G.R. No.
119602 October 6, 2000 The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in CA-
G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled "Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-
appellant, versus Philippine President Lines, Inc., defendant-appellant."
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by
Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto
Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the
Orinoco River.1 He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February 11,
19882 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.3
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was
at the bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then
the officer on watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port4 at 1:40
a.m. on February 12, 1988.5 Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel
was under way.6
Roque Channel at mile 172.7 The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot
assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness
of the channel.8
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations.9 These occurred at 4:12 a.m.10 It was then that the watch officer
called the master to the bridge.11
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel12 and verified that it
was in the centre of the channel.13 He then went to confirm, or set down,
the position of the vessel on the chart.14 He ordered Simplicio A. Monis,
Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to check all the double bottom tanks.15
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River,16 thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein
petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of
Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against Philippine President Lines,
Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon
amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of
litigation. The complaint against Pioneer Insurance Company was dismissed
in an Order dated November 7, 1988.17
At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on the following facts:
"1. The jurisdictional facts, as specified in their respective pleadings;
1
"2. That defendant PPL was the owner of the vessel Philippine Roxas at the
time of the incident;
"3. That defendant Pioneer Insurance was the insurance underwriter for
defendant PPL;
"4. That plaintiff Wildvalley Shipping Co., Inc. is the owner of the vessel
Malandrinon, whose passage was obstructed by the vessel Philippine Roxas
at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, as specified in par. 4, page 2 of the complaint;
"5. That on February 12, 1988, while the Philippine Roxas was navigating the
channel at Puerto Ordaz, the said vessel grounded and as a result,
obstructed navigation at the channel;
"6. That the Orinoco River in Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel;
"7. That at the time of the incident, the vessel, Philippine Roxas, was under
the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned by the government
thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master;
"8. The plaintiff filed a case in Middleburg, Holland which is related to the
present case;
"9. The plaintiff caused the arrest of the Philippine Collier, a vessel owned
by the defendant PPL;
"10. The Orinoco River is 150 miles long and it takes approximately 12 hours
to navigate out of the said river;
"11. That no security for the plaintiff's claim was given until after the
Philippine Collier was arrested; and
"12. That a letter of guarantee, dated 12-May-88 was issued by the
Steamship Mutual Underwriters Ltd."18
The trial court rendered its decision on October 16, 1991 in favor of the
petitioner, Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. The dispositive portion thereof
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S.
$259,243.43, as actual and compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53,
as expenses incurred abroad for its foreign lawyers, plus additional sum of
U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorney's fees of plaintiff's local lawyer, and to
pay the cost of this suit.
"Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."19
Both parties appealed: the petitioner appealing the non-award of interest
with the private respondent questioning the decision on the merits of the
case.
After the requisite pleadings had been filed, the Court of Appeals came out
with its questioned decision dated June 14, 1994,20 the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding defendant-appellant's appeal to be meritorious,
judgment is hereby rendered reversing the Decision of the lower court.
Plaintiff-appellant's Complaint is dismissed and it is ordered to pay
defendant-appellant the amount of Three Hundred Twenty-three Thousand,
Forty-two Pesos and Fifty-three Centavos (₱323,042.53) as and for
attorney's fees plus cost of suit. Plaintiff-appellant's appeal is DISMISSED.
"SO ORDERED."21
2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration22 but the same was denied for
lack of merit in the resolution dated March 29, 1995.23
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner assigns the following errors to the court a quo:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO
THE MASTER NOR THE OWNER OF THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" FOR THE
GROUNDING OF SAID VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO
ORINOCO;
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE;
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE "PHILIPPINE ROXAS" IS SEAWORTHY;
4. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
VENEZUELAN LAW DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY PROVED IN THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT ANY OBJECTION
FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND WHOSE OBJECTION WAS INTERPOSED
BELATEDLY ON APPEAL;
5. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT ANY
FAIR OR REASONABLE BASIS WHATSOEVER;
6. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE IS MERITORIOUS HENCE, PETITIONER SHOULD BE
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS AND INTEREST.
The petition is without merit.
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan law is
applicable to the case at bar.
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.24
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an
unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is quoted hereunder.
Where the foreign law sought to be proved is "unwritten," the oral
testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.25
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office." (Underscoring supplied)
The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include competent
evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
foreign law.26
3
In the noted case of Willamette Iron & Steel Works vs. Muzzal,27 it was held
that:
"… Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California,
since the year 1918 under oath, quoted verbatim section 322 of the
California Civil Code and stated that said section was in force at the time the
obligations of defendant to the plaintiff were incurred, i.e. on November 5,
1928 and December 22, 1928. This evidence sufficiently established the fact
that the section in question was the law of the State of California on the
above dates. A reading of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil
Procedure will convince one that these sections do not exclude the
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a
foreign law.
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact …You ask the witness what the law is;
he may, from his recollection, or on producing and referring to books, say
what it is.' (Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief Justice
Denman in a well-known English case where a witness was called upon to
prove the Roman laws of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he
referred to a book containing the decrees of the Council of Trent as
controlling, Jones on Evidence, Second Edition, Volume 4, pages 3148-
3152.) x x x."
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon, the
Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,28 to
testify on the existence of the Reglamento General de la Ley de
Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)29 and the Reglamento Para la Zona de
Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules governing the navigation of the Orinoco
River). Captain Monzon has held the aforementioned posts for eight
years.30 As such he is in charge of designating the pilots for maneuvering and
navigating the Orinoco River. He is also in charge of the documents that
come into the office of the harbour masters.31
Nevertheless, we take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta
Oficial32 of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was
presented in evidence as an official publication of the Republic of
Venezuela.
The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is published in a
book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.33 Only a
photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence.
Both of these documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be
public documents for they are the written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers of Venezuela.34
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory: (1) It must be attested by the officer having legal
custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be accompanied by
a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with
the seal of his office.35 The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but
is intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of
a document in a foreign country.36
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by
the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as evidence
with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by Section 24 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who
attested the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those
records made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
4
consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal of
his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such
certificate could be found in the records of the case.
With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is objectionable, for the
written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of authority,
when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be
proved by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.37
At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was not
pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the
pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.38
A review of the Complaint39 revealed that it was never alleged or invoked
despite the fact that the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law
must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading
and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be
the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.40
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a thorough study of the errors
assigned by the petitioner.
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private
