TORTS CASES PART V The rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been adumbrated thus: (ITO
carious liability has been adumbrated thus: (ITO YUNG ABOUT SA
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA,
CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE
GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILYROSALES, respondents.
-zyka-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(ENTERPRISE THEORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY)
FACTS:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its
driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27.
The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the
University of the Philippines Integrated School.
On August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then
crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City.
An eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound
for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of
the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters
away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts
to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide by RTC of Quezon City.
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the
MMTC, as a defendant therein.
In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC
and Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorneys fees
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court
The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution,
dated September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: WON MMTC, AS EMPLOYER OF MUSA, IS LIABLE
HELD:
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance of their
duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers directly, regardless
of the solvency of their employees.
TOPIC)
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed
upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon
the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all
past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to
profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them;
and because he is better able toabsorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who
is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection,
instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the
enterprise is conducted safely
In Campo v. Camarote, we explained the basis of the presumption of negligence in this wise:
The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the
carelessness of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner
of the vehicle in the choice of the driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove
the owners lack of diligence, the right will in many cases prove illusory, as seldom does
a person in the community, especially in the cities, have the opportunity to observe the
conduct of all possible car owners therein. So the law imposes the burden of proof of
innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent and causes damage, the law
presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving
the contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the
scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. For this purpose, they have the burden of proving that they
have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the
quasi-delict and in the supervision of the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the supervision
of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
IN THIS CASE, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring
procedure. According to MMTC, applicants are required to submit professional driving licenses,
certifications of work experience, and clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation; to
undergo tests of their driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to complete training
programs on traffic rules, vehicle maintenance, and standard operating procedures during
emergency cases.
MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle
maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to
determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, but there is no record that Musa
attended such training programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No
proof was presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of
daily inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.
Normally, employers keep files concerning the qualifications, work experience, training,
evaluation, and discipline of their employees. The failure of MMTC to present such documentary
proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses.
Victory Liner vs Heirs of Malecdan
-em-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(ENTERPRISE THEORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY)
Facts:
Victory Liner Inc. is a common carrier. Private respondent Elena Malecdan is the widow of the
deceased, while private respondents Veronica, Virginia, Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola, Manuel and
Valentin Malecdan are their children.
Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old farmer residing in Barangay Nungnungan 2, Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela. On July 15, 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., while Andres was crossing
the National Highway on his way home from the farm, a Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane
stopped to allow him and his carabao to pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a
bus of petitioner Victory Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so
doing, respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a result, Andres
Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled over. The Victory Liner bus sped
past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its destination without helping him.
The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdan's neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who was resting in a
nearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan sustained a wound on his left shoulder,
from which bone fragments protruded. He was taken by Lorena and another person to the
Cagayan District Hospital where he died a few hours after arrival. The carabao also died soon
afterwards. Lorena executed a sworn statement before the police authorities. Subsequently, a
criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was filed
against the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo Joson, Jr.
On October 5, 1994, private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5, Baguio City, which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver guilty of
gross negligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross
negligence in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its driver were held liable
for damages. On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Victory Liner, Inc. no longer questions the findings of the Regional Trial Court that Andres
Malecdan was injured as a result of the gross negligence of its driver, Ricardo Joson, Jr. What
petitioner now questions is the finding that it (petitioner) failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Issue:
Whether or not Vicory Liner exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its employee.
Held:
No. Vicory Liner was negligent.
Article 2176 provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an
employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the
performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the
employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.
Article 2176 provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict committed by an
employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the
performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party may recover from the
employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. The rationale for the rule on
vicarious liability has been explained thus:
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees acting within
the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage."For this purpose, they have the burden of proving
that they have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees,
employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.
In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.'s written examination, actual
driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological examination, NBI clearance, physical
examination, hematology examination,urinalysis, student driver training, shop training, birth
certificate, high school diploma and reports from the General Maintenance Manager and the
Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the tests and training sessions and was ready
to work as a professional driver. However, as the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof
that Joson, Jr. had nine years of driving experience.
Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the company were given seminars
on driving safety at least twice a year. Again, however, as the trial court noted there is no record
of Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar. Petitioner likewise failed to establish the speed of its
buses during its daily trips or to submit in evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports of
field inspectors. The finding of the trial court that petitioner's bus was running at a very fast speed
when it overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these
reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be negligent in the
supervision of its driver Joson, Jr.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. AND FELIX PANGALANGAN
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC, ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT AND
FERNANDO PINEDA
-gaddi-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(MEANING OF MANAGER UNDER ARTICLE 2180)
FACTS:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged.
A complaint for damages was filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc. Balingit contends that he was not Pineda's employer. He moved that the
complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had
no cause of action against him.
The CFI dismissed the complaint as to Balingit on the ground that he, as the manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., is not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article
2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" used in article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the manager of a corporation.
NO.
ART. 2180 provides:
“The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.”
“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.”
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It
may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" is used in the sense
of "employer".
Hence no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned
because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
SPOUSES JAYME VS. APOSTOL
-pochi-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(MEANING OF MANAGER UNDER ARTICLE 2180)
Petitioner: Parents of the minor Marvin Jayme who died
Respondent:
- Fidel Lozano (driver of pick-up truck; employee of Municipality of Koronadal)
- Mayor Fernando Miguel (Mayor of Koronadal)
- Rodrigo Apostol (Registered owner of the pick-up truck)
- Ernesto Simubulan (has possession of the pick-up truck)
FACTS:
Mayor Fernando Miguel was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway. Marvin was sent 50 meters away from point of impact indicating driving on high speed.
Marvin died.
Petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondent praying that all
respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss.
RTC: rendered judgment in favor of spouses holding Mayor, Apostol and Lozano solidarily liable
for damages
- Municipality of Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other
defendant being an agency of the State
CA: Reversed RTC
- Mayor Miguel was not Lozano's employer and, hence, not solidarily liable for the latter's
negligent act. He was merely a passenger.
- It was the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver's true and lawful employer.
ISSUE:
WON a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to
him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian? NO. The doctrine of vicarious liability
or imputed liability finds no application in the present case. Mayor is not the employer
of Lozano. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing
vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow
employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.
RULING:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own quasi-delictual
acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known
as vicarious or imputed liability.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must
be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another;
(2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the
authority to give at all times; and
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions
entrusted to him.
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the
employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter.
To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we rely on the four-fold test.
This involves:
(1) the employer's power of selection;
(2) payment of wages or other remuneration;
(3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and
(4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which
was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. Lozano was employed as a driver
by the municipality. An employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee
was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the
employee subsists.
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the vehicle's registered owner.
There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make
him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may
have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an employer-
employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver's negligence should
not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the
vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself
to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Handley v. Lombardi is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability: Plaintiff was
not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and superior
employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not
properly applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master, but only
by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's
agent he was delegated Kruse's authority over the driver.
In Swanson v. McQuown, the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of, or
direct or encourage it.
RE: Spouses’ allegation that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano
and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident.
NO. In Benson v. Sorrell, it was ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the
employer of the driver.
MARTIN V. CA
-belhur-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
FACTS:
 Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930.
 At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo,
Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged.
 Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand
was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
alleging inter alia that he was liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees
and litigation costs as the employer of Nestor Martin.
 The petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee.
 the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no evidence had
been adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The motion was denied.
 Judge Eutropio Migriño held in favor of the plaintiff
 The decision was seasonably elevated to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed it in toto.
ISSUE: WHETHER MARTIN IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
HELD:
 NO. The action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, providing in part
that: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
 The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-employee relationship
although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in any business or industry.
It differs in this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires that
the employer be engaged in an industry to be subsidiarily liable for the felony committed
by his employee in the course of his employment.
 Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180
is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned
task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done,
the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense
 of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that
article.
 In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to
show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of
the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-
employee relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It
noted that although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer,
"he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation."
 In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to drive and do not have
to employ others to drive for them unless this is needed for business reasons. Many
cannot afford this luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an unnecessary
expense and inconvenience. In the present case, the more plausible assumption is that
Nestor Martin is a close relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed
the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not have been accommodated
if he were a mere employee for employees do not usually enjoy the use of their
employer's car at two o'clock in the morning.
