in a dist:ln! .101,
will dance and leap, and that not from any mechanial cause (as oome
roncci,..,) p;!ssiveiy only, but from a ,·ial acti,·e principle in nature,
"'hi~h is affected .... ith concord . nd harmony .:! No'" there is )·n a
pulchritude of another kind, a mort' imerior symmetry and harmony in
the ",lations, proportions, aptitudes, and corrc:spondencic:s of things to
one another in the great mundane system, or .·ital machine of the
un;'·t'I"St', .... hich is.1\ mltsical1y and harmonically romposed. For which
cause the ancients made Pan, that is natu"" 10 play upOll an harp. But
the sense, which only passi,·cly ~n.'ein.. particular out".,.,.d objects,
doth here, like the brute, hear nothing hut me", ooise and sound md
ebner, but nl) music Or harmony at all, h.ving nl) active principle md
mticipation within itselflO comprehend it by md correspond or vitally
sympathiu wilh it, whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual b<ing
will be ravished and enlhusial;tically transported in the contemplatioto of
it, and of its own accord dance this pi~ of Pan. N.tures intellectual
mltsic and h.nnony .
•6. But I shall yet funher illustrate thi s busin .... that the mind may
acth·cly comprehend mort' in the outward objttts of sense, md by
occasion of them, thm is passi,·d)· ~i,·ed and impressed from tbem
by another instanco:. Suppose a learned written or printed volume held
before the eye of a brute creature or illiterate ~rson. Either of t~cm
will passi,·c1y rea:i,·c all thot is impressed upon sense from tOOse
delineations, 10 whom Ihe", will be nothing but se,·era! scrawls or lines
of ink drawn upon white paper. But if a man th.t h.th inward
antici pations of lcarning in him look upon them, h~ will immediately
have another comp~hension of them than that of sense. and • stranle
scene of thoughts presently reprcscnt(d to his mind from them. He will

" of ....,.....,. be«. "The ...... of .................

" " ' _ . ... . . . . . . . . . PUH

.-.
~~'~ ... "iI!! .... _
pbroi<al_l>Clbo<.
"""-"' - . ...........""" io ' ."inc'- bJ. "i"-, any
_ _ - . .......•... _ _ catfJ .... ...... - . .... 1Irint:

,.
set: he,...en, canh, sun, moon and stars, comets, meteors, elemenUl in
those inky deline:uion •. He win read profound theorems of phiJo.ophy,
gcomwy, asrronomy in Ihem, \cam J gRal de.al of new knowledge
from them Ihat he neve, under5100d bcf"ore, and u..,reby jUSlly admire
Ihe wisdom of the CDmJKIRr of them. NOf thai .11 this .."os passively
swnpcd upon his lIOul by sense from those characters. For sense, lIS I
aid hefore, can pem:ive nothing here bUI inky .,,,,,,,·15, and the
intelligent reader will many tilTlCli oorrect his copy, finding errataS in iL
BUI because his mind was before furnished with certain in..,.,d
anticipation. that such cha""'ters signify the ele ..... nts of t<:rt:lin
sounds, those sounds certain notions OJ" cogitations of the mind, and
because he hath an active pown of exciting any such cogitations within
himself, he reads those sensible cogitl.rion., the pa...i,·e mmps or prints
of another man's wisdom or knowledge upon them, and also learns
knowledge and inslTUction from them, nOt as infused into h;,; mind
from those sensible chuxtel1, but by reason of thoscc hints and
signification. thereby proposed to it, accidentally kindled , awakened,
.nd excited in it. For all btu the phanwrnII of black inky SU"Okes and
fiwures arises from the in ....rd activity of his own mind. Whcn:fore this
insWlce in itself &h ..... how the activity of the mind may OOtnprehend
more in and from ..,n.ible objecu than is passively imprinted by them
upon sense.
But no ..., in the room of this artificial book in volumes, let uS
.ubstitute u.., hook of nature, the whole visible and matmal universe,
printed aU Over .... th the passive characters and impressions of divine
wisdom and goodness, but legible only to an intellectual eye. For to the
senx both of nun and bOlte there appears nothing else in it but as in
the other, so many inky ocrawk, i.~. nothing but filJUTCS and colours.
But the mind or intellect, which hath an in .... rd and act1'·c participation
of the sa ..... divine wisdom mat made it, and being printed.lI o,..,r wim
tile same uchel)'pal 1Jea1, upon occasion of those seMible delineations
represenled to it, IlIId laking notice of ... ha!SOCvcr is rogn.:lle to it,
enning its OWn in .... rd activity from thena:, will nOf ha~e only a
wonderful ittfle and large prospect of other thoughts laid open before
ii, and variety of knowledge, logical, mathematical, ..... taphysical, moral
displayed, but tho dearly read the divine ..·isdorn and goodness in
e.·ery page of this gre:at \"Olu ....., as it "l're writtcn in large and legible
characters.
 Chapter 11\

I. We have hitm.to showed that then: an: many ide2s of the mind
whieh, though the cogitations of them 'tw: oftcn ocasionaUy invitro
from the motion or appulsc of sensible objects ,,-jthout made uJXm our
bodies, yet 1KM,,;\hsandinlf the ideas them..,h-es could not po5Iiibly 'tw:
stamped or impressed upon the soul from them, because sense takes no
cognizance at all of any such things in th05C roqKIrcal objects, and
therefore they mu" needs arise from the intute vigour and acti,-ity of
the mind i_If. Such IS arc, tint, the n:l.tive ideas or the ""veraJ ../.....
or respeCts ...·hieh Ire betwixt corporeal things themselves compared
with one anoI:her. Which rclllti,'c ideas 'tw:ing not compn:hcnded by
sen.." and yt'l not .. ithsanding the natures of all compounded OOI"porcaI
thinp, wlmher artificial Or natural, that is whether made by the arrifiet:
of men or nature, consisting of them, we havc dcmonstrativdy proved
from thenet:, that the natures of no compounded corpon:al things can
possibly be kno"'"lI or compn:hended by sense. And again the ideas of
oogiul.li ,-c bcinp, and tm " '-craJ modes of them, logctmr wilh all such
notions as invoh-e IIOtnC Inpccl or n:b.tion to them. For although these:
also be often """"'s""'ally invited and elicited by the objects of sen.."
when the mind, in Ihe comempllltion of them by its 0"''11 active
strcngth, pera:ives Ihe sigrultures of arl, coun..,ls, conrri,.... et:, ...·isdom,
nay, IrId goodness also <all which Ire modes of cogitati,'c beings}
primed upon them. Yet they cannot 0"'( thcir 'tw:ing Or efficiency to the
:activity of those: oUI"vd objects, bUI mcn:ly 10 thc activity of the mind
itself.
I should no ...' proceed 10 lI>o ...., that e,'cn Ih"'" simple corporeal
things themsc:h-cs, which by sense: wc havc a p"ssive perception of, in
individual bodies without us, IrC also known and underslood by the
act;'-c power of the mind excrling its 0 ..."11 inte11i~ble ideas upon diem.
a. That ocn.. tion is not knowlcdlfc of those corporeal things that we
sensibly perceive, ...-e h;a"e befon: largely showed. And indeed it
sufficiently appears from hence, because upon the seeing of light IrId
colours, though never w clearly, the feding of heat and cold smarlly,
the hearing of loud sounds and noises, ....., nalurally enquin: further,
what this lilfhl and colou"" heat and cold, and sounds IrC, .. hieh is an
undoubted acknowledgement that we have nOi a clear and satisfactory
comprehension of Ih.,.., Ihings which nuke", suong a "TOke IlIld
impression upon Our scmes. And Ih en:fore Ihe mind desires 10 ItU5ler
IlIld conquet" mem by ilS own active mmph and power IlIld 10
comprehend them by some ideas of ilS own , which are not foreign, but
native, domestic, and intrinsical to it.
Now if sense itself~ nO{ knowledge, much less can any serondary or
deri,...ti,·e result from sen.., be kno ...·!edg<', for this would be a more
obscure shadowy and ennid thing tiwl sense i_If is. & when the
ilTl1g<' of a man's &ce, recei"ed in a mirror Or IDlKing-glass, is reflected
from thence imo a seamd mirror, IlIld so fO","lIrd into a mird, srill
further it goes, the more obscu re, ronfused, IlIld imperfect it grows, till
at b$t it br<:omes altogethu imperceptible. Or as in the cirdinp and
undulations of wate!", aused by Ihe falling of a slone into ii, that an:
suc:cessi"e!y propagllled from one to 1lIl00her, the further IlIld wider they
go, the ......,.1:$ an: still the less, slower and wuker, till at length they
become quile undi""ernible. Or as a secondary echo, that is, me echo of
an echo, falls as much shon of the primary echo in proporuon, as that
doth ofthe original in proponion, as lhl! dOlh of the original voicc'. Or,
lastiy, if we oould supPQ&e a shadow to cast a shadow, Ihis secon dary
shadow, or project:ion of a shadow, ...·ould fall :IS much shon of the
prilTl1ry shadow as that did of the substance itself. So if lhe knowledge
of corporeal things ...-ere but a secondary IlIld derivative resuli from
sense (though it cannot be conceived that the passion of seo.., should
ray upon the iotellc<;t, so :IS to ~t a secondary passion there, any
man: mllIl one shadow should ast another) then kno .... ledge would ~
much a weaker pe.ceplion of them than sense itself is, and nothing but
as ;1 " 'ere the secondary reflection of an inuge, or Ihe remote cirdings
IlIld undulations of the nuid wate!", or the mere echo of the echo of IlIl
original voice. Or, lastly, nothing but the sharlow of the shadow of a
sub\;tance. Whereas it is a far more ruJ, sub.tantw, and satisfactory,
man: penetn.tive IlIld comprehmsi"e pen:qltion than ..,nSC is, reaching
10 me vcry inward CSKnce of the mings perceived. And Iherefore ;1
must of n.......;ty proceed from lhe active po"'er of the mind it..,lf,
exerting irs own intelligible ideas upon mil which is passI"e!y perceived
IlIld so comprehending il by someth ing of irs own that is native and
domeslic to it. So that besides the ..,nsahoRs (a(ulhiflala) OK phllIl wms
(.;avniupafal me SC115ible ideas of oorporcal thinp p;u.s;'·dy impressed
upon us from without, then: must ~ al50 conceptions OK inlt lligible

'"
 CONurn;ng ,urn~/lInJ ;",,,,Jllab/, WUl'II/;ly

ideas of them (volj/mra) actively exerted from the mind itself, or

otherwise Ihey could ne~er be understood.
3- Wherefore. th'l we rnay the bener illustr.ue this business, let lIS
sUpP'JSC' some indi"idual body, ,.. for example, a ",hite or block
triangular superficies. or • solid four-squ.re (U/r~J",JnI"') induded all
within. triangul .. supcrficies, ex""",d first to the view of sense Ill" •
livinl!" eye, .nd then aften..rd considered by th~ intellect, that ".~ rnay
see the difference ~twixt Ihe pass;,'e perceplion of;1 by sense, and the
act;"c comprehcnsion of it by the understanding. Now sense, that is a
living eye or mirror. as soon as e.-er il is colwened toward this obiect.
will here passively perceive an .ppearance of an individual thing, as
existing without it, ",hite and triangular, without any distinction
concrt:tely and confusedly together. And it will pcrai..~ no more than
this, thoul!"h il dwell nevcr so long upon this object. For it pcrcci,·ts no
more than is impressed upon it. And here the pass.lon of sense cnd& and
goe5 no funher. But the mind or intellect rtsiding in the same ""ul that
hath I power of sensation 01"", then beginning to make. judgement
upon that which iii thuli pass;,'cly pcrech'cd, exerts its own innatc vigour
and acti.-ity, and displ.)·, iuclf gndually after this manncr. For, first,
with its subtle divisi "e powcr, it will analyse and r<'SOh'c this ronc,..te
phamllsrnalial ""hole (IOIJI",) and take nmice of ""..eraJ distinct intcl~«­
tuaJ obj«u in it For considering that C"CI)' while or black thing is not
necessarily triangular, nor c"cry triangular thing white or black, it finds
here two distinct intcllrctual objects. thc onc ,,·hite. the other (riongul ...
And then again, because that which is nothing can ha\"e no affe<:tiom, it
rondudts. that hCTt is !iOII1cthing as a rommon sub;ect (subm·.I ..",) to
both these affections Or modifialions which it ails a corporeal
substanec, which being one and Ihe same thing is here both white and
triangular. Wherefore it finds at least Ihrtt distinct objects of intcllttnl<ll
cogitation, corporeal substance, white, and triangular, all individual. But
then rencctinl!" again upon thc:sc: sc"cra1 objtds. and Ihat il may further
enquire into lhe natures and essences of them, it now bids adieu to
scnsc and sinll""laril y, and I;Iking a higher night considers them all
uni"cr:sally and abstractly from indi"iduating circumstances and maucr.
T1u.t is. it no more secks thc know led", and comprehension of rhc:sc
Ihings ""ilhout itselr, from ",hence it hath alrady passi,'cly pcTCCived
them by sense. But revol .. ing within itself upon its own inward notions
and acti"c anticipations (..-hich must IlCI:ds be universal) it looks for

.,
,.
some donv:sti", ideas (If its (lwn IU understand these genen.l natures by,
that so from thence with • descending ,;ew it may comprehend under
them those individuals that now a/Te<;l lhe sense.
4- FirS( therefore, for corporeal substance in ~er.d, ",lIicli is the
subject (".hfmllMm) both of colour and figu"" nO{ to pursue any long
and ledious PI'O"'ffS il quickly concludes that essence of it to be this: a
es
,

thing utended impenetrably, {If which hath impenetrable longitude,

latitude, and profundity. And because it is nO{ he'" considered mc",ly
as I notion or objective cogitation, but as a thing actuIUy existing
without the mind, tlle",fore it exerts another nO{ion ('Drill) of existence
Or singularity also, Which added to the fortTICT makes it up I thing thlt
IIlth impenetrable cltension existing_ Now none of these ideas, neither
of cs.sence nor elistence, nor thing, nor substan"'", nor oomething, nor
nothing, nor impenetrability, nor extension, nOT longitude, latitude, and
profundity, we", impressed or Stamped upon Ihe mind, either from this
individual, or an y otller 5Cnsible object. f or they can be neit her secn
nor peraived by any corporeal sen5C, but a", me",]y tIdted from tht
innate activity of the mind itself, that same po"..,r by ,,-hid. the mind i.
enabled to conceive of nO{hing (nihil) as weU as something ("/i'l"Ui) and
ceruin il is lhat the idea of nothing was ne"Cr imp ressed from any
thing. And if the essence of body, or rorporeal liubstance itself, be only
romprehended and understood by the act:i,'c ideas of the mind (for
5Cn5C here ""reci"ed no such thing, but only ",as affeo:ted from the
exterior induments thereof, rolour and figure), then tile several modes
of it, such as whiteness and triangularity, which are but oenain modes of
an exlended liubiitance. mUSI needs be understood in like manner, rw>I
by passive ideas and phantasms, but the noem.:ltical or inte1~gible ideas
ofthc mind.
s. Wherefore in the next pI""", as for white colour or whitcness, here
is a plain and »<Ilpable difference betwixt sen5C and intellection. betwin
the phanasm (o/xivraopa) and conception (WI/po). betwixt a 5Cnsiblc
and intelligible idea. For the 5Cnse Of phantasm of white. that ".., have
from the individual object iii no clear comprehmsion or any essence or
intelligible notion (T"li~) but only a passion or affe<.:tion in the $(luI,
caused by some local motions communicated to the brain from the
object without, that is, ~ dro""Y, confused, and imperfect perceptive
cogitation. But now the a,,-.kenw mind (IT intdlect remlvinB" its own
in"-.ro ideas, and being not able to comprehend any 5uch mode Or

'.
'I' ate
'1uolity in ~X1ended ""!>stan"'", as mis sensibl~ idea of whit~ is, formally
consid~ll'd, for Ihis very r=n, boldly and confid~ndy concludes that
this is no real quality in mat body itsdf absolutely considered, because
no such thing is intelligible by it, In which opinion, it iii confirmed by
sense itsc:lf, in that the lower ends of the ninbow that reach to the eanh
do nO'! stain or dye any thing with the ",nral coloura of it; and mat me
same drops of de'" Or rain to eyes at sevenl distances have 011 those
several colours of the rainbow in mem and none ot 011. And by OIher
uperiments it appears that these things are only passions or affections
in the sentient itself, caused by some peculiar modificatiofl of the
superficies of tlut materiol object in resp«l of the figure, site, and
di&pOSition of its insensible p.rts, whereby the light or intermediate
globulous pnticles are in a peculiar manner ",flected upon the eye, .nd
that probably me difference betwixt. white and a black object consists
in this, that in on e the small particles are polite and solid, and therefore
vividly reflect the lighter gLobulous panicles, but in the other, being
differentl y disposed, me ~ght, 15 I ball flUng against a heap of sand, is
not so smanly ",fltc'!ed from it, but 15 it "'ere sinks into it, and its
motion is stifled and smothered in the caverns of it. Wherefore the
intelligibk ide. of. white colour is mis, that it is a ""min passion Or
sense in me soul, caused by a peculiar modification of the object
wimout, in Il'Sp«I of the disposition of its insensible parts, whereby the
lighl Or globulous panicles are more smartly and vividly reflected upon
the eye. Which is anothCT kind of comprehension of it, than the sensibk
idea or phantasm of while is, which i. no intelligible idea, but a
cogitotive passion, mIt is, anOther species of cogitation, or an half-
a...,.kened pel ception. Neither a", these intelligible ideas of passion and
",nsc: impressed upon the liOul from the sensible objects without, for the
eye sees neithCT passion nor sense, but they are actively exened from
the mind itself, ond Ihe",fore ml5tCTed and conquered, and compre-
hended by il.
6. I nllW procttd 10 the Il5t intellectual obicct comprehended in this
individual body, "'hich is triangularity, or some one panicular species of
a triangle, 15 for example, an equilateral, or • m:tangular triangle. For
there <;an be no individuol triangle but musl be of one detenninote
species or another.
Now because the phantasm of such a triangle dOlh not only bear a
resemblance of the outwllird maleri~1 object, which the phantasms of

'II ate
colours and the like do not, hut also of the true imelligible ideo I
triangle itself, and because when men think never SO abstractedly .Ijd
mathematically of a mangle, they h.ve ronur..;>n ly some rude ph. ntuln
or picture of it before them in their imagination, thueru", m;ufy
confidently persuade themselves that then: is no other ideo of a triariaie
or other fiJU"' beside the bare phanlaSm or sensi ble idea impr~d
upon the soul from some individual object without - thai is, nO act~e
nocmarical ida inwardly t uned from the mind itself. Which indeed ill
all one as to say, that there is no in tellection or knowled ge of. {'''nllk
al .ll, forasmuch as neither sense noT rancy, which a", but supcrfiC~I~
imperfect, and incomplete ""rapt;'"c cogitations, reach 10 the romp
hension of the nOlKm or CSSCnce of any thing. Whuefore now 10 m C
the contrary .ppnT, we will again view this material trian!!"Je, or roJ.
S<Ju= (w,//rtdl'llm) before our eyes, I11<Iking a nearer approach to It,
Ind upon this second contemplation of it we plainly observe m....:h
inequality in the superficies, uneven ness and inequility in the lines, :uk!
bluntness in the angles . From whence it evidently Ippears that that i~
thlt we had in our minds of • ~et:'! triangle as a plain superfi?ts
terminated by three .t.... ight lin... joined together in th ree angles, cndu,g
in SO many points, was nO{ impr<:S5Cd upon our soul from this ;ndi,·idllll
object, it being different from it, and fir more exact and perfet:'! then
that is. And therefore it must needs be granted th.t it "'"as I;ioU.t
occasionally Of accidentally in vited and dnwn forth from the mind,
upon the ~ight of it, ju~t in the same manner as when a man looks upG(rt
certain lines drawn with ink upon a pica: of paper something rCSCM-
bling the f""" of I man, his mind doth not fix and stay itself in ~e
consider-Ilion of those inky lines, but presently upon this occasion
ueites within itself the idea of a man'$ nce. Or when I man walking :;:
pllery where there are divers pictures; hung upon the wall, chan
amongst them to espy the picture of a friend or acquaintance of ,
which, though perhaps far from an exact ~mblance yet not "·i~­
standing makes him presently to excite the idea of his friend in iritis
imagination. Neither of which things could possibly be, if thm: had ~t
been I previous and pre-i:xistent idea of. man's face, or such a cCruf
friend in his mind before. For otherwise a man in this case could think
of nothing but just that "'"as impt' sed upon him by sense, the figUrCS~r
those inky delineations, and those sevenl strokes and shadows of e
pictures;. In like manner, when we look upon the rude, imperfet:'!

,,'
irngulae figures of I5()tm corporeal things, the mind upon this ......... sion
excite!; from within itself the ideas of a peMed triangle, squa~, circle,
pyramid, cube, sphere, and tM like, whose ~nces a", so indivis,ble
that they are not C2l"'ble of the least additions, dotraction, or ..... riation
without the destruction (If them, becallSC' there was ".",... rude and
bungling raernblana of these regular figures ;n mose material obt<crs
that we look upon, of which probably the maker had the ideas in his
mind. And the mind naturally delights more fO think of simple and
regular, than of compounded Ind irregular figures.
7. But, if anyone should here object, and say, tJu,t it doth not follow
from hence thot that more I"'rfect idea which now I hive of. triangle in
my mind, the acmracy whcrrofthis present visiblc idea before my Of'"
dot:h not: rach unto, was xti"ely ucitcd from the mind itself, because it
might be some time formerly imprus«l, from !>Ome other individ!W
triangle which I had d"where _n, just in the .. me manncr as when I
""'ked upon a piaure, that idea of. man'. face in gencral, Or of thai
particular friend, that was occasionally excited Ihereby, "'lIS not my
innlte idea, .... an idea thlt sprung wholly from the activity oflhe mind,
bur was formerly impressed upon the soul, from individ .... l sensible
objects no'" !"elmmbered or C1lled 10 mind. I "r Ihat mis C1nnot
possibly be true, becallSC' Ihcr. nc'"cr was any material Or sensible
straight line, triangle, cin:le, that we .. w in all our li,'es, that was
mathematically exact, but even "n" it"lf, "' least by the help (If
mi<:rosoo~ might plainly disconr mum unevenness, ruggedn0$5,
nexuosity, angulosity, irregularity, Ind defomliry in them, as " 'ill appear
10 anyone thl1 !ihall make a Iriangle upon the mosl accurate lines that
wit or art of man C1n make. And then:fore no material lin. could stamp
or impress upon the !IOul in a Imre pusive ""'y those uact ideas that we
now hove of. triangle or of. straight line, whif;:h is the shortest possible
betwttn tIO-U points, or a circle th.t is every where equidistant from an
illdividu.al centre, &e. Alld if it should be again replied, that not ..ith_
stlllding there being many weh lines and circles as commcm sense
tannot disarn the least irregularity in them, howSOC:"er they would be
in the Iman rime rcaJly irrc-gular to a peMed and Iyncean sight, )"ct
ac<:OTding to their apl"'arance might impress thOSl: ideas that we havt of
.. n.. .. ko....... .,_,""""' ""',
.... l1oyaIs
Co..h.-""" _ ....'" of .......' .6"",& <n<tu .... "
. " _ t .hu... hdo ... ....-,"""hOp,g" .... ""'" ,., . S<><Rob<rt
IItooH, M'".,'"" ., ('--loa. ,~). Coompor. TIS. p. H"

''''
,.
a straight line or circle. I answer tIlat this annot be neither, there being
• vast differenc:e betwixt the confused indistinction of sense and fancy,
by reason ofthcir bluntness md imperfection and the express :><:curacy,
preciseness, and indivisibility of thOllC' intelligible ideos th.t we ha"e of a
nn.ight line, circle, trUngk, four-squa~, and other geometrical figures.
And then:fore tIl.t imperfect, confused, indistinction of sense could
ne'"cr impress my such accun.te ideas upon the mind, but only OCC'.inn
Ihe mind actively to excn them from within itself.
8. N.y, mough it should be granled that then were material lines
mathematically enet, perf~ triangles, iquarn, pyn.mids, cubes,
sphera, md tile ~ke, such as gcomelr)' suppo5eS, os no doubt but the
divine power an make such in fining maner, yet sen.., OOtIld not .t.1I
reach to the diKerning of the mathematical aocun.cy of these things, nO
more than it doth 10 the absolute equality of any quantities _ os of lines,
superfici<:s, bodies, mgles - which is found and determined only by the
undentanding in tIlat intelligible maner (",.uri4 ;~ltlliri;iJiJ) ...·hkh
gromctry is ronverf>ant about. So that sense could not be oble to
determine whlltriangk and what four-squan: (m,.Iu",.,IIn) ..... mothc_
matically uact. and wh.t not. From whence it is demonstrably evidenl
thOl neither the nOlion ('4Iio) of perfect equality, nor tile perfecl
m.thematical ideas of figura, trimgle, square. circk, pyramid, cube,
sphere, &c., ...·erc impressed upon the liOul from without by sense, sense
nOl at all reaching to Ihe discernmenl oflhem.
9. But, Judy, if there were matmal lines, triangles, pyramids, perfectly
and mechanically enet, yclthal which m.de lhem such, and thereby 10
differ from other irregular lines, imperfect triangles and cubes, could be
nOlhing but a conformity to an antecedent intellectual idea in the mind,
as tile rule and exemplar of them. for otherwise an irregular line and an
imperf~ triangle, pyramid, tul:oe, arc os perfectly that Ihat they #C, as
the other is, only they #c not .grttable to thOllC' mticipated and
prcconc:ci"ed ideas Qf regular lines and figures actively cxened in the
mind, or intellect, which the mind natun.lly fonneth 10 itself, and
de~ghteth to exercise itself upon tIlem, as the proper obiect of an and
scima:, wh ich the other irregular figures Ire 11(1(. WhercfOf'C .... he"""er.
man looking upon matmal objects judges of the figures of th."" and says
this;' a Slraight line, this is a perfect triangle, that a perfect circle, but
tIl<lSe are neither perr~ triangles nor circles, it is plain Ihat here an: t.... o
seven! ideas of tIlese lines and figura., the one outv.'ardly impressed

,oS
from lhoso. individual malmal objectS from without upon the sense of
the beholder, the OI'her actively ncrtro from his inword mind or
intellect. Wh ich btter busy anticipation of it is the rule, pattern, and
exempbr when:by he judges I)f those sensible ideas or phanwms. For
otherwise, if Ihen: ....en: nl) in ...··n d anticipations or mental ideas, the
spectator would not judge at all, but only suffer, and every irregular and
imperf~ triangle bcing os perfectly like to Iml, which i. Ihe mosl
perfect triangle, the mind now having no inw:...1 panern of its 0\\11
be:fon: ii, to distinguish and put a difTen:nce, would tlOI' say one oftmm
was man: imperfect than ;mother; but only comparing them one with
another, [the mind) would say tm! this individual figun: waS not
perfectly like 10 Imt. Upon which aca:mnl the perfect lriangle would be:
os imperfectly the imperfect triangle os the imperfect was the perfect.
roo Wherefon:, os I said be:fore. this is iust in Ihe same manner os
when a man looks upon the picture of;m absent friend or famili.ar
acquainunoe, and presently judges of iI, he hath plainly tWO seve~
ideas in his mind al the same time: one outwardly impressed from the
present picture, the other pn:-existent in his mind be:fon:. By one of
.... hich he makes a judgement upon the other, and finds many faullS in ii,
sa,·ing that ~ both Ihe ideas wen: {,,",igo and adventitious, the pre-
exislent idea h.,·ing bttn lOme time formerly imp., .sed from an
oUlward material object, and thence retained in the memory or fancy.
But in the other case, .... hen a man looking upon a malerial triangle,
square, circle, cube:, sphen:, in which Ihere an: some palpable irregula-
rities, which he judges of by oompating them wilh some inward pre-
uis!Cnt ideas that he hath in his mind of a perfect individuallriangle,
square:, circle, cube:, and also ooncei'·Q; some dislike and displeasun: at
Ihe disoonformily of the one 10 the Olher. The pn:-existent ideas here
wen: no fore:igo or adventitious things, bUI .... Iive and dom""tic 10 him,
nor at any time (WCTC they] fOrm<:rly possivdy """,i,·ed from any
matmal objects without, bUI actively exerted from the mind itself. And
l lhin k there: is no doubt to be nwle but if a perfect adull man, that was
immroialdy framro out of the earth, having a ne .... ly created soul
infuwl os the prolopbsl had, should look upon IwO several kinds of
objects at the lWT\e time, whereof one was a perfect circle Or sphere:,
equilateral triangLe, four-squan:, square:, or cube:, Ihe other having some
resemblances of the same, had notWithsunding apparent irregu larity in
some partS of them, but notwith5tanding apparent iTl·~gularity in some

".
'I' ate
 Co/ftm,m, tlt".",,1 ~"d i."",,,,dlt ",orality

pam ofthem, but that at 6rst sight he would be mon: pleased with the
one than with tile: other. Which rould not be unkss he had some: native
or acti"e idea of his own within hilT\SClf to compon: them both with, to
which one was mon: conformable than the other. For then: could be no
luch thing as pulchritude and deformity in matcriill obi«ts, if tlm'e
wen: no ani,'C power in the soul of framing ideas of rcguln, propor'
tionate, and symmetrical 6g1.1res within itself, but which it might put a
diffen:na: bet"'ccn outwud ob~crs, and make a judgement of them; but
that it only n:oeived Stamps and impn:ssions from ..;tho\l1, for then it
must needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alib, and not
more plcuW or displcased with one than with another. Now the
judgcmt:nt that men have of pulchritude and deformity in !>tnsible
things il not merely ani6cial from institution or instruction, or of "'ught
thingo, butluch as ..,rings originally from natun: itself.
II . BUI thai there is an intell igible idea of a mangle inwardly uencd
from Ihe mind itself, distinct from the phantasm or sensible idea that is
oUlwvdly impressed from the maleriill obj.ect, ..ill yel funhc:r appear
from lhat .. hich f"UO ..... For the mind ronsiders firsl thc gmerieal
",lIure of iI, thaI it is a plain figun:, and Ihot 0 plain figun: is the
termino!i<Jn "f 0 plain superficirs. Which superficies is nothing dse but
mc:n: latitude without profundity, for plain figures an: no OIheno'ise
ronceived by geometricians. Now, it is «rlain that this idea of 0 l uper-
6cies, which geornetricians have, ..... ne,'cr imprimed upon their minds
by Gense from any malerial obiects, then: being no such thing any when:
existing without the mind, as latitude "'ilhout profundity. And therefon:
it must needs arise: from tile: act;'·;ty ofllle: mind itself. And the idea of a
plain IUperficies, that is, such a superficies 1$ to all whose pan. a str:aight
line may be acc:ommodaled as well as the idea "r. s""ight line, must
needs be activdy ucited from the mind also. Apin, il considers the
differcna: betwixt 0 triangle and other plain figures, that it is included in
and terminated by Ihree s""ight lines jDined togt:ther in three poinlS.
Wh ich s""ight lines ioined together being the extremities of lhose lines,
ha"e neither longitude, latitude, nor profundilY in them. Whith nuthe-
maUcaI ideas., in lib manner of a line ..ithout lalitude or profundity,
" 'en: never imprnscd upon Eu<:~d, or any other geometrician from
without, as is evident without further proof. Moreo"er, thi. intdligiblc
idea of ~ triangle, as it includes some numerical ronsider:ations in it,
.. hich R'nR' hath no idea of, perceiving only one and one and one: SO

'"
thell'in sides and angles are Il'lali,-ely consider«l also 10 one another.
Nay the "ery nO{Ion of an angle, and Ihe quantilY IherMf, is • Il'lnive
Ihing, as Produs hath obsc.nxl, and Iherefoll' not impressed by sense,
Again, the mind considering rhe ideo of ils own, as ir ""n find out Ihe
several properties of a triangle by mere cogiution wilhout any thing of
sense (as that the gT'tater side al w:a)'s sublends the greater .ngle, ""y and
that the thrtt angles are alw.ys equal to Iwo righl .ngles, as ,,'e .hall
show afte ..... rdsj SO il.lso, by its own strength, is able to find OtJI all the
species Ihat.re possible in • plain triangle, in respect of Ihe diffell'nces
bolh of sides and angles. As in respect of the sides. that it is either
equilateral or CVffi·lcrg«l (iMluio) or ha.-ing unequal sid es ~u"/....u",j
or blunt-<x>mcred ("",MytON;""') or sharp-corncred (O';'r;WVlov) tri-
angle, and thallhen: an be no individual rriangle but must ofntttSsity
belong to one of the Ihrtt species of either sort . So that this is not
gathered from sense, but ucrtcd from the active power of the mind .
12. The mind an clearly undersund a triangle in genenl without
determining its thnught to an y pmicuLar species, and yet there can be
no distinct phantasm of any such thing. For c,'cry distinct phantasm or
limsible picture of a tri.ngle nlUS! of n~sity be either equiLate... l or
equicrun.l or inequil.te ... l, uneven-legged (l(dkN"",j. And 50 as we can
in like manner dearly understand in our minds a thing with a thousand
comers (difwID~Il"') or one wirh len thou$2lld oorn~rs (...yrioID~""'),
though "l' annot possibly h••-e a distinct phanwm of either of them.
But for those particular species of triangles which w( may h..,( distinct
phanWm5 of, this doth not at all hinder but th.r we h..,c, nON-irh·
standing, intelligible ideas of the same besides, .cti'-cly exm«l from th<:
mind itself. And so there is • phantasm (~Vf(lOp(lj and • conception
(vOt,pa) at the same time concurring together, an octivc and a ~ive
cogitation. The cona:ption or intelligible ideo being as it were embodied
in the phantasm, which alone in itself is but an incomplete peru-pri"e
cogiution of the soul half .wahncd and doth not oompnr:hend Ihe
;ndi,-isible and ;mrnuublc notion (rQ/w) or CSSCnce of an y Ihing.
Which thing to those that cannot belleT undentand it by ...-hat we
h..-e already declared , might be illust1"3tcd in this manner: when an
IlS{ronomer, thinking of Ihe sun, demonstrates thaI it is a hundred and
siXly times bigger than the globe of the earth. he hath all the while •
phantasm Or imagination oflhe sun in his mind, but as a circle of. foot
diameter (cixrnEp 1f000iov) nay he annot for his life h.ve a true

'"

'I' ate
phantasm of any sud! magnitude which conlains Ihe bigness of the
canh so many times, nOr indeed fancy the tanh a hundmhh part so big
as il is. Now, as the aslronomer halh an inlelligible ide~ of the
magnitude of the SUn very diffcrenr from the plwuasm Ortt.c same, SO
in like manner M."e we intelligible ideas of COI'pOrnJ things, when "1:
undel"SWld mem, besides me ph.;mtasms of memo The phantasm oong
as il were It.c crasser indumenl (;"vo/urn/III) Or corporeal vehicle of the
inlelligible idea (..0'1#0) of the mind.
13. Hitherto, by the inSWl'" of an indi,;dual and malerial triangle,
we have , ho""lI how the soul, in undcn;t:anding corporeal things, doth
nOl: memy suffer from ..ilhoul from the body, but actively exeru
intelligible ideas of its own, and from y,.ithin irself. Now, I absene that
il is so far from being lrue, that .11 our obioeti'·e cogitations or ideas are
corporeal emUleS or rnIialiOln from corporeal things without, Of
imprcmd upoo the soul from Ihem in a gross corporeal manner, as a
signarure or.ramp i. imprinred by a oeal upon a piett of wax or day,
that (as I have before hinted) this is not true sometimes of Ihe liellsible
ideas Ihemselves. For all pc,"cption whatsOeyer i. a vital energy, and
not a mere de.d passion. And as the ..ornical philosophy instructs uo,
there is nothinll oommunicated in sensation from the nutmal objeas
withOUI, but only certain local motion. thar a", propapted from them
by Ihe nerves inro the brain. n Which morian. cannot propapte
thernsc.lyes corporeally upon the soul also, becausc it pcnerr.nes and
run. throullh all the pam of its own body. BUlthe soul, by reason of
that vital and magical union whieh is t...twc:en il .nd the body,
sympathizing with Ihc scvcral motions of it in the brain, doth thereupon
exe" sensible ideas or phantasms within itself, whereby it pcr""i ...,:!! or
takes notioc of objeas distant from the brain, either with or w;thootthe
body. Many of which ""timeolS and phantasms ha.·c no similirudc at
.U, either "ith those local motions made in the brain, or with the obfctts
without, such ;as .re the sentiments of pain, pleuure, and titillorion,
hunlltT, thint, heat, and cold, ,w,CC1 and bincr, ~lIht and coloots, &c.
Wherefore the truth is thOl sense if we well considcr it, is but a kind of
s~h (/Dfl't14), if I may so tall iI, nature as it ..·cre talking to us in the
sen.ible obi«nl without, by ecruin mtMion, as signs from thence
communicated to the br.lin. For, u in spcedt, ... hen men talk 10 onc

". -
" n.. ... ;=' plUkooopIoy- .. _ _ It< ..... ;" Y,

'"
. ..... , s.. <lie d _ ; ' 8001< ..
another, they do but nuke certain motions upOn the air, which C&nrKII
impress their thoughts upon ooe mother in a passive mmner, but it
being fint consented to md agreed upOn, that such ceruin sounds shall
signify such ideas and cogitations, he that hean those sounds in
discourse, doth not fix his thoughts UpOn Ihe sounds themseh'ts, but
presendy Ue'TtS from within himsc:lf such ideas and cogitations as those
sounds by consent signify, though there be no similitude at all betwin
those sounds and thoughts. Just OS in the!;m'le nunner na[Ure doth os it
were talk to us in the ou",'Ud objects of sense, and import vlrious
sentiments, ideas, phantallms, and cogitations not by stamping or
imprusing them push'ely upon the soul from without, but only by
C01'tain local motions from them, os it were dumb signs made io the
brain; it ha"ing been first constituted and appointed by nature's La,,',
that such local motions shall signify such sensible ideas and phantasms,
though there can be no similitude at all betwi~t them. For what
simili[Ude can there be betwixt any local motions and the sensa of pain
or hun~r, and the like, OS there is no similitude bet .... ixt many words
and sounds, and the thoughts "'hich they signify. But the soul, as by a
artaio _ret instinct and OS it were by compact «(I f~JI""~JfI tI <~JflP~<lD)
undenl2nding na[Ure'. lan~~, os soon os these local motions arc
made in the bmn, doth not fix ill attention ilTllTlCdiately upon those
motions thmlSCh~, as .... e do not use to do in discouTK upon rroere
sounds, but presmcly exerts such IiCIIsibk ideas, phantallms, and
cogitations, as nature hath made them to be signs of, whereby it
peraivcs and cakcs cosnizance of many other things bath in its O'NII
body, and without it, at a distance from it, in order to the good and
consen-ation of it. Wherefore there are t....o kinds of pcrcepri,'c powers
in the soul, one below another: the first is that which belongs to the
inferior put of the soul, whereby it sympathilcs with the body, which is
determined by the several motions and pressures that arc made upon
that from corporeal things without to se"eral ~iri\'C, and fantastical
energie5. whereby it hllh • slight and superficial perception of indi,,;dual
toqIOreo.l things, and as it ""ere of the OUl!iid"" of them, but doth flO'[
reach to the comprehension of the "",,nce or indivisible and immutable
notion (r8rio) of any thing. The second percepti"e pOwer is that of the
soul itselr, or that superior, interior noctial pan o(it which is free from
all passion or sympathy (.:bwOlj, dut.ojJlfa/1rk), free and discnl2ngkd
from all that magical sympathy with ihe body. Which acring alone by

'"

'I' ate
iw:Jf, e~enS from within the intelligible i<!as of things virtually
contained in iu; own cognosciti>'e po ...-er, that are uni'-ersal and abstract
norions (r.I'.~'J) from which as it ""ere looking downward (1",,'1".'"
M'"pt' S;tfl"~S) it oornprehe:nds individual things_I' Now, because thc:R
laner which are pure active energies of the wu l, are many rimes nerted
upon occasion of those ~he:r passive or Ii)'mpat hetical perceptions of
individual things antcceding, it i:< therefore rono:ived b)' man)' Wt they
are nothing else bUI thin and CVlInid inuges of tl105e 5CfIsible ideu, and
therefore that aU intellection and knowledge ascends from ",n"" and
intellection i:< nothing but the: impro"ement or result of sen",. Yet,
notwithstanding it is ...... t ""nainly true thot they prt.><:ttd from a quite
different PO"'-CT of the: 5001, ,,-hereby it aai,-eLy prtXrudes itli own
immediate objttts from within itself, and oornprchccnds individuals
.. ithout it, r>O( passively or consequentially, but as it were prOIeptically,
and not with an ISOI:nding, but .... ith a descending pelocption. Whereby
the mind first reflening upon iw:lf and its own ideas. vinual1y comained
in itli own omniform cognoscitivc po .... er, and thence descending OO .. n-
...'ard, comprehen<h individual things under tI.em. So that kno.... ledge
doch no! begin in individual •• but end. in them. And therefore they.re
but the secondary objects of intellection, the 0<;lIl1 taking its first rise
from ..;thin itself. and iO by its o ...·n inward rognoscit;,'e po ....u
comprehending thinp without it. El", how should God h..-e knowl-
edge? And if "e klmw all God knows, then do .. e know Or p in
knowledge b)' universals. In which sense (though not in that other of
Prot:tgoras) the 50uI may be lTUIy said 10 be the measure orall things,lt
No,,' ] say, irthe "cry sensible i<!as and phantasms themsel\-r;S be not
J'Kre nam.,. or impressions from individ ual things "';thout in a
corporeal manner improssed upon the soul. but acti'-e though sym-
pathetical energies of the soul itself, ;t is much more impossible that the
univenal and abstract intelligible ideas of the mind, or essen«s of
things, mould be mere sum.,. or signotures imprnstd upon the 5Oul, as
upon I dead thinl in a gross rorporeal manner,
'oj- Wherefore here;" a double error rommined by vulgar phi!oso-
phen: fint that they nuke the sensible ideas and phantumS to be tolally
improssed from " 'ithout in a gross corporeal nunner upon tM soul, as it
" -cre upon a dead thing; and S«OIldly. that then they suppose thc
,. All'. ..' ' .... s... ....... p, sS,
.. l'1ooo, TIwt ..... , s>-O. Aloo '-.',...

".
'II ate
 CoNumUrr ruru l ud imm~laMr morality

intelligible ideas, the ~bstra<.:t and universal notions of the mind to be

made out ofthCK sensible idell5 md phmtaSms impressw from without
in a atrporeal I1W1ner likewise by abstnction or scpu,nion of the
individuating circumsWlc.... as it were by the he .... ing of certain chips
from them, or by hammering, beatin!!". or .nvillin!!" of them out into min
intelligible ideas, as if solid and massy gold should be beaten out into
min "'af_gold. To .... hich purp<.>Sl: they have ingeniously contrived and
oct up an active undenWlding (i8Ullu/UJ Ql.IU),){J ~ke a smith o r
carpentcr, with his shop Or forge in mc bnin, furnished with all
nc.:css:ary tools and instruments for such .... ork. When: J would only
demand of IhCK philosophers ..... hether this t~ir so «pert smith ffolwr)
or architect, th<: actin undersWlding, when he goes about his work,
doth knn'" .... hat he is to do .... ith these phanl1SlTU beforehand, what he
is 10 male of them, and UntO " 'hat shape to bring them? Jf he do nno: he
must needs be a bungling workman . But ifhe do, he is prevented in his
design and un<knaking, his ",.".k being done alread y to hi. ruand. F.".
he must nceds have the intelligible ide;o of Ihat which he knows or
undcrsWlds alread y within himself. And then:fore now to what purpose
should he usc his tools, and go about to hew and ruammer and an vil out
thesc phantasms into Ihin and subtJe intelligible ideas, merely to make
that ",hil,;h he rualh already, and which was native and domestic 10 him?
But this npininn is founded in no less 2 mil;take of Arisrotk's text
concerning the active understand in!!" who nner dreamed of any such as
these men imagine (if "'e may believe the Greek scholiasts, that best
undcrst'XKI him)lt than it is of the lext of nature, as if not only th06C
phantasms, bu t 21so th<: intdligib'" ideas thC/IUClves .... en: gross and
cmporcal things impres.scd from nuller. Whereas e,'en r~ first ofthCK
are passive energies of the IIOUI itself. fatally united to some local
motions in the body, and concurrently produced with them, by reason
oflhat magical union betwixt lite IIOUI and body. Butlhe otlter arc pure
active energies of the mind itself. as free from cmporeal sympllthy.
Neither can thCK laner be made out of the former by any abstraction or
K"pantion . no nor by an y depinxation or clt)mical distillation Of"
sublimation neitber. For it is a tb ing utterly impossible IItat vigour,

• s.._'1_By"wlprpOl;t jl.,,·,Cud_ ..... "".. _ _ .. nUn<! ~.

" F",;,," ><c, 0\.... ' of AjoInadiAoo (n_ ,_ AD ... ) and S ...... · M" (,;.If,"'''''7 ..,~
c..t..a.th,lhdoo_ ... ofdool . ... .. ,k" ... doo...!y" . ,., . . . 0\._
"' _ _ ' "" t ,;-

...
,.
acti~ity, and aw:l.kened energy,:1S intellections are, ~hould be raiKd out
of dull, slugJish, and dro ... y passion or sympathy. And this opinion is
bUllike thlt IlI:her of the sam< philosopher's con~ing the eduction or
raising of substantial and immaterial forms oUl of lhe J'USive maner,
boI:h of them plOtteding from ont and the sam< sonishn= of mind
that indoca them to think thaI dull, stupid, and se:nsdcss mailer is the
6rsl original SOUrce of aU activily and perfection, all form and pulchri-
fude, all wisdom and kno .... ledge in lhe world.
And Ihings being rightly oonsidered, this opinion doth in truth and
reality auribUle:lS much activity 10 the soul, Ihat saith it halh a power of
noising or educing of inlelligible idea!; or uni,·ersal and abstract notions
(r.I;",,~.) OUt of phantasms as that other that affinns it hath a po ..·er of
cxemn, Ihem from itself, as it would attribute as much activity to the
sun 10 say thaI he had a power of raisin, or educing light of the day OUf
of nighl and darkness, as 10 say thaI he had a po ....,r of cxeniog it nul of
his o..·n body.
IS. Wherefore others of this kind of phibophers thaI will not
ICknowledge any immaterial substance that hath any active power of iUl
own in if, OT anythio, in the soul buidn imptnlion[ sl from corporeal
objects without, h.,·c found OUf a!\Other device, and that is this: plainly
to deny that there...., any universal norions, ideas, or reasons (rGI;""n)
in thc mind at aU, but that those things which are called universal....,
oothin, else: but namH applio:d to se:,·cno] individuab. Which opinion as
if ""lIS formerly held by th05e that " ·ere therefore called nominalists
("~"';"GIn), so it hath been laTely re,·ived and taken up by IOIIlC of these
strenuous impugners of immaTerial and incorporeal sub&tanCC$. There is
nothin, in the ...orId (..ith alaTe luthor)lZ uni'·ersal, but names. For The
things named are cvery one of them individual and sin,ular. Now
ind«d this is tl"lX, and nobody deolcs it, uf things nisEin, without the
mind. BUT this author's meaning herein is 10 deny all uni,·ersaI
conceptions (,.."r~,",,) and reasonin" (r~I;" ....r) of the min d, :IS appears
hy his brtIcr explication of The .arne opinion dse:whe,..,:
This universal is the name not of anythiniJ oistinl in lhe nllu,.., of
thinp, ...... of any idOl Dr phantUm f""".d in The mind, but 01 ....11 the
name or..,.". .........J or name; .., thaI .. hen an animal or "one, .... a
'PC:<:"e. or anythin,,1sc is <aid to he uni.· ..... ~ it is to be: underuood
only dial IhoK .........J. animal. '10M, ... uni,·tnaI namn. thaI is namos
" .-".Sc<b<Iow.
nO
 Om".,,;"g (ll."iSl iSltd imlfluldk IfID,,,lity

common to more things;:and the conccptionl .n. .... ring to them in the
mind ... the imares and phoneasms of singular lJlimals or OIhtf things,
And themore to undmtand the meanin3 of an uni>"tfRl, th.cn is no
need of Iny other faculty than that of the imari""tion, whereby"", ...
minded t"'t ....mi. of th.. ..,.t h...., -..ttimcs .x~itcd on" thing
L~ '
In our m,nu.
• • _In
9<11J><tJmd &not,..,,-

That is, th.re are no olher ideas in Ihe mind hut only phanlllSms of
individual corporeal things; only there are universal names, which an'
applied in common to more individuals than one. But there is no miter
object of th e mind or cogitation bUI only singular and individual things
existing without the soul. Wherefore this author COII5Cntaneously here-
unto defines undeHtanding 10 be nothing else bUI conception caused by
.~h. And therefore if s~h be peculiar 10 man, then is und er-
standing pecul;"r to him also, This mysterious notion is insisted upon
and explained like ...·i.. by the third objector against Canesius' metaphy-
sics afler this manner:
Now ","'t do we say, if perhaps reasoning be nothin l else bUI the
coupling IJId . ... ining togelh.r of names or Ippellation. by these word.,
il U. WIIen« we ""hor nothing ...11 by reason concerning the nllUN: of
thinp;, but <:nr><nning their appellations, to wit ",hoth.r .... join the
names of things """",rding to az><.,lI<nu Or not. If thi< be "" as it ImY
be, reasoning ... ;o depend upon names, names upon 'M imagination, and
the im.apnarion upon the motioon of the bodily organ •. And"" the mind
will be nothin! <lK but. motion in some partS ofth. body.'"
According 10 which philosophy, rcas<ln and science do nOl superadd
JI c..!--.II', """"'boo from H:!! . 0. , _ . ""iIoo. t . oecI, , . 'Eo< ..... -..en 110<
.,,;,...... . - ,.;".;.,.............. ;" mu...."" .. _ ..... Ii.. phon"""';' . ........ in
....... formaci. oed akoiut .... pet _ _ .... """,in;' nomen. jq . ' """ d",,,,, ........ ",I
........ .-.! tpO<II'IUO •
,.,. ..... &c. I'aioot. _ ... , _ .. i... .
.-.! aIiooI 'I'" 1" 01 _ ",,;"""'1< ..... D·" ,',,'" oi,._ homin .....
oed un, .... YO<OI . . . .- ' " " . . . . . . . . . . . . _ , ....
•• iv<rsodit..id ... .-inoplutibw.-, , ," , ... ..., d. .... ipoio.. ...... pi"
.... , ..." , _ tn ..... Iium •.., >l;..."" ....... "",;ioes" p/IuI'"-'''
1~ ....... _
ad ... .. . ,,, So in"Wid du, tI .. ran. ..... _ in", . .. ,;.. q<>IlI.Lldoo_ ...... <jll Ii
. - ........... . - .... in .. _ "ei_'
(0,.... pI'! yht ....... pp, ' 7-,1: d.
Eo,rW W..... YOI. • I' >0).
" c..!-.h~".-,,,""'o/'1)eeca ,...~;d " " _... oifone"'_._~ 'Iiud""_
; ,Iorio .. .-..enttio _in ... .;,.. sppd\ttiotI ..... pa- _ hoc, lJo. U..... ""I·i .,...
. . - .iII~ _ino do fIIIN'" tttllOI. oed do _ _ Ii tb. " . oinI ...... "'""" "I ....
....... """'... --.1_ poca. I . ,,~ Y<I _ , so Ioot,;o ....... _ _ _ N' •
dopa- •• -, ...... . - , ,. ... ;" .' , , _........ ,rio 1...1... ... _.m ""'1'01'
_ _ _ .. '"" - . . .... 0600d ........ "''1... "''''''' .. ....- ... - _ 1M;'
...,..uc;' (AT .... '11). To. 'thu objtaoo> .... ""'"""" 11 t ••• "Ill;';' h;' fount< ubjo:iliot.,
((:SM ... 1111

H;
anything" tQ Knse,"" nxh any fun he. in the knm.-le:dge Qf the nature
of thin", but only in makinS Ulie of commoo nama to express !iCveral
individ""l. by ~t oncc_
t6. Whell'forc, a1th<>ugh there be alrcad)' ellQUgh said to pnwe that in
the: undcnl2nding of individual ~nalthings, besides IieT1K and the
Knsible phantasms from them, thell' all' a~ intelligible: ideas and
uni>'ersal notions ("'I ...." .. ) exened from the mind itself, by .. hich alone
they arc compll'hended. Yft otillto make this business delll" , and also
to demoom-ate that the knowledse of universal axiomatical truth and
scimrifial theorems is a thing ",h;"b doth nOl passi>'ely result from
sense, but from the :H:IU11 rtrength and vil""r of the intelk-ct il$l:lf
comprehending i(5 Q..-n intelligible ideas, we will hen: propo:o;e that one
JeOOlCtrical theorem COIlcc:ming l triangle:; that it hath three angles
equal 10 t1O'O right angles, and oon~ide .... hat the subject Qf il is
lcicnrifically (btl<Tl7/~w.l~l comprehended.
First then:fore, if thell' be "" other ooject Qf the mind in k""..-1ed1JC
but sensible in dividuals exisling "ithout U5, then the subject Qf this
thcmcm, ..-hen Eudid wwu!j:ht iI, ..... ooly ...,nll: imlividualbuUiI:s by
him compared t~r. Nay, Euclid himself did n<X carry this knowl.
edlJC about with him in bis mind, neither was he ma5le. of it any ionIC'
than he held those individU11 bodies in his hand5, Q. lool.ed upon them
with his eyes. And iflo, il could not siplify anything al all, to any OIllet'
person which either then or no ... had n<x the same individual bodies 10
com!"ll', that Eudid had. \Vhc:reas it is plain that the .... bjcct of thi.
It.e..rcm, ... hatJOe\'u it be, is such a Ihing as e"ery gWl'J1elrician, IhouSh
in ne"u !loch distant pl;l(U and times, hath the "ery same a1"'lYS ready
al his hand, without the least imaginable difference. And they all
pronounce co,u:eming the: same thing. Which could nOl possibly
otherwise be, unlc:ss it ,",'ere some uni"erul notion ("'tHo) and intelligible:
ida of the mind.
17. Apin, sewndly, no individ""l or materiallhinl il the: s ubject of
this thtofCfl\, as IieT1K takC'$ rosnizancc of it, that is the mailer and
colour and figull' and mlJIlitude, all concretely together. For the: same
individual malle. may p r.... ntly be made quadrlngular or circular, bUI
only precisely in respect of the figure, and of th~t also no otherwise than
as it is conformable to the indivisible: and immuuble "",ion (filii'.) or
idea of ~ triangk, romprehended in the mind,.. the exemplar of il. Now
as ... e hue .howed already, lhere is no maleriallriangle: any ... here 10 be

,,'
found that is mathematically exact and accurale, neither is Ihe indi,·idual
form of a material lri""lIk immutable. And if there ... ere:my mathema-
tically exact, our sen'" could be no criterion (Kpmip"'~) or rule to judge
of it, nor discern when anything ..·ere i",·isibly such, nor judge of the
absolute and mathemarical e<juality of the three material angles of it,
wilh IWO olhrr angular superficies. Wherdon: the iubittts of thii
gto;....elrical IhtOrnn an: no s<:nsible individual bodies, but the notions
(r.ri",.~.) of the mind itsdf, in ..·hieh alone mathenutical accuracy is to

be found, :md the exact equality of one thing to mother ccnainly and
infallibl)· known.
t8. Nay if we should suppose that there were some individ .... J
malerial triangles and angles. a~lutdy and mathematically exact, and
that our .. n.. did infallibly p."cci,·e the indi,·isib!e points of them, or
thaI we had an in fallible pair of compaq .. , ",·hose lOps (rJupiJn) ... ere
mathematical points, whereby "'·e could measure the s<:'·cral angles of
the triangle and right angk in a I"'rfe<:1 circl., accurately divided into
infin ite pans; or els<: cuning off those ..,,·eral angles of the ujanglci and
bying them t~ether upon an a~lute plane we shou ld thus mechan;"
cally find them e<jual 10 the two malerial right angles - Ihis ,,·ould r>OI
amount to the knowledge of this Iruth, th.t • triongle as such hath of
necessity three angles equal to two right angles, w.
thus considering
them only as material individuals, and Ihings existW1g withoutlh. mind
by corporeal 5mSC. For though we had now found tlul these indi,·idual
material lriangles ...·en: e<jual to those two indi.idu.l nuteriol right
angle., yet looking no funher than .. lUe detem,ined to indi,·;duals, "'·e
could nOt ten ""minly that it wllS SO with an individual triangles. much
less understand any lI«CSSity of its being so, or allain to anything of the
fftSIKl (&on) of it, in ,,·hieh alone c,·cry true scimce consisleth. And

Ihis Aristotle hllh ohse,,·w ,·cry I"'nincntly to our purpose:

N.ith.r is it ..... my to understond by ....,~. but II pCI ""i<e. lIut this

,..,gord •• p..llktolar thins ond mann ... and 'he p"""n' ,ime. Bu, i, ..
impossible w perce;'·. b)· ~nsc: ",·hot ttb1C:S '0 enrything, and in ,II
rtSpecIO. For /1is and "". relate not '0 an universal. For of an uni.·nul
"-e lOy th.tt it is .1...).. and .'-ery_"",..,. Sine<: then demonsl""io ... ,n: or
an univCi"Sal. il is plain that th(1"( is no kno,,·lcdge .... 'he uni.·¢r"I:al
theorems of JtOmCIry by .. n.... t·.". il is manifest, ,hat if "-e could
p< ".io·. by ........ that the three anpes of. tNn,1< ..-ere e<juol 10 two
",ht ""sles., yet ohould " .. no! res! .. tistied in 'hii, .. having ,I>c"fon: a

."

•
The mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further
require I demoru;tn tion of it, which demonsmuions are noI of indivi-
duals p"'CLived by <en.." but on ly of t~ universal notion. (r.n....... )
rompuhmded in the mind. Knowledge, as I uid before, being a
descending comprehension of I thing from the universal ideas of the
mind and IKM an ISCLnding pelCLption of them from individual. by
~K.

'9. Wherefon: the apodicrical knowledge of this truth is nO( otherwise

to be anained than by the mind'. UCCIlding above liCn"", and elevating
itself from individuals to the compuhension of the univcrul notions
(•• riDNtJ) and ideas of things within itself, making the object of iii
enquiry and contemplation IKM this nor that material indi"idual triangle
without itself, but the indivisible and inunutllble IKMion of I triangle.
And thus it finds sc,·cral .... ys thot a triangle, IS such, must ofn"",,"sity
have its three angles equal to TWo right anglcs.
For lil"$t. if one will consider any triangle as made out of a
parallelognm (though thi. be the more compounded fi~re) dirided by
a diaxonalline into TWO equaltriangJes, it is pJain in e"ery parallelogram
there are four angles eq ....l to four right angles, beausc "'hm • straight
line cull! TWO parallel lines, the TWO interior angles must of neoessity be
equi,"IIent to two right angks., one of lhem
being the complement of the other to I
semicircle. But when the parallclognm is
divided into 1\0"0 equal triangles by I diagonal
line, the quantity of the three angles in each
must of necessity be half the quantity of the
four angles in the parallelogram.

· ....."bJo,..... (...]UO·.u..foi_,.4"')
" aut" ' oIePi
. . . .' ... .lh '1 I , . ..... bri ..... _
I
.... oJoN-.-
"1 .. Ti>.,., <I<l ........qoIl • • , ' ; ....... d_ '[ "'; ...
:.Iot,~,w"..;"""
"''''''nII<.,......oj!llo "'•.'".,; ""'0I-
' '{u;;
• " I... ,_,w.,I,d,nlP.I."'b..., ............. ,h, _ _ " ·oIofi' '" .....,
;tJJj oItu.- h, . . d 01. _ _ _ ,h, ... ' ' ' - ...... ~ .... q,,- ... )W" :
~.,........ iT "I', :,.. ""''';z «io;(....l ..........., p,.....,.. ..u.ii.ro-.!IIo""
• ...,.., J "'.. ,... " oil,. .. ,. T toI. ..a .-..BoI~ it ".;en. Ion; [.] (AI ~ ....... ,;",
,t-".".J" _C,-, ,TI$.P.1J'-

'I' ate
 Or if a man will ronsider the fummiun (sr~wi) of a pl.in triangle in
this manner, 6rst by a straight line cuning two parallcllines, and then
one of these parallels moving upon itll ""ntre in the straight line out of
iu; parallelism, and inclining tOW;lrds the other line, if it move ne,'er &0
linlc OUt of its parallelism towards the other panllel, the continuuion of
it must needs CUt the other line, and make a triangle. And so much as
the interior angle, ""hich "';Ih the other opposite, made up two right
angles, so much is the third angle. And therefore all three mne up two
right anglts.
zo. No ..' here is a gross error of the vulgar 10 imagine, because
geometricians demonstrating such thcon:ms commonly m:alr.e use of
such ""nsible sehemes or di.gruns, thai therefore
the knowledge of this rruth doI:h result from ""nse,
or Ihat the ~elricians themselves have no other
id ... in Iheir minds of straighl lines, parallels, right,
acute, and obtu"" angles, triangles, equ;tlity of
angles, than what are impressed upon thcir fancy
from th""", sehern... Whereas th""", ore only made
u"" of to enteruin the ranC)' in the mean lime,
",hilsl Ihe mind being intent upon the demonstn.-
tion, ocli,ely exertS other intelligible ideas of these
things from "'ithin il!iClf, and from Ihence compre-
hends the apodictical necessilY of the Ihwle",.
Neither is the true and proper knowledge of one
theorem or uni"ersal and n"Cl"S"ry lruth, either in
geomerry OT metaphysics, passi"ely impressed upon
the 80ul from individuals exisring withoul, or the result of mere sen"",
but it proceeds from the acti"e strength and vigour of the mind,
comprehending the intelligible ideas and universal notions (rat;olfa) uf
things within itsc:lf.
~ I . Wherefore we conclude, that the immediate objects uf gcometrica.l
science, properly 80 called, an: not individual bodies or superficies but
the intelligible and uni,'crsa! ideas of. triangle, square:, circle, pyramid,
cube, sphere, actively exened from the mind and comprehended in it.
For Ihe mind doth nOl: seek illl ob)ect:ll of kno ...·ledgc abroad .... ithout
itself, but must needs aai,'ely comprehend them within itsc:lf. Which
al§O, as we shall show in the follo ...;ng chapter, ore immutable things,
and always the same.

'"
 OJapter Iyl'>

1. No indi"idual matenal thing is al ...... ys n~ril)· the same ...;th iuclf,

but mutable and changeable. And our sensible pe=prinns nf them an:
nOlhing but passions or affections in the soul from !iO/11e local motinns
in our body caused by them. Which passions also are a kind of motinns
in 11,,: soul, when:by we do not oompn:hend ttle immutable ".tiD or
C'Nna of any thing. But intelle<:tion and knowledge an: the ;>Ctive
comprehmsion of something that is fixed .nd immuub1c, and hath
al ...ys a necessary identity with iuclf. For Ih.t which is nOI one steady
and immutable thing annO{, .s such. M an objKt of intellection Or
kno ...·ledl!", ndther can the mind fil itself upon it. For il mUSt needs
mock and delude the undersunding, I""1"'tually gliding and roUing
away from it whm il mdeavnurs 10) grasp or compn:hend it. Nnlher can
it M the basis or subi«! of any sciemificalthcon:m nr proposition. For
how an . ny thing M a:rtainly. oonstantly. and immutably affirmed of
Ihal which is no nne anain thing, nor alwa)'s immuubly Ihe same with
itself. Whwce il plainly follows lhal Ihe immediate obiects of intellre-
tion and knowledge cannot N These individual material things as such
which nur senses I n: passively affected from, bUI must of necusily M
somelhing else.
2. For which caUse rhose f1owin~ philosophe... bernn: mentioned,
Heraclitus. Cnlylus. and Prougoras, 7 rh.t maintained that then: "'ere
no other Mings Ihat could M Ihe nb~as nf oogiurion besides Ihese
individual and maleriallhings, which they supposed a1 ....ys 10) flow, and
never 10 stand still, did, consentancously In this hypothesis nf theirs,
asocn that rhere was nn knowledge but sense, and no cenain or
immutable oompreMminn nf an y thing. For thor this assertion of theirs
was grounded merely upon this hypothesis thar there was no OIher
being or object of the mind besides indi"idual malerial things as . "",h.
....'hich they signified .fter this manner, by saying that all things flowed ,
fDr these material things dOl so. ArillDde plainly instructs us in his
Metaphysics:

_ ".",plos.
" s... obo.. _ '. <1> . .. pp. J.IT. In TIS. P. 1J! o..!_ rdtn .. 'tilt H... _ ...t_
S,., ....•.

'"
 The sround of this opinion, ,,'hich denied .11 ceNin and imm~t.blc
koowledg<: " '3S from hence, beause truth . nd kno ... ledge mer to beings
or entities, :and the)" suppostd thot tM'" ..·.r. no oth.r beings beoid..
thCK indi .iIlU11 scnsibies only. In .. hich th= is ,-cry much of
undcterminateness ... And whicllth.y percej"ed to be liable to pcr;>etuol
moI:ion or mutation . No ... eoo>«:ming that " 'hich &I ....)". chongc:o,
nothinJ (::In be .ffirmcd OS COOStantiy and immutably true. And from this
proposition sprung the highest oecI of tOOse which .... called He..di,ical
philooophtn, and those that follow Cntylu~, " 'ho at b.n cam. to th is,
that be only mo'-cd his hnge', hut thought that nothing at.1I ought to be
affirmed, .nd ... pr<Mndcd Heraclitus for saying thot one cannot twice
ent ... into lbe .. me ri,.... beau.. I>c tMughl thot one could not so much
as on"" do il.).O

Thot is, tMt nl) mat.ria1 thing remain.d on. mom<:nt the same.
J. Wherefore if th .... be any such thing as intdlcction, sci ....."" ond
knowledge, di5linct from ertemal sense, and any immutable truths, th ....
there must I)f ~eiSity be som<: other kind of hcings or .ntities, besides
these individ"..l nuteriolthings., os the immedi.te objtns or subjtns of
th.m, such things as do not floW but 'oIw.)"s ",nuin immutably the
ume' or ·pctlitan .... t'. and 'hal'ing oIl.-.ys the som<: noture',19 as Plato
expresscth these immediate objttts of knowledge. Or else in Arilltotl.'s
langltlge, ·.n immutable essence' (dKi'1/fQ( oooio). Who therefore
confut •• boTh these sects of philosoph • .,.. whercof one ""lIS cxtrentdy
met.physical, that nude 011 things to stand still. Whom [ oonf~ I
understand not, the other too grossly mn.rial and addicted to sense,
that made nothing to stand still but all things to flow art.r this mann.r:
11 .. manifCSl thai neither Ihey . peak truly "'00 affirm aU things to ,esl,
nor IMy ,hat affirm an thingS \<} movo. For if.n things !'CSt, then ,h.
$O"", 'hinp would alwars be true and f.lse, ""h;c~ is nOl 00, beause he
that .ffirms ,h", onCe ...-:os nOl, .nd apin will no, be. Bu, if all'hinp;
mo,,,, then nothing con be true, ond th=fore 011 things will be f.I .....
,. . /1,,,,. (MI ,+;: 016(", ..,,;,.... 01" ..... "'" oJn"" ", . .... ., j ~ ... I.",b"".· ,4 .I' oJn.
~ . <i... ,.I oJ.rIIrrtol"';-'· t. M ~ .. J.A.j .. ",,} o.p;.-. ........; I ........,t« ' . .
"1:" 1< ._• .!¢m.. ,oUt".. "' ............ 'oi .....", ....... M ,o/i ~'" "'-'&.
Ii: 6Ic.q" ..... ..... )'I , . ..., , ' ... """, ..... .p.;J J ••, ...... ~ AJ : P ..... '£Jt. )<Ip
' '"' ' ' "" .....,,..... ....~oj...,.. oI.:P<mInr 4010:: • ..m oI~ ~ ..,. _ _
'H_J.D,;;u •. n j .... I:jwtiMJ><; UZO" 01.; ,~ ~. """"' "".0 <!t1. ;q.,., A.UO. ,~.
Mrr..... k;",,..;-.,.'«I 'HpaK;,,;"" ..... iI«> .;",;"', Im" l.li; ~ oMq} _""I!'iI """
¥ ,IJI_ ..m.;; 1Y""'. 001' (............ M,,.,.pi<J ,.,00 fl.
~
,. ........... go.-;-,,,,, Of..,.,...
q...." Kai}lio,o.; ~"ix<>""", Notq< ......... m... I'loo>.
.. """ ....... (6') 01..,...-." III ..... ojp<jUh ..,.. ..... &<.,1/11 u,-.", ••,1"111 ......... _ 0

.,
And both he and Plato compounded that a,mtroyen;y thus, by :acknowl-
edging two soru of entities, the one mutable, or subie<;t to flUI and
motion, such as are esperully individual oorporl:al things, the other
immutable, that always rest or stand still, which are the proper objcet5
of certain, constant, and immutable knowledge, th.t therefore emnot be
"",re nothings, non-entities.
Which latter kind of being, that is, the immutable CSSCnce (ru.:;'n/t~
oOO;a) as a distinct thing from individual scnsibles, Aristotle plainly
asscru :>gainst Heraclitus and those omer flowing philosophers in these
words: 'We would have these philosophers to know thatlxsides sensible
things', that are always muuble, 'there is another kind of being Or entiry
of such things as are neither subjtct: to motion, corruption nor
",nention'." And elsewhere he tells us that this immoveable essence is
the objtct: of theorctial knowledge of the 6rst philosophy and of the
pure m.thematics.
4. Now these immutable entities .re me uniHrsal '~IW"~" Or
intelligible natures and CSSCnces of all mings, which IiOme oomp;lre to
unities, but Aristotle to numbers, which fonnally considered .re
indivisible. Saith he 'essences .re like to numbers" l b«:ausc if but the
least thing be added to any number or subtracted from it, the number is
destroyed.
And mese are the objects of all ceruin knowledge:. As for eomple,
the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles,
squncs, circles, pyramids, cubes, spheres, and the like. Wh ich b«:ause
they are always mutable, nothing em be immutably affirmed of them,
but they are those indivisible and unchangeable '~lio ..(S of a triangle,
squarc, circle, which are ever the same to .11 geoll"'lIio.ns in all ages
and places of which such imm utable theorems IS these are demonstrated
as that a triangle hu necessarily three angles equal to two right angles:]
But if anyone demand here, where these immutable entities do exist,
I answer first that as they are considercd form.lIy, they do nOI properly
e%ist in the individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted

'I' ate
upon the: understandinl (.. hich some ha"e tarn to be Aristode'.
opinion) because no indi,~dual material thing i5 either univ~ or
immutable. And if these thinp were only lodged in the: indi vidual
oensiblCl, then they .. ould be unavoidably obno~ioui 10 the tluctuninl
....... es of the same reciprocating EUMPUS," in ...·hich all individual
material Ihinp all' pcrpHUally whirled. Bur bca.UIII: tho:y ptrish not
tosether wilh tMm, it iI a oenain arJUmem that the:y exiSi indcpcn~
dently upon them. Neither in the nnt place do Ihey nisI somewhere
else apart for the individual xnsiblc:s. and without the: mind . Which is
that opinion that Aristode justly wndemru;, bur either ;ustly or unskiJ..
fully anributes to PLaIO. For if the mind looked abrood for ill objecll
wholly "iu.o...l itself, then all ill kno,,-Iedge ,,-ould be nothing bUI wn2
and pilSSioo. For to know a thing is nothing but 10 comprehrnd it by
some inward ideas that a", do!l"w:sti<: to Ihc mind, and acti"dy CJc"ffl
from i1. Wherefore these inlelligible ideas or eSSelu:a of thinp, tl\or;c
fonns by which we understand alllhings, exisl nowM", bUI in Ihc mind
itself. For it was "ery ...-ell determined long ago by Socrates in Plato's
P."""..uKs thaI these things arc nothinl elsc but N"""'~I •. 'Thc:K
species or ideas a", all of them nothing bul ,,"""'Q/Q 01" notions that exist
nowhere bUI in the soul itself."! Whe",fo", to say th.1 the", are
immutable natures and 1:SSe1>CCl, and r.,UJMI of Ihings, distilKt from the
individuals thai exist ...·ithmJl us, is all one IS if one should say that there
is in the uni .. trse above the orb ofma!ltt and body, anotlle. superior
orb of intellectual beinr, thai oomp",hends its o...·n immediaTe objects,
that is the immutable "'MMI and ideas of things with itself, by ... hich il
understands and knows all thinp without itself.
S." And yet, notwithstandinl, though these things nisi only in the
mind, they arc not lherc:fore mtf"C firmrnlS oflhc undcl"$tandinr. For if
the subjects of all ~ntifica1lhrorems ...·c"' nothinl bUI figmrnts, then
aU m.nh and knowkdge that is built upon Ihem .... ould be a mm:
fictitious thing. And if truth itself and the intdlecmal nalu", be fictitious
things, then what can be real o r solid in the worldl BUI it is C\'idrnt that
thourh the mind think. of thrsc things at plcasu,"", )'CI Ihcy are not
.. no_,",w'OLB •• ia_H'
.. T~ '- """'• . If I , _ ~ ...1,oW •.,.::tl ,.;~ OJ • , i . , t,";. ooli:u i.U<oIo • to
II'Vlt (1'I0I0, ........ ·h,JAl.
.. n....io _ _ ........... ,... l " ... of<llia....t .... V .... _ • . .. ....
",J; ' , ..... ,· ...001 ............. ,... • . '--'...,dj. , _
pooiI ......

'"

'I' ate
 Qmr(1't/;~S titrnal ud i",mutabk ",.rality

arbitrarily framed by the mind. but ha,"e certain, determinate. and

immutable Il1tures of thei r own. which all' indepmdent upon th.e mind
and which all' blown away into !lOthing at the plasull' of the same
Iking that arbitrarily made them.
But we all nnunUy wnceive that th()I;C things have nOl only an
ctemal. bur alm a nca:ssary uistencc. SO that they could nOl eVeT bur be
such and so many as they all', and can nc,·cr possibly peri~h or cease to
be, but aa absolutely undestroyable.
Which i$ • thing frc<juently acknnwledged in the writings of both
thooc famous philosophers, P~to and Aristotle. The former of them
caUing tho&c things., 'Things that wcre nc,·cr made, but ys all" and .I"...
'things that were never made, nOr can be destroyed· .' 1 'Things ingcner-
able and unperishable', 'fUiU PIMa ~<S"I pgm. Mil Mm"r <su' {as T ully
npresseth it)." And Philo, the Platonical Jew, calls the fa '"Ql)fa, 4'1
which are the same things we spe. k of, 'the most nea:sury essences'
(amYKa.Ur(lHlI ooo-iw), that is such things as could not but be, and
cannot possibly not be. And Aristotle himself calls the r4liolUJ of th ings
in hi$ metaphysics not only 'things separate from !lUller and immutable'
uwpurra and oiKi...,,(I). but al ... eternal (a~I<l). And in his ethics
likewist he calls gcometricaltruths eternal things (di<lla), lib. 3, r~p. S,
whell' he makes the gwmetrical truth concerning the incommcruur-
ability betwixt the diameter and the side of. square 10 be an eternal
thing.!(I ELsewhere he tells us that 'ociencc properly SO called i$ not of
things rorruptibJt and contingtnt,SI but of things necessary, incorruJ>-
tible, and eterml. Which immutable and eternal objeclll of science in the
place before quoted he described thus: 'Such a kind of entity of things
as has neither motion. nor generation, nor COfTuption',SCl that is, such

" hi ~oj ~ oLlX oW ~".. (.... _ .... )!"i" ~ J'Iju "''''''''"' (Piiktoo
6 .... ).
.. C«m. Or_ ".,0. J,ado ...........: ·1'I0I0('')'1_10,_",< ,.,", ohoy .....
and okpnd ..... tdlo<t ........... : Goer •• Or"'............ H .\I. 1 1 ' - (Lonolon
foot ._
.....
CarnbrioIJ<, M ..... '939) .
.. PIoilo; ........ (,.
s.a;,... ..
. 1' F .MI ...., ........... ...
_,'= {"""
>0 ......... o!'». J.ooish It _ _ .. ·, .\Io:undrio. n....up
lot o/fmd • 1'10_ ... dm .... "" _ . ,_ olio. lot
_ .... I\rslIO .... bIy "" io!dliP>k""" of . . . .. oh< """,,'n, ofG04 .
• ...,,; uiI. L<6Omoo6JU; ~':;' ,,... 010 • ...,,; "", (_~ * 14r<ym,.,. •..;,.;. .~.
""'~"" (~.
orandorioo.-tIIt ......,
• •._
£,"" "' ....J-..~ 110. . . . . on "'"" q"""""" _)'"tI. doot
" od ...... ~,;""tor .. ,.;,...r.(~. ,,-,;" ~15bJ5).
" 0;",... (01",,) ""'" ~".,.. Ii W« ~i"",,, ",,",l". W« ~ W« ,. " • ,~ • ...--.
( A _ . M ....010...... ''''''I'J'I~

,,'
things IS were never rrulde, and can n(yeT bC' destroyed. To which he
...ith IDe mind is n.....s'"'rily determined. For scien~ or knowledge has
nothing either of fienon Or of arbitrariness in it. but is 'the comprehen-
sion of tha[ which immutably 01'. (II;(lrdh)'fI, roo o\'n:><;)
6. Moreover, these things han a consistent bC'ing, when our particular
created minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they =
immutable in another sen&e likewise, not only bca""" they are
indivisibly the same when we think of them. bUI also bcauSC' they ha"e
a constant and never-failing entity, and always =, whether OUT
particulu minds think of them OT not. FaT the intelligible natures and
es,sc,nca of a triangle, square, circle, pyramid, cUN, sphere, &e. and all
the n......... ry geometrical "entia Ixloflging to these several figures,
were not the creatures of Archimedes, Euclid. or Pythagoras. or any
OI:her inventors of geomcuy, nor did then first begin to lx, but all these
.,IiO~N and "erities had a real and actual entity bC'fore, and ,,'Ould
continue still, mough all the geometricians in [he world wen: quite
extinct, and no man knew them OT thought of them. Nay, though all the
rrulterial world were quite .wept away, and .Iso all particular created
minds annihilated together with it, yet then: is no doubt but the
inteUigible natures or cssenca of all geometrical figures, and the
necessary verities Nlonging to them, would notwithstanding remain
safe and sound. Wherefore these mings had a Ixing also Nfon: me
matetial world and aU particulu intcUecIlI wen: crearcd. For it is not at
all con~ivable thaI ever then: lYaS. time when there "u no intelligible
nature of a triangle, nor any such thing cogitabk at all, and when il was
not yel actually true m.t a triangle hu thrtt .ngles equal 10 111'0 right
angles, but \hal these things ..-ere aflerward arbilrarily rrulde and
brought into Ixing out of an amttedcnr nothing or nOn-enDty, SO lhat
mc Ning ofthcm bore some certain .ute, and had a }'oungness in them,
and so by Ihe same rcoson might wax old, and decay again. Which
notion he often hups upon when he spc:>k. offmm. (w,,) ofthinr' IS
when he says 'There i. no generation of the essence ofa sphere',J that
is, it is • thing [hOI is not made, but always is. And d&ewhen: he
pronounce. uni"cf$Zlly of the uo", 'The forms of mater~1 things ue
without generation and corrup[ion',S< and, 'That none makes the form

u "'" ~""". _""" l<n-, )'i_II;. s..Arioooo". M"".M,....,,-..l_acaoalIy.1[' T " " ' •

.. -A .... ,.oio_,..j ~piJr; ~""'" ri .... ,i dlo,. (ibOI., IOJJb5~ _ .. "OCT~.

'"
of any thing, for il is Ile\·U genetaled.·jJ Oi~en; ha'·e censured ArisuKk
in some: of such passageltoo much to confound physics and m«aphy-
lics tozetJtc,r. For ind""d these thinp II"( nO' true in a physical, but
onl)· in a m«aphysiOilI s(n5e. llIat is, tlu: immedi.at1: objccn of
inlell«tion and science (ni IIOlfTti), are etmlt l, neoess:arily nistem, and
incorruptibk.
7. Now tM plain maning of all this i. nothing clsr, b ... t that th~ is
an eternal wisdom and know~", in the "",rid, necaarily existing
which _ m:ver made, and can n('.·(1 aue w 1M: or 1M: destroyed . Or,
which is all Ont:, that tMl"( is an infinite (lemal mind necnsarily
nisting, and that xtually compl"(hend. himself, tlu: possibility of all
Ihings, and Ihe verities clinging 10 them. In a wonI, th.1 there i. I God,
or an omnipotent and omoiscient Being, nec;"<'H?rily eristinl. who
thef(fore cannot desU"Oy his own oong Or naIUf(, thai is, hi. infinile
powc:r and wisdom.
For.rna the intdligibk CS5eTICa (r~ rio ....) and ~eritie.s of things, as
we obsc,... ed IM:(ore 01,11 of Plalo, are nothin, b... t 1t«ffUI/~, thai is
ub;c.;tiv~ IlUtiU'''' ur knuwk:oJ5"'" . .. hio.:h "'" thi"p !.h at "",,,,ut ~IiM
alone, but .""""her "';,h ,hot ocnuol knowled", in which lhey ....,
rompl"(henrled , they al"( the modification. of some: mind or imellw:. It
is .11 one to affirm thai there are ("(mill ' ./;"lfn, esKnccs of Ihinp, and
verities nfl' sorily nisling, and to say that there is an infinitf,
omnipotent, and eternal Mind, neassarily existing that Iho·.)'5 acnWly
comprellendeth himS(lf, lhe essences of all things, and their '·erities, or,
rather, which is the ..."iMon, euen<:U, md verities of.ll thinp. Fot' the
,.,;"1/1,and essences of things are not dead things, l.ike 1<1 many l tatues,
images, ot" pictures h... nl up somewhere by themseh·es alone in I wwld .
Neither arc truths I!lf"re sentences and propositions written do""n with
ink "'polI • book, but they are hing thinp md nothing but modifi<:a-
lions of mind or intellect. And therefol"( the fin;t intelk<;t is essentially
and archetypally all r.N·~"'" and ~erities, and all particubr clUt1:d
intellects .re but dcri~riYf participations of it, Ih.t are primed by it
with the ume tttypal signatures upon them.
And ore: may ... ndoubtedly conclude, lhat it is a thinl a1tosnhtt IS
certain, thl! the,.., is an infinile and (lemal Mind (thl! is, I God)
necnsarily existing in the ..·orld, as thll thel"( e,·er ..·os the r~/iD or

,"
intelligibk essence of a triangk, or circle, of unity and du:ility, and that
it was ever acrually true that a triangk hath th= angles equal to tWO
right angles, or thatlUfW'h'. QdJil/J 1U'I"alibus ~ffifi""1 Qtl{ll_1i4 [eq UJls
added [0 equals make equals] Or the like.
S. Neimer does this hinder or COntradict the truth of mi. assertion,
that many thai: doubt concerning the existence of a God, yet notwim-
standing confidently bd~ve the necessary etemity of these things, and
persuade themselves that, though then: ,...,re no mind nor inteUect, and
50 no God in the world, nay though there was no malleT neither and no
substantial entity at all, yet notwithstanding these ralilmts and verities of
things would necessarily be as they~.
9. For thell' is an a1;l$olule impossibility in this assertion that mese
esscnc:es of things and verities shou ld be, though then: were no
substaniUl mtlty or no mind existing. For thC5C' things th......,l,·cs must
of necessity be either substances or modifications of substance. For what
is neither substance nor modification of a substance is I pUll' non-<:ntity;
and if they be modifications of substance they cannot: possibly exiS!:
without that substance whose modification. they all'. Which must eimeT
be mailer or mind. But they all' not the modification. of malleT as such,
beau"" they are uni,·erUI and immutabk. Therefore they arc the
modifications of 50rmc mind or inlel1«1, so thot these cannot be eternal
without an eternal Mind.
And these rmcn do but deOO,·e themselves in the hypothetical
IU!IIioo, that then: would have been th= rQliOlU' :and uni,·crsai
verities, though there had ne'·er been a God or inlellect. Neither
considering Whll the nature of God is, whose existence they would
question Or doubt of, nor whal those T/JI;O~N and verities are, which
they would make so neceliSarily nistent, by means whereof they do at
once assert and question the same thing. For that which bcgClll so
strong a persuasion in their minds that the TIlIWflt1i of things and
universal verities arc so necessarily eternal, though they do IlO'I peraive
it, is nothing else: but an inward invincible prepo'p-,ion of the
necessary nistence of God, or an infinitc eternal omnipotent and
omniscient mind (that ahny' OCtuaUy comprehend. himself, and the
extenl of his Own power, or the ideas of all possible things), so deeply
radicated 1nd infixed in their minds, 15 that they cannot possibly quit
themselves of it, though they endeavour i\ never 50 much but it will
unawares adhere: to them, even when they fora Ihemsrlvcs 10 suppose

'''>
the noo-e~islena of God u " "",non, wt.o.c idea they do not ck:arIy
compnhend. Thai is, ,he fora: Ofn"IUre is 50 mung in them as 10 make
them acknowled~ the thing when they deny the ""'rd. So thallhe true
~ins of this phenomenoo is nothing else but Ihili, that God is a
being 50 necessarily exislfllt, tNt tOOugh men will su ppose the noo+
exiaena of him, and deny Ihe name. yet notwithstanding they cannot
but confute themselves, and ronf. . the IhinS.
10. Nay, il is clearly and mathematia.Uy demonstrable from what we
have already pro,·ed, INt then: is some elemal mind. For as il is
unq1.lC$tionably artain ,hal SOITI(lhinS in the world "-.5 eternal, merely
from hence, bccoll$l: Ihere is beinS which rould nOi spring OUt of
IlOIhing, and therefore, if lhere were no God, nuner of nox:usily must
be eternal. So because theTe is mind and unden tanding and acnaal
knowlcd", in the ""rid, and Ihese Ihinp could not spring OUI of
mallu, wisdom and knowled", muot needs be elernal thinII', and there
must be of necessity some eternal mind.
For, U; .y~fIuSl, tNI once there had b«n no knowled~, no
intellipble r./iDlfN or r5$enCCII of lhing&, no mind or intellect in the
"",rld, it would N~e been absolutely impoosible INI ever there should
hne been an y such thins. bccoll$l: il rould neither sprins oot of
nIMhing, nor, which is all one, OUt of senseless and unknowinll
manu.$/!
I I. Now because e'·cry thins th.t is im"",nect must nceds depend
upoo something that is perfect in the WTIe kind, our panicular
imperfect undentandinp whid! do not alway. actuall)· COIlllin the
'.';"110 of thinp and their vcritie5 in them, which arc many limes
ignorvtt, doubting. cTrins, and oIo ... ly proutd by discourse and
ratiocination from one thins 10 &BOther, must needs be deri,.. tivc
particilMDonS of I perfect, infin itt:, and etemal in tellect, in which is the:
"riImn of all thinp, and all uni'·ersal ,·mlies arc always actually
comprehcnokd.. Whidt consideration is 50 obvious and unavoidable,
tn.t Aristode himself rould not miss of it. FOI'" he lells US Ihat sina our
undcrsundinp arc bUI p<Mentially all thinp (OOvcYI£I lIavra), thaI is
have: not an lCIUaI but potential omniformity only, then: must of
M'N'Ssity be;" m,,," 114/'''. [in narurel another inttllea that is aauaJly
all knowledge, and is the same 10 our undtrStandings, 'Ihlt a.cti,·t an is
.. F... Cood_~..,........ _
! ·'I._TISnlfr.
......_ _God. from """d · ", .. _ .,.. _ _ _

."
,.
 CONurnml rurn~1 ud i",,,,,,,dlr !fUtralil),

to passive maner' and, 'that th~ light is tl) our eyes',:md tru.t "'hieh does
not, 'sometimes understand and sometimes not underst:md' bur is
a1W;1Ys eternal, :oc:tu..! knowledge.~7 A sun that never ... tIl, an eye tru.t
ne'-er winh. Wherefore thoogh all our knowledges be not stamped Or
impresKd upoo our lII)uls from the matter, they are 011 as it were ectypal
prints (<141payi<1para) and deli"otive signatures (iKpa,para) from one
archetypal intellect, that is essentially the rat;o~rs of all things and all
verities.
tz. And from he:nlX it corn=; to pus, that all understandings are not
only constandy furnished with forms and ideas to concei"e allrhinp by,
and thereby enabled to understand all the clear conceptions of one
another, being prinTed all O,'CT at once wilh lhe: seeds of univenal
knowledge, but oIso have c:cacdy the: same ideas of the same things .
Whereu if these things were impressed upon our !iOuls from the maTtCT
wiThout, all men would not be readily furnished with the idl2S to
conCC"ivc all things by II e"ery rime, it being merely euual and
contingent "'hlt things OCCur 10 men'. se,'enl senses. Neither could
their ideas be c:cactly alike to one another, 1xnuse no individual obtecrs
are so. And therefore when one spoke of one thing, """ther would mean
Inomer. Much less could men so promptly and c:cpcditely neTt them
upon all ocasions, if they were dead fontls passiHly received only and
not all virtually contained in some one :accive and vital principle that had
a poHential omnifontlity in it.
Wherefore, OS ThcmistiU!l ob",,,-6, men could nOl: possibl)' confer
and disooul"K together in thai manner os they do, presently percei";ng
One anlMher's meaning, and h"';ng the very 5<lme conceptions oflhings
in the:ir minds, if all did nOI p.artake of I)ne and the some intellect.
Neither could I)ne so readily t"",h, and anOlher t..:un, 'if there were not
the same cctyp.alstampo; of things in the mind bul:h of thc: teacher and
the learner'.J.I
t3. Moreo"er, from hc:n1X also it comes 10 pass that truths, though
they be never SO many se'-enl and dist:mt minds apprehending them,
yet riley are not brohn, multiplied, or diversified thereby, bUI Ihat they
are one and the same individual truths in them al l. So that it is bm one

" 0/0,.+ 'Q"I qiJ;, '''' ...... ' (A - . t:k ._ 4)001» . O/O,'~ ~ lilid., 4JOO'J~ .,t~
_ . ok.!.!< OIl ""'._ "'" It , _ .
.. n.", - , - (ft_' -J':)-< JUt d I'~ n ,; ",d;; "";;"';"';"'0; i><o< ............, u.d Ii IIIi f<""'o. '"
.,; """'" .... """""'on"" "'" , ..... >110_0,;. "'" m,bld.

'; ,
truth and knowledgc that is in all the undenlandinss in the world. JUSt
u when a thousand eyn look upon the sun at ona, they all S« tM
WllC' individual objed:. Or as when a gmt crowd or throog of people
ho:ar one IlIld thc rwnc orator speo.king to tliem all, it is one and the IW1lI;
voict, that is in the ~,.r:n.l "'1"$ of alltOOse III'vera! auditol"$. So in like
manner, when innumerable CTCI!ed undersWldings direct themseh·c:s to
the contemplation of the Amc uni,·ersalllIld immulwle truths, they do
all of Ihem but u it wen listen to one and Ihe IilIl'\( original voice of tM
eternal wisdom that is never silent, and the 1II',.era! rontcp(ions of those
truths in their minds an: bill like s.,..era! echoes ohM same VtrH ",nom
[conceprionll] of the divine intelkct ruounding in them.
14. From what We h.,·c already declared, it is evident that wisdom,
knowledge, IlIld understanding arc (lema! IlIld self-subsi stent thinp,
superior to '"""Iter and all ""nsible beings, IlIld indcpc:ndcnt upon them.
Which mySiery is thus acknowledged both in Ouutianity IlIld
Platonism, in that wisdom IlIld intellw HC nude the cternalllIld fil"$t-
begonen offspring of the first ""iginal goodness, the founlain of all
things. 'The Lord possessed mc in 1M bqinning of his WlIy, before hi.
worb of old. I "'"U set up from ('·crluting, from the beginning, or ever
the eat"lh was. &c.' (Proverbs 8.H- 3). And indeed that opinion that
knowledge, wisdom, IlIld undemanding [uc] in [their] 0""" natUre
posterior to sensible IlIld matmal things, IlIld do-th result O\It of tliem, or
procttd ooly from thc radiation IlIld acti,·ity of the nuUer 01\ that which
undel"$t:lnds, is nothing else but do ...... right atheism. For if this wen:
lrue, that wisdom, knowledge, and intellection were in illi own nature
postmar 10 smsible and corporeal things, as being nothing but the
sump or impress oflhcm, then it must needs follow that this corporeal
world was nOl made or framed by llIly IlIltccedent wisdom or knowledge,
but that it sprang up of i~lf from the blind, fonuilous, and giddy
motions of eternal atoms., from whence all thai knowledge that is in the
world did afterward res.ult. Which is aU one as to say that then is no
God at all.
But if llIly will here pretend that there is indeed I knowledge in God
IlIltea:dent to all rorpon:al being, IlIld therefore no passion but. thing
independent upon nuner IlIld self-originated, but yet notwimstanding,
the knowledge of aU CTCIted undemandings is not a thing immediately
derived from thence, but only taken up It the rebound or second-hand
from sensible and ror,,"1 eaI things; this is just u if one should say that

'J'
there is inden! • brigh tness or lucidity in the sun, btlt yet /lOI:with-
standing the ti,ht which is in the air, iii no!: deri" ed from that light which
i$ in the body of the i un, hut liprin gs ilTlll\edilltc1y out of the po"'U of the
dark air. Which heinl I thinl sppllmnly sb§urd, it may be p!awned
that thi. asKnion i~ nothin, but I ~erbal and p"'tenckd acknolO'led ge-
ment of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent knO"'lcdge
made by such as deny the same. Fot otherwise to wlla! purpo5C should
they 110 ~iokntly IlIId distortedly pen'eTl Ihe nalural ordeT IlIId ckpen-
&ncy of thinl' in the uni,'ctV, and cut off that rugn.tion and
oonnection which is belwixt thin", im perfcci Ilnd thin", perfect of the
same: kind, ~i%t crated minds and the in<:mlted mind, which is the
inteUectul1 scaIc or ladder by whieh " 'e dimb up 10 God, if they did
re:aJly belie"e and acknowledge an}" such thing. But he that can belie~e
that all human knowledge, wisdom, and prudence has no other soun:e
and ori"ntl than the radilltions .nd impresses of the dan maltCT, and the
fortuitous and tumultuous jumblinp t""r...,f, it i. justly to be 5Uopecttd
Ilia! he is too ncar akin to those ancient th...,logucs th,t Aristotle: speaks
uC .lL.. , f~lcltai <hi: vri~i"al u{ G...J amI alllhinp uut uf nilht or Ihe dark
chaos of maner,J9 thllt held there i. no God III all, or thst blind and
!\Cnselcsi nutter and chance = the only orilinill of ,U things.

t. We formerly showed thllt the perception of external sense all such is a

mn-e relative and fantalltial thinl, there bein]!: IlOI:hin]!:llbwlutc1y InIC
and re:aJ in it, but only this., that the soul twh . uch I [mSion, Ilffection,
phan tasm, appcannae, or S«IIlinl in it . But iC1ISC being but .n
idiopathy, " 'c cannot be absolutely certain by it thlll C\'cty other person
or animallw the same: passion or Ilffection or phantasm in it from the
same cool""uJ object that We "''''"h'~ have. 'Are yvu certai n thll
C\'ery <XlM:r animallw; the same !\CnS( or phantasm of every colour Itw
you haye', llith Soc:rucs, IoCCOrdiD]!: to Prougoras' sefliC, 'Day that every
lKhe:r man has the same. Or, lastly, an you be so much IS 5U", thllt
yourxlf shall iIlWll)'S have the same phantasm from the: IW11C object,

'"
wMn you a", not aho'ays the &aim with yoursdf?.oo and passions are
dh-ersilied by th~ k5IO(11)'Kpaoia fidios)'71cruy) of the patient. Where-
fore we cannlK be: su"' Im",ly by the passions of sense, what the
absolute n.:Ilurc of a corpon:al obje<;t is without us, our pctUpUon bdng
only reLnivc to ourselves, and our several organs and bodily muu.
Nay, we cannot be: sure IhallMre is any objecr al all be:fo", us, ...·hen
we ha>'e a phantaSm of sens:alion of somelhing. Forasmuch as not only
in our drnms, but also when .... e a", ...... ke we have phantasms and
..,nsatiom in Ull of Ihings Wt h.n no ",ality.
The ",.son nf all which is, because by exlernal sense we do bUI suffer
from corporcollhings existing withoul, and SO do not comprehend tM
nature of the Ihing as it is absolutely in itself; but only our own passion
from il. Neilher i. our sense a passion immediatdy from Ihe Ihing itself
Ihal is pcrcei"ed, for IMn il .... ould "'" be: altogelher SO uncemin as il is,
bUI only from certain local motions in thaI bod y which the soul is vitally
uniled to, by the mediation whereof it pcroeivCi other things al a
distance, which local motions and passions may be: produced when IhCTC
a", no such objects.
So thaI if rher1: ....ere no other pt,ceplive po ....er or faculty distinct
from external sense, . 11 0\11' perceptions would be merely relative,
se<:ming and fantaStical, and nOl reach 10 the absolule and cemin truth
of .ny Ihing . And every on. would but, as Protagoras expounds it,
'thin k his 0"''71 pri>'lt. and ",lath'e thoughts truths,,~1 and all our
cogitations being nothing but appearances, would be indiffCTCndy ali ke
true phantasms and one as anlKhcr_
2. BUI we ha~e since .Iso demonsrrated Ihlol the", is another
percepti>'e power in the soul superior to outward sense, and of a distinct
nature from iI, which i. the power of knowing or und erstanding, Wt is,
an .cti~e exertion from the mind itself. And therefore hu this gnnd
P"' elll,nence abm-. sense, thaI it is no idiopath y, nOl a Imr. pri>'lI!., a
rel.live, seeming, and fantaStical thing, but the romp",hension of thlot
which absolulely IS and IS NOT .

.. "H ri """m .... b'" 0/6, "'" ~., "'00<0' ~ "" ...... (.. .1~ai 6up00J, c....',
""" I/Iai,..,,,, 6" ... q..,
a..."
,oIl,~ IoJ: 'f"w; f ..,AoI,.a.u.-. 6"
-ollp'" (So<n ... ID " - " ' ia
"'* "'"n...-.""OtJo<o,.-oj
jOi dJ"'~· r-- ,j 6·oI.UtV d>6""",01
.MOl nWnW,
'wI,
.w
c..d_~
j" r..,.tioII
,~ ~ .it II,, ' .~ .wr~
..............
...:.. ""' ........ .rll>r """'.... <on' ;" 1 <ho4>olopr bo1_l', at ....... Om ..... .
h . "'"_ ~ S. ... Hulooomib'O<>II "",,', "lUu..... .....
" ,.10!00 .....,,&.(<1(...>"(... , ......... n-..... '6'D~
 For whereas the ob~cts of external sense (ui aiulhtui) au nothing
but indi~idl,lal corporeal things existing without us, from which by
lense "'C receivc onl)' idols, images, and passions, of which, as Plorinus
observes, 'that which is known by sense, is but an image of that
individual body esisting without, which sense suffm; from. But the
objKt of sense i. a being not in"''ardl y oomp,."hended, but ,."maining
without<6Zand , 'for this elIuse the truth of the thing is no! in sense, but
only opinion'.6J
Yttthe proper and immediate obitcts of science: righdy so-alled and
intellection (ul vol/ni), being th e intelligible essences of things and their
necusary verities, thai exist nowhere but in the mind i!Stlr, the under-
standing by i\5 acri"e power is fu1ly master of them, and comprehends
'not idols or images of them','" but the very things themselves within
itself. 'Knowledge is not tM peraption of things abroad without the
mind',·' but is the mind's comprehending i!Stlf. 'The mind, in
con. iderin, things, will not apprehend the thin gs themselves, but only
their images, &c .Mi
Wheufo,." it is most true as Aristotle often observeth, 'that the
knowled", of any sclentifical th.......,m is one and the self-same thing
with the thing knO""n',67 'that "'hich knows and that ",-hich is known are
,."a1ly the ilUTIe thing"M 'The knowledge of any metaphysical Or
mathematical truth is the '"try thing', Vi 'or truth itself known ' and not
any pauion or picture of il. w And though the same philosopher writts
elsewhtu thot sense is the .. me wilh sensible things and understanding
the soarm: with the things understood,71 yet the difftTtnce: bttwixt thooe

(10,,; j"",,,m ..... q..,. OIl";' oI6oMd "' •...m;". .. . '" t';", • .1<.,0."';" ..... 1.1""'. '" ,,; . 6C
,OIl ~ _ ",,",<Ii ~" m ,.wol/J l{tt. <MI "",",.u..,r:IO; (1'IooIm.... E _ "'. ' .
15-<1)·
" ~ __ b .-.rt.Ip' .... t<I~ ....... (I.I. . ......p s).
.. to ..rnI ln, ta _ <MI ta........."" (il*I.~
.. "II -....., "s.",.,,,,,*.,.; hI !.o.".,...... to.,kO l»T, (iI>OI. ~
,. hi (~')060~ l»T",; ""t·..."... !.o""'>iInr ~~" (W .• <JOO>O)'
" o/a6Ifo,.;, tO~,;, ..... ..,.... «it ......,;. Nao _ ......

."
'I' ate
lOrD is '-err greal, for lhe se:nsible Ihinp rally exisl wit/wul, and sense:
Jus only a passive and phantasmarial representation of mem. But
imtlleawl conceptions propuly so-aJlcd, the primary obj«u of
science and intdltttion, thaI is the 'sep;lrate eternal and immutable
Nlitmn of things',n ex;,1 no..1ien: bUI in the mind i!Klf, being its own
ideas. FClT the soul is IS ArislOIIe opcaks, 'Ihe pl:aoe of fornu and
ideas,,'l and they have no 0I.11u enrity a! all 001 only in beinl kno1\'Tl or
und=tood. And by and thf"OlJlh these inward ideas of Ihe mind itself,
.. hich an: ilS primary objccB, doe5 il kno.. and understand all enemal
individuallhinp., which are lhe seoondary obj«u of 1r.oo..1ed1C only .
3. Morwver, tltJl Ihe inte1kction and knowinl perception of the soul
is nOl relllh'e and fanlUtital IS the sensiri,'c, is evident from hence,
because il il liable ro false:hood, which il could not be, if il had nOl a
power of oomprehtlldinl absoIule truth.
For external sense:, for this very reuon, is nOI capable of falsehood,
because as ,uch il does not comprehend 1M abwlult trulh of any thinl.
heinl only a phantasm (fal'T(loi(l) or appearance, and all appearances as
>1IC1t ~ alike true.
So in ]ike manner, if the noc'lical perceptionl of the soul Were only
fantasrital, and did not extend to lhe comprehension of lite absolule
truth of thinp, then e"ery opinion would of nec:c:ssity be alike trut,
neither could tlien: be any absolute falscltood in any, because: '''''cry
fancy is uue,,74 Ilta! is., every fancy is a fancy Or an appeannce, and
nothinl more i. re<juired 10 il. For absoIutl: 1r1,lth bclonp not to the
naNre of iL BUI it i. evidenl 10 all that an: nOl lunk and delentraled
below men ;nro brutish sottlshness, Ihal there an: false: opinionl.
WIw:nce il folio ... un<kniably that the noctical kno ..inl and intellut""e
power e%lend s to the absolute trum of thinp. So thaI .. halever
theoreriall,ln;versal proposition in geometry OT mcuph)"Sics is 1nH: 10
one mind, me same is absolutely true in i!Klf, and IherefOl"e trut to all
minds whallOeVer thf"OlJlhout the whole " 'or\d, that cmly understand
il.
Whcn:fore, though the immediate objects of knowledge, which an:
lhe inteUigible essences of minp and their relations to one anotllu or
verities, eIiSl no...·here bul in minds, ytl notwithstanding they an: no!

",
figments of the mind, b«ausc then every opinion or cogitation would be
alike true, that is a true figment h ..;ng no other truth but relari"t to
that particular mind wt..;,s., figment it is. But these things MVt an
absolute and immul3ble nature in themsel,'es, an d their mutual res~
to one another are alike immutable. And therefore those opinions and
cogillltions of the mind ...·hich arc not conformable to the immutable
reality of Ih""" objective idns have an absolu te falsehood in them. As
for example, the nature of a triangle is an immutable thing, and this is
demonstrable of it as imm utabl y an d necessarily true thai il hath Ihr~
anglel equal to tWO tight ones. Ncithff can any man's opinion or
thinking make it otherwise. For it is a false opinion, unless it be
agreeable to the immutable nature of a triangk So likewise the ploin
regular gCQl1letrical ..,lids as such h..·c an immutable natUre or essencc.
And it is demonstrable nf them that there are five such bodies, and that
there can be nn more. And any opinion to thc contrary will be an
absolutc falsehood. Wherefore every opinion or thinking is not knowl-
edge, but only a right opinion. And therefore knowledge is not reilltive
(lIpOt TO KpiVOV), as sense is. Truth is the most unbending and
incompatible, the IllOSt nl'"C""'qry, firm, immutable, and adamantine
thing- in the world.
,.. Moreover, because these intelligible ~n CCS of things, as before
was observed, are like unities indi"isible, SO that if the least be added to
them, or detracted from them, they are not the same, but something
else. Whenever the same things are rightly undentood by any minds,
they muSt of necessity have all the same truths belonging to them every
where. Nay, these truths are not all multip lied , as we obse" 'ed before,
by the multiplicity of minds that apprehend them, but are as one and
the same indi,;d..."l truths in thoo;e several minds, forasmuch as wisdom,
truth, and knowledge are but one and the same eternal original light
shining in all cn:ated understandings.
T o conclude therefore, whenever any theoretical proposition is
rightly undcl"itood by any onc panicular mind whatsoc,·u, and where-
iIOCver it be, the truth of it is no privlte thing, nor relative to that
particular mind only. But it is a catho~c and universal truth (d).l/Oi.:.;
KaOo-uKov), as the Stoics speak , throughout the whnle "" orld. Nay, it
wou ld nn! &il to be a truth throughout infinite worlds, iftbcrc were..,
many, to.lI such minds, as shnu ld rightly understand it.
s. BUI probably it may be hen: demanded, how a man shalJ know

'"
'I' ate
whm his cona:plions are conformed 10 Ihe absolute and immutable
natures or essences of things and Iheir unch.npble relOlions to ont
another? Sina: the immediate objN."tS of inrdlection uist in the mind
iw:lf, we must nm go about 10 look for Ihe criterion of truth wilhout
ourselvr:s, by consulting individual sensibles, as the exemplanl of our
ideas, and measuring Our conceptions br them. And how is it possible to
know by measuring of ..,nsibl< squares, thOl the di:lmeter of e.'tTy
square is incommensurable ",-ith Ihe sides! Nay, as was observed before,
the nea:ssary truth of no geometrical Iheorem can e'-cr be eXlJ11ined ,
pro,'ed, or delermined by ..,nsible things mtchanically, And though the
cternal di"ine intellect be the archetypal rule of trulh, we cannot consult
thO! neither to s« whether OUr conceptions be commen surale wilh il . [
answer therefore, Ihat the criterion of Irue knowledge is not to be
looked for an y where abroad wilhoul our own minds, neilher in the
height above, nor in lhe depth beneath, but only in Our knnwledge and
cona:ptions themselves. For the entitr of all thromical truth is nothing
else b.ul dear intelligibility, and whatever is dearly ooncei,-ed is an
entity and a truth . But thot which is false, di~ine power itself cannot
make il 10 be o1"",.ly and distinctly und~,ood because falsehood i. a
non-entity, and a dear rona:ption is an entity . And omnipore""" itsolf
cannot make a non-enrity to be an mtity_
Wherefore no man ever was or can be dtcei,·e.,l in taking that for an
epistemonical trulh which he clearly and distinctly app",hends, bur
only in assenting 10 things not clearly opp",hended by him, which is the
only true original of all error.
6. But there is anmher opinion t .... t "::ems tn have goined the
countenana: of some very learned philosophers, whi<;h diff~ hut a
little from the Protagortan doctrine. Though for my pan [ ooncei '-e it
nOi to be an opinion, but only a certain scheme of modesty and humility,
which they Ihought decorous to take upon thelllSC'h'cs that t~· might
nOi seem to arrogate too much either 10 them5elvtS, or to their exa:lIent
perfomtllnces, by nOi 50 much as p"'tending to dffi'lOOSirate any Ihing
to be absolutely true, but only hypothetically, or upon supposition t ....1
our faculties are rightly made.
For if we cannot otherwise possibly be certain of the truth of any
thing, but onlr~" 4YPOf4ts; that our lilculties are rightly made, of which
none can h"'e any ceruin assurana: but only he that made them, lhen
all created minds whatsoever mUJI of necessity be condemned 10 an

.,s
elem~1 supsis_ Neilher ought t""y ever to assent to any thing as a:minly
O'Ue, since ~II their truth ~nd knowkdge as such is but relalive to their
faculties arl!it",rily made, that may pos.ibly be false, and their clearest
apprehensions nothing bUI perpetual delusions.
Wherefore according 10 Ihis dOCIrine, we having no absolute certainty
of the firsl principles of all our knowkdge, as that ""oJ rog;/al. W
[whatever thinks, is). 14."",./;,. ,.dJ;/,. ,.,,,,,,lib... 4firiull/ ,.,,,,,IIIUi
[Equals added to ,""uals make ,""ualsJ, OmIlU lIumu... m wi {JIlT wi
;"'PIIT [Every number is either even or odd1_ We can ntither be sure of
any mathtmati<::al or metaphysical truth, nor of the uistr:nce of God,
nor of ourselves.
For whereas ...me would endtavour 10 prove the truth of their
intellectual faculties from hena:, Ixcause there i•• God, whose nature
al ... is such as thai he cannot deceive,7! it is plain th.t this is nothing
but a cill:k, and rn.okes no pl'OJT"SS at all, forosmuch as all the cenainty
which they have of the existence of God, .nd of his nat un:, depends
wholly upon the arbitrary make ofthtir faculties, which for aught they
know may be false. N.y, according to this doctrine, no man can cenainly
know that then: is any absolute O'Uth in the world al all, Ixcause it is
nothing but his faculties which makes him think there is, which possibly
may be false. Wherefore upon this supposition, all created knowledSt' as
such is a mere famasti<::al thing.
Now this is very stranSt' to assert, thO! God cannot make a creature
which shall be able ccrtlinly to know either the existence of God, or of
himself, or whether the'" be any absolute truth or no.
7. It is evidem that this opinion plainly sup]XJSeS that intellwual
faculties may be so made, as dearly and distinctly to understand that to
be O'Ue which is absolutely ralse and impossible (for unless they did
acknowledSt' that we do dearly understand some things, they could not
undertake so much as hypothetically to demonsl"'te any thing). As for
example, th.t the whole is not grealer than one of irs parts, or that the
th= angles of a tri:angk a", nner "<tWlI to two right angles.
Now, we have already demonstroted that a falsehood can never be
dearly concei,-ed Or app",hr:nded to be true, Ixcause ~ falsehood is a
me", non-entity. And whatsoe,-er is clearly conceived or understood is
:an entit}'. But a non-entity can ne,'er become an entity_ Nay the troe

'"
knowkd~ or scimce which exists nowhtre but in ~ mind ilKlfhas no
o~r Imtiry at aU besides intell igibility, ond therefore, wh.n soenr is
clearly intelligible is absolutely true.. Hena: it comes to pass th.t bolh
phiJosophtrs ond divines have without scrupJc measured the divint
omnipolencc itself, ond the possibiliry of things by their o"'n dnr
inldJ«tionII ronccrnin, tltem, ond SO pl'Oflouna th., God hill15Clf
(:II1nol make ronrradictioos to be tnJc II lhe Arne time, WI>enas il wc"'
• high and unpardonable pruumption thus 10 "emu", 10 measu", the
divine omnipolena, if then ~"' nOl: on absolule aruinty of~ truth
of clear intellection., .. beinl nodting else bUI the immutable wisdom of
God participated and imparted 10 us, And if il be absolutely impossible
even to omnipolena:, that ronrradictories should be true logether, then
omnipoltna: illiClf a nnot make any liuch faculrics as drall dearly
understand tltat which if false to be true, sina: tlte essence offalschood
ronliisu in nothing ebe but non-intelligibiliry.
But if they wiU say that il is not impossible Ihat ronrradictories
should be true, because our faculties, ...·hich nuke us Ihink so, may be
fabc 0.",,1 ,Jeu:iyc us in ncry Lhin~, the ,tnT,.,..,ry U>l' '''''IUCIlt;C flUm
hena: will be <Itot it is possible: tha, there m.ay be no certain knowled,,,
It all, becauR if rontrxlictorics may be true, then I1oO'Ihin, can be
ceruinly affirmed Of denied of any thin,.
8. Wherefore, be our f.cult;'" what they will, and let them be
supposed to be made how you will, yet norwilhsundin, whatsOeVer is
ckarly undentood and ronccived, Iw an obiccti"e entity in it, and
must of ncassity be true. FOf • clear ronaption cannot be nothin,.
And thou,h intellecru:ol focult;'" m.ay be nlade obscure mo", or less,
yet il is n.ot possible th,t theey should C\'CT be made false, so as ckarly
to apprehend whll50Xvcr is In~ to be false, and wltat is false to be
~.

So that if then: wc", • world of men anted either in ~ moon or

elsewhere, that lhould affirm tlte contradictories to all tlte theorems in
gromcrry, forasmuch u we certainly know that ...·c clnrly undCT5land
tltem to be tntc:, and thaI faJso:hood an never be clearly understood, We
oulht not in ~ \ea$t to question from hence whether our bcuttics or
thein ...·cre made true, or to suspect that truth ond knowlcd~ were
such whimin, things, as that they merely depended upon an arbitrary
make of faculties. But [wc ought] to rondudc without any rontroycny
that this was but. bedlam world of mad, &lnric, lAd disll'lCIed sou ls,

...
that Ju.d no dear apprehensions of any thing, and either by men: chance
or humour hlpp<:nw to ~nttO every thing Ihal lOU false as lJ'Ue.
9. But yet ifany nne will still pcrtinaciou.sly u'F lrul1 it is nothing bUI
our faculties which instruct uS thus, thlt every dear conception is an
entity, and that the entity of truth is nothing but dear intelliJibility, thlt
contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no
possibility of any cemin knowlwge, that all Ihis is from Our faculties,
but that still our faculties themselves may be false - nay it is not
reasonable to think that the intellectual faculties of any creatures .t.ould
be absolutely infallible in any thing, because this Seen" to be the
peculiar privikge and sok prerogative of the Deity.
I answer that this is the thing we contend fOT, that the ultimate
resolution of thcon:ticol truth and the only criterion (Kpm;plO~) of it is
in the cleamess of the apprehensions themsclvr:s, and not in any
supposed blind and unaccounuble make of faculties. So thai the
cen:ainty of clear apprehensions is not to be derivw from the contingent
truth offaculties, but the goodness of faculties is only to be tried by the
dcamcss and distinctness of apprehensions. For be these faculties what
they will, clear intdkCl1.lll conceptions must of n~ity be truths,
beause they are real enrities. And to suppose that faculties may be.50
made, as to beget clear apprehensions of things that are nOH, lIS if
knowledge were an arbitrary fictitious thing, is much like thlt opinion of
somo:, IMt all the new celestial phenomena. as of the jovial planets,7li
I11d the mountains in the moon, and the like, are no real things, but that
the dear diaphanous cryual of the telescopes may be.50 artificially cut,
ground, polished, as to male all those, and any other pheno",ena,
clearly to .ppcar to sense, when there is no such thing. Nay, it is more
absurd and ridiculous to imagine, thot that more than c.)'Stlllin.,
JXllucid inteUectual f&culry, by which...., pc"",ive the truth of things,
can be arbitrarily so made Or polished as III rcpTelOCTTt any non-cntitic:s
wh.tsoevcr, as clear and real obiects of intellecrion.
to. Nay, 10 make the ccrtainry of all truth and knowledJ" , nO{ to be
determined by the cleamess of opprehensions thcmJclvCi, but a
supposed unaccountable truth and rectitude of faculties, and 50 by the
uncertainty thereof quile to baffle all our dearest inteUections, is quite
III pervert the nature ofkno .... ledJ", which is the 'comprehension ortMI
,. .,.......,,( jo><, " .1"p""· n.;, ..... """',;.",,( """"'............ __ io on a/Iuoioo ..
CidiIto·, d....... ;".

'.'

,.
which absolutely is' (KnTIilIII"'" TOO 51"1"..... ), which is not terminated in
appearance (TO O'~ 4>ru1'6J1tI'O V) only, as sense is, but in that which is (TO
ov) and 'whose evidence and certainty is no extrinsical and bolTOwed
thing, but .... tive and intrinsical to itsc:lf'.
For ifknowledge have no inward KPIT~PIOV [criterion] of its own, but
the cenalnty of aU truth and knowledge depend. upon an arbitrary
peculiar make of faculties, which is not a thing knowable in itself,
neither can wre be any assurance of it given but ",'hat is extrinsical by
testimony and revelation (inartificial argum<:nts), there will he no such
thing iI$ koowledge, but all will be mere credulity and helief.
t I . It is a fond imagination for any to sUPP'* that it is derogatory to
the glMy of God to besro,,' or import any such gift upon hi. creatures iI$
knowledge is, which hath an intrinsical evidence within itsc:lf, Or that
creatures should have a certainty of the first principles which all men
are conscious that they do so clcarly understand, that they cannot dOtlbt
of them, as that Nilli/ ""I/a m ,jJmio [No elTed results from noth ing],
Atlf'U'li4 tuidj,,, "tfl'a/i#su tJ]ineNI (Ut) atqu"liiJ {Equals. added to tquals
make equals], without which they can know nothing at all, though they
be notwithstanding ignorant, doubting, and erring in many things, and
slowly proceed in their ntioci .... rions (rom one thing to another.
WherC2S, on the a>ntrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to SUPP'* that
God cannot make any creature that can possibly ha" e any analn
knowledge of God's 0"'''' existence, or any thing more than a bare
credulity of the same ,
t,.. Wherefore sina it cannot he denied but every clear apprehension
is an entity, and the es.cna of truth is nothing but dur intelligibility,n
those philosophers mUSt I<\y the streSS of their cause here, thlt
intellectual faculties may be so made as that men can never cenainly tell
when they have clear apprehensions but may think they ha"e them
when they have not.
And it annot he denied but that men are oftentimes dcaiyed and
think they clearly comprehend what they do not. But it does not follow
from hena, because men sometimes think that they clearly comprehend
what they do not, that therefOJ'C they can neyer be certaio thl t Wy do
clearly comprehend any thing. Which is JUSt as if ... e should argue that
because in (lur dreams we think we have cleat sens:ations, We cannol
then:fore be ever ,ure, when,..., are ...-n e, th.t we sec. things that roally
are.
I shall conclude thil; discou,"", with thot of Ori gen .g.inst Gelsu ...
'Science and knowledge ;. the only firm thing in the world',7J without •
participation of " 'hieh communicated to them from God, all creatu"",
would be Imre luiibria [plaything.) and ,·anity.

Chapler VI

I. We hove now .bund.ntly confuted the pr<){agore~n philosophy,

"'hieh, thot it might be sure fa destroy the immut.ble natures (If just
and unju.t, ....ould destroy all science (If lno .... ledgc, and make it relati"e
and fantastical. Hoving shu .... n th.t this tenel is nOt (lnly most absurd
and cont",dictio)w: in itself, hut als<> Trulnifesdy repugnant t(l thot "err
alomical physiology on which ProragOlOS endca,-oured to found it , and,
than which nOlhing can more dr.ctually confut. and destroy it' as also
[having] largely demonstrated, thot though sense be ind~d a mer.
rel.ti,·. and fantaStical JXrteption as Protagm.. s thus far rightly
supposes. Yet nmwith.lllnding th.r. is a ,uJXrior pol,,-.r of intellectron
and kno .... ledge of a different natUre from sense, whieh i. nOt terminated
in mere seeming .nd 'ppnran'" only (tv ~Iii <p1lI.'"OpiV<iJ), but in th.
truth and reality of things (ev rrP 0\'0), and re.ches to the comprehen_
sion of that whkh really and absolutely is, .... h~ objects are the .ternal
and immulllble essences and natures of things, and their unchangeable
relations to om:' another .
•. To prennt all mislllke, I sh.ll ag:lin ,..,member what I hove bo:for.
intimated, that wh.,.., it is .ffirmed that the essences of all things ore
eternal .nd immulllble (which doctrin e the thool<>gical sct.ools ha" e
constantly avouched) this i. ""I y to be understood of the intelligible
essences .nd YlJtio~. of things, as they ore the obie<n of the mind. And
that then: neither is nm can bo: any other meorting of it than th;', that
there is an eternal knowledge and wisdom, or an etcm.1 mind or
intellect, which cornp,..,hends .... ithin itself the stc.dy and immutoble

'"
,.
r.~, of all thin" and their vtriri.e$, from which all particular
intellects arc dnlvw, and 011 which they do depend . Bill nO( that the
ronsnwtivt e5KfICa of all individU.11 created thin" wen: et ........ l and
Unatlted, II if God in aatinlthe world did nothinl elM: but nlOme
sarnstinlly upte$$ it, 'S."ri Uuf., ~ tunI'!,,' wstirr tmlnlW',
oo]y do!he ~ <:ternal, increutd and anteeedeni eiKnca ofdUn" with
a nnr outside prmrn! of uistm~, and no! crate Ihe whole of them.
And u if the consriwli~e -U-nQCS of thin" could nist apart KpaJately
from the thin" thanKh·u, which absurd con"';! Amtotlc: f~uendy
and no lea deKfVwly chast:ises.
3. Wherefon: ~ result of 01] that we ha,~ hitherto said is this, that
the in!d\isI"b1e Mtura and _ces of thin" arc ..... thcr arbiu....y nor
fanwtial, thu is, ..... thu oIlo:n.ble by any ..ill WlutllOeYU, nor ctw.~
able by opinion. And the~rore every thinl is nt' ,.,,;Iy and immutably
10 Kience and !mo... led.,. what it is, whether -,*>lutely or rela!i\"C]y, U)
all mind. and intellects in the world. So that if moral g.-I and evil, jusl
and unjtW, signify any realilY, eittKr absolute or relative, in the things
.., denominated, as tMy mtW han some certain nWira .. hich arc the
:actio... or IOU" of mm , they a~ neit her alterable by InC"I"C: will nor
opinion.
Upon which ground that wise philotopho:r Plato, in his Minos.,
detcrminCi that a law (..oJlO(") is no! any .rbitrary deeree of a cily or
,uprcme lovernors CMrI'II ItO~) bcauliC thefe may be unjUSt
decrees which Ih,.ref~ :o.rc no I..... bUI the invention of that which it
(roo OI'fO(" i{Q)panc) or .. h.t i, .bsolutely or immuabl)· JUSt in its 0'0....
nalure .79 Thoulh it be very [n.Ie .lso that the arbit ...... y constitutions of
thoR that have 1.... ful authority of commandinl, ..hm they an: nO(
materially \Il1jU5t, arc laws abo in I Kalndary M:nse, by vinue of that
nuural and immutable JUStice or law that ~uira political order to be
obKf\'ed .
.. BUI I have no! wen ,II the$e ",inl only U) confute MXpti..:ism or
fantnlici'iI~ Of Im:~ly 10 dd'cnd and o(llTobonlle our UfUmc:nt for the
immuable natllra of just and unjust. But also for some «her ..eig:bty
PU11'( t I thaI ""' vet)' much conducinltO the business that ,,~ ha,·,. in
hand. And tim of all that ~ toul is nor a mere nsked and passi~ thinl,
, rIU4 , ....111, which Iw no innate fUmitu", or activit)· of its own, nor

,~

••
any thing at all in it, but what was impressed upon it [from[ witllout.
For if it wen SO then tJ.en, coold not possibly be any such thing as
moral good and evil, JUSt and unjust, forasmuch as theK differ<:nces do
not arise merely from the outward objects or from the imprelSell which
they make upon u. by ..,n"", then: being no such thing in them. In
""hich "'n'" it is ttuly affirmed by the author of the uWl,IIa1l, 'That
then: is no common rule of good and evil to be taken from the natun: of
the obitcts themsdves',.... that is either comiden:d absolutely in them-
..,Iv...., or n:latinly to external ..,n"" only, but according to some other
interior analogy which things have to a cemin inward determination in
the soul i!Self, from whence the foundation of all this differ<:nce must
needs ari5e, as I shall lihow afterwards. Not that the anticipations of
morality spring merdy from intellectual forms and notional ideas of the
mind, or from certain rules Or propositions arbitnrily printed upon the
soul as upon a book, but from some other mon: inward and vital
prineiple, in intellectual heinp as such, when:by they have a natund
determination in them to do some things and to a"oid others, which
wuld not be, if they were "",n: naked passive things . Wherefon: since
the natun: of morality cannot be. understood, without some knowledge
of the natun: of the soul, I thought it seasonable and requisite here: to
take this occasion offered and to pn:P'l«' the way to our following
discourse"' by showing in general that the soul i. not a mere passive and
receptive thing, which hath no innate acti"e principle of its own,
btaU5e upon this hypothesis there: could be. no such thing as morality.
s. Again, I ha"e the rather insisted upon this argument also, btause
that which nukes men SO indinable 10 think that justice, honesty, and
morality ~ but thin, airy, and fanrastical things., that have linle or no
entity or reality in them beiides sensuality, is a certain opinion in
philosophy which doth usually accompany it, that matter and body are
the first original and source of all things; that there: is no incorporeal
su\l$nmce superior to maner and independent upon it; and therefore
that sensible things are the only real and subsWltial things in nature;
but """Is and mind. springing secondarily out of body, that inu.Uec_
tuality and morality be.long unto them, ~ but thin and evanid shadows
• 1 _. u,-;...... P'" '. dI. 6... no I1"lirJo W "., of n-., H_ . .... W~
_ _ . ..... " ;, LfF" ~ fr<om ...... k.uM oIoaI Cood-"> Ji.u ohM lot ......... "'"
,~,_~UtW_

,lit. "fo"..., "' .... 0(,"" ~"'~~.~ .. r......m. bo' ... . - to< =- whido.;r
"p,
...,.0(,"" th, ....... , 'u ' ., ... '" ioIlow"•

."
of sensibk 1nd corpon:ll things, and no! natural, but artificial and
factitious things that do as it were border upon th" confines of non-
entity.
6. Thi. is a thing excellently ,..en obse...·ed b)' Plato, and th"..,fore I
shall sel do"'n his word. lllaIP concerning il:
"These men making !hi> distribution of Ihings, Ihal allthinp that ~, are
ci'.... by na.ure. or art. or chance, Ihey imagine thaI the crea.eu. and
rnD<1 ""ooJIm, thinl' thaI . ... in .h. "","d. ~ fO be .rtribuN:d to na.lIrt
and chaoo.; ... hid! -...orkinr upon Ihosco creater Ihinl' whid! are mode by
na,ure, docs form and fabricate oertain smaller thinp af,......."'. ",'hid!
_ commonly call onilkial'hingo.. To speak more plainly, fin:, .... ' .... .br
'0
and earth. ,hey attribute wholl)' natun: and chan.ce. but flO{ to any on
or ,.iWom. In Jike """nna , ...... hod;" of .... arth, .... lun. moon and
...... 'hey wiD ha,.., to be nude OIl' of them fOrlui,ously agitated; and 10
by chana: causing both di"" .. system. Ind com.pages of things. Thu •
•hory ",,,,,LeI han the ...holt ha~.ns made, and .1I 'he earth and &nimols.
and .11 ,he _ . of the J""'. not by ony mind, in",llttt or God. no. by
any art or wisdom. bu. all by blind rulure and oluncoo_ But art and mind
,d.
If, ....... 'pringin, up "'" oftheoc. to ha,.., begotten certain ludicrou.
'hinp, ..hich han ~"k truth and .-aJity in them, bu. an like imasa in
I ,!au, luch .. pittur. and mu.it produces. Wherefore thno mon
l!tribute all ethics and politics, monlity and 10.... not to ... tu ... but to
ar., ........ prod""non. .... not real and subotan.;"I.u

7. Now ,his philosopher. thot he may evintt that ethics, politics, and
., ,uy...,. '"'" " ... <i.;; od ... /00,1 .. ~'" (... I .. !'i> ....... '" No
nin '. [... J "'&>u<.". ........ !'i>..,.,....,. ..-..-,.. ..... ~ . "'"
,q"" ,.".,.....
,oIC_
,<I". , .

rOn'_ nil< 'TI"K~"" .q-.".. "" No ...... <It, .. ~_. f'j. """ 1"")";_'"
~""
_ _ -,.,

oi ~ ""'_ ..
_i
,...,.•• /no>o .«In.. ,~.. ,~ """" 00I,,~ J .!oj .~ >O!...;
• (On ( .. ,rlll/·h, ........ _y,;.. T/If1oii>«¥oi ~ oi..,. ....... .......
...... Kai rin
*'
,i.rr/ ". ..... , _. oi HI pn~ , .............. ~ " .........

"'''1'''' " ,., •. . .,..... ,!o<I , _ 1")'0. . . . . . . . .....:.;- _ ~ TOno N.

I..."".. tri<mu •• Ii (",...,_,," ~ .,1.-............
6r"..; ... ~ ~ (."..; "*'"" v,p<i. ""' """"", ."", ""......... olai ....... - . " _
..m.
.....;.,. K,e- ~.nI Wzoro M ~"'~'IC ~, T.... oi , '.nI """"

,;z,.,•. 4.U.I ~ ~ ...... '«Ii '"no liz..,. No ....""......_

_t..
N<' ..",lNo , . . . . . . . ., 6U . ..... ...... n.cs... ... r .... ><1, . ocaI (0)0 .,; ........ .
(.,. ..... <i1piin""""" to ,.,;"..,~. OIl"" ..... .,;N,,. " .. """'. . . . ""
......... ,.. , .. .,.
~ , ",To;. .... "'rr6w.......,. i<i<' •• ~........... , Tt . . .. ~; IV . : .... , I !, I"f'l'""
........ ,u;. .•• , .;.frnl."".,.>t""""'- ,,;,, *~,....,. '«Ii M........j, .......... ~
dori •• -j e.. ,q_. 1... I.Mao'" ~«l f'j •• .,. • V..... . - . OIl ........ ti.rr/ M. ~ """
AI,V V 11_ ~ fiUa.;. u.... ~ 8Ii.>a.; (1'Ido. l..o ... III' .~ Thio io ... . 0ftJ .....

. 01.,.._.,
~ '.50'" "" ..... __ ..-
do.. ........ ;JiI ...... _
hm. point ............. - - . ; . """"', ..,, (_~
·oodhm ............ "' ....... ,h ....." . . . . . . . . Cood_ ... t .. .
I ,", 'w 1Oiiodooo' ;'.,•.,••",001,

,,6
morality are a:s real and SUbsWlliaI things, and a:s !TU1)· narural a:s those
things ..·hich belong to nutter. M mde:lvours to show that souls and
minds do not: spring secondarily om of nutter and body, but that tM)"
are real things in nature, .upc:rior and antecedent to body and maner.
His words are th=,
ll>eoe men I ...J Ire .u ;ponn, concern;n, the no,,,,,, of mind ...d 50111,
OSin otMr regank. SO especially in '0l'"t of its original... i, is in order
ofnoture bef_ matter:and body, ... d does not result out ont, but does
COII1l1W1d I', ,",vern;!, ond rule ;,."'

And I h<I~e in lih manner in this antecedent discourse, endeavoured

to show that wisdom, kno .... ledge, mind, and intellect, are not: thin
shadows or images of corporeal and sensible things, nor do result
secondarily oot of mailer and body, and from the acri~ity and impres-
.ions thereof, but h..·., an indepen<knt and self-subsistent being, .... hich
in order of nature is before body, all pMric...w- created minds being bm
derivative panicipations of one infinite eternal mind, which is antece-
dent to all oorporealthings.
8. Now !Tom hen", it nllunlly follows, that those things .... hich
belong to mind and imellecl, such as morality, ethics, politics and la.....
are, which PlatO calls, 'the offspring and productions of mind, are no
less to be lICCOunted natural th ings, nr real and sUMtantial', than those
things which belong to stupid and senseless maner. 1H For sina: the
mind and imdlect are first in order of narure before: maner and body,
those things which belong 10 the mind must n«ds be in order of nature
before those things which belong to the body.
WheKfor. mind and ;nt.11o<:1, art:and Ia...., nhi<:l :and monlity '""' fim in
order of noture, before hard Ind .,ft, light and heavy, lon, and brood,
which belong to body."

u ~... <ro;,.. ~ x ud", : ,,,,,.. 6~ ~ipo ...lC:. ol6. '" '" ~'" "'"
-,... '" I.t« ..... .. oli..lan- Mt;" <too. "'" ... n
i ..... ...:.; to.~ ..... i .............
l,o" ,A. "'""""" ....:y.iwr. ..... ,...40/41;« _
......... ~ (__ p. ....). Cud _ _ _ "...,
..... ....-.;a .
I.; " Y.n
Loeb,·.-.,..a ....... Cool "d,
_ ..... __ I.0<Il. ·Mind'.
.. "",,......;.aN 0/,1 ';"'D. fUm 11_ ~ ..... ro . . (1.o .. IIQoD) .

"'" . . . """"II
.. -Apo. """ "= •..,...", ni ,.,1t; ""I')'<Y!! yin"", a. dJt /C,.. .. , • .,;,.
"""" , ...... _f/ottipa; • """"<~
~.
'WO! "'" ...... .<dI ,~ .<ooi ..,.,

....
""'~ " ... /",' .... ,.,... . . ...................... -.o'""".<ooi .......... .,o.<po.. T1rio
Ii ... bo 1.0 .. ~ Cod_ . , 'I t' .... _ _lodonJ"
............. .....,.

,.,
C ;;pvnghted m
And lherd'ore more real II1d substantial things. f"OT ,inIX mind and
intdkct are I higher, more real and substancial thing chan senseless
body and !ruInu, and what hath fu the more vigour, acti"icy, and entity
in it, modifications of mind and intelkct, ouch as justiIX and mor:!.lity,
must of necessity be more =1 and substantial things than the modifica-
tions of mere scnsdclis !ruiner, soch as hud and soft, lhick and thin, hot:
and cold, and the like are. And thtrcforc thilt gra"e philosopher
txctllcndy well concludes:
the JTCllat and fim 0I'0ri::1 and ocrionJ If" of Irt or of mind, which ,.-ere
before body; but those thinp whid! .... Mid II) be by nature (in ,,-hith
they abu.., tbt word ... CUre appropriating it only to ..,n..,IOSI and
inanimate mantt) an. .ficnnrd. btinl ""....ned by mind and .rt."
9. W~refore I thought our fOllTlCr discourse: sca!iOnabk to confute
the dullness and grossness orlhose philosophut."" that mab rorpo'cal
things uisting without the soul, to be the only ootid IlIld substantial
things and make their grossest cxternal senses the ooly judges of Ithe]
reality of things, 'llIld SO conclude n<Khing is Of has any =Iity but what

.,.
th~ can grasp in I~ir hands, or ha" c some gross or palpable sen""

Whucas notwithstanding it is mosl [rue th.t those corpo=1 qualities,

which they think to be such real things existing in bodies without tMm,
arc for the most: put fantastic and imaginary things, and ha~c no more
reality than the colour-. of the ninbow, and, as Plotinus cxprcsscth it,
'h"'e no reality at all in me objects without us, but only a sec:ming kind
of entity in our own fancies',- and thCf'tfore are not ab50lutely any
thing in themselves. but only relative to aninu!s. So that they do in •
manner mock us, whm we conceive of them as things really exisling
withoul us, being nothing but OUT own shado,"'s, aDd the vital passive
entT¥ics of Our own souls.
Though it ..-as nO! Ihe incention orGod or nature to abu"" us herein,
but a most wisc conmvllIlIX tbus to beautif)' IlIld adorn the visibk and
!ruItcriai world, to add lusu-c or embellishment to it, that it might have
.. T;,~ ni.,...;m. En< .... "1«'", ri.t:..,.;~. ~'Q.!""!.Jtp6J ....... ~ _ ...... oJ
...... <t-.o.: ~f1/Jii>; 1a-"...,..I{....,"..t<6 ,0&.., ....'1'" ni ~"' " h< .q..,.; '" .-.1
. . <..... 19-~ ....... o..I·_r,h ....
" 0/ _ ol.U<> 0/01;0<_ <I"" " ..,;~. _ ...,;..: .oh J':YD" '4' 600. No< 1'Tuo ' ,oo, but

..... _.;,..
Pkoo, n..... '!SL
.. ni ""'!. .... tod_ ,u;.'!. .",. . - " I,la q. I,t ' ,ao". PIoOO.., c-.Jt •.w,, .,...
,..... "'

",
dwms, relishes, and allurements in it, U, gratify our 'ppetites. Whe<eas
otherwi~ really in itself, the .... hole corporeal world in its naked hue, is
IIO!hing el~ but a l>eap of dust or atoms, of several figures and
magnitudes, variously agitated up and down. So d"l1 these things which
we look upon as such real things .... ithoU! us, ore IIO! properly Ihe
modifications of bodies themselves, but several mod;fica!ions, passions,
and affections of our own souls.
10. Neither ore lhese passive and sympathetical energies of the ...... 1,
when it acts confusedly with the body and the pleasures resulting from
them, such real and substantial things as those thaI orise from the pure
noetical energies of the soul itself intelleclually and morally. For since
the mind and intellccr is in itself a more real and substantiallhing, and
fuUer of entity than maner md body, those things which arc the pure
offipring of the mind (voii ycvYl/l'0roj and sprout from the soul iuclf,
mUSI needs be more real and subsllmial than tMK Ihings w~.ich
blo!i!iom from the body, or from the soul enfeebled by it, and
&lumbering in it.
II . Whenforc tlul phiLosopher professing md understanding 10
c;onfutc Atheists, and Ul show, 'that all Atheists, though they pretend 10
wit never SO much, are but bunglers at reason and sorry phiLosophers'."
He nOI wilhuul ause fetches his discourse from hence, that 'They that
thus infccl men'. minds with impiety and atheism, make that "'hiell is
the first ause of all ~nel'llrion and corruption to be the last thing in the
universe, and that which is the 1asltU be the first. From hence proc«ds
Iheir error concerning the being of God.'''' That is, Ihey make mind and
soul IU be the laslthing, md body and mallCT to be Ihe first.
This therefore is the ooly course and method which this philosopher
p.ooccds in 10 confute the atheists, to show, 'that mind and soul,;n thee
order of the uni.·crse. arc hcfure body, and nO! postemr to ii, mind Ind
IOu] being that which rule in the universe and body that which is rlJlcd
md ordered by il'."' And Ihen is no phenomenon in the world bUI my
be solved from this hypothesis. Nuw Ihis he demunsrnt.tcs, nen flOm
local mutiun, because body and matter has no oclf-moving power, lIld
therefore it is nlO.-.,d IIld dctennined in its motion by a higher principle,
.......1 or mind. Which ;argument is further improved by the author of
Wt e~ceUent philosophical treatise, BooIr; 11, chapter 2. 92
.. A" .."I,.r-".t"'lo(u""I9....
.. h io _ dar "";ct,
...
iWd .• I9'L
""" '.. <dIeM plI~;c,t ........ io ~ Cud_'.
•• il>i<\.,&o,6<;.
"1"<... "",, ..... 101

'...

,.
 11. Now, for the self-&ame: cause I h..·e ende ..·oured to demonstrate
in the foregoing discourse, that kno ...·ledgt' and intellection cannOt
possibly &pring from sense, nor the ndiation Or impresses of mancr and
body upon that which knows, but from an active power of the mind, as
a thing antecedent to maner, and independent upon it, whereby it ;5
enabled from within to exert intelligible ideas of all things.
[3. Lastly, I Iuve insisted the n[her so largely upon this :u"flunent
for this further reason also, because it is not possible that the", should
bC' any such thing as morality, unless there bC' a God, that ii, an in6nitl:
eternal mind that is the 6rsl original and soura: of all things, whose
nature is the first rule and exemplar of morality. For otht-....·ise it is not
"""",,i.·able when"" any luch thing should be deri'·ed to particular
intellectual beings. Now there ean be no such thing :IS God, if stupid
and sensele.. nutter be the first original of all things, and if all being
and perfection that is found in the world, nuy spring up and arise out of
tht- dark "'"Gmb of unthinking mailer. But if knowledge and under-
standing, if soul, mind, and wisdom may result and tmCrge out of ii,
then doubtless everything that appears in the world may. And so ni,ht,
maner, and chaos mUSt needs be tht-lim and only original of.1I thin".
[4. Wherefore Plato,:IS lluve already intimated , taking noti"" of the
opinion of dh·ers pretenders to philosophy, 'that first water, air, and
earth are Ihe lirsl beings of all, to whid! senseless and inanimate things
they appropriate ~ title of nature. But tlut soul did spring up
aftCTWllrd out of these :IS • secondary thing,9l and :IS • me", shadow of
them, he immediately adds concerning it, 'We h.,·e here found and
discovered the true fountain of .11 athdstical madness thai posscssa
most of those that dnl in physiology or questions of natural
philosophy','" vi~., that they are.1I pv:Sses'ed ,,·ith this ..,ttishn.,.., that
mailer and body is the lirst original of all thingll. And therefore it is
obKrved by the some author, that the same persons that held all things
were derived from body, blind n.tu"" and chan"", did both deny the
existen"" of God, and, which is consentanwus thereunto, asserted tlut
justi"" and morality h..·e no nature or entity at all. saying, they were

"
....
s.:a' iI io fico.,. M ... .. hio 1_ _ 11(,

. . orai
0f,'" s..t(l<Indon.
w.:.., ni *, . ai ~ .......G ~ .... ...rm.. oi.., Km
<aoino..no. I"'ZIio oW. ,.,;,"'....,...... (ibid .• "'<C) .
165'9~ II." _ ... I'!o...

,«p,flj • ..",,,~,
IA~

.. (h,o ~ ,noI j....;.""~". 6..., i. "... • • .e~ 60...... "'.'<Of< ''''' """ ... , "
UoiIH ". "'l1l"I...... (ibid.).

'SO
nothing but ~ from corpornl things, without the sentient or the
rcnitence, or the reocrion made upon Iocol nKItion in a body dul y mixed
and tempered. ThaI is, if IiO\II and mind, knowledge and wisdom may
thus ariK from 1M rontemplation of me", snl$Cless matter, and
ndiation or impreuion that is the me", local nKItion of rorporul
obieas without, then as we said hefo"" the", cannot possibly be the
last shadow of argument left to prove a Deity by. Since not: only tile
souls of men, but also all that wisdom, oounsel, and contrivance that
apJlCU" in the frune of the wholl: visible world , might first arise in like
manner from the me", casual concourse and contempcntion of tM
whole maner, either in those particular bodies of the sun and stars, Or
else in the whole system and compagcs of the material world itse lf.
IS- Wherefo« we have not: Oflly showed tN.t all intell~ion and
knowledge does not: emerge or cmane out of sensc, but also that ..cnSC
itself is not a men: passion or I'KCption of corporeal imprt'SSCS [from)
without, but tN.t it is.n active energy and vigour though sympathctical
in the senUcnt. And it is nO....,..., possibll: that this should arisc out of
KnSClcss matter and atoms, by reason of any peculiar oontempcntion or
tontntu", of them in l"e$pc<:t of filfU"', site, and mlMion, than thOl
which all atheists stoutly deny, th.t something should arise out of
nmhing.
And he", we can never sufficiently applaud that ancient alOmicol
philosophy, so successfully ",v;"ed of latc by Cartcsius,95 in that it
shows distinctly "'hat maoer is, and whot it can anKIunt unto, nMrICly
nmhing e1sc but what may be produced from me", magnitude, figure,
site, local motion, and rest. From when ce it is demonstnbly evident,
and mathematically certain, that no cogitation can possibly arise out of
the power of mat[c.; whereas that otl>er philosophy which brings in •
dul unintelligible maner that i. nothing and c"cry\hing, out of whose
poienw.lity nO! Oflly innumcnble qu.litics, but also substantial forms
and sensitive !;Ou\s (and the",fo", why not nllunal.lso, since all reason
emerges oul of scnsc?) may he educed , mUSl of necessity perpetually
brood and hatch athei",", Whereas we cannot but ntrcme1y .dmi", tha[
monstrous dotage and son;shnCSll ofEpicurus, and SOme other spurious

.. Cud ... iIo., tiU Homy M.......... <1«1 D ..... . tho ......, 0( _ _ ......... "loA , '1
"'"' hod _ u..... .. tho .......... Gro<b. Ct. Add .... f98o, fol .. " 'CMt..n.. .....,
",i,d • .,. ... _ AIomi<all ", ~y _in~ ... ill po .... pooriIy .. io .... I><fo<o:
D, ;= ..pbkoo 001 .. ' ""riooI "'"'" 8r ... n Q,006ria ............... :

., .
prc:tenden to this atomical philosophy, that notwithstanding they
acknowledge nothing else in matter besides magnitude, figure, si te, and
motion, yer WQ\Ild make IlQt only the power of Sl:nsation, bur alw of
imellectioo and ntiocination, and therer~ all human souls to al'iK
from the men: COntUtun: o( corporeal atoms, and utterl y uplodc all
inoorpornJ substances. Than which tWO assertions IlQthing can be more
tontm!ic!ious. And this is (ar more absurd, to make reason and
intclkcrion to arise from magnitude, figure, and motion, than to
attribute thO$( unintelligible qu.alities to matter which they explode .

."
A Treatise of Freewill
Copyrgnted matarlal
 Chapl~r I

w~ _m dearly 10 be l~d by Ihe illSli~(11 of ~alurt 10 Ihink Ihal Ihere is

""meming £4>' ~!,iv,\ in nostra pofeslate, i~ ~ur 0"'" poflltr (though
dependently upon God Almighty), and thaI We = not alt<>gl'ther
pass;,'e in our acling:>. nor determinffi b), inevitable necessity in
.. hatsoe"er we do. 1kcallSC' we prai"" and disprai"", commend lI1d
blam~ mon for th~ir actings, much omerwi"" Ihan We do inanimate
beings or brute animals . Wilen "'e blame or commend • dock or
IUlOmaton, we do ;t so as not imputing 10 thaI . U1QtlUton its being th~
cm"" of its 0"'" mo"ing well or ill, agreeably or disagreeably to the end
it was design~d for, this being ascribed by us only to the anificer. But
when we blame a man for .ny wiekffi actions, as for taking .ny another
man's life, either by perjury or by wilful murdCT, we blame him not only
as doing otherwi"" than ought to h..'e been dooe, but at"" th.n he
might have done, and that it was possible f(lr him 10 ha,'~ .,-oidcd iI, SO
thaI he was himself the cau"" oftbe evil thc"",f. We d(l nut impute the
evil of aU men 's wicked actions 10 God the creator and "",ktr (If them,
after the 5allIe manner as we d(lthe f.ults (If. clock or " .. teh .. hony to
the .... tchm.ker, All men's words at least free God from the blame of
wickffi actions, pronouncing (/ OW<; d.wmx;. God is ClllSC'less and
guiltless of them, and we casl the bl:une of them wholly on the men
lhernseh·es, as principles of action; .nd the true causes of the moral
defects of them,: So also do we blame men'li acting viciously and
imll1Ol'llll)' in another SCfl"" than we blame a halting or a srumbling
horse; or than we blame the natural and necessary infinnities, of men
Ihernseh'es when unrontractffi by ,'ia:. For in this «I"" we SO blame the
Thio io ....... ot<d;';"y"' " . , _ " , . " . . . '''''''''''''''IiIJ,
S....... _ ..... ,,0 '_ ..
'tIIinp "", .... "b .\ "-.I ....', C. Stoup., '$00;< Drknn;"i.m , no! M ...... Rt.ponoibi'Wr', io
p.l, \liot (,"",). no. S_CLonoSon, '9m. pp. "J- I ' , Il.W. SNrpI«, ............, . _ ..
""", <Icp<nds Oft .... in AI<'- <>l ApIo .... ' · ,0. F_• ...... Il.w . SI.upi« (1_ .
''IiII~ TIl< bl,'y _"" "" do" _ ~ .... _ of ... ~ ... "' ~'.
(Latin ..I< 0. ,,;.. ~ .. ) .... " "illia ..,..... ow.,.... 1""''' to _
"m ",,_
............. Iif.-.thy
<>lpn;,. Of <>l","",,'. Oritrn omplor> tho s.,.,~, '110 ....... (;. - . _ I I ). s..
, J.P. .'01;"". ,..,~ """" ~""- smn G""'.....
DIeo<omo .... ""..,.,........,. in."';";';' p.ib;+j". ".11: ·i, ;'. "'prtfI" porf«booo"
.... ""' ... KU ...... toNy. ,..., io, fr<dr. ,m. """.. him in. sp«ioIwoy .... _ "'" ofh ~
""""'" ..-.:I _ ...... <>l pnioe tOt ~hor ... _ II', do 001 ........ "' ............ tOt """"'""'"
pn>ducms ....... _ _ to <ky ___ ....,... II> ""fotrto. \>oa" ...... p,cd . ,of ......
b. .. ,,""""'"' ,.. ru,-. I, ~ do<' .,'. . . . . .. pnio<d tOt """",""i"s _ ar,MI)-·
....s. .",Ku· Ccs.." . ~ "S)·

'S>
 OfftulDill

infirmities as to pity the men themsd,'es, looking upon them as

unfortunate but nQ{ os faulty. But we blame men's "icc:s, with a
displeasun against the persons themselves.
The same sense of nature's instinctS appean; yet more pbinly, from
men'. bbminS, accusing, .nd condemning them..,h·es for their Own
actions, when done either r.lShly, inconsiderately, and imprudently, to
their own private disadvantll!"", or else immonlly In d viciously, and
.pi... t the dictate of honesty. In which latter CISC men have an inward
sense of guilt (besides shlme), remorse (If conscience, with horror,
confusion, and ostonishment; and they repent of those their :actions
afterward with I kind of self-deteStlUon, and wmnimc:s r,ot withO!Jt
txeTCising revenge upon themsdves os being a pm of justioe due. No
man aa:uses or condemns himself, nor looks upon himself as guilty for
having had I fcnr, the stone, or the gout, ...·hen unCOlltJ"ICted by ,·ice.
And if all human actions "'eTC nC"T'sary, men would be said no mote to
repent of them than of di .... scs, or that they .....,re not born prinoes, or
heirs 10 I thousand poun<4 I y=.
Lastly, ...., have also a sen.., of retriburi"e, punitive, vindictive justice,
I I n.ot ......... r.ney. but. rhinl ...... Uy uisting in n. ru ......... h"" punish_
ments are inflicted upon malefaClOrs for their unjUSt and illcgal actions
post, by civil ,"""gistra[.,. in porticuw commonwealths. For though it be
true [hat these ci,;1 punishments do in p.n look forward 10 pre,..,nt the
like for the future, by terrifyinS othen from doing the same, or to
hinder these malefactors themseh-I:$ from doing the ~ke mischief .gain
by cutting them off by dC<lth, as ...·e kill noxious animals, ,"olvl:$, and
vipen:, and serpents, and mad dogs, yet it is not true that this is all the
meaning of them, and That Ihey ha"e no retrospect to the actions past; as
being satisfaction to the t<luitable nature of ration.l beings, when they
~ wicked men who h.ve both abu~ and debased themseh'es, and alw
acted injuriously to mhers, to hnc disgrace and pain fOT their rew:l.rd.
But men's natunl instincts do more sITOngly suggest 10 them a notion
of vindic;ttive jusrice, in the Supreme Governor of this great mundane
repub~c, God Almighty, in inflicting punishments upon notorious
wicked persons, enn here in this life, though someriml:$ hut slowly, as
Pluwch has obser. ed .3 But bc$idn this whil:h, the gemnlity or

. ..."'" '*"".to "" oIu; '

Mrio;; "',,... apin IdII;; tl'f'd1> ""' _ _ Au' " . ' 11". "".Ii . . . ,'" ¥
,;, ,. . ,. ' ....."' 9 " ......... (Plo-. M_ ~. '0. ............ .

."
'VI ate
 Off·ulIJill

mankind hov~ ah""ys had a strong presage of punishments 10 be

inflicted by Ihe Deily afTer deaTh. And Th~ ScripTUre assures us that
there is a oolemn day of judgement appointed, in ,,-hich God "in
conspiCllously, palpably, and notoriously rend~r to ~very one IttOrding
to his work. or actions pasl. And mat th~se punislumnts in Hell, after
death, .... iII respect only me fUlure, and arc no otherwise designed tkan
15 illrical and medicinal, in ordn to the curing or r«Ov~rinJ of the
deceased souls pWlished, as some have imagined (from ",h~nce Ih~)"
infer that mere can be no eternal punishments) i!I neither agreeable to
Scripture nor sound reason. But if all actions be necessary, Ihere SttIIlS
to be no more reason why there should be a day of judge men I appointed.
to punish men for murders and adultery, injustice and intrmperancc,
than for agues and fe~ers, palsies and lethargies.
Hence it is mat mo~lis(S., loolcing upon men's free and voluntary
actions as bJamc,worthy in I peculiar sense, have called. th~ evil of Ihem
"'diu", OI/p#l, an evil of fault, in way of dislinction from tIwse other
n........"')· evils which ore withoul fault, thaI is of " 'hich me doer him§clf
was not prop¢rly t~ cause. Con«ming which G«ro mus _ HIK lilli
Ptrv<IUU "iIIilllomitli Pt./;"',,,r",,,,, prtJ,ur ,ulpQ"';' i.e. IhOi no evil i. to
be feared by a man, OOInpar.llively to Ihe e"il of fault, according to tkat
Sroic,,1 doctrine thai the truest and greltCSI goods and e"ils of ~tional
beinr, ronsist tV roT, 7tpro/peT/Kof, or tV lof; tq,. ~/llv, in their own
free wined. actions or things in meir own power.
Wherefore, I conclude merefore, according bom to me genuillC
instincts of nalure, rightly interpreted, and the lenor of the Oristian
religion, we are to conclude that there is somelhing bp' "pfv, in our ""''''
power, and that absolut~ ncassily does nO{ reign o,'er all human
actions, bul that m~re is somcming of contingent liberty in Ihem. This
being an article of Orisl'S (aith, thaI God hath appointed a day in
which he will judge me world, and render rewards and punishments 10
men for thcir actions past in this life, good and evi!. Glory, honour, and
po~r, to C\'ery man thaI ham done well, bUllribulation and anguish 10
every soul Or man that hllh done C\·ii. We cannOl possibl)' maintain the
justice of God in mis., if all men's actions be "tttSnry eitbeT in their
own nature, or by Divine decrees and influx. That is., we cannOl possibly
maintain the truth of Christianity "~thout a liberty from ncc=:ity.5
• ..., ' ...,.co.-., EfittolMfo_m v,1rttn " . - 5.
, ·p""iohmmll .. . 1ibtny fr<>m .........,. .... __ .c 1""''"'- _;" ....

."
,.
 OffrmPilI

Chapler n

NIK ....idwanding which, there ha,-e n<K wanted"""", in III og<:5 who
have contended tM.t there is no such thing IS liM",,,. .,.il';"". [freewill],
nmhing in our own power, no conlinlt'lt libeny in human Ictions, but
wha!SOt'o~r is done by men was absolutely and una,oid.bly n«""spry_
And this upon ",,0 diffcrmt groundli, fim, because according to
some, this contingent ~beny is 7CpiJrIJa dvV7CapKTOv or ,h'lJl[o.rrarov, I
thing bolh unintelligible and impossible to exist in naNre. Secondly,
becau5e though there be such a thing possible, and actually «isling, yet
is the nuciM: tlM:r«>f pttuliar only to God Almighty - 110 that he i. the
only Klf-determining Being, and tIM: actions of all crealUres "~re by his
d ecrees from all eternity made Il"O""SJry"
The reasons a1Jegttl why there should be no lueh Ihing in nature
uisling anywl\en:, IS a oonlingentliberty or freewill, are cl1iefly such IS
these. First, because nothi ng con mo'''' itself, bul quU:flliJ """"fJ..
,"~wl'" u ,.;u, [whatever is ""'vw iI; """-w by oornething eisel,
tlM: ..ero.., wluuoever is n..,,'eII is moved by something el"., which
mo,-eth nc:c,mrily. Secondly, because though it should be gnnted that
tlM:re i. something self-active, or moving from itself, yo-l nmhing can
change itself, or act upon itself, or determine its o .... n action_ Since the
same thing conn<K be badlag""t and patient.t once. Thirdly, becau".,
oU:5iv dvaiTIOV, nothing can rome 10 pass ...·ithout a ClUse; or ...hauoever
is done or produced had • sufficient ClUK antecedent; and, as Hobbes
add$, ' Enry su fficient Cluse is a necessary ClUK'.' Fourthly, because .11
vo~tion is determined by the reason of good, or the appearance of the
greater rood; now the appeatutea and rezsonS of good an: in the
unden;tanding, and the..,fore 001 arbimf)' but necessary, ,,-l\en:fore all
volitions must be necus:ary. Fifthly, becaUK dut which is indifferent in
itself can nevcr to eternity determine itself, but .... ill lland indiffcrmt for
e,-cr, without motion, vo~tion , or action, either way. Lastly, Hobbes
IiOphisrically argues the necessity of evtry disjuneti"e proposilioo . From
these and Iiucb like groundli have nuny of tbe ancients conduded tbat
then: is a chain of clUIieS from etc:mity to etemity, every link wbcnofis
• :!: .5 • •""_~j~ _boo, -.. .. ' II '" pop, atMI _ _ 1I)"1ooc pnPl'-.d

."
 Offru~i!l

necessarily c:onnecled boch ""ilh lluil which wem before, and Ihal which
follows after, according 10 lluil in Ennius:
Utirwn M ;n netM •• Petia KcUribus..
c - «rid;"'nl obiqna ad ternm T ribes.
['Would thaI in P.~us· slade the: pine-tret t..arru
Hod ""..... fallon'" anh by &:1<$ Io<".""t
10 ""hich Ciaro adds,
Lieuit HL Ih;u", uti....", n. in P.lio nata uLta unqulM ...... arbor; .... m
OIl""" ufin .... "" 0SSd moo. U11Ul PeLiu .. hmiLi, ...que IUpttion. rq>e-
~nl"" '"8",<li in infin;,um Iictt,

Nu. Ind. n..·is ir.r.hoond.., uQrdium co<pil,,,.

~m """" p.-..et.rit:a? quia oequifur i11OO.
Nom numquam H... e!nltS mea 00rn0 c:d.rra pedtTn
M ......nimo oegro,.."..... [Saucia]. ".,'0
['He misht hs,'c ""'" c...... (,,<1M.- bod, ~W",,1d th., "" ,_ hod '''.r
I""'''' on Pdius t " and •• m further, "Would thO! no Mount Pd' ... hod
erismlH and similarly one .... y JO on
Nor tt.ena, had maok inception of Ih.1ad
Ofloyins do"", • ship.
Wlut is ,he point of......,untinllh<5c pUt ev.nts? beau..
For wer. it $0, my rov;ng royal mismso;.
Medea, from he. home had ",,' •• Jet forth
Hnr. sid and by Io.·.'serud "'copan "'wnded'j'
TIIou,h Ihis, as the Ame Ciaro obKnelh, is only lhe cluiin 0. scrietl of
causes.w fU4 "M [r,t«SSa.y causes). For though there we", Ile\'ff SO
many .hi~ rndy al hand in Medea', lime, )~I "'"IS thue lheTefo", no
neoessiry thaI ,he ohould c:ommit h.rwlfto sea, 0. be tr:ulsponed in any
on. of them. But M r Hobbes carries Ihe business much funher, .... hen
he dogmalizes in Ihi. manner: 'Th.1 IN:", ;. no one :acrion, how casual
1OC'~r it seem, to the causing_hereof /XlnCUr nQ( ",-hauoevcr is '" ""'...

• F... f.nrUw.. s-.-o. !ina .....,. in l ......, ,.... ~ 001. J. V_Ito (1.ftcItft. '""ll. A•
. , - .. 0.-.. n. foJo. '5.JJ. Trw.:.';'" br II . • ," ," ao-. n. _ ..... .
,.. ,. , __
-_· c·"1,,
·. . ..
·-..-.,'9)'1
...................... : · .. _ ... r, ·t"1 .M....

".
 orrrmPil/

/la/Mm' [in the nature of things],' o which he saith truly i. a great

paradoI, md which d~~s upon many mt«edent speculations. So
that a/XOfding to him every action doth no\: only depend upon OIIe
single chain, bur is implned md entangled ..ith infinite chains. 1 ,
But the reasons assigned why though there be such I thing IS
contingent Jibe"y in nature, yet the curcis<: thereof must nttds be
peculiar to the Deity, are commonly such IS these: first, beause to
suppose any creatUre determine itself, is to make it indepcndenl upon
il$ Creator, which is COIltndictious to the ide. of God, from whena: it
wi!! follow th:lt God must be the sole determiner of all actions in the
uni"en;e, and indeed properly the only IClor. Secondly, beause if lbere
be contingent Jiben)" in my creaturely agent., there could be no Divine
prescience: of such fUlure CVel\l$. Thirdly, neve"heless, if it should be
supposed that there is a prescience nOlwithslanding contingency of
men'. wills, yet: this prcscienu itself will ronsequently infer neassity of
lhem.'l because if lhere be any libeny of w ill IS to ..-.1 things., Ihi.
wi!! be a ground of Pelagianisrn,ll a denying Ihe ne«:ssity of Divine
grace being taken .... y by this so much cried up am~otl<1lov, self-
powc:r, or f=wilL Lastly, il S«1t1S absurd and unjust too, thlt men
should be damned 10 all Clemity for I rontingent tum of their own will.
(This wes a... y the reason of il, men may IS well be damned for wh:lt
they were necessitoted to by Di vine Ottrt:C!l.)

Chapter III

If there were nothing i ¢i'';p/v, in our o ...·n power, no wil~OOu/OV or u.i

/H>1tJ/U, 00 self-power, 00 contingent libe"y of acting, but everylhins
whlllSOC\'er acted r=arily. Then upon supposition that God Al.-
mighty should, .fter the confbgration of this eanh, put the whole frame
ofth;' ...mld apin euctly in the ,'ery!WmC posture th31 it ""'" in at the

....
"" i'N111.
oI.,.,_.,..
,, ...",,,,... O'-·,._"
.. ... .......... .....
,. 1" : :Of~._N.,...)'." "-'''''. M_-.h, .u. p. J67.
~ 0000000dlmo·, • ....... ;, ............ 01,...;.-_ ......
oI r • .- _ .. ....
" Pd ; " A.tho....,.""'h_~ _ _ _ ""'r.... oI ..h-_Io,-_ ......
01
dIiorto., , , ; _ "" ..., 00.-... Gn<t. c-.. ......
tho Iott.-r.....tt...m....,- _ . ,......
_ _ _ ;,.p ...pIuoioood "'"""" ~ .... ., . - j<>OOI. r.- "" M....,- ......... ......"
..conpws...

.M
 OffrmPiI/

beginnin, of this mundane rewolution; and make anOlher Adam and

ano!her E,"e perfecdy like the fortner, without Ihe least diffeTellce either
of body or mind, and !hey propapling or muhiplying in successive
~nerations, it should ronlinllC' or run out such another period of time
:as this world hath lasted hefore, ocy..., thousand yean or more; th...,
would eyerything, every motion and action in it he the ,·ery same thO!
had b«n in the fortTlel" periodic revolution without the least difference
or variation. Another liuch like Cain and Ahel, anOlher Enoch, and
another Noah, another Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, another Moses,
another Pythagons, another Socrates, ano!her Jesus Olrist, another
Pontius Pilate, another Caiaphas," another e,·erything, and anOlher
e'"ery person, exa.ctly the same, wearing all Ihe sanK clothes, dwelling all
in lhe owne or like t.ousa, sitting upon lhe same stools, making all the
ume motions, writing all the safllC' boob, speaking all !he safllC' ""OTd.,
and doin, all the AfIlC' actions 0\..... again.
This was the doctrine of the Stoia, that then had b«n and should
be infinite such worlds or mundane periods, and circuits from eternity
'" e'er"i.y, CxaL:']y .Jikc '" .,IIC """lh~r.1J 11,<:y .""IJUS'ng God
AlmighlY himself 10 be a necessary a~nt tOO, and, therefore, that after
the several conflagrations, he must needs put things in !he ,·ery ume
posture he had hefore. And then oil acting necessarily, there muSt he oil
along the same or like men, doing 011 the safllC' things encdy.
Celsus, who for the mDlit pan per50rutes a Platonist, Ita,·ing ,·...,ted
this Stoical dogma, the k:amed Origen aninud,·ens upon him afier !his
manner:
I kroow 1"101 why Cc:lsus, writinl againll u. On;ilians. should think it
IKC "ry to USC"!h1$ Stoical doIma, ,hot Ius no< so much as .seemin!
or probable demonstration. That from tM I:>qinnin! to the tnd (or
rather without beJinnin! or end) thn<: should be Ilw.Y" the same
pt,iodJ or circuits of mooul thingS., ..,d ,hat of nttnsiry in ttrt:ain
.ppointed re\"Olutions, 011 things that h:I,·c been, are,:and shall be, should
be ,be very same agsin repea,edly. From wbenee it will follow, that of
...... ;ty SocntCS sh.ll al_yt be about to philosoph i.e, ond to be
ICICuscd for holding new ~ and corrupting of the youch, and AnytUs
,. St.""''!' 11 ... '_on.ao.c......~ •. b<low. ~ ..... tho_"'""' .. C-,.
ca- ",.17 ........... wt.cre he ""I.. "'" Ii<Il ..;.to So: . no....". toNal. , ,I
I''''' .;
....... 0..;,.... 1),
_rea...
" oJ, • •
" Co "a,b - . . .. oM s..;., .... " Ok d <OIIIIi< <)'da. " "'" mol d _h d " - tho .......
;,' Ojed ..... ed.

.,.
 Offru";f!

and M~~nu be al .... Y" aboul 10 bear"';!I>CSS Ipin.' him. and .he ..,n.'~
of Arc:opogll$ 100.1( to cond~n him to drink poison" And all." .hI:
AmC manner (uith .his ...... Orig~n) will;. be n<cOS$Iry .ha•• ..xo.din!
'0 a~poin,td ..,,'OIunool, Phabris should al .... Y" be abou, 10 'Ymlniz~,
."d ,he Pherxan AIe"",der to act ,he Arne crud,in, and men
condemntd 10 Phalaris' boll ••1.... )"~ be lbout !O roar." Which, if il be
admintd, [ know no!: bow any libeny of will can be d~fentkd , or how
there should be any pbee kft fOr praioe or dilpro.io<_'" Lib ... ;.."
accordin! .0 this hypothcsd of ~Isu. (thl! this period of mortal ,hinp,
from the: bepnninr to the end, shall be rep..lltd the same o'~r opin
infinitdy. and that al .... )-, the .. me thingo. of net .... ity "';11 be pail and
preKnt ond to CO<nc ,,·;,Iwu, .nd). M.-. .hould . 1.....".. in ....,.y
.." ...Iulion, lead lhe child"", of Israel out of Egypl. through IhI: Rtd Sea;
andJesus being born apin and apin. sbouLd do the ..me Ihing which be
hod, MOl once, bt" ;"finit~ 'imts, done: befor.; and aU the same
o,rinia!u, al$D. should be in appoin'td tima; infinit.ly; and ~ .....
should ,,·ri,. 'his '-."y ...... book apin.. Christian.., ... hi<h ho had
""';"en 'en lhousand Ii..... befo..,. No,.. ~hu. lLIlIC1"!Cth .... h periodical
rt""lulions of morul thinl' only, ... herrin of 'Krt:I&i,y 'he ...... th.al
ha'-e been, an:, and shall be. in 'hili world, should hl'-' been homofore,
and .hall be """n, infiniuly_ Hu, the S'oia scncnlly mainwn ou.h
periodical 1"<:,,,lul;""o ofimmortol thinp 100, or, I! 1....-. oftoo.e .. hid!
they ..xounl gods. for arter the universal confb.gration ...·hich hllh been
infini,ely. and shall be :again infini .. ly, all things "';!hou, "'''''p,ion,
occording to thmo, run ...... nd in 'h....... ord.". from the berinnin, '0
the end; all ,h. sunc sod........11 .. the ...... men, doing the same
things. Nev.rtheless. '0 lessen the Ibsurdity her..,f, ,I><sc Stoics, indeed,
pre,end ,hot they sluJll'IDI be all numerically the .. me. but ol,apoiKtou;;,
ClIactly alike in ..cryth;ng. So thl! noI'lIe ...... nume.ol Socrates shan
be apin but one in aU Ihings tDCIly alike !O Socra'... ...-ho .tu.1111WT)'
OtIC in ,nthinp •• o<,ly .Iike '0 Xanthip~, " and ohsU "" accustd by , ..."
~ronn .. in all Ihinp Ilik~ '0 An)1us and M.~,UI. Bu, I undenund no!
th;. (Aith Origt-n). ho ... Ii""" the ....... Id is .I.... y. numemUy lhe ...... ,
.nd no! """,her onctly alih '0 .nother, lhe thingo in iI .oould noI ""
numc-rical!y the ...... roo, .nd MOl e:<aetly alike only.lCI

,6,

'VI ate
 O//m",;11

But tile cas<: "'ill ~ the same, sllould we supposo: two numerically
distinct "'orlds, made by God Almighty, at the same: or contemporary
limc:. u:l(:dy alike 10 Ont another, two Ad:uns :lnd 110'0 E.'a; indis-
lin!"id... bly lhe same, both in !IOU1 and body. multiplying them,d,'es by
propagation for se'-eral thousands of years. If there "<IS no such thing as
contingent liberty in natun:, tlley must """ds all along, at the same time,
nuke the Jame motions, speak. tile !;;Ime "'ords, write the same boals, all
as uactly alike to one another as Ihe motions of tile inuge in the glass
an: 10 Ihe body "'ithout il.
Now if we annot think this 10 be possible. but that, two sucll worlds
being made in all things perfectly alike, and tile first parents. men and
wotnrn, in them perfectly alike tOO; )'et, in process of time. there would
grow a grcat dissimilitude and di~en;ty het ...·een tllem. But though this
di"ersily " 'ere never so little, yet must it needsI t be gramed tllatthere is
a conlingent liberty, and that men lIu'e something in their own I"''''er,
add "",,"ething of their o\\'n, so thot they an change tllemselves and
detennine themse]'-es, Ind all tllings Ire not linked and tied in I flllll
adanunline dtain of causes,

DIopter IV

Now thatlllis is not true, quod nmrfd /fur"" ;/firJt;/fum hdH~/ft ['thot III
Ih ·mgs h."e·Intema I nettssny.
. '] " or t hat not h"mg lit
' "rum /f~IUri' l J can
possibly act omer"'-;5/: than ;t suffers or is acted upon; but tlllt, on the
conn-ary, there i. wmc contingent libeny in n.tun:. and thot men. and
otOO rational creatures, can add or casl in somc:thing of their 0 ...... to
tum the scales which e..-en may, I think, sufficiently Ippear from hence.
Because it Clnnot be denied but th31 then: arc, Ind nul' be, nuny cases
in wllich senral objects propounded to OUr choice at the same time, arc
so equal, or euctly alike, as thot there cannot posIlibly be any reason or
mori"e in the understanding neoe5Sllrily to detennine the choice to one
of them ralller than to anotller of them. As for uample, supposo: one
" ·8o''''''''''' ......... . ....·... _ o ( ... , · . ... _in ....
" nil appears .. lie . ......, .. ..... , . on. D< _ " . _, ...· 1 ,a. -...I .. ""'" ipro
... ·n · .... -.n ,ioin_ ',·io· !""""l<qoodoc_;".If_b>.....,
,", . , Uhinilin.u"';""1.
II ..... ......... IIoIoIxo., I)f u..., .011 N~. in 11'' '''.''1. MoI.._• .-01 " . p. >67_

,"
 OffrUrDiII

man should offer 10 anoIher, OUI of twenly suina pieoes of gold, 01'
golden balll., or silver Slobulites, iO exactly alike in bipleK. fiSUre.
colour, and weisht, as tlull lie' could discc:m no manner of diff=noe
between them, to male his choice of one and no nIOn:. Add also tlull
tItcsc JUinas or golden baUs may be 50 placed circularly as to be
equidimnl from the chooser's hand . Now it cannot be doubted bUI
thll, in this case, any man would certainly choooe one, and not stand in
....pcruc or demur beau ... he could no{ leU which 10 prefer or choose
before another. But if beinS necessitated by no moth·e or reason
mteadcnt to choooe this T2ther tlw> that, he must determiM himself
conlinrmtly, or fonuilously, or ausclcssly, il heinl all one 10 him
which he look, n-or could there be my knowledse u ".IUI. [from
causest· befOKhand which of tItcsc twenty ..·ould =tainly be tUen.
BUI if)"ou will soy lhere was some hidden, nm .. nly detenninltinll in
this case, then if the nial should be milk I hundred times oVer and Over
apin, or by I hundred se,·era) pl'rsons, there is no re;liOII why We mUSI
not allow that all of them must needs take the some SUi""" every time,
lhal ill ather the fi ....t, or »e<:<>nd, or third, &~., "f them, ali they lie in
or<kr from the nsht or left hand.
From hence, ~, it Ippears that T2oonol beings, or human 5Ouls,
can extend themsclvCl further than neccss"T)· natures, or an = further
than the)" suffer, thlt they can Krively chanse thenuelves and dctermiM
themselves tontin~ntly or fGrtuitously, when they arc not I>«umily
determined by a u$C5 anlccedcnL Here is, therefun:, I great difference
between corporeal md incotpooeal thinp. Bodies thlt cannot move
themsel,·es, can nt'·er act further tlw> they suffer, md thcrc:fore if
causes of moIion. or impulsions made upon them be "f equal force or
strensrh, they cannot move at all, neither one ..oay IKJI" I'other. If two
equallCllcs in a balance hive equal weillhu put intG lhem, they will rest
tOo eternity, and neither Gf them be .ble 10 move up or down. But
T2tiooal beinp and human 50uls itandins in equipoise as 10 mohve
reasons, and hayinll the ..... Ics cquiponderant, from the ..eight of the
objects themselves without them, will not pl'rpctually of necessity
always thus hml in suspense, but may themselves add Or cut in some
grains into one scak nther than the other, 10 make that preponderant,
10 that the <ktermination here will be continrmt or looK, and not
 Offrut;if/

nea .... rily linked with wlul wem before. Here, therefore, is a sufficienl
caUiiC which i5 nm r,h' wry. Here i5 something dunging itseIf, or
acting upon i_If, a thing which, though indifferent as to reason, yet
can delermine i_If and take away llul passh·e indiff[ ercnoe].
BUI it canoot be denied by an y theist, but Ihat this liberty, al least,
must be ..dnowlod",d to belong to God Almighty. There being many
thin.. in the frame and cofllltitution of the ..·orld for which no rcuon
could possibly be liven, why they should be of na:essity so :as they are
and nIX <Xherwioc, and , merefore, mUllt be determined by his arbitnry
will and pleasure. AI for example, the ...... ld being supposed IIIX to be
infinite, mere could not be any necessity in lbe ming i_If, wh y il
should be just so big as il is, and not an inch nor an hairbrcadm biggu
or Io:sscr. There could be IlO n«U5ity wh y the numbeT of SI2TS should
be even or odd, whereas one of them it mU5t need. be, and is SO :as il
seemeth good 10 him to appoint. So like ..ise Ouisrianity assUIU us that
God halh appointed a day in .,,·hich he will judge IIt.e world. Ofwhich it
is &a,d, Mark '3.3:1, 'But oftha' day and hour, knowem no man, no not
the angels which are in hea'·en, neither the Son, but the Father. ' In
which word" it i, imp~ed that thi, is a thing detennined. by rite
arbitrary soodwill and ploasure of God the Falher. There being no
nl:CC$Sity in the nature of me thing i_If, why it should be ast at such a
precise rime, and IIOt an hour nOr a moment SOOnu Or later. Nay, it is
oommonly conoeh·ed Ihat th is whole created world, wilh a1llhings in it,
having no ne<:essary Uisto:1UX, but prroanous both, might IIIX Iuve
been, and apin is destroyable, was made by Ibe arbimry ..;u and
pleasure of God, iICOOrding to that, Rev.•. 1I, 'Thou Lord hast created
all things, and for my pleasure they are and were created.' The creation
beingllOt a natural and n~y emanation, as the word :and me Son i.
from the Father, but a free and iiClf-dctennined. emanation, it being as it
were bUI the Aork 1!~IK&; of God Al[mightyJ. 'He spake the
word, and they were made.'
nUl this arbiml)" and contingent libeny of Ihe Deily is carried on
much 100 rar by mose who extend it to the necessitating or all creaturely
actions and volitions, by a Di,·inc predetermination of evfl)'lhing, with
• CQnsequent irTcsililibk influence; and 10 the rcprob\lting of r.... rite
KJ"Cll1:r part of mankind, by absolute <lect=s from e"lemity, and without
,. _J~'tk""""~
~
__ .· """'''.j..
TIS, PI'. 57< .... m. s.. A"""
't''~ '''' rhcy ..... _·
Mipo, 1'9 ..... n , p. J"":'
;'r' ;"

,6,

'VI ate
any req>ea 10 IOOr o..'n ao.:tions, aIJo, lhe futun: neanion u-" Ioof, by
damnin, of lhem for " 'hll lhey 1I't11: ~itatcd un,,·oidably to d o by
Gfod) A,mi,hIY) himself.
'TIS, indm, an aWurd Dyin, of _ IMI Dr... r~I'" Ai.,u-...,
God is bound to do the bat. For God Mlh no law 001 the p.. f« li... nf
his 0011\ Mllin:. N~Jesa, il lTiIIIy be .. en c:o ndudcd. that God an
ao.:t noIhin, conlrary 10 lhe DfI'M: law of his 0 ..1\ perfeuions, IMI is, an
do i"IOIhin, either foolishly or unjustly. And it may be piously belie..·cd,
that when he did CTnU. ttw: world. he mack lhe whok ~fter the: best
n'WIMT that (all thinp corui<kred) il c:ould M~e been maoX in, and,
r.:onKqurnily, tMt as he carollO! be liable to an,. blame for makin, the
whok WOfW thm il misfll M'~ Ixm. 50 neilher is he 10 be (pvm]""",h
pniK and aommmdiotion, u nw:n In:, for doin, betler when he mishl
In,·, dOl>(" wone .

BUI Ihil conrinStnI liberty of ..,If.dft...",i .... lion, which ..." h.,·,
hi.heno spokm of (a iled by iOnM: of the Greek phibophers epeleu·
Jlick liheny), when thce " I perfect equalilY in objects and a men:
fon uil0W; ~lf-dctenni .... rion, it not tlul tWTt(otiuIO_. IMI Ii"",,,,
, ,IIi,n,,,,,•...·hich is the foundation of p..ise or di.pn;.." commendation
or bLanw:. For when two ob~, pcrfectly equal and uattl,. olike, ue
propounded to a 1TWl', choice, as IWO 'gp, or IWO ,uincas, or I....,
IOLdm mils., of equal bi,OC'iI.. and wei,h l,and n iue, he cannoc be justl)·
blamed by any orhe. or hi,..lf, for chooAn, 01>(" of lhem n .bet- than
anorher. And lhe case mU$l nttdl be the same in aU other objeas of
choia:. lhal have I perfect equality of iood in tho:m, or arc means
equally .mdin, and conducin, 10 the same md . Then: an be no jw;t
blame or dispnise. 00. only ..·hce the objects, brin, in tJ..,uose!vos
rally unequal, the one better. the otMT WOI..,,' man rtfuscth the ben.".
and chooic:th lhe WOfW. As in lhe differma: hmo'em the dica.1I: of
horJ lIy or consciena:, and .he "'IIMiou of the lO'Au appmus,
indioin, eitho:r 10 ImJUiI pleuun: or privale utility. He that n:sisrin,
thea low"," an.d WOIIC. inclinaOOn$, finnly :odhemh 10 the better
p rinciple or dica.tc of honuty and ¥in~, hath in aU 'KU and places in

,M
 Off,wnl!

the world bct:n acwumed hm"l:1"D.;, praisewonhy, as being KpeiHWV

ia!lf4l. superior 10 himself, or a sclf-omquel'Of. But he thai yieldeth up
himself as vanquished or succumbcth under the 10"'er affections, called
the law of the membcn, in opposition to that superior dict:l.tt: of
honesty, or law of the mind, is ac:rounted blamccwonhy as being ;;crurov
tavr4l. inferior to himself, or conquc",d by his worser pan. Now that
the", is such an atrrt:<!QllcrlOV as this too, such a liberty or will (whe",
there is an inequality in the obj.ects) of determining oneself better or
worse, and SO of deserving commrndotion or blame (though it be OOt
rightly taken by some for an absolute perfection as will be showed
elscwhcn:~ is undeniably evidcot, both from Ihc common notions of
mankind, and from Ihe SC1lse of consciencco in all men, accusing or
excusing them.
Nevenhdess, it must be granted that thc", is no snull difficulty in
the expl:lining of this phenomenon rightly; SO as dearly to make out and
vindicate the Arne from all nceptions made against it, espe<:ially since
the vulgar psychology, Or the now gene..lly n:oo"ed ""'y of philoso-
phizing conccoming the soul, dlxh either quite baffie and betny this
Uberty of will, or dse tender it absurd, ridiculous. or monstrous.
For the vulgar!)' m:cived psycbo!ogy runs thus_That in the .. tional
soul the", a", nolO faculties. understanding and will,n which under-
standing hath nothing of will in it. and will nothing of understanding in
it. And to th= two faculties an: attributed the actions of intelleerion
and volition: the understanding (say they) undemandeth. and the will
willeth.
But then follows a bit...". [parting of the ways]. whemn these
philosophers are divided: for, first, nuny of them suppose this under_
standing 10 be the beginnu and first mo,,,r of all actions. For this
reason, because ipoli "ul/Il cupid. ['then: is no desire of the

r...... il>< Sbri< .....i _ i. "",...., ,.";,,,... or . 0"<"".on,... IuIto,

.. The """"Pi 01,, ;, ..
...-. ...............
" c..I_,,-...........m..
~ _ So T'Ioornu
iorA .1 I I'

,.,
 OffrttlPill

unkno..,, '~ U lhere an be no desi.., nM no ...ill of thaI which i.

unknown. And, KCOIldly, they conclude Ihal lhe undemanding 1C1eU!
necessarily upon its seven! objeets, withoul an)·thing of will 10
deu:rminc either iu exercise or &peci6c:ation of !hem (which nrussity
some aU a uain of Ihou.ghuf9 bccaux t"" wiD being blind, lhertfore
annex delemUne t"" uOOenWlding, eimer ro exOTCi§c or speci6c:ation
of object. Thirdly, that the undersunding judgelh necessarily of all
Ihings, nex only as to the U"\nh or falsehood of speculari"e things, bUI
also as to eligibility ofpracticals, wlut is 10 be done or not done. Lastly,
Ihat lhe blind faculty of will always ~y follows ~ last practital
judgwltM oft"" neceuary understanding.
BUI others mere are, who, in order ro lhe AI>;nl o{mis phenomenon
oflibeny of will, think it nw iry to IUJlPOS'!', thaI first of all, the: will,
lhough blind, yet determines the understandin" bcxh ro euoc"e, and
specification of obied.. And though lhe undemanding, being neoessary
in its judgements, doth only propound to the blind ..ill what he thinks
ought ro be dOf1<', or hi. last practical judgemeM in the case, and no
more, only ro allure and in>;te the will mcreumo. BUI dial mis lO~e"';sn
qUw-l, or empreu of the 10\11. the blind will •• till remainelh as free. and
indifferent to do or nOithis Or that, as if the undemanding had given no
judgement at all in the case, and doth at last fortuitously determine i!Self
" 'ithout 1"Qpcct: to the same either way. Which i. the me:aning of that
definition of ~bcrty of will commonly given, thaI V./.. ~la., ",.itis
6""'ihu lUI ",nuiwtf rtf"uitis. ~USI aftrt. wi ,,0tI IIftTt, that the " 'ill
after all things put, ~ last dkt:<te or judgement of the understanding,
itself therein included , is yet fret: and absolutely indi fferent, both .. to
exercise and ro specification, and dcxh delmtl,ne itself to do 01" not. to
this or that, fortuitoUily. Then: being no IMher way, as these men
con.:eive, to salve the liberty of the will but this only.

Ot.aplcr VI

But, lAY, ,fthis psychology be true, then either an then: be no liberty

It all, no frttdom from necessity, or else no omer than Iu<;h as is ab$urd
.. 00i0I • .-I .. _ ........ W/. ,0 .,. _ .. d.... •· • • .no.
.. "" ",,"= ID I klta, ................... J .

,,"

,.
 °ffrm"ifl

and ridiculous or monstrous_ For, firit, if the blind will do aI"'-a)1sj

n«,1"5 rily follow a necessary dictate of the undcn;tanding anteceden t,
then mull all volitions and actions nttds be. nec... ry _ that pretence
which some here make 10 salve libe.rty of will, notwithstanding, from the
amplitude of the undentanding, lIS having a "''lICT scope and prospect
be.fon: it; these fancies and JoOr'7Mt [impulses, desires], each whereof is
dctcnnined 10 one, signifying nothing at all, so long as the under-
standing in its approtntions and judgements, concerning the difference
of d\osc obi<:<:ts, aClll altogether ncoe:surily. But whereas some otheri of
those philooopheri, who rontend thot the will must, therefore, of
necessity foJlow the last dieme or practical judgement of the necessary
understanding, becaUK it is in itself a blind faculty, do nevertheless, in
order 10 maintain liberty, :l.SS<'rl th.t Ihis blind f;>culty of will doth first
of all move and determine the undCTStanding, both lIS to its nercise and
obi<:<:ts, this is a manifcst contradiction in itsClf. Besides, they are here
forced 10 run round in an cndle.. eirele: they maintaining t!tou the will
an will nothing, but as reprcscnted to it first by the undcn;tanding
(";Il~' other .."" it TIl..,t will it know~ not ,,-hat), alld apll that the
understanding cannO{ :oct about this or thot bue as it is mo,-cd and
detennined thereunto by the ,,·m,
so that there mUst be both an action
of the understanding going be.fore every :oct of the will, and also an :oct
of the will going be.for-e c'·cry act of the understanding, whieh is furtlter
comradictiou. and impossible.
But if the blind wiU do not n......s...ily follo..-lO the last dictate of
practical judgement of the necessary undcn;tanding, but still remains
i"diffeTCTtt and doth fortuitously determine itsClf eith •• in compliance
with the Arne or othtTwisc, then will liberty of will be men: irn.tionaliry,
and madness itsClf acting or dC'lennining an human :octions. Nor is this
all, bUltMI ,,·hich wiJl"h in every man " ill perpetually will nOl: only it
knows not why, but :also it knon not what. Thcn is all Qlnsid.",tion
and deliberation of the mind, all counKl and .d,·icc from others, all
uhortation and persuasion, nay the mully of reason and undemanding
itsClf, in a man, altogether useless, and 10 no purpose al alL Then can
then: be no habits either of virtue or vice, that nUllmng unoenainty and
fortuitous i"differentt, which is iUpposcd to be. tsSCntiai 10 this blind
..... OfIry orlioot ~ ok"'",I"'ll1oo • _ _ ...... ID" .... ...! objca. boot
.... _ ... ;, _ '" . _"""","", on folio..- "'" . . _ of;' or __ .......... at
,.e" ._ .. ....
,"
 OfftUlPiII

wilt, being ut[(rly unc:apable of either. Nor, aftcr ~n, could this
hypolhesis salve thc phrnomcna of commendation and blome, re"",rd
and punishment, praise and dispraise. For no praise, commendation, or
blame, could belonS 10 men for their f"",willed Ktions ncith~, since
when they did weU they acted but fonuitously and ternerariously and by
~hance, and when they did ill their wills did but ~fij~rt II#>, use thei,
own narural right and essentiol privilel{e, or property of acring 1m6rt.{XJ~
tnryXaw;r U it happmeth, Or any way, without ruson. Lastly, as for this
schobstic definition of f""''''iII, rio:. that it is, after 011 things put, bnides
the mlilion iw.lf, even the lUI practical jud",ment in the lI0II1 roo, an
indifferency of not doing or of doing this or lhat. This is . n UpsWI
thing, which the ancient peripatCtics, U Alennder ll and othen, "'eTc
unacquainted Wilh, their aa:o<Jnl thermf being Ihis, 1M! amo~
1UpIWTWuI the same Ihinp being circumStlnt, lhe Arne impressions
being ..... de upon men from withoUI, 011 IMI they ~ passive 10 being
lhe same, yet Ihey may, T1<XWilhSlllnding, ael differenlly. The losl
practical judgement also, u according 10 these, being that which u men
.re not merely passive 10, so is it really the same thing with the
/kNMwIr;, the " 'ill, or volition.

Chapter \'ll

But this scholaslic philosophy is nunifestly absurd, and mere ..::holastic

jargon. For 10 atlributc the act of intellection and perception to the
facully ofunder1tanding, and acts of volil;"" to Ihe faculty of will, or 10
say th., it is the understanding that understandeth, and the wil1tlult
wil!eth - Ihis is 011 onc as if one should say that thc faculty of walking
""'lketh, and the faculty of speaking spea.keth, or IMI the musical
facullY pl.yeth • Ie....., upon the lute, or sings this or that tune.
More.,,·cr, since it is generally agreed upon by 011 philosophers, tMI
MI~"n S""/ I"P!Osisonlm, whatsoever actS is. SUbsiSlenllhing, Iherefore
by this kind of Language Ire th~ twO faculties of understandinS and
will nude 10 be two SlipfWnl~, two subsistent things, two agenu, and 110'0
II .... ' 1
_ _ Pi
of".'", I,.,; A, Oo".'! .h ... _"'Ikjo .. _ _ ~ _
s..-"! . _ II7 . Cad_"-'~"'_"TJS,
-..t.ocdo h • .,...w. ........ f
(P.111) .

.,.,
- • ....., .......

'VI ate
 OflrurDill

persons, in the ...... 1. Agreeable to ",'hieh are these forms of speech

commonly u5ed by scholastics, that the understltnding propounds to the
wil~ represents to the will, ollurQ and invites the will, and the wiU
eitht:r follows the understanding, or else refuses to comply with its
dictates, ncrcising its own libcny. Whence is thai inexuiable confu-
sion and unintelligibk nonsense, of the will's both firsl moving the
understanding, and also the understanding first moving thc will, and
Ihis in an infinite and endless circuil. So that this facully of ...ill must
needs be suppoocd to mo,·c understandingly, (lr knowingly of ",hal it
doth, and Ihe foculty of undemanding to move wiUingly, OT not wilhout
..ill. Wh<:reas to intellect as such, or as a faculty, belonp nothing but
nM:re intellection or pen:cplion, without anything of will; and to will as
luch, OT [as] a faculty, nothing but mere volilion, withoul an)1hing of
intellection.
But all this while it is really Ihe man Or soul that understands, and the
man or soul that wills, as il is the man Ihat ..... lks and thc man that
speaks or talks, and the musician that pla)·s 2 lesson on the lute. So that
it is one and the 5an1C subsiilent thing, OflC and the samc: soul that both
undemandcth and willeth, and the s.ame agent only that actcth
di'·crRly. And thus may it .... ell be concei,·ed that onc and tbe 5an1C
reasonable soul in us may both ...;11 understandingly, or knowingly of
what it wills; and understand or think oflhis or thai object willingly.
It is not denied but thai the raTional soul is If(IA.OOQl'tlJIO<;, halh many
po .... ers or faculties in it, that is, that il can and doth dispby itself in
se'·cn! kind. of energies, .. the same air or breath in a Pncumatic
inmum[ent],JI passing through several pipes, makes several notes. BUI
then: is a certain ordff or method tM m.y be conceived wbertoin the
soul pUIll itself forth in Ihese illl &e,·cral operalions and affections, of
which I shall plocced to treat in the ncxt place.