respondent that would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to
give only the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance
with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
"If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed
in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall
be required."
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which
an ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property.
This we have found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel
sailed only after the "main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were
checked and found to be in good running condition;41 when the master left a
competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the
inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred
anew.42
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in Philippine Ports Authority
Administrative Order No. 03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage
Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a master
of a vessel and its pilot, among other things.
The pertinent provisions of the said administrative order governing these
persons are quoted hereunder:
5
"Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory
pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports due to his negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the
accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has
exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize the damage.
"The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage
grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of
the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or
to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the
vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master.
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be
determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light
of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
"x x x
"Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or Pilots’ Association. --
The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
"x x x
"f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the
time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or
berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the
moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order."
The Code of Commerce likewise provides for the obligations expected of a
captain of a vessel, to wit:
"Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in the office of captain:
"x x x
"7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take command on entering and
leaving ports, canals, roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on board
discharging his duties. x x x."
The law is very explicit. The master remains the overall commander of the
vessel even when there is a pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship
as he can still perform the duties conferred upon him by law43 despite the
presence of a pilot who is temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not
required of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being navigated by a
pilot.
However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order No. 03-85, provides:
"Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a harbor and anchoring
thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well
as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage.
"xxx."
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the
engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal,
bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar
Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port
Ordaz, Venezuela,44 and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years.45 He
also had experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.46
6
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the
order or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the
Philippine Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the
vessel,47 mayhap, because the latter had assured him that they were
navigating normally before the grounding of the vessel.48 Moreover, the
pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was very familiar
with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and that
he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River.49
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master
chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of
the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of
pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.
"Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of compulsory pilotage, are in a
different class from ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill and
a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters over which their licenses
extend superior to that of the master; pilots are bound to use due diligence
and reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in proportion to the
pilot's responsibilities, and implies a knowledge and observance of the usual
rules of navigation, acquaintance with the waters piloted in their ordinary
condition, and nautical skill in avoiding all known obstructions. The
character of the skill and knowledge required of a pilot in charge of a vessel
on the rivers of a country is very different from that which enables a
navigator to carry a vessel safely in the ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of
the rules of navigation, with charts that disclose the places of hidden rocks,
dangerous shores, or other dangers of the way, are the main elements of a
pilot's knowledge and skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor
pilot, is selected for the individual's personal knowledge of the topography
through which the vessel is steered."50
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When
the vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on,
and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the middle of the channel and
that the vibration was as (sic) a result of the shallowness of the channel."51
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine
Roxas as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of
the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the
portions which are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the
depth of the said river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all
probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent
and liable for its grounding.
In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that:
"x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is liable for any injury done
by the negligence of the crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will
apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master or owner, by whose
negligence any injury happens to a third person or his property: as, for
example, by a collision with another ship, occasioned by his negligence. And
it will make no difference in the case that the pilot, if any is employed, is
required to be a licensed pilot; provided the master is at liberty to take a
pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master acts voluntarily,
although he is necessarily required to select from a particular class. On the
other hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a
fortiori, if he is bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case,
neither he nor the owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the
negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot cannot be deemed
properly the servant of the master or the owner, but is forced upon them,
and the maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply."
(Underscoring supplied)
7
Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while there was none,52 the
voyage has been sufficiently planned and monitored as shown by the
following actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez, to wit:
contacting the radio marina via VHF for information regarding the channel,
river traffic,53 soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on the
buoys.54 The officer on watch also monitored the voyage.55
We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river passage plan to be the
cause for the grounding of the vessel.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because
the circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence
on the part of the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the
following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of such character as
to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for
defendant's negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of
the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part
of the person injured.56
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over
the ship from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage
channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e.,
negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are absent.
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, we hold that it is not.
The Lloyd’s Register of Shipping confirmed the vessel’s seaworthiness in a
Confirmation of Class issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the
above named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the class "+100A1
Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and
+LMC" from 31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about
12/2/88."57 The same would not have been issued had not the vessel been
built according to the standards set by Lloyd's.
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's Register of Shipping testified thus:
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top side tank have any bearing
at all to the seaworthiness of the vessel?
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also basing on the class record
of the vessel, wherein recommendations were made on the top side tank,
and it was given sufficient time to be repaired, it means that the vessel is fit
to travel even with those defects on the ship.
"COURT
What do you mean by that? You explain. The vessel is fit to travel even with
defects? Is that what you mean? Explain.
"WITNESS
"A Yes, your Honor. Because the class society which register (sic) is the third
party looking into the condition of the vessel and as far as their record
states, the vessel was class or maintained, and she is fit to travel during that
voyage."
"x x x
"ATTY. MISA
Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly tell us what is (sic) the
'class +100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean?
"WITNESS
8
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built according to Lloyd's rules and
she is capable of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is particularly capable of
carrying Ore Cargoes with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty.
"x x x
"COURT
The vessel is classed, meaning?
gear motor were also tested.61 Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel for
consumption for maneuvering and checked the engine generators.62
Finally, we find the award of attorney’s fee justified.1âwphi1
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

"A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or seaworthy."58 "x x x

It is not required that the vessel must be perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship "(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
must be reasonably fit to perform the services, and to encounter the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the parties to the policy.59
"x x x"
As further evidence that the vessel was seaworthy, we quote the deposition
Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the private respondent was
of pilot Vasquez:
unjustifiably forced to litigate, thus the award of attorney’s fees was proper.
"Q Was there any instance when your orders or directions were not
complied with because of the inability of the vessel to do so? WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 36821 is AFFIRMED.
"A No.
SO ORDERED.
"Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your commands and orders?

"A. The vessel was navigating normally."60

Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the Philippine Roxas submitted an

accident report wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he checked
and prepared the main engine, machineries and all other auxiliaries and
found them all to be in good running condition and ready for maneuvering.
That same day the main engine, bridge and engine telegraph and steering

9
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading
which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
10
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article
53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement
and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of
which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall
be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage
as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband
and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage
to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as
to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements
11
must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse
to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the
exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was dissolved or
annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The
law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
12
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family
Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied
upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source
of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was
a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage
does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original
rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for
the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the
parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in
any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of
the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of
a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment
to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
13
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were
both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the
instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal
Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-
Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four children were born out of that
marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another
marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated
that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged
with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
14
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for
the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He
therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member
of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia
Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their
families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34
of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that
he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each
other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant
to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and
sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their
marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he
known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
15
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation
to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated,legal separation does not dissolve the
marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all
the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when

he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the
law excuses no one has special application to judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

ACCORDINGLY , the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby

ADOPTED,with theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed
upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

16
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time,
much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who
created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her
uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89)
which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court
to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the
Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the
motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims,
that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January
20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
17
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his
wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he
is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
(Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the
18
Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141,
private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her
complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the
alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the
court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts
intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on
the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When
private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After
such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to
present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988,
until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.
19
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage
shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between
the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private
respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the
challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,
penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points
out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about
the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons
for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological
disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical
disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses
to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there
has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with
the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show
that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner
also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the
reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and
avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He
never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried
to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he
presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no
evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is
petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him
to prove such a claim.
20
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
"To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief.
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife
whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved
is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is
not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code),
the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order"
(Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared
with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an
ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the
natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of
creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures
the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife
must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the
21
other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied
judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court

of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and
the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

22
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in
addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a
marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity,
our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages
void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said
novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of
the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General
has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his
frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging
the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and
friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that
sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in
October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few
weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations
and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the
couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order
to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the
start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and
Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended
that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1)
Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends
even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her
marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
23
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and
that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as
of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities."
Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application
of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as
a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there
is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that
such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
24
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be
more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of
the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality
traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was
a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness"
on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the
part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness
to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
25
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on
the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the
novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many
trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996,
which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code
are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence
may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
26
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to
grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of
the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina
subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
27
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001,
which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent
Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic
Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a
child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who
they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life
together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the
ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all
throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and
selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely
volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost
everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff
in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement,
tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that
she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of
his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and
scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of
their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional
advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she
perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since
childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and
suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two
(22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still
living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented
malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour;
that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who
was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported
respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she
was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to
what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the
witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified
that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope
that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage
were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and
28
wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting
signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was
also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that
period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed
in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law
school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt
that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents
during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to
him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she
would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty
or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly
opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs
and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents
reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not
forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as
his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very
generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent
Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a
mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal
properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that
petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when
she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and
the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner
Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his
address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When
petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling
the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s
hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to
call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived,
petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another
occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard
petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang
bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA
whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by
petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco
contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem
which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support
and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is
secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had
engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is
characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who
are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and
differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative,
depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and
suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to
cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the
detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the
marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire
29
(along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize
(or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and feelings. The
matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing
of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of
personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per
DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before
the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations.
She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of
fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started
having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that
she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously
supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law
school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present
case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the
pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her
to give him a chance to have a new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation
on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said
report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more
than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of
traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was
also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is
capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally,
she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound
decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential
obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would
religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise
leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go
to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw
respondent Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part
that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married
and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together
continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the
early 90’s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the
plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
30
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk
responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A
wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to
the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as
our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital
partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes
may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04
May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying
mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and
Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is
empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s
feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening
the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit
amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious
of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set
aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not
only of defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING
TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that
whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of
the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its
own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This,
the Court of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi
despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi
31
Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from
the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15
March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the
declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an
essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that
"the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein.
Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by
his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession
with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is
wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position
as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita
which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by
experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
32
to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue
of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or
respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding
that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological
report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations
of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has
done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra
marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl
now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them
together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file
the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-
ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy
should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said,
"Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."48
33
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from
the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential
marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is
the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In
herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital]
affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar,
respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him,
her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to
endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze
her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is
there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba,
whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,
reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the
basic and essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the
other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the
doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated.
On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner
Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as
required by law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-
laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the
priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her
inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and
wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their
individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately
sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have
been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived
therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming
strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love
and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere
showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v.
Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel
might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is
no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual
problem.61
34
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

35
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the
marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to
respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage.
One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial
support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no
longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996,
respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons
by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In
August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file
his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the
lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The
trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report
finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that
the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial
court granted respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She
then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered
documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita
M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and
VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are
ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties
pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
36
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be
traced to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into
marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic
of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
6
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the
promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese
citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to
"observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The
appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to
the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why
should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with
family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved
a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of
error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological
incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the
personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
37
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of
Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the
ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
38
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing
guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved
Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for
and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He
made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological
illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had
she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This
could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not
do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an
instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot
presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his
39
family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical,
illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do

not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the
husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because
the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate
with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision

dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

40
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he
was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led
to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital
vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.1 The civil
marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.2
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September
18, 1968;3 Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;4 Kenneth David
born on April 24, 1971;5 and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.6 The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs
with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the
treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian
national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she
had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner
accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family
Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons
was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of
general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.7
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she
conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be
conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in
whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-
Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that
she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like
her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are
indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.8
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
41
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September
28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the
essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties
is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General,
appealed alleging that –
I psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court
and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.10
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
January 8, 2002.11 Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion
and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations;
(2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity,
juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of
evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological
incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is
behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term
"psychological incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,12 it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
42
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity
of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.13
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality
disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy
analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly
qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could
not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What
is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four
children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity16 or sexual
promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 5517 of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal
separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent.
The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of
the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court.1âwphi1 We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation
43
of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances,
like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific
answers to every individual problem.19 While we sympathize with
petitioner’s marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the
law no matter how harsh it may be.20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

44
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227
dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked
by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have
his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant
in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an
eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and
Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo
City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened
Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to
happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple
would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days
with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as
a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by
long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration
of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to
visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the
auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25
August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the
regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding
of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No.
9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it
was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its
report to the court).
45
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for
its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that
clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her
whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee,
which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import
of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice
(Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the
other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient
reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is
not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment.
He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null
and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that
subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or
mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity,
46
there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground
for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent
but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word
"mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor
Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in
inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used
a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil
Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable
marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a
distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack
or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the
marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not
and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose
way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is
a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is
capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals
and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that
psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing
to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they
do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they
47
are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent.
He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which
is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice
Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of
consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there
is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the
action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually,
although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a
defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children
and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been
cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that
psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding
of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a
help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval
in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an
understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean
Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if
the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the
consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among
the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only
temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated
that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the
term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy
stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with
the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice
Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may
occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the
celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision
is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that
after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later
on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in
this case is to allow him to remarry.6
48
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if
such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On
the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may
encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity.
Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue
on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological
or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists
but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that
the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of
marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity"
because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason
why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law
should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under
Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law
and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to
the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the
ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law?
The other members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer
to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid
under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
49
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director
Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten
years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like
the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive
for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm
was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of
a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
50
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind
of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be
able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by
Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders
and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect,
which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity
consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could
be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to
deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act,
the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount
to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these
obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared
invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is
afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the
person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr.
Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and
their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
51
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon
the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however,
do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
—
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of
our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still
hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably
and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all
the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
52
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage,
may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between
the parties is hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution
denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig
City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52
relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties’ children. In the best
interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to
petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent" .chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of
Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1)
on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at
the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was
solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-
1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the
other hand, joined the Women’s Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge
from the military service.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
53