 The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the question of the driver's
alleged negligence or the lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner in the selection
and supervision of his employee. These questions have not arisen because the
employment relationship contemplated in Article 1860 of the Civil Code has not been
established.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
ROSENDO C. CARTICIANO and ZACARIAS A. CARTICIANO, petitioners,
vs. MARIO NUVAL, respondent.
-monica-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
PANGANIBAN, J.: To hold an employer liable for the negligent acts of the employee, it is
enough to prove that the latter was hired to drive the former’s motor vehicle. It is not necessary
to show, in addition, that the employer’s children were aboard the jeep when the accident
happened. Once the driver is shown to be negligent, the burden of proof to free the employer
from liability shifts to the latter.
Facts:
Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was driving his father’s Ford
Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s owner-type Jeep, then driven by
defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars
were about to pass one another, Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island
of the highway an occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser
collided head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered
multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered P100,000.00
as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it.
Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants (Nuval) for
damages.
PLAINTIFF’s contention:
The proximate cause of the accident is defendant’s Darwin recklessness in driving defendant
Nuval’s jeep; that on account of said recklessness of defendant Darwin, plaintiff suffered damages;
that defendant Darwin was an employee of defendant Nuval at the time of accident; that
defendant Nuval did not exercise due diligence in the supervision of his employee; that defendants
should he held liable for damages.
DEFENDANT s contention:
DEF Nuval on the other hand insisted that he cannot be held answerable for the acts of defendant
Darwin: THAT:
1) DEF Darwin was not an employee of defendant Nuval at the time of the accident;
2) DEF Darwin was hired only as casual and has worked withDEF Nuvals company only for
five days;
3) that at the time of the accident, DEF Darwin was no longer connected with DEF Nuvals
company;
4) DEF Darwin was not authorized to drive the vehicle of defendant Nuval;
5) DEF Nuval tried to locate DEF Darwin but the latter could no longer be found;
6) DEF Nuval cannot be held liable for damages.
RTC: rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants ordering the latter to pay
the former jointly and severally for the damages suffered by appellees.
CA: Explained that in order to hold an employer liable for the negligent acts of an employee under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. The employer in this case, RESP
Mario Nuval, cannot be held liable for the tort committed by Darwin. 1) appellants did not present
evidence showing that the driver was indeed an employee of respondent at the time the accident
occurred. 2) even assuming arguendo that Darwin was in fact an employee of Nuval, it was not
shown that the former was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the incident
happened. Thus, the requisites for holding an employer liable for the tort committed by an
employee were not satisfied.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
1. Whether Darwin in an employee of Nuval. YES
2. Whether Nuval is liable for the damages incurred by Darwin in case the latter is proven
to be an employee? YES
HELD:
1. Yes, Darwin is an employee of Nuval. No Proof That Employment Was Terminated
The court disagrees to RESP’s contention that on the date the accident happened, Darwin was no
longer his employee because the latters services had already been terminated. Nuval adds that
Darwin was hired for a period of only 4-6 days. To substantiate this claim, the former presented
payroll and employment records showing that the latter was no longer his employee. However,
as revealed by the testimonies of the witnesses presented during trial, RESP had other employees
working for him who were not listed in the payroll either.
The rather easy access which Darwin had to the keys to the vehicle of Nuval further weakened
the latter’s cause.
1) nobody questioned the fact that the former had freely entered respondent’s house
where the keys to the vehicle were kept. The theory of Nuval that Darwin must have
stolen the keys as well as the vehicle is rather farfetched and not supported by any
proof whatsoever. It is obviously an afterthought concocted to present some semblance
of a defense.
2) both respondent and his employees who testified did not act as if the vehicle had been
stolen. He had not reported the alleged theft of his vehicle. Neither did he search nor
ask his employees to search for the supposedly stolen vehicle. In fact, he testified that
his employees had told him that the keys and the vehicle had merely "probably" been
stolen by Darwin.
2. Yes, Nuval is liable for thje damages incurred by Darwin under vicarious liability.
Under article 2180
“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible xxx "Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.”
The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope
of the authority given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to bring
respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected. True, this may have been one of his
assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was presented showing that it was his only task. His
authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Third parties are not bound by the allegation that the driver
was authorized to operate the jeep only when the employer’s children were on board the vehicle.
Giving credence to this outlandish theory would enable employers to escape their legal liabilities
with impunity. Such loophole is easy to concoct and is simply unacceptable.
The claim of respondent that he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
is not borne out by the evidence. Neither is it supported by logic. His main defense that at the
time of the accident Darwin was no longer his employee, having been merely hired for a few days,
is inconsistent with his other argument of due diligence in the selection of an employee.
Once a driver is proven negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle
owner equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of
employee as a defense.14 Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this
burden.
No Proof of Contributory Negligence RESP Nuval’s accusation that PET Zacarias Carticiano is guilty
of contributory negligence by failing to stop his car or to evade the oncoming jeep is untenable.
Both the trial and the appellate courts found that the accident was caused by the fact that Darwin’s
jeep suddenly veered towards Zacarias’ lane when the vehicles were about to pass each other,
thus making it difficult if not impossible for petitioner to avoid the head on collision.
Disposuitive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial courts Decision REINSTATED, except that the award
of P100,000 for lost income or opportunities is DELETED
MAXIMO SOLIMAN, JR. VS. HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON
-jeanelle-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
Petitioner: Maximo Soliman Jr.
Private Respondent: Republic Central Colleges
FACTS:
 Petitioner Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent
Republic Central Colleges (“Colleges”), the RL Security Agency Inc., and one Jimmy
Solomon, a security guard.
 On August 13, 1982, while petitioner Solomon was in the campus ground and
premises of private respondent COLLEGES, as he was still a regular enrolled student
of the said school taking his morning classes, defendant JIMMY SOLOMON who was in
the premises of said school performing his duties as SECURITY GUARD under the
employment and supervision of RL Security Agency, Inc., stroke and shoot the
petitioner on the abdomen with a .38 caliber revolver.
 Petitioner was treated and confined and as per doctor’s opinion, the petitioner may
not be able to attend his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance
of his usual work for a duration of three to four months before his wounds would be
completely healed.
 Private Respondent COLLEGES filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that complain
has no cause of action. That it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by
petitioner student for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer
of the security guard charged.
 Private Respondent COLLEGES further argued that Article 2180 7th paragraph, of the
Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, while SECURITY GUARD Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or
student or apprentice of the school.
 Respondent Judge granted private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss holding that the
security guard was not an employee of the school.
ISSUE:
WON Private Respondent Republic Central Colleges is NOT the employer of the security guard
Jimmy Solomon.
HELD: YES. Private Respondent Colleges is not the employer of the security guard.
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault
or negligence exists not only for one’s own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a
person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for
acts or omissions of another are the following:
 xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils, their student or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
 The first paragraph quoted above, offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for
the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy Solomon.
 Private Respondent Colleges was not the employer of the security guard. The
employer of Jimmy Solomon was the RL Security Agency, Inc., while the school was
the client or customer of the RL Security Agency.
 It is settled that where the security agency recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by
the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients
or customers of such agency.
 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in
selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot be demanded
from the client or customer whose premises or property are protected by
the guards.
 The fact that the client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts
or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with
the security agency.
 There being no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy
Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the
acts of the security guard Solomon.
 Since there was no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil student or an
apprentice of the Colleges, he being an employee of RL Security Agency, the other
above quoted paragraph of Article 2180 Civil Code is not available.
ADDITIONAL: Does it follow, however, that respondent Colleges could not be held liable
upon any other basis of law, for in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to
entitle respondent school to dismissal of petitioner’s complaint in respect of itself? NO.
Respondent Judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather
should have, in the interest of justice, allowed the petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on part of the
respondent College.
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
-joy-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue,
Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage,
right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire
spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects
inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc.
and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge
of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
Caltex: admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims
that the business conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated by
Boquiren as an independent contractor.
Boquiren: Im an agent of Caltex. It exercises control over me.
Issue: Whether Caltex should be held liable for the damages caused to appellants. (Ya in its
capacity as employer)
Held: This question depends on whether the operator of the gasoline station was an independent
contractor or an agent of Caltex.
Under the license agreement the operator would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for
the use of the premises and all equipment therein. The operator could sell only Caltex products.
Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other words control,
of Caltex. The operator could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the consent of
Caltex. Termination of the contract was a right granted only to Caltex but not to the operator.
These provisions of the contract show that the operator was virtually an employee of the Caltex,
not an independent contractor. Hence, Caltex should be liable for damages caused to appellants.
 Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC
-ron-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
Facts:
 Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82 yr old retired schoolteacher (now
deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer Inst. and driven
by its alleged employee, Funtecha.
 Kapunan was walking along Roxas Ave at 6:30pm of Oct 20, 1977. As a result of the
accident, Kapunan suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for 20 days.
 Evidence showed that only one headlight of the jeep was functioning.
 Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded
Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him.
 The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious
victim to the hospital.
Kapunan instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan reserved his right to file an independent civil
action. City Court Funtecha guilty as charged, conviction affirmed by the then CFI.
Kapunan commenced a civil case (independent) for damages before the RTC. Defendants were:
 Filamer Christian Institute
 Funtecha (person driving the jeepney)
 Agustin Masa, the director and president of Filamer Inst., in his personal capacity in
that he personally authorized and allowed said Funtecha who was his houseboy at the
time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question despite his knowledge and
awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said
vehicle.
Allan Masa (president’s son & the authorized driver), who was with Funtecha at the time of the
accident, was not impleaded as a co-defendant.
RTC rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer Inst. and Funtecha to be at fault but
also Allan Masa, a non-party. RTC absolved Agustin Masa from with respect to the complaint filed
against him in his personal and private capacity, cause he was not in the vehicle during the alleged
incident. CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not Filamer Institute can be held liable for the tortious act of Funtencha. (No)
Ruling:
The legal issue is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to
petitioner Filamer Inst. with reference to Funtecha.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer Inst. has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code,
specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
“Sec. 14. Working scholars. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students
on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the
latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given real
opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court
under such arrangement.”
Filamer Inst. cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special
category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition. Funtecha
worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. Funtecha was not included in the
company payroll.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary
responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer Inst. for the reason that
at the time of the accident, Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment.
His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes.
Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then
driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were
certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. At the time of the injury, Funtecha was not
engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some
purpose of his own.
It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. Petitioner
Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.
Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer Inst. answerable to the injured party under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the
authorized driver of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's
irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which led
to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan.
But under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty of
negligence, such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. Allan was never impleaded in the
complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment
is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a
stranger.
CA decision SET ASIDE. Complaint for damages against petitioner Filamer Inst. DISMISSED for
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ,
JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS HOSPITAL,
INC., respondents.
-zyka-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(PROOF/DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP)
FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a
Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the
normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation,
registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794.
On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of
going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other
causing severe injuries to the former. Abad brought Vasquez to the hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vazquez died. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of
Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After investigation, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed
for failure to prosecute.
So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and
Castilex Industrial Corporation.
TRIAL COURT – Ruled in favor of Private Respondnets Vicente and Luisa Vasquez. Ordered
ABADand CASTILEX to jointly and solidarily pay.
CASTILEX AND ABAD separately appealed.
CA – affirmed the ruling of trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the
liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former.
CASTILEX moved for a reconsideration – CA modified its decision reducing amount of award.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. (WON CASTILEX MAY BE HELD
VICARIOUSLY LIABLE)
HELD: NO
[Art. 2180. XXX
[4TH PAR] The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
[5TH PAR] Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)]
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship;
once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was
committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the
tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question
of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of
itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless
it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employers liability for
the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employers
motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going from his work
to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting
within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit
to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle to go to and from meals, an
employee is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his
duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while
so driving the vehicle.
II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work
 In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem
or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence
of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment
even though he uses his employers motor vehicle.
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having
the employee drive home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having
the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment
in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home
and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters personal use outside
of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly
assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes
and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose
in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where
the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the
employer is not liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction. Whether
the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers
business or within the scope of his assigned task.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioners
office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies
Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioners
place of business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente
Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open
and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when
ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. That same witness for
the private respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was with a
woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy! This woman could not have been ABADs
daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about
2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner
put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no
connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the
perks attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted
to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that
petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of
ABAD in driving its vehicle
PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATION THAT PET.
CASTILEX BE ABSOLVED OF ANY LIABLITY FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY ITS
EMPLOYEE, ABAD.
Campo vs Camarote
-em-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(BASIS OF PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE)
Facts:
Juan Camarote was in 1953 the registered owner of a jeep with plate license DV-807 while
Gregorio Gemilga, a duly licensed (professional) driver with license No. 77675, was his driver. On
August 30, 1953, as Gemilga drove the jeep along the road in Davao, it bumped against the rear
of another which two passengers had just boarded. As a result of the impact Felix Giluano suffered
many physical injuries and he later died. So on October 26 a criminal information was filed against
Gemilga. The trial was scheduled for December 11, 1953, but on December 5, 1953 Gemilga
pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to imprisonment and indemnity of P3,000.
No execution of the indemnity was asked for and none was issued.
On October 19, 1953, before Gemilga entered his plea of guilty the present action was instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Davao by the heirs of the deceased Giluano against Juan
Camarote, the owner of the jeep, and Gemilga, the driver. The case was submitted for judgment
upon a stipulation of facts, the most important of which are set forth in the above statement. On
the basis of the stipulation, judgment was entered for Plaintiff against Defendants sentencing
them to pay Plaintiff P6,000 as damages and P500 as attorney’s fee. Against this judgment this
appeal was presented.
The principal contentions of the Defendants Juan Camarote are: (1) that his liability as owner of
the jeep is only subsidiary, and (2) that if the action is against him for his negligence, he is not
guilty of such negligence but exercised the diligence of a good father of a family because he was
not in the jeep at the time of the accident and the driver of the jeep whom he employed is a
competent driver. There is no question that the basis of the action is the supposed negligence or
lack of good diligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle.
Issue:
WN Camarote was not negligent and exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Held:
No. The law which defines the scope of the liability of a car owner in relation to accidents and
injuries caused by the vehicle driven by another is Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Art. 2180. — The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”.
Under the new Civil Code, the owner of the vehicle is included among the persons who may
respond for the acts of their employees who cause damage to third persons in the course of their
employment. By reason of this newly inserted provision the owner of a jeep driven by another
becomes responsible for the driver’s negligence under the terms and circumstances specified in
the last paragraph of article 2180. In accordance with this paragraph the owner of the vehicle is
responsible unless he proves that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. But in the case at bar, Camarote, the jeepney owner, was not in the jeep; and the
only manner in which he could have avoided damage to third persons would have been by the
exercise by him of the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of his driver.
Did he satisfy the requirement of the law in this case?
Defendant Juan Camarote argues that the mere fact that the driver was a professional driver is a
sufficient exercise of the diligence required of a good father of a family, which would exempt him
from responsibility. We think that this is a mistaken view of the law, taking into account the fact,
of which we take judicial notice, that licenses are easy to obtain and no strict examination is
required before professional driver’s licenses are given, and that the holding of a driver’s license
is no guarantee or assurance of the carefulness of the holder of the license. In order that
the Defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family,
he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver’s license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experience and record of service. Defendant-Appellant did not take these steps, which are
considered essential, and we must hold that he has failed to exercise all due diligence required of
a good father of a family in the choice or selection of his driver.
The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person injured by the carelessness
of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the
choice of the driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owner’s lack of diligence,
the right will in many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a person in the community, especially
in the cities, have the opportunity to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So
the law imposes the burden of proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the driver is negligent
and causes damage, the law presumes that the owner was negligent and imposes upon him the
burden of proving the contrary.
Finding that the conclusion of the trial judge as to Defendant- Appellant’s responsibility is correct,
we hereby affirm the decision, with costs against Defendant-Appellant.
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
-gaddi-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
A collision took place between a passenger jeepney and a truck at around 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of June 14, 1979 along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger
of the jeepney, Ruben Reinoso, Sr. was killed. The passenger jeepney was owned by Ponciano
Tapales and driven by Alejandro Santos, while the truck was owned by Jose Guballa and driven
by Mariano Geronimo.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and against Guballa; for damages to property, in
favor of Tapales and against Guballa. The CA set aside and reversed the RTC decision and
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: W/N Guballa exercised due diligence in the selection of his employee.
(NO.)
Factual Findings
It was established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the negligence
of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based on the sketch and spot report of
the police authorities and the narration of the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision was
brought about because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left side
portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting the passenger jeepney as
a consequence.
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in automobile
collisions, the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the sketch of the police officers, clearly
shows that it was the truck that hit the jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck
was speeding along E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney
was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck reached a certain point near the Meralco
Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit the left middle side portion of the passenger
jeepney, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney.
The truck driver should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E. Rodriguez
Avenue was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in the middle thereof.
Exercise of Due Diligence
Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and supervision
of his employee. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families (diligence of a good father of a family) in the selection or supervision of his
employee. Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualification, experience and service record. With respect to the supervision of
employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Guballa, attempted to overthrow this presumption of negligence by showing that:
(1) He had exercised the due diligence required of him by seeing to it that the driver
must check the vital parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound like the
oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn
(2) Geronimo had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation
came about
(3) Whenever his trucks get out of the compound to make deliveries, it is always
accompanied with two (2) helpers.
This was all which he considered as selection and supervision in compliance with the
law to free himself from any responsibility. This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as
equivalent to an exercise of all the care of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his driver Mariano Geronimo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial is REINSTATED.
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was
negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the
proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while
closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunan’s jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was
beyond the control of accused-appellant.
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as
defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs) of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case as these witnesses are not available
to testify in the civil case.

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., vs. RTC: decision in favor of respondent Calaunan
MODESTO CALAUNAN CA: Affirmed RTC
-pochi-
Hence, this petition.
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
RELEVANT ISSUE: WON PRBLI exercised the required diligence in the selection and
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
supervision of its employees? PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees.
Petitioners: Driver and Owner of bus
RELEVANT RULING:
Respondents: Owner of jeepney
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as
FACTS:
to their qualifications, experience and service records.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together
with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep.
The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. The two vehicles In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard
collided. operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof.
The jeepney fell on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage
To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
By reason of such collision, a criminal case and a complaint for damages was filed before the RTC evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case: In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
Version of Manliclic Version of Calaunan
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in The jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes
question. However, they explained that when kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter overtook the jeep and in the process of public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
overtake another jeep in front of it. Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add
CA acquitted petitioner Manliclic for the crime Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
Property with Physical Injuries: said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
 In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that
it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient
to overcome such presumption.
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very
good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles.
There is no evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated
by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver
should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them.
- There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to
oversee how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting
incidents similar to the herein case.
In regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its
employees, particularly the driver involved in this case
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the
damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
VICTORY LINER V. HEIRS OF MALECDAN
-belhur-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
 Petitioner is a common carrier. Private respondent Elena Malecdan is the widow of
the deceased, while private respondents Veronica, Virginia, Mary Pauline, Arthur, Viola,
Manuel and Valentin Malecdan are their children. Andres Malecdan was a 75 year-old
farmer.
 While Andres was crossing the National Highway on his way home from the farm, a
Dalin Liner bus on the southbound lane stopped to allow him and his carabao to
pass. However, as Andres was crossing the highway, a bus of petitioner Victory
Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., bypassed the Dalin bus. In so doing,
respondent hit the old man and the carabao on which he was riding. As a result,
Andres Malecdan was thrown off the carabao, while the beast toppled
over.The Victory Liner bus sped past the old man, while the Dalin bus proceeded to its
destination without helping him.
 The incident was witnessed by Andres Malecdans neighbor, Virgilio Lorena, who was
resting in a nearby waiting shed after working on his farm. Malecdan sustained a
wound on his left shoulder, from which bone fragments protruded. He was taken by
Lorena and another person to the Cagayan District Hospital where he died a few
hours after arrival. The carabao also died soon afterwards. Lorena executed a sworn
statement before the police authorities. Subsequently, a criminal complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property was filed
against the Victory Liner bus driver Ricardo Joson, Jr.
 Private respondents brought this suit for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Baguio
City, which, in a decision rendered on July 17, 2000, found the driver guilty of gross
negligence in the operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross
negligence in the selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. Petitioner and its driver were
held liable for damages.
 On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with the modification
that the award of attorneys fees was fixed at P50,000.00.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER FAILED TO EXERCISE THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF THE FAMILY IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEE.
HELD:
YES.
 Article 2180 provides for the solidary liability of an employer for the quasi-delict
committed by an employee. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their
employees in the performance of their duties is primary and, therefore, the injured party
may recover from the employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.
 Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task only if they can show that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. For this
purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such
diligence, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties.
 In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. With respect to the
supervision of employees, employers must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for breaches
thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
 In the instant case, petitioner presented the results of Joson, Jr.s written examination,
actual driving tests, x-ray examination, psychological examination, NBI clearance,
physical examination, hematology examination, urinalysis, student driver training, shop
training, birth certificate, high school diploma and reports from the General
Maintenance Manager and the Personnel Manager showing that he had passed all the
tests and training sessions and was ready to work as a professional driver. However, as
the trial court noted, petitioner did not present proof that Joson, Jr. had nine
years of driving experience.
 Petitioner also presented testimonial evidence that drivers of the company were given
seminars on driving safety at least twice a year. Again, however, as the trial court noted
there is no record of Joson, Jr. ever attending such a seminar. Petitioner likewise
 failed to establish the speed of its buses during its daily trips or to submit in
evidence the trip tickets, speed meters and reports of field inspectors. The
finding of the trial court that petitioners bus was running at a very fast speed when it
overtook the Dalin bus and hit the deceased was not disputed by petitioner. For these
reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding petitioner to be
negligent in the supervision of its driver Joson, Jr.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 17, 2002, is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION as to amounts to be paid.
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a
causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code.
He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or
that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of
law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.

PET’s argument Court’s observation

a) “driving an overloaded Whether the driver (of PET) meant 60 miles per hour
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., petitioner, vehicle with only one (which could be 96.77 kilometers per hour) or 60
vs. functioning headlight kilometers per hour, the fact remains that the panel
during nighttime certainly truck was OVERSPEEDING because the maximum
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NICANOR BERNABE III, JOSEFINA BERNABE, in their
increases the risk of allowable speed for truck and buses on open country
individual capacities and as HEIRS OF JASON BERNABE, JOHN JOSEPH BERNABE, accident,” roads, such as the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite,
VICTOR IGNACIO, JULIETA ENRIQUEZ and RAMON ENRIQUEZ, RENE TABLANTE, b) that because the Cimarron is only 50 kilometers per hour. 13
LEOMAR MACASPAC, JR., CHARITO ESTOLANO, NENITA SALUNOY, in their individual had only one headlight,
As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's
capacities and as HEIRS OF DALMACIO SALUNOY, respondents there was “decreased
panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only
-monica- visibility,” and that the fact
that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a very
that the vehicle was
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger
overloaded and its front
jeepney ahead of it as well.
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE) seat overcrowded
“decreased [its]
FACTS: This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Bent panel truck of petitioner Sanitary maneuverability.”
Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several
others. On August 31, 1980, a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry
collided with a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving
others. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. Furthermore, based
Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have avoided the collision.
The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI. Driving Second.
the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him
suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this On its liability as employer of the negligent driver,
caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, a) PET contends that there is no law requiring the submission of NBI clearance and police
his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane. The driver of the Cimarron, clearance of employees prior to their employment. Hence: PET’s non-submission of the
Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, NBI clearance and police clearance of its driver does not mean that it failed to exercise
died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals. the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees

RTC: Rendered judgment for private respondents. b) PET’s failure to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo psychological and physical tests
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC before employment has no basis in law because there is no law requiring such tests
ISSUE: prior to hiring employees.
1. PET contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and, PET’s contention has NO merit.
therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. NO CA did not say that petitioner's failure to submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof
2. Whether PET exercised due diligence? What are the RELIABLE INDICATORs to prove that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection of its employees. Instead:
Due Diligence according to the CA? No. (see below)
RELIABLE INDICATORs OF THE EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE
First.
NBI & Police Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Accordingly, it
PET claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and regulations
clearance behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision
at the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed
of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements
to be negligent. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
 fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the office manager of
petitioner in its Dasmariñas plant, said that petitioner has a policy of
requiring job applicants to submit clearances from the police and the
NBI. In the case of applicants for the position of driver they are required
to have at least two (2) years driving experience and to be holders of
a professional driver's license for at least two years. But the supposed
company policies on employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista
show in what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they
drove their vehicles in a safe way.
psychological and With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical
physical tests tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, such
circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of
due diligence. As the trial court said: 14(No tests of skill, physical as well
as mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be
employees. No OJT and seminars reminding employees, especially
drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done.
There were no instructions given to defendant's drivers as to how to
react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs.
There was even failure on the part of defendant to present its
concerned employee's 204 file. All these could only mean failure on the
part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.)