Chapter VIIl

It is • ,·ery material question which Aristotle stanelh, Ti Ttl 1fpWfax;

K'I'OiiV _ whOl is that thai first mo'·Clh in the soul and senClh all the

.,.
'II ate
 Ojj.u..u/

othe:r wheels on work? ThaI is, .. hal is Ihal '·;lal po ...·u, and OlUX)',
whieh thc: SOIII firsl dispbycth itldf in, and wtu.;h in order of nature
pr«cdes all ill other powc:n., it implyin, lhem, or ..mn, t:hnn on
worI; ~ Fin!., tht:re~, I say lhe outward obsefvalions of CX>tpDical
_ are not 1M only be,;u,,;nJ and firM lnO\·cn; or "'"IlKS of all
COJitlDon. in us, • thc Epicunans, Hobbians. and Atheists IUppose
....110, inded, make aU (:O(itltion 10 be nothinl but IocaIII"IIXions in the:
brain; IheR brinll inlel"CUrnnl they only occ..iomIly raisinl a nrioety of
CO(itacionl. BUI there is • thrnd of" Iik always sp inninl OUI, and a ~vin,
sprin, or foo.Intain or c:ositation in 11M: _I itJI:lf. No..-w dj,·m; of 11M:
schobotia, II we 5:lid before, Itil UI lhat it is no other than an
indiffcrall or blind will whK:h lim movelh 11M: undtmandin" and
aUlelh deliberation, and )·CI .ne. th is, ilKlf blindly chcx.eth and
deltmUMth III human -.;lions. Whueu., if 11M: 6,"" m(ncr be pcrl"caly
blind, then musl ;1 mo'·e to il knows not .....1, and il knows not why.
And be perftctly indiffcm>1 1O move any OM Ihing DIMr than another.
MOft(Ivcr il is not c:onc;e-i...,ble thaI mere indetermination and indilfn--
en(:)" should be the lint monT of all -.;lions.. Iksidcs which, 11« ' " try
nalure must be the bqinnc. and . prin, of.n -.;lion?' Whereas, i( lhere
wtrC any lu,h faculty of the soul ;Ii a blind will (.. hi, h is impossibk)
knowled", mull of n«eftity go before if, to rep rcscm thinp to ii, and
10 hold I loreh 10 light it and sho .. it ill ...... y, and th il mu&t come affer
it, it must folio .. i( I I its guidc. Wherefore kno ..1ed,le and under-
standinl, coun~1 and rel$l)n, Ind deliberation, Rtf11 to bid Ihe rains!
for the first moVe-!" in the: 5Oul, and Ih.t ...·hich leads the vangul1d.
Nevertheless il is ttrtain I"'t neither Ihilt Ipccubti.-c nOr delibtnti~c
undemandin, dOlh al ...... y(.) -.;I in II,"C(hUrily of itsdf and ""i"-
telTUplCdly, but we are iClUible thaI OIl' minds are cmplo)·ed and set
nrork by tomelhing elit, lhal we apply tMm both in CDnIt:mpbtioll and
d~~berarioo 10 this or that object, and c:ontinUot 01" a.U lhem ofT al
pitasun, as mudt iii 1111' open and mUI our C)·es, and by movinl our
C)ti do1crmiM our sij:hl fO Ihis or thaI objea: of siKhI. Wen: our souk
in I constanl Pzc 01" 5ludy, a1 .... ysspulIling OUII neuihry thread or
..-ria ofuninltmlpled _Ienlle IhouJhts; then could 1II"e ne\·U ha,-,:
any pI ' n« of mind, no Inenrioo 10 paAing OCDI[ionaI) occur{rcna:s),

" ·F_
..... ...' ."'_.'yl ... s.._.....
.. ·..-.-t,..",,_ . ...... 01"._'__ 01",. ... ,_ ....
Ii __ ., II i " _.

'"
,
 Offrml!i/I

alWlIYS thinking of something el&e, or h"'ing our wits running out a

wool-p~hmng, and so ~ rotally inap~ for ac~ion. Or, COtlld ",.~ do
oorhing at all, bm aft~r studin! ddib(ration, th~o should W~ ~ oft~o in
I puzzle, al a stand, demur, and fumble a loog time ~fore We could act
or "" iIl any Ihing. Anstorle him&elf d(!crmines that fJovhj, roun&el,
c:annor ~ th~ fi",t mo";ng prin.ciple io Ih~ soul, beaux th~n ...." mUSI
consider, 10 ron~ider. to consider infinildy. Again, thc principlc of all
a.crions, and Iherefore im~lIection itself is ends and good. E,'cry thing
acting for the sal:~ of SOfIl( cnd and good. And ron«rning ~nd., tM
same Aristotle hoth righlly OOser-.·ed, Ihat they are 0tlK aifJaipt:rQ. q,ii>"(ll
6t:l, Ihal they are IHX chosen, . Iudin! OUl, or devised by us, bUI e xist in
nature, and pre"cmi,'c1y obtrude Ihem&eh'cs upon u•.
Wherefore, w~ rondude that Ihe .0 ffpWroJo; K'voiiv, thll which
firsl mov(!h in us, and ;s Ihe spring and principle of all dclibcrari"e
action, c:an ~ no other than a ronSlllm, restless, unimerruptn! desire,
or 10"e of good IS such, and happiness. This is an e,'er bubbling
fountain in Ihe «nITe of the soul, an ell ter or .pring of molion, bmh a
pri",,,,,, and ~~IUU'" ",obil. [fi .. t and pcrpernal mo"er[ in us, the fi .. t
wheel that &e1S ill the Olller "'heels ;n mOlion, and an e"erlasting and
incessant mo'·CT. J6 God , an absolutely perfect being, is nol Ihis lo¥e of
indigent desire, but a 10"e of o"(\"flowing fuln= an d redundancy,
communicating itself. BUI imperfect b(ings, as human souls, npecillily
llps.ed, by rca50n of the pori. [needJ which is in Ihem, are in continual
inquest, restl= desire, and liCUeh, alWllYS pursuing a secnt of good
before them and hunting after ;1.)1 Th~re are &e"eral thinp which
hl\'c a fa« and mien, Or . lluring show, and promising aspect of good
to us. As pleasure, joy, and case, in opposition to p;nn, and sorrow,
and disquiet, and labour, and lurmoil. Abundance, plenty, and
sufficiency of all things, in oppos;l;on to p!I\"Crty, stra;tneu, $eanliness,
and penury. Pow(\", nOi only IS it can remo,'e "'"lm, and command
p!.enty, and supply pleasures, but also in Ihc &en5C of Ihe thing itself.
Honour, worship, and ¥enCTation, ;n opposition to cvil$ of dis~,
contempt, and scorn. Prai&e, commend.tion, and Ipp1aU&e, in opposi-
rion 10 ce... ur~ of OIhers, ignominy, and infamy. Darity, and celebrity,
<1<_, ~
AI "" foot.,( , ... I"'P' ......... "" ,.,.."".... ;,. 'God • I'<m<t sm,; .....
>0
",,"'0.'. r .............
IMolopo><>ll .... br '
DiopIayiq Ho-H< "*'r ..... _oUr. bu," 11 ........
·, ......... I_JI'o<ctty ..... .ltr.x.;.......... ",,'.
Soulo ..

j! .............
So<n ... ;, I'\o .. ~ $,,-,";. . >oJ\>. """ d-"" .. !'\orin..,,_oJ,
III< ....... ,..,., on<! - . Raoouroo ond N«>i. , ... _ " .,( I..o>~. !Old
".J .
br

."
'VI ate
 Offtufl'ill

in opposition 10 pri"~le obscurily, and hing in cornel'S. P~xcdlen'y

o~u others, superiority, viclory, and SUCttSS - in opposition to being
worsled or foiled, left behind, outdone, and djgppoinled . Securily. in
opposition (0 anxiety, and fear of losing whatsoevu;"" pulchrilude, in
opposition to ugliness., and deformity. Knowlcd"" and lruth, in opposi-
lion 10 the evil. of ignonncc, folly, and error. since nO man would
willingly be foo~sh, nO man would err or be mistaken. Liberty, in
opposirion to restraint, bondll"" sc:rvility, to be subje(:1 10 oonunand5
and prohibitions. l •
BUI above all th=, and such like Ihings. Ihe soul of man h~th in il
pavtw;ta fl, a certain ~Iicinatioo, presage, ~m, and odour of one
_mllm !<ollllm. one su preme highest sood transcending all others,
without which, lhey will be all ineffeclual as 10 complete happioess, and
signify MKhing, a certain philosopher's stone Ihat em lum all inlo gold.
Now this love and desi..., of sood, as sood in ",nenol, and of happiness,
traversing the soul continually, and acrll.ning and pro~oking it COfIlinu-
ally, i. nOl a lTICTe passion or ItOflllt; bUI ~ scnkd raoh'ed principle, and
Ihe very SO\II'C", and fountain, and centre of life. II is necessary and
nalUre in us which is immutable,;and alway. continues the lOme, in equal
quantity. AI CarlesiUS supposed the same quantity of motion 10 be
perpetually consc:rvcd in the univcnc,iO bUI nOI .like in all the liIme
bodic&, but being transfen-cd, and passiog from OfIe 10 other, and so,
more or less, here and then. 5<J is Ihe..., the sam< stock of love and desire
of sood always alive, working in the soul by necessil), of nalure, and
agitating ii, though by men'. will and choke, il may be di"crscly
dispensed OUI, and placed upon differenl obje(:lS, more and less.
But lhere are many OIher powers and cne.gics of the soul, Ihat are
necessary and natural in us 100, besides that 10""est of Ihe plastic
life!' subject to no command of[the] wilt. Its vital sympathy with the
body displaying irsclf in the perceptions of the outward sense and of
bodily plusure and (pain], the smnmc:nts ""hcreuf lhe !IOUl, as willing,
hath no imptrillltl [oommandJ ovu, though it havc a despotic and

.. _£- ... " -, . .

undisputed powu locomotive in OIher [... J and mcmbcn of the body.
Then fancy or imagination, sudden passjons and hormM, and commo-
..
.. 'I 'I
...._ .-I··'
ttl) .. , r"U';;i"uo'.
................
ii_boo, _
~r"'
.........
_ .. ....
r<riouo _ _ ....
• D T" - . . , ,t>; ...... R,J7-OP ......,.6, AIoo. Tit W,.I,I, .... , .
.. A "r" Cud_',! bio.... 1'Iooti< Notun. Far. fuB ........... Ihio ... hio 'A
,c-= ........
or ..

[);oj M I" Lifo .. N.......·.TIS,PI'.06-",

".
•
 O[[mrgil/

lions talkd roncupisciblc and irascible, whose first assaults pre,'enl

our will, inttndtd by nature as spurs to ac:1ion, and the quichntn of
lifc, which dse without thcm ""ould grow dull and Lanlluid, and
o;ometimes, as it wcrc, fall asleep; these are natural too, comc upon us
unawares, inv..:]e us, and surprisc uS with thtir suddm foree, and wc
havt no absol ute, despotic, easy, undisputed power o,'er them,
notwithstanding ""hich the hegemonic of the soul may by COI\ativcs
and endeavours &<>:Iuire more and more po....,r o"cr them. Abovc all
theR: is the dictate of honesty, commonly called thc dictatc of
consclcnce - which orten majestically controls them [and) cluhes with
the (oth"" , This is necessary nature too, whm here the hell"llIunic,
SOII'Ktimca joins its assistance 10 the beller onc, and SOtTM:tirnes takes
pan with the worser against it. Lastly, the understanding, both
spccubtive understanding, or the 5Oul, as considcrinll the truth and
falsehood of things, and the practical, considering thcir good and evil,
or what is to be done and not done, botll of tllem inferring
conscqumccs from prcmi!l5cS in way of discursi"c reason , The
p""ceptions or whkll, arc all natu ral and ncccssary, .ubject <0 no
<X>flUTWId of will , though both the exercise, and their specification of
objects, be determinable by ourseh'es.

(]upte. IX

The next grand enquiry is, what is TO 'iyqW>'IICOV, the ruling,

I{Ovcming, commanding, determining principle in us. For here, or
nowhere else:, is to be found the TO i",' 'ill"" and the TO alh~0tl<1I0V,
wi />DIm,.., Kif-power, or such a libeny of will as whereby men
deser.'e pmK Or dispraise, commendation or blame. Th i. hcg", ilonic
of the 50ul is a thing that was much taken nOli« or by the Greek
philosophers. after Aristotle, and to th is is ascribed by them the
original of thooic moral evils thaI dcscrvc blame and pun ishment, Thus
the learned Origcn, Na", fila (uil{l<r raliD ta .... m txisU~lis in ipso
",./itiar, I{I<" tilta PrrtWniun/: ~(( IlliuJ q"irqull," m ",alu," jWllla
nosmun rralllt'll tlll{l<isiliuinl"," [Each person's mind i5 responsible for
the evil .. hich exists in him, and this is what e"il is, Evils are actions
"hich result from it. In our view nothing else: is strictly spcal:ing

'"
 OffrUIl!;U

evil.J,i l where the fO buiuwv tTr4l0VIKOV is rendeTtd by <kknius·

'
nI4 (Ij;fUl "liII, (>.ery man's own reason, itS if th is ",ere the thing
whereby he is the (::aU$( nf mnral evil. He laking it for granted that
Origm'l hegemonic, in every man, is uasQn; which is ~ thing
commonly s.upposcd to be natural and necessary in ilS peruption,
when:a neccH3ry nature can be no foundation for bWne and punish-
meTII. And if monI evil were to be imputed wholly to n«essary
nature, then must Ihat, and lhe blame of it, needs be imputed In God
himself, as the (::aUSl' the ......f. Whereas Origen'. design here, and
e[sewhere, is 10 free both God and nature from the blame of mnral
evils, and cast it upon men lhemselves, itS being SOITI<:thing, besides
necesnry nature, loose and It their own di.posal, and therefore apxai
lrpci("twv, principles of action, and Ihus, toCCOrd;ng to Origm, every
man', own hegemnnic, or thai which rules or commands in his ......1, is
the ooly (::aU$( of moral evil, via, or wickedne55, which is truly evi l, as
abo are the act",ns that proc EE d from il. And in strictness or UlClnUi
of philosophy (..ith he) lhere is rKMhing else evil 10 • man; Ihal is
nOt:hing besides Ihe evil of sin and flIult. But I know p ith he th'l this
g • mailer of greal subtlety and nice'Y, and the..,(o", i. would be an
OIJC'TOSe thing to e~plain ii, &c. and require longer ambages of
disa.>urse than would be proper for this place. Now the herd of
modem philosophers and lheologers, who ~ealously maintain the
phenomenon of liN"'''' "rbilri~"" nr freewill, think there is nO othet"
way In do il bm only 10 make an indifferent lnd blind will fortuilously
determining itself, to be both lhe first movt'r, and the h~monic or
rulin, principle in the soul 100. Nevertheless they themselves acknowl -
edge that there is 110 much of neees" ry nature (Val in this blind and
fOltUitnu5 will, thai it is norwithstandin, Ilways determined 10 good,
or SOITI<: appearance of it, and can never po5Sibly choose evil when
represented In it by the undemanding as wholly such. But wilhin that
latitude and com]nSS of apparent good in the understanding, the wiU
to them is free to determine i!$tlf tn either greater or les ....., and SO to
any of the lowest degrec:s and appearances thereof. Nay, though a
thing Mve never SO much mon: of good than e,,;1 appearing in it. yet
.. ,,,,.y trion"" -t1'I'~ oi.- ,,,...,., ' ' ' '0; lY ~ """"" I.n'" ifri; I.n, nI KG"....
ni iu.. ooWw.... ~ _!'1M ~ .,.,....... I.n. _ ..... oI6a "" ...,.,.4ooIjo<...,
'0' ' .. 1(."...."" nI ....,... "'!OhFn. c-,. c..-. ",~ ....... a..dwa. p. 'n~
"sy ,.... - (lck .. _ ,· ....,. .. OripcI w_s, ......I<d. " _<,l"!M •
..a:_... c..-.(cu....... ,•.s!l_
,,.
 Ojjrwpill

Ihe Least glimpse of pKl glimmering in iI, i. enough for the blind will
to e~ercise its lordly and unaCl.XM.lntabk libo:rty in preferring iI, before
such another good as hath nOf any the leait shadow of evil appre-
hmded in it. And " 'hen any great end is proposed, and upon
deliberation concerning means, it clearly appears 10 lhe underslanding
thaI there is one me ....... "'hich, if cho5en, cannot fail but rach. and
anain to Ihat end; but aJMXher, "'hich is only not impossible to do it,
but hath ten thousand to one odds apins! it . In this case (they say) it
i. the perfection of the blind indifferent wiU to be able to determine
itselffonuitously that " ""Iy as ....ell as the other.
But as it is very absurd fO make acti"e indiffererta: blindly and
fortuitously determining itself. Ihat is acti"e irrationality and nonsense,
to he the hegemonic and ruling priociple in e'"Cry man; and as il i.
ind~ impossible, there should be any sudl thing in natUre as a blind
faculty of will, which does nothing else but ....ill, acting temerariously or
fortuitously, "'here there are different d~glL ,5 of good and evil in the
objeas such IS shaU be petfectly indifferent, 10 never so mudl greater
or lesser good; a ....ill that is noehing else but will, mere impetus fora:
and activity without any thins of light or understandins - a will .... hich
acts both it knows noe ....hy or .... ~fore, and e,'en it kno",-s no{ .... hat _
50 could not such a blind , indifferent, Ind fortuitous will ruling sal"e
the phenomenon of man! good and e"il of commendation or blame,
bo:<:ause this bo:ing supposed to bo: the petfection of this .... ill's own
nature, and a man's essentiallibcrty and pri"il~ to act thus, there an
be no fault nOr blame in him for his eUTI:isi ng the same. and acting
ac:wrding to his nature - no nature bo:inl sin.
Wherefore il cannot be supJlOO"d thlt the hegemonic. or ruling
principle in a ITLJn is unerly dnoid of all light, and perception, or
understanding. Noc,,;thsunding .... hi<:h, in pecable bo:inp nason,
understanding, and kno .... lwge, as such, or as ne«ssary nature canno{
be me only hegemonic Or rulinS principle. Beau.., reason, u such, can
never act unreasonably, understanding, IS such, and clear VC'ra:ptiom,
can never err. There is no such thing IS false kno"'kdge, nor el' .... ,touS
understanding, nor can .in e.·cr be the result of reason, undemanding,
clear pera:pl""'.. and knowledge, any more than error.<i Nor is error
any more from God and the ne0e5Ary nature of understanding, than sin
.. Hetc c..d_ io . ,............. Col,' ;" ...... 00 .... dotpn..;,y of Iwnoon . - . lit
...... IF " i"' 'On,. c.ne.ion Iino: ... doNoy...t ............ of ox... Itio .. , ............ _

'n

:yl ate
 Offrtt ..ill

is:. But the hegemonic of created .,uls may tn, and judge r.Jseiy, and
lin. MomI,·e:r ..e knt\w, by otIUin u.,menoe, that speculation or
deb~ion about particular thinp is determined by ouncha both as
to obj.ecu: and ueii:ise:; _ an c;aJ1 ;t ofT from one. Ibing, ami anploy il
Of KI il I ...-ork opon IlII(J(her, and ..., an 'UI" H, Sl.lSpend, and lIop
the Utl , is:<: of it ( .. hen we plaK) too, diverting ound~a into action.
From wilma it is: plain IIw Ihue is: SOi,"'thing in us supuitw lha"t-
unto, _hing mort universal Ind compKhm.ive, ami )~ withal
more simpk, which is: hegemonic 10 ii, and doth ~ and determine
theamt .

GapleT x

I say, theufore, thai the TO ';,'qWVtIl'OW [hq:unonironl in cvery man,

and indeed that which is: properly w, uurKlva (we rather tuo~;ng thosoe
"'h, r thinp of nee:' -so.,. nature than Mini them), is the IOU] as
wmprehmding itself, all ill concerns and intuc:lII, its abilities ami
capacities. .... d holding itself, IS il .... en: in its own hand, II it were
redoubled upon luclf, having a power of ,nUn dong Or uming ;tself
more or less in conlider:ation .... d deli btr:ation , in ra;&ting the Io....er
appetites that oppose iI, both of utility, reason, .... d I">onnly; in Klf-
n:colkction and anention , and .igillnt circumspcc!Ion , or standinl
upon OUr ",ani; in pU'l"'l" and raolutions, in diligence in arrying on
Steady dnigns and acti,·c cndelivou,", _ thilt in order, to Kif-improve-
ment and the Klf-ptomOlinl of ill 0"'''' 1fOOd, the IiIinl and QOIlIervinl
itself in the Wrte. llootogh by aecidcnt and by abUK, il often pro\"a .
self-impairinl POWC1", the original of ";n, vi«, and wickedness, whemry
men btuow,,,, to thenutlva the ClU$CI ofthcir own evil, blame, puni5h-
ment, and mixry . Wh=fore this l\'I'mooicon Iwl aJ"""YI derelUcina
the ptiSivc Clpability of men', .... ture one """y Of other, mher for better
or for .INK. And (it] h", I Klf-fomting ami K if-framing po"''''r, by
which ""Cr)' man is Kif-mode. into ..ha, he i5. And ......,dingly d~a
either praise or dispraise, r1:Wlird or punishment.
Now I say, in the lim pba:, that, man', $OU.II$ tw:p;cmouicaJ o~er
. ,Oli"".' ",,__•••'••• ,_~. Ioor ...... _ " Goo!;" ,~~'.'_ .. s.. TiS , .....
1''''''''
."
•
 0//ruII'ill

i!Klf, having a power of inlending and exerting itself lOOn: or less in

considel'lltion and delibr;r.r.tion, wh(11 differ(111 objttu, or ends, or
mroiums, [an:J propounded 10 his clloi~, Illat an: in IlIemiClv« really
b«ter and WOlU, may, upon liliglll oomider.uionli and immarun:
deliberations (he attending to IIO<TM' apporancc of good in one of 111m.
without taking nOlice of the evils attending il), clloose and pn:fer Ihat
which is n:ally WOlU ~f~ ,he ~ttn, so as 10 dest"c blanl( Ihf:n:by.
But this not because it had by natun: an equal indiffen:ncy and freedom
10 a gn:ater or Inser good, which is absurd, or because il had a natul'lll
liberty of wiD either to follow or nOl follow, its own last practical
judgCTTlCllt, ,,'hi<:h is aU one as 10 say a ~~rty to follow or not follow its
Own volition. For upon both these su ppositions there would hU'e b«n
no such thing as fault or blame. But lien: also the pccrson being suppooW
10 follow the gn:ater apparml good at this rilnC' and not allogether to
clash wilh his last p~iOlI judgement neither. But because he might
have mode a ~tter judgement than no ..' he did, had he man: intensely
considered, and man: matun:ly ddi~ralro, which, that it [sir] did not,
""'" its [.irl own faulL Now '''''y ,hat a man ha,h no< ,hi. power "vcr
himself to consider and o:kli~l'lIte man: or less, is to contradict common
upcricnce and in ..m sense. And ID deny that a man is blllnC'..mthy
for inward telnC'rity in acting in any tiling of moment withoul due and
full deliberation, and 110 choosing the worser is absurd. But if a man
have thi_ power over himself t(l consider and deliberal1: mon: or Io:s.s;
then is he not always delnminro lhereunlo by any antecedent nettSSary
OIUSCS. Thmo two things ~ing inconsisl(11\ and oontradictious. And
a:>nscqucntly the", was somothing of a:>ntingcncy in the choice.
From "",'hat has been declo",d it appears that though pccrccption ~
nllure or n«usary understanding in us, yet for all that, we are nOI
morely passive 10 our own pncrical judgam-nts and to the appcarant:C1i
of good, but contribute somothing of our own t(l Ihem, to make them
such as they lTe. Bccausc thest may ~ vny different &CCOrdingJy as ae
do more or kso in.cnsely con.ider or ddiben..c, which i•• 'hins U,
liPiv in our 0"'11 power. A man who docs but sliShlly consider, may
hasuly choose that IS better, which upon mon: IICrious and leisurely
consideration, lie would judge sllould be refused as what is much the
worser. The AmC motives and reasons p.opounded rutve not always the
AmC force and efficacy upon differ(11t persons, nor yel upon the RTl1C'
person_, neither at several timco, but more or Io:s.s IS tht:y are differently

".
 O[[m"';l1

appll:hended, or more or Itsi anended 10, pondell:d or considered,

whidl ",e are 001 mell:l)" passive 10, bUI delermined by ourse),'e5.
Besides which, il is cemin, thaI in our practical judgements ,,'e often
ulend ourseh'n or [ourl assents funher than our undersWldin" as
nl:«~y n.nure ,oes, lhat is, further than our clear and diRinct:
perceplions. For when upon a sUghlff oonsiderarion we all: sometimes
become doublful which oft\O."O 01" moll: Ihings &hould be prefe'll:d, not
clearly discerning allhat time any gre:uer eligibility in one than anotM'
of them, though in reality tMIl: ,,-ere much diffell:nce, "'e a.., nOl
hereupon nl:«n iult"i to arresl and stop and .uspornd aclionn, bUI may
and orren do proo;:ttd to making. judgement in 'M cas<: one way or
other, stochastically or conjecrunlly (which it$l:lf is nOl "ilhout """'"
contingency ntither) and IiO go fO''''';l.d 10 action.
It halh seemed very &trangc 10 1iOm<:, what Cartesiu& halh wrillen,
Ihal il is not the undersw.ding but 1M "ill thaI judgelh:' and Ihal this
is Ihe cause: of error as well as of sin. And indeW Ihis may well ,"m
Stl'2llge aa.>ording to that nOlion, which men rommonly ha,'c of will, as a
mere: blind faculty. B... i. is """'. cer ... in th.t cyen in 'pc<: .. l.tivc .hinp,
about \nuh and fa(s(:hood, as well as [in) praclical [lhingsJ. the
tlq;cmonic of the soul (wtlich is Itle lilOul sclf-romprehensive, and
having the conduct: and managemen. of it$l:lf in its own hand) doth
IilOmetimrJi ""lend itself funher in way of assent than tM ncas.:ary
understanding goes, or beyond cleat and distinct: pcrttplioo. Ttull is
...·hen we tll"e no clear and dislinct: ~ption of the truth of a
propooirion (which is the kno ...·ledge of it and can nc,'cr be false) ,,'c
may nolwithstanding, ulend Our assents further and judge "ochasti-
cally, Ihat is opine, this way 0. thai " "Y concerning iI, and thai
lilOlIlelimes with a greal deal of confidenee and assuranee too. And this is
undoulKedly th e original of all error in spe<: .. lati,e thin gs also, which
canllOl be imputed 10 nl:« nry nalUll: in us ...·ilhoul casting the blame:
of them upon God Ihe maker of it. The understand;n, as necessary
nalUIl: in us, or clea. distinct con«pl>on, can ne",r ur b«:ause there
cannOI pouibly Ix any clear COfICCption of falsehood in cternalthings :15
geometry and mctaphJ$ics. ac ... oonccptibiliry is thc .....,nee of mn~
and clear distinct conception is knowledge, which can nc",r be ral..,.
Wher-efoll: if we did al ...';I.YS suspend Our assents, when we had no dear
.. o..c.n..,M .............. CSM,· •• H ·
.. P.,.. 0...:..... ' .. _ ... 0("' • .. ' " h. _ .... ,.,."., '.JO- S« £IM."" . ...............

,"
 Offrull1ill

distinct ooncqlrions of the oonneaion be:tWttll the prnlicate and

subject of a propo!ition, we should never err. But we do oflen opine and
jud~ stodlllStically, CC>rK:eming truth and falsehood even in speculative
things, beyond OUr clear conceptions and cntai n knowled~. That of
Aristode,'; "aKia 4>opTl"'; rW. dpxw." and the common opinion thai
interest and vicious inclinations bribe the judgement, sbo... that the
judging power in us is IlOl the understanding or n«X I arr natu", in Wi,
for then il could not be: bribed, oomlpted, and ..... ycd . And indeed the
naxs .. ry understanding that ,s our clear conception and knowledge
going so liule way, there is need and UK of tbis SlodillStical judging and
opining be:yond it ronceming truth and falsehood, going furthn and
be:yond ii, in human life, our :actions and volition" depending much
upon our speculative opinions concerning the truth and falKhood of
tbings. The weakness of human understanding is such that there are
very few thinp which men do SO certainly know as thar no manner of
doubt may be raised in their minds ap,ns' tbern, either by oophistica]
arguments Of bigotry in ",Iigion. Hence is it, that divine filith Is so mucb
conunc:nded 10 uS in the Gospd, whicb is undoubtedly an :lSS<:nl 10
tbings be:yond clear concqllion and certain nea:ssary knowledge. The
helief of Ihe ""i!<tellce of a God, of the n.Nral inunortality of the soul,
and conKquently of ,..,v.-ards and punishments after this life, are things
wbich the generality of mankind, h••e no clear conceptions nor
demonstralive science of, and yet they are highly nece&S:;lry to be:
believed in order to • moraUy ,·inuous and good life. And it was truly
and wisel)" said by PLaIO that l<iOT1~ and 6p(Jai oo.:'w tl faitb and Inle
opinions are thinp no less uKful and effectual in life, tban cxnain
seicna: and demonstrations. Nevertheless ,t cannot be: denied, but tbat
by tbe rash uncautious UK of this power of the hegemonic in Our souls,
of extending its :assent further than our clear conception, and be:yond
our undersWlding lIS necessary noture in us, we frequently fall into
many error-., which errors are therefore no more to be: imputed to God
than our sins an:.. they being not from ~y n.Nre all made by bim
bUI from the ill conduct or nun.gement of ourselves, and the abuK of
that aOret;~IOV or IMi ",Im,.., thai larger power, which we bave over
ourselves, gi~en for necess3ry uses and purposes in "tending our

0' 0
 OfIm""fI

OSSI:nts and iudge.rrw:nts beyond our cle.\r conception, understanding, Or

knowledge., without suffic;'n! grounds. And then may be "cry sufficient
grounds sometimes to bel;'ve beyond knowlo:dg<', as well as beyond
KnK and y« notwithstanding is this di"ine faith a vimlt or gnce.

Otapler XI

Apin in that contest betwixt the dictate of I>onesty or of conscienoe,

and the sugestion of the Jo,.'er appetites urging and impelling to
plcasun or pll'Knt good or profit, T say in this contest: there is no
necessary understanding ime l posing and coming in to umpin between,
that does unavoidably and irresistibly determine on. way or mMr. But
the maner wholly depends upon the soul'. hegr:J"l"oOfiic or power 0\'«
itself, its utning itself ,.i!h more or leu fora: and vigour in ",,;mng
theK lower affections, or hindering the gratification of them, according
to which the issue or event of ocrion will be determined. But this is no(
one single hattie Or combat only. but commonly. long Lasting or
continued W3T land] collua:ation betwixt the higher and the lower
principle, in which thcrt are many vicissitudes, re..iprocationl, and
alternation. upward:and downW3Td, OS in the stales of a poi. ofhalanoes.,
before there come to be a perfect conqUtSl on either side, or fixation
and Stltling of the soul either in the bener Of" the ""orse. Ouring "'hieh
struggling and rollucration was that pronounced. 'the good that I "'ould
do 1 do not, the ""il that 1 would not do that do 1'.49 And then according
to tht issue of!his intestine war will men either nttive pnise from God
or dcscrvc blame and punishment from him, "orr and honour to him
tJut doth "'ell, but 'tribulation and :anguish to every soul that doth
evil,.50 And 'I h.ave fought a good fight and nOW there is bid up for rrw: a
crown of life.,11 And that we ha~e a power more and less to extTt
ourscl~a to resist the lower inc~nations, or hinder the gntifications of
them, and to comply with the diewc of ronscienoe or Itonaty, We being
not wkolly dt!ermined !hemn by necusary causes an!eceden!, but
having something at least of it bj/ ~J<w, in our own power, e.·cry man'.
own conscience bears wilne..s, in accusing and condemning him when-

.. R....M'1.' ..

,',

'Y' ate
 Of[ruw;1I

ever he does amiss. Whereas it is plain tim if we be determined by

necess;1y of natUre here, men is dlere rwthing in OUr m\-Tl power, nor
.;:an ..ie be hlameWOTlhy or desc:ne punishment.
Moreover ....., an: cen::ain by inlemol "'""''''', Ihat our !lOUIs as
c:omprehending themselves, and hegemonial Or having a rulin, po .... er
over dlem""lves., .;:an exert themseh'cs more or kss in ""If-rerolkaion,
"If-attention, httdfulna:s, and animad"ertenee, in ~ipl.l.nt cimtmspec-
tion, in fortifying themseh'es in firmness of purpo5C' and re5(llurion
beforehand, in aT!"),ing and pursuing steady designs of life, in exciting
endeavours, in activity and diligence of execution. No,,' when men an:
commended for diligence, indu5uiousness, studious endel\'ours, firm-
ness and steadiness of resolution in good, vigilant circumspection, and
blame ror the ammry, viz. _ negligence, remissness, supineness,
irultention, carelessness, &c. These thinl!" are imputed to the men
thetttSClves., as the causes of things, and as n04: being determined by
ne"'''Sary callses as milch as the notions ofa watch Or clock are.

Chapter XII

Bill besides imemal "'""''''' and common norions, the Iiaffi(: thing is
ronfirmed by the Scriptures, not only apocryphal, bUI canonic:al olso.
The genuine ""n" of me ancient Jewish church herein, appearem from
this ofJesus Ihe son of Sirach, ch. xv. It.
Say not K is through Ihe Lord lhal I f.lI .way. For lhou oughlest not to
do 1M things du.1 he hum. Say nol thoo lie halh caused me 10 CtT, fDr
he hath no .....d of 1M sinful man. The Lm-d ha.Nh all abomination, and
they thai feor God 10,·. it nM. Hiftts,olf made man frnm 1M beginning,
and Id't him in 1M hand "f his rounse!. If ,hou .n1l 10 keep ,h.
rommandmenll [Ind 10 perform aca-ptlble hithfuinessJ, he hath oct fire
and "'"... ~ore thee, otrctcb forth thy hand unlo ...""ther tl>ou .n11.
Before man is lift ond death and "'hother him liketh shall be gi •• n him. l '

Whidl latter pusagc seems 10 refer to that of Moses, ~1I1. JO. 'Stt I
hlIve set before thee this day life and good, death and evil. In that I
command thee to k...e me Lord my God, 10 ..-:alk in his ways and keep

"Eat ' " " 'PH1.

,s,

,.
 Offrm,;/1

his ronunandments. ,il 'I caU hea'·en and earth to reo;:ord this day apinJt
you, that I ha"e set before you life and dath, blessing and cuning.
Therefore choose life that thou and thy ~ may li'·e.'l-i Here by leaving
man in the hand of his own col.lllsel is plainly asKrted an llIht{oti(1I0~, or
Illi pDUII", a power of detcnnining himself towards the better Or the
wone, life or death . With which agreeth Solomon himself, Prov. 16.)2.
' He that ruleth his [OWII] spirit is tnOJ"t: mighty than he that taketh a city.'
He that is "pdO(1QJ~ b:wrcP, superior to himself, or a conqueror over his
inferiiorJ pass(ioos~ irascible and concupiscible. This implies a kind of
duplicity in the human SOIIl: one. that which is ruled, another, that which
mleth, or the lOul 10 be as il were reduplicated upon itself and 10
hegemonical over itsdf; having a power to intend itself n>OI"e or less in
resisting the lower appetites, which anl1O'l be without something of
contingency or non-n.,....·ity. W~ the lOul net"'$ .. rily and essentially
good and impeccable, he would be above this self-power _ were he
nothing but lusl, appetite, and Aontct, he would be below it. Now he: is 'in
a middle stale I perfection betwixt boih. He hath some po ...·cr to keep
under his body and bodily lusts' (, Cor. 9.17).1) To mortify his memben
thalllTe upon the earth (Col. l.S). To gird up the Ioinl of hi 1 mind (, Pel.
I. I) . To add IOmCthing ro himself(a Pet . I.S}. 'Add ro your faith ,;rtue,
[and to virtuc) knowledge.' To improve these talents which he hath
n::aived from God, and to return to him hisown with urury (Malt. 15).56
To pUl'le himsclf(a Tim. I.Zt): 'Ira man [therefore] purge himselffrom
these he shall be • vessel ofhonour.' To 'dt;lIl$( ounch'es from filthiness
of [the} flesh and spirit', • Cor. 7. ' . To keep himself pure (I Tim. s.n).
'To keep himself unspotted from the world' lJam. U7). 'To keep
ourselves in the love of God' Oude a l ). To keep himself thaI 'thaI wicktd
one touch him nol' ( I Joh. $.18). 'To O"eTaHIlC' (Apoe. ;1.7).17 In thGl:
places it is pbin that the 5IM.l1 of man hath • reciprocal energy upon itself,
Or of acting upon itself - so that il is not: IMTdy passive to that which it
n:cei,'cs from God - I power orbeing. (oo-workuJ .... ith God, a power of

" 0.. .. ,", , l""',- ,6. .. ibOI., ..... ,9-

" '11011 to"", ..... -ylo:N!y .... IIriooJ;, ..... 'j boo,' (, c.:... 9-'7~
.. "" .. . l"Ihs ........ (1II .... . , . , ...)O."'I'.>7).
" 'To"",, _ ooa",,, .... willi ~,.. .. taI.e .... _ at !d.' (Kro. '"7). '"'- .hhs 101, . ,
_ _ """' ....... ;1 DO_ 1;(' .;·.. 110... _ ... _ _ ... _
_ 4 " , -..... ,"u,OIod ....... _"" .. . h· , ..to...;'d;'" ... '1 .• .• ,.a,.-
Cud_·, ..,d'"
,,.
'VI ate
 Offm1llil1

improving itsdffurtmr and further, and ofkeeping and conserving itself

in good, all which gnnOl be witl>out a non-necessity Or contingency.

Chapter xm

This faculty of o.tiT~oti<7l0~, or ",j powun, or power o"er oulKlvc:s,

which belongs 10 the hegemonioon of Ihe soul, or the soul as
reduplicated upon itself, and self-comprehensive, wher-eby il can acr
upon itself, inlend and uen itself more or less, and by reason Ihemlf
jud~, ond will, and act differently, is intended by God and IUIIUre for
good, as a self-promoting, self_improving po,,'cr, in good, and also a
~-con..,rving power in the .. me, whereby men [receive] prailie of
God, and Iheir persons being justified and sins pardoned through the
merits and true propitiatory ..crifice, Mve • reward graciously be-
stowed on them by God, even 0 cro ...-n of life, NOIwiths!:!.nding which
by accident and by the abuse of it, it pro"cs that, whereby men olso
come 10 be unto themselves the causes of their own sin, of guilt, blame,
and punishment - the objecu of God's vindicative justice, thai which
will especially be displayed in thai !PUt day of judgement which is to
come, The justice of which day of jud~ment to punish men for the
past actions of their wicked livc:s can no otherwilie be defended than by
"""rting _ IUch an he~monioon in the soul, as ",'hereby it has a power
over iuclf or a freedom from necessity.

Chapter XlV

It appears from what I have declared that this liHrum lI,mln'IIm Or

freewill, which is properly an ruh~OOuIOV or sui 101tl11lJ, I power o,'cr
oneself, either of intending Or rem;"ing and consequvuly of deter_
mining ourselvc:s betler or worse; .... hich is the foundation of commen -
dation or blame, praise or dispraise, and the object of retributive
jumcc, remunerative or ,udicative, re ....... ding or punishing; i. not a
pure perfection (as many boast il to be) bUI hllh a mixture of
imperfection in il. So thaI il cannol belong 10 God Or a perfect being to

.8,
 O/fruwill I
have a sdf-imending and sclf-~milting power,s. a sclf-improvin, arod
sclf-impairin, power, a sclf-advancing and sclf-.dcprcssing, to deser.e
p"'~, c:ommendation and ~ward on the one hand {it being obscnr:d
by AristotLe that it does nm: properly belong to God bralVl:r,Jru
p.(lJ(api(ta8a.tr much less to deserve blame and pun ishment. I)ur 10
be mutable Or chanl{CllbLe in .....y of diminuOOn, lapsable or peccabJe,
is an essmtial property of a rational crn!U~. MoTCOvC1 a per~C{
being <:anr>Ol have any such power of stretching its iudgcflll:nt
beyond ceruin kno ..·lcdgc, or of ekinl{ oul the defect of knowledge or
undencanding, and supplying or lengthenin g it OUt, by faith I\ld
probable opinion. A perfect beinl{ Cln neither be more nor Less in
inlmOOn or beinl{ I pure act, il Cln hive no such thinl{ os self-
recollection, vigilant circumspection or diligence in CXttUtion, bu t it
is immutable or unehlnl{Cllble goodnoss, and wiWorn undcf~l iblc.
Anus and his followcn maintaining the Logos, the word and Son of
God by whid! all things ~re made, to be a crnturc, did conscnta-
ncously thereumo assert, that he was endowed with this kind of
liHru", arbitris."" whereby he was mutable, lapsable, and pccg.ble 00
BUI the N;';""e fathers, defmdinl{ the true Godh"d Or di"in i,y of
the Logos, deereed on the contrary that being not lapsable, ......
p«eable, he was nOt endowed with tlull liN",,,, ,,,bllriu,,, which is In
essential property of every ... tional or intelligent creature. Acrordinlly
IS Origcn 61 had before declared llult the Logos, beinl{ essentially "'_
inlellect itself, could therefore never deJt11e ... te inlO folly. And the
Holy Ghost, being essentially holiness itself could nm: degenerate intO
unholiness, and 50 neither of them could haye tbat liN",,,, IJrhi,..."",
which is tbe original of lapoability and pc<:ability. And Ihus 5t
Jerome, S~hu Dtw ~((.u 11011 1D,nt. (ult'IJ, 1[11;" Iihnt. IJrbitrio
p'lUllillJ J~III. IDSSIIIII ;" ~I'IJ1fU{Ut p.rl~'" " f1«I~". [Only God Clnnol

.. ' .. be . . . . .....,. oM ...... <abIy Good and ...., _ . ....... I'u r ioo _ .. be .. ~
coofuc<'" F,.....;J{' _ OIl .FI ' Ii _ . i" .... aII ... ·perfoco _I',
.. 'TGIoe FRiood. "'..... . ", AhAodt. N;._.... EMia "a,b, .... )",
.. CoId_ .. r.n., dw Arion ......,..... oleo;,! 01 .... d;';";!)' 0I00t'0<, _ ... ,' 1 ,

. . "'" _ «.
. ;11 0( AltunoIoioo « . J"'}....:I N;"", PI) .
• , n.._olOripn .... _lNod ...... Arion _ " CoooI-.h """ ......!oo _ .... ....
"1"'""",.. rirw olon.-,
by d ' . ';''I1oOm fn;ono. .............. dw~ ...... , 0( r"".;11 ....
""'1opo_()aCold_~"""".....,.
..... _ _ 0( An.o ...... ;", L S"
.......
,,.;
J. T ............. _S,H_'Thc ~· 4~
(od,~ $...-=;, . .~ '" Rol. .. ' " c.Irw< 0{
XVI ... ,. XVIII... "'""'''' (W...... and ...... '~l~ pp. ')9-<1_

,M
 Offrwnll

sin. Sin~ all O(he. thinp are endo,,-ed with fne .... ill, they can lum
either ""3y],(>2
But""'"'" there are who persuade lhemsc:h'cs tMllhe ~.fo:-crion of
the Deity consistelh in being indirrerent to all thinp, altogether
undetermined b y any ant«:went moti,'''' or rraons of ,oodneu,
wisdom, or troth, and ilStlfl0 he the sole determiner of alltMse by an
indirrerent, :ubilnt)', COIltin",nt Ind fortuitous ... ill. And this is that
monstrous and prodiz:;ous idea or portraiture of God ",hich Can ... ius
hath drawn out in hi. ""'tlphysics,·J That there is If Nil. 'QIN "'n' aNI
HIf; {no principle of tnlth or goodnessl in nature Intt«<knl to hi. "'ill.
So thai oocording to him, God is boch good and ",ioe by will, Ind not by
any natUre; • heing nolhing but blind, indirrerent, and fortuitous ,,·ill.
omnipotenL And all divine perfections ore swallo .... ed up inlo .... ill _Ihat
• trian,le hath thne angles equal to IWO right angles., thlt equals lidded
to equals make equals, or that lWO and 1\\-0 are not four othe ...... iSoe than
oocording to his will, beau"" they .. ere made such by an arbitrary
decn:c of God Almighty .... Wherus aocording to Sciprure God '" •
nature of infinite Lon, goodness, 0' benignity, displaying ;lStlf ac-
conlin, to infinite and perfect wisdom, and 1O,'em{ing] Rat{ional]
creat[ures] in righlWu.nOS!!, and th", is liberty of the Deity, SO thaI it
consi.reth nol in infinite indirrerency blindly an.d arbitrarily determini ng
.U thinp. Then: is • IUtU.., of goodnOS!!. and • nature of ,,-isdom
anlecedent to the .... iII of God, which '" the rule and measure of it. But
th", hypothesis ofCan.,.;us Ilike o\'enhro..s all mor.ality and lCien~ at
once, makin, truth and falsehood as ..-ell IS the ~ dirrerena:s of
,0001 and evil ITICTe arbitrary Ihings, ...·ilI and nO( n:tture, [and] thereby
al$o deslroy. all faith and trust or oonfidrncc in God, IS well II!; the
certainty of Qristian reliJioon.
Upon this ground or principle, of God h,,-ing an arbitrary contingent
freewill to all thin!!" did 5C:IIm of the Arian party endeavour to
o'"CTlhrow the divinity of the Son or Word , Beau,,", God muSt needs
be",t him un .... illinJly, unless he bcgo!: him by an arbitrary contingent
freewill, which would make him luse a precariou. existcna, and 10 be
destroyable apin at pleasure, and f;OrI""'Iuenily 10 be • creature. But
"'Arioo ••
••• "" ".., : .77 , _
, _ .......,
. . . 'OJ t . __ c- po« r'~R.'-- _ . . •• .~
.... ,_
"'~ '. • .. 0,...11, "" ,.. - ' JJ7. " 1>1 .... ,...., , .. _ . ... ,,_ . ....
.. ..,~ ... s.._I'0_..., 1,1+
.. $00 _ TfS. p ..... _ _ Cud • .,do 1 _ 0 '1' , ",,' ............. cohIJ ~ioo. ""'" •
1U,.... wol n-. Of l'" ,~ Iftd DoCt-' ,f,....,'.

'"
 O/frterrill

Athanasius and Ute oth.,. catholic flthers in OppOSllJon hereunto,

maintoined thot God the Flther begot I Son mil by arbitnry free....iIl,
but by way of TIlItural emanation incu. pon:al and yet nOl therefore
unwillingly IMlr yet ""i1hou[ will neitlln, but his will and nature here
concurring and being the IiOIIl'Oe. it being both a natural will and willing
TIlIture. So that the Son begon m thus from eternity by the es5CTItW
ftcundity of the Father and h;s o~erflo"'-ing Jl(rfection (which is no
n«essity impostd l,lpon him, nor yet • blind and OIupid natur." as thot
of fire bl,lming or the .l,In shining), this di~ine "piluK'''''''', or oUt
shining splendour of God the Father hath no prearious, but a necas:ary
uista>ec:, and is I,Il\deslroyabLe.~ WherelS all crtatl,lru, having once
had • beginn ing, cannoK possihly ha,'" a ntteSSal"y Hislena:, wen: it
only for Ihis n:ason, beaiUR Ihey ona: W(Te nOI. But besides Ihis lhere
can be no repugnana:, bl,lt that wh.t ona: was not, might not be again;
Or be reduoed to non-existena: by that ",-hich sa"e it a being 01,11 of
nothing. Wherefore thol,lgh it should be affil'nM'd thai creatures also did
proceed by way of emanation from the Ddt)', os being a kind of .Ui~
lfpo4>tiP'KOI; of God Almighty, yet was this emanation of anCKber kind
from thot natural and nec' ' I)' emanation of the Son. n~ly I
voluntary emanltion sl,lspettdible. Nor can it be denkd but that God
Almighty might by his absolute power .nnihiLote this ...·hole creo.tion. A.
suppose, if aU .. tional creatures s.hOlJld dexctlenle, (os. greal Jm'f ha"e
done), and continue obstinately in their apostasy (as a late ~
wpposcth the annihilation of wicked men's &001., arter the day of
judgement, ronduding this 10 be the 5CCOnd death threatened), and
then instead thereof crtate alWlther world of rational creatures, which
conceit of other worlds created before th is from eternity, hat h not only
been o,.-ned by the Stoics asserting an infinite viciuirudc and revolution
of ...·CKIds, one after another, all new ill> to the ntional creatures in them,
but also hath been . l,Irmiscd by some of the Christ(ianJ profe:ss[ion],
Origen himsdfhoving IIOfTIC umhng<' of it."
All will is genenlly ackno .. lcdged to hove this naturally or necessarily
belonging to it, to be determioate<! in good, 1$ its objecr, it being
impo&s:iblc thll any intelligentbeiog slo.ould wiU evil ao "1IC1o.. TIo.cTefore
.. M .On ,.. . . ..I1J) _ T , ... ok' !, at tbr "',_. at Ooriot ....... Ariw.,.
t , ... t, ....... tbr .. '·' u""" " ;.. <TH<I .. ' \ ' '"tbre ·.at/>;_1J.>.5).
.. .sm;. doLua.. 01 _ _ .,..,.... !in _ . p. " , . c..I_ .... ..r... .. on,...'.
"t ttt li. '"""'" ........... - , of ,..... : , _ " " - " . . . . . at -.00<10
..un."'.,. ... _.....' ,M"

opvngnted m nal
 Offrmpjlf

it seems blMh rational and pious to concei,'c lhal the best: of all beings.
who is tumtlally good md ~,should always act aJrttably to its o ...·n
nalure, md !herefnre ...ill !he besl, md OO1lsequendy make Ihe world in
thc best: manner that it was capable or. Some indeed will needs
p~nd"1 Ih.1 God does nIlt always do Ihe besl, becou"" IMY suppose
Ihis to be m essential freedom and libeny in him, 10 be indiffemu 10
will atm the better or !he WOrR:r. Which is all one as to !Oay he is
indiffc rent to act either, acrordinl to his own wisdom and goodnCS!l, or
not . But none ofthesc men, nor my alheists neither, were e'-cr yet able
to show how the workmanship of God in m y part of !he world, or in
their own bodies, could have been mended in the least thing that is. Nor
can God's providtntt in the govemnmlt of rational creatures be
suspected nnlto be tM best, by m y wl\o belie'-e that M hath appointed
a day wherein he will judlt' the "" orld in righTeousness, and without
respect of pers[on,j "'nder to evfery] man accordjing] to hi, works.
When M<>scs tells us of God pronouncing of everything thaI he made,
that it was 'IC~ ~1t1 vtry IOH (Gen. 1.31 ), we aJ"C to undcntand the
meaning to be, thO! it"'0\5 the besl, the Hebrews having no olher W;ly 10
express the superlative.
Notwithstanding which, arbitrary md contingenl liberty is not quite
excluded from !he Deily by us, there beinl many cases in which there is
no besl, bUI a gmt scope and latitude for Ihings to be detmnined either
this w'y, or that ..... y, by the arbitrary will and pleasure of God
A.lmighty. A.. for instana:, !he world being s upposed to be finite (as it
ean nil moll: be infinite than it could be eternal), that it should be just of
sucb a bigness, and nIlt a jot less or bigger, i. by the arbitrary
appoinlment of God, since nil man can with reason affirm Ihat il was
absolutely best that it sl\ould h[a]ve been so much as an inch or hair's-
breod!h bigger or lesser !hm it is. The number of the stan musl need s
be either even or odd, bue il cannot be said that either of them is
absolutely in ilKlf the besl nOr yet Ihat the number of those nebulose
.tllkl( [Staf1;j, that appear to our sight as.mall as pind ust, sl\ould be just
so many as they arc, and neither one more or Jess. So likewU;c the
number of created angds and human soul., or that every One of uS had a
being and I consciousness of ou rselves, must needs be delennJn.ed by
the arbitrary will and pleasure of the Deity , wl\o can obliterate and blot

.. .... 01 ~ <lU.c

,.,
"

•
 O/ftmAlI

anyone of us Out again OUt of being, and yet the world nol be a jol Ihe
kss perfect by it. Howevet' we may readily bear a p;lrI and join wilh Ihe
four and twenty elders in the apocalypse falling down before Ihe throne,
in that 500g of thei,.,., 'Thou an worthy 0 Lord to reaive glory and
1Km000r and power; for thou hasl crealed all things, Kru ma
r~v BiJ.Jtalv
!TOO, f(ll" thy will (or pleasure) they are and Were crealed.o6II Though all
things in the unive"" had not betn arbitrarily nude 5uch as tbey '""',
but according to the best an and wisdom, yet "'ere they not therefon
leu for Ihe will of God; il being his wiU 10 nuke them according to his
wisdom; or to order aU things in number, measure, and wcight {Wisd.
II . ZO).09

Chapler xv

The instanoes of Ihe Ta iv&X';!l£"" ,r;J.w.; lXtlv, as the Gm:ks call

them, such things as • ..., contingent or unnt=ry, h"'e been f...,_
quentiy given in inanimate bodies thO! hI,'c no ""If-moving nor ""If-
changing power, and the...,fo..., can ncver be moved nor changed but, as
to Ihem",,!>'cs, ne<:cssarily. As for eumple, that il may eilher rain or nO!
rain tomorrow; that the wind may then blow either from the nonh, or
from the south. 'These and such like inferences h,,·c been conuno.l1y
given by ancient writers (as well as modem) who assen contingency
againlit the Dcmocritictl or Stoical f.Ite Or necessity of all actions; but, as
I conceivc, "cry improperly, for though the..., be in JUltu..., a possibility
of eithet' of these, and the..., is an unartaint)" to uS which of them will
be, yet which§OCver of them al any time com ... to pass, COITloOlh nOi 10
pass by any contingent libcriy of its own, but is determined rvcess·rily
by natural ClUSQ antcadent, or without. As for thot OIher ""mman
instana: of the casl of. die,70 he,.., is no contingency or non-nea:ssity
neither in the motion of the die after it be out of the CISter', hand,
though it be uncenain to U5 which side will fall uppermost. But there
may be an antecedent contin!:cncy in the postu,.." and fora:, or impulse
of the thrower, which is to be distinguished from the motion of the die
itself. No body that is by nat"..., tu;poKi""mv, oJ""'ys moved by
.. Rndo_ •.". .. ;-< . .......... , ..... t"'_ .... $ t _",._
• , _ T _ o{ '"""".Y-""""""." w.m.""- _ _ •...t IV. 1'1'. '1l>-1 .

.,.,
ryl ate
 Offrw;il/

....... thing elsc, and never originally from itself, can have a contingency
or non-necessiry in its own motion, its such, though it may hi:
contingently movw by something else, having a power o"er its own
action, to determine the same,
Wherefore there canoot pos5ibly hi: anything more scnse\e$s and
absurd than the doctrine of Epicul'US, ...·ho asserting a amtingent ~berty
of willing in all animals, frtt from Dte and necessity, den"ed the original
thereof from. a contingent de.:lination of senseless atoms from the
perpendicular, more or less, and unartainly this wa)' or thu way,
ord ne mmS ipsa ~ n=um
inte!ltinum habcat <unchs in rebus agondi.
e, devicfa quao «>ptu. rerre, patique,
id facit e.iguum ditwnen principiorum
,..., rqione loci ecru, n« temp"'" <=10.
,'But ,.·ho, 1..1" the mind itSelf from run-ing n",,",it}' ",;thin it in .11
..,.;"".. and fTOrn !>tin, .. i, .'ne m.....mj and f<><ttd '0 endun: and '"
suffer this, is the minute .wt1'ving of the tiM beginnings at no filed
pbce Ind at no filed time,1"
And this forsooth upon this preten"", kst anything lihould come from
nothing, or be made without. causc:
quare in oerninibus quoqU1:, idem r.teu<: ntt< - 't " ' ,
ts$< oliam pno<t ... plagu. <1 pondera ClUsam
""",;bus, unde haec ..t nobis innata potesIU,
de nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmu.,
['Wherefore you must admit !he ........ exis .. in the seed. aloo, tho,
moOOn' hI,' .... me COUSl: OIhtr than blo.... and ... oiShlS, (TOrn which th"
PO-' is born in us, since "'" 1ft thot nothing can be produced (TOrn
nothing'.fZ

Wherefore for the avoiding contingent libcny coming from nothing, Or

Ming without a cauoe, he ..,igo.;t an impoo.siblc cauoe, for oothing can
he mon: impossible than this, Wt a sc:nst"less atom which hath no sc:lf-
moving power, should have in it a contingem liberty of moving Ihis way
or Wt way.71

'"
'I' ate
 O[[rttIDil/

Ntvcnhc1ess il may wen be questioned whether there may mil: be

50mething of oonlingcnq or non-nea:ssiry in Ihe actions of brute
animals, though it be out of ql.lelition thaI they have nothing of monliry
or monl freewill in them. We did before: we notice of a certain kind of
libeny from necnsity, wltere blame or commendation had no plxc,
called by some of tile ancients epeleuslic, where thcre being an equal
eligibility in sev ..... l obittu widlOUt the leasl difference, we can
determine ourseh·e. fonuilOusly to either of them. Now il is no\: easy 10
exclude brute animals from such a oontin~cy as this, bcause then:
may be obj«u proposed 10 thrnt (as of meat and drink) 50 e:nedy
equal, and placed at such equal di.unccs for. considcnblc time; as thaI
it cannOl be ooncei,'cd what ph)"Sical cause then: .hould be neces5ll"ily
to detennine them at last to dtller of Ihrnt, or to this ntlleT than that.
And yctthey "'ill not hang in suspense but certainly do one or Olller. So
again when: tMY an: dimacted betwixt an equal fear and I\'enation on
one side, and equal hOf><' or desire on the other, at the same lime, as •
dog bel"'ixI a whip and a bonc, they will not alway. continue in demur
and au.pen", 'hoU5h 'h" ..,.1.,. bco u"",,,ly even, and a perfee< U~.,..,~ ..
10 motives and causes. SUI tlteff will .fter a detennination, 5Omelimc.
one way, sometimes anolher, which cannOl ....en be lhought ne<:essary
without anything of fortuitous contingency.
Motto"er Epicurus " 'OS of opinion, lhat ... ,,"ell brute animal., as
men, had a po,,"er o ,'cr themsch'cs, of intending themseh'cs more 01" less
to their sensual or animal~, fancied hy them:

n""ne vida etiam poltfact;' tempore puncto,

oarttribus, nan pn<SC: wnen [prorumpttc <'Quorum
vim <:upidam tam de rubito, q ...m .... ns ..·et ipsa].
['Do you not sec also .. hon ""Ils.re thrown o~n at a li.·on moment, that
nc"crthclao the ager force of the hones connOl burst forth so wddmly
.. the mind i..tlf <:no· ... ,']"

Wh«c he CO/ltth'cd that brutes "'en: nO! mc~ly passi~e to their own
rancies and .Qnlfat' but that they could add S01TICthing of lheir own to
them mo~ or less, and actively intend themscl~cs beyond what they
suffered or what W2S by naru~ impressed upon Ihem; which, ifit be so,
lhen must then: be 50mcthing in brutes superior to their ~MftUU, some

.. l, "";... ~.,.... ....... ~-4. Tho "'" .... and .... 1I"1i........ "'" io llIc .. ;Poa1 ...

'.'
 Offrullli/l

one thing, whio;h, taking notice both of OUiw",d objects by sense, and of
its own fancies and ~o"""" em intend them more or kss, and add more
or less to them.
And there may seem to be some funher pn.>bobiliry of thi. from
hence, becolJJ;C we find by experience that brutes are man y of them
dociblc, and can acquire habits, to do many tllings even to admintlon.
Now fmcics and Mmult as liuch are nlM capabk oflulbits, no more than
orrrttwiU. And thuc:fore that which thc:so: habits ore: in, and which thUIi
dcttnnines their moUon5 (and their ~o""". too) must be a kind of
h~moni(: in the acting probably not witMut some contingenq.
However it is not easy 10 belie,·c WI e,·try wagging of a dog's tail, every
morion of a wanton kiding sportfully playing and toying, or of a II...
skipping, hath such a necessary cause, as thai it could none of them
possibly hIve been otherwise.71

Chapter xvt

But whatever be the <:asc: of brute animals as to this particular, whose

in5ides we cannot enter into, yet we being in the inside of ouRCI.eli do
know certainly by inward sense tllat there is in us some OM hegemo-
nical, wh ich romprehending aU the other powcrs, enefiles, and capa-
cities of our soul (in which d\"IlKfofJa).asl'O(}tw they ore: recollected IlIld
as it were summed up) luI,·ing a power of intending IlIld exerting itself
TTI01l' or less, dctennineth, not only actions, but also the whole passive
cap<lbility of our ""lure one way or Olher, either for the bener or the
WORC.
And I say WI according to reason there must of necessity be such a
thing lIS th is in men, and all imperfect rational beU1gs, or souls vitally
united to bodies. f or there being so many several faculties and different
kinds of energies in them, as the oalsitivc perception of QUtlQrd objects
together with bodily pleasure and pain, sudden fancies and hO..,IIU,
appetitcs IlIld passions towards a prcso:nt ..,.,ming good, or againlit a
present apparent (vii, rising up in us, or toming upon us and invading
us, with great force and urgency. then thc fm: reason of our pri ..... te

"'Hc . .... ... ...... . iw',._ ...... ,...,,_.

'"
 OfftttlNII

utility, which disco'-enng inamven~nces prucnt and fut\ln: anending

them, often amtradicu these apJl(rires of a present semu.al good, Apin,
the 5uJl(rior dictate of honesty, which many times is inconsistent both
wilh !he apJl(tite!; of pleuure and the n::uon of private utility. Besides
then:, a s)l«ulative power of contemplating it 9"",'- '"'Ie d '"0'" mle, of
whatsoever is and is nlM in IWUn:, and of the IrUth and falsehood of
things univenal, whence it obtr\ldes upon us the nOllce of. God and
His existence IS the objca of religion, the substantiality or pennanem
subsistence of our own soulsafter me body's droly. Lastly a demxming
powt'T of what is to Ix done in life in order to the promoting of our own
good and upon emergent occ:asions, I say then: being so many wheels in
thili machine of our souls, unless they Ix all aptly knit and PUt togt:ther,
so IS to conspin: into one, and unless then: be. some one thing prniding
Over them, imending itself more or less, directing, and ordering, and
Jiving me fiat for actioo, it could nOl go forwards in motion, but there
must be. a confusion and dismction in it, and we must needs be
perpetually in puzzle. We should Ix like to a disjointed machine or
aUtomatOn all whOliC wheels are nne well ""I togt:ther, which therefore
will be either at a stand continually, or c1"" go on very siowly, heavily,
and cumbe.rsormJy_ It could never arry on evenly any stead y designs,
nnr manage itself orderly and agrenbly in undenaking, but would be.
altogether a thing inap! for action.
If apJXtites and passion rise necessarily from ob~ witllout and the
n::uon of private utility did necessarily suggest something amtrary to
them from the consideration of other present inoonveniences or future
ill consequences, wen: there nne some middle thing here to interpo5e or
to umpire bet"Nttn them WC' must of neoessity be nonphrssed and at a
stand. But if either of these by superiority of strength did alW;t~
necessarily prevail OVer the other, then would that other be altogether
useless and supufluous, and so the wholl:. bungle in natun:.
The case il the same IS to the clashing and discord betwixt the
SliJl(t lot dicate of honesty and conscience and that ohensual pleasure
or private utility. If these two be ~uipondennt IS scales in a balance,
and there be no hand to rum or ClSt in grains of advantage either ....y,
then must the machine of me 5(>IJ1 be at I stand. But if one of them do
alW;tyl necessarily preponderate the other, men is the lighter altogt1hu
idle and to no pUrpo5e.
Again, if s)l«ulative and delibe.r.ariwe thought be always necessary in

".
 °ffrm"iI/

us, both "" 10 exercise and spccifionion , Ih~n mllSI il be ~ilh~r boau..,
they aR all ~ly produced ilI1d detennined by objeClS I)f'len..,
from without, according ro !he docIrin~ 1)( Oemocritus II1d Hobbian
alheislS, or ~lse because the understandin, ah'"lI)'S necessarily " 'orketh
I)f itself upon this .,.. 111:01 object, and pusclh fmm one object 10 anocher
by a nec:esury ..,rics or train II1d concalenation of thoughts. Upon
supposition ofmc, fOl " "'r,...., rould "",vcr think of anythin" I>(W spuJo: •
....,..d at any time but wlut obiern of IICT1se wilhrnil did obtrud~ upon us
unavoidably. We roold never divest our I)"-n thrnighu, noT stop the
inundation of lhem flowing in I strnrn from ooj«u nor mtenain Illy
conSWlt desi~ I)f lite, nor carry on any projects for the fUlure; ,",'e
bein, ooly pus;"e tl) lhe present obj«u of lICT1iC before UIi, all our
Ihoughts bein, .]1 scribbled I)r sumped up<:>n our 5I)uls by them as upon
a shec:1 <>f paper.
But if the latter of these be supposed. then rould we never 1I:o"e Illy
p,ek""" of mind , no n:o.dy attention 10 ... """,nl Dttur'u ....... or
occuionl, but our minds would be always royin, .,.. rambling out, w~
having no p<:>wcr o,'cr them 10 calilhem back from Iheir straRlings, or
fix them and ducnninc them on any ""nain objoects.
Lastly, if we could not intend ourseh-es in dili"'l1<% of activily and
endca"ours, mort' or kg ~ ourseh'cs 10 pursue any puTpOSe' or design,
fonify our minds with rnoiution, ncit~ ourulvcs ro ""'Ichfuiness and
circumspection, recoIlea ourselves more and less in considering.1I our
interests and concerns, if we oould nol from ourselves exc" any acl of
yi"uc or tk~ion f.,.. which we should tntly deserve praiK, nor anI act
of.in for which '"'c .""uk! justly dcsen'~ blame, for ...., shmold be1 bUI
dead machines mo,-cd by Kinuners and "ira; (I"~fII'"'' MrvU .Iit"..
m~t Ii""",,) .
To conclutk, God Almighty roukl not make such I rational creature
u this is, all whose joinlS, 'prings, and whec:1s of tn(l(ion ...-ere
,........ .. rily tied I~r, which had no .df-p<:>nr. no Ite1!;cmonic or
ruling principle, nothing 10 knil and runi'''1 ,he: multiforiou. ]W'tS of "I~
IlUChine into one, to JlecT and IIWI.Igc lhc conduct of i"",lf no _
than he WlJld havc made a1lthc bird. ofth~ air OfIly ";Ih one wing, all
th" basts of th" 6eld. hones, and other canle "ith Ihrec: legs, for the
idea ofthne Ihings is nothing 50 unap! u that of an imperfect rational

."
 Offru~;ff

beinl, aU w!loK POWttl and wheell of ~ an: ~Iy tied

~, which hath no ~ thinl preaKlinl and JO~inl in it, havinl
• 5elf-inll:lldinJ, and self~mnininl, and self-promurinl poWl:r.
Wherdore m il ark&{oWlO~. ,..; ,.,t1fu, self-poWl:T, commonly
called liberty of wi11, ;. no arbitnry contrinna:, or appo;nuncnt of
Deity, rno:rdy by will anne.ud to mional aaturu, bill a thinl which of
n'" 3'ily bdonp to die idea or nuliR of an impel I'«t ntionaI beinJ.
Whaula pttfect beinr. _tially sood and ......, ;. lIbo\'e mil f, «wiD
or self-poNts, it beinr impolS>'ble that it should enr improve i(K1f,
much leu impair itself. BUI an impcrf(taJ ntiorW heinl, which is
without m. K lf-powcl , . an iMp! rnonl"'1 and rnonwous minJ,1Ind
therdon, .uct. • minr .. God could not mate. Bul if ho: 1I'OUkI male
any imptifKt n:lionaI CI'CIllIl'ft, ho: mUSt of ne<;CSSily endue: lhem with
an iotrr-IIitP or self-tulinr po ...~r. WheRfore thaI wbich by a.;cidenl
follows from abide of' lhit; powo:r tmnoI M imputed to God Almi,bty _
a5 tho: COIIK of it, vic. sin, and vK:c. and wid<c:dnas. Since ho: mUSI
rilho:r mab no imptrfect ntionaJ heinp al all, or else male thrm such
who rtIIy M Iapsablr and ptLcoblc by Ihrir own defaul17'

Ch;pter XV1I

I haVt now bUT one: mini moR 10 add, and ,hat is 10 take notice of.
<lI)fTUl'IOR mistakc which lamed men hove been guilty of. confoundinl

this faculty of ~will ",ith libc:ny ali it ill a ltalt 0( pUR pttfcction, for
what is mon: c;ommon!han in writinp both ancient and modem, to find
men crukinl and boutinl oftbc ~oot1ja tW~ dvrIKElJ'iWU~. tho: libc:ny
of contrarirty, i.t . 10 sood or t~il, ali if tbis wu really. bberty of
ptrfKtion, 10 M in an indiffCTtnI ~uilibrious mtt to do sood or evil
moral, which is too ~kt tho: Jan~ of lho: 61"$1 lmlptcr, 'Thou shall be
• God krtowinl sood and evil.' WheRM the: lnot I;:" 11 of. man, II il
speW pure pttfu:riOil • when by tho: riJbl 11K of tho: faculty 0( Utewill,
!osW>er with tIM: aaisbnoet: of Divine I''''', he is habitually fixed in
monJ sood, or ....:h a fOliC of mind, .. lhal he doth frttly. readily, and
caaily comply Wh the law of the: Divine life. taking • pleasun: in
" _. ... ..."I00 ....:H~-:I"~.::==
• 0
• ii _
. ).$: 1 ' . _ ..................... od,.
.

,,.
,
 Ollrr~AJI

complattna IMrt:unlo; and hlvin, an l\~nalion 10 Ihe rontnry; or

..hen lhr b .. oflht; 'Pirit oflife halh madc: him frtt from thc b .. of sin.
which ;.; 1M dalh of 11M: IOU!.
Bul ..hen, by 1M abuse of lhal nuul'lll faeulty of frttwill, men COIt"Oe
habinWly bed in c.il and sinful inclirwiona, then an: they, as Boethi",
..ell Hpl " I it, Ii.,,,;, 1iMr1./t (.,tit;o.• knowinl good and nil, 'made
apti' 'C, and broulf'ol in ~ by their ooom f.cewill,'7'1 and obno.riowo
10 di~ jllilice and displcuure for the iIamC. Who....uo:r C\IIiomarily
convnineth &in,• .. hidl;'; by h.ii 0"1I frttwillllbwed or t>U .... sdy
UKd. contnry 10 the deliilP'l of God. and nalure in bestowin, lhr ume
upun 14, is lherroy made the Jo:rYant of it. and dcpri.,cd of WI 1n>C'
mlC of liberty, .. hidl is man 'l po:rfection.
The flC\llty offrttWiU is good. .. he.wy men lin' adnnccd abo~c ,he
low condition of brute animals. ,,'1'10 a", under I """ i~y of foIlowin,
lIM:ir fancies..., ,, '., and appetiles 10. JeftIWII good only, 0' a good of
pri""'tC ..elfish utility, lhey hlvin, no JCIIK of thll good of honesty, and
.ilf'oICOllinal whidl is of I diffcm. t kind from il. Bin this flClllty bein,
thaI which ill pro~. 10 crcalUru, and 10 im~rfttl beinp only, hath I
mi;nU1'( of creamrely "ukMtl Ind im~.fection, in it; and therefore is
liable 10 be abused, 10 all lhereby 10 beCOlrlC 10 OUrKh'H the Clu"" of
1Hl' own bond~ and servitude. Whereas lrue liberty, wh ich is I state of
vin"", holme., and rightnl\lsneu (a communiClted Divine ~rfttlion
or panieipation of lhe Divine na!U re) can llC\'o:r be abused .

Q UpltT X\'III

I now pro< .d 10 _,,'Cr all lhe argumcnu or objections made aplnsl

this I'ac:uIly of thero
~' rjJI'~ or aUreoeOOaIO ~, thil; P# ,.m/.I, or pD'<'fer
over oonelV5, .. hidl in (ns • contingency oc ~ity, and is
commonly ..........'"" ....'" and Iw ...", ....'m .- _ the (""n<brion or
praise and dispruK, of n:uiburivc ju.oo., n:onordin, and punishin,.
And this as tIM: man..... hlth bttn now alrudy HpbiMd by Wi will be
YU)' (:IIiy for Wi 10 do.
I begin with ,he pretended pound$ why this 5houJd be 1fpdyllO-
"r 0."_ _ _ ".'.'.,.,., . , .... .. _ , • .-,..,... ..... ' ...._ .
• ""L~ I'

'"
 Offt..",ill

d"';lrapK'!'ov, a thing which hath no existeD« in nalUre, but in iuclf [is]

unimdligible and absolutely impossibk. TM first whereof is mis that
nothing can move OJ" act an y ""'y, but os it is mo,-ed nr acted upon by
~hing else with",,! iL This argument is thus ridkulnusly PT!>-
pounded by Mr Hobbes, 'I con~ive tbat nothing lakem beginning from
itself, but from t~ actinn nf some other immediate . 0 1 witlwlu!
itKlr.,*1 But mis meaning, if he had an y meaning, could be nn other
tlwl this, that no..:tion taketh beginning from the agtnt iuclf, but from
the action of ~ other agtnt without it. Which i. all one as if he
slwluld say that no .gent acteth from iuclf, not omerwise than as it is
pOS1li"" 10 ""me other . 0 1 without it. That is, Ihere is nothing self-
moving Or self-lICting in the world, nothing that actem other.riM: tlwl as
it suffererh, or is made to act by somt:lhing else: without.""' Now if mis
proposition be true, il must ,,"d. be granted that there an be no
contingtnt ~berty or freedom from n«es:silY in nature, but all thinp
will d~nd upon a chain of causa ucb link of which is ne«nrily
connecled, both wim what went before, and whal follow5 after, from
eternity.
But it is ~rtain Ihat mis argument makes no more sense againsl
conlingencyor non -necessily, than il doth apinS! the exislence of a
God, or an unmoved mover md finl ause of all tbings _ It is of equal
force bolh ""'Y' and meufore ifit do substanlially and effectually prove
Ihe ne«ssily of all actioru, men doth il as firmly evince Ihat Iherr is no
firsl unmoved O'T uncauoed cause, that is, no God. And I do not
question, but thaI Ihis is the Ihing which Mr Hobbes aimed at, though
he disguises his design as much as he could in his book ~ ~rpq", ch.
~6, 'Eui~" ~o (5c. '.

Ahhoogh from hence thaI nothm, can mo.e i...,lf, il is rilhtly enough
inr.e"ed lhe ... is. tinl mover thaI wu eternal; yet ne>"mhdeSf il cannot
be inferred from thf:nct, .. it mmmonly is, Ihal tlterc is ""Y <lunal
immoveable or unmoved mover, but an the contrary, thaI there is In
eternal moved ",""ver, btausc u it is true thaI nothing is moved from
itself, so is it like... true that Mlhinl is ","",-ed but from I _Iter, ..hir:h
..... itself allo Ix("", ",""ved by ..,.,....,ing else. OJ

"'ori, 001. M...... =do, rot ". p. '14_

" Of LWm, ,01 Nf«!Jity,"
""Thio _ _ . ....... ;,J_,.,. tM. _ It ' .......
.. Ikll, .O'...,.....do.* s..o,...loosioto,YOl. .. p. ~ l1o<. h·· •• Coo!-.Io·~
o ...... I Ltt ,.E...WW..... ""'... p• • , ..

,
,"
opynghtoo IT £nal
 Off.trll>iJl

In which words ~ doth It once cndo:>"our 10 t:r.uuIUK and ronve:y the

poison of .theism, and yn 10 to do it cnJii]y, as that if he be charJaI
with it, he might have some lftITIinr iublmu"" or ~.I4ioo1. He aith
fil'$( WI it is rirhd y infCfKd tMe is lOme fil'$( ttemal mover, which
Ioob vtry wtLL, but then he doth not stand 10 this, but contradicts it
immcdiau.ly af~rWll'd in denyinl that lhen: ;. any nemal immoveahlc
mover, or any other nemal mover, t!un iuc:h as was itKlfbefore R'IO\-~
by IOIM'thinr tlte, which is all one as to Sly that then: was no first
mo'"er. But one thinr moved another fivm nernity, without any
hqinninr, any fint mo~er, any unmo,'ed stlf-mo~ed movu." For the
fim mover, if then: be indttd any such, must n«ds be an unmoved
mo"er, .. hich .,.. not ilSt]f before ....,..ed or acted by anothtt, but a
stlf-movinr mClVu.
BUI Ihis wt..ok Irlument th", at OIK'C. Slnkinl apinst: contingttlCy,
and the: heinl of a God boI:h toStthtr, and which pretends 10 be III
malhc:marial dcmonOlr.uion iI evidently the ~ cI"IioWi piece of
rid~1ous nonstnK that cvc:r .... wrinen . For if then: be moIion in the
corporal world, as there is, and no pari of il could eVer move itself,
then must there of MC$ity be some unmoved or stlf-moving thin, as
the fil'$t ClUIit thenof, IOmcthing which cuuld mo'"< or ~ from itself
wilhout beinll' moved or ao;led upon by I rI01her. BecaUK if nothinll" al aLL
could move: Or &CI by il$tlr, bUI only u il Willi moved or acted upon by
another then could not motion or IClion ever lx-gin, or ever have romc
into the world . BUI since then: is motion in the corporeal world. and no
part of it could moVc ;tRlf, it mUit nffds eithcr ori,inal!y pto(led from
a fint unmoved or IItlf-moving mo,'er and ClUK. or else: .LL of il ...... "e
from lIOlhinl, and be produced without a ClUIit.
Bullhc tnlth is Ihis, liuollhc:se unlikilful phiJosophers apply that 10 all
heinl wiuot:50tvu, .. h ich is the property of body only, tlw il QUlnot
moVe itldf, nor othc ....isc mo,'e t!un as it is Clused 10 move by
IOmtlhin, dst without it; as it ClllIIOI $lOp it$ motion neither, "'hm it ;.
......,. ;"'PI d upon il (it brinl wholly of. paNive natun:), and from
hmcc il afforded an undeniable demonstration 10 us., that ~ is mmc
incorporaJ heinl. and IOrntIhinl unmovo:>ble. or Itlf-m.ovii1g and sdf-
laing, u tht firsl aUK of all moI:ion and action , ...hich in iuelf nor
.. ·""'_ ... _w·.· ,.... _ " _,,;, . _ _ ; ' tlTlS _ ....
, . t t I _ ...... _'-""'_,.; i:a _ _ ........ _
; ._,. " ....... _ t l _ · ,.,mI_. SOOTls. ...... ,.... ,.

