GENERAL PROVISIONS – ART.

209-215
1. SALIENTES V. ABANILLA
FACTS:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes.
Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to
their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the
Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla
in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody which the trial court granted. However, petitioners contend that the
order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had
the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie
proof thereof, and even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper
remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus.
Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the
law, has the right of custody of the minor. Respondent on the other hand, asserts that
the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors’ right
to see his father and vice versa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus is available and should be
granted to the petitioner.

RULING: Yes. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their
son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto,
the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial
grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child.
In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available
to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provide that in all questions regarding
the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor
to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the
directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the
answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order
requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This
was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of
custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private
respondents’ petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his
own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his
child under seven years of age.

2. ESPIRITU VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City. Teresita left for
Los Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status

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sometime later. Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer.
Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and
wife where a child was born, Rosalind Therese. During their vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time they returned to the United States,
Reginald Vince was born. The relationship soon deteriorated and Teresita left her
family to go back to California. Because his assignment is not yet completed, Reynaldo
had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show
that the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S.
to live with her mother. She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother
kissing a “bad” man who worked for her father. Both children are now over seven years
of age and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

ISSUE: Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:

No, as both children are now over seven years of age, their choice of parent
should be given respect by the court.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the
mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore. As
the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due
respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines.
Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by
the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said
behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article
213(1) of the Family Code.

3. DAVID VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of
four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J.,
was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children,
both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and
introduced him to Villar's legal wife.

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After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to
give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for habes corpus is appropriate to decide the question of
custody of a minor child when the parents are in an adulterous relationship?

RULING:

Yes.

Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."

It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to
the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to
each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however,
that it cannot arise in any other situation.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who,
as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him.2 Since,
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is
deprived of her rightful custody of her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."3

Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and
support them on her own since they were born. That she receives help from her parents
and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation,
compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the
close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is.

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Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family
Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal
obstacle thereto."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than
seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be
taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the
mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts
must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private
respondent).

SUBSTITUTE AND SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY – ART. 216-219

4. AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora (victim) died after being mortally hit by a gun fired by his classmate in
the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos (CSJR). Both the victim and the
offender were graduating 17-year