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a
Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone
conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became
sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy
Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the
Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987
and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however
prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their
children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they
would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He
would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would
also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chicken. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries
early in the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged
from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able
to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and
Construction Development Corporation.
"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994,
when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she
did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw
him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who
came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at
the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as
contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver,
went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss
unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU,
Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D.,
for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the
appellant on the other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
54
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their
children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of
the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in
the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as
set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and
such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the
petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological
or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by
psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted
with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of
them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital
obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her . . . unable
to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed
incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert.
Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was
suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental — not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and
[was] incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration
the following issues:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the
findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of
all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of
the Petition." 7
The Court’s Ruling
55
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that
were submitted to determine respondent’s psychological incapacity to
perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by
the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent,
who had refused to submit himself to such tests.cralaw : red
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and
the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the
Family Code 9 were laid down by this Court as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the
nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be ‘protected’ by the state.
x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the
celebration’ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
56
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095." 10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Totality of Evidence Presented
in the present case — including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker — was enough to sustain a
57
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does
not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had
lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed
to give material and moral support, and even left the family
home.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not
to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence
showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations
are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the
grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 12 At best,
the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court
laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina.
Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure
of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED,
except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio
sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
58
G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, Petitioner,
vs.
BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated October 11, 2004 as well as the
Resolution2 dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January 11, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903.
In the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose
Reynaldo Ochosa’s (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young
lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year
college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual
intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property.
Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In
1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby
girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona
Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the
Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with
him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did
Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when
Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the
Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living
quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their
military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the
failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had
illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways
when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in
her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one
occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having
sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bona’s sexual infidelity
circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away
from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is
currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify
59
his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity
to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon
Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary
period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the
parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to
both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably
determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military
aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified
about respondent’s marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who
testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that
respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she
described as follows:
"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking
behavior.1âwphi1 So therefore they don’t develop sympathy in feelings and
they have difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr.
Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in
different areas in the Philippines. And while he is being transferred from
one place to another because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs.
Bona Alano refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only
few occasions in which she followed him. And during those times that they
were not living together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she
developed extra marital affair with other man of which she denied in the
beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she admitted it to Mr.
Ochosa that she had relationship with respondent’s driver. I believe with
this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking
emotions from other person and not from the husband. And of course, this
is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage."
According to Rondain, respondent’s psychological disorder was traceable to
her family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a
mother who was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since
respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and
refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses’ testimonies, petitioner formally
offered his evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the
petition on the ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no
measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity
of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition
and nullified the parties’ marriage on the following findings, viz:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
‘A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.’
60
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity
must exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological
incapacity of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and
INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
existing under everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was
manifested in respondent’s infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his
witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondent’s history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that
respondent’s bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty
in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with
several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder
have no insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all.
As in the case at bar, respondent’s psychological incapacity clinically
identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain
incurable.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11,
1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DECLARING the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J.
ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of
psychological incapacity of the respondent under Article 36 of the Family
Code as amended with all the effects and consequences provided for by all
applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil
Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its
Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information
and guidance.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the
Court of Appeals which sided with the OSG’s contention that the trial court
erred in granting the petition despite Jose’s abject failure to discharge the
burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to
comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in
its assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11
January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another is entered DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.6
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
61
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial
court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina8 the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
62
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outburst" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law
on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.9 (Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.
For, indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
63
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a
marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.11
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we
made a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s
exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little
the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing
all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.13
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment
of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus,
clarified in the same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the
same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.14
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondain’s testimony15 and
her psychiatric evaluation report16 as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose17 and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal18 and
Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence
presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with
several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are
persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot
apply the same conviction to Jose’s thesis that the totality of Bona’s acts
constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the
Family Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were
already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other
words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."
With regard to Bona’s sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we
have only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to
support this allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript:
64
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after
several years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the
torture because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and
finally, when I have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an
affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this – her life with other men of course
before the marriage you have already known –
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips – because you said that you thought that this affair
would go to end after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so that’s why you can’t
bear it anymore?
A: Yes, ma’am.20
Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide
evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided
assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrist’s conclusion that
Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her
marriage with Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her
helplessly prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be
taken as credible proof of antecedence since the method by which such an
inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms of meeting the
standard of evidence required in determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatrist’s findings on Bona’s personality profile did not emanate
from a personal interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr.
Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological
test, how about the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, ma’am.21
As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with
Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the
testimonies of other witnesses, to wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, ma’am.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal who testified in this court?
A: Yes, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate
members of the parties?
65
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of other witnesses, ma’am.
xxxx
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your
evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview
with the other witnesses, your Honor.22
Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bona’s psychological condition indirectly from
the information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual
circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the
trial court judge had found them to be credible enough after personally
witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the
evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bona’s pre-marital
history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we
have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bona’s dysfunctional family
portrait which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted
by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose,
the spouse who has the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed
psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bona’s family
history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both
Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their
employment in petitioner’s household during the marriage. It is undisputed
that Jose and Bona were married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal
Bajet started to live with petitioner’s family only in 1980 and 1986,
respectively.
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of
evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal
examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize
that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a party’s
complete personality profile, information coming from persons with
personal knowledge of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an
approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same
time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
information.23
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse’s psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the
case at bar, is, to the Court’s mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did
not wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological
incapacity, we need only to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his
witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
JOSE OCHOSA’S TESTIMONY:
66
Q: How long did you stay with your wife? GERTRUDES PADERNAL’S TESTIMONY:

A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
there were only few occasions that we were staying together because most
of the time I’m in the field. A: 1979.

Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not – your
wife come with you in any of your assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day
and then –
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in
this case because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters.
Does the quarters have different rooms?
A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you? Q: But very near each other?

A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan. A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time? Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?

A: Yes, ma’am.
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.

Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived
because it is not very far – together that you have a chance to be with the spouses?

A: No, ma’am, once in a while only. xxxx

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?

A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least xxxx

three (3) days every other month.
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were
supposed to have been living together?
A: No, actually in 19 – middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with
your husband?
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived
together?
67
A: Yes. Ma’am.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the
respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes, ma’am, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, ma’am.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAIN’S TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was
assigned in different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the
husband in different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was
the reason why she did not like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because… by
transferring from one place to another, she just don’t want to go, she just
wanted to stay in Basilan where her hometown is, ma’am.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent don’t want to go
with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to
go with him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away
places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in
some far away different assignments she also assumed that the assignments
were in this war regions they were always fighting considering the place in
Basilan they were in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to
stay in Manila, ma’am.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, ma’am. She did not follow immediately. She
stayed with him only for four (4) months, ma’am.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living
together as husband and wife for this period of time during the
relationship?
A: Yes, ma’am. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for
a few months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time
68
when they were together the husband was giving an attention to her. The While we are not insensitive to petitioner’s suffering in view of the truly
husband was always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial
the attention was not there anymore, ma’am.27 precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological
incapacity cases that must be applied to the present case.
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their
conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose SO ORDERED.
who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his
later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bona’s refusal to
accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may
be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies.
Any doubt as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the
fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during
the following decade.

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona’s alleged psychological

incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not
to the inception of the said marriage.

