GENERAL PROVISIONS

G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970

PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.

German M. Lopez for plaintiff-appellant.

Pedro R. Davila for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing his complaint in
Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.

The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and
Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — copy of which was
attached to the complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of
unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo,
including the improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957; that said
right of redemption had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or successors,
despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed
of sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned
land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon improvements
worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of
our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land acquired through a conditional
sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the
aforementioned property.

In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, 1954, long
before the institution of this case; that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be
her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever executed "any document of whatever
nature in plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of
Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00";
and that being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the
case" before filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay
damages.

Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing substantially the averments made in her answer and stressing that,
in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on
record." Presently, or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order appealed from, reading:

Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A" annexed to the complaint that
Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the land in question, and considering the fact that Silvestre
Gayon is now dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's
complaint, as prayed for, this case is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.1

A reconsideration of this order having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present appeal, which is well taken.

Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside. To begin with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon "has nothing to do
with the land subject of plaintiff's complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is one of his compulsory heirs2and has,
accordingly, an interest in the property in question. Moreover, her own motion to dismiss indicated merely "a necessity of
amending the complaint," to the end that the other successors in interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of the latter, be made
parties in this case. In her opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter
alia, that the "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless there is a declaration of heirship." Inasmuch, however,
as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent"3 and "(t)he inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death,"4 it follows that if his
heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as
owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be
undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of
heirship, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent.5

As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code
provides:

No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035.

It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of
the same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the
same Code, pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is
included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the
general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the same
does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does
not bar the same.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as
defendant or defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the
decedent, or, in the absence of such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for
further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee,
Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.

On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue
of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the
DAR was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the
petitioner in this case.

The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent)
and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3

On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.

The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by
Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;

Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:

1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San Vicente,
San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki,
humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure Administration;

2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at
noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at
pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa
kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;

3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang
sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;

4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang lupang
nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa
katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong
ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;

5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay
KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang
loteng nasasabi sa unahan.

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang
gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4

The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages
of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5above her
name in the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for
annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6

On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered
and the deed was declared null and void.7

During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with
the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother.
Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.

In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
 From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the lots
in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct
Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was the sister of
the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from
Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an
area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots in question with the
permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on
the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan
Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in question; he has been there even
before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in
question in favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the
defunct Land Tenure Administration.

This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.9

Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of
the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11

On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in
favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera
directed Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent
Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a
Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.

In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised
the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs
were disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the
decision of the Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of
purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera
paid for the property with the use of her own money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was
by mere tolerance and that they had been paying taxes thereon.16

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of
Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for
further proceedings on the merits.

A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.

On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision
of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale
executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was
ordered to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it
can transfer property.

Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied
on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera
was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief
submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.

On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
 There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959. There
is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims
that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in
favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical
sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the Court finds
that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was
to merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA after
the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that
she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in
its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca
Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she
is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita
Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots
and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19

The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld
the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.

Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.

Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN
THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS;
AND

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.

We rule for the respondents.

Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property
and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication
may be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.

In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose"
was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.

In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial power—that which is held
by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation
of a final order."22 This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not
considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three
(3) branches—the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme
in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to
"determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the
resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the
other branches of government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.25

Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 198026 where it is therein provided
that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution…"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the
NHA.

Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial
court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October
10, 1989).28 We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of
judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment.29 The
appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30

Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it considered the application
for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the
subject lot; that it considered the respective application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done arbitrarily.

The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA.31That,
"insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera,
the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it."32

We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity
of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian
na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be
in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which
provides that:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.33

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA
gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would
transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the
disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her
estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as
to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of law.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor
revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
operation of law.

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by
virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the
law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person"39likely to
stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil
Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void40 should have
alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after
a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.

We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved
and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in
Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 154391-92 September 30, 2004

Spouses ISMAEL and TERESITA MACASAET, petitioners,

vs.
Spouses VICENTE and ROSARIO MACASAET, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The present case involves a dispute between parents and children. The children were invited by the parents to occupy the
latter’s two lots, out of parental love and a desire to foster family solidarity. Unfortunately, an unresolved conflict
terminated this situation. Out of pique, the parents asked them to vacate the premises. Thus, the children lost their right to
remain on the property. They have the right, however, to be indemnified for the useful improvements that they constructed
thereon in good faith and with the consent of the parents. In short, Article 448 of the Civil Code applies.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 22, 2002 Decision2 and the
June 26, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP Nos. 56205 & 56467. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

‘1. Vicente and Rosario should reimburse Ismael and Teresita one-half of the value of the useful
improvements introduced in the premises prior to demand, which is equivalent to ₱475,000.00. In case
the former refuse to reimburse the said amount, the latter may remove the improvements, even though
the land may suffer damage thereby. They shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary.

‘2. The award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.

‘3. The records of these consolidated cases are REMANDED to the Court of origin for further proceedings
to determine the option to be taken by Vicente and Rosario and to implement the same with dispatch."4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita5 Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario Macasaet are first-degree relatives.
Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his wife.6

On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City an ejectment suit
against the children.7 Respondents alleged that they were the owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-78521 and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease
agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their residence and the situs of their
construction business; and that despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of ₱500 per week.8

Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that respondents had invited them
to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other, employ
Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and help in resolving the problems of the family.9 They added that it was the policy of
respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their children. Thus, they
contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other
hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521 was allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used
in the renovation of respondents’ house.10

The MTCC11 ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It opined that Ismael and
Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.12As
their stay was by mere tolerance, petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon
demand.13 The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an advance inheritance, on the ground
that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it disbelieved petitioners’ allegation that the other parcel had been given
as payment for construction materials.14

On appeal, the regional trial court15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the RTC allowed respondents to
appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by
Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.16 It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to
purchase the land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter situation, petitioners should pay
rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate the building.17

Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review,
which were later consolidated.18

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been occupying the subject lots only by
the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.19 Thus, possession of the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their
receipt of respondents’ letter to vacate it.20

Citing Calubayan v. Pascual,21 the CA further ruled that petitioners’ status was analogous to that of a lessee or a tenant
whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner.22Consequently, in
ascertaining the right of petitioners to be reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on respondents’
properties,23 the appellate court applied the Civil Code’s provisions on lease. The CA modified the RTC Decision by
declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable. The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code,
Ismael and Teresita had the right to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the improvements made.24

Not satisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court.25

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should apply in the rendition of the
decision in this case;

b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;

c) Whether or not damages including attorney’s fees should have been awarded to herein petitioners;
 "2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should apply on appearance of parties
during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful detainer suit;

b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (230 SCRA
164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an unlawful detainer suit;

"3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the matters of improvements, or is it
Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article 453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to apply the
Civil Code;

"4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence, appropriate laws, rules and
jurisprudence;

"5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should be held accountable in
rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;

"6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw office should be held
accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]"26

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Ejectment

Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At the outset, we stress that this is the main issue
in ejectment proceedings.27 In the present case, petitioners failed to justify their right to retain possession of the subject
lots, which respondents own. Since possession is one of the attributes of ownership,28 respondents clearly are entitled to
physical or material possession.

Allegations of the Complaint

Petitioners allege that they cannot be ejected from the lots, because respondents based their Complaint regarding the
nonpayment of rentals on a verbal lease agreement, which the latter failed to prove.29 Petitioners contend that the lower
courts erred in using another ground (tolerance of possession) to eject them.

In actions for unlawful detainer, possession that was originally lawful becomes unlawful upon the expiration or termination
of the defendant’s right to possess, arising from an express or implied contract.30 In other words, the plaintiff’s cause of
action comes from the expiration or termination of the defendant’s right to continue possession.31The case resulting
therefrom must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.

To show a cause of action in an unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is illegally withholding possession from
the plaintiff is sufficient. The complaint may lie even if it does not employ the terminology of the law, provided the said
pleading is couched in a language adequately stating that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate has
become unlawful.32 It is equally settled that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined
from the averments of the complaint.33

In the present case, the Complaint alleged that despite demands, petitioners "refused to pay the accrued rentals and [to]
vacate the leased premises."34 It prayed that judgment be rendered "[o]rdering [petitioners] and all those claiming rights
under them to vacate the properties x x x and remove the structures x x x constructed thereon."35Effectively then,
respondents averred that petitioners’ original lawful occupation of the subject lots had become unlawful.

The MTCC found sufficient cause to eject petitioners. While it disbelieved the existence of a verbal lease agreement, it
nevertheless concluded that petitioners’ occupation of the subject lots was by mere tolerance of respondents. Basing its
conclusion on the fact that the parties were close relatives, the MTCC ruled thus:
 "x x x [T]he parties herein are first degree relatives. Because of this relationship, this Court takes judicial notice of
the love, care, concern and protection imbued upon the parents towards their [children], i.e., in the instant case,
the love, care, concern and protection of the [respondents] to the [petitioners]. With this in mind, this Court is
inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal lease agreement between the
parties herein that took place in 1992. x x x.

"From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and occupancy of the subject
premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement between
them."36

Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and the CA) did not err in ordering
the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents. There was no violation of Section 17 of Rule 7037 of the Rules
of Court. As earlier explained, unlawful detainer was sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the trial.
Significantly, the issue of whether there was enough ground to eject petitioners was raised during the preliminary
conference.38

Not Merely Tolerated

Possession

Petitioners dispute the lower courts’ finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis of mere tolerance. They argue
that their occupation was not under such condition, since respondents had invited, offered and persuaded them to use
those properties.39

This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon
demand.40 A summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation.41The unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.42

Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of."43 Sarona v.
Villegas44 described what tolerated acts means, in this language:

"Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are ‘those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which one’s property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.’ x x x. And, Tolentino continues, even though ‘this is
continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." x x x. Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: ‘There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every
case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or
performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission."45

We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere tolerance. Petitioners were able to
establish that respondents had invited them to occupy the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other and
help in resolving family problems.46 By occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the invitation.
Hence, there was a meeting of minds, and an agreement regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between the
parties.

The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely "something not wholly approved of" by respondents.
Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as "neighborliness or familiarity." In point of fact, their possession was
upon the invitation of and with the complete approval of respondents, who desired that their children would occupy the
premises. It arose from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.

Right to Use the Lots Terminated

That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the duration of possession. In the
absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the Civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
 "Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.

"The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.

"In every case the courts shall determine such period as may under the circumstances have been probably
contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them."

Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period. Such qualification cannot be inferred
from the facts of the present case.

To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of parental love and a desire for
solidarity expected from Filipino parents. No period was intended by the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of
their agreement does not necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so.47

Based on respondents’ reasons for gratuitously allowing petitioners to use the lots, it can be safely concluded that the
agreement subsisted as long as the parents and the children mutually benefited from the arrangement. Effectively, there
is a resolutory condition in such an agreement.48 Thus, when a change in the condition existing between the parties
occurs -- like a change of ownership, necessity, death of either party or unresolved conflict or animosity -- the agreement
may be deemed terminated. Having been based on parental love, the agreement would end upon the dissipation of the
affection.

When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the parents and the children, the purpose
of the agreement ceased.49 Thus, petitioners no longer had any cause for continued possession of the lots. Their right to
use the properties became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate. And because they refused to
heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession, which was originally lawful, became
unlawful when the reason therefor -- love and solidarity -- ceased to exist between them.

No Right to Retain

Possession

Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts’ dismissal of their contention that Lots
T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part of their inheritance and given in consideration
for past debts.

The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only upon the latters’ demise.
Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent.50 Assuming that there
was an "allotment" of inheritance, ownership nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer
title to certain persons in the future is not inconsistent with the owners’ taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient.51 Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible
evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance "allocation."

We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment, Lot T-
78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents’ debts.52 The evidence presented by petitioners
related only to the alleged indebtedness of the parents arising from the latter’s purported purchases and
advances.53 There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the alleged debt.
Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting of the purported debt,54 a fact that disproves a
meeting of the minds with the parents.

Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collection case against respondents
(Civil Case No. 0594-96).55 Thus, the former’s allegation that the indebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be
given credence, inconsistent as it is with their action to recover the same debt.

Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the premises when they admitted in
their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents had a title to the lots.
 "The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners] do not object but what is
due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish of their dignity and honor must be given the
[petitioners] for the benefits of their children before the premises will be turned over."56

As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.

Second Issue:

Appearance at the Preliminary Conference

Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant during the
preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC should have dismissed the case
upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with
a written authorization from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference.57 The issue then is whether the
rules on ejectment allow a representative to substitute for a party’s personal appearance.

Unless inconsistent with Rule 70, the provisions of Rule 18 on pretrial applies to the preliminary conference.58Under
Section 4 of this Rule, the nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the
appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to
alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.59

Section 4 of Rule 18 may supplement Section 8 of Rule 70. Thus, the spirit behind the exception to personal appearance
under the rules on pretrial is applicable to the preliminary conference. If there are valid reasons or if a representative has
a "special authority," a party’s appearance may be waived. As petitioners are challenging only the applicability of the rules
on pretrial to the rule on preliminary conference, the written authorization from respondents can indeed be readily
considered as a "special authorization."

Third Issue:

Rights of a Builder in Good Faith

As applied to the present case, accession refers to the right of the owner to everything that is incorporated or attached to
the property.60 Accession industrial -- building, planting and sowing on an immovable -- is governed by Articles 445 to 456
of the Civil Code.

Articles 447 and 1678 of the

Civil Code Inapplicable

To buttress their claim of reimbursement for the improvements introduced on the property, petitioners cite Article
447.61 They allege that the CA erred in applying Article 1678, since they had no lease agreement with respondents.

We clarify. Article 447 is not applicable, because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner of the property uses the
materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor builds on the property of another, which is the
factual milieu here.

In view of the unique factual setting of the instant case, the contention of petitioners regarding the inapplicability of Article
1678 deserves attention. The CA applied the provisions on lease, because it found their possession by mere tolerance
comparable with that of a lessee, per the pronouncement in Calubayan v. Pascual,62 from which we quote:

"x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate."63 (Emphasis in the original.)

As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresita’s possession of the two lots was not by mere tolerance, a circumstance that
negates the applicability of Calubayan.
 Article 448 Applicable

On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable provision is Article 448, which
reads:64

"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."

This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe themselves to
be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto.65 It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a
holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary.66 From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief
that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.67

However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond this limited definition.
Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,68 this provision was applied to one whose house -- despite having been built at the time he
was still co-owner -- overlapped with the land of another.69 This article was also applied to cases wherein a builder had
constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that the law deemed the builder to be in good
faith.70 In Sarmiento v. Agana,71 the builders were found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of
another, whom they had mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.72

Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The established facts of this case
show that respondents fully consented to the improvements introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children
occupied the lots upon their invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements
introduced thereon.73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the structures on those
lots.

The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.74 In that case, this Court deemed the son to be in good faith for
building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and consent of his father, to whom belonged the land upon
which it was built. Thus, Article 44875 was applied.

Rule on Useful Expenses

The structures built by petitioners were "useful" improvements, because they augmented the value or income of the bare
lots.76 Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 is provided for by Article 546, which we quote:

"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

"Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying
the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof."

Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and other improvements on the
subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the
properties by reason thereof. They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.

In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,77 this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for
the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option that respondents would take
and the amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots. We
disagree with the CA’s computation of useful expenses, which were based only on petitioners’ bare allegations in their
Answer.78

Ruling on Improvement Justified

While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the issue of physical or material
possession of the property in question, this Court finds it necessary to abbreviate the issue on the improvements in
relation to Article 448. First, the determination of the parties’ right to those improvements is intimately connected with the
MTCC proceedings in the light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no dispute that while they constructed the
improvements, respondents owned the land. Third, both parties raised no objection when the RTC and the CA ruled
accordingly on this matter.

Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid needless delay. Both parties
have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or equivocate would not serve the cause of substantial justice.

Other Issues Raised

Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners’ allegation that the MTCC judge and
respondents’ lawyers should be respectively held personally accountable for the Decision and for filing the case.79The
insinuation of petitioners that the lawyers manipulated the issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing.80 Their
contention that respondents did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was based solely on hearsay, which has
little or no probative value.81

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one half of the value of the useful
improvements, amounting to ₱475,000, and the right of Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those
improvements (if the former refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.

2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, specifically to the following matters:

a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet’s option to appropriate -- as their own -- the improvements on
the lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided under Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil
Code; or in requiring Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it is
considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent
based upon the terms provided under the Civil Code

b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet in the construction
of the improvements on the lots

c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful improvements

d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet’s choice of type of indemnity to be paid (whether b or c)

e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the improvements built thereon

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.

Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.

HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its
decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and
operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public
interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant
Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that
under the provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be
issued to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a
daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from
said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject
to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).

Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:

1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.

2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.

3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the
Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased demand.

4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its announced policy with
respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)

In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the
commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of
law.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute his application
before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in
its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other
properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died.
His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be
such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was
financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said
application to its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the
assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial
ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page
3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the requisites of the
law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.

If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option he died,
if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his person,
there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal
representatives. In such a case there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate
or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted
right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence established that the public
needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain
and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to
failure to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different from the
legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.

Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases, for the
protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or
defended "in the right of the deceased".
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to
the possession of any other person for him.

In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this Court
draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:

Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property or rights (emphasis
supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be
instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or
interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by
their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed
under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of
the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right
involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be
empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively, consider
as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in the cited volume
(p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal
rights which are also property for juridical purposes.

Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things, "an
option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of the
same volume we read:

However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every species of
title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether executory or executed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the
meaning of the Public Service Act.

Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:

As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of the man
whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to defraud the estate.
Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.

The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the death of one
Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver that the forgery
was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:

. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a decedent as
a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation.
"The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as
natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8
Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a
human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a corporation; (2)
a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of
artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the
definition given by the authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim
against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn
vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases
where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person whose name is forged; and this is a result to
 be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our
minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural
persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal
entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there has been a due administration; and
one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded
as having intended to defraud the estate of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in
it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their
respective interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural
persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a
"person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his
investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and disbursements which
the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate
thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered
as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of
Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and
this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:

. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are
indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .

Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased
person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article
661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death.
It was so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that
case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in
the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property,
rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.

The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might
not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the
heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations
as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction
were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to
exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is
identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra,
citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased
person.

Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of
the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso thereof
expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates
of public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and
the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of
the Philippines or of the United States.

Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting
from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after
his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the
jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said:

. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation
of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it seems clear
that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in
section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without
the constitutional guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical,
no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or
juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and
the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said
application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.

How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his
creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his
citizenship, and for not considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before
the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the
same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more
than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of
his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of
personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.

We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law
indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of
his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have
obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and
that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate
and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a
contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended,
within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed.

Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 1511 July 26, 1905

MIGUEL PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MACARIO ANGELES, defendant-appellee.

Ledesma, Sumulong & Quintos for appellant.

Alberto Barretto for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

On January 15, 1903, Miguel Pascual brought this action to recover the possession of a certain tract of land unlawfully
occupied by the defendant, Macario Angeles, and for the payment of rent due, damages, and costs. It was alleged in the
complaint that the defendant, Angeles, then held under a lease a certain tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio of
Uaua, municipality of San Jose de Navotas; that the land formerly belonged to Ciriaca Pascual, his sister, from whom he
inherited it; that the defendant owed him 30 pesos for the use of the land during the years 1899, 1900, and 1901 under
the terms of the lease written in Tagalog and attached to the complaint; that, demand having been made upon the
defendant for payment of the rent due for the first two years, he asked for and obtained an extension; that by virtue of this
extension the lease was continued in force; that a subsequent demand was made upon the defendant about the end of
the year 1901 for the payment of rent due and for the possession of the land; that the defendant refused to do either; and
that he had since been in the wrongful possession of the land.

The defendant, Angeles, entered a general denial to the complaint. He denied specifically under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the lease attached to the complaint, alleging as a special defense that he was the actual occupant of
the land claimed, and had been in adverse, quiet, peaceful, public, and uninterrupted possession of the same for more
than thirty years, having during that period built houses and planted trees thereon.

The court, after hearing the evidence, rendered judgment June 20, 1902, in favor of the defendant, with costs to the
plaintiff. To this judgment the plaintiff excepted on the ground that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained
in the judgment were against the law and the weight of evidence, and thereupon presented a motion for a new trial,
alleging in support thereof that it was not necessary to show that the land in question had been allotted to the plaintiff in
the partition of the state of the deceased Ciriaca Pascual, since it satisfactorily appeared that Macario Angeles had paid
rent to plaintiff under the lease in question, thus recognizing him as the lawful heir and successor of Ciriaca Pascual. That
there was no conflict between the testimony of his witnesses Agustin Siangyo and Mariano Sengco, because the rent paid
in 1901 was due from previous years; that he had sufficiently proved the identity of the land described in the complaint
with that referred to in the lease, both being in the same barrio of Uaua, Navotas; that it had been shown that the camarin
belonging to the defendant was built upon the land involved in this case; that it did not appear that another lease existed
between the parties; that no question had been raised during the trial as to the identity of the land referred to in the
complaint with that which was the subject of the lease; that this point accordingly was not discussed. He finally gave
notice of his intention to appeal in case the motion for a new trial was denied.

The motion for a new trial being denied, appellant excepted and presented his bill of exceptions, which was settled and
certified to this court by the court below.

In the lease of January 2, 1886, written in Tagalog (p. 15, bill of exceptions), it is stated, among other things, that Ciriaca
Pascual thereby leased to Macario Angeles a tract of land 15 yards square in the barrio of Uaua, San Jose de Navotas,
for the sum of 10 pesos per annum, from January to December; that the lessee could build thereon a nipa but not a stone
house, and could not devote the land to any but residential purposes nor inclose the same with a stone wall without the
written consent of the owner; that the lessee could neither sell, mortgage, sublet, nor make any alterations or
improvements upon the lot; that the wife and children of the lessee could not succeed him in the occupation of the land
under the lease; and that if the lessee failed to comply with any of the provisions stipulated in the lease he should
forthwith return the land and in case of litigation pay the expenses thereof. This lease appears to have been signed in the
presence of two witnesses, by Miguel Pascual in behalf of the owner, Ciriaca Pascual, and by he lessee, Macario
Angeles. As appears on page 10 of the bill of exceptions, Angeles admitted that his signature in the lease was genuine.

The existence of the lease under which Macario Angeles held the land in question having been proved, and it appearing
that he failed to pay rent for several years, a sufficient cause existed for the ejectment of the tenant. (Judgments of the
supreme court of Spain of April 19, 1873; November 3, 1881; May 5, 1893, and others.)

This action arises out of the contract of lease and presupposes in the lessor a right to the ownership or possession of the
property. For this reason he can not be compelled to prove his title thereto. The tenant can not deny the title of his
landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Sec. 333 of the Code of
Civil Procedure; judgments of the supreme court of Spain of December 6,. 1882, and October 12, 1889.)

Those in the actual possession of land under a claim of ownership, right of usufruct, or any other right entitling them to the
use of the same may maintain an action for ejectment against a wrongful possessor.

Miguel Pascual, as testamentary heir of his sister, was in the actual and adverse possession of a tract of land in Uaua,
Navotas, of which the land in question was a part. His possession dated from the death of the testatrix, who must have
died prior to April 7, 1894, when her executor asked for and obtained a copy of her will executed in January of the same
year. The plaintiff was recognized by the lessee, Macario Angeles, as such owner and lawful possessor and as heir and
successor to the deceased Ciriaca Pascual. Angeles paid him rent for the land from the time of the death of the former
lessor until the year 1898, as shown by the record. It was not until the year 1901, when he decided to keep the land, that
defendant refused to pay rent for that and the two preceding years, 1899 and 1900.
If the juridical personality of the deceased testatrix is transmitted to the heir and the latter is considered as identified, with
his devisor, to whose rights, action, and obligations, not extinguished by her death, he succeeded, then there is no doubt
that the plaintiff, as testamentary successor of his deceased sister Ciriaca, as appears from the will on page 17 of the bill
of exceptions, had a right to oust the defendant, Angeles, for failure to pay the stipulated rent. (Art. 659 of the Civil Code;
judgments of the supreme court of Spain of February 10, 1879; September 13, 1882, and January 28, 1892.)

Miguel Pascual is now vested with the rights of the lessor. To him, as successor of the deceased, Angeles had been
paying rent from 1894 to 1898. Angeles is now barred from questioning the rights of the deceased owner of the land and
much less Pascual's capacity and rights in the lease, under her will, which is the only basis of his judicial claim. (Sec. 333
of the Code of Civil Procedure.)

Again, the defendant can not question the genuineness and due execution of the written lease, a copy of which appears
on page 15 of the bill of exceptions. He himself recognized it and it was admitted in evidence during the trial, the court
stating that it established a fact relating to the question at issue. (Bill of exceptions, p. 11) the presumption, therefore, is
that the contract was executed for a good and sufficient consideration. (Sec. 334, par. 36, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.)

As to the identity of the land referred to in the complaint, it may be said that this was fully established not only by the lease
and the evidence introduced at the trial but by defendant's answer as well. He stated that he had not been in possession
of the land in question as tenant but as owner, and that his possession covered a period of more than thirty years. This
shows that both parties agree that there is but one certain tract of land in dispute.

It is an established act that Macario Angeles used the land, and is at present in possession thereof, under the terms of the
lease. Therefore his defense can not be sustained. There is no proof to support it. On the contrary, the defendant has
contradicted himself. He stated that the action arising out of the lease had been extinguished one year after the execution
of the contract. He gives no reason, however, for it. This shows that he occupied the land as tenant and not as owner.

In an action for ejectment no questions can be raised or decided incidentally tending to defeat the title or right of
possession evidence by the documents introduced by plaintiff. (Judgments of the supreme court of Spain dated June 16,
1883, and April 21, 1884.)

For the foregoing reasons we are of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and that the judgment of the court
below should be accordingly reversed, giving the defendant thirty days within which to vacate the land wrongfully
occupied by him and to return the same to Miguel Pascual, at the end of which period, in case of his failure to vacate, he
may be ejected. The defendant is further ordered to pay to the plaintiff all the rent due with costs. After the expiration of
twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and let the case be remanded to the court below for
execution. So ordered.

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO
and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.

Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974,
declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents
of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven.
She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will
dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of
the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her
paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in
the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed
that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973
wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the
same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of
Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary
rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his
wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr.
were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the
will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its
branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.

Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix
illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the
conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel,
Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner
Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court
to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate
proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr.,
Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a
compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted
into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be
issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October 15, 1973
manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared
void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order
since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its
order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2,
1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was
issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17,
1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the
reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to
withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974
addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B.
Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the
probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was
"very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its
order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its
provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of
the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had
been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-
23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to
the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included
his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other
dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid,
the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although
she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs.
Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code
which reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition
shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing
enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of
the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced
his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as
envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her
estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided
during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are
compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts.
179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-
half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750
and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance.
Or at least his legitime should be respected.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may
be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become
effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the
children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his
hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of
validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the
testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under
article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made
the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the
manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate
(Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her
parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil
Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the
institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil
Code).1äwphï1.ñët

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he
signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order
of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to
pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara
vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the
supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon
the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby"
(Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-
Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that
will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will
(Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the
testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that
the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it
effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in
his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better
than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular
administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not
in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that
"immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons
having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the
appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims
when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special
administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and
his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or
devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability.
A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration
of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973,
setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in
Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47305 July 31, 1942

In the matter of the estate of Rufina Arevalo. ARISTON BUSTAMANTE, administrator-appellant,

vs.
PETRONA AREVALO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Nicasio Yatco for appellant.

Ventura and Belmonte for appellees.

BOCOBO, J.:

The main issue in this case is whether or not Exhibit C, presented by appellant for allowance as the last will and testament
of the deceased Rufina Arevalo, is a forgery. The Court of First Instance of Manila held that it was a forged document, and
allowed an earlier will, Exhibit 6, whose authenticity was unquestioned. The value of the estate is over P50,000.

The questioned document was prepared and signed in duplicate. It consists of two pages and is dated October 2, 1937. It
appears to be signed by Rufina Arevalo and by three witnesses, Manuel M. Cruz, Remigo Colina and Angel Sanchez. The
formal requisites of a will have been complied with.

An initial fact that arrests the attention is the formulation by the appellees of the allegation of forgery even before seeing
the questioned document. Said charge of forgery was signed on April 22, 1938, although Exhibit C, which had been in a
sealed envelop, was not opened by order of the court till the next day, April 23, 1938. It is true that the opposition by the
appellees was not actually filed in court till April 23, but it was signed by appellees' attorneys on April 22, was subscribed
and sworn to by Amando Clemente on April 22, and a copy thereof was sent by registered mail to Attorney Nicasio Yatco
on April 22. Moreover, in the morning of April 23, appellees attorneys Messrs. Jose Belmonte and Vicente Delgado,
announced their opposition to the will Exhibit C in open court, before said documents was opened by order of the court on
that day.

One of the principal reasons of the court a quo for believing Exhibit C to be a forgery is that in the genuine signatures the
terminal stroke of the capital "R" in "Rufina" is not joined with the letter "u," while in Exhibit C such ending is united with
the letter "u" in the two marginal signatures, although in the central signature appearing on page 2, the two letters are
separated. The probate court believes that this difference between the marginal and the central signatures is due to the
fact that the forger first used the check of "La Previsora" (Exhibit I) as the model in falsifying the marginal signatures, but
having been shown another signature with the characteristic already mentioned — separation of the two letters — he tried
to imitate said peculiarity in making central signature.
We believe the probate court over looked the well-established principle that in passing upon questioned documents, the
test is the general character of the writing rather than any minute and precise comparison of individual letters or lines.
In People vs. Bustos (45 Phil., 30) , this Court held:

It is a first principle in writing that exact coincidence between two signatures is absolute proof that one or the other
is a forgery. There must be some different before authenticity reposes upon a general characteristics
resemblance, coupled with specific differences, such as naturally result from the infinite variety of conditions
controlling the muscles of the writer at each separate effort in forming his signature.
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the present case, a careful scrutiny of all the questioned and the standard signatures has convinced us that they have
been written by the same person because they show the same general type, quality and characteristics, with natural
variations. We are, therefore, inclined to give credence to the expert testimony to that effect presented by the appellant.

Moreover, a forger who has to make two or more signatures usually sees to it that all the signatures are uniform for fear
that any difference might arouse suspicion. In this case, however, in some questioned signatures the letters "R" and "u"
are separated, but in others, they are united. Osborne in "Questioned Documents" (pp. 368, 369) says:

Another indication of genuineness in a holographic document or a considerable amount of writing, or in two or

more disputed signatures, are certain natural variations in the details of the writing. It is difficult for the
inexperienced or unthinking examiner to understand that a certain extent of variation in a group of several
signatures and variation in repeated words and letters in a continuous holographic document can be evidence of
genuineness. The forger does not understand this necessity for natural variation and, as nearly as he can, makes
words and letters just alike.

xxx xxx xxx

It necessarily follows, therefore, that if the several lines of a disputed document, or several signatures under
investigation, show these natural variations of writing of the same word or letter, all of course within the scope of
variation of the genuine writing, this variation itself, surprising and paradoxical as it may appear, is as strong
evidence of genuineness as the opposite condition is evidence of forgery. (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the document in question was prepared and signed in duplicate, so that there are six
signatures of Rufina Arevalo, instead of only three. It is reasonable to believe that a forger would reduce the number of
signatures to be forged so as to lessen the danger of detection. In this case, Attorney Nicasio Yatco, who supervised the
execution of Exhibit C, must have known that it was not necessary to make a signed duplicate of the will.

As for the probate court's opinion that the forger must have used Exhibit I (a check issued by "La Previsora" to Rufina
Arevalo) as a model in falsifying the marginal signatures, it is highly improbable that said check was in the hands of Rufina
Arevalo or of her attorney, Nicasio Yatco, on or about October 2, 1937, when the document in question was signed. The
check had been issued on June 30, 1936, or over a year before, and it must have been returned by the bank concerned to
"La Previsora" in the ordinary course of business, because it was produced by the Manager of "La Previsora." It should
likewise be observed that the signature on the first page of the duplicate will (Exhibit C-3) does not have the supposed
peculiarity of the standard signatures, that is the separation between "R" and "u." If, as the lower court states, the forger
upon being shown a model other than Exhibit I, imitated said characteristic separation in making the central or body
signature on the original will Exhibit C, it is indeed strange that he should not do the same immediately thereafter on the
first page of the duplicate will but that he should, instead, repeat the mistake he had made on the marginal signatures on
the original will.

Finally, to conclude that a forgery has been committed, the evidence should be forcefully persuasive. Before we are
disposed to find that an attorney-at-law has so debased himself as to aid and abet the forgery of a will, which would not
only send him to jail for many years but would ruin his future, we must require proof sufficiently strong to prevail against
every fair and thoughtful hesitancy and doubt. And the instrumental witnesses have testified that Rufina Arevalo signed
the will in their presence. It is hard to believe they would commit perjury as it has not been shown they had any interest in
this case.

Therefore, we find that the will of Rufina Arevalo, dated October 2, 1937 and marked Exhibit C, is genuine and should be
allowed.
It is unnecessary to discuss the incidental issues of fact so ably presented by counsel and examined in detail by the
probate court, inasmuch as the foregoing disposes of the basic question raised. The relative position of the contending
devisees in the affection of the deceased; whether Rufina Arevalo could go alone to the law office of Attorney Yatco on
October 2, 1937 to sign the will Exhibit C; the alleged resentment of the testatrix toward Amando Clemente when she
signed the second will, and similar questions are not of sufficient significance to alter the conclusion herein arrived at. In
fact, they merely tend to becloud the main issue.

The next question to be inquired into is whether or not the later will (Exhibit C) dated October 2, 1937, whose probate is
herein approved, has entirely revoked the earlier will, Exhibit 6, dated January 9, 1936. Though both partes admit that the
first will has been revoked by the second, yet we deem it necessary to discuss the question because a member of this
Court thinks the earlier will can stand in part. It appears that the undivided interest of Rufina Arevalo in two parcels of land
and the improvements thereon which belonged to the conjugal partnership between Bernabe Bustamante, who had died
before the making of the two wills, and Rufina Arevalo, was expressly devised to Amando Clemente in the earlier will but
was not specifically mentioned in the later will. In the first will, Exhibit 6, Rufina Arevalo, who had no forcible heirs, gave to
Ariston Bustamante, her nephew, three lots and the buildings thereon; devised a parcel of land and the houses standing
thereon to her cousin, Petrona Arevalo Viuda de Zacarias, and to her niece, Carmen Papa de Delgado; and finally
disposed, in favor of Amando Clemente, another cousin, of a piece of land and the houses thereon, and of her undivided
interest in the two parcels of land and the improvements thereon, which belonged to the conjugal partnership, also making
said Amando Clemente the residuary legatee. But in the second will, Exhibit C, she designates Ariston Bustamante her
only heir in these terms:

Segundo — Nombro como mi unico heredero, Ariston Bustamante, de todas mis propiedades dejadas ya mueble
o inmueble que se describen mas abajo:

(a) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 5059

(b) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 4681

(c) Transfer Certificate of Title of Manila No. 19961

(d) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 5066

(e) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 4682.

Her undivided interest in the two pieces of land of the conjugal partnership, with Torrens titles No. 4887 and No. 15628,
devised to Amando Clemente in the earlier will, is not specifically mentioned in the later will, Exhibit C. Moreover, the
second will has no revocation clause.

At first sight, it would seem that the earlier will can stand with respect to Rufina Arevalo's share in said two parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal partnership. But a closer examination of the later will counter-acts such initial reaction.

In the first place, the testatrix in the second will names Ariston Bustamante her only heir to all her property, both personal
and real, her words in Spanish being: "Nombro como mi unico heredero, Ariston Bustamante, de todas mis
propiedades dejadas ya mueble o inmueble." (Italics supplied.) It is true that in enumerating her parcels of land, she did
not specify her interest in the two lots of the conjugal partnership. But this omission must have been due either to an
oversight or to the belief that it was premature to name said two parcels as the conjugal partnership was still being
liquidated. In either case, the testatrix must have thought that her comprehensive words "mi unico heredero de todas mis
propiedades dejadas ya mueble o inmueble" would be sufficient to cover all her property, whether specially listed or not.

Secondly, in the opening paragraph of the second will, the following words appear: "hago constar a todos este
mi ultimo testamento y voluntad expresado en Castellano lenguaje que conozco y poseo, y queriendo disponer de mis
bienes por virtud de este mi testamento." (Emphasis supplied.) Though she knew that she had made a first will, she
nevertheless said that the second will was her last one. This would seem to signify that her last will, cancelling her
previously expressed wish, was to make Ariston Bustamante her only heir. Furthermore, when she said she wanted to
dispose of her property by means of the second will ("queriendo disponer de mis bienes por virtud de este mi
testamento"), it would appear to be her intention that no property of hers should be left undisposed of in the second will.
This fact is corroborated in the second clause wherein she names Ariston Bustamante as her only heir to all her property
whether personal or real.
We believe, therefore, that the first will has been entirely revoked. Though it might appear right that Amando Clemente
should receive something from the estate because he, together with Ariston Bustamante, has been raised by the testatrix,
and both are her relatives, nevertheless it would be venturesome for us to advance our own idea of a just distribution of
the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in the later will. As she had
no forcible heirs, she was absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she choose, subject of course to the payment
of her debts. It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a will in order to effect what the court
believes to be an equitable division of the estate of a deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to
carry out the intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once that intention has been determined through a
careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial
cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest. It might be said that it is hard to understand
how, in a temporary anger at Amando Clemente, the testatrix would entirely cut him off from the inheritance. We should
not, however, sit in judgment upon her motives and sentiments, first because, as already stated, nothing in the law
restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because there are no adequate
means of ascertaining the inward processes of her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those
who expected her bounty.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, declaring the second will Exhibit C a forgery and allowing the first will
Exhibit 6, should be and is hereby reversed, and another judgment shall be entered allowing the later will Exhibit C, which
has entirely revoked the earlier will Exhibit 6. No special pronouncement on costs is made. Let the record of this case be
returned to the court of origin for further proceedings. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated
April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis,
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry
receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas
law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs
theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.

ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special
Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton,
etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in
Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
 Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified
the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her
(Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law
of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because
the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN
IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING
HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY
UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
 V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the
time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness
the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as
an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until
1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years
until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed
the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in
1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines
during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died
at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was
born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he
returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento,
California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have
intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode.
But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
 "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to
insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the
Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of the
court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d
877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person
of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California
Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness.
(Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable,
and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality
of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the
Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the
the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so
often been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result
from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in
this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
 disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected
the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and
they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the
validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
14.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into
a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a
foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is
renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the
further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since
an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would
in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16
C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that
the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof.
Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws
as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx

Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form
of the following theses:
 (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or
even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he
must accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in
the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which
follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about
the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules
of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for
the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York
court has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law
of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to
the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children
while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to
support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear
in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of
the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions
that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946

TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.

Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.

Lucio Javillonar for appellee.

DE JOYA, J.:

On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, for the recovery of one-half (½) of the property mentioned and described therein, which had
been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra, and which had been previously divided equally between the two
extrajudicially, demanding at the same time one-half (½) of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant
Encarnacion Neyra. The defendant filed an answer admitting that the property mentioned and described therein was
community property, and at the same time set up counterclaims amounting to over P1,000, for money spent, during the
last illness of their father, and for money loaned to the plaintiff.

After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to one-half (½) of the said property,
adjudicating the same to her, but at the same time ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77, plus
interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.

Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals for Manila, alleging several errors,
attacking the execution and validity of said agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed, pursuant
to the to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties, as shown by the corresponding document, dated
November 3, 1942, which was filed in the case the following day, November 4, 1942.

In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years, unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942
at the age of 48, allegedly from heart attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was claimed, she had
been suffering for sometime.

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, by virtue of said
agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since
November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a petition, dated November 23, 1942, asking for the reconsideration of
said decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated
November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of
death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion
Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against
Encarnacion's will; and that the court had no more jurisdiction over the case, when the alleged agreement was filed on
November 4, 1942, at the instance of Trinidad Neyra, as Encarnacion was already dead at the time.

The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for reconsideration, is whether or not said
compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942. Trinidad
Neyra maintains the affirmative.

The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, in this case, has fully established the
following facts:

That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and two children, by his
first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; That after the
death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in
connection with the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31,
1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the first case, filed in
March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the
property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in the court of first
instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162); and the second is the instance case.

That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will on
September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making
no provision whatsoever in said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her
bitter enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due
deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said
decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said
religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for
that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat, and gave him instructions for the preparation
of a new will; that Atty. Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, merely prepared a draft of a codicil, amending said will,
dated September 14, 1939, again naming said religious organization, among others as beneficiary, and said draft of a
codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance; but it was
also rejected.

In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on October 31,
1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make
confession, after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila,
so that she might take holy communion; that Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made, and, as
a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro Garcia, also of the
Quiapo Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took holy communion; that after the mass,
Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad
Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio
Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters greeted each other
in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which
they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the
City of Manila, the instant case being the second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the
property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents
of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. They also agreed
to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney
Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions
for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will
and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming
Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two
documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the
afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the
presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he
asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that
Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a
son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala,
in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after
which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The
agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as
witnesses.

Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.

The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men,
and who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three
of the attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked
to the testatrix.

Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion
Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses
presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the
afternoon of November 3, 1942.

Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that when the thumbmark of
Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in
the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion
Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.

Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's,
thumbmark was affixed to the will, only in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del
Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.

The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature of effects of Addison's disease, is
absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.

According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as ten (10) years, while
others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per
cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d
ed., 1935, pp. 1250-1253; McCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)

And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age
of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years.

In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of witnesses, who had
known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts.

Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that
it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed necessary and
sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in
spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of
tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the attending physician that the
deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days, prior to his death, was held
not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he
was conscious and able to understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan
Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the
fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and
Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and
intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental
condition at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)

Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6
o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly,
thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in
question.

It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the
testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily
receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes,
they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.

Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated
November 3, 1942.

The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement
and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been
fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in
question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at
the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so;
and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. (Jaboneta vs.Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed
by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap
Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)

Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are children of legatees named in the will,
dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will, dated November 3, 1942.

Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect that there could have been no reconciliation
between the two sisters, and that the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the
agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that her thumbmark was affixed to the
will in question, when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is absolutely devoid of
any semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra
and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore,
absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal aphorism — falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)

To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the two documents, dated November 3, 1942,
petitioners have erroneously placed great emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion
and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is
the most violent. Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet not impossible. They had
forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian faith, and hope
and charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They had also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than
that embalmed in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.

It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra,
as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must
have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always
brought her happiness, and that she had always been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently what was
her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her
heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her
generosity, under her last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said agreement, and thus
depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.

It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed and executed by Encarnacion
Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty.
Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4,
1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942,
dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919

In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.

Filemon Sotto for appellants.

M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916.
From this decision the opponent's appealed.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the
testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the
three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses,
nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the
will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that the will was duly admitted to probate.

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three
witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one applicable in the case) evidently has for its object
(referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's
dispositions. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In
requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on
several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the
bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be
signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and
the witnesses in the presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its
authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures,
affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance
the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written
on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the
sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But,
when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the
removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering whether or not this clause
is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and
of the three witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the
statute. Moreover, referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the
attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the
latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on
their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net

As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew the dialect in which the will
is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of
this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she
knew this dialect in which this will is written.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.

G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.

Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant.

Anacleto Diaz for appellees.

CARSON, J.:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the
court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside,
some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the
act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of
course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the
last will and testament of the deceased.

The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of fact of vital importance in the
determination of this case, as he was of opinion that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5
Phil. Rep., 541) the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the
other describing witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to
invalidate the execution of the will. But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to
have been in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to
the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision from this
witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain
separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each signature."

In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription
of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not
mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of
each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their
relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the
moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position
with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction
and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the
question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its
subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other
were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the
doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat
the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.

The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to probate as the last will and
testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with costs of this instance against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-21755 December 29, 1924

In the matter of the testate estate of Antonio Mojal, deceased. FILOMENA NAYVE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LEONA MOJAL and LUCIANA AGUILAR, opponents-appellants.

Manuel M. Calleja for appellants.

Felix U. Calleja for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena
Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased.

The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to the will, and ordered the probate
thereof, holding that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in
accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will
to probate and overruling their opposition.

The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four pages
written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses
on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also
on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the
page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not
appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.

The defects attributed to the will are:

(a) The fact of not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b)
the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state
the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed
all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

As to the signatures on the margin, it is true, as above stated, that the third page actually used was signed by the testator,
not on the left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but about the middle of the page and the end of the will; and that the
fourth page was signed by the witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was by the testator, but about the middle of the page
and at the end of the attestation clause.

In this respect the holding of this court in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), is applicable,
wherein the will in question was signed by the testator and the witnesses, not on the left, but right, margin. The rule laid
down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will
was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and
consequently it was allowed to probate.

Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that, as each and every page used of the will bears the signatures of
the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not
detract from the validity of the will.lawphi1.net

Turning to the second defect alleged, that is to say, the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters,
suffice it to cite the case of Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil., 494), where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and
not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will, which is the third
defect assigned, it must be noted that the last paragraph of the will here in question and the attestation clause, coming
next to it, are of the following tenor:

In witness whereof, I set my hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig, Albay,
Philippine Islands, this 26th day of November, nineteen hundred and eighteen, composed
of four sheets, including the next:
ANTONIO MOJAL

(Signed and declared by the testator Don Antonio Mojal to be his last will and testament in
the presence of each of us, and at the request of said testator Don Antonio Mojal, we
signed this will in the presence of each other and of the testator.)
PEDRO CARO
SILVERIO MORCO
ZOILO MASINAS

As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case of Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), it was held that the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages
composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at
the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be
no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by
the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.

With regard to the last defect pointed out, namely, that the testator does not appear to have signed on all the sheets of the
will in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed on all the sheets in the presence of
the testator and of each other, it must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator
signed the will "in the presence of each of the witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of each other and of the
testator." So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such a requirement
was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses
signed all the sheets of the will.

The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be proven by the
mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the attestation clause
now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the
mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the
instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.

Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will is
proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state such evident fact does not
invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.

The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 103554 May 28, 1993

TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR
LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA,
QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO,
and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO
CANEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo
Caballero, respondents.

Palma, Palma & Associates for petitioners.

Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Presented for resolution by this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether or not the
attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of
Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code.

The records show that on December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight
years of his life, executed a last will and testament at his residence in Talisay, Cebu before three attesting witnesses,
namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. The said testator was duly assisted by his lawyer,
Atty. Emilio Lumontad, and a notary public, Atty. Filoteo Manigos, in the preparation of that last will.1 It was declared
therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties
to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara,
all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.2

Four months later, or on April 4, 1979, Mateo Caballero himself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3899-
R before Branch II of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu seeking the probate of his last will and testament. The
probate court set the petition for hearing on August 20, 1979 but the same and subsequent scheduled hearings were
postponed for one reason to another. On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard
by the probate court.3 On February 25, 1981, Benoni Cabrera, on of the legatees named in the will, sough his
appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate, the estimated value of which was P24,000.00, and he was so
appointed by the probate court in its order of March 6, 1981.4

Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a second petition, entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero" and docketed as Special Proceeding No. 3965-R, before Branch IX
of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Cebu. On October 18, 1982, herein petitioners had their said petition intestate
proceeding consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 3899-R in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and
opposed thereat the probate of the Testator's will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.5

Benoni Cabrera died on February 8, 1982 hence the probate court, now known as Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, appointed William Cabrera as special administrator on June 21, 1983. Thereafter, on July 20, 1983, it issued an
order for the return of the records of Special Proceeding No. 3965-R to the archives since the testate proceeding for the
probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first. On March 26, 1984 the case was reraffled and eventually assigned
to Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu where it remained until the conclusion of the probate proceedings.6

In the course of the hearing in Special Proceeding No. 3899-R, herein petitioners appeared as oppositors and objected to
the allowance of the testator's will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution, the testator was already in the
poor state of health such that he could not have possibly executed the same. Petitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to
the genuineness of the signature of the testator therein.7

On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses, Cipriano Labuca, and the notary public Atty. Filoteo Manigos, testified
that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that,
contrary to the assertions of the oppositors, Mateo Caballero was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any
way in the execution of his will. Labuca also testified that he and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the probate hearing
as the had died by then.8
On April 5, 1988, the probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament of the
late Mateo Caballero, on the ratiocination that:

. . . The self-serving testimony of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome the positive
testimonies of Atty. Filoteo Manigos and Cipriano Labuca who clearly told the Court that indeed Mateo
Caballero executed the Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "C" on December 5, 1978.
Moreover, the fact that it was Mateo Caballero who initiated the probate of his Will during his lifetime
when he caused the filing of the original petition now marked Exhibit "D" clearly underscores the fact that
this was indeed his Last Will. At the start, counsel for the oppositors manifested that he would want the
signature of Mateo Caballero in Exhibit "C" examined by a handwriting expert of the NBI but it would
seem that despite their avowal and intention for the examination of this signature of Mateo Caballero in
Exhibit "C", nothing came out of it because they abandoned the idea and instead presented Aurea
Caballero and Helen Caballero Campo as witnesses for the oppositors.

All told, it is the finding of this Court that Exhibit "C" is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero
and that it was executed in accordance with all the requisites of the law.9

Undaunted by the said judgment of the probate court, petitioners elevated the case in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19669. They asserted therein that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally
defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will
in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

On October 15, 1991, respondent court promulgated its decision 10 affirming that of the trial court, and ruling that the
attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code, thus:

The question therefore is whether the attestation clause in question may be considered as having
substantialy complied with the requirements of Art. 805 of the Civil Code. What appears in the attestation
clause which the oppositors claim to be defective is "we do certify that the testament was read by him and
the attestator, Mateo Caballero, has published unto us the foregoing will consisting of THREE PAGES,
including the acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters of the upper part of each
page, as his Last Will and Testament, and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin in the presence of the said testator and in
the presence of each and all of us (emphasis supplied).

To our thinking, this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need be presented to indicate the meaning
that the said will was signed by the testator and by them (the witnesses) in the presence of all of them
and of one another. Or as the language of the law would have it that the testator signed the will "in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another." If not completely or ideally perfect in
accordance with the wordings of Art. 805 but (sic) the phrase as formulated is in substantial compliance
with the requirement of the law." 11

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court, but the same was denied in the latter's
resolution of January 14, 1992, 12 hence this appeal now before us. Petitioners assert that respondent court has ruled
upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled jurisprudence on the matter and are now questioning
once more, on the same ground as that raised before respondent court, the validity of the attestation clause in the last will
of Mateo Caballero.

We find the present petition to be meritorious, as we shall shortly hereafter, after some prefatory observations which we
feel should be made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controversy.

1. A will has been defined as a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death. 13 Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds
of wills which a testator may execute.14 the first kind is the ordinary or attested will, the execution of which is governed by
Articles 804 to 809 of the Code. Article 805 requires that:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
 direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness, it shall be interpreted to them.

In addition, the ordinary will must be acknowledged before a notary public by a testator and the attesting witness. 15hence
it is likewise known as notarial will. Where the attestator is deaf or deaf-mute, Article 807 requires that he must personally
read the will, if able to do so. Otherwise, he should designate two persons who would read the will and communicate its
contents to him in a practicable manner. On the other hand, if the testator is blind, the will should be read to him twice;
once, by anyone of the witnesses thereto, and then again, by the notary public before whom it is acknowledged. 16

The other kind of will is the holographic will, which Article 810 defines as one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testator himself. This kind of will, unlike the ordinary type, requires no attestation by witnesses. A common
requirement in both kinds of will is that they should be in writing and must have been executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator. 17

However, in the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language or dialect
known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore, the language used in the
attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses. 18 The last paragraph of Article 805 merely
requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be interpreted to said witnesses.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has
been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same. 19 It is a separate memorandum or record of the
facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that
compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. 20 It is made for the purpose of preserving in
a permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a particular will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the attesting witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved. 21

Under the third paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the
will, 22 should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or
expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that
the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that saidwitnesses also
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard
against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages;23 whereas the subscription of the signature of the testator and the attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of
authentication and identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument executed by the testator and
attested to by the witnesses.24

Further, by attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.25 The attestation clause, therefore, provide strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a will
and to insure the authenticity thereof.26 As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed
only by them.27 Where it is left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible and easy to
add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the testator and its witnesses.28

In its report, the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for requiring the formalities to be followed in the
execution of wills, in the following manner:

The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this Project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator
 more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.

This objective is in accord with the modern tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of
wills. . . .29

2. An examination of the last will and testament of Mateo Caballero shows that it is comprised of three sheets all of which
have been numbered correlatively, with the left margin of each page thereof bearing the respective signatures of the
testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing the testamentary dispositions is expressed in the
Cebuano-Visayan dialect and is signed at the foot thereof by the testator. The attestation clause in question, on the other
hand, is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the end thereof by the three attesting witnesses
hereto.30 Since it is the proverbial bone of contention, we reproduce it again for facility of reference:

We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the
Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the
testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES,
including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters on the upper part of each
page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every page thereof, on the spaces
provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the
presence of each and all of us.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of senses, while
subscription is the act of the hand. The former is mental, the latter mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was
published as such, and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication; but to subscribe a paper
published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the sole purpose of identification.31

In Taboada vs. Rizal,32 we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see
and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the
signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the
same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. As it involves a
mental act, there would be no means, therefore, of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the
witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is substantially expressed in the
attestation.

It is contended by petitioners that the aforequoted attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the
third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting
witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. We agree.

What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that
the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left
hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the
words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the
presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however,
be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately
follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the
left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis , is the statement that the witnesses signed the
will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the
form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as
contemplated in the pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code, to wit:
 Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the
will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with
all the requirements of article 805" (Emphasis supplied.)

While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page
by the three attesting witnesses, it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witness affixed their
respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since, as petitioners correctly observed, the
presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed, but it does not prove that the attesting
witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The execution of a will is supposed to
be one act so that where the testator and the witnesses sign on various days or occasions and in various combinations,
the will cannot be stamped with the imprimatur of effectivity.33

We believe that the further comment of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes34 regarding Article 809, wherein he urged caution in
the application of the substantial compliance rule therein, is correct and should be applied in the case under
consideration, as well as to future cases with similar questions:

. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All theses are facts
that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can
be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in
the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis ours.)

3. We stress once more that under Article 809, the defects and imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a will invalid should it be
proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. In this regard, however, the manner
of proving the due execution and attestation has been held to be limited to merely an examination of the will itself without
resorting to evidence aliunde, whether oral or written.

The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses
signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.35 In such a situation, the defect is
not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article
805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present
case since there is no plausible way by which we can read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an
implication thereof, that the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and
of one another.

Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents since it
presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or from which it may
necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted textual requirements were actually
complied within the execution of the will. In other words, defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied
by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever from
with such facts may be plausibly deduced. What private respondent insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses
alleging that they saw the compliance with such requirements by the instrumental witnesses, oblivious of the fact that he
is thereby resorting to extrinsic evidence to prove the same and would accordingly be doing by the indirection what in law
he cannot do directly.

4. Prior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, there was a divergence of views as to which manner of
interpretation should be followed in resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal formalities required in the
execution of wills. The formal requirements were at that time embodied primarily in Section 618 of Act No. 190, the Code
of Civil Procedure. Said section was later amended by Act No. 2645, but the provisions respecting said formalities found
in Act. No. 190 and the amendment thereto were practically reproduced and adopted in the Civil Code.
One view advance the liberal or substantial compliance rule. This was first laid down in the case of Abangan vs.
Abangan,36 where it was held that the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. Nonetheless, it
was also emphasized that one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will, hence when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded. The subsequent cases of Avera vs. Garcia,37 Aldaba vs. Roque,38 Unson vs.
Abella,39 Pecson vs. Coronel,40 Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, et al.,41and Nayve vs. Mojal, et al.42 all adhered to this
position.

The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescribe the formalities that should be observed in the
execution of wills are mandatory in nature and are to be strictly construed was followed in the subsequent cases of In the
Matter of the Estate of Saguinsin,43 In re Will of Andrada,44 Uy Coque vs. Sioca,45 In re Estate of Neumark, 46and Sano vs.
Quintana.47

Gumban vs. Gorecho, et al.,48 provided the Court with the occasion to clarify the seemingly conflicting decisions in the
aforementioned cases. In said case of Gumban, the attestation clause had failed to state that the witnesses signed the will
and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator. The will in question was disallowed,
with these reasons therefor:

In support of their argument on the assignment of error above-mentioned, appellants rely on a series of
cases of this court beginning with (I)n the Matter of the (E)state of Saguinsin ([1920], 41 Phil., 875),
continuing with In re Will of Andrada [1921], 42 Phil., 180), Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca [1922], 43 Phil.,
405), and In re Estate of Neumark ([1923], 46 Phil., 841), and ending with Sano vs. Quintana ([1925], 48
Phil., 506). Appellee counters with the citation of a series of cases beginning with Abangan vs.
Abangan ([1919], 40 Phil., 476), continuing through Aldaba vs. Roque ([1922], 43 Phil., 378),
and Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios ([1924], 46 Phil., 922), and culminating in Nayve vs. Mojal and
Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152). In its last analysis, our task is to contrast and, if possible, conciliate the last
two decisions cited by opposing counsel, namely, those of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and Nayve vs.
Mojal and Aguilar, supra.

In the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite
that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of
the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was
cited, but the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision
in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, wherein it was held that the attestation clause must estate the fact
that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be
proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere
examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident
facts does not invalidate the will.

It is a habit of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous cases; seldom do they admit inconsistency in
doctrine. Yet here, unless aided impossible to reconcile the Mojal and Quintana decisions. They are
fundamentally at variance. If we rely on one, we affirm. If we rely on the other, we reverse.

In resolving this puzzling question of authority, three outstanding points may be mentioned. In the first
place, the Mojal, decision was concurred in by only four members of the court, less than a majority, with
two strong dissenting opinions; the Quintana decision was concurred in by seven members of the court, a
clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second place, the Mojal decision was promulgated in
December, 1924, while the Quintana decision was promulgated in December, 1925; the Quintana
decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the third place, the Quintana decision is believed
more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the law.

The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in
section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same
Code, as unamended. It is in part provided in section 61, as amended that "No will . . . shall be valid . .
. unless . . .." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
 presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that "The will shall be disallowed
in either of the following case: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone
carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to
enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose
so emphatically and clearly expressed.

We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary,
modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra. (Emphases in the original text).

But after the Gumban clarificatory pronouncement, there were decisions of the Court that once more appeared to revive
the seeming diversity of views that was earlier threshed out therein. The cases of Quinto vs. Morata,49Rodriguez vs.
Alcala,50 Enchevarria vs. Sarmiento,51 and Testate Estate of Toray52 went the way of the ruling as restated in Gumban.
But De Gala vs. Gonzales, et al.,53 Rey vs. Cartagena,54 De Ticson vs. De Gorostiza,55Sebastian vs.
Panganiban,56 Rodriguez vs. Yap,57 Grey vs. Fabia,58 Leynez vs. Leynez,59 Martir vs. Martir,60 Alcala vs. De
Villa,61 Sabado vs.
Fernandez,62 Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 63 and Lopez vs. Liboro,64 veered away from the strict interpretation rule and
established a trend toward an application of the liberal view.

The Code Commission, cognizant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the undeniable inclination towards a liberal
construction, recommended the codification of the substantial compliance rule, as it believed this rule to be in accord with
the modern tendency to give a liberal approach to the interpretation of wills. Said rule thus became what is now Article
809 of the Civil Code, with this explanation of the Code Commission:

The present law provides for only one form of executing a will, and that is, in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines had previously upheld the strict compliance with the legal formalities
and had even said that the provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
regarding the contents of the attestation clause were mandatory, and non-compliance therewith
invalidated the will (Uy Coque vs. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405). These decisions necessarily restrained the
freedom of the testator in disposing of his property.

However, in recent years the Supreme Court changed its attitude and has become more liberal in the
interpretation of the formalities in the execution of wills. This liberal view is enunciated in the cases
of Rodriguez vs. Yap, G.R. No. 45924, May 18, 1939; Leynez vs. Leynez, G.R. No. 46097, October 18,
1939; Martir vs. Martir, G.R. No. 46995, June 21, 1940; and Alcala vs. Villa, G.R. No. 47351, April 18,
1941.

In the above mentioned decisions of our Supreme Court, it has practically gone back to the original
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment by Act No. 2645 in the
year 1916. To turn this attitude into a legislative declaration and to attain the main objective of the
proposed Code in the liberalization of the manner of executing wills, article 829 of the Project is
recommended, which reads:

"Art. 829. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure
and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact
executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article
829."65

The so-called liberal rule, the Court said in Gil vs. Murciano,66 "does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the
door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing details that
should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration into its confines, to ascertain its
meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results."

It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the
allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.67

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the impugned decision of respondent court is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The court a quo is accordingly directed to forthwith DISMISS its Special Proceeding No. 3899-R (Petition
for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero) and to REVIVE Special Proceeding No. 3965-R (In the
matter of the Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero) as an active case and thereafter duly proceed with the settlement of the
estate of the said decedent.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO,
PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two other cases directly related to the present one
and involving the same parties had already been decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, 1 which was a petition for
certiorari and mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition ruling that the more appropriate
remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for the probate of the will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the
petitioners commenced in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176, for the probate of the
disputed will, which was opposed by the private respondents presently, Panfilo and Felino both surnamed Maloto. The
trial court dismissed the petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining against the dismissal, again, the petitioners came to this
Court on a petition for review by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition, we set aside the trial court's order and directed it
to proceed to hear the case on the merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already been revoked by the
testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners appealed the trial court's decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7, 1985, affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
adverse decision proved to be of no avail, hence, this petition.

For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a great help.

On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano
and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did
not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 1736. However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the
parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's
estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then
presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.
That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.

Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty.
Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January
3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the
original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The
document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while
Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more
valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners
Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in
Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the
allowance of the will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to us by way of a petition for certiorari
and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we stated earlier, we dismissed that petition and advised that a
separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by
the petitioners.

Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers
allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was
indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the
presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate
court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix
going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the
services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such
facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively
revoked.

There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. The heart of the case
lies on the issue as to whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.

The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.

Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:

(1) By implication of law; or

(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or

(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator
himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled,
or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the
fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of
Court. (Emphasis Supplied.)

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under theexpress
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the
will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that
requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of
a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express
direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones
present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned.

The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private respondents as oppositors in the trial
court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear
"inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses,
Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was
indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according
to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will
because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.

At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization
on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...."4
The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for probate instituted by the petitioners argue
that the same is already barred by res adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to
appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding
No. 1736) denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings
therein and to allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable.

The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent
case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action. 5 We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.

For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is
concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate
settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect
to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for
probate. This is understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on
the probate of the contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and
with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate
settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is
likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it
may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted
this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score can not be sustained.

One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be inferred from the fact that "(a) major and
substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the
properties remained at the time of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired
after the execution of the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here that as these additional matters raised by the
private respondents are extraneous to this special proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after the will has
been duly probated and a certificate of its allowance issued.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated June 7, 1985 and
the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance
of Adriana Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.

Claro M. Recto and Serafin C. Dizon for appellants.

Delgado & Flores for appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to probate the last will and testament of
the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed on August 17, 1918. The oppositors-appellants brought the case on
appeal to this Court for the reason that the value of the properties involved exceeds P50,000.

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any
forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana
Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed
Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y
Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939. (Exhibit I).
The later will executed in 1918.

On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition, which was docketed
as special proceeding No. 8022 seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being
no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting
the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their
evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that
the same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed another petition
for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding No.
56, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that
petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the
manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could be
heard, the battle for liberation came and the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for
reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce
the copies required for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14, 1946, similar to the
one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same grounds as those contained in their former
opposition. Then, the case was set for trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court issued an order admitting the will to probate
already stated in the early part of this decision. From this order the oppositors appealed assigning six errors, to wit.

I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the
probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the
probate of another alleged will of Molo dated 191.

II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of Molo's
alleged will of 1918.

III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come to court with "unclean hands" and as such
is not entitled to relief.

IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo's alleged will of August 17, 1918 was not executed in the
manner required by law.

V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was deliberately revoked by Molo himself.

VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was subsequently revoked by the decedent's will
of 1939.

In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the probate court erred in not holding that the
petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order to enable her to
obtain the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and circumstances
with their opinion indicate that petitioner connived with the witness Canuto Perez in an effort to defeat and frustrate the
probate of the 1939 will because of her knowledge that said will intrinsically defective in that "the one and only
testamentory disposition thereof was a "disposicion captatoria". These circumstances, counsel for the appellants contend,
constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by petitioner with a view to insuring the realization of her plan of securing
the probate of the 1918 will which she believed would better safeguard her right to inherit from the decease.

These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection with special proceedings No. 8022, now
closed and terminated, are vigorously met by counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise them in these proceedings
which are entirely new and distinct and completely independent from the other is improper and unfair as they find no
support whatsoever in any evidence submitted by the parties in this case. They are merely based on the presumptions
and conjectures not supported by any proof. For this reason, counsel, contends, the lower court was justified in
disregarding them and in passing them sub silentio in its decision.

A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this contention. There is indeed no evidence
which may justify the insinuation that petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of the
deceased to enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere conjecture drawn from the apparently
unexpected testimony of Canuto Perez that he went out of the room to answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio
Reyes was signing the will and the failure of petitioner later to impeach the character of said witness in spite of the
opportunity given her by the court to do so. Apart from this insufficiency of evidence, the record discloses that this failure
has been explained by petitioner when she informed the court that she was unable to impeach the character of her
witness Canuto Perez because of her inability to find witnesses who may impeach him, and this explanation stands
uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is satisfactory or not, it is not now, for us to determine. It is an incident that
comes within the province of the former case. The failure of petitioner to present the testimony of Artemio Reyes at the
hearing has also been explained, and it appears that petitioner has filed because his whereabouts could not be found.
Whether this is true or not is also for this Court to determine. It is likewise within the province and function of the court in
the former case. And the unfairness of this imputation becomes more glaring when we stock of the developments that had
taken place in these proceedings which show in bold relief the true nature of the conduct, behavior and character of the
petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in disrepute by the oppositors.

It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will executed on June 20, 1939, was filed on February 7,
1941, by the petitioner. There being no opposition, the will was probated. Subsequently, however, upon petition of the
herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting said will to probate was set aside, over the vigorous opposition of the
herein petitioner, and the case was reopened. The reopening was ordered because of the strong opposition of the
oppositors who contended that he will had not been executed as required by law. After the evidence of both parties had
been presented, the oppositors filed an extensive memorandum wherein they reiterated their view that the will should be
denied probate. And on the strenght of this opposition, the court disallowed the will.

If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the testamentary disposition in her
favor invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through
consultation with a lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of filing the petition for the probate of the will.
She could accomplish her desire by merely suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to
the probate of the will executed in 1918. But for her conscience was clear and bade her to take the only proper step
possible under the circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for the probate of the 1939 will. This
she did and the will was admitted to probate. But then the unexpected happened. Over her vigorous opposition, the herein
appellants filed a petition for reopening, and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted and the case was
reopened. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Is it her fault that the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the
order admitting the will to probate was set aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never expected. Had
appellants not filed their opposition to the probate of the will and had they limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of
said will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased would have perhaps been accomplished.
But they failed in their strategy. If said will was denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to impute bad
faith petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the
deceased to happen.

Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did not commit the second and third errors imputed
to it by the counsel for appellants. Indeed, petitioner cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent her from
seeking the probate of the 1918 will simply because of her effort to obtain the allowance of the 1939 will has failed
considering that in both the 1918 and 1939 wills she was in by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged
with bad faith far having done so because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of her husband. She cannot be blamed
being zealous in protecting her interest.

The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased which was denied
probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the
effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.

Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid down in the case of Samson vs. Naval, (41 Phil.,
838). He contends that the facts involved in that case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence, the doctrine is
that case is here controlling.

There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved in the Samson case we are indeed impressed
by their striking similarity with the facts of this case. We do not need to recite here what those facts are; it is enough to
point out that they contain many points and circumstances in common. No reason, therefore, is seen by the doctrine laid
down in that case (which we quote hereunder) should not apply and control the present case.

A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was
not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. (41
Phil., 838.)
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that, while they do not disagree with the soundness of
the ruling laid down in the Samson case, there is reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated and
runs counter to the modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence. They maintain that said ruling is no longer
controlling but merely represents the point of view of the minority and should, therefore, be abandoned, more so if we
consider the fact that section 623 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the revocation of wills, is of American
origin and as such should follow the prevailing trend of the majority view in the United States. A long line of authorities is
cited in support of this contention. And these authorities hold the view, that "an express revocation is immediately effective
upon the execution of the subsequent will, and does not require that it first undergo the formality of a probate proceeding".
(p. 63, appellants' brief .

While they are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for oppositors, and that view appears to be in
controlling the states where the decisions had been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in line with the
assertion that is now the prevailing view in the United States. In the search we have made of American authorities on the
subject, we found ourselves in a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the
statutes adopted by each State in the subject of revocation of wills. But the impression we gathered from a review and the
study of the pertinent authorities is that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law. On page 328 of the
American Jurisprudence Vol. 57, which is a revision Published in 1948, we found the following passages which in our
opinion truly reflect the present trend of American jurisprudence on this matter affecting the revocation of wills:

SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument. — Ordinarily, statutes which permit the
revocation of a will by another writing provide that to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be executed
with the same formalities which are required to be observed in the execution of a will. Accordingly, where, under
the statutes, attestation is necessary to the making of a valid will, an unattested non testamentary writing is not
effective to revoke a prior will. It has been held that a writing fails as a revoking instrument where it is not
executed with the formalities requisite for the execution of a will, even though it is inscribed on the will itself,
although it may effect a revocation by cancellation or obliteration of the words of the will. A testator cannot reserve
to himself the power to modify a will by a written instrument subsequently prepared but not executed in the
manner required for a will.

SEC, 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil. — A will which is invalid because of the
incapacity of the testator, or of undue influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. Moreover, a will is
not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. Nor is a will revoked by a defectively executed will or codicil,
even though the latter contains a clause expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where it is provided by
a controlling statute that no writing other than a testamentary instrument is sufficient to revoke a will, for the
simple reason that there is no revoking will. Similarly where the statute provides that a will may be revoked by a
subsequent will or other writing executed with the same formalities as are required in the execution of wills, a
defectively executed will does not revoke a prior will, since it cannot be said that there is a writing which complies
with the statute. Moreover, a will or codicil which, on account of the manner in which it is executed, is sufficient to
pass only personally does not affect dispositions of real estate made by a former will, even though it may
expressly purport to do so. The intent of the testator to revoke is immaterial, if he has not complied with the
statute. (57 Am. Jur., 328, 329.)

We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in 1939. On page 1400, Volume 123, there
appear many authorities on the "application of rules where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is the
following:

It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not being executed in accordance with
the provisions of the statute, or where the testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will
is procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not
revoke the first will or affect it in any manner. Mort vs. Baker University (193-5) 229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S.W. (2d),
498.

These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in the Samson case is predicated. They
reflect the opinion that this ruling is sound and good and for this reason, we see no justification for abondoning it as now
suggested by counsel for the oppositors.

It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides that a will may be some will, codicil, or other
writing executed as proved in case of wills" but it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within
the meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills", simply because it was denied
probate. And even if it be regarded as any other writing within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding
that unless said writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation. (See 57 Am. Jur. pp. 329-330).
But counsel for oppositors contemned that, regardless of said revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given
effect because of the presumption that it was deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors contend that the
testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause contained said will, himself
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these
proceedings is only a duplicate of said original.

There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have
is that when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator
himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will
was denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found
the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.

If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most
logical step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be destroyed. But this was
not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that
because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been
misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing
exactly the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of
circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by
the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.

Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the execution of the
second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the
testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In
other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's
belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is
the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation".

This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels
or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect
for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the existence of some other document, however, and has been
applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68 C.J.P. 799).

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to
raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the
new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)

This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the
valid execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)

We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed
from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of
1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and
would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die
intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife
as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the due execution of the will.

The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel
Cuenca. The first two witnesses died before the commencement of the present proceedings. So the only instrumental
witness available was Angel Cuenca and under our law and precedents, his testimony is sufficient to prove the due
execution of the will. However, petitioner presented not only the testimony of Cuenca but placed on the witness stand
Juan Salcedo, the notary public who prepared and notarized the will upon the express desire and instruction of the
testator, The testimony of these witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the manner required by law. We have
read their testimony and we were impressed by their readiness and sincerity. We are convinced that they told the truth.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.1âwphïl.nêt

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744
promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591
ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for
reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial
Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591
ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo,
pp. 108-109) are as follows:

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the
probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted
as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a
translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as
the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided:

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I earned
jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino,
widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother
Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in
Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.

Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A.
Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was
denied by the trial judge.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the
Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p.
159).

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of respondent
Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was
filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p.
177).

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is not
the proper remedy under the premises;

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to
probate;

(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition
mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line,"
and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission
shall not annul the institution of heirs;

(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere institution of a
universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite
distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and
should be in violable.

(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp. Proc. No.
591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and

(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and ineffectual.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said
of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner
(.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes
the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of
the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied
that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid
v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy
are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes
are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results
in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary
disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article
854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises
having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his
brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy
(Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must
have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor,
neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of
personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an
interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the
provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted
child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to
petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive exercise
of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co
Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic
that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118
SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not
dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137
[1983]).

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the
will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of
the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid,
17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v.
Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to
do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preteriton
The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition
without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations.
The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On
the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us
on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
 meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was grounded
on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the
hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the
provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will
appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity
of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v.
Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2)
he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It was
denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are
matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p.
32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).

For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its face the will
appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the
obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have
meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed
of by private respondents.

Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the
more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra)
and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of
justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
(Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in
the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to
dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The court's
area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are
the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is
not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on
appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this
litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the
will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete
nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do
hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid,
age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of
1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —
 Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and
betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa
comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun nombrandole

como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna
de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a uno
cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que el
heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have on hand
a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's
remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to
abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But
she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And,
the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their
legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of
Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal
heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the
nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se
añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de heredero
en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o
total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o todos los
forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que
comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los
herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814,
al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal
institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such
institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that
nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation.
Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the
"Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses the rule of
interpretation, viz:
 ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente
interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en
algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion
de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos forzosos en
todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes
en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido
es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien
testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y
eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a
un heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del
testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion
contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una
cosa en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so
expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will —
void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent.
There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now
854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to
legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de
heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la
porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". 15From
this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate
the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye
la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the
distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will
itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether.
Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from
preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the
will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may
prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les
corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said
legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage
should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced.
This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case
of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest
accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be
absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said
article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would
be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil
Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs from
legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only
provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein dealt
with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are separate and distinct not only
because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but because they are in themselves different.
Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific
property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a
legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn
merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of
petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005

J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically
made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should
go to which set of heirs.

This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1 dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals which reversed
the Decision2 dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.

The factual antecedents follow.

Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with
Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escaño (Josefa)
and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria
Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves
(Pedro).3

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four (954) square meters, known as Lot
No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and
Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When Antonia died, the
land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443
entitled "Josefa Teves Escaño v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian,
participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement5 which embodied
the partition of all the properties of Don Julian.

On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental,
12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the first marriage.
The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other
properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas, and the house where Don
Julian was living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.

Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays down the effect of the eventual
death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaňo
and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited
from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the
other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and
adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children,
namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
supplied)

On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumption of
Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental
Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner.10 On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.

On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration of the subject lot in its name. A
court, so it appeared, issued an order11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12
November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner.12 Since then, petitioner has
been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.13

Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the subject lot after the execution of
the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and
Hilaria Cadayday, respondents herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home and constructed
a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real
Estate15 dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children,
Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979,
respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9
November 1983.

At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents discovered that the lot was
already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to register the deed.17

Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of Bais City, seeking the declaration
of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their
names, plus damages.18

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds judgment in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders:

(1) That complaint be dismissed;

(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-375;
 (3) That plaintiffs pay costs.

Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.19

The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph 13 of
the Compromise Agreement.20 It added that the direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise
Agreement was only in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.21Paragraph 13
served only as an amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first
marriage.

According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of
their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latter’s death. Thus,
upon Don Julian’s death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the
properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary
rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other
properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.22

The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her
four (4) children was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his
lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot No. 63 being the
conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no
hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the
latter.26

The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julian’s death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate
since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of
extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it. Had
respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the registration of the same with the
Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court added.27

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court’s decision. The decretal part of the appellate decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
as null and void.

With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L. Teves.

SO ORDERED.28

Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated 31 January 1964, particularly
paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his
estate except as regards his (Don Julian’s) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.29 The two sets of heirs acquired full
ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself
could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res
judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.31

The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply
executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved
in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No. and Page No. at
the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location where the said title was registered or transferred,"
were not filled up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin."32

Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, raising
pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can
be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or
assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second marriage pursuant to
the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second
marriage; and (d) that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. and
Page No.33

While most of petitioner’s legal arguments have merit, the application of the appropriate provisions of law to the facts
borne out by the evidence on record nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents.

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has to be quoted again:

13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escaño and
Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited
from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the
other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the properties now selected and
adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children,
namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio
Teves." (Emphasis supplied)

With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian
from the second marriage became automatically operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby
vesting on them the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and
reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where we
defined future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the
contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:

ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a
contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object
of a contract.

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the
object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.35

For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract.36 A
contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347,
where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;

(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and

(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature.37

The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and therefore aligns with the general
rule on future things, reads:
 ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

....

In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter
vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.38 The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does
not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership.
Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here
after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the
partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.39

The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 105640 of the old Civil Code. The only change in
the provision is that Article 1080 now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an
act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.41

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition inter vivos his property, and distribute
them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character,
sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner
of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.42

The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to Article 1347. However,
considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare
hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might never
exist.43

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian
remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second
marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose
of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had
already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.

Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot
during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court
disagreed, holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s
heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is
well-founded.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the
heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.44 It is the total omission of a
compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance.45 It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory
heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary
property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.46 But there is no
preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of
a forced heir.47

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties,
as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition
prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other
properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions
in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line.48Hence, the total omission from
inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it
is unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents’ argument on preterition, still the petition would ultimately rise or fall on whether
there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of
petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal
prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such
transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged
transfer deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed
examination.

Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and
correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence
of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.50

To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient and convincing quantum of
evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens
title. Thus, contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian instead of his
signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of petitioner’s title for this Court has ruled that a
thumbmark is a recognized mode of signature.51

The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a
grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established
by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the transferee relies on a
voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry
of Deeds. This is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. The sections read, thus:

SEC. 53. Presentation of owner’s duplicate upon entry of new certificate. – No voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument,
except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis
supplied)

....

SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. – An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee
simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds
shall thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and
deliver to him an owner’s duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate
certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which the new certificate is
registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owner’s duplicate of
the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed
with the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. (Emphasis
supplied)

As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have presented it to the Register of
Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or
on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is
absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard
that the finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and
Page No. gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203
and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid transaction.

What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:

Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.

CONDITIONS: Lost owner’s duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a new Certificate of Title
No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.

Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979

 Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.

(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA

Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52

What the entry indicates is that the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a petition for the reconstitution of the said
owner’s duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owner’s duplicate and its
replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an
order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the
Registry of Deeds had not been lost.

Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the reconstitution and replacement of
the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost is the owner’s copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owner’s copy could be
ordered replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owner’s copy of
the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court
order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title—even designating the very number
of the new transfer certificate of title itself—the order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the
cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost,53 as the petition for reconstitution is
premised on the loss merely of the owner’s duplicate of the OCT

Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to effect the transfer of title to the
subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so
constrained to do because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered land in fee
simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529.

A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the assignment is not supported by
any consideration. The provision reads:

....

WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves,
Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño at Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of
Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latter’s notarial register as Doc. No. 367;
Page No. 17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escaño, transferred,
conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of
the former as of December 31, 1971.

WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following
properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.

From the properties at Bais

Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves

....

Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all improvements. Assessed value -
P2,720.00

....

WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect the registration of the
transfer of the above corporation.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys,
and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-
 FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment
shall become absolute upon signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)

The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does not represent the consideration for
the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair market value of allthe nineteen (19)
properties enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in favor of
petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55 of petitioner’s accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration
cannot prevail over the clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental Deed.

The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage which is annotated on the back of the
TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the assignment.56 However, the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was
actually executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly, said mortgage, executed as it
was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the
mortgate obligation, could not have been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.

Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely: (1) consent of the contracting
parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause produce no effect whatsoever. Those
contracts lack an essential element and they are not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409,
paragraph (2).59 The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be supported by
a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with
the fact that the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the
application of the presumption of existence of consideration established by law.60

Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the New Civil Code is clear on the
point, thus:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take
effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.

In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the
donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly
notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not
appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or
where the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not
noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document,62 the absence of acceptance by the
donee in the same deed or even in a separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives to write finis to a protracted
litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing at all times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts
have ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.64 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or to
serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably
determinative of the underlying controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the
core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the
appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears
on its face to be a blatant nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-16763 December 22, 1921

PASCUAL COSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA, ET AL., objectors-appellees.

Eduardo Gutierrez Repide & Felix Socias for appellant.

Jose Varela Calderon & Benito Jimenez Zoboli for appellees.

OSTRAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila setting aside a will on the ground of undue
influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez. The will gives the tercio de libre
disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of
nineteen hundred Spanish duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in
Barcelona during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.

The evidence shows that the testator, a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands, became acquainted with
Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit returns with her for many years thereafter. After his return to the
Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close communication with him until his
death in February, 1919. There is no doubt that she exercised some influence over him and the only question for our
determination is whether this influence was of such a character as to vitiate the will.

The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 1144-1149.

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect the
influence must be "undue." The rule as to what constitutes "undue influence" has been variously stated, but the
substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind
that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make his express
the will of another, rather than his own.1awphil.net

. . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in
question, either at time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of
procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. . . .

. . . and while the same amount of influence may become "undue" when exercised by one occupying an improper
and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that
relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the sense above expressed, existed at
the time of its execution and we do not think that this burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that
the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and
subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own." He was
an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession, appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only
by a legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son and by a proper feeling of gratitude
in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she had made for him. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue
influence and does not invalidate a will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the present case.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who
 have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
(Mackall vs. Mackall, 135 U. S., 1677.)

It may be further observed that under the Civil Law the right of a person with legal heirs to dispose of his property by will is
limited to only a portion of his estate, and that under the law in force in these Islands before the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the only outside influences affecting the validity of a will were duress, deceit, and fraud. The present
doctrine of undue influence originated in a legal system where the right of the testator to dispose of his property by will
was nearly unlimited. Manifestly, greater safeguards in regard to execution of wills may be warranted when the right to so
dispose of property is unlimited than when it is restricted to the extent it is in this jurisdiction. There is, therefore, certainly
no reason for giving the doctrine of undue influence a wider scope here than it enjoys in the United States.

For the reasons stated, the decision of the lower court disallowing the will of Federico Gimenez Zoboli is hereby reversed
and it is ordered that the will be admitted to probate. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.

J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth
P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila.
She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of
Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below the attestation clause
and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental
faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the
testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo
building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of
said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila
which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an
opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2)
the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was
executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to
intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during
her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting
the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion
to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the
decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as
passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which
decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a motion for
reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the
decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated
portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate.
And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled
down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in
question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an
interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate
(Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On
the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
"interested person." An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and
not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs.
Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would
she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir,
executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in
the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because she is
not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already
disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1äwphï1.ñët

In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left
by the testatrix? She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil
Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot
give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by
law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ."
And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code
denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there
is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon
the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
 former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but
the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under
our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to
the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no
relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is
an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to
his other relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a
relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may
have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of
either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate
proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the
same should not have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured
thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we
state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her
conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and
every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that
it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to
sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be
a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and
afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of
health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and
understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in
Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and
identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the
court a quo made the following observation:

The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof
adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the
alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see
personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years
after the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory
 of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix,
had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own
testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at
the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions,
each of them was able to talk with her.

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the
mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix
simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering
from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient to
disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness
of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind
of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza,
42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its
execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been
decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and
the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...

From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow
that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or
to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)

To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings
determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to
Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason
why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the
legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the
disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly
executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to
the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 149017 November 28, 2008

VALENTE RAYMUNDO,petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTA ISAGON VDA. DE SUAREZ, DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR,
EVELYN SUAREZ, ET AL., respondents.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and Resolution2 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 58090 which reversed, set aside and recalled the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders3 in Civil Case No.
51203.

First, the long settled facts.

Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez'4 marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein respondents,
namely, Danilo,5 Eufrocina, Marcelo Jr., Evelyn, and Reggineo,6 all surnamed Suarez. During their marriage, governed by
the conjugal partnership of gains regime, they acquired numerous properties, which included the following: (1) a parcel of
land situated in Barrio Caniogan, Pasig with an area of 348 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 30680; (2) property located in Pinagbuhatan, Pasig, with an area of 1,020 square meters under Tax Declaration No.
A-016-01003; and (3) Lot Nos. 5, 6 & 7, Block 2 covered by Tax Declaration No. A-01700723 (subject properties).

After the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez,7 executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,8 partitioning Marcelo Sr.'s estate, thus:

WHEREAS, the said deceased is survived by the parties hereto who are his only legal heirs: TEOFISTA ISAGON,
being the surviving spouse, and EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN
SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, being the legitimate children of the deceased with
the said TEOFISTA ISAGON;

WHEREAS, the minors ELPIDIO, SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ, EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR.
and REGGINEO SUAREZ are represented herein by EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, in her capacity as the guardian
and legal administrator of the property of the said minors;

WHEREAS, there are no known debts or financial obligations of whatever nature and amount against the estate
of the deceased;

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Parties have agreed to settle and liquidate
the assets of the conjugal partnership between the deceased and TEOFISTA ISAGON, and to settle and
adjudicate the estate of the said deceased, by and pursuance to these presents, in the following manner, to wit:

1. That TEOFISTA ISAGON, as the surviving spouse and partner of the deceased, shall receive in absolute and
exclusive ownership the following properties as her lawful share in the assets of the conjugal partnership of gains
between her and the deceased, to wit:

(a) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6938, situated
at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;

(b) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6939, situated
at Sitio Pantayan, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal;

(c) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38291, situated at Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;

(d) Half (1/2) interest and participation in the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 38290, situated at Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal;

(e) TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS AND NINETY (P12,530.90) deposited with
the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines, and THIRTY-NINE PESOS (P39.00)
deposited with Prudential Bank.

2. That the Parties TEOFISTA ISAGON, EUFROCINA S. ANDRES, ELPIDIO SUAREZ, DANILO SUAREZ,
EVELYN SUAREZ, MARCELO SUAREZ, JR. and REGGINEO SUAREZ, shall each and all receive and be
 entitled to a share equivalent to one-seventh (1/7) of the estate of the deceased MARCELO SUAREZ, which
estate is comprised of the following properties, to wit:

(a) A parcel of land covered by TCT No. 30680, situated at Barrio Kaniogan, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P4,150.00.

(b) Three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 33982, 33983 and 33984, situated at Barrio Pineda,
Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with an assessed value of P560.00.

(c) A parcel of land covered by TCT 33986, situated at Barrio Pineda, Municipality of Pasig, Province of
Rizal, with an assessed value of P440.00.

(d) Two (2) parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 42 and 44 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd.,
being a portion of Lot 2 described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _____, situated at
Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P590.00.

(e) Two parcels of land, being Lots Nos. 43 and 45 of the amendment-subdivision plan TY-4653-Amd.,
being a portion of Lot 2 described on the original plan II-4653, G.L.R.O. Record No. _______, situated at
Barrio Santolan, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, with a total assessed value of P1,190.00.

(f) A parcel of land, being Lot No. 6, Block 269 of the subdivision plan pos-112, being a portion of Lot 2,
Block 348, Psd-3188, G.L.R.O. Record Nos. 375,699 and 917, situated at San Felipe Neri, Province of
Rizal, with an assessed value of P6,340.00.

(g) A parcel of land covered by OCT No. 391, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal,
with an assessed value of P1,840.00.

(h) TWELVE THOUSAND (12,000) shares of stock of the Consolidated Mines, Inc. represented by
Certificate No. 71-5-B (for 1,000 shares) and Certificate No. 12736 (for 11,000 shares).

PROVIDED, that their title to the properties hereinabove mentioned shall be in common and the share of each
heir being pro indiviso.

Curiously, despite the partition, title to the foregoing properties, explicitly identified in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
as forming part of Marcelo's and Isagon's property regime, remained in the couple's name. Not surprisingly, Teofista
continued to administer and manage these properties. On the whole, apart from those now owned exclusively by Teofista,
all the properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not changed, with
Teofista as de facto administrator thereof.

In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation (Rizal Realty) and Teofista, the latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the former's
shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo, his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito
(plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of Contract and Damages, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 21736 to 21739.
Thereafter, in 1975, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the
respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily liable to
plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00.9

When the judgment of the CFI became final and executory, herein subject properties were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 to satisfy the judgment against Teofista and Rizal Realty. The aforementioned plaintiffs were the highest
bidder, and bought the levied properties for the amount of P94,170.00. As a result, a certificate of sale was issued to them
and registered in their favor on August 1, 1983. On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued a final deed of sale
over the subject properties.

Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, or on June 21, 1984, herein respondents filed a revindicatory
action against petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the
annulment of the auction sale and recovery of ownership of the levied properties. Essentially, respondents alleged in their
complaint that they cannot be held liable for the judgment rendered against their mother, Teofista, not having been
impleaded therein; and consequently, the subject properties, which they own pro indiviso with their mother, can neither be
levied nor be sold on execution.
Meanwhile, the RTC, Branch 151, formerly the CFI, Branch 1, in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379, issued an
Order10 directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the subject properties, (2) to desist from despoiling, dismantling, removing or
alienating the improvements thereon, (3) to place petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion in peaceful
possession thereof, and (4) to surrender to them the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent
documents. Herein respondents, joined by their mother, Teofista, filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the
subject properties are co-owned by them and further informing the RTC of the filing and pendency of Civil Case No.
51203. Nonetheless, the trial court denied Teofista's and herein respondents' motion, reiterated its previous order, which
included, among others, the order for Teofista and all persons claiming right under her, to vacate the lots subject of the
judicial sale.

Undaunted, Teofista and herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to annul the foregoing orders. The
appellate court, on July 6, 1987, dismissed Teofista's and herein respondents' petition, thus:

We believe this petition cannot prosper for two reasons. First, as purported case for certiorari it fails to show how
the respondent judge had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The two
orders being assailed were preceded by a final judgment, a corresponding writ of execution, a levy on execution
and a judicial sale, all of which enjoy a strong sense presumption of regularity.

Secondly, as far as [petitioner] Teofista Suarez is concerned, she cannot complain about the levy because she
was a party in the consolidated cases where judgment was rendered against her in her personal capacity. Since
she did not appeal from the decision, she cannot say that the judgment is erroneous for an obligation that belong
to the corporation. And with respect to the children of Teofista Suarez, who are co-petitioners in this proceedings
[herein respondents], suffice it to point out that not being parties in the consolidated cases, what they should have
done was to immediately file a third party claim. The moment levy was made on the parcels of land, which they
claim are theirs by virtue of hereditary succession, they should have seasonably filed such claim to protect their
rights. As the record discloses, however, the children chose to remain silent, and even allowed the auction sale to
be held, filing almost a year later a half-hearted complaint to annul the proceedings which they allowed to be
dismissed by not diligently prosecuting it.

In Santos v. Mojica (10 SCRA 318), a partition case with third- party claimants, the Supreme Court came out with
the following ruling: "The procedure (a petition for certiorari) followed by him (a petitioner not party to the original
partition case) in vindicating his right is not the one sanctioned by law, for he should have filed a separate and
independent action making parties therein the sheriff and the plaintiffs responsible for the execution xxx. It can,
therefore, be said that (he) acted improperly in filing the present petition because his remedy was to file a
separate and independent action to vindicate his ownership over the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the restraining order previously issued is DISSOLVED, with costs
against petitioners.11

On the other litigation front concerning Civil Case No. 51203, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the RTC Pasig,
Branch 155, on February 25, 1985, enjoining petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion from transferring
to third parties the levied properties based on its preliminary finding that the auctioned properties are co-owned by
Teofista and herein respondents. Subsequently, however, Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the RTC, Branch 155,
at the instance of petitioner Valente for failure of herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet another turn of events, the
RTC, Branch 155, lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias summons.

Thus, it was now petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's and Maria Concepcion's turn to file a petition for certiorari with
the CA, assailing the various orders of the RTC, Branch 155, which all rejected their bid to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.
The CA granted their petition, thus:

And the fact that herein private respondents, as the legal heirs of Teofista Vda. de Suarez and supposedly not
parties in Civil Case Nos. 21376 - 21379 does not preclude the application of the doctrine of res judicata since,
apart from the requisites constitutive of this procedural tenet, they were admittedly the children of Teofista Suarez,
who is the real party-in-interest in the previous final judgment. As successors-in-interest of Teofista Suarez,
private respondents merely stepped into the shoes of their mother in regard to the levied pieces of property.
Verily, there is identity of parties, not only where the parties in both actions are the same, but where there is
privity with them as in the cases of successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
or where there is substantial identity.
 Finally, the action to annul the judicial sale filed by herein private respondents is not the reinvindicatory suit, much
less the third party claim contemplated by Section 17 of Rule 39.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders dated February 25, 1985,
May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No. 51203 are hereby annulled; further respondent
judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203.12

From this ruling, herein respondents appealed to the Supreme Court. In Suarez v. Court of Appeals,13 we reversed the
appellate court, thus:

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner [herein respondents] and private
respondents [petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] and the developments subsequent to the
filing of the complaint, [w]e cannot but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and the manner of publicly
selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with, only one-half of the 5 parcels of land [subject
properties] should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case:

The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

Article 888 further provides:

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of
the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided."

Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants."

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned property is different from
and adverse to that of their mother [Teofista]. Petitioners [herein respondents] became co-owners of the property
not because of their mother [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father [Marcelo
Sr.]. Therefore, petitioners [herein respondents] are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its Resolution of August 28,
1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said portion.

It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition.

Upon our reinstatement of Civil Case No. 51203, each and every pleading filed by herein respondents, as plaintiffs
therein, was hotly contested and opposed by therein defendants, including petitioner Valente. Moreover, even at that
stage, when the case had been remanded with a directive to "determine that portion which belongs to [herein
respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion," Civil Case No. 51203 had to be re-raffled and transferred,
for varied reasons, to the different court branches in Pasig City. In between all these, petitioner Valente, along with the
other defendants, repeatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 for the purported failure of herein
respondents to prosecute the case. Most of these Motions to Dismiss were denied.
With each transfer of Civil Case No. 51203, the judge to which the case was raffled had to study the records anew.
Expectedly, part of the records went missing and were lost. On April 12, 1993, the Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 71, to
which Civil Case No. 51203 was remanded, filed a report on the records of the case, to wit:

1. The first volume of the record in the above-entitled case was recorded as received on June 20, 1990, by Sheriff
Alejandro O. Loquinario;

2. That the staff of Branch 71 at this time was sharing a small room with Branch 161 at the First Floor of the
Justice Hall, and as the Branch was newly formed, it had no equipment or furniture of its own, and was still
undermanned;

3. That sometime in August 1990, Branch 71 moved to the staffroom of Branch 159 at the Second Floor of the
Justice Hall;

4. That on October 25, 1990, this Court received a Notice of Judgment dated October 22, 1990 from the Court of
Appeals that ruled the dismissal of the above-entitled case, and as per standing instructions of Judge Graduacion
A. Reyes-Claravall, the same was bound as volume 2 of the case;

5. That just before the Christmas vacation in 1991, the branch was forced to hastily move all of its records and
equipment to branch 69, because of the unexpected notice we received that the room we were occupying was to
be demolished in order to meet the schedule for the renovation of the building;

6. That unfortunately, the room was demolished before the undersigned could make a last check to see if
everything was transferred;

7. That it was only later on that this office discovered that important documents were indeed lost, including
transcripts of stenographic notes in a case that was submitted for decision;

8. That sometime in May 1992, the branch moved its Office to its present location;

9. That on March 8, 1993, this Court received a copy of a Decision of the Supreme Court reversing the earlier
ruling of the Court of Appeals;

10. That it was at this time that the first volume of this case, which was bundled along with other cases which
were decided and/or archived, was reported as missing;

11. That from the time the same was found to be missing, Judge Claravall ordered that a search for the same be
made in all of the offices wherein this branch was forced to share a room with, as well as the Court of Appeals, in
the event that the same was transmitted to said Court;

12. That all the efforts were in vain, as said record could not be located anywhere;

13. That the undersigned now concludes that the first volume of the above-entitled case was probably lost during
the renovation of the Justice Hall Building, and will have to be reconstituted with the use of documents in the
possession of the parties, or documents entered as exhibits in other Courts.14

In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of Records15 of the case. Initially, petitioner Valente,
and the other defendants -- Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion -- opposed the motion.16 However, the trial court
eventually granted the motion for reconstitution, and ordered petitioner Valente and the other defendants to submit a copy
of their Answer filed thereat and copies of other pleadings pertinent to the case.17

Thereafter, three (3) incidents, among numerous others, set off by the parties' pleadings, are worth mentioning, to wit:

1. A Motion for Leave to File and Admit Supplemental Complaint18 filed by herein respondents. The Supplemental
Complaint additionally prayed that the levy and sale at public auction of the subject properties be annulled and set aside,
as the bid price was unconscionable and grossly inadequate to the current value of the subject properties. The
Supplemental Complaint further sought a re-bidding with respect to Teofista's share in the subject properties. Finally, it
prayed that TCT No. 6509 in the name of petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion be cancelled and
TCT No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo Suarez, married to Teofista Isagon, be reinstated.
2. A Manifestation and Motion (to Execute/Enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court)19 filed by
herein respondents pointing out that the Supreme Court itself had noted the current increased value of the subject
properties and that petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion unjustly enriched themselves in
appropriating the subject properties worth millions then, for a measly bid price of P94,170.00, for a judgment obligation
worth only P70,000.00.

3. An Urgent Motion [to direct compliance by plaintiffs (herein respondents) with Supreme Court Decision or to consider
the matter submitted without evidence on the part of plaintiffs]20 filed by therein defendants, including herein petitioner
Valente, pointing out that plaintiffs (herein respondents) have yet to comply with the RTC, Branch 67 Order commanding
them to submit (to the RTC) any evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo Suarez, in order for
the court to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista. The Urgent Motion stated in paragraph 2, thus:

2. The defendants [including herein petitioner Valente] did everything possible to expedite the disposition of this
case while the plaintiffs [herein respondents] did everything possible to DELAY the disposition of the same
obviously because the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are in full possession and enjoyment of the property in
dispute. In its decision of September 4, 1992, the SUPREME COURT nullified TWO final and executory
DECISIONS of the Court of Appeals in an unprecedented action. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] to establish with evidence their personality as heirs of Marcelo Suarez, and after
being able to do so, to adduce evidence that would determine what portion belongs to plaintiffs hence the above
matters need be litigated upon before the RTC can "annul the sale with regard to said portion" (belonging to the
plaintiffs alleged heirs).

On these incidents, the records reveal the following Orders issued by the different branches of the RTC:

1. Order dated March 17, 1995, issued by Presiding Judge Rodrigo B. Lorenzo of Branch 266, Pasig City, admitting
herein respondents' Supplemental Complaint.21

2. Order dated January 22, 1996, issued by Judge Apolinario B. Santos resolving: (a) herein respondents' Manifestation
and Motion (to execute/enforce Decision dated September 4, 1992 of the Supreme Court), and (b) therein defendants'
(including herein petitioner Valente's) Request for Answer to Written Interrogatories.22 The RTC, Branch 67, resolved the
incidents, thus:

From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, this Court is convinced beyond a shadow of doubt that the Decision of
the Supreme Court of September 4, 1992, being the final arbiter in any judicial dispute, should be implemented for
the following reasons:

xxxx

On the request for Answers to Written Interrogatories filed by the defendants, it is obvious that at this stage of the
proceedings where the Supreme Court had already pronounced the undisputed facts, which binds this court, the
answer sought to be elicited through written interrogatories, therefore, are entirely irrelevant, aside from having
been filed way out of time.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court, implements the decision of the Supreme Court dated September
4, 1992 which mandates that:

"xxx and Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioner and
to annul the sale with regard to said portion."

In order to enforce such mandate of the Supreme Court, this court orders that:

a. The auction sale of the five (5) parcels of land and all prior and subsequent proceedings in relation
thereto are declared null and void.

b. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6509 in the name of defendant Valente Raymundo is also declared null
and void, and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig City, is ordered to issue a new one in the name of the
deceased Marcelo Suarez or to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30680 in the name of Marcelo
Suarez.
 c. Teofista Suarez is ordered to reimburse the amount of P94,170.00, plus legal interest from the date of
issuance of this order, and failing which, the portion of the estate of Marcelo Suarez belonging to the
surviving spouse, Teofista Suarez, may be levied on execution.

d. [Herein respondents], including Teofista Suarez, are hereby ordered to submit to this court any
evidence showing settlement of the estate of the deceased, Marcelo Suarez, in order for this court to
determine the portion in the estate which belongs to Teofista Suarez.

Therein defendants, including petitioner Valente, filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the trial court denied on May
29, 1996.

3. Order dated September 10, 1996, issued by Judge Santos denying the appeal interposed by petitioner Valente from the
January 22, 1996 and May 29, 1996 Orders, ruling that these are interlocutory orders, and, therefore, not appealable.23

4. Order dated April 8, 1999, issued by Pairing Judge Santiago Estrella which declared, thus:

Considering that counsel for the plaintiffs does not have the birth certificates of the heirs of the plaintiff to prove their
affiliation with the deceased which is one of the matters written in the decision of the higher court which must be complied
with, and in order for counsel for the plaintiffs [herein respondents] to have the opportunity to complete all documentary
evidence and in view of abbreviating the proceedings and as prayed for, today's scheduled pre-trial is re-set for the last
time to May 19, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.

In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs [herein respondents] is advised to secure all the documentary evidence
she needs material to this case which will expedite the disposition of this case.24

This last Order and therein defendants' Urgent Motion spawned another contentious issue between the parties. In this
connection, Judge Estrella issued an Order25 requiring the parties to file their respective position papers due to the
"divergent views on the nature of the hearing that should be conducted in compliance with" our decision in Suarez. Both
parties duly filed their position papers, with herein respondents attaching thereto a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate executed by the heirs of Marcelo Suarez in 1957.

In resolving this latest crossfire between the parties, the RTC, Branch 67, issued an Order dated January 11, 2000, which
reads, in part:

This Court is of the view that the Honorable Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, precisely it directed that the
records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

xxxx

It is a matter of record that there was no trial on the merits completed in the Regional Trial Court. xxx The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered the reinstatement of Civil Case No.
51203. Naturally, there was no trial on the merits before this Court that allowed the parties to adduce evidence to
establish their respective claims in the plaintiffs' [herein respondents] complaint and in the defendants' [including
petitioner Valente] counter-claim, respectively. It is in this context that the Honorable Supreme Court reinstated
the "action [of herein respondents] to annul the auction sale to protect their [herein respondents] own interest.

While this Court is of the view that trial on the merits is necessary for the purpose of giving the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] a chance to adduce evidence to sustain their complaint and the defendants [including petitioner
Valente] to prove their defense, consistent with the directive of the Honorable Supreme Court (in its Decision
promulgated on September 4, 1992), the Court is, however, confronted with the very recent decision of the
Honorable Supreme Court in "Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2,
1999" where it held that -

The declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solve vs. Court of Appeals (182 SCRA 119, 128). The trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to
 establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment
of a status or right.

In as much as the leading case on the matter is that of "Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320,
March 2, 1999" it is left with no choice but to obey said latter doctrine.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, this Court holds that in the light of the doctrine laid down in
the case of "Heirs of Yaptinchay vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999" this case is dismissed without
prejudice to the plaintiffs' [herein respondents'] filing a special proceeding consistent with said latest ruling.26

Herein respondents moved for reconsideration thereof which, however, was denied by the RTC, Branch 67 on March 14,
2000.27

Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the trial
court's order dismissing Civil Case No. 51203 without prejudice. All the defendants in the trial court were impleaded as
private respondents in the petition. Yet, curiously, only petitioner Valente filed a Comment thereto. The appellate court
granted the petition, recalled and set aside RTC, Branch 67's Orders dated January 11, 2000 and March 14, 2000, and
reinstated Judge Santos' Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996. It disposed of the petition, thus:

We agree with [herein respondents].

On September 4, 1992, the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 94918) reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
mandates that Civil Case No. 51203 be reinstated in order to determine the portion in the estate which belongs to
Teofista Suarez. The sale of the parcels of land was declared null and void. Necessarily, the title (TCT No. 5809)
in the name of respondents was also declared null and void. xxx

xxxx

Hon. Apolinario Santos of Br. 67, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, on January 22, 1996 and on motion of [herein
respondents], issued an order to execute/enforce the decision of the Supreme Court xxx.

xxxx

[Petitioner Valente, Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion] filed a notice of appeal on the order of Judge Santos.
The appeal, on motion of [herein respondents] was denied on September 10, 1996. Obviously, the decision of the
Supreme Court had become final and executory. Likewise, both orders of Judge Santos dated May 29, 1996
denying the motion for reconsideration and the denial of the notice of appeal dated September 6, 1996 had also
become final and executory.

The denial of petitioner Valente's Motion for Reconsideration prompted the filing of this present petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Valente posits that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in recalling and setting aside the
Orders of Judge Estrella and reinstating those of Judge Santos because:

1. The CA ruled that the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos were final
and executory, and yet the latter did not allow an appeal to be taken therefrom ratiocinating that the questioned
orders were interlocutory, and therefore, not appealable; and

2. The CA ignored and violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario28 which held that
a declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding and not in a civil action.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

At the outset, we note that petitioner Valente incorrectly filed a petition for certiorari to appeal the CA decision. Petitioner
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Simply imputing in a petition that
the decision sought to be reviewed is tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not magically transform a petition into a
special civil action for certiorari. The CA decision disposed of the merits of a special civil action, an original petition, filed
thereat by herein respondents. That disposition is a final and executory order, appealable to, and may be questioned
before, this Court by persons aggrieved thereby, such as petitioner Valente, via Rule 45.

On this score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright. However, we have disregarded this procedural flaw
and now resolve this case based on the merits or lack thereof.

Petitioner asseverates that the assailed CA ruling "is unfair and it amounts to a trickery to prevent an appeal against a
final order by claiming that the appealed order is merely interlocutory and later maintain that the same order has become
final after declaring it to be interlocutory."

We reject petitioner's paltry contention. Petitioner apparently does not comprehend the distinction between an
interlocutory order which is final and executory, and a final order which disposes of the controversy or case; much less,
understand the available remedies therefrom.

We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and the end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.29 It does not terminate or
finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits.30Upon the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve
the case.31

On more than one occasion, we laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final i.e., "Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it
is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.32 The
Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos are interlocutory, and therefore, not
appealable, as they leave something more to be done on the merits of the case. In fact, in paragraph (d) of Judge Santos'
Order dated May 29, 1996, herein respondents were directed to submit evidence showing settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo Sr.

Contrary to petitioner Valente's stance, there is no trickery or chicanery in the CA's distinction between an interlocutory
and a final order. Indeed, as ruled by the CA, the RTC Order denying petitioner Valente's Notice of Appeal attained finality
when he failed to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

We cannot overemphasize the rule that the correct identification of the nature of an assailed order determines the
remedies available to an aggrieved party. The old Rules of Court in Section 2, Rule 41 reads, thus:

SEC. 2. Judgments or orders subject to appeal.-Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal. No
interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of
appeal until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

xxxx

With the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1, Rule 41 now provides for the appropriate remedy to be
taken from an interlocutory order, thus:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes
of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the denial of therein defendants' (including petitioner Valente's) appeal from the Orders dated May 29, 1996 and
September 6, 1996 was in order. Thus, the CA decision affirming the RTC's denial was correct.

Further, on this crucial distinction as applied to this case, petitioner Valente filed a petition for certiorari from the CA
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58090, which is not an interlocutory order. It is a final order which completely disposed of the
merits of the case with nothing more left to be done therein. The correct and available remedy available to petitioner
Valente was, as previously discussed, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In fine, petitioner Valente erroneously sought relief through reversed remedies. He tried to appeal the interlocutory orders
of the RTC which are unappealable. Thus, the RTC properly denied his Notice of Appeal, and the CA correctly upheld the
RTC. He should have filed a petition for certiorari; under Rule 65. On the other hand, from the final order of the CA, he
comes before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper remedy is an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45.

In the recent case of Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals33 we ruled in this wise:

As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules.

Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to the Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. It seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by
the court, tribunal, or officer. In contrast, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action
based on the specific grounds therein provided and proper only if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.

Independently of this procedural infirmity, even on the merits of the case, the petition does not fare otherwise. It must be
dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario,34 herein respondents must first be
declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal
property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.

We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.

Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista ― and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs ― has been
firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.35 True, this Court is not a trier of facts,36 but
as the final arbiter of disputes,37 we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased
father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to
the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that
our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is
wrong.

As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, "Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion
which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to said portion." There is clearly no intimation in
our decision for the RTC to have to determine an already settled issue i.e., herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo
Sr.

Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of
Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The
following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.'s and Teofista's paternity of herein respondents, and the latter's status as
legitimate children:

1. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein respondents, questioned the
RTC, Branch 151's Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986. Although the CA ruled against Teofista and
herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter's status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and38
2. The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were, as children of
Teofista, merely successors-in-interest of the latter to the property and by virtue thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res judicata.39 We subsequently reversed this ruling on the
wrong application of res judicata in the conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the CA's factual
finding of herein respondents' status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that "the proprietary interest of
[herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein
respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of [Teofista] but through their own right as children of their
deceased father [, Marcelo Sr.]."

Clearly, herein respondents' long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot be indirectly
or directly attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.

Articles 262,40 263,41 265 and 26642 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo's death, support the
foregoing conclusion, to wit:

Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the same;

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of
birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.

If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two
years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the
fraud.

Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure
of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the
deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and
heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties,
and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-
declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably.

Petitioner Valente, along with Violeta, Virginia and Maria Concepcion, became owners of the subject properties only by
virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofista's judgment obligation. This judgment obligation is solely Teofista's, and
payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not absolutely owned by her. These properties
were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus,
upon Marcelo Sr.'s death, by virtue of compulsory succession, Marcelo Sr.'s share in the conjugal partnership was
transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.

Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 77843 of the Civil Code. It
reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination of heirs,
prevailing over all kinds of succession.44 The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil Code
defines legitime as "that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Herein respondents are primary compulsory heirs,45 excluding
secondary compulsory heirs,46 and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the decedent's
estate.47
Even without delving into the Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate in 1957, it must be stressed that herein
respondents' rights to the succession vested from the moment of their father's death.48 Herein respondents' ownership of
the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelo's death, although their respective shares
therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties were sold on execution sale to answer for
Teofista's judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents' share therein was null and void.

In fine, Teofista's ownership over the subject properties is not absolute. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even
attempt to dispute the conjugal nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject
properties, only that portion could have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of
Rizal. Thus, a separate declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their
share in the subject properties.

We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,49 where we scrutinized our rulings in Heirs of Yaptinchay and the
cited cases of Litam v. Rivera50 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,51 and Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga52 cited in Solivio.
We ruled thus:

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then
the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.
Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a
putative heirs has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring
about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the
estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies
leaving property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he
failed to name an executor therein.

xxx

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceedings. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case-subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could
be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners xxx.53

All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.,
there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special
proceeding for a declaration of their heirship.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
58090 is AFFIRMED. The Orders dated May 29, 1996 and September 6, 1996 issued by Judge Santos
are REINSTATED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F.
LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing her complaint
for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which
her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three
sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his
daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the following: 1äwphï1.ñët

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of P3,699.63.

(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in certain shares of the
San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance
Company and the Manila Times.

(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512
of the Manila registry of deeds.

1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205, 48203, 48206, 48160
and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;

1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now Quezon City;
1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila registry of
deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of
the Manila registry of deeds;

1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets);

l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of deeds (Streets
and Estero):

2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded
her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

A mis hijos :

Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que he heredado
de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a
los hermanos Values Legarda.

De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a las Hijas de
Jesus, en Guipit

La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta construida sobre
terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1äwphï1.ñët

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953

During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of
their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the order dated July
16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda.
de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R,
July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's
three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said
properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to
the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).

As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 she
contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the properties in question as
reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower court erred in not
holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and
hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived
her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for review is a
closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due
course to the petition for review.

In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since on the basis of
the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question are subject to reserva
troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot be resolved in
this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly
article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to
the exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees
within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to
the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved in Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserve
troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a
certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover,
the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve troncal, a legal
institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to
resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which reads: 1äwphï1.ñët

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese adquirido por titulo
lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido
por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said
descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant
or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant
(6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the
exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811
(Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3)
the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4)
the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives are not included
(Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extrañas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un
azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan
Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two
parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso,
inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system
in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her,
should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Mañalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her
father, Anacleto Mañalac who owned the other one-half portion.

Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the said one-half
portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Mañalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona
Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana Mañalac, who belonged to the line from which
said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Mañalac 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs.
Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58
Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva.
44 Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her
estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable property. Upon the death of
Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative
within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion
and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the
survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition that such
title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property.
He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279.)

The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to a fideicomiso
conditional.

The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no
reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if
he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor predecease the reserves.

The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable character of
the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3;
Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract
regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1äwphï1.ñët

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus) said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservists, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)

Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can
already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their
reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of
property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista
lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not
dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226,
237).

The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant (prepositus) of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
(Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by
J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will
or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in
the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res
judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate
(Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not
from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to
whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees
in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article
891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case,
where it was ruled: 1äwphï1.ñët

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant (reservista) together with
his own property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir
receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right
of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).

ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the
deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of their share in the reservable
properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio
II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in Severina's will in favor
of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and could not be
inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties. The other six
sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.

Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of
the Florentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death there are
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its reservable character. The property
should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the
reservable property should be awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are
the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant
and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her
sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason
for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of
life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her
daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of
the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does
not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest
relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not pass into the
hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and
there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question
even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from the prepositus, of
whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs.
Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of third-degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family,
"except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should
be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l,
4).

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the properties inherited by
Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are
reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y
Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively,
should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved.
Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they had a
son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro
also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration
of her ownership.

Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan — that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan — appeared in the case to
oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right
reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)

The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.

Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property
required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land which
are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved — a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had
acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired
them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him
in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title], and it
is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he
receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood
relationship.

The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the
property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration — that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired
them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by operation of
law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to
reserved.

The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly, the
allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents
speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed
and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two parcels of
land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without
any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his
heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to the
exclusion of collaterals.

The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her
possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any
transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is
that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the
predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore
been fully complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be
required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate
ascendant.

The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the children
and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established
in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)

In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what by
operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be
reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.

No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her inheritance
through the free disposal of her son.

Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro
Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also
presumed to be acquired by operation of law — that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not
by operation of law.

Nor is the third assignments of error admissible — that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right required
by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case.
The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:

The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that those rice
lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).

The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the lands
belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to
be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must
be delivered to her.

The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges prescription
of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in the property
registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such
obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first
instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right
required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to
the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a
period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry;
but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has
prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of action for
guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).

The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the mortgage
imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that
right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to be
reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in
December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893;
that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of
property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the
positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it
has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting
the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding
the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the
right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the
mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth
allegations.)

The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable, even
though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such
right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error,
that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the
Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in
Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of place here.

The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first
enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:

The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968 thereof,
where it says:

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be obliged to
set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have
required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable
consideration."

The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not contain
any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the
Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the
children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the
supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:

That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be
reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not
thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which
is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that
said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and
because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be reserved,
makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the
law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already declared,
the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to which said
articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of
the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."

From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right
required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the
ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to
the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such
right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the
assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.

But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a principle
of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of
assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is
an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by
the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the
person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must
be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right
reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with
respect to the father.

In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said article 168
reads as thus:

Legal mortgage is established:

1. . . .

2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be reserved,
upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for the right
of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to
be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action
has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of
action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the
reservation.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the
foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199,
to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."

Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the
proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of
the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the
interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal
representatives."

Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right must
be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the
law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in
the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an
allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the property be
reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place,
because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act
No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to
intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right
reserved in either parcel of land.

Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its
decision:

Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the deceased
Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)

It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person who
has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the
right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title.
The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and
then he is said not to have the fee simple — that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who,
after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.

The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:

What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil
Code?

There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in whose
favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but
the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible,
although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior
to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.

Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points — the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining
features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis which
only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other
persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)

In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained — that is, that the surviving
spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the
descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong
to him exclusively — use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary
title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or
they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that absolute ownership
would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that
the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the
condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any
support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of
the father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes
two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in
article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the
hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no
way perform any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the
form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the
property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can
dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first
marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is required to
be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the
property itself:

Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse after contracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.

It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit: "If at
his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."

If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily be null
and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says
that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
Article 109 of this Law says:

The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate it,
provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that
right in the registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot impugn
the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who
must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all
the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they
survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the
alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the
right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a
condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances.
This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs
that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first
marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make the reservation.

Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the
existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:

During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the
extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has
been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to
their heirs.

The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in the
manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.

But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the property, he
can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but
the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are
applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator
on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved in article 811
than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries
with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with
article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:

The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the time
of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the
property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If
they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law
to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can give what does not belong
to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree
 will in their turn have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to
reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and
they will complete ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the
death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)

The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition
subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses
or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even
though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because
they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when
the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then
will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to
say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any
of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the registry, dare to
dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was
definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might
pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right
required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the
person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute should that person die."

Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law
to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the
rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it
seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the
object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would
otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere usufructuary,
the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property
the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in
question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the
usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property required
by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all
the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as to whether or not she
transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two
heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.

If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use, enjoy,
dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it,
although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:

Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to his
right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor
the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be
recorded, as the law provides?

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:

The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title,
however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed — that the alienation the purchaser
may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:

Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold, with the
obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing
sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a
point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged —
that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the
thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a
fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose
favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not
applying to the person who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is entitled to
register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording in the
registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.

G.R. No. 169454 December 27, 2007

THE HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO, NAMELY: REGINA AND FLORA, BOTH SURNAMED DORONIO,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO, NAMELY: TRINIDAD ROSALINA DORONIO-BALMES, MODING DORONIO,
FLORENTINA DORONIO, AND ANICETA ALCANTARA-MANALO, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, in an action for reconveyance and damages. The CA declared
respondents as rightful owners of one-half of the subject property and directed petitioners to execute a registerable
document conveying the same to respondents.

The Facts

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a parcel of land located
at Barangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352.3 The courts below
described it as follows:

Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con
el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el
NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados.4

The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and
Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are
the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias5 was executed by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter’s wife, Veronica Pico. One of the properties subject of said deed of
donation is the one that it described as follows:

Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on
the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west
by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value …200.00.6
It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a
significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT
No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the
owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as
it was never notarized.7

Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades8 although they have different theories regarding its
present ownership. According to petitioners, they are now the owners of the entire property in view of the private deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation
because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent
property at the eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato
Doronio of the eastern half of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by their
predecessor, Fortunato Doronio.

Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed, on January 11, 1993, before
the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"9 docketed as Petition
Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the said petition10 although notices of hearing were posted on the
bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen.11

During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the petition.12 After the RTC ordered a general default,13 the
petition was eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of
OCT No. 352 and issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and
Veronica Pico.14 Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners’ predecessors.

On April 28, 1994, the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a petition in the same
Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered the registration
of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the
registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on
May 13, 1994 on the ground that the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was not
appealed.

Determined to remain in their possessed property, respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action for
reconveyance and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction15 against petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (as
defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. Respondents contended, among others,
that the subject land is different from what was donated as the descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352 and under
the private deed of donation were different. They posited that spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante intended to
donate only one-half of the property.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated, among others, that the property was originally covered by OCT No.
352 which was cancelled by TCT No. 44481. They also agreed that the issues are: (1) whether or not there was a
variation in the description of the property subject of the private deed of donation and OCT No. 352; (2) whether or not
respondents had acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by acquisitive prescription; (3) whether or not
the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the registration of the private deed of donation
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid; (4) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages; and
(5) whether or not TCT No. 44481 is valid.16

RTC Decision

After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the
parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;17 that a title once registered under the torrens system
cannot be defeated by adverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription;18 that the deed of donation in
consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481
in the names of said parents;19 and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as
they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the property they are claiming.20

The RTC disposed of the case, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING the herein Complaint filed by
plaintiffs against defendants.21

Disagreeing with the judgment of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. They argued that the trial court erred in not
finding that respondents’ predecessor-in-interest acquired one-half of the property covered by OCT No. 352 by tradition
and/or intestate succession; that the deed of donation dated April 26, 1919 was null and void; that assuming that the deed
of donation was valid, only one-half of the property was actually donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico; and
that respondents acquired ownership of the other half portion of the property by acquisitive prescription.22

CA Disposition

In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated June 28, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Declaring the appellants as
rightful owners of one-half of the property now covered by TCT No. 44481, the appellees are hereby directed to execute a
registerable document conveying the same to appellants.

SO ORDERED.23

The appellate court determined that "(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees’ predecessors can
be gleaned from the disparity of technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio
and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees’
predecessors."24

The CA based its conclusion on the disparity of the following technical descriptions of the property under OCT No. 352
and the deed of donation, to wit:

The court below described the property covered by OCT No. 352 as follows:

"Un terreno (Lote 1018), situada en el municipio de Asingan, Linda por el NE; con propriedad de Gabriel Bernardino; con
el SE con propriedad de Zacarias Najorda y Alejandro Najorda; por el SO con propriedad de Geminiano Mendoza y por el
NO con el camino para Villasis; midiendo una extension superficial mil ciento cincuenta y dos metros cuadrados."

On the other hand, the property donated to appellees’ predecessors was described in the deed of donation as:

"Fourth – A piece of residential land located in the barrio of Cabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded on
the north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by Fortunato Doronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the west
by a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house of light materials – also a part of the dowry. Value
…200.00."25 (Emphasis ours)

Taking note "that the boundaries of the lot donated to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico differ from the boundaries of
the land owned by spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante," the CA concluded that spouses Simeon Doronio and
Cornelia Gante donated only half of the property covered by OCT No. 352.26

Regarding the allegation of petitioners that OCT No. 352 is inadmissible in evidence, the CA pointed out that, "while the
OCT is written in the Spanish language, this document already forms part of the records of this case for failure of
appellees to interpose a timely objection when it was offered as evidence in the proceedings a quo. It is a well-settled rule
that any objection to the admissibility of such evidence not raised will be considered waived and said evidence will have to
form part of the records of the case as competent and admitted evidence."27

The CA likewise ruled that the donation of the entire property in favor of petitioners’ predecessors is invalid on the ground
that it impairs the legitime of respondents’ predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. On this aspect, the CA reasoned out:

Moreover, We find the donation of the entire property in favor of appellees’ predecessors invalid as it impairs the legitime
of appellants’ predecessor. Article 961 of the Civil Code is explicit. "In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the
inheritance, x x x, in the legitimate x x x relatives of the deceased, x x x." As Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia
Gante died intestate, their property shall pass to their lawful heirs, namely: Fortunato and Marcelino Doronio. Donating the
entire property to Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico and excluding another heir, Fortunato, tantamounts to divesting
the latter of his rightful share in his parents’ inheritance. Besides, a person’s prerogative to make donations is subject to
certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than what he can give by will (Article 752, Civil
Code). If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation
is reducible to the extent of such excess.28

Petitioners were not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition under Rule 45.

Issues

Petitioners now contend that the CA erred in:

1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF
TRANSLATION THEREOF.

2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS.

3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND
THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.29

Our Ruling

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not

Translated into English or Filipino Is
Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection

Petitioners fault the CA for admitting OCT No. 352 in evidence on the ground that it is written in Spanish language. They
posit that "(d)ocumentary evidence in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with
a translation into English or Filipino."30

The argument is untenable. The requirement that documents written in an unofficial language must be accompanied with
a translation in English or Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be insisted upon by the parties at
the trial to enable the court, where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide the issue.31Where such
document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either
by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in which the document is written is understood by all,
and the document is admissible in evidence.32

Moreover, Section 36, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides:

SECTION 36. Objection. – Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.

Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.

An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is
allowed by the court.

In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (Emphasis ours)

Since petitioners did not object to the offer of said documentary evidence on time, it is now too late in the day for them to
question its admissibility. The rule is that evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be validly considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment.33 This is true even if by its nature, the evidence is inadmissible and would have
surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.34

As a matter of fact, instead of objecting, petitioners admitted the contents of Exhibit "A," that is, OCT No. 352 in their
comment35 on respondents’ formal offer of documentary evidence. In the said comment, petitioners alleged, among
others, that "Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and G, are admitted but not for the purpose they are offered because these exhibits
being public and official documents are the best evidence of that they contain and not for what a party would like it to
prove."36 Said evidence was admitted by the RTC.37 Once admitted without objection, even though not admissible under
an objection, We are not inclined now to reject it.38 Consequently, the evidence that was not objected to became property
of the case, and all parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the
said evidence.39

Issues on Impairment of Legitime

Should Be Threshed Out in a Special
Proceeding, Not in Civil Action for
Reconveyance and Damages

On the other hand, petitioners are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the impairment of legitime of Fortunato
Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It
may not be passed upon in an action for reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction, is the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of estate.40

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding.
Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.41

As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:42

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

x x x a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific
rules prescribed for a special civil action.

xxxx

c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special
mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings."

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano
Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

We likewise find merit in petitioners’ contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.43 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his
death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of
the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.44

Declaration of Validity of Donation

Can Be Challenged by an Interested
Party Not Impleaded in Petition for
Quieting of Title or Declaratory Relief
or Where There is No Res Judicata.
Moreover, This Court Can Consider
a Factual Matter or Unassigned Error
in the Interest of Substantial Justice.

Nevertheless, petitioners cannot preclude the determination of validity of the deed of donation on the ground that (1) it has
been impliedly admitted by respondents; (2) it has already been determined with finality by the RTC in Petition Case No.
U-920; or (3) the only issue in an action for reconveyance is who has a better right over the land.45

The validity of the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners’ predecessors was one of the issues in
this case before the lower courts. The pre-trial order46 of the RTC stated that one of the issues before it is "(w)hether or
not the transfer of the whole property covered by OCT No. 352 on the basis of the private deed of donation
notwithstanding the discrepancy in the description is valid." Before the CA, one of the errors assigned by respondents is
that "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE DEED OF DONATION DATED APRIL 26,
1919 WAS NULL AND VOID."47

The issue of the validity of donation is likewise brought to Us by petitioners as they stated in their Memorandum48that one
of the issues to be resolved is regarding the alleged fact that "THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THE DONATION INVALID." We are thus poised to inspect the deed of donation and to determine its validity.

We cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that respondents may no longer question the validity of the deed of donation
on the ground that they already impliedly admitted it. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent
from the beginning. The right to set up the defense of its illegality cannot be waived.49 The right to set up the nullity of a
void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties as in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to
third persons who are directly affected by the contract.50

Consequently, although respondents are not parties in the deed of donation, they can set up its nullity because they are
directly affected by the same.51 The subject of the deed being the land they are occupying, its enforcement will definitely
affect them.

Petitioners cannot also use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-92052 as a shield against the verification
of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is one for quieting of title.53 In other
words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or
whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this rule.

SECTION 2. Parties. – All persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the
declaration; and no declaration shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the action. (Emphasis ours)

However, respondents were not made parties in the said Petition Case No. U-920.1âwphi1 Worse, instead of issuing
summons to interested parties, the RTC merely allowed the posting of notices on the bulletin boards of Barangay
Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan. As pointed out by the CA, citing the ruling of the RTC:

x x x In the said case or Petition No. U-920, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of barangay Cabalitaan,
Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen, Pangasinan, so that there was a notice to the whole world and during the initial
hearing and/or hearings, no one interposed objection thereto.54

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the
person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem.55 The judgment in such proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties.56 Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as
they were not made parties in the said case.

The rules on quieting of title57 expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who
are not parties to the action.

That respondents filed a subsequent pleading58 in the same Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become
final did not change the fact that said decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent
pleading was dismissed on the ground of finality of the decision.59

Thus, the RTC totally failed to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be bound by its orders.
Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.60

Moreover, for the principle of res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and
causes of action.61 The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because respondents were
not impleaded in Petition Case No. U-920. While the subject matter may be the same property covered by OCT No. 352,
the causes of action are different. Petition Case No. U-920 is an action for declaratory relief while the case below is for
recovery of property.

We are not persuaded by petitioners’ posture that the only issue in this action for reconveyance is who has a better right
over the land; and that the validity of the deed of donation is beside the point.62 It is precisely the validity and enforceability
of the deed of donation that is the determining factor in resolving the issue of who has a better right over the property.
Moreover, notwithstanding procedural lapses as to the appropriateness of the remedies prayed for in the petition filed
before Us, this Court can brush aside the technicalities in the interest of justice. In some instances, this Court even
suspended its own rules and excepted a case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
demanded.63

Moreover, although respondents did not directly raise the issue of validity of the deed of donation at the commencement
of the case before the trial court, it was stipulated64 by the parties during the pre-trial conference. In any event, this Court
has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at a just decision of a case before it.65 Though not
specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice
to be rendered.66

Furthermore, this Court has held that although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. The Supreme Court is clothed
with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision.67

A rudimentary doctrine on appealed cases is that this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary at arriving at a just decision of the
case.68 Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of the
question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as an error.69

Donation Propter Nuptias of Real

Property Made in a Private Instrument
Before the New Civil Code Took Effect
on August 30, 1950 is Void

We now focus on the crux of the petition, which is the validity of the deed of donation.1avvphi1 It is settled that only laws
existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable to it and not the later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect.70 Accordingly, the Old Civil Code applies in this case as the donation
propter nuptias was executed in 1919, while the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.

Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated
must be specifically described.71 Article 1328 of the Old Civil Code provides that gifts propter nuptias are governed by the
rules established in Title 2 of Book 3 of the same Code. Article 633 of that title provides that the gift of real property, in
order to be valid, must appear in a public document.72 It is settled that a donation of real estate propter nuptias is void
unless made by public instrument.73

In the instant case, the donation propter nuptias did not become valid. Neither did it create any right because it was not
made in a public instrument.74 Hence, it conveyed no title to the land in question to petitioners’ predecessors.

Logically, then, the cancellation of OCT No. 352 and the issuance of a new TCT No. 44481 in favor of petitioners’
predecessors have no legal basis. The title to the subject property should, therefore, be restored to its original owners
under OCT No. 352.

Direct reconveyance to any of the parties is not possible as it has not yet been determined in a proper proceeding who
among the heirs of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante is entitled to it. It is still unproven whether or not the
parties are the only ones entitled to the properties of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. As earlier intimated,
there are still things to be done before the legal share of all the heirs can be properly adjudicated.75

Titled Property Cannot Be Acquired

By Another By Adverse Possession
or Extinctive Prescription

Likewise, the claim of respondents that they became owners of the property by acquisitive prescription has no merit. Truth
to tell, respondents cannot successfully invoke the argument of extinctive prescription. They cannot be deemed the
owners by acquisitive prescription of the portion of the property they have been possessing. The reason is that the
property was covered by OCT No. 352. A title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated even by
adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated by prescription.76 It is notice to the whole world and as
such all persons are bound by it and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.77

The torrens system is intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but it cannot
be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land.78 The system merely confirms
ownership and does not create it. Certainly, it cannot be used to divest the lawful owner of his title for the purpose of
transferring it to another who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. It cannot be used to
protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit
one to enrich himself at the expense of another.79 Where such an illegal transfer is made, as in the case at bar, the law
presumes that no registration has been made and so retains title in the real owner of the land.80

Although We confirm here the invalidity of the deed of donation and of its resulting TCT No. 44481, the controversy
between the parties is yet to be fully settled. The issues as to who truly are the present owners of the property and what is
the extent of their ownership remain unresolved. The same may be properly threshed out in the settlement of the estates
of the registered owners of the property, namely: spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:

(1) Declaring the private deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of petitioners’ predecessors NULL AND VOID;
and

(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to:

(a) CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico;
and

(b) RESTORE Original Certificate of Title No. 352 in the names of its original owners, spouses Simeon
Doronio and Cornelia Gante.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986

PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS
FOUNDATION, INC., private respondent-appellee.

Abraham D. Caña for petitioner-appellant.

Jose R. Edis for private respondent-appellee.

NARVASA, J.:

Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donation inter vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and
should be reduced at the instance of the donor's widow.

Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless, leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only
surviving compulsory heir. He also left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on September 30, 1980
in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will
were lots Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his death,
these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the Tupas
Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.

Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas
Foundation, Inc. in the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil Case No. 16089) to have the
donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such proportion as
... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her. The
complaint also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as might be proper.

The Trial Court did not see things her way. Upon the facts above stated, on which the parties stipulated, 1 said Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, rejecting her claim on several grounds, viz.:

... (1) Article 900 relied upon by plaintiff is not applicable because the properties which were disposed of
by way of donation one year before the death of Epifanio Tupas were no longer part of his hereditary
estate at the time of his death on August 20, 1978; (2) the donation properties were Epifanio's capital or
separate estate; and (3) Tupas Foundation, Inc. being a stranger and not a compulsory heir, the
donation inter vivos made in its favor was not subject to collation under Art. 106 1, C.C.2

The Trial Court is in error on all counts and must be reversed.

A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations, one of which is that he cannot give by donation
more than he can give by will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is donated as exceeds what he can give
by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its
taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such
a donation is, moreover, collationable that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the donor at the tune of his
death for the purpose of determining the legitime of the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the
estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061
of the Civil Code would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has been held to be a long-
established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 4 where this Court said:

... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in
excess of the portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as provided in
Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts
made not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers, as decided by the
Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in computing the
legitimes, the value of the property donated to herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered
part of the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the requisite data to determine whether
the donation is inofficious or not. 5

The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his
death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation
contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. 6 The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or
separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave
what was not his, but that he gave more than what was within his power to give.

Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is,
by law 7 chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious, i.e., it
exceeds said portion and thus impairs the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in order to find out whether it is inofficious or
not, recourse must be had to the rules established by the Civil Code for the determination of the legitime and, by
extension, of the disposable portion. These rules are set forth in Articles 908, 909 and 910 of the Code, on the basis of
which the following step-by-step procedure has been correctly outlined:

(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death;

(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted from the
value of the property thus left;

(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the hereditary
estate;

(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of donations subject
to collation; and

(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total thus found the portion that
the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.8

Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely disposable portion by which the
donation in question here must be measured. If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that
difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be
reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.

For obvious reasons, this determination cannot now be made, as it requires appreciation of data not before this Court and
may necessitate the production of evidence in the Court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and petitioner-appellant Partenza Lucerna Vda. de Tupas is adjudged
entitled to so much of the donated property in question, as may be found in excess of the freely disposable portion of the
estate of Epifanio B. Tupas, determined in the manner above-indicated. Let the case be remanded to the Trial Court for
further appropriate proceedings in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.