'99
 Offrull>ill

being moved nor aaed by mod'leT, can cause body to move locally, md
did at first imprus such quantity of motion upon m. oorpornJ universe
as oow theR' is in it. u

Chapter XIX

Apin, it is obj«ted, that though it should be granted there was

50melhing ""If-mo"ing md ""If-acti"e, and which ,,";os not merely
passive to another thing without it, acting upon it, yet (or all that, it is
noc pos.sibk that anything should determine itself, act;"eIy chmge itself,
or act upon itselfbeause one and the gme thing cannot be both agent
and ~tient at onoe.
To "'hich I reply, first thll there is no necessity rut .. hal actcth from
itself should al"lI)"S act uniformly, Or without any diffen:nce or change.
Thai in U5, which moves lhe members of our body by cogitarion or will,
doth not alway. do it alike, but determinelh illlelf diffen:ndy Ihen:in,
acting somerimts on One member IiOffiClim"" on anotlteT, moving SOI1lC-+
times this "";IY sometimes that ""y md with roon: or less oelerity md
strength, md sometimes arresting motion apin . So that nothing can be
moR' pbin thilll rut, by determining illlelf differendy, it doth a.=rd+
ingly detcmline the motion orthe body. And it is t'Omrary to the verdict
of our inward sense 10 affi rm that, when we thu. mon ou r body and
members arbitrarily and at pleasure, no onc motion of our finger, no
nicUlion of our eyelids, no word spoken by our tongutc could ~CT
possibly h....: been otherwise than it "-as at that time, but that it "-as
necessarily so determined, by a succ:cssi,'c chain of caUKS, from an
eternity, or at least from the beginning of the world, much Jess, as Mr
Hobbes further dogmatizes, that theR' is no one action, how casual or
contingent .... ver il ..,.,m, 10 the au.ing whereof did not II onoe concur
L- • • 16
WI1"tsOever IS .n 'tntm "'"",,•.
That which determineth itsdf and changeth itself may be said to act
upon itself, and consequenrly to be bolh agent and ~tient. Nuw though
this cannot poUibly belong tu a body which nen . moves itself, but is

.. HaIf._·'. . . . . . N....-,..."or"du,"
.. B t: . Of ~.oJ
TII< ' · t .....
......... ",
·;, IO ... bu>dTIS"" . ..... s.

.-""""""f"",, '........ ;cf p. ,60, .. , . , _

p • .., . TIl;' io _ .................. .

'VI ate
 Offrw»ill

es5mlially trCPOKivrrrov, al .....ys mo,'cd by ~thing elK widlO\J! ii,

yet: nothing hinde~ but that what is by naNre amo-Ki",/rov, self-
moving and Klf-aai"e, may also dctermine its own motion or acti,;ty.
and 00 the ".me be ".id 10 be both agmt and patK:n!. We arc: C<rtain by
inward senK that we can refl«t upon uurselves and consider uurselves,
which is J redupliation of lifc in a higher dope.:. For all cogitative
beings as such, arc: self-conscious. Though oonscimce, in a peculiar
KnK, be commonl)" attribUled 10 rational ~ings only, and such as ""'
sensible of lhe iiwilNff ADNnl~"'''' rI ",rpj~,.. [distinction between righl
and wrong], when they judge of their own acrion. aerording to th.t
rule, and eilhu condemn or a<Xjuitth......,lv"". Wherefore that which is
Ihus ct>Mcious of itself, and reflni"c upon itself, may also as ..;ell act
upon itself, either as fortuitously dClermining its own activit)" or else as
intending and exerting itself more or less in order 10 the promoting of
its Own good.

Olapter XX

But it is still further obittted thai' thing which is indifTc ... nt as such
can ncyer determine itself 10 mo"e or act any way, but must needs
conlinue in suspense without action, 10.11 eternity. Thill i. an argument
which Pompon.tiu." 7 relic. much upon to destroy contingent liberty of
will, and establish a fatal nec:cssit)" of.1I aaions.
And her<: we must again observc thot what belonr;eth 10 bodies only,
is hy these philosopher-. unduly ntended to all beings whacsoe'·er. 'Tis
true thai a body which is unable to mo,'e itself, bUI passively indifferent
10 recei,'c any motion impressed upon it, ona resti ng must ne.:d.
continue to Test 10 all eternity, unless il be delermincllo Ihis or that
motion by oomcthing elK wilhout. And if it 5hould be impelled different
., ,....",!'m.,. ".; (htnd P'" , ....... ), lk j.,.. .. , . , . . _ " .. " ......... -, <>I.
btIonI L<mt1 (!.uooo, 19m p ..... Bcd .. -.. I . •y ........ ipoo ....... _ .. , _ _
_ ......... ""110 ..., _ .......... "",ilF<tm ... ""' ..... ""'" .... . I,' lk j. .. ("""
po"boIod 15"71" _ 0( .... _ _ "'P'" _A J
~ , ... ... I em {I 06' - I~IJ _ ..... d br Altx_ ol A"," r
."XC 'TO

dioc... ,;to, 0( .... plLl , w" 0(

"'"ted
A ..... - .... 101 I' fuiooodt ......... of ..... A,.;, r I I " Hciobal
, 7..
77 • . . . . . . , . . . 7

u......for ... _-...ioI ....... ..

....('..... ...
,~.o
,9I6 ~
" -_' ... A..
o,. So< M. I'W><, 1'0.", " , .. ..-
_m ,- ....
It_.r "'" ,.
; ' ~ . . . . .; • u. .. ~
0 of ""
_1t>t
-
R_""

'"
'I' ate
 OffrmPilI

-.nys al onCe by IV"O equal fon::es, it an never be .ble of iuclf 10 move

either -.ny. Two saks put into a perfect equal poise an neither oflhem
move upward or downward . But it will not therefore folio ... that if equal
mtMives to action, equal appeuances of good offer themselves to a man,
he- must the-rdofe stand for ever in an ~"or equilibrium, and can
nc:va- detnminc himself to act one way or OIher.
Nn·crthelcss m is is a great mistake of Pomponatius and many others,
10 mink that mat liberty of will, which is 1M foundation of pmse Or
dispraise, must consist in. man's having a perfect indiffermc:y after all
moti'·es and rcuon, of action propounded and after the last prattial
judgemenl too, to do Ihis or Ihat, 10 choo&e me bern:r or ,,"Oowr, and to
determine himself fonuitously eitm way. for the contingency of
freewill doth not consist in such blind indiffcrency os mis is ana- the
Wt judgellient and all motives of action conside~: but il is antca:den t
tllenunto, in a man', intending or exerting himself more or less, bodl in
toIlsideralion and in IftOlution, 10 ruiSI thc: inferior appetites and
indi~tions to the worser.

Chapter XXI

i\nothe-r argument used to prove th.t contingc:nt frttwilt is a thing that

an have not existcna: in nature is because it il reasonable 10 think that
all elections and volitions are determined by me reasons of good, and by
the .ppearance of the greater good. Now the reasons and .ppearance. of
good ate in me understanding only, and theref~ are not arbitrary but
II... ' .. I)'. Whence it wilt follow that aU eJection. and volitions mUlit
needs be n«<lUI)'.
But AristOllc himself lo"g since made • question whctlKr aU
1I
lpp«nn<:el of good were 1!<"Ces"1)' Or no. And il is most cullin that
the). lin not so. for II we do ITIOI"e or less intend ourselves in
consideration and deliberation, and II we do II1OIl: or less fortify our
raoIutions to resist the lower appearances and p mions, so will the
appearances of good and our p~ judgemen l$ be different to us
accordingly. Whence it frequently (>.lIT1oQ; 10 pass Wt the same motives

,.
 OffrurPilI

and reasons have not the same effect upon different men, nor yet upon
the $lime man at different times. Wherefore thi. is but one of the vulgw
errors; that men are merely passi"e to the ap~annces of good, :and to
their own practical judgements.

Ch~pter XX II

Aoother argu"",n t for the natural necessity of ill actions much used by
the Stoia was this, that OOOllV avaiTlOv, nothing can be ...·;thout. calISe,
and wha~ver hath a callSC: must of neor:ssiry co"", to ~. Mr Hobbes
think. to improwe this argu""'nt into a demonslntion afler this manner .
Nothing can come to pass withou t a sufficient cause, :and • sufficient
callSC: is that to which nothing is needful [{} prod uce the effect,
wherefore every sufficient callSC: must needs be: a necns:uy cause, or
produce the effect necessarily."
To .... hich chiWish argumentation the reply is easy, that a thing may
have sufficient power, or ..... m nothing of POWCT IleCCSSary to emble it
to produce an effect, which yet may ha"e power also or freedom not to
produ<:t il. Nothing is produced ...;Ihout an efliciem Clusc,:and such :an
effic(iem1 cause as had a sufficiency of po ...·er to enable it to produce il.
BUI yet ,hat person, who had sufficienl po .... er to produce an effect
might notwithstanding will not 10 produce it. So thai Ihen: an: two
kinds of sufficienl causes. One is such as acteth necessarily and an
ne;lhCT sus~nd nor determine its o...·n action. Another is such lS o.cteth
contingently or arbitnrily, :and hal h a power o,'er its own :action, either
to suspend it or determine it lS it plnsc:th.
I shall subjoin 10 this :another argumenl, "'hieh Mr Hobbes glories or,
as being the ""Ie invenlor of. From the nec:asiry of a disjunctive
proposition notbing CIJ1 be ... conti ngent but that it WlS ~ly lTUe
of ;1 beforehand thaT it will either come to pass Of not come to pass ....
Therefore, says he, ifthere be a necessity in the disjunction, the", must
be a nCV'SSily in one or other of the two parts thereof o.lone by itself. If

.. B!! • Of ~.oJ N",";", ill £<vld.io H..... vol . ... p. m . 0. ~ c-......

u.."". N«nAty..M c...... 001., ..... . . 1'1'. ]1.-,.
• Dt....,.... Boot .. "Of~ anoILoP<'. do. .. 00<. I. Il: ll LE. torlM w..... vol. w,
I' 'n·

.,
 Of[.uflIiJl

thell' be no IItXXssity that il shll awTH: to pass, th~n must it be nccns:ary

thai il shall not rome 10 pass, u if t!>'re a.>Uld noI be no nc:casity in the
disjunction thoogh both memben of it ... ell' contingent, :and neit!>'r of
them nectsSarJ . This is a IOOSl shameful igrn>rance in top:, especially
for on~ ...110 pretends 10 much to gcomerrical d~mon'lrarion.
And ~ Ihis childish and riditulou. nonoen.., and ooph istry of his
was stolcn from IDe Stoics too, ..ho playcd thc fools in loP: aflcT thc
wt"M: manne!". Every proposition, said lhey, concerning a supposed
fUl\lre contin~t, thlt it will rome to pass, was cit!>'T ~ or faL..,
beforehand and from ettrnity. If it wert: tru~ then it must of rteCeSSity
come 10 pas&, if false then was it neassary it should not rome to pus.
9
.... nd )"et this ridiculous ooph istry puuled not onl)" Cittro ' but also
.... risllll:lctl himself OIl much U to makc IDem IIoId that pn.>p05itions
concerning fUNrt: contingents ""enc 10 be neither true nor false.

Gapter XXIIJ

I now come to ans ....e.- the IrplmeRlS of those, for the fleaSsity of
action, ...110 suppose that though COf1tin~ t lilxny do indent naturally
belong to all rational beings :os such, yet norwithstanding thc nercise
thereof i. peculiarly TeKrved to God .... lmighty himself only. He from all
eternity determining all action. and events wluttsoevcr according to his
arbitrary .... ill and plcuure, and so by hi. irresistible d=ec$ and influx
making them neccsury, though Olhe ......;.., in theiT o.. n naturt: they
woukllut.-e been contingent.
The: first ground of which opinion is th is, for a Clfttun: to excrcise a
contingent arbitrary (,,,, .. ill ;. alL one :os for it 10 ICI independently
upoo God, wherefore Ihis mllR n«do be rcse ...-ed 10 thc Deily, as hii
peculiar privilege and pn:ropti.·c, arbitrarily and cootingently \0
determine alilhinp.. and Iherefore to make all actions nux pry to WL
God would not be God, if he did n<X arbitraril y detnmlne aU things.
" ' I . '""'_ oj ..... _ ....... Ep;cwo. .. _ _ ,rio,',
", .. Ii. . . . . .«Om_ .
r......... Iieri 1- .1, .' <0.- Dr /Mf
'''''~ ·AI ......... ;. "" lira,...
.... &loom; _ pIopo porioo: ..... , . ,~ _
i l . . - .. ..... _1:j:OcIItUI ond .. lOr ""' ....
....,. pc I . , io ........... Of &lot, t ................... ~ ""'''''''' 1 _ .......... "'"
.. . - . . .... . . - . . , 10 ..' (1Mb • ., iw,~
,""fl".
..
.. ANoodt.I.It .... ,..",.
 O//.mI1iIl

BUI first,thii ii 10 ~ ..... llo .. Up all things into God, by making him tht
solo!: X'tOr in Iht un;vax, all Ihinp dse bt-ing- _rdy pusive 10 him,
and dettnnincd in tOO • .mons b)' h im . This .t kasl is, u Plorinus
intimates, 10 m:akt God Iflc, il1lJlXdiatc hi!iiliKlllic, and soo[ 0( lhi! " 'holol:
..orld.'J
Ap;n, this is flO( the JIIprnne pcl"ffCIion 0( lhi! DeilY, to dClmnint
allthinp and actiona ubitrarily, eontinlC"d y, and lOrtuilDUdy. BUI 10
loCI ......... dinl lO sood- and "'isdom, God bein, infinile disinlCT"i!5lrd
kM displaying illiltlf wisely, thercfon: producing from his ft:cundil)" all
thinp lhat could b( madt: and .. rrc fill<.> be made. liufft:Tinllht:m 10 oct
accordin, 10 tMir own n11Um. himself presidinl 0>'(1' aU, and
ucrcisilt, his jusrice;n lhi! man ...."'.nl .nd ptmmo:nl 0( tM ..hok.
And sintI' all rational crururn h1vt H$(nlially lhis propeTt}' of liNn""
....·rriv1ll, tM 10 a..l1t{otl.JIQ~ se[f-po"'i!! belongin, to than, 10 suppose
that God A[m{;,hl)'] could nol "",·.m Ihe " 'orld withou, offering .
consnnl yio[ence 10 ii, ~"i!r luffaing ,h.m 10 OCI according 10 their
own natlln, is >'t ry absurd."
This powtr 0( conring.nl frttwill II !lOI independenl upon God, bUI
conlroJlabloe by him II ploeuurt, as aI50 il is obnoxious 1l1d ICCOUnNh[c
to hi!; juslice in punishi nl Ihe uoroil1nCC!!! of ;1. And " 'cre il nOl for
Ihis, th. Div;n. jlUtkc ",lribUI;v., dispensing ",ward. and puni.h_
mtntl., could have no place ;n thi! world, nor no obiecl to exercise il5<lf
upon.
M OI"tlO\"cT it iii « n. in Ihal God Clnn!)1 dtlermini! and dllCrtt all
human vo[ilionl arnIlClionii _ bill that h. must b( the 5010e CI\JSe of.U
the .in and monl evil in it, and men be tOloll)' rrtt from 11M: luill of
them. But in truth 'hili " 'ill desiroy the ...,.,Iity of moral good and .....·;1,
V;n\1C and "ice, and mal. them !lOIhinl bUI IfI(n 11<1"'" Or mockeries.

Oupli!r XXIV

Apin ;1 ii objeclO:d dw if all hum(anJ aaion5, be neither nccessuil)' in

thcmseh'es, IMM" yn ma.ok.uch by Divine dtucu, Ihey annox pxsibl)'

".. _0..
,. . ~
... _
..........", .. II _ .

,
 °ffnt,;;/1

~ foreknown by God, u..refore we must n~. either deny the Divine

omniprescience, or deny rontingency.
Whe..., in the first plxe wc gnnt, that vo~tions purely coming."t in
their O... n nar[urej (as when the objects or mean. are p«fecdy equal,
and have no differences of bent"!" and worse, ~ing nOl made n~ ....-
rJily by Divinc de... L:S, Or influence neither) are not ceminly foreknow-
able nt (~ ...U. Since that catUI<X ~ certain ly fotekno ..·n t.f f alUU [from
causes] which has no ncc'IS "Y causcs.
And if contingent vo~tions ~ neitheT ceminly fordmo"Olble t.f
(dlUU, nor any way else but are absolutely unforeknowablc, then ..·ould
it be not more derogatory from the Di.·ine omniprescicnce, that it
cannot know things unknowable, than IQ the Divine omnipmence. that
it cannot do things that an: nOl doable, Qr that are impossible to be
don:.
However, these things ...Quld nm be so many as i. oomm<mly
supposed. For all voluntary actions are nm contingent - man' ....ill
being alway. nece·.. rily determined III good, and the Ivenation of eviL,
so that there are innumerable cases in human life, in whidl We may
certainly knll"'· befQrehand what any man in hi. wits ....... Id do, as.ts.;,
many other[.j wherein there can be no doubt but that a good man
would do one way, and a man Qfviciouli corrupt principles ar>(I{her ""y.
NQlWithstanding which, thllugh future contingents be nm foreknow-
able or 'SJ,"", nor we [be] able to comprehend how they shlluld be
foreknown odterwlse, yet WQuld it ~ great pruumptiQn in lI$ then:fQre
flady to deny Divine prescienee in them. he<:ausc the Divine nature and
perfecions surp... our human comprehension. We do ~lieve in
Div[ine] eternity without ~ginning, and therefore withQut successive
flux (fQr we clearly conceive that whatsoever hath a successive duntion
must have had a ~ginn[ingl) tt.ough we cann.o:t romprellend this
eternity.
And we ~1it-vL the Divine omniprescnce QT ubiquity, mough "·e do
not understand the manner of it, since "'.• cannot conceive God to be
extended Qver paru (or". /Mrtn) numerically distioct and infinite.,
wherefore;t would ~ pious III believe [orJ ronee"·. likewise that God
foreknows all future contingent events, thQugh we canllO{ understand
the manner how this should be.
But many learned men and good philosophers h..·e satisfied them-
Klves here, that though events perfecdy contingent be not ccoru.inly

'VI ate
 Offm",ilf

foreknown tX <<1M,,:', )'1:1 they are seen and known 10 God by an

anticipation of fUlurity . The divine du .... lion of etemily, which i.
withoul ,ucceui"e nux, being present CO Ihe past and fUlure, as "'ell as
CO the instant now. He that caUs Ihjn~s lhal all: mX as iflhey ","ell:;95 He
WOOK name is (\ cOv. (, ';v. Kal (\ Cpx0p.ewx;, is and was and will \)(;9(0
He who is bolh pasl and fueure, !iUS all future conlingent even '" in
I~<IIIII ae/t",i/Q/U, in hi. high watch IO,,'U of eternity, and that Ih= is
such I Divine etemi,y is dcmonst .... bk by reason.

Chapter xxv

BUI i, is still further urged Ihat, upon a supposition of Ihe ttnain

pl"C5cientt of fulure contingencies, it will follow una" oidably that they
will nroc rily come 10 pus. This is Ihe constant ery ofSocinus and his
follow,,",'" bUI withoul Ihe least 5h.tdow of reason, for if the presci<:ntt
"" true: they lJIust Lx: r"'~~"'''''n IV be: """Iilllle"''', •."') t11en:furc Iu
~ to pass not necessarily but contingently. Morro"cr, they do not
therefore oome 10 pus becallSC' they are foreknown , but they are
fOll:known because Ihe)' will come 10 pass, the certain pl"C5ciena: is not
the cause ofthei, fUlure coming CO pus. BUllheir fueure comin~ to pass
is the cauK oCthei, being foreknown . Theil: is no more nrocssity arisin~
from the prescience, than there would have bttn from thcir futurity,
bad they not been foreknown. For that which now i., though ne"cr SO
contingent, yet since i, is, ""as fulUre from all elernilY, bUI it WlIS not
therefore nroc'S?rily fumre, bm contingently only. Here i. no ncc;r:ssi,y
but tX 11)'1"1""', or hypothetical. Upon .upposition lhat il will be, il i.
neees"rily future, bUI there i. nO absolule necessity in lhe thing ilSClf.
When a contingent thing hath bttn, and is now pasl, il is lhen nrocssary
thot it should have been; or it could not possibly nOi ha"e been a
lIy",tfmi. aUI il doth not therefore follow thaI il ""as neee' -anly caused,
Of" that it was impoloSibk not to have been .

.. "God, ~ ho ~ tile _ and collett> _Ittinr ..... ich bt ""' .. tI>ourh " .., W< ....
(Ro..q . 17~
.. 'Lon! God........,....-_ ...... is, and is ......... ' ( R... 4.') .
.. F_ So . . (5 . ·n) ( 1 1J'l- 160.0~ _ of ........... ; '" . , - . .... 5 ,,,.~
Iio a' ,of Unil>riooiom.
 Offrtt~1

Apin ir is objeaed mar me suppollirion oflibeny of will is inconsi.nem

wim Divine graa: and will nea:ssarily infer PeLogianism.91 Bur rhe
falsiry of mis may appear from hence, mlr rhose I ngels which by rheir
right use of liberty of win stood ...·hen others by the abuse of il fell,
toough by that ~ ~beny of will they might slill possibly continue
wimout falling, yet for all mit it would not be impossible for them 10
fall, unless IDey had aid and assistance of Divine gnce to secure them
from it. Wht-""fore it is commonly con~ved thlt IS, notwithstanding
that liberty of will by which it is """"ible for them ne ,-cr to foil, they had
need of Divine graa: to sccu.., them agains! a possibility of falling, and
that they a.., now by Divine grate 6xed and con6rmed in such a sute as
that they can never faU .
Much mo.., is the aid and assistance of o;,-ine gnce necessary bolh
for the reoo"cry of lapsed souls and for their pcrsuer.mce. The uR of
their own freewill is necessarily mjuired, for God, who made uti
""itoout oul1ltlv,,", will not ... '-c US witoout oul1lth· ... _ We ."" to 'strive
to enter in It the straight gate','111 '0 fight me good fight,,"10 and 10
run I good nce,101 we a", to purge ourselves from .n unclnnlleSS of
flesh and spirit, to.! ..e a"" 10 'keep ourselves in the "we of God,.!OJ
He was an unregcnerlted JXTiOIl who in rhe parable had but One
IIknt giHn him and is condemned for a slothful sen.. nt, beca~ he
did not by the use of his frttwill impro'-e thlt rakn! which he had
reaived and ""tum to his IlWiter his own with usur)', which had he
done mO"" would hIve been superadded. Our own endeavours and
activity of freewiU • .., insufficienr withoul Ihe addition and ilSSistanee
of Divine grace, for it is God ...·hieh worhlh in US both to will and to
,.
do,l00 'by grace ye are ""ved',lDI 'and by me grace of God I om wh.t I
,m,

... ,c...;,,-.. '$.0"_

'I' ate
 Offruwill

Chapter XXVlI

Then: is :mmher witty objection nude by a modem writer asserting a

fatal nKUSity of all aetions, that whtn:os libtrty of will is introduced to
sal"e a phenomenon of a d.y of judgement, and the justice of God in
inflicting punishment upon men after this life for their actions p.1St, this
will by no mans ..,...·e their tum. I Gay continlC'ncy will no mon: sal"e
th is pherK>l1M:non than n«usit)', For it is no more just that men should
bt damnw to all eternity for. mere chance or contingency, th:m th.t
they should for necessity. T o damn men for their continlC'nt frecwilled
actions is aU OOe OS if one should bt damned for throwing such. CIst of
a die. Men could no more help contingency th:m necusity. Whcn:f"""
the matter can be resoh'w into nothing c\sl: but God's absolute po ...er,
and his arbitr:lry :md u=untable will, ... hi ch by n:ason of bis
omnipotence malt •• tlut to bt JUSt whatsOC"er he will do. It seems he
thinl« not 6t to damn men to eternity but &uch os wen: necessitated to
do wicked actions before, bill he might h"'e done OI.herwi..: if he had
thought good by hi. ab!;olute po ...er.
To :mSWer this, no nun shall bt damned for the contingency of any
action ... here thcfC' YI'U no diffen:nce of ben.r or wor.." a pc:rfect
~""lity :md one thing os much eligible os tile other; then: can be no
fault nor blame in this cose OS YI'U Gaid btfon:, But where there is an
in~ua1il)' ofbtncr or WOrK, • divcrsity of gwd, honesty, and duty on
one h:md, :md "'05",,1 pin :md pleosure on Ihe other, men having.
power hcfC' Oyer thcmseh'cs to intend :md exen themsch-es in resisting
their ..,nsual appc:titcs:md cnden'ouring more :md more by degrees to
comply with the dicutes of conscience opposed to them. If at the end of
their livC$ they bave run their course OS that they have suffered
them..,lves.t lost to be quite foilw and vanquished by the ..."....,r, it is
jun that th~ should fall lihort of the priu SCI before them, that they
should lose. the em ..... :md receive shame, disgracc, and punishment .
Men shall not bt damned for the cost of a die or such a fonuitous
contingency. But for their not using rut power which they ha"c oVer
themselves to promote themselves towards the good of honesty :md also
for their abusing that power, by actively determining :md fixing
the"""l.·.,. in vicious habits.

".
 Glossary

This glotsary lisllI Cudwonh's unfamiliar I~rminology and U5a"",. BUI

il i.....onh noting thaI sonM: of the earliest recorded usages of 00.
conlemporary conceplual vocabulary occur in Cud .... onh (I~rms such as
consciousness, r~tributin, p"yc!\ology, ..,If-determinalion).'

a.c:ucangular acutc-angkd (triangle)

ambage circumlocution; obscure bngw~
angulo.silY angularity
annected linked
anvilling working at an anvil ('an.-il' u..,d as "erb)
.podictical dtmonslJ~ble, cenain
.poretical full of doobu and objections
appulse pressure. impaa, dri"ing against
aplitude fimess, suitability
alJut~ slurp, subtle
a"ersalion .,..,. .I0Il

Canesius o..an_
celerity ,,,,,d
circumslant incidental; circumjacent
COJiubility capable of being t!\ought
CUf'lJlion affinity. connection
COJII05citi,'~ cogniti,'~

So. _ HoI.,'s... W........ An" I ,. 'J> _ CuoI_~ T_ .. <I r......... N_

•• ~ ('9foo) . ... ,..l.; ........ "Cud_.\Ion, s... ....ords·, IV_...J ~ (,"'}),
J')-'" MIl "Cud_ - ' bio cUI w;"', N<-o- W............ , "'j". Nom oM 1

~ h'l7J~ ......... HoJ __ 1"'", ... bolo ... "'" .. wi. 1,Iwy of Lo<t, .....
~-

'"
 ClosUl,),

colluctation opposition, conflict:

compages solid smtclures
compbccl\tt complaisance:, agreeableness
complicated folded together, involved
rompossibilily possible ClH'xislencc:
conative striving, ende;",vur (also plural: conatiycs)
concinni!y elcpncc, nearness
concupiscibk arousing vehement desire
conscnWleously in agreement
comemperlled blended
con!emperation blending
conlradict:iws COI1tradict:ory
con!risution ~~.

-, the combination of elements or hUllMlUn in the

animal body; comti!Ution. On p. 89 Cudworth calls
muis the 'hannonicol rml/Wr~I"r~ of the whole body'
<.TUcialing crucifying
depinntiori lenn from alchemy, nQl found, but probably equiva_
kill to 'tincrure'
disconfonnily lKlII-confonnily
docible capable of being mush!
~Yl" imprint, Stlmp, copy (hence, «typal)
""~
draw out, produce
eduction drl"ing OUI, production
~,
CITW\.iI!e
epo:lcustil.{k) adventitious
epistemonicol epistemological
equicrural equilaleral (triangle)
=w printing erron
the true or primiti,'e fonn of a word
"""""
evanid
eJttrinsccol
p.'
extrin.ic, ulernal
nexuO/lily nelibilily
.~ hinge, joinl
giobulite tiny globule
graleful p"",",
,"p Iud, fortune
hegemonicon ruling principle of Ihe soul

."

'VI ate
;'0""",' impulses, desires
;"lrial medicinal
icterical jaundiced
id~llly ~nsalion or r~lin, peculiar 10 an indiyidual
indument pnnen1, clothing
,~""" e'luilibrium, balance
kiding kinen
bpsobilily I;"bilily 10 fall
Limner dnughLSman, illuminator
ludibria baubles, obiects of ridicule
l,~ (ohighl) penClnling, dear
make (II.) male-up
nunci!",led (Mla"ed
~~
hobsOO lin
nebuloK nebulous
nict':l!ion blinking, winking
noemata I;On""pts, obj«ts of intellection
noenuticaL iruellcaual, mental
noetial irueU«"1u.o!
novarui'lue new and old
obnoxious 10 !i.-oblc 10 puni.hm~nt by
Obo1~tridous prod ueth'e, 'mid-"i fd r'
ob1l1SanlP'br wilh an obtu~ angle (gwmetry)
OpelOSC laborious
!""turiencr parturient state, being in labour
pc:a:abili1Y li.-ohility 10 sin
pea:abLe liable 10 sin
peri!",1erial peripatetic
phantaSmatical .mapnary
phanwma1ically by Ihe .enSCS
phrene1ical fl1ll\1ic, mad
pLmic shaping, producti>"..
polile smooth, polished
prea=lkncy excel~ng, surpassing
prep0:5u..,on JlOSSe"ion in advance
prokp.is anticipation
pro1ended protrUded
proloplasl first-made thing, origin.:ol, archetype

'II ate
pui ...... t powerful
pukhrirude

.,
radicatW """"
~"d
radiate, shine
rectangular right-angled (triangle)
~;tence resistance
."'"
~".
"..·our
doubt
u/Jnu relation
schetical of schcses, relatin
oottishness foolWlness
spermatic gcner.ltive, shaping
litochastically by coniecturc, probabilistic:ally
streperous harsh-sounding, lacking harmony or music:ality
litriated thinly drawn out
liublimation process of colwerling a solid imo a vapour by meanS
ofhnt
subsultations leaps, bounds
liUpcrfiCie:s surface
therical positi,"e, arnin-ary, dogmatic
umbruilc s~owy
undefectible witt.out defect
vaticim.tion premonition
whiffiing trifling

'"

'I' ate
 Index
M ' " f". A'd' .. ,
Alo_' .. A....,f' " _ ' ..... . ,., .., ..
A.. • ' "'" 0.- " _r..,..;".;
""........ _
........
},
A " , _ .IO
....... ..... "'.;
' Ii> BoIp!,J""'"
IIo,te, "*" .
"...,.,. (po •• ;, ,M) .. ", 11-9..,.., "0, " ..
A'" ,. ", .......... " ."
,' M ' ' .. Milo....... e '", ..... 0 , . .rii
1Ioodoy, • • , d u. L

" " . .........

"",,b . ok N,mI'" , (Anr!nM do Now Coot ...)

,
., .. ,.0.0.,.,...
e;w. ... ,.1, ' 1"-...fip<I, ....... W ,
_ " - , • • , ........ ' • • ,' . 50 c - '· "',
c.;. , ~ ,. E.och "'. E.. W. ,6", , _ , . "
.1.001.' • " .. Ja<W ,6 • •, - _ ,150 M - • .;;;. :a.
A ..... ' , nJ ,6'_0, til. ,." NoooIo ,6" __ ..... "',
.1.0 ' , .. C".... " 51 '_'''''''''l' . _ , COOO , - •
"
.1.0' .. ,. " tIi
~ .. ,;<, l1.!!tl'!.lt.~.IO=.So ~
,....... . CrwW·
On\l -''I,I50, ... r
, ... ~rii,
, ', · .... ,150
~ 10,'0, ~ "50 , .. -6, ' JO. '150 ' ''' '1', ',.. 1:91 , ..... C ' ... '9J"·,
'150 '150 ,16; Do _ Io!!. S4f1 • • _ ~!lI. '" ••, .... J_, ... .-,... ''', J....
~ nw.. 7fa" 10,'.0. 'l50 ,Jl, '1" Do ,....... ".. ...... 10-1 ... , ... . . - ,...
.... 'F ' " ,--.:M"""","" ... ,u-50
, ... ..",aI,'))"jt; ,y;,' ,,_aw.
,"-'.... _,... "1"" . .....
p,.,uiN 'J', ' ........ ' .... L •• ' '0-
!!> ". ,.., ,,, ; ......... .i" ~" , ,1, " .."" ' ... ' ... ,,.. ...... l _ ,1>.-..
0. 0..- fII: ~_ I!o. "'; Do .... i! . ~" ....... . T_, ,' ·.'to
A .... ' .. fIG<, I.A.S. uUi, . . . . ,
Au • • • " ... - . T'oomooo D . ....
... .,.9>-"50 ... --.;_ . . ~ bod,- !!. u,lIo. S!::lo ~ ~ ~ ~
AoIKnt!, K. ... .. 1s. ... , ....... ...~',.,'6<.'"
,. 01; AM' ,.
''''
A.......... '~,II
. . . ' "" ~_~
• ,. ,,_c'_So 'U ..' "' ",Ilo
•• _••
.....
___ .
I oiou !lr..IO=.So f".. U. iI:J> I'· !oL ' " , ' 450
'.'''' " '"
_.VJ.""""""
Auorio, UrI. " .
_ _ (...._ ) ,., ',""", ,I,. ,to-$. _H_ ....
.... .,
a.-...s. ....
,1 f
, " '''''''''' -=t. . 50 ... ,"" ..... -
, '" Col •• '

'"
,. ••
Ca ... ·' •• Oorioo:".GoIItte.IIi, • ., Clote lUll ,i.
,!:Mi• .................
"
',.
Ca.
Eo .... c.rq.n
;" . ... ......... r......... " . ... )1 .... . ! •• '., ...
~ p . .. .... . ri
~ "
oiou ........ . ,;. ...... ']0. . . . . ... I".w;r'" '1'1".
" ,... !to!1,!!.~!l. '!t..l!::oL tio.to lIotL
C ,"- 11
I ~ ... 9 ...... ... ............. ..,.. " ' . ",..' ..
c... .......... '»-$. ' >7. !..!to .w·....
43 ....
OoodwKlo . b [odd ,no. •'..... _. ,_..
' '7
o I ) " . UowoI .... no. " . "' ... " , 0

0wIa 1 "'; hi I ' !l. ... I).". 0J7.,~ • •, ' ... "J.
a..."....;...J_ (J<toobuo ~ ..) "'" ,10-,. 'Il
0.-;,0 •• , .......... Jooq 110 ti.~1!. ~ 1'O-l'). 17 ....... ,. ,...
o "'...., ,$1. ,6~ '_7 ,"'- ''''" "'. ,oS, "So '0). '97: ... .....
00ri0D0. l C. Hi d. pi", .. - .... .. - . .
0-.. _-r.a;.. ..... ,"'- '!"I. '!'It ... ~.... jotoo - .
1Mt<._.;.. ..
~"
". I"", ·; .. _) 1.it Tl."~'"
........s
F""""
...",.
.--. .......... •... ·;.. n
I k, i-';;;

-
_ . '. ' 0 •. ' i _
...L,
c,
""
........ _
, .....1.. ' ....... "
_ ,..1..... "... ,,':- ... _ ....
.•

Cna.G .......
Coo, .... "" ....., r.....;o I........ ..... _ 1......... .... u ri.
' si. ,60, '6). 'Of.... . ,... ,,., ,Is-OJ. ~
c-o
c..-......
.. Q;"'.
....... ...,; ..,.... ~ ........
CooI_
~

~O-";'_M_
•. J... ..
0wIa,;
Ph I..... J.. "" _.
Pun .......... A. , ri

c ,.,"", l>IpIo ~h Gobk,.A . • "; ..

Cool_I>. LlooIpIo ;.... • ..; _ . _b ol o.w.;. ()dioo ...... , ..
','., J.•;;; ..
....... .................................
.. _ ... -.0/ •••11

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Cambr id gr Tex,s in ,he HislOr y of P hilO5Op h ~­
Tilin ,u~H.lml i~ I~ >trW. Ih,!uT
Antoine Arnauld .nd PicNe Nicole lAtir #r I~t Arl ./ 11Iidi.., (wi",d 11)- Jill
V....,., Bu""' ...)
Boyle A Fry( £~,.iry u". 1M V"". ,1y RmiwJ N.I .... •/ N.", .. (edited b)"
Edward B. D .... ond Miduocl H unte,)
eon ..:ay 1U J>rT.n,ln ./Ikt Mf1l Arilol . d M WrJI Pk,l.,.,.; (tdi«d by
Allison P. Couder, and Taylor Cont)
Cudworth A T".,iM e""",,,,;..,
E'mul • ..J '_toik AI.nlU; (edited by
52r.1h H ullOn)
D' wnes M uil.iN.... Fins Pka....,ky, ..ith ..,Icction. from the ()jjt" ....
.,.J R"oo (rili,riI.ru. an introduction by john Conin","",)
Kant 1U M#.,.yoin ./ M ...1t (edited by Mory G . CSO!" ";th I n introduction
b)' Rose. Sulijnrl)
La MClIn. M ......... AI.- ul OIj ... II'ril"',. (editril by Ann Thorn ..... )
Leibni>. N.", £SUp ... 11. __ U""",,.J;., (edi,ed by P.... Rfmmn' ond
jonathan Hennen)
NictzSdM: 11_•. All T.. H .... _ (n:aru;b,ed by R_1- Hollinrd>l< " ith on
introd....:non by R>eIwd &hlclll)
Schlei.. ",ochcr 0" R.Iit....: S,.«At1 I. ill C..(u",1 o..,itm (rilited by
Richard Ctooter)

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