We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.28

69
January 11, 2018
G.R. No. 218630
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27,
2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed
the May 8, 2012 Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the
marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab
initio.
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence)
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual
friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she
got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and
conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried
how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the
situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.4
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering
and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that
they went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself
wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until
the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying
he knew nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent
almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees.8 Katrina
noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and
suffered from a very high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would
repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy
between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every
night to see to the needs of Lanz.10
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's
decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she
treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments,
often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her
youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation
center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center
if she will not stop.11
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his
parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact
since then.12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano,
based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic
70
Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-
importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way.13
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was present
but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset
was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors
interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual
help, and support to his wife.15
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and
Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab
initio. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall
cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same
and so as to avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of
respondent. Custody over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner,
with reasonable visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably
Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among themselves.
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the
National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in
turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment
and/or cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry.
Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
SO ORDERED.16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-
11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of
each and every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be
appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological
report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable
tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based
not solely on the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to
have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by
Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is
71
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations,
meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the
negative.
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.19
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration
of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We
have decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected
of a husband.
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other
cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence
clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
were based solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that
72
Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor
was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B.
Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of
the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the
petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below.
The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition
was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the
petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is
noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at
the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her
mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in
an Article 36 case because she could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other
hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature
would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-
sided description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn
Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological
evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition
only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course
be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary
worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more
rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there must be a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While
the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity
exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was
similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the
psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers
73
from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of
what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither
explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that
the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by
Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological
disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the
psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr.
Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to
perform his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving
statements. To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in
the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly
depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their
frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can
hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not
rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and
should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize
some marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the
party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed
to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to
support the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's
marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented
by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the
rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent
to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that
apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to
substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her
testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.28
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and
declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 4903-11 is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
74
APRIL 18, 2018
G.R. No. 210518
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER and MICHELLE K. MERCADO- JAVIER,
Respondents
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Decision2 dated July 10, 2013, and Resolution3 dated November 28, 2013,
rendered in relation to CA-G.R. CV No. 98015. In these assailed issuances,
the CA reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Pasig City,
which dismissed the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed
by respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier (Martin) against respondent Michelle
K. Mercado-Javier (Michelle) under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Martin and Michelle were married on February 8, 2002.4
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of the
Family Code.5 Martin alleged that both he and Michelle were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.6 He thus
prayed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint
custody of their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.7
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on his
own behalf,8 and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D. Adamos
(Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on Martin and
Psychological Impression Report on Michelle). 9
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos diagnosed
her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. 10 Likewise, Dr. Adamos concluded
in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin suffered from the same
disorder. 11 Their disorder was considered grave and incurable, and
rendered Martin and Michelle incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Dr. Adamos further testified before the RTC to
provide his expert opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological
Impression Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the
respondents' common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente ). 12 He
was unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not respond to Dr.
Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological evaluation. 13
Ruling of the RTC
In its Decision14 dated March 10, 2011, the RTC dismissed the petition for
failure to establish a sufficient basis for the declaration of nullity of the
respondents' marriage. The relevant portions of the RTC's decision reads:
Upon the other hand, though Dr. Adamos diagnosed [Martin] to be afflicted
with a narcissistic personality disorder, which rendered him incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations of observing love, trust and
respect. [Martin's] testimony is found by the Court to be not supportive of
such finding and vice-versa. In fact, on the basis of [Martin's] declarations,
the Court came up with an impression that [Martin] is a man gifted with a
lot of patience; that he was righteous, that he laudably performed his role
as husband and father, and that in spite of [Michelle's] alleged wrongdoings,
he still exerted his best efforts to save their marriage.
75
Thus, as to [Michelle's] alleged psychological incapacity, the Court finds
[Martin's] testimony to be self-serving and Dr. Adamos' findings to be
without sufficient basis.
Taking all the foregoing into consideration, the Court finds no sufficient
basis for granting the relief prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 15
Martin moved for the reconsideration of the RTC's decision on May 18,
2011. 16 Finding the arguments in the motion unmeritorious, the RTC denied
the motion in its Order17 dated September 7, 2011:
In the case at bar, the Court found no sufficient basis for making a finding
that either petitioner or respondent or both were afflicted with a
psychological disorder within the contemplation of existing law and
jurisprudence. Such being the case, there was no need to resort to Dr.
Adamos' findings.
Having said this, the Court finds no compelling reason to set aside its March
10, 2011 Decision.
Wherefore, premises considered, the pending Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.18
Unsatisfied with the RTC's ruling, Martin appealed the denial of his petition
to the CA. 19 In his Appellant's Brief, Martin submitted that it is not
necessary for the psychologist to personally examine the incapacitated
spouse, or Michelle in this case, before the court may rule on the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.20 He also argued that, at the very least,
there was sufficient evidence to support his own diagnosis of psychological
incapacity.21 Martin thus claimed that the RTC committed a reversible error
in dismissing his petition.
The Republic filed its own brief opposing the appeal of Martin. Arguing that
there was no basis for Dr. Adamos' findings as to Michelle's psychological
incapacity, the Republic asserts that there was no independent proof to
establish this claim. Furthermore, the Republic argued that Martin
supported his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with self-serving
testimonies and hearsay evidence.22
Ruling of the CA
On review, Martin's appeal was granted. In its Decision23 dated July 10,
2013, the CA held that:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
March 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 07, 2011, respectively,
issued by the [RTC] of Pasig City, Branch 261, are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between [Martin] and [Michelle] is hereby
declared NULL and VOID ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA found that there was sufficient evidence to support Martin's claim
that he is psychologically incapacitated. The CA also negated the RTC's
ruling by referring to Martin's own testimony, in which he narrated his
tendency to impose his own unrealistic standards on Michelle.25 In its
challenged decision, the CA likewise ruled that Michelle's diagnosis was
adequately supported by the narrations of Martin and Jose Vicente.26
Aggrieved, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration from the CA's
Decision dated July 10, 2013.27 The CA denied the motion in its
76
Resolution28 dated November 28, 2013 for being a mere rehash of its earlier
arguments.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis for
the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It
argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving, especially in relation
to Dr. Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations under the Family Code.
According to the Republic, there were no other witnesses that were
presented in court, who could have testified on Michelle's behavior.29
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The totality of
evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the Court
discussed in Santos v. CA, et al. 30 as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 31
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos32that for purposes of
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required that a
physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned.
It is enough that the totality of evidence is strong enough to sustain the
finding of psychological incapacity. In such case, however, the petitioner
bears a greater burden in proving the gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability of the other spouse's psychological incapacity.33
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic v.
Molina,34 these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each case are determined
on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all fours with another.35
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence
to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. He testified as
to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. In
particular, he stated that Michelle was confrontational even before their
marriage.36 He alleged that Michelle always challenged his opinions on what
he thinks is proper, which he insisted on because he witnessed the abuse
that his mother went through with his biological father. 37 He also thought
that Michelle was highly impressionable and easily influenced by friends, as
a result of which, Martin alleged that Michelle acted recklessly and without
consideration of his feelings. 38
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial
court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle suffered
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of childhood trauma and
defective child-rearing practices.39 This disorder was supposedly aggravated
by her marriage with Martin, who she constantly lied to. It was also alleged
in the Psychological Impression Report that Michelle openly had extra-
marital affairs.40
The basis of Dr. Adamos' findings on the psychological incapacity of Michelle
was the information provided by Martin and Jose Vicente.1âwphi1 Jose
Vicente was a close friend of the respondents, having introduced them to
each other before their marriage.41 Jose Vicente was also allegedly a regular
confidant of Michelle.42
77
While it is true that Michelle was not personally examined or evaluated for
purposes of the psychological report, the trial court was incorrect in ruling
that Dr. Adamos' findings were based solely on the interview with
Martin.43 Even if that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are not
immediately invalidated for this reason alone. Because a marriage
necessarily involves only two persons, the spouse who witnessed the other
spouse's behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to the
psychologist. 44
This notwithstanding, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that
Michelle was psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on
the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were no other
independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence
of Michelle's alleged psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot
discount their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that they were
able to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and
childhood history. The records do not show that Michelle and Jose Vicente
were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to
Michelle during their adulthood. Either Martin or Jose Vicente, as third
persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about her
childhood, how she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her
family.45 Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma, Dr.
Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may
reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering from a chronic and persistent
disorder that is grave and incurable.
The Court's explanation in Rumbaua v. Rumbaua46judiciously discussed the
dangers of relying on the narrations of a petitioner-spouse to the
psychologist, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to
her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause
cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in
the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed
the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not
actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
xxxx
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really
incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological,
not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report - i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared
to be grave and incurable" - is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could
have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's
condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to
our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
78
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.47 (Citations omitted and
emphasis Ours)
It does not escape our attention, however, that Martin was also subjected
to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed
him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.48 Additionally, the diagnosis was
based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent
several-or to be accurate, more than 10-counselling sessions with Dr.
Adamos from 2008 to 2009.49 These facts were uncontroverted by the
Republic.
In his testimony, Dr. Adamos explained that Martin had a "grandiose self[-
]existence," which proceeded from his "ideas of preference towards ideal
love and ideal marriage."50 Dr. Adamos also found that Martin lacked
empathy, leading him to disregard and ignore the feelings of Michelle.51
As a result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
with tendencies toward sadism. 52 Dr. Adamos concluded from the tests
administered on Martin that this disorder was rooted in the traumatic
experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around a
violent father who was abusive of his mother.53 This adversely affected
Martin in such a manner that he formed unrealistic values and standards on
his own marriage, and proposed unconventional sexual practices. When
Michelle would disagree with his ideals, Martin would not only quarrel with
Michelle, but would also inflict harm on her. 54 Other manifestations include
excessive love for himself, self-entitlement, immaturity, and self-
centeredness.55
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential
characteristics of psychological incapacity on the part of Martin. As such,
insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did
not commit a reversible error in declaring the marriage of the respondents
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
As a final note, the Court emphasizes that the factual circumstances
obtaining in this specific case warrant the declaration that Martin is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at
the time of his marriage to Michelle. This is neither a relaxation nor
abandonment of previous doctrines relating to Article 36 of the Family
Code. The guidelines in Molina still apply to all petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage inasmuch as this Court does not lose sight of the
constitutional protection to the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological incapacity
of respondent Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated
July 10, 2013 and Resolution dated November 28, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent that the
marriage of the respondents on February 8, 2002 is
declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of
respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED.
79
April 24, 2018 Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing
G.R. No. 221029 on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
vs circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January
25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated
RESOLUTION February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012)
for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
peralta, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
(Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation
October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET
granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition
ASIDE.
for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
Metro Manila.
national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
SO ORDERED.3
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan
The facts are undisputed. and after die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was
rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of 4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her
divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
a judgment of divorce Japanese court. husband;

80
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the
former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said
Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to
her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said
Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation
of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her
maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for
Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were offered and
admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 -
March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese
husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations
of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In
ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be
recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the
Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized
as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts
and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the
Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the
decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec.
Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based
on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind
Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married
to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the
appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo,
81
Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed
abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this
petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the
Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O.
No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and
39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This
provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after
Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a
divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or
property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea
of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the
problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still
82
considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have
already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by
naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable
decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid
divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a
Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree
rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry of
marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear
anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that
[she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property
relation, respectively.
83
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the
joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US
citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was
only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court
dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others,
that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing
in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In
ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien
spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There,
we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged
post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x
x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a
complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his
Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a
conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van
Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated,
but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred
that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of
the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent
as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony
by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown
to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
feed from the bond of the former marriage."
84
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has
to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a
wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the
Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is
implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese
national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which
declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a
Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of
whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from
the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,
but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights
recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband
jointly filed for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed
a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The
RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a
divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that,
consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven.
Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate
85
action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the
pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings.
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and
obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues
of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual
obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is
severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's
personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute
divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law
cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit
of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only
the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as
expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the
prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear
and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the
alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We
put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute
there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be
interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated
by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not
to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of
Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in
which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly
literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the
law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her
countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
86
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by
operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle,
found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending
rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament
that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose
rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the
laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the
court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The
deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the
vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the
right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest
of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It
essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over
the latter.52
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which have the
force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case,
We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of
the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a
Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and
substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt,
there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as
varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino
national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More
importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
87
against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the
national law of the foreigner.55
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained
a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of
the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce
proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor
to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is
inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not
be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38
of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the
Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever
law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be
"reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing
under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the
bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent
refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the
reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant
the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All
to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce
26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the
indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating
divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was
sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the
presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence,
it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome
by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and
fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral
conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a
foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions
are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by
pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are
relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are
more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is
not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an
alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does
not and cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right
88
to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any
way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a
question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their
exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be
recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically
answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is
this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a
divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My
intention was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but
not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of
divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity
March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the
grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of
the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On
March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the
Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and
with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce,
such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one
year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one
spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the
Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No.
836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens,
whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of
the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in
the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and
89
602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these
bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and
Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of
2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19,
2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations.
Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as
follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code,
modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than
six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual
agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar
procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common
child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath
two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an
absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code
restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the
marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or
personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited
with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
90
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with
the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to
be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time
of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at
the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is
highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of
the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of
the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or
transition from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition
for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or
vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the
total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and
repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church
react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it
as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon
marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions
on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation
follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for
country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect,
bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right
and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be
read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional
provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the
State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is
also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien
spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost
always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In
fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not
eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women
91
and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of
Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of
2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the
Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not
lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human
person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than
good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign
divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or
her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any
subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall
be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child
born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold
a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the
principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and
assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time.
With the advancement of communication and information technology, as
well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly
connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not
too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in
heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect
unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that
the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is
not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical
to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush
aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking
the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover
in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for
we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep
them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may
seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature
and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the
will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
92
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to
motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case
brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that
will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy
by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree
rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports
to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a
fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment
decreeing the divorce.93
93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce
decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it
appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG;
neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity
of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The
power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent
Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to
remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September

18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception
of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED
94
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry
under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure
question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated
May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26
of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against
him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley
and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San
Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no
law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter
of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
95
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before
the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this
connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The
issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity
of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on
how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
96
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the
following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will
not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce
them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them
abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy,
a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
97
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of
the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for
legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be
no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient
evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
98
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23,
are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

99
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and
to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
100
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only
to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would
be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material
interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy
of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of
venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
101
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal,
i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in
the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x
x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x
x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification
and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court
for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
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The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse.
The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz
v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with
the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of
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nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment
or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
104
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be
repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule
on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of
party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act
No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
105
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from
the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to
sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse
is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be
no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the
civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
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Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary
to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There
is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine
courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do
not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the
Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served."91
107
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between
a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle
in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him
or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution
for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs
to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of
108
the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and
the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107,
Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

109