MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S POE- LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC,et al.

GR Nos. 221697 , GR No. 221698-700

March 8,2016

Perez, J.:

FACTS:

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before
May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE
(SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s

deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February 3,2005.
She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and finally went
home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired
her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born
Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents cannot
be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen

(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she
satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for
Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her
physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was
found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability
that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s
bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstancial evidence are
admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein
though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship
as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the
UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently)
coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in
acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning
to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay
and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her
candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC.

Bersamin, J:

FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by

former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.
On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit
whose charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective
demurrers to evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at
large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the
then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and
confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or
less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for
bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of
guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately
filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish
a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the Sandiganbayan,
holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to
commit plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA
and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective
petitions for certiorari.

ISSUES:

Procedural:

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence.

Substantive:

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy

among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;

2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime
of plunder: (a) Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was
the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information
proved by the Prosecution?

RULING:

Re procedural issue:

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an
interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court
to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners
was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of
their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so “x x
x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the
discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is
more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
do substantial justice.”

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the
sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and
effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused
could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the
existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show
was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the
basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It
is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No.

148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the effect that an information
alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1)
with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as
confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts
constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the
accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the
allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main
plunderer sought to be prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the
crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only
necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was
essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly informed
of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the
information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense because
they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constituted the offense charged.
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the
mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution
dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific
allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence
that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be
fatal to the cause of the State against the petitioners for violating the rights of
each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at

least Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-

gotten wealth valued at not less than Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish
the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated
or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution
adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for
that matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any
amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by
the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA
or Aguas, or Uriarte.

(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is
to look at the accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or
malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which
the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself
or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the
company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is
associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted
by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own; to misappropriate means to own, to take
something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege, or
right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;”
and malversationoccurs when “any public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same
or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property,
wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms together is
that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the
public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of
the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasurysimilarly requires such
use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in
contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden
act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken
impliedly for his personal benefit.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but,
more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same.
Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the
Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174
as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for
insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

 Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential

elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate
of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen

Ruling:

1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a

candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino

Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by

the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was
also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
"en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an

American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty
of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a
Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national
security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted
outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that
it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of
the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it
does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it
touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art
VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list
is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in
the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according
to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-
day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar
to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed
to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there
are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before
her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the
self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the
Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring

1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of
events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time
and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger.
Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave &
serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains
to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to
the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting

1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own
country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot,
homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat
to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers
& not expand.

Paras, Dissenting

1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right
to return to the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she
should be buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is
powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if
national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t
be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety.
Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would
know how to handle Marcos’ return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting

1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security

should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven,
dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the
safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did
not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following
arguments:

1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return
to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has,
she had exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to
return in the Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied
because of lack of merit.
Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed.
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased.
Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is
Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the
definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in
conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike
 Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not
forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to
dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation
whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the
people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted
arbitrarily