#36 Santillon vs Miranda – number and gender of words

FACTS:

November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving
one son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several
parcels of land located in that province.

Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said
petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario
Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal,
except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta
Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties
enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was
not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all,
the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that
subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administrator of the estate.

March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and
distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the
parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he
insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the
remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other
hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta
claimed 1/2.

June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and ordered that
in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall
inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro
Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance with Art.
892?

HELD:

Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could or
should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving
spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on
the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because
"children" will not include "child".

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834
of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two
contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and
the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.

#37 Chua vs CSC – doctrine of necessary implication

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the
government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail
of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost
fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD:

YES. Petition was granted.

RATIO:

Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual and
emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits
under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly
extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP.
It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is the
doctrine of necessary implication which holds that “what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof
as that which is expressed”.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner’s
application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive,
as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted;
after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum requirement under the law
but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

#38 Batungbakal vs NDC – remedy implied from a right

Facts:

On February 14, 1939, Batungbakal was appointed as a cash and property examiner by the Auditor
General in National Development Company. On August 24, 1945, Batungbakal was reassigned as a
property examiner in the same company. However, on December 31, 1946, he was suspended from the
office by the Investigation Committee. And on April 17, 1947, Batungbakal has received a notice for
dismissal. It was stated in the said notice that according to the findings of the Investigation Commitee,
Batungbakal has been found to have committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty to the
detriment of the company.

In 1948, Honorable e La Costa, the chairman of Investigation Committee passed to the office of the
President through the Department of Secretary the results of their investigation. It was found out that
Batungbakal has not committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty, therefore, it was
requested that Batungbakal shall be given remedy through reinstatement to his office, as well as to pay
back his salaries from the dismissal up to the reinstatement.

However, it is obviously not feasilble since the former position of Batungbakal was already occupied by
the present incumbet, and to dismiss the present is to remove him without cause.

On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if not disgusted with the
treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the NDC and
Manuel Agregado as Auditor General.

Issue:

Whether or not Batungbakal has the rights to reinstatement and to back salaries.

Rulings:

Having proven that the plaintiff had been suspended and dismissed without cause, contrary to the
express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the Auditor
General, a duty whose performance may be controlled and enjoined by mandamus. There is no room for
discretion. The Auditor General is not being directed to perform an act which he may or may not execute
according to his discretion. He is being asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done.
And the payment of the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement, this, aside from the
parallel and analogy which may be found in section 260, paragraph 1, Revised Administrative Code which
provides for the payment of back salary upon reinstatement.

According to Article 12, section 4 of the Constitution, “No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.” Batungbakal would receive a remedy of
reinstatement to the office since his right was violated by the art of NDC. And the present incumbent
being made to leave the post to give way to the plaintiff’s superior right might be considered as a cause of
dismissal.

#39 Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs CA – words construed in ordinary sense

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course thereof,
the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with lauan and
almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required
invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to gain entry into the
premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that
date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible
number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

HELD:

No,

The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber.

While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found
in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being
prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage
meaning.

And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.
#40 Gatchalian vs COMELEC – general words construed generally

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural born mother,
Marciana Gatchalian.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson Gatchalian. They had with them Certificate of Registration
and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature
of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens and was issued Identification Certificates.

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners
to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen.
Among those cases was that of William and others.On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners,
reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1961 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case
against them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the
warrant of arrest issued against him.

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that the respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of
exclusion be charged with violation against the Immigration Act of 1940.

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action.

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a
mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On September 4, 1990,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the
Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.

On September 6, 1990, respondent’s wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. That petitioners acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. Respondent Capulong issued the
questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.

Issue:

Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.

Held:

The very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which was dispatched to the
Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.

In matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for the purpose of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.
Philippine law, following lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.
Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly
a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Section 1, Article IV of the Consititution.