1. Rodriguez v. People, October 24, 2012 trial court.

trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file
2. San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders v. Bayang, April 20, 2015 his or her notice of appeal.
3. Cabrera v. Ng, March 12, 2014
4. Negros Slashers, INc., v. Alvarez, et al., February 22, 2012
5. Cebu Bionic Builders Supply v. DBP, November 17, 2010 Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be
6. GSIS v Heirs Caballero, October 4, 2010 accorded the same statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day period within
7. Concorde Condominium v. Baculio (February 17, 2016, G.R. No. 203678 which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed
8. Rapid City Realty v. Villa, February 11, 2010
9. Boston Equity Resources v. CA Jun 19 2013 absurd and incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than those of civil
10. Ursua v. Republic, January 24, 2012 cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases under the spirit and rationale in Neypes greater leeway
11. City of Dumaguete v. PPA, August 24, 2011 in filing an appeal through the "fresh period rule," with more reason that it should equally grant the same to
12. Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction, November 27, 2013 criminal cases which involve the accused’s "sacrosanct right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution,
13. Lucia Barrameda v. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc, November 24, 2010
14. PAFIN v. EJI Yanagisawa April 11 2012 as no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
15. Dy v. Hon. Palamos and Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corp, September 11, 2013
16. Republic v. Batigue Point Development Corp, March 14, 201 SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. and OSCAR VIOLAGO, Petitioners,
17. Sps Genato v. Viola, February 5, 2010 VS. MA.CRISTINA F. BAYANG, RESPONDENT.
18. Tijam v.Sibonghanoy
19. Julian v. DPB December 7, 2011
20. FEDMAN Development Corp v. Agcaoili, August 31, 2011 The "fresh period rule"—which allows a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
21. Sun Insurance v. Judge Asuncion (Feb. 18, 1989 Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
22. Ayala Corporation v. Madayag reconsideration—applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.
23. Copioso v. Copioso [2002]
24. Magallanes v. Palmer Asia Inc., July 18, 2014
25. Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015 Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the
26. Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, December 2, 2013 appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP is administrative in nature; thus, the
27. Guy v. Guy, September 5, 2012 "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
28. Arcelona v. CA, Oct 2 1997
29. Go v. Distingction Properties Development, April 25, 2012
30. Ang v. Sps. Ang, August 22, 2012 CABRERA V. NG, MARCH 12, 2014
31. Algura vs. Local Government Unit of the City of Naga G.R. No. 150135, 30 October 2006
32. Complex v. Fil-Estate, march 5, 2012 The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the
33. Newsweek v. IAC, May 30, 1986 lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not
34. Napere v. Barbarona, January 31, 2008
35. Ang v. Sps. Ang, August 22, 2012
deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules
36. Emergency Loan pawnshop v. CA, Febraury 28, 2001 should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
37. Sps. Ochoa v. China Banking Corp March 23, 2011 disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment
38. Briones v. CA, January 14, 2015 of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to
39. Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, et al., April 19, 2010
40. Quintanilla v. CA, September 24, 1997 frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
41. Martos, et al., v New San Jose Builders, October 24, 2012
42. Congressman Lucy Torres v. Codilla, Jr., March 20, 2012 NEGROS SLASHERS, INC., RODOLFO C. ALVAREZ AND VICENTE TAN, Petitioners, vs. ALVIN L. TENG,
43. Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr., June 2, 2014 Respondent.
44. Orpiano v. Sps. Tomas, January 14, 2013
45. Jose v. Javellana, January 25, 2012
46. Mediserv v. CA, April 5, 2010 Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
47. Ledda v. BPI, November 21, 2012 duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In
48. Sps Fernando v. Alcazar, March 12, 2014 numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the
49. Casent Realty Corp v. Philbanking Corpo, September 14, 2007
demands of substantial justice and equity.
50. Republic v. Conjuanco, et al., April 12, 2011
51. Sun Insurance Corp v. CA
52. Do-All Metal Industries v. Security Bank, January 10, 2011 Indeed the prevailing trend is to accord party litigants the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
53. Rizal et al., v. naredo et al., March 14, 2012 determination of their causes, free from the constraints of needless technicalities.
54. Sablas v. Sablas, July 3, 2007
55. Magdiwang Realty et al., v. The Manila Banking Corp, September 5, 2012
56. Lim v. NPC, November 14, 2012 Here, besides the fact that a denial of the recourse to the CA would serve more to perpetuate an injustice and
57. Anama v. PSB, F.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012 violation of Teng’s rights under our labor laws, we find that as correctly held by the CA, no intent to delay the
58. Manila Electric Company v. La Compana Food Products, Inc, G.R. No. 97535 August 4, 1995 administration of justice could be attributed to Teng. The CA therefore did not commit reversible error in
59. Cabrera v. Ng, G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014 excusing Teng’s one-day delay in filing his motion for reconsideration and in giving due course to his petition
60. Campos Rueda Corp, v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-18453 September 29, 1962
61. Viason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 26 for certiorari.
62. Siasoco v. CA, GR. No. 132096, August 22, 2008
63. Tiu, et al v. Phil Bank Of Communication, August 19, 2009 CEBU BIONIC BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC. and LYDIA SIA, Petitioners, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
64. Lisam Enterprises, Inc. v BDO, G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012 PHILIPPINES, JOSE TO CHIP, PATRICIO YAP and ROGER BALILA, Respondents.
65. Heirs of Wenceslao Tabia v. CA
66. Javarata v. Koroles, June 2007
67. NPC V. JUDGE ADIONG, July 27, 2011 The rule on questions of law, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the
68. Basbas et al., v. Sayson et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011 Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As will be discussed further, this exception is attendant
69. Buncayao Sr., v. Fort Illocandia, April 19, 2010 in the case at bar.
70. MARINA v. Marc Properties, Feburay 15, 2012
71. Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, July 27, 2011
The failure of the petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the period fixed by law renders the
RODRIGUEZ V. PEOPLE, OCTOBER 24, 2012 decision final and executory. Such failure carries with it the result that no court can exercise appellate
jurisdiction to review the case. Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by
It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration which is denied by the
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
GSIS VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO
Among the powers of the Supreme Court is the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Considering that the GSIS, under its Charter (Sec. 39 of RA 8291), is exempt from “all taxes, assessments,
fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” is it also exempt from the payment of legal fees?
No. The provision in its Charter exempting the GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all
kinds cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.
Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by the Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) and local government units (LGUs) will necessarily
reduce the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally
infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
CONCORDE CONDOMINIUM v. AUGUSTO H. BACULIO
To note, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases was transferred to Courts of general jurisdiction
or the appropriate Regional Trial Court when R.A. No. 8799 took effect on August 8, 2000. Section 5.2 of R.A.
No. 8799 provides:
SEC. 5.2 The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within
one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
RAPID REALTY V. VILLA
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.7
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V. CA JUN 19 2013
The "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to dismiss or the
answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can
always be raised anytime, even for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x
subject, however, to the principle of estoppel by laches."36
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses
which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked when an answer or a
motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense.37 If the objection is not raised either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court.
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the
Constitution or the law and that the Rules of Court yield to substantive law, in this case, the Judiciary Act and
B.P. Blg. 129, both as amended, and of which jurisdiction is only a part. Jurisdiction … cannot be acquired
through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties; neither can it be conferred
by the acquiescence of the court…. Jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law…. Consequently, questions of
jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal even if such issue was not raised in the lower court.
J]jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein-a matter that can be
resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the
question of jurisdiction could depend almost entirely upon the defendant.
G.R. NO. 168973 AUGUST 24, 2011 CITY OF DUMAGUETE, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR,
AGUSTIN R. PERDICES, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY,RESPONDENT.
Error of law: The March 4, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 6, 2005 Resolution, erred on
question of law in setting aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, dated December 7, 2000
and February 20, 2001. The said Orders of the trial court were made in order to determine factual issues and
to correct its error in its findings on the September 7, 2000 Order. Thus, the Court of Appeals decision is
contrary to law, justice, equity and existing jurisprudence.
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter.[29] In Basco v.
Court of Appeals,[30] we allowed a liberal application of technical rules of procedure, pertaining to the requisites
of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the importance of the subject matter of the controversy.
Admittedly, the filing of respondent-spouses' motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of the period
of appeal because of the absence of a notice of hearing required in Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Rule 15, of the Rules of
Court. As we have repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper; it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. Being a mere scrap of paper, the trial
court had no alternative but to disregard it. Such being the case, it was as if no motion for reconsideration was
filed and, therefore, the reglementary period within which respondent-spouses should have filed an appeal
expired on 23 November 1989.
But, where a rigid application of that rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule
may be relaxed, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus
be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.
AKLAN PROVINCE v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the
claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without
prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a
local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the COA
which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities.
LUCIA BARRAMEDA VDA. DE BALLESTEROS V. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN, INC., REPRESENTED
BY ITS LIQUIDATOR, THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be reminded that
such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of jurisdiction. However, the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character.
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court shall have
jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. The
interpretation of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its intent.
PAFIN V YANAGISAWA (2012) GR NO. 175303
The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has
been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of
judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as
an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC.42 By insisting on ruling on
the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and
created the possibility of conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas43 states: "The various branches of the
[regional trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as
they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their
respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion
and seriously hamper the administration of justice." The matter is further explained thus:
It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring
jurisdiction excludes the other courts."
In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is
finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its
action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is
essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on
the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is
enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. M/V "PILAR-I" and SPOUSES
ERNESTO DY and LOURDES DY, Respondents.
The argument of Orix Metro that it did not accede to the restructuring of the loan is only a belated repudiation
of the new schedule of payments and deserves scant consideration. Orix Metro had already benefited from the
said new schedule when it accepted the payments made by the spouses Dy based thereon. In fact, as further
proof of its consent to the restructured schedule of payment, records show that Orix Metro wrote a letter to
Limchia Enterprises, Inc. on 10 August 1992 informing the latter that the monthly amortization on its loan had
been reduced to P127,261.00 for the next 12 months. The spouses Dy relied on the acceptance without any
objection by Orix Metro of the payments made based on the new schedule. On equitable principles,
particularly on the ground of estoppel, this Court upholds the new schedule of payment. Let it be noted that the
doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its
purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable
principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where,
without its aid, injustice might result. As aptly ruled by the Court of Appeals in this case:
REPUBLIC V. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the SC to hear and determine
cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed P100,000.00, such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax
declaration of the real property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the RTCs.
MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in 2 instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed P100,000. MTC
acquired jdxn via #2.
The value of the land should not be determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, BP 129, Sec. 34
provides that the value of the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in 3 ways: first, by the
affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or,
third, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
CAB: #1 n/a - no affidavit executed by Bantigue as to the value of the property. #2 n/a - no multiple claimants,
just Bantigue. #3 it is then. From the records, we find that the assessed value of the property is P14,920 for
the entire property. Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question
does not exceed P100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the BP 129, as
amended.
SPS GENATO V. VIOLA
For clarity, the complaint should have been amended to reflect in the title the individual complainants. There
being a "defect in the designation of the parties", its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the
action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. In the present case, the specification of
the individual complainants in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties.
Only their names were omitted in the title but they were already parties to the case, most importantly, they
were heard through their counsel whom they themselves chose to prepare the complaint and represent them
in the case before the HLURB. No unfairness or surprise to the complainants, including Viola, or to the Sps.
Genato would result by allowing the amendment, the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural
rules or to correct a technical error.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further
said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
JULIAN V. DBP, GR 174193, DEC. 7, 2011
The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full amount of docket fees
within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal
to be perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over the case. The requirement of an appeal fee
is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of
reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the challenged
decision, resolution or order final and executory.
Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has declared that in appealed cases,
failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period warrants only discretionary as
opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all
attendant circumstances.
FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, VS. AGCAOILI G.R. No. 165025 August 31, 2011
If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court or his
duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be
required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government on the part of the plaintiff.
The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of
filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still
acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.
In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the Court, resolving the issue of the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees
due to the inadequate assessment by the clerk of court, ruled that jurisdiction over the complaint was still
validly acquired upon the full payment of the docket fees assessed by the Clerk of Court. Relying on Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 30] the Court opined that the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court with jurisdiction over the
claim, and although the docket fees paid were insufficient in relation to the amount of the claim, the clerk of
court or his duly authorized deputy retained the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the
party filing the action could be required to pay the deficiency, without jurisdiction being automatically lost.
SUN INSURANCE V. ASUNCION (1989)
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee,that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee
due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
AYALA CORPORATION VS MADAYAG
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not
be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment
of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is stated that
"where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment" by
considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary
or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the
amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, 3 this Court had occasion to make the clarification
that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing
of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint
or any pleading, should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary
or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such
damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant
to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material defect in
failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the
amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary damages sought
and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
LOLITA B. COPIOSO, Petitioner, v. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all
surnamed COPIOSO, and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents
The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in
relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary
estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (1), applies to cases incapable of
pecuniary estimation
Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil
cases involving sum of money or title to, possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is
determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the real property involved, such
that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or
P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is
vested with the RTC.
Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over
the contested property the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC.
Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the reliefs prayed for, forestall its
cognizance by the MTC.
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to,
possession of, or any interest in the real property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts,
reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare
ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for
reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined
with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The assessed value of the parcels of land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the
court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative of its jurisdiction.
MAGALLANES VS PALMER ASIA
Under our procedural rules, "a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is
not the real party-ininterest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action."26 In the instant case,
Magallanes filed a motion to dismiss in accordance with the Rules of Court, wherein he claimed that:
x x x the obvious and only real party in interest in the filing and prosecution of the civil aspect impliedly
instituted with x x x the filing of the foregoing Criminal Cases for B.P. 22 is Andrews International Products,
Inc.
The alleged bounced checks issued by x x x Magallanes were issued payable in the name of Andrews
International Products, Inc. The [n]arration of [facts] in the several Informations for violation of B.P. 22 filed
against Magallanes solely mentioned the name of Andrews International Products, Inc.27
The real party in this case is Andrews, not Palmer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec.
2.Parties in interest.– A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and
2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the
Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action.
Parties who are not the real parties in interest may be included in a suit in accordance with the provisions of
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court:
The CA erred in stating that Palmer and Andrews are the same entity.29 These are two separate and distinct
entities claiming civil liability against Magallanes. Andrews was the payee of the bum checks, and the former
employer of Magallanes. It filed the complaint for B.P. 22 before MeTC Branch 62. Thus when the MeTC
Branch 62 ordered Magallanes to "pay the private complainant the corresponding face value of the checks x x
x",30 it was referring to Andrews, not Palmer.
RESIDENT MAMMALS V. REYES
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects
standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997
Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law.
It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative, viz.:
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure.”
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by
our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in
their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS v. ROVILA WATER SUPPLY
At this juncture, a distinction between a real party in interest and an indispensable party is in order.
In Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, et al.,[57] the Court clarified these two concepts and held that "[a] real
party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. On the other hand, an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action, in contrast to a necessary party, which is one who is not
indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already
parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. xxx If a suit is not
brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action. However, the dismissal on this ground entails an examination
of whether the parties presently pleaded are interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not whether all
persons interested in such outcome are actually pleaded. The latter query is relevant in discussions
concerning indispensable and necessary parties, but not in discussions concerning real parties in interest.
Both indispensable and necessary parties are considered as real parties in interest, since both classes of
parties stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit."
Jurisprudence on the procedural consequence of the inclusion or non-inclusion of an indispensable party is
divided in our jurisdiction. Due to the non-inclusion of indispensable parties, the Court dismissed the case
in Lucman v. Malawi, et al.[59] and Go v. Distinction Properties Development Construction, Inc.,[60] while
in Casals, et al. v. Tayud Golf and Country Club et al.,[61] the Court annulled the judgment which was rendered
without the inclusion of the indispensable parties.
G.R. No. 189699
SIMNY G. GUY, GERALDINE G. GUY, GLADYS G. YAO, and the HEIRS OF THE LATE GRACE G.
CHEU,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. OFELIA C. CALO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC -Mandaluyong City -
Branch 211 and GILBERT G. GUY, Respondents.
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that
an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who
must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
Settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory40 being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power,41 and, it is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should
be dismissed" for such absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.42
ARCELONA V. CA, OCT 2 1997
The common property involved in this case is covered by a Torrens Title, specifically mentioning the co-
owners thereof. To bind the entire property and the owners thereof, all the registered owners must be
impleaded. The private respondent ONLY IMPLEADED the three co-owners, excluding the petitioners herein.
For the petitioners to be bound by the questioned decision, such would really be a derogation of their
constitutional right to due process. The questioned decision, too, suffers the fatal defect of utter want of
jurisdiction.
True, the above dispositions refer to jurisdiction over the subject matter. Basic considerations of due process,
however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction over the persons of indispensable parties which
a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said defendants. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person
of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by law or otherwise by
his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no jurisdiction
over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void.29 A decision that
is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law
and, hence, it can never become final and executory.30
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there
can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all
necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions,
their presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power.31 It is precisely "when an indispensable
party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."32 The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.33
. . . . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a
party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of
the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that "any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment." It was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining
all the other co-owners. Former Chief Justice Moran, an eminent authority on remedial law, explains:35
Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of
indispensable parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.
GO V. DISTINCTION PROPERTIES DEVELOPMENT, APRIL 25, 2012
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below; thus, his
residence is immaterial to the venue
of the filing of the complaint.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (Emphasis ours)
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.25 A
real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.26
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he
does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners
as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.
Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right
to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the
petitioners – the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to
the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.27
The petitioner’s reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty.
Aceron is likewise a party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. – Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in
his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal
except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise
deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of the case.
SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA, petitioners,
vs.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON
PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR., respondents.
A review of the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant) is necessary before the
Court rules on the issue of the Algura spouses' claim to exemption from paying filing fees.
When the Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the rule on pauper litigants was found in Rule 3,
Section 22 which provided that:
Section 22. Pauper litigant.—Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper
upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding
provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority[,] once given[,] shall include an exemption
from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall
be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case [favorable] to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.
From the same Rules of Court, Rule 141 on Legal Fees, on the other hand, did not contain any provision on
pauper litigants.
On July 19, 1984, the Court, in Administrative Matter No. 83-6-389-0 (formerly G.R. No. 64274), approved the
recommendation of the Committee on the Revision of Rates and Charges of Court Fees, through its
Chairman, then Justice Felix V. Makasiar, to revise the fees in Rule 141 of the Rules of Court to generate
funds to effectively cover administrative costs for services rendered by the courts.20 A provision on pauper
litigants was inserted which reads:
Section 16. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of court fees.—Pauper-litigants include wage earners
whose gross income do not exceed P2,000.00 a month or P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro
Manila, and P1,500.00 a month or P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro Manila, or those who do
not own real property with an assessed value of not more than P24,000.00, or not more than P18,000.00 as
the case may be.
Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing appeal bond, printed record and
printed brief.
The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the pauper-litigant.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper-litigant shall execute an affidavit that he does not
earn the gross income abovementioned, nor own any real property with the assessed value afore-mentioned
[sic], supported by a certification to that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or treasurer.
When the Rules of Court on Civil Procedure were amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (inclusive of
Rules 1 to 71) in Supreme Court Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8, 1997, which became effective
on July 1, 1997, Rule 3, Section 22 of the Revised Rules of Court was superseded by Rule 3, Section 21 of
said 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
Section 21. Indigent party.—A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if
the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of
stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful
fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case
favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.
Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial
court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with
sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the
clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue for the payment
thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.
At the time the Rules on Civil Procedure were amended by the Court in Bar Matter No. 803, however, there
was no amendment made on Rule 141, Section 16 on pauper litigants.
On March 1, 2000, Rule 141 on Legal Fees was amended by the Court in A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, whereby
certain fees were increased or adjusted. In this Resolution, the Court amended Section 16 of Rule 141,
making it Section 18, which now reads:
Section 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.—Pauper litigants (a) whose gross income
and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro
Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b) who do not
own real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt
from the payment of legal fees.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper litigant, unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the
assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the
litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading
of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.
It can be readily seen that the rule on pauper litigants was inserted in Rule 141 without revoking or
amending Section 21 of Rule 3, which provides for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of filing
fees. Thus, on March 1, 2000, there were two existing rules on pauper litigants; namely, Rule 3, Section
21 and Rule 141, Section 18.
On August 16, 2004, Section 18 of Rule 141 was further amended in Administrative Matter No. 04-2-04-SC,
which became effective on the same date. It then became Section 19 of Rule 141, to wit:
Sec. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees.– INDIGENT LITIGANTS (A) WHOSE
GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE
THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY
WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL
FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant unless the
court otherwise provides.
To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property
with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigant's affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant's affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the complaint or
action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been
incurred. (Emphasis supplied.)
Amendments to Rule 141 (including the amendment to Rule 141, Section 18) were made to implement RA
9227 which brought about new increases in filing fees. Specifically, in the August 16, 2004 amendment, the
ceiling for the gross income of litigants applying for exemption and that of their immediate family was
increased from PhP 4,000.00 a month in Metro Manila and PhP 3,000.00 a month outside Metro Manila, to
double the monthly minimum wage of an employee; and the maximum value of the property owned by the
applicant was increased from an assessed value of PhP 50,000.00 to a maximum market value of PhP
300,000.00, to be able to accommodate more indigent litigants and promote easier access to justice by the
poor and the marginalized in the wake of these new increases in filing fees.
Even if there was an amendment to Rule 141 on August 16, 2004, there was still no amendment or recall of
Rule 3, Section 21 on indigent litigants.
In the light of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the two (2) rules can stand together and are compatible
with each other. When an application to litigate as an indigent litigant is filed, the court shall scrutinize the
affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the applicant to determine if the applicant complies with the
income and property standards prescribed in the present Section 19 of Rule 141—that is, the applicant's gross
income and that of the applicant's immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum
wage of an employee; and the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP 300,000.00). If the trial court finds that the applicant meets the income
and property requirements, the authority to litigate as indigent litigant is automatically granted and the grant is
a matter of right.
The Court concedes that Rule 141, Section 19 provides specific standards while Rule 3, Section 21 does not
clearly draw the limits of the entitlement to the exemption. Knowing that the litigants may abuse the grant of
authority, the trial court must use sound discretion and scrutinize evidence strictly in granting exemptions,
aware that the applicant has not hurdled the precise standards under Rule 141. The trial court must also guard
against abuse and misuse of the privilege to litigate as an indigent litigant to prevent the filing of exorbitant
claims which would otherwise be regulated by a legal fee requirement.
JUANA COMPLEX I vs FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC
G.R. No. 152272 / The complaint has been properly filed as a class suit.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.
Also, the subject matter–the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road–is initially shown to be of common or
general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with
the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing
and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents
in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as
plaintiffs in the complaint.
NEWSWEEK V. IAC, MAY 30, 1986
"In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he
be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language
only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping. The
case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all. We have here
a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have
a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
G.R. No. 160426 January 31, 2008
CAPITOLINA VIVERO NAPERE, petitioner,
vs.
AMANDO BARBARONA and GERVACIA MONJAS BARBARONA, respondents.
When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the
substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. In such case, counsel is obliged to
inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.
The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the
death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party. 5 The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case
subsists despite the death of the party.
Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party
alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.6
Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case,
and present evidence in defense of the deceased.12 In such case, there is really no violation of the right to due
process. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence
available in support of one’s defense.13 When due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the
Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.14
G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES ALAN and EM ANG, Respondents.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs
and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to
a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.19
The petitioners’ complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file
his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents
of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.20
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the
court of the place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd.,21 this
Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no
residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be brought in any province where the defendant or
any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no residence in the Philippine
Islands. Only one of the parties to the action resides here. There can be, therefore, no election by plaintiff as
to the place of trial. It must be in the province where the defendant resides. x x x.22 (Emphasis ours)
Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod
City. Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners’ complaint against the respondents may only be filed in
the RTC of Bacolod City – the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners, being
residents of Los Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their
complaint.
Emergency Loan pawnshop v. CA, February 28, 2001
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred grievously amounting to ousting
itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB was well founded because venue was clearly improperly
laid. The action in the Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at Km. 3
Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within the territorial jurisdiction of the proper
court where the real property or part thereof lies.14 An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of,
or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The Regional Trial Court has committed a
palpable and grievous error amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Sps. Ochoa v. China Banking Corp March 23, 2011
Verily then, with respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it
being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the
general provisions of the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to actions arising from or related to
the mortgage, such as petitioners' complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
The other arguments raised in the motion are a mere reiteration of those already raised in the petition for review.
As declared in this Court's Resolution on January 17, 2011, the same failed to show any sufficient ground to
warrant the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction.
Briones v. CA, January 14, 2015
Under Rule 4, the general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the
court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Republic instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may
either introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of
said actions in a certain exclusive venue, viz.:
The parties, however, are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section
4 of the same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only
in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed
upon but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of
the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation
is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose
any other venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the other courts,” or words
of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
Bungcayao v. Fort Ilocandia, et al., April 19, 2010
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a
party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court
is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion
for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.
Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary judgment has been properly
rendered in this case.
Quintanilla v. CA, September 24, 1997
The amount stated in the mortgage contract between petitioner and RCBC does not limit the amount for which
it may stand as security considering that under the terms of that contract, the intent to secure future indebtedness
is apparent. It would have been different if the mortgage contract in the case at bar simply provides that it was
intended only “to secure the payment of the same and those that may hereafter be obtained the principal of all
of which is hereby fixed at P45,000.00...” Yet the parties to the mortgage contract further stipulated: “... as well
as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor”. The latter phrase clearly means that the mortgage
is not limited to just the fixed amount but also covers other credit accommodations in excess thereof. Thus, the
general rule that mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage cannot be applied herein.
Rather by specific provision and agreement of the parties, the mortgage contract was designed to secure even
future advancements.
Having determined that the mortgage contract extends even to petitioner’s other advances in excess of the
P25,000.00, RCBC’s counterclaim for such other advances cannot but be considered as compulsory in nature.
Such counterclaim necessarily arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of petitioner’s
claim which is to enjoin the foreclosure of the latter’s other credit accommodations in excess of P25,000.00. It
thus satisfies the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between the claim
and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court. Both claims are merely offshoots of the
same basic controversy. Moreover, RCBC’s counterclaim does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties upon whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction and the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Finally, even granting that RCBC’s counterclaim is permissive where the trial court has no/cannot exercise
jurisdiction over said claim unless/until the corresponding docket fees therefor has been paid, petitioner is
however barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Martos, et al., v New San Jose Builders, October 24, 2012
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in this case, one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification,
and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
The absence of a proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissible.
Congressman Lucy Torres v. Codilla, Jr., March 20, 2012
While the existence of the Verification is not disputed, petitioner notes three alleged defects. First, the Election
Protest was filed on 21 May 2010, but the Verification was allegedly subscribed and sworn to on 21 May
2009.[13] Second, Codilla, a resident of Ormoc City, could not have possibly appeared personally before the
notary public in Quezon City.[14] Third, in the notarial stamp, the date of expiration of the notarial commission
was handwritten while all other details were stamped; the PTR indicated was issued in 2005; there was no
MCLE Compliance Number as required by Bar Matter No. 1922.[15] Petitioner claims that due to the lack of a
proper verification, the Election Protest should have been treated as an unsigned pleading and must be
dismissed.
The alleged defects of the Verification are more apparent than real. In any case, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the HRET in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Election Protest and directing
Codilla to have his Verification properly notarized.
Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr., June 2, 2014
A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule... may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be
served thereby.
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and... correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the
Rule on the... ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise,
those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the plaintiffs or... petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the Rule.
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special
Power of Attorney designating his counsel... of record to sign on his behalf.
Orpiano v. Sps. Tomas, January 14, 2013
Although the Court believes that Estrella was not prompted by a desire to trifle with judicial processes, and was
acting in good faith in initiating the annulment case, still the said case should be dismissed because it produces
the same effect which the rule on forum shopping was fashioned to preclude. If the collection case is not
dismissed and it, together with the annulment case, proceeds to finality, not only there is a possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered; an unfair situation, as argued by the Tomas spouses, might arise where
after having paid the balance of the price as ordered by the collection court, the cancellation of the TCT and
return of the property could be decreed by the annulment court.
Court says that “the absence of the consent of one (spouse to a sale) renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale.” However, while
Estrella is raring to file the annulment case, she has to first cause the dismissal of the collection case because
she was by necessity substituted therein by virtue of her being Alejandro’s heir; but the collection court
nonetheless blocked all her attempts. There exists a just cause for her to be dropped as party plaintiff in the
collection case so that she may institute and maintain the annulment case without violating the rule against
forum shopping. Estrella had the right to maintain the annulment case as a measure of protecting her conjugal
share (but the issue of whether the sale should be annulled is a different matter altogether). Despite all these
reasons, Estrella is still not allowed to take prodecural short cuts.
Jose v. Javellana, January 25, 2012
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not.
A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court to the effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from an
interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari.
Mediserv v. CA, April 5, 2010
Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari
must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records. The party need not sign the verification. A party’s representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal
party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
The requirement that a petitioner or principal party should sign the certificate of non-forum shopping applies
even to corporations, considering that the mandatory directives of the Rules of Court make no distinction
between natural and juridical persons. A corporation, however, exercises its powers through its board of
directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of
the board of directors.

In another case, the SC explained that the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not
jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby
be served.
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission
thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the
certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies
to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied
by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
Ledda v. BPI, November 21, 2012
In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money arising from Ledda’s default in her credit
card obligation with BPI. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based on Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit
card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-
payment of the amount due for such credit card transactions, despite demands.11 In other words, BPI’s cause
of action is not based only on the document containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the
issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and
Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document contemplated in
Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth
in and attached to the complaint.
Sps Fernando v. Alcazar, March 12, 2014
Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for
the second time, and the presentation of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect
the outcome of the case. It was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect
petitioners’ cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and was made
part of the records of the case when respondent’s evidence was first taken. Though respondent now claims that
she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would explain then
why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears
that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and
identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondent’s failure
to present the original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the
case.
While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere photocopy,32 there is no harm if
in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence
by the party proponent.
Casent Realty Corp v. Philbanking Corpo, September 14, 2007
Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of
said documents. This judicial admission should have been considered by the appellate court in resolving the
demurrer to evidence. Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.--An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceeding
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the
manner of denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure to
file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be
deemed admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered by the court in
resolving the demurrer to evidence.
Republic v. Conjuanco, et al., April 12, 2011
Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of
it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so
state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Sun Insurance Corp v. CA
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules in is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. In the question that the docket fee that was paid was still insufficient, the Court ruled that it is a matter
which the clerk of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk-in-charge should determine
and thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus the
Court laid out the following:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of action. Where such filing is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but not beyond the prescriptive
period.
2. Same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, 3rd party claims and similar pleadings. The court may allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive period or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Do-All Metal Industries v. Security Bank, January 10, 2011
A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing.
What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment
of the filing fees due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional
claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.
NO the bank is not liable. The supplemental complaint specified from the beginning the actual damages that the
plaintiffs sought against the Bank but the plaintiff paid no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim
that they were willing to pay the additional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the
same. They merely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it. But
a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be
paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental
complaints.
Rizal et al., v. naredo et al., March 14, 2012
The petitioners argue that the CA erred in dismissing their appeal for their failure to indicate the page references
to the records of the case pursuant to Section 13(a), Rule 44[12] of the Rules of Court. They invoke Section 6,
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that "technical rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." They cite the case of
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation v. Sison,[13] where it was held that an appeal should not be dismissed on
mere technicality.
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
It cannot be gainsaid from the above guidelines that, with the exception of pauper litigants,[26] without the
payment of the correct docket or filing fees within the reglementary period, jurisdiction over the subject-matter
or nature of the action will not vest in the trial court. In fact, a pauper litigant may still have to pay the docket
fees later, by way of a lien on the monetary or property judgment that may accrue to him. Clearly, the flexibility
or liberality of the rules sought by the petitioners cannot apply in the instant case.
Sablas v. Sablas, July 3, 2007
An order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. It can be properly issued against the
defending party who failed to file the answer within the prescribed period only if the claiming party files a motion
to that effect with notice to the defending party.
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party in default: (1) the
claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending
party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) the claiming party must prove that the
defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rules of Court. The rule on default requires
the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. It is not enough that the defendant fails
to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. The trial court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant
in default as the rules leave it up to the claiming party to protect his or its interests. The trial court should not
under any circumstances act as counsel of the claiming party.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to permit the defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the
merits even after the reglementary period for filing the answer expires. The Rules of Court provides for discretion
on the part of the trial court not only to extend the time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed
after the reglementary period. Thus, the appellate court erred when it ruled that the trial court had no recourse
but to declare petitioner spouses in default when they failed to file their answer on or before November 5, 1999.
Magdiwang Realty et al., v. The Manila Banking Corp, September 5, 2012
The petitioners’ default by their failure to file their answer led to certain consequences. Where defendants before
a trial court are declared in default, they thereby lose their right to object to the reception of the plaintiff’s evidence
establishing his cause of action. This is akin to a failure to, despite due notice, attend in court hearings for the
presentation of the complainant’s evidence, which absence would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s
right to object to the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented
therein.
Lim v. NPC, November 14, 2012
There is no question that the Arcinues’ motion failed to comply with the requirement of Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
SECTION 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court,
a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation, why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
Personal service is required precisely because it often happens that hearings do not push through because,
while a copy of the motion may have been served by registered mail before the date of the hearing, such is
received by the adverse party already after the hearing. Thus, the rules prefer personal service. But it does not
altogether prohibit service by registered mail when such service, when adopted, ensures as in this case receipt
by the adverse party.
Anama v. PSB, F.R. No. 187021, January 25, 2012
The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements is considered a worthless
piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can
be acted upon by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly
covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
In this case, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. The
records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly served upon, and received by, petitioner’s counsel-
of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a “signed stamped received a mark”
appearing on said pleading. The said law office, as a matter of fact, did not present any written denial of its valid
receipt on behalf of its client, neither is there proof that the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Offices has formally
withdrawn its appearance as petitioner’s counsel-of-record. Thus, there was compliance with the rules.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse
in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the
court of its authority.
Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict
and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice. Through such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the motion.
Manila Electric Company v. La Compana Food Products, Inc, G.R. No. 97535 August 4, 1995
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive
and the court has no authority to act upon.
Thus, when it filed in Branch 78 its answer with counterclaim on September 21, 1990, fourteen days after the
expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco was already in default and, naturally, it had to
bear all the legal consequences of being in default.
It must be clarified that under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is the order of default, an
interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment by default, which is a final
disposition of the case and appealable to the Court of Appeals.
A party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him in accordance with Rule 38.
We agree with respondent Judge that Meralco's motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial is
a mere pro forma motion inasmuch as it does not specify the facts constituting the alleged fraud which under
the Rules must be alleged with particularity.5 Being a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the
period to appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on November 29, 1990, Meralco had until December
14, 1990, within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed on January 28, 1991, was
clearly filed out of time. Having lost its right to appeal, Meralco cannot take refuge in the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition. The Court has always maintained that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal, and there appears to be no cogent reason why such policy should be waived in this
case.
Cabrera v. Ng, G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014
The Court has indeed held, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, mandatory is the
requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a
motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the
appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-
day notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather the requirement is for the
purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and
meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully
oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera was reset by the RTC twice with due notice to the parties that it
was only on October 26, 2007 that the motion was actually heard by the RTC. More than two months had passed
since the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The respondent
was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the arguments interposed therein.
Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on September 20, 2007. Notwithstanding that the
respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by the spouses
Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to
argue his position. Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based
merely on their failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
Campos Rueda Corp, v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-18453 September 29, 1962
It is settled in this jurisdiction that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations made in the complaint
or petition. On the other hand, we have also held heretofore that this principle applies to proceedings in the
Court of Industrial Relations
The insufficiency of the allegations of Muyot's complaint to place his action within the jurisdiction of the
respondent court could not be cured by amendment, for in Rosario vs. Carandang, we clearly held that "a
complaint can not be amended so as to confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of action
originally set forth was not within the court's jurisdiction." Moreover, the record does not show at all that the
Court of Industrial Relations had admitted the amended complaint.
In the light of our view on the question of jurisdiction, we deem it unnecessary, for the purpose of this decision,
to decide the questions of res judicata and prescription of the causes of action raised in the petition under
consideration.
Viason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 26
A summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of the President binds that corporation. The
secretary however, should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. In the case at bar, the
secretary was not an employee of petitioner but of Vlasons Shipping, Inc.
Acting under the impression that petitioner had been placed under its jurisdiction, the trial court dispensed with
the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent amendments of the petition. But the first service
of summons on petitioner was invalid. Thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Not
having been validly served summons, it would be legally impossible to declare petitioner to be in default. A
default judgment cannot affect the rights of a party who was never declared in default.
Siasoco v. CA, GR. No. 132096, August 22, 2008
Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, the complaint may still be amended once,
as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect to claims against the non-answering defendant(s).
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants,
but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.—It is clear that plaintiff (herein private respondent)
can amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a responsive pleading is filed. Contrary to the
petitioners’ contention, the fact that Carissa had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from
amending its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein petitioners.
Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their Complaint once, as
a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendants, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.
After a responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially
altered since such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant but also delays the action;
Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice.—The
rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which provides that after a
responsive pleading has been filed, an amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially altered.
Such amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the action. In the first place,
where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore,
the Court has held that “[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order
to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might
justify a refusal of permission to amend.”
Tiu, et al v. Phil Bank Of Communication, August 19, 2009
“Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase “or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered” was stricken-off and not retained
in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, “the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true, however,
when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to
be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.”
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the
action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of
action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.
Lisam Enterprises, Inc. v BDO, G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012
Rule 10, Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. – Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in
Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action
or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of
action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice,
and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Heirs of Wenceslao Tabia v. CA
We have held that the rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers.[33] The Director of Lands is a quasi-judicial officer.[34] As such officer, his decisions and orders
rendered pursuant to his quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
Res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. In the case at bar, where there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there
exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Thus, the issues in B.L. Claim No. 288(n) of
prior possession of Lot No. 1430 as well as the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Director of Lands'
conclusion may no longer be relitigated.
Javarata v. Karolus, June 2007
The CA rightly held that the court a quo erred in rendering a judgment by default against the defendants for
refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories, without first requiring an application by the proponent to
compel an answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was as yet
no trial or presentation of evidence in the court a quo. Petitioner's prayer to affirm the trial court's December 18,
1997 default decision does not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the trial court was based on
constructive admissions by the defendants of the allegations of the plaintiff due to the court's application of the
sanction for not answering the written interrogatories. In reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should
have given the parties a chance to substantiate by evidence their respective claims at the trial court. This is
particularly true with respect to the plaintiff's claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding
which the CA said that clear and convincing evidence was required but wanting. This is because the wrong
procedure followed by the trial court effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.
NPC V. JUDGE ADIONG, July 27, 2011
Judge Adiong failed to conduct a pre-trial conference in Civil Case. Respondent judge failed to conduct the pre-
trial conference itself. It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial conference is mandatory and
failure to do so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules
of Court, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Such ignorance
of a basic rule in court procedure, as failing to conduct pre-trial, sadly amounts to gross ignorance and warrants
a corresponding penalty.
Basbas et al., v. Sayson et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on
the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the
failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment,
issues apparently exist – i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission,
disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer – but the
issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions,
or admissions.
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the presence of
issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by
admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate.
On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts
affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue
raised is not genuine.

“A ‘genuine issue’ means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an
issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.”

Buncayao Sr., v. Fort Illocandia, April 19, 2010

Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a
party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court
is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the
pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact
which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion
for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.

MARINA v. Marc Properties, Feburay 15, 2012

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays where the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried.24 A "genuine issue"
is such issue of fact which require the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim.25 There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.26 A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so
patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an
issue is resolved against the movant.

It must be stressed that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.31 As already stated,
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact rests upon the movant, in this case
the respondent, and not upon petitioners who opposed the motion for summary judgment. Any doubt as to the
propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must thus be resolved against the respondent.

Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, July 27, 2011

Even if we overlook the procedural lapse and resolve the case on the merits, we still affirm the assailed CA
resolutions.

Under the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered where, on motion of a party and after hearing,
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." [18] The Court explained the concept of summary judgment in Asian Construction and
Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank: [19]

Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at
an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for
summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.