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is MODIFIED in the sense that award
denominated "for moral damages and unearned income" is deleted, and in lieu thereof for loss of
earning capacity and the further for death indemnity are awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy
and the award for attorney's fees is disallowed. In all other respects the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED.
BUTARO YAMADA VS. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO.
-jeanelle-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
 The plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an automobile from the
defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at
a certain price hour and was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the
taxicab company (Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co.).
 The journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip, while
crossing the tracks of defendant Railroad Company in the barrio of San Juan, the
automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs got injured.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad
Company and held the defendant taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs
in various amounts. The taxicab company appealed.
 It appears from the record that the driver of the automobile drove his machine upon
the railroad tracks without observing precautions which ordinary care and prudence
would require, without reducing speed and without taking any precaution looking to
determining whether there was danger from a train or locomotive.
The trial court accordingly found that the driver was guilty of gross negligence and
that the said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. It also found out
that the driver had been instructed by the taxicab company to approach and pass
over railroad tracks in the manner and form followed and observed on the occasion in
question, and for that reason, the taxicab company was liable for damages.
 Several ERRORS are assigned by the appellant (TAXICAB COMPANY):
FIRST. The finding of the trial court that the driver of the automobile did not slacken
speed which was fast, upon approaching the railroad crossing, which was clearly
visible and had to be approached on an upward grade, or to take any precaution to
avert the accident.
- The appellant contented that the view of the railroad tracks in both directions was
obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that was impossible
for a person approaching the crossing even though on guard to detect by sight the
approach of a train.
SECOND. The appellant contends that the plaintiffs cannot recover for the reason
that the negligence of the driver of the automobile, if any, was imputable to them,
they having permitted the driver to approach and pass over the railroad crossing
without the use of ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of a train or
locomotive, and having made no effort to caution or instruct him or compel him to
take reasonable care in making the crossing. (DI DAW DAPAT MAGRECOVER YUNG
MGA PLAINTIFFS SA KANILA <taxicab company> KASI PINAYAGAN NILA YUNG
DRIVER NA MAGCROSS PARIN SA TRACKS AND WALA DAW SILA GINAWA PARA
IINSTRUCT YUNG DRIVER NA MAGTAKE NG REASONABLE CARE- SABE NI
APPELLANT)
THIRD. The finding of the trial court that the defendant railroad company was not
guilty of negligence which contributed to the causing of the accident complained of.
In support of this claim, defendant taxicab presents other facts which shows that
defendant Railroad company was negligent:
a. That the accident occurred in the heart of the barrio San Juan within approximately
one hundred meters of the railroad station, that is, in a populous community;
b. that the railroad company did not maintain either a flagman or protecting gates at
the grade crossing where the accident occurred, while the sign “Railroad Crossing”
was broken on the side toward the road;
c. that trees and undergrowth had been permitted to grow and adjoining the right of
way and houses were constructed thereon, in such a manner as to obstruct the view
 of persons approaching the railroad track until within a few meters thereof; and
d. that the approach to the crossing is twisting, and on either side thereof are ditches
about two meters deep.
 The main contention of the appellant taxicab company is based on the claim that,
even admitting as proved all the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the appellant is not
liable. It is maintained that up to the time the accident occurred, the defendant
taxicab company had fully performed its duty to the public, it being undisputed in the
record that the driver was competent and had a long and satisfactory record, having
driven cars for the defendant for 5 or 6 years without accident or misadventure, and
that his negligence, if any, in attempting to pass over the crossing on the occasion
cannot legally be imputed to the taxicab company so as to make it liable for damages
resulting therefrom.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taxicab company failed to exercise due diligence and therefore should be held
liable for the damages resulting from the accident.
HELD: YES
 On the first assignment of error, the court held that it was clearly the duty of the
driver to reduce the speed of his car and the noise thereof to such an extent that he
would be able to determine from the unrestricted and uninterrupted use of all his
faculties whether or not a train was near. It is the law that a person must use
ordinary care and prudence in passing over a railroad crossing.
What acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence must depend
on the circumstances of each particular case. The degree of care differs in
different cases. Greater care is necessary in crossing a road where the cars
are running at a high rate of speed and close together than where they are
running at less speed and remote from one another. BUT IN EVERY CASE,
DUE CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED.
In this case, the appellant’s own showing is to the effect that the view of the track in
the direction from which the train was coming was obstructed in such manner that
neither the track nor a train could be seen as a traveler approached the crossing; and
yet, in spite of that fact, the chauffeur drove upon the tracks without investigation or
precaution of any kind.
* The very fact that the train was approaching and was so near as to collide with the
automobile is strong evidence of the fact that no precautions were taken to determine
that fact. If the driver had taken the simplest means of permitting his own faculties to
exercise themselves fairly, there would be no accident, as the presence of the train
would have been discovered in an instant; but he chose, rather, to give his senses no
opportunity to protect him or his passengers and drove on the track at full speed with
all the noise which an automobile produces at such speed.
(DI KO NA IDIDISCUSS IBANG ISSUES MAHABA KASI TALAGA TOTAL FOCUS LANG
NAMAN US SA DUE DILIGENCE.) HIHIHI.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., Petitioner, v. MARICAR BASCOS
BAESA
-joy-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
FACTS:
Spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their, together with spouses Ico with their son and seven
other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Ilagan, Isabela, to
celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa. The group, numbering fifteen
(15) persons, rode in the passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered
owner thereof. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus
from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a
curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children,
Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The
jeepney was extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio
Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present,
Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained in hiding.
Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor
children filed an action for damages against Pantranco.
PANTRANCO invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez. petitioner claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez was employed and remained as its driver
only means that he underwent the same rigid selection process and was subjected to the same
strict supervision imposed by petitioner on all applicants and employees. It is argued by the
petitioner that unless proven otherwise, it is presumed that petitioner observed its usual
recruitment procedure and company polices on safety and efficiency
Isyu: W/N Patranco is exempt from liability on the ground that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees (W/N there is a presumption that the employer
observed usual recruitment procedures and standard safety)
Held: Nawp. No such presumption. Employer must adduce evid to that effect
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption
of negligence on the part of petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence
not only in the selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising their work rests with
the petitioner [Lilius v. Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934); Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No.
L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623]. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no
presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards were
observed. The mere issuance of rules and regulations and the formulation of various
company policies on safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are
not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the negligence of its
employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver, the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed. Petitioner failed to do this. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by
the petitioner, which consists mainly of the uncorroborated testimony of its Training Coordinator,
is insufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against petitioner.
Secosa vs Heirs of Francisco
-ron-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE: EVIDENCE)
Facts:
 On June 27, 1996, 4:00 p.m., Erwin Francisco, an 18 yr old 3rd year physical therapy
student of the Manila Central University, was riding a motorcycle along Radial Ave,
Manila.
 At the same time, petitioner, Raymundo Secosa, was driving a cargo truck on the same
road. The truck was owned by petitioner, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc
(DWPSI).
 Traveling behind the motorcycle of Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn
was being tailed by the truck of Secosa. The three vehicles were traversing the
southbound lane at a fairly high speed.
 When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the motorcycle causing
Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over Francisco, which
resulted in his instantaneous death.
 Fearing for his life, petitioner Secosa left his truck and fled the scene of the collision.
Respondents, the parents of Francisco, filed an action for damages against Secosa, DWPSI and
its president, El Buenasucenso Sy at RTC Manila. RTC ruled in favor of respondent parents. CA
affirmed RTC decision in toto.
Issue:
1. WON DWPSI exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees as required by article 2180 of the New Civil Code to be
exempt from liability. (NO, DWPSI NOT exempt from liability)
2. WON petitioner El Buenasenso Sy should be solidarily liable with petitioners DMCI and
Secosa in violation of the corporation law (piercing the veil – Corpo Law). (NO)
Ruling:
1. Article 2180 of NCC states:
“The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible x x x.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry x x x.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.”
Based on the provision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the
employer either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after
such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the
part of the employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for
quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that
it exercised such degree of care.
The employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he observed
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee, but he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or
documentary evidence. The reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the
employers testimony or that of his witnesses.
Court holds that petitioner DWPSI failed to conclusively prove that it had exercised the
requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Edilberto Duerme, the lone witness presented by DWPSI to support its position that it
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees, testified that he was the one who recommended petitioner Secosa as
a driver to DWPSI; that it was his duty to scrutinize the capabilities of drivers; and that
he believed petitioner to be physically and mentally fit for he had undergone rigid
training and attended the PPA safety seminar. DWPSI failed to support this with
documentary evidence which would have strengthened its claim. Such an omission is
fatal to its position, on account of which, DWPSI can be rightfully held solidarily liable
with Secosa.
2. El Buenasenso Sy cannot be held solidarily liable with his co-petitioners. While it may
be true that Sy is the president of petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services,
Inc., such fact is not by itself sufficient to hold him solidarily liable for the liabilities.
The records of this case are bereft of any evidence tending to show the presence of
any grounds that will justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction such as to hold
the president of DWPSI solidarily liable with it.
Petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner El
Buenasenso Sy is ABSOLVED from any liability adjudged against his co-petitioners.
 METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA,
CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE
GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and
LILYROSALES, respondents.
-zyka-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(ON SOLIDARY LIABILITY)
FACTS:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area. Musa was its
driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27.
The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the
University of the Philippines Integrated School.
On August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then
crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City.
An eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound
for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of
the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters
away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts
to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide by RTC of Quezon City.
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the
MMTC, as a defendant therein.
In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC
and Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorneys fees
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court
The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court, in a resolution,
dated September 12, 1996, partly granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie
Hence, this appeal
ISSUE: WON MMTC AND MUSA ARE SOLIDARILY LIABLE
HELD: YES
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee
in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This
does not make the employees liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages
is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-
delict.[59] Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against either
MMTC or Musa.
From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday[60] that the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries sustained in the operation
of said vehicle. In Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[61]it was held that to
escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce
sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Finally, we held in the recent case
of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[62] that the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver.
Figuracion Vda vs. Consolacion
-em-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(ON SOLIDARY LIABILITY)
Facts:
Lope Maglana was an employee of the Bureau of Customs whose work station was at Lasa, here
in Davao City. On December 20, 1978, early morning, Lope Maglana was on his way to his work
station, driving a motorcycle owned by the Bureau of Customs. At Km. 7, Lanang, he met an
accident that resulted in his death. He died on the spot. The PUJ jeep that bumped the deceased
was driven by Pepito Into, operated and owned by defendant Destrajo. From the investigation
conducted by the traffic investigator, the PUJ jeep was overtaking another passenger jeep that
was going towards the city poblacion. While overtaking, the PUJ jeep of defendant Destrajo
running abreast with the overtaken jeep, bumped the motorcycle driven by the deceased who
was going towards the direction of Lasa, Davao City. The point of impact was on the lane of the
motorcycle and the deceased was thrown from the road and met his untimely death.
Consequently, the heirs of Lope Maglana, Sr., here petitioners, filed an action for damages and
attorney's fees against operator Patricio Destrajo and the Afisco Insurance Corporation (AFISCO
for brevity) before the then Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch II. An information for
homicide thru reckless imprudence was also filed against Pepito Into.
On December 14, 1981, the lower court rendered a decision finding that Destrajo had not
exercised sufficient diligence as the operator of the jeepney. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against
defendant Destrajo, ordering him to pay plaintiffs the sum of P28,000.00 for
loss of income; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P12,000.00 which amount shall
be deducted in the event judgment in Criminal Case No. 3527-D against the
driver, accused Into, shall have been enforced; to pay plaintiffs the sum of
P5,901.70 representing funeral and burial expenses of the deceased; to pay
 plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages which shall be deducted in
the event judgment (sic) in Criminal Case No. 3527-D against the driver,
accused Into; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees and to
pay the costs of suit.
The defendant insurance company is ordered to reimburse defendant
Destrajo whatever amounts the latter shall have paid only up to the extent
of its insurance coverage.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion
of the decision contending that AFISCO should not merely be held secondarily liable because the
Insurance Code provides that the insurer's liability is "direct and primary and/or jointly and
severally with the operator of the vehicle, although only up to the extent of the insurance
coverage." Hence, they argued that the P20,000.00 coverage of the insurance policy issued by
AFISCO, should have been awarded in their favor.
Issue:
WN AFISCO should be held solidarily liable with the operator of the vehicle.
Held:
Yes. The particular provision of the insurance policy on which petitioners base their claim is as
follows:
Sec. 1 — LIABILITY TO THE PUBLIC
1. The Company will, subject to the Limits of Liability, pay all sums necessary
to discharge liability of the insured in respect of
(a) death of or bodily injury to any THIRD PARTY
(b) . . . .
2. . . . .
3. In the event of the death of any person entitled to indemnity under this
Policy, the Company will, in respect of the liability incurred to such person
indemnify his personal representatives in terms of, and subject to the terms
and conditions hereof.
The above-quoted provision leads to no other conclusion but that AFISCO can be held directly
liable by petitioners. As this Court ruled in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo City, Br. 75, "[w]here
an insurance policy insures directly against liability, the insurer's liability accrues immediately upon
the occurrence of the injury or even upon which the liability depends, and does not depend on
the recovery of judgment by the injured party against the insured."
However, we cannot agree that AFISCO is likewise solidarily liable with Destrajo. In Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the opportunity to resolve the issue as to
the nature of the liability of the insurer and the insured vis-a-vis the third party injured in an
accident. We categorically ruled thus:
While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity
against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the
insurer, however, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts
against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held
solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The
liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on
tort.
The Court then proceeded to distinguish the extent of the liability and manner of enforcing the
same in ordinary contracts from that of insurance contracts. While in solidary obligations, the
creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the solidary debtors, in an insurance
contract, the insurer undertakes for a consideration to indemnify the insured against loss, damage
or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. Thus, petitioner therein, which, under
the insurance contract is liable only up to P20,000.00, can not be made solidarily liable with the
insured for the entire obligation of P29,013.00 otherwise there would result "an evident breach of
the concept of solidary obligation.
Similarly, petitioners herein cannot validly claim that AFISCO, whose liability under the insurance
policy is also P20,000.00, can be held solidarily liable with Destrajo for the total amount of
P53,901.70 in accordance with the decision of the lower court. Since under both the law and the
insurance policy, AFISCO's liability is only up to P20,000.00, the second paragraph of the
dispositive portion of the decision in question may have unwittingly sown confusion among the
petitioners and their counsel. What should have been clearly stressed as to leave no room for
doubt was the liability of AFISCO under the explicit terms of the insurance contract.
In fine, we conclude that the liability of AFISCO based on the insurance contract is direct, but not
solidary with that of Destrajo which is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, petitioners
have the option either to claim the P15,000 from AFISCO and the balance from Destrajo or enforce
the entire judgment from Destrajo subject to reimbursement from AFISCO to the extent of the
insurance coverage.
 GAUDIOSO EREZO vs AGUEDO JEPTE
-gaddi-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
FACTS:
Jepte is the registered owner of a six by six truck. While the same was being driven by
Rodolfo Espino, it collided with a taxicab at the intersection of San Andres and Dakota Streets,
Manila. As the truck went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo causing injuries, as a result of which
he died.
Erezo brought this action against the registered owner of the truck (Jepte). Jepte
claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the
time of the accident. He explained, and his explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco,
the manager of the corporation, that the trucks of the corporation were registered in his name
as a convenient arrangement so as to enable the corporation to pay the registration fee with
his backpay as a pre-war government employee. Franco, however, admitted that the
arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicle Office.
The CFI held Jepte liable as he represented himself to be the owner of the truck and
the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his representation, registered the vehicles in his name, the
Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his declaration
of ownership and registration.
ISSUE: W/N Jepte, being the registered owner, should be allowed at the trial to
prove who the actual/real owner is. (NO.)
We already have held that the registered owner of a certificate of public convenience is
liable to the public for the injuries or damages suffered by passengers or third persons caused by
the operation of said vehicle, even though the same had been transferred to a third person.
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered
under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered
owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the
actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated
if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is. Under the same principle
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service, should primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is
being driven on the highways or streets.
We do not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not recover
whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom
he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle. He has a right to be indemnified by the
real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages.
There is a presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is Jepte as he is the
registered owner in the Motor Vehicle Office.
Under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended), registration is
required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is
transferred, but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway. The
main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
We hold with the trial court that the law does not allow a registered owner
to prove the actual owner. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving
who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one
who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means other
than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the
owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory if the registered
owner be given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his ownership.
The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and would seem
to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A registered owner who has already
sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party complaint, in the same action
brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee
of the vehicle.
MA. LIZA FRANCO-CRUZ vs. CA
-pochi-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
Petitioner: Registered owner and operator of FRANCO TRANSIT
Respondent: Victory liner (owner of bus and truck wrecker), Other Respondents were spouses
of those who died
FACTS:
On January 4, 1998, a Franco Transit bus collided with the rear portions of a bus and truck
wrecker both owned by respondent Victory Liner, Inc. which were stalled along North
Expressway.
The collision damaged both vehicles of Victory Liner and killed Manuel Fabian, Rodel Ganelo,
Caesar Santos, and Michael Figueroa. The driver of the Franco Transit bus also died.
Respondents filed before RTC a complaint for damages against Petitioner for failure to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver of the
Franco Transit bus
Petitioner raised that she is not the registered owner of the bus, hence, not a real party-in-
interest-ground to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It was instead registered
under the name Felicisma R. Franco. She submitted as defense the Certificate of Registration of
the bus.
However, petitioner and her counsel failed to appear during the pre-trial
RTC: rendered decision against Petitioner despite due notice. Hence, petitioner was declared in
default and respondents presented evidence ex parte.
CA: Affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable for the damages for failure to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver of the Franco Transit bus?
Respondents having failed to discharge the onus of proving that petitioner was, at
the time of the accident, the registered owner of the bus, it was error for the trial
court to credit respondents’ evidence. Thus, the case is instead remanded to RTC.
RULING:
There was no attempt, however, on the part of any of the witnesses for respondents, to
controvert petitioner’s affirmative defense that there is no cause of action against her, she not
being the registered owner of the Franco Transit bus, even despite her submission of the bus’
Certificate of Registration in the name of Felicisima R. Franco which is conclusive proof of
ownership.
Respondents, in maintaining their cause of action against petitioner, relied on the January 4,
1998 Traffic Accident Reportof Balajadia, who conducted a spot investigation after the
occurrence of the accident, wherein he stated that the Franco Transit bus was "[r]egistered
under the name of Marializa Franco-Cruz of Batac, Ilocos Norte." How Balajadia arrived at such
statement, he did not indicate in his Report. Neither did he pass on it when he took the witness
stand on February 11, 1999.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
For the entries in Balajadia’s Report to qualify as prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated, the following conditions must be present: x x x
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially
enjoined by the law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by
such other person in the performance of a duty enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts
by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information. (Underscoring supplied)
Balajadia’s statement that the Franco Transit bus was "[r]egistered under the name of Marializa
Franco-Cruz of Batac, Ilocos Norte" was not shown, however, to have been based on his
personal knowledge or that he had sufficient knowledge thereof acquired by him personally or
officially.
It bears emphasis that the presentation by respondents of evidence ex-parte did not
relieve them of the burden of proving their claims against petitioner.
Respondents having failed to discharge the onus of proving that petitioner was, at
the time of the accident, the registered owner of the bus, it was error for the trial
court to credit respondents’ evidence.
Just as it was error for it to hold that "the defendant [-herein petitioner] failed
1) to rebut" the evidence showing the accident was the result of the negligence of the
Franco Transit bus driver and
2) to present evidence to overthrow the presumption of negligence against her pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code in light of its order allowing respondents to present
evidence ex-parte and denying petitioner’s pleas to be allowed to participate in the
proceedings and present evidence on her affirmative defenses.
The trial court’s decision in favor of respondents must thus be set aside.
DISPOSITIVE:
The decision of the trial court is vacated. Civil Case No. C-18212 is REMANDED to Branch 121
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City which is hereby directed to allow petitioner to
present evidence on her affirmative defenses and/or rebut respondents’ evidence and to allow
respondents to submit additional evidence if necessary and/or they so desire.
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES V. ESPINAS
-belhur-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
FACTS:
 On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was
driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of
Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal
light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle
of the intersection when another car, traversing President Quirino Street and going to
Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas
car turned clockwise. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but
Espinas was able to get its plate number.
 After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the owner of
the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar.
 Espinas filed a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
 Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas
car, the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the
husband of Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car
was being driven by Atty. Flors personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.
  The MeTC, in its decision dated January 20, 2004, ruled in favor of Espinas. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, affirmed the MeTC decision.
 On appeal, the CA partly granted the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 86603; it modified the
RTC decision by ruling that Carmen Flor, President and General Manager of Filcar, is
not personally liable to Espinas.
 The appellate court pointed out that, subject to recognized exceptions, the liability of a
corporation is not the liability of its corporate officers because a corporate entity subject
to well-recognized exceptions has a separate and distinct personality from its officers
and shareholders. Since the circumstances in the case at bar do not fall under the
exceptions recognized by law, the CA concluded that the liability for damages cannot
attach to Carmen Flor.
 The CA affirmed the liability of Filcar to pay Espinas damages. According to the CA,
even assuming that there had been no employer-employee relationship between Filcar
and the driver of the vehicle, Floresca, the former can be held liable under the
registered owner rule.
ISSUE: WHETHER FILCAR CAN BE MADE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF THE
REGISTERED OWNER RULE.
HELD:
 It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is
made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
 In Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, we ruled that in so far as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the
negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent
of such owner.
 Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle
primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180,
of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is
understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar
is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be
held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages
caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor
vehicle registration, which has been discussed by this Court in Erezo, and cited by the
CA in its decision: The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused
by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on
a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other
vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means
of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to
the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of
the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways.[emphasis ours]
 Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered
owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner
who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death
caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
 These same principles apply by analogy to the case at bar. Filcar should not be
permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the
blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and
his alleged driver, Floresca. Following our reasoning in Equitable, the agreement
between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind
Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose
only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.
 Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code -
that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage - because the motor
vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the
vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.
 Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an employee of Filcar is
irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the
damages sustained by Espinas. While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code does not contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in
case of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to answer for the damages
caused to Espinas car. This interpretation is consistent with the strong public policy of
maintaining road safety, thereby reinforcing the aim of the State to promote the
responsible operation of motor vehicles by its citizens.
 This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual
employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust
enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified
by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay
as damages for the injury caused to another.
 The set-up may be inconvenient for the registered owner of the motor vehicle, but the
inconvenience cannot outweigh the more important public policy being advanced by the
law in this case which is the protection of innocent persons who may be victims of
reckless drivers and irresponsible motor vehicle owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated February 16, 2006 and
the resolution dated July 6, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner Filcar Transport Services.
EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUCITA SUYOM,
MARISSA ENANO, MYRNA TAMAYO and FELIX OLEDAN, respondents. [G.R.
No. 143360. September 5, 2002
-monica-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
FACTS:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of
Myrna Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and
injury. Tutor was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and multiple physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of
the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995,
respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing
Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.
RESP filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corp and Equitable a Complaint for damages in RTC Manila.
PET filed PETITION for REVIEW on the judgment of the CA to pay for damages to RESP
contending that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer
in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also contend that Tutor was an
employee, not of Equitable, but of Ecatine. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Is Equitable Leasing Corporation, the registered owner of the vehicle, being held liable to pay for
the damages for the negligent acts committed by the person to whom he had actually
sold the vehicle? YES
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the
parties to enter into a FINANCE LEASE AGREEMENT. Under such scheme, ownership of the subject
tractor was to be registered in the name of PET, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid
by Edwin Lim. Further, in the Lease Schedule,] the monthly rental for the tractor was stipulated,
and the term of the Lease was scheduled to expire on December 4, 1992. After a few months,
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, on December 9, 1992, a
Deed of Sale over the tractor was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin
Lim. However, the Deed was not registered with the LTO.
The court hold PET liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the
registered owner of the tractor at the time of the accident. The Court has consistently ruled that,
regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar
as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences of its operation. In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is
the employer of the driver, the actual operator and employer being considered as merely its agent.
The same principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public
service.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary
liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
Dispositive: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
As penned by J. Panganiban: In an action based on quasi delict, the registered owner of a
motor vehicle is solidarily liable for the injuries and damages caused by the negligence of the
driver, in spite of the fact that the vehicle may have already been the subject of an unregistered
Deed of Sale in favor of another person. Unless registered with the LTO, the sale -- while valid
and binding between the parties -- does not affect third parties, especially the victims of accidents
involving the said transport equipment. Thus, in the present case, petitioner, which is the
registered owner, is liable for the acts of the driver employed by its former lessee who has become
the owner of that vehicle by virtue of an unregistered Deed of Sale.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE INC. VS. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO. INC.
-jeanelle-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
FACTS:
 A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing the
Laurel Highway. The car was insured with plaintiff-appellee UCPB General Insurance,
Inc. then driven by Flaviano Isaac.
 The car was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck OWNED by
defendant-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance Inc., and allegedly LEASED to and
operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co. Inc. (SUGECO) and
driven by its employee, defendant-appellant Renato Gonzaga.
 The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi lancer car resulting in an
explosion of the rear part of the car and injuries to the driver and passenger. The
driver of the truck Gonzaga continued on its way to its destination and did not bother
to bring his victims to the hospital.
 Plaintiff-appellee (UCPB General Insurance) paid the assured representing the
insurance coverage of the damaged car. (P244,500.00)
 As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name PCI Leasing, repeated demands
were made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of said amount. NO PAYMENT WAS
MADE.
 PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. interposed the defense that it could not be held liable
for the collision, since the driver of the truck Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that
of its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact it was SUGECO and not petitioner PCI leasing
that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by
 petitioner and SUGECO.
 RTC order defendant PCI Leasing, and Gonzaga to pay jointly and severally
complainant. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals: That petitioner PCI Leasing is liable for the damage caused by the
collision since under the Public Service Act, if the property covered by a franchise is
transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer
is not binding on the Public Service Commission and, in contemplation of law, the
grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the operation of
the vehicle, such as damage or injury to third parties due to collisions.
 Petitioner PCI Leasing claims that CA’s reliance to Public Service Act is misplaced,
since the said law applies only to cases involving common carriers, or those which
franchises to operate as public utilities. That the case before the Court involves a
private commercial vehicle for business use, which is not offered for service to the
general public.
ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER, AS REGISTERED OWNER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE THAT FIGURED IN A
QUASI-DELICT MAY BE HELD LIABLE, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, WITH THE DRIVER THEREOF,
FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED TO THIRD PARTIES.
HELD: YES
 The registered owner of a vehicle driven by a negligent driver may still be held liable
under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on compulsory motor vehicle
registration and the liabilities of employers for quasi-delicts under the civil code.
 The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delict
resulting from its use is well-established in jurisprudence.
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by
which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases,
because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties, BUT TO
PERMIT THE USE AND OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE UPON ANY PUBLIC
HIGHWAY. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the
owner so that if any accident happens, responsibility therefor can be fixed
on a definite individual, the REGISTERED OWNER.
 Should the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who is the actual and real
owner is? NO
The law does not allow him to do so. Were a registered owner allowed to evade
responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee ow owner is, it would be easy
for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape the said responsibility and
transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with
which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to discover
or identify the persons actually causing damage or injury. He has no means other
than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicle Office to determine who
the owner is.
 The registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle, however, has a
recourse to a third party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover
for the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.
 But in this case, there is not even a sale of the vehicle involved, but a mere lease,
which remained unregistered up to the time of the occurrence of the quasi-delict that
gave rise to the case. Since a lease, unlike a sale, does not even involve a transfer of
title or ownership, but the mere use or enjoyment of property, there is more reason,
therefore, in this instance to uphold the policy behind the law, which is to protect the
unwitting public and provide it with a definite person to make accountable for losses
or injuries suffered in a vehicular accident,
CONRADO AGUILAR, SR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK and FERDINAND BORJA, respondents.
-joy-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
FACTS:
Petitioner Conrado Aguilar, Sr. is the father of Conrado Aguilar, Jr., the victim in a vehicular
accident involving a Lancer car registered in the name of respondent bank, but driven by co-
respondent Ferdinand G. Borja.
On September 8, 1984, at around 11:15 P.M., Aguilar, Jr. and his companions, among them Nestor
Semella, had just finished their snack. As they crossed the road, a Lancer with plate no. NNP 349
and driven by Ferdinand Borja, overtook a passenger jeepney. In so doing, the Lancer hit Aguilar
and Semella. Aguilar was thrown upwards and smashed against the windshield of the Lancer,
which did not stop. Aguilar and Semella were then brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital at
Pamplona, Las Piñas, where Aguilar was pronounced dead on arrival.
Respondent bank admitted that the Lancer was registered in its name at the time of
the incident.
Petitioner states that the Court of Appeals erred when it disregarded the fact that respondent
bank was the registered owner of the car and concluded that the bank was not liable since there
was "no iota of evidence that Borja was performing his assigned task at the time of the
incident.” He insists that the existence or absence of employer-employee relationship between
the bank and Borja is immaterial in this case for the registered owner of a motor vehicle is legally
liable for the damages incurred by third persons for injuries sustained in the operation of said
vehicle.
According to respondent bank, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the negligent employee
commits the act outside the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties, the employer has
no vicarious liability. Further, the bank insists that it is not liable since at the time of the accident,
Borja was driving the Lancer in his private capacity and was not performing functions in
furtherance of the interest of Comsavings Bank. Additionally, according to the bank, Borja already
bought the car on installment basis. Hence, at the time of the incident, the bank concluded it was
no longer the owner of the car.
Issue: whether or not respondent bank, as the Lancer’s registered owner, is liable for damages.
HELD: YASSSS (TRANSPO)
In BA Finance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 715, we had already held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not for public service, is primarily responsible to third
persons for deaths, injuries and damages it caused. This is true even if the vehicle is leased to
third persons.
Rationale for holding the registered owner of a vehicle directly liable:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens,
or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility
therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification.
Registered owner not allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is
Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee
or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or otherwise, to escape said
responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property
with which to respond financially for the damage or injury done.
Remedy: A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse to a
third-party complaint against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.
Villanueva vs Domingo
-ron-
TOPIC: LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS
(REGISTERED OWNER RULE)
Facts:
 Respondent Priscilla Domingo is the owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer with co-
respondent Leandro Luis R. Domingo as authorized driver.
 Petitioner Nostradamus Villanueva was then the owner of a green Mitsubishi Lancer.
 On Oct 22, 1991 at about 9:45pm, following a green traffic light, Domingo was cruising
along the middle lane of South Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south.
 Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with driven by Renato Ocfemia darted from Vito
Cruz Street towards the South Superhighway directly into the path of Domingo’s car
thereby hitting and bumping its left front portion.
 As a result of the impact, Domingo’s car hit two parked vehicles at the roadside, the
second hitting another parked car in front of it.
Per Traffic Accident Report, Ocfemia was driving with expired license and positive for alcoholic
breath. Hence, information for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and physical
injuries was file against:
 Ocfemia – person driving the green Lancer
Impleaded in the complaint were:
 Villanueva – previous owner of the green Lancer
 Auto Palace Car Exchange – buyer of the green Lancer
 Albert Jaucian – owner of Auto Palace Car Exchange
Petitioner Villanueva claimed that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the mishap
because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by Albert Jaucian/Auto Palace Car Exchange. Trial
court found petitioner liable. CA upheld the trial courts decision but deleted the award for
appearance and attorneys fees.
Issue:
WON the registered owner (Villanueva) of a motor vehicle be held liable for damages arising from
a vehicular accident involving his motor vehicle while being operated by the employee of its buyer
(Jaucian) without the latters consent and knowledge? (YES)
Ruling:
Court have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible to the public and third persons while it is being operated. The rationale behind such
doctrine was explained way back in 1957 in Erezo vs. Jepte.
The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered under
the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner
is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions that they
may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the public
should be required to prove who the actual owner is.
Under the same principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for a public service,
should primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while
the vehicle is being driven on the highways or streets.
The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no vehicle may be used or operated upon any public
highway unless the same is properly registered. Its primary purpose is to render it certain that
the violator of the law or of the rules of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to
discover him.
Petitioner insists that he is not liable for damages since the driver of the vehicle at the time of the
accident was not an authorized driver of the new (actual) owner of the vehicle.
Petitioners argument lacks merit. Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is
irrelevant to determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and
directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the
streets and highways. To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner
before the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor
vehicle legislations are enacted in the first place.
With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant poses is: should not the
registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the actual and real owner is, and in
accordance with such proof escape or evade responsibility by and lay the same on the person
actually owning the vehicle? The law does not allow him to do so.

The above policy may appear quite harsh and would seem to conflict with truth and justice. It is
not so. A registered owner who has already sold a vehicle has the recourse to a third-party
complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the damage or injury done,
against the vendee of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving
him of liability; said inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration
that the law demands and requires.

Court holds that the registered owner, Villanueva, is primarily responsible for the damage caused
to the vehicle of the plaintiff Domingo, but he has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner Jaucian of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to
the plaintiff Domingo.

Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.