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GR 117438, Legal Ethics, Sesbreno v CA, Sesbreno v CA case digest, Sesbreno v CA GR 117438

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, attorney’s fees

FACTS:

Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and
backwages imploring Atty. Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The employees
and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be paid 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% as expenses taken from
their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees and ordered the Province of Cebu to
reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and
ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979. The
former employees waived their right to reinstatement among others. The Province of Cebu released
P2,300,000.00 to the petitioning employees through Atty. Sesbreno as “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.”
The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten
employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40%
to be taken only from their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders, with which petitioner complied,
requiring him to release P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to retain 40% of the back
salaries pertaining to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial
court fixed the attorney’s fees a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial court
modified the award after noting that petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it
should have been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for
legal services but was even further reduced to 20%.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to
petitioner Atty. Raul H. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by private
respondents

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the parties 6
authorized petitioner to take a total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The trial court,
however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all monies to be awarded to private respondents. Fifty per
cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the provincial government, according to the
Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the contract of professional
services. What a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial control. A
stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the
amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount
unreasonable unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally
recognized as valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s fees are
found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he
deserves,” is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a
contract. The Supreme Court averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary award, 50% of all
monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in favor
of the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It
would, verily be ironic if the counsel whom they had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or
even 60% of the total amount collectible by these employees. 20% is a fair settlement.

Petition is DENIED
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806 April 7, 2014
(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE BORROMEO R. BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ALAMINOS CITY,
PANGASINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The present administrative matter arose from the judicial audit of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, then presided by Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante (Bustamante). Judge
Bustamante retired on November 6, 2010.

Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC was conducted on
September 21, 2010 by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In a
Memorandum1 dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Bautista Villanueva
(Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial audit findings that, as of audit date, there were 35
cases for decision (21 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending
incidents for resolution (19 of which were already beyond the reglementary period) in Judge Bustamante’s
court. At the end of his Memorandum, DCA Villanueva gave Judge Bustamante the following directives:

1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure to: [a] decide within the
reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870, 1937, 1978, 2056 and 2205, LRC Nos. 28, 65 and 70,
and Criminal Case Nos. 5428, 6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721, 8163, 8390, 8395, 8654, 9022 and
9288; and, [b] resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos. 1668 and 2132, Criminal Case Nos. 8004, 8005,
8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196, 9232 and 9235;

2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to SUBMIT copies of the decisions to
this Office within three (3) days after your compulsory retirement; and

3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases enumerated in item (II) above, and to
SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this Office within the same period indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph.2

Judge Bustamante submitted a letter3 dated November 8, 2010,4 addressed to DCA Villanueva, in which
he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC and Criminal Cases submitted
before my last day in office on November 5, 2010 except Civil Cases Nos. 1937 (Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago)
and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when I was not yet the Presiding Judge. I
found out that there is [a] need to retake the testimonies of the witness concerned so as to attain substantial
justice.

As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it was because of the volume of
work in this court. As it was noticed by the Auditors when they came over to audit, I have already started
deciding with drafts attached to the records but I was overtaken by more pressing matters that I have to
take immediate attention, like urgent motions, motions to dismiss, motions to quash, approval of bails. All of
these are in addition to my trial duties.

I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning, and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock, with the desire to
finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night just [to] comply with my duties within the time frame
but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on time because as I said[,] of the volume of work in this
court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases submitted for decision before I retired except, as above
stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056 because of the reasons already stated.

Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for resolution, as follows:

In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 1668 and 2132. However, the
motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil Case No. 2222, considering the opposition of the plaintiff
because of their counterclaim, I believed the motion needs further hearing, hence, the motion was not
resolved. Similarly, the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 2254 needs further hearing, and if no order
setting the motion for hearing, it may be an oversight because of the submission of several cases for
decision almost at the same time.

In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases Nos. 9015 & 9016 (People vs.
Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos. 9148 & 9149 (People vs. Anselmo, Jr.) while Crim. Case No.
9196 was set for further hearing.

On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it may have been an oversight
because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil Case No. 2222 and pre-trial conference for the marking of
documentary evidence has been subsequently set but the counsel for the accused failed to appear.

The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not resolved because of the prayer of
the parties in open court for them to await the resolution of the civil cases they filed before the Regional
Trial Court, as they are working for the settlement of these civil cases, which may have [an] effect in these
cases.

The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously resolve the matter.5

In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies of the decisions and resolutions
he referred to in his letter.

The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24, 2011, reporting viz:

(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33 cases decided
by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already beyond the
reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the reglementary period,
10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1 year and 8 days to 4
years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after their respective due
dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).

(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his court, all of which
were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to 3 years, 8 months,
and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending incidents in his court, Judge
Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing; (b) there is a need to await the resolution
of other cases pending before other courts; and (c) oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge
Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the
resolution of the same until the related cases before other courts have already been decided.

Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases and resolving
pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, formerly
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for
gross inefficiency.
In a Resolution7 dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that although he already retired
from the service on November 6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement benefits (except for his
accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of the instant administrative matter against him.
Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative matter be resolved soonest so he could
already receive his retirement benefits or that his retirement benefits be released but a certain amount
commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose be withheld.

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench.
The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not
be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right
to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.8

The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide
cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted
in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar9:

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all cases within three months from
the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted for
decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the period
specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum.
Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge,
absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice without
delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that:

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted
by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend promptly to the
business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law and the Rules. Under the 1987
Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases within 90 days from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence
and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient. Time and again,
we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate our efforts to minimize, if not
totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day reglementary period
is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative
liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay. (Citation omitted.)

This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the constitutionally prescribed
90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his
right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it undermines
the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute.10

A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead
persevere in its implementation.11 Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall
behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases.12 The Court usually allows reasonable extensions of
time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the
90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an
extension and such request is generally granted.13 But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any
of these cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension
granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative
sanction.1âwphi1

Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamante’s explanation that he failed to decide Civil Case
Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN). These two cases were
allegedly heard when he was not yet the presiding judge of the MTCC. Relevant herein is the ruling of the
Court in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan14:

The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. In
Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided that "A case is considered
submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. The
ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision
without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for
decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is
earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the
period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge
in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the transcripts
within which to decide the same." x x x (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially heard Civil Case Nos. 1937
and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for decision on November 20, 2009 and February 27, 2010,
respectively. Even if it were true that the two cases were heard by the previous presiding judge of the
MTCC, there is no showing that from the time the cases had been submitted for decision until Judge
Bustamante’s retirement on November 6, 2010, Judge Bustamante made an effort to have the TSN
completed. Although technically, the 90-day period would have started to run only upon the completion of
the TSN, the Court finds Judge Bustamante’s lack of effort to have the TSN completed as the root cause for
the delay in deciding the two cases.

The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases were left unresolved because
of the need for further hearings in the same. The incidents were already submitted for resolution and, as the
OCA observed, Judge Bustamante only saw the need for further hearings in said cases after the conduct of
the judicial audit. In addition, Judge Bustamante did not submit any order setting the cases for hearing.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in deciding cases and/or resolving
pending incidents was oversight. A judge is responsible, not only for the dispensation of justice but also for
managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services. Since he is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions, he should know the cases submitted to him for
decision or resolution, especially those pending for more than 90 days.15

There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve pending incidents within the
reglementary period, and without authorized extension from the Court and valid reason for such failure,
Judge Bustamante is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order.
Under the amendments to Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is
a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of
more than ₱10,000.00, but not more than ₱20,000.00.

Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left undecided/unresolved or
decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period by Judge Bustamante; as well as the fact that Judge
Bustamante had already retired and can no longer be dismissed or suspended, it is appropriate to impose
upon him a penalty of a fine amounting to ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering decisions
and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

DULANG vs. REGENCIA

AM No. MTJ-14-1841 – June 2, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe

FACTS:
On Feb. 2000, Gershon Dulang (complainant) filed an ejectment complaint before the MCTC presided by
Judge Mary Jocylen Regencia (respondent). On May 2009, complainant moved for the resolution of the
ejectment case given that the same had been filed as early as the year 2000. However, notwithstanding
the summary nature of the ejectment proceedings, respondent judge rendered a judgment dismissing the
ejectment case only on Feb. 2011, more than 11 years after its filing.

Complainant then filed this administrative case against respondent judge.

ISSUE: WON Judge Regencio may be held administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.

HELD: Yes. Respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

The prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication of duty of judges.
If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the
litigants. This is embodied in Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that “a judge shall
dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods” and echoed in Sec. 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that “judges shall perform all judicial duties,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”

In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by
the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. In violation of this rule, Judge Regencia
rendered judgment only more than two years later, and failed to proffer any acceptable reason in
delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision

Penalty
Respondent judge was previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency where she was
ordered to pay a fine and warned. Moreover, her length of service of more than 17 years should be taken
against her instead of being considered a mitigating factor. Hence, a fine of P40,000 instead of suspension,
should be the appropriate penalty for her misconduct.

A.M. No. P-13-3132 June 4, 2014

(Formerly A.M. No. 12-3-54-RTC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
SARAH P. AMPONG, COURT INTERPRETER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ALABEL, SARAN GANI
PROVINCE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from the letter1 dated March 15, 2011 of Executive Judge Jaime L. Infante
(Judge Infante) of the Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, "Branch 38. (RTC), addressed to
complainant the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),2 inquiring about the employment status of
respondent Sarah P. Ampong (Ampong), a Court Interpreter III of the said RTC since August 3, 1993. In the
aforementioned letter, Judge Infante informed the OCA that despite Ampong's dismissal from service by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which dismissal was affirmed by the Court, the RTC never received any
official information or directive from the OCA on the matter. As such, Ampong remains employed in the RTC
and has been continuously receiving all her monthly salary, benefits, allowances, and the like.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the
November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir
(Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her,
the CSC rendered a resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to
such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved
for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already
appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her.
Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals (CA).4

On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal from service on the
ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is
estopped from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for
review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P.
Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision).
Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive
any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release her salaries and allowances.
However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a
Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to
withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.8

In her Comment9 dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No.
167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its
enforcement.10 Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over
the case against her.11

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In a Memorandum12 dated March 27, 2013,the OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty of
Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for
Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground that she no longer
possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution.13

The OCA found that Ampong’s act of impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers for and on behalf of another person indeed constitutes dishonesty, a grave
offense which carries the corresponding penalty of dismissal from service. It added that the fact that the
offense was not connected with her office or was committed prior to her appointment in the judiciary does
not in any way exonerate her from administrative liability as an employee of the court.14

Further, the OCA found that Ampong’s appointment as Court Interpreter III did not divest the CSC of its
inherent power to discipline employees from all branches and agencies of the government in order to
protect the integrity of the civil service. Consequently, the CSC could validly impose the administrative
penalty of dismissal against her, which carries with it that of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture
of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless
otherwise provided. In this relation, the OCA emphasized that the CSC ruling effectively stripped Ampong
of her civil service eligibility and, hence, could no longer hold the position of Court Interpreter III.15

The Issue Before the Court

The issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her
employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court resolves the issue in the affirmative.

As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held Ampong administratively
liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination
for Teachers on behalf of Decir, viz.:

The CSC found [Ampong] guilty of dishonesty. It is categorized as "an act which includes the procurement
and/or use of fake/spurious civil service eligibility, the giving of assistance to ensure the commission or
procurement of the same, cheating, collusion, impersonation, or any other anomalous act which amounts to
any violation of the Civil Service examination." [Ampong] impersonated Decir in the PBET exam, to ensure
that the latter would obtain a passing mark. By intentionally practicing a deception to secure a passing
mark, their acts undeniably involve dishonesty.
This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray." [Ampong’s] dishonest act as a civil servant renders her unfit to
be a judicial employee. Indeed, We take note that [Ampong] should not have been appointed as a judicial
employee had this Court been made aware of the cheating that she committed in the civil service
examinations. Be that as it may, [Ampong’s] present status as a judicial employee is not a hindrance to her
getting the penalty she deserves.16 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).

Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case, viz.:

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the Constitution
and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to its
administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to "control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil
Service examinations." This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or
anomaly connected with the examinations.

However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over
all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the
Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It
violates the specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all
courts and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary.

In Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, this Court held that impersonating an examinee of a civil service
examination is an act of dishonesty. But because the offender involved a judicial employee under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court, the CSC filed the necessary charges before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA), a procedure which this Court validated.

A similar fate befell judicial personnel in Bartolata v. Julaton, involving judicial employees who also
impersonated civil service examinees.1âwphi1 As in Sta. Ana, the CSC likewise filed the necessary charges
before the OCA because respondents were judicial employees. Finding respondents guilty of dishonesty
and meting the penalty of dismissal, this Court held that "respondents’ machinations reflect their dishonesty
and lack of integrity, rendering them unfit to maintain their positions as public servants and employees of
the judiciary."

Compared to Sta. Anaand Bartolata, the present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service Law
by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the offense before her
appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under
the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC.
Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that,
she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination.

That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the
administrative reach of the Supreme Court.

The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court,
regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.17 (Emphases
in the original; citations omitted)

Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that "a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law," 18 Ampong could no longer seek the
August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service
on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In line with Section 58(a)19 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it
the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.

To clarify, however, despite Ampong’s dismissal on the ground of dishonesty, she should nevertheless been
titled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any, pursuant to the aforementioned provision of the URACCS,
which does not include the forfeiture of the same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the
service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of
their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which
they have earned prior to their dismissal.20

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness,
and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in
the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to
preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel.
Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice.
Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore,
deserve to remain with the Judiciary.21

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSTAINS the dismissal of respondent Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of the
Regional Trial Court of Alabel, Sarangani Province, Branch 38, on the ground of Dishonesty. Accordingly,
her retirement and other benefits are forfeited except accrued leave credits, and she is perpetually
disqualified from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any
government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. SARAH P. AMPONG

Facts:

Sometime in 1994, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) instituted an administrative case against Respondent
Sarah P. Ampong, Court Interpreter III of RTC Sarangani, for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonate or taken 1991 the Civil Service
Eligibility Exam for Teachers on behalf on one Evelyn B. Decir.

Ampong admitted such allegation, hence, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from service.
Ampong moved for a reconsideration and appealed to the CA but both were denied and her dismissal
from service was affirmed.

Notwithstanding the said decision, the Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court
Administration (OCA), which did not receive any official directive regarding Respondent’s dismissal,
continued to release the latter’s salaries.

But when Judge Infante, judge of the RTC where Respondent works informed OCA about such dismissal, the
latter filed a Memorandum that it started withholding the salaries of Ampong. Respondent prayed that the
Court revisit its ruling and reiterated that the OCA and not CSC has the jurisdiction over the matter.
OCA recommended for Ampong’s dismissal for her acts constituted dishonesty. OCA also avers that the CSC
has an inherent power to discipline employees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent had been dismissed from her employment?

RULING: The Court held YES.

RATIO:

By intentionally practicing a deception, the act undeniably involves dishonesty.

The court defined dishonesty as “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. Respondent’s dishonest act as
a civil servant renders her unfit to be a judicial employee.

Moreover, pursuant to the “doctrine of immutability of judgment”, “a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law”.

It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an employee of integrity, uprightness
and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in
the performance of her official duties but also in her private dealings to preserve the court’s good name
and standing.

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. GARAY AND PNB

G.R. No. 179914
June 16, 2014

FACTS: Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon were the owners of a property which they mortgaged
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on
July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in PNB’s name,
which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses
Sombilon failed to redeem the property. On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in
favor of PNB. On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of
PNB. On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon
failed to make the required down payment. On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of
a Writ of Possession before the RTC. Respondent Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order granting the Petition
and issued a Writ of Possession in favor of PNB. On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a
reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was the former
counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code. Respondent Judge hereby held in abeyance the Writ of Possession.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession

RULING: Yes. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court. A debtor has one year from
the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property.
During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond. But after the one-year period,
the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. And
once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. Questions regarding the regularity
and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or
hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in
a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such
action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ ofpossession. In this case,
the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In
fact, the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was
ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of
the subject property.

Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, we find none of
these recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB
and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for
Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right.

I. Short Title: NPC-DAMA v. NPC

II. Full Title: NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) versus National Power
Corporation (NPC) – G.R. No. 156208, September 26, 2006, C.J. Panganiban
III. Statement of Facts:

On June 8, 2001, Republic Act No. 9136 or the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001” (EPIRA
Law) was approved and signed by President Macapagal-Arroyo. It provides a framework for the
restructuring of the electric power industry, specifically (1) the privatization of the assets of NPC, (2) the
transition to the desired competitive structure, and (3) the definition of the responsibilities of the various
government agencies and private entities. Thus, under such law, a new National Power Board of Directors
(NPB) was constituted.

On February 27, 2002, in pursuant of the EPIRA Law, the Energy Restructuring Steering Committee
(Restructuring Committee) was created by the Secretary of the Department of Energy to enact the first and
second provisions stated above.

On November 18, 2002, the Restructuring Committee proposed a guideline to the NPB which was
modified and passed by the latter through Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-
125. Said Resolutions provide that (1) all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003
and (2) the NPC personnel shall be entitled to separation benefits.

IV. Statement of the Case

Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction which assails the validity of the NPB Resolutions by
maintaining that no quorum existed during the NPB Resolutions meeting.

Petitioners argue that of the seven persons present in the meeting, only three are NPB members. The
remaining four are merely representatives of other NPB members not present in the said meeting thus,
rendering the said Resolutions void.

V. Issue

Whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted.

VI. Ruling

No, it was not. The legislature is the one who vested the power to exercise judgment and discretion
in running the affairs to the NPB. Discretion means a power or right conferred to them by law of acting
officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
 Hence, the court held that the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the
NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions because it is their personal judgment that
must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility.

There are also exemptions to the general rule. It was also held in the case of Binamira v.
Garrucho that:

“An officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the

presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless given the
power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot
delegate his duties to another”.

And in the case of American Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents:

“A delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist

him in his functions…only when judgment and discretion finally exercised are
those of the officer authorized by law…so long as it is the legally authorized
official who makes the final decision through the use of his own personal
judgment”.

In the case at bar, however, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive
departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.

VII. Dispositive Portion

Wherefore, National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are declared
VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT

A.C. No. 6470. July 8, 2014.*

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT
Facts: Atty. Juvy Malit had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that
falsely named Mercedita de Jesus as its absolute and registered owner, despite Malit’s knowledge as a
consultant of the Bataan LGU. Because of this, the mortagee sued Mercedita for perjury and collection of
sum of money.
Malit was also alleged to notarize a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees, and a Certificate
of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which was still covered by the period within which it could not be
alienated.
Malit filed her comment. After the rejoinder, Mercedita filed an urgent ex-parte motion for submission of
additional evidence which contained 10 files which showed more violations on Malit’s end.
The IBP Commissioner recommended the revocation of Malit’s notarial commission for two years. The IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved this, but modified the suspension to one year. Malit filed two
MRs and maintained that the additional documents were inadmissible for violating sec. 4, Rule VI of Adm.
No. 02-08-13 (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Malit is guilty of violating the CPR
Held: Yes.
Notary Public; Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Supreme Court (SC) must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate.—Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not
the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability
for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules
1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same
ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.—A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons
who signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
Notarized Documents; Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence with The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The
Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested
with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for violating
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as
notary public. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is immediately revoked and is perpetually
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public.

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, vs. ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR.

FACTS: The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S.
Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson. Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as
the “Alabang Boys”) were the accused in cases filed by PDEA for the illegal sale and use of dangerous
drugs.
In a Joint Inquest Resolution, the charges were dropped for lack of probable cause. Because of the failure
of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case, several media
outlets reported on incidents of bribery and “cover-up” allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug
trade. This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings.
It was revealed during one such hearing that respondent had prepared the release order for his three
clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul
Gonzales. Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act. He
had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the
bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended that respondent showed disrespect
for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official,
even though the latter was not a government prosecutor. Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground
that a similar action had been filed by Dante Jimenez.
DEFENSE: Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and
draft the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, âif the Secretary of
Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited. In any case, respondent continues, the drafted
release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained “a mere scrap of paper with no
effect at all.” The Investigating Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while
the letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced
to prove the charges. However, by his own admissions in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment,
respondent drafted the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of
“feeding” the draft order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public
official. Hence, Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any
similar action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Verano should be suspended for violating CPR.

HELD: Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found guilty of violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against members of the bar, irrespective
of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a complainant in a disbarment case is not a
direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment
case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven xxx. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.
Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. Canon 13 states that a lawyer shall rely upon
the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court.
We believe that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of
influence-peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where
respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar. During the mandatory
hearing, the following statements were established as respondent’s admission that:
1) he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the
latter; and
2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery despite being
unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of expediting the case.
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice. To that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of
the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his
client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. Zeal and persistence in advancing a clientâs cause must always
be within the bounds of the law.
Rule 1.02 states: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Further, according to Rule 15.06, a lawyer shall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body. The succeeding rule,
Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles
of fairness.