LTD
the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was
Capitol Subdivisions vs. Province of Negros Oriental
7 SCRA 60 (1963)
FACTS:
Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda
Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar
Amenabar, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in
the name of the aforementioned in 1916.
Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the aforementioned Hacienda
to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000, payable in
instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the
name of the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares
obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title under his name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot
378 to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again
mortgaged the Hacienda, including said Lot 378, on the Philippine
National Bank, subject to the first mortgage held by the Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co.
These transactions were duly recorded in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and
the Bank acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at
the foreclosure sale.
Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and
another TCT was issued in the name of the Bank.
In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the Hacienda to the son of Jose
Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000, payable in annual
installments, subject to the condition that the title will remain with
the Bank until full payment.
Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract
with the Bank, to plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the
installments due to the Bank in 1949.
Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to
issued.
It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in
1934 by the Bank, the latter did not take possession of the property
for Jose Benares claimed to be entitled to retain it under an alleged
right of lease.
For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in
favour of Carlos P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation.
When, upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff
took steps to take possession the Hacienda and it was discovered that
Lot 378 was the land occupied by the Provincial Hospital of Negros
Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made representations
with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the
proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being
satisfied with the explanations given by said officials, it brought the
present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in
question in the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings
and that it took possession of the lost and began the construction of
the provincial hospital thereon. They further claimed that for some
reason beyond their comprehension, title was never transferred in its
name and it was placed in its name only for assessment purposes.
And that defendant acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot knowing
that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not
declare such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in
the aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
HELD:
The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that
they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances
indicate that the expropriation had not been consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation
case refer only to its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the
notices. Second, there was an absence of a deed of assignment and of
a TCT in favour of the Province as regards Lot 378. Third, the property
was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot 378 could not have
been expropriated without the intervention of the Milling Co. And yet,
the latter was not made a party in the expropriation proceedings. And
fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back,
which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not
belonged to the mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been
expropriated without the Bank’s knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to sell the
Hacienda Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that
some particular lots had been expropriated by the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental, thus indicating, by necessary
implication, that Lot 378 had not been expropriated.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA G.R. No. L-43105 August
31, 1984
AURORA BAUTISTA, OLIMPIO LARIOS, FELICIDAD DE LA CRUZ,
ELPIDIO LARIOS, LUCITA BANDA, BENITO SANTAYANA,
FRUCTUOSA BANHAO LUCIO VELASCO, GREGORIO DATOY,
FELIMON GUTIERREZ, ET AL., v. CA and SANTOS DEL RIO
FACTS:
The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the
shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio.
After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos
Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case sought and obtained
permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said
land. The private oppositors, however, violated their agreement and
instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an
ejectment suit against the private oppositors and later on sought to
register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed
their respective sales applications with Bureau of Lands, and they
opposed Santos del Rio’s application for registration.
The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration.
Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the
Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors
filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the
Supreme Court.
The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is
covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the
lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of
registration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land;
and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable
title to the land.
HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and
reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land; hence it is
not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private
property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable
title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not
the acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which
applicant already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. Applicant by himself and through his father before him, has
been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse
possession of the disputed land for more than thirty (30) years and
has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is
clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
TEOFILO CACHO v. CA, REPUBLIC, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN G. R. No. 123361. March
3, 1997
FACTS:
Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land
situated in Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits
of the Military Reservation No. 43 known as “Camp Overton.”
The application was tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge
and he granted the petitioner (Cacho) the entitlement to the two (2)
parcels of land. On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir of the
deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution
of the two (2) original certificates of title under RA 26.
The petition was opposed to by the Republic of the
Philippines, National Steel Corporation and the City of Iligan
on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine – that states that – all lands of
whatever classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to
the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA denied the petition for
reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of registration be
reopened. Thus, the instant petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in its decision to
reopen the decrees issued by the Judge Jesse Jorge.
HELD:
A land registration proceeding is “in rem.” The decree of registration is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
Government and its branches,
irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing
of the application, because all persons are considered as notified by
the publication required by law. A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions
actually contested and determined but also upon all matters that
might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. It is
no doubt that the decrees of registration had been issued and such
decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof.
The decision of the CA to reopen the decrees previously issued runs
counter to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
It also constitutes a derogation of the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
The decrees are res judicata
and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in
the nature of proceedings in rem. Such a requirement is
impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens
System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.
NATURE OF DUTY TO REGISTER INSTRUMENTS
EDUARDI S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA v. HONORABLE
JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
SACLAUSO, CA, and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO
Facts:
A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of
Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is
the land subject of the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and
possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found
that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to
be put in the name of petitioners. In compliance with the order or the
RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated the order
declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued
new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason
of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis
pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This prompted
the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting
Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but
the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE:
What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or
annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD:
Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register
of Deed’s stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on
the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of Appeals. The
function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of
deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in
nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to
file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It
shall be the duty of the register of deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registratio
n.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in
writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this
decree.” On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: “When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be
taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage
or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any
party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register
of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be
submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of
Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.”
BALBIN v. REGISTER OF DEEDS
Where several co-owner’s duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a
voluntary instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all the
copies to the Register of Deeds so that every copy of thereof would
contain identical entries of the transactions affecting the land covered.
FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur
register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate
of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be
annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears
to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of
deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated
in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate
sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino
Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their
co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of
CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds
refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the
matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the
action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is
proper
HELD:
YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their
integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright
conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. If
different copies were permitted to carry different annotations, the
whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that
is, property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina,
“there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the
surviving spouse may make such a conveyance.” Assuming the
conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact
that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more
than ½ his share, not to say more than what remained of such share
after he had sold portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelio’s civil
status, character of land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the
registration may await the outcome of said case and parties may
protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
FACTS:
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of
Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name
of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May,
1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in
Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of
Deeds upon the following grounds:
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by
legal presumption, is considered conjugal property;
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the
effectivity of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both
spouses sign the document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale
was made, the surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole
property without violating the existing law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of
Agusan on a petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the deed of sale and to issue to him the corresponding
transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of October 16, 1963, the
lower court, declaring that “the Mandamus does not lie… because the
adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151”
dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this
present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to
register the transaction appealed to by the petitioner.
HELD:
No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a
sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession
and transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute
legal grounds for his refusal to register the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to
determine; this function belongs properly to a court of competent
jurisdiction.
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act
1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion when
confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or
instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said
section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with
respect to any deed or other instrument presented to him for
registration all that he is supposed to do is to submit and certify the
question to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall, after
notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on
the doubtful question.
Gallarado v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and
first cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana,
the latter being the daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter
of this controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Cavinti,
Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less, initially
covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2,
1924 owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva.
On August 10, 1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was
sold to them in a private document, an unnotarized deed of sale
written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed by the late Pedro
Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in
favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title
was cancelled and a new certificate of title was issued in the name of
the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- 6293
(No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant
Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto that ownership over registered property may be acquired by
R.Villanueva executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without merit. No title
Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt was made to settle said acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is
controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners instituted court unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his
suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S. hereditary successors.
Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages
with the Court of First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring
the deed of sale of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted
transfer certificate of title of petitioners, void ab initio.
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate
Court. However, the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984,
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate
of TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.
HELD:
No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that
the conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or
clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace,
who shall certify such acknowledgment substantially in form next
hereinafter stated” was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the
registration of the private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not
lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale. With
reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,
Act 496 “Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether registered
under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in
accordance with more prolix forms heretofore in use.”
It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely
not registerable under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention