SASH 38

Ruitao Xie

Essay Topic #2 Oslo Accords

The essence of the conflict between Israel and Palestine dated back to 1947 when the
United Nations passed the Partition Plan to create a Jewish and an Arab state on the
Palestinian land. Under the resolution, two-thirds of the land used to belong to Palestine were
now under control of Israel. Over the decades following the decision, there have been many
military conflicts either armed or unarmed between both parties and eventually led to the
displacement of millions of Palestinian refugees. Both parties were exhausted from the
constant war and conflict and they recognized the importance to solve the conflict through a
peaceful means. It was under such background that the Oslo Accords became a reality, as a
way of "achieving region-wide disarmament and the integration of Israel into a larger, pan-
Middle Eastern, network of economic institutions". (Owen, 2004, p.233) While the initial
signing of the Oslo Accords was seen as a sign of the start of a new era in the Palestine-Israel
conflict, it did not equalize peace. Rather, it was the beginning of achieving peace, and the
majority of the issues remaining had to be resolved through further negotiations. The ongoing
process and its outcomes shattered people's high hopes completely and were more harmful
than helpful to the actual peace process.

Being seen as a major breakthrough in the century-old conflict, the Oslo Accords was
at first applauded by the majority in both states. (Tessler, 2009, p.758) In 1992's Israeli
election, prime minister Rabin came to power. He was more politically moderate compared to
his predecessors, therefore, he proposed that a peaceful negotiation with the Palestinians
could be the ultimate solution to address the core issues in the conflict. In the Oslo Accords,
they reached a mutual recognition of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories as well
as Israel's right to exist in peace and security. (Cleveland and Bunton, 2009, p.503) The first
two years following the agreement, both parties made actions to maintain peace in the region.
The Israeli side stuck to its promise of deploying its army from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The Palestinian Authority was created under the Oslo Accords as an interim governing
body to take over the administrative and security responsibilities following the Israeli
withdrawal.

However, the smooth transitional period did not last long. The two parties had
viewed the core issues in different directions. For the Palestinians, they viewed it as the first
step towards the establishment of an independent state. For the Israelis, they placed emphasis
on the security of its nation and the Jewish settlements. Not only did it fail to bring
immediate peace to the region through compromise and mutual recognition, but it also
deteriorated the peaceful continuation of dialogue between two parties and lowered the living
standards for the people involved.

Since the Oslo Accords were at first seen as transitional and preparational for future
negotiations, many questions were left in vague steps of further actions. It was described as
"destructive ambiguity" as it masked large gaps in each side's conceptualization of what
mutual recognition meant in practice. (Rynhold, 2008, p. 10) In this way, the Oslo Accords
held more significant meaning rather than actual meaning. In this regard, it failed to protect
the rights and claims of both parties. One of the issues concerning Palestinians the most was
the settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza. Per Palestinians' concerns, the Oslo
agreement did not require Israel to cease settlement activity in the conflicted regions but
rather left the question for final status negotiations. (Tessler, 2009, p. 792) Between 1993 to
1996 alone, the number of Jewish settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza increased by
almost 40 percent. The Palestinian communities in these areas were further isolated, and they
had limited access to resources, goods and mobility rights. (Roy, 2004, p.368)

The Palestinians were the weaker side in the conflict, and they suffered "severe
economic decline, social regression, and political repression" as a direct result of the accords.
The Palestinian economy used to highly rely on Israel as the majority of the labor outflow
goes to Israel and it became a strong economic pillar for the national economic performance.
However, since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government shifted away from
their initial advocate of integration. In fear of terrorist attack, it proposed a closure policy
starting by "allowing an influx of foreign workers" to replace the Palestinians. (Rynhold,
2008, p.10) With the population influx, the Palestinian labor lost their competitiveness in the
market, and many of them eventually lost their jobs and had to return home. On the other
hand, with such a high number of male populations returning, there were not enough jobs in
the market for them. Many of them then shifted their support from PLO to right-wing
extreme Islamic groups. They believed that a peaceful negotiation would no longer bring the
outcome they proposed, rather, they would return to war and blood to fight for their own
rights. Thus, the economic closure in the Israeli market following the signing of the Accord
only brought Palestinian people with detrimental impacts.

In addition, the signing of the accords was, in fact, unsuccessful to solve the
imbalance of power. The primary rule of international law is "the rule of force". (Aruri, 2001,
p.81) This is especially evident in the Oslo agreements and its subsequent implementations.
For the Palestinians, one of the most concerning issues was the right of return. However, it
was marginalized in the Oslo documents. Despite the Israeli leadership agreed to include the
introduction of the refugee issue as a "negotiable issue on the agenda", the right of return was
seen as a Palestinian provocation. In Decemeber1993, during the General Assembly meeting
where the main agenda was to settle the refugee problem, both Israel and the United States
voted against Resolution 194. Being the main ally of Israel, the position that the United States
took had a distinct impact on the region, and it further alienated Palestine from participating
in decision makings of matters of their own. Therefore, like all predecessors of the Oslo
documents, it was yet another example of being "conceived, structured and nuanced by Israel
to serve Israeli interests". (Aruri, 2001, p.81)

What's more, the Oslo Accords was harmful to the peace acquisition process as it
indirectly led to the rise of extreme power in both states. Due to the inaction of the PLO in
responding to the rigorous measures by the Israeli government on national security, there was
growing dissatisfaction in Palestine. They were tired of the endless uprooting, deprivation,
and discrimination for decades long, and religion then became the most effective response.
(Pappe, 2006, p.246) When the attempt of peaceful negotiation didn't bring Palestinians the
ideal outcome they longed for, they would support a more radical solution to defend their
rights and freedoms. One of the direct beneficiaries was Hamas. (Cleveland and Bunton,
2009, p.508) On January 25, 2006, Hamas won the majority in the election. With a hardliner
in power, the government would usually adopt tough measures, and eventually led to further
bloodshed. When the Israeli side assassinated leaders of Hamas, it then responded with a
suicide bomb attack which only led to the start of a new vicious cycle of violence.
 Similarly, on the side of Israel, the assassination of Rabin on November 5, 1995,
demonstrated that there was an evidently huge gap between his ideology of "trading land for
peace" and the fervent rejection of this policy by those on the far right. (Eisenberg and
Caplan, 2010, p.165) The country's trust towards establishing a parallel state was exhausted,
and there was a growing concern of Palestinian usage of settlement for future attacks. In
Israel, many religious Israeli Jews opposed to the signing of the Oslo documents. As for the
Rabbis in the West Bank, they believed the territorial compromise made by the Rabin
government was totally unacceptable and betraying the Jewish law. Therefore, the giving
away of sacred property should be condemned and a death penalty was applicable. (Tessler,
2009, p.782) Since Netanyahu got elected, he prioritized Israel's security requirements and
demanded the Palestinians to comply with all relevant agreements. His own unwillingness to
work with the Palestinian leadership also impacted the further outcomes of the peace
dialogue.

In conclusion, despite the good intention of the Oslo Accords striving to resolve the
regional conflict in an immediate fashion, it was indeed a step too radical. It represented the
Israeli wish to compromise territory for regional peace and the PLO willingness to initiate
peace negotiations, however, specific steps were lacking and there were no clear intentions of
concluding them. (Pappe, 2006, p.243) The ambiguity in the document languages led both
parties to shift from mutual trust to mutual suspicion. The interplay of power imbalances and
the involvement of international actors also led to more suffering of normal civilians. When
the peace negotiation halted, the patience of the people would be easily exhausted and then
they would return to support a drastically closure policy which only made peace dialogues
hard to proceed.
 Citation

Aruri, N. (2001). Palestinian refugees. 1st ed. Sterling, VA: Pluto Press.

Cleveland, W. and Bunton, M. (2013). A history of the modern Middle East. 4th ed. London:

The Perseus Book Group.

Eisenberg, L. and Caplan, N. (2010). Negotiating Arab-Israeli peace. Bloomington: Indiana

University Press.

Owen, R. (2004). State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed.

Taylor and Francis.

Pappé, I. (2014). A history of modern Palestine. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Roy, S. (2003). The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict and Palestinian Socioeconomic Decline: A

Place Denied. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, [online] 17(3),
pp.365-403. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20007687?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

Rynhold, J. (2008). The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed

Implementation?. [online] Available at: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-

papers/the-failure-of-the-oslo-process-inherently-flawed-or-flawed-implementation/
[Accessed 26 May 2019].

Tessler, M. (2009). A history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 2nd ed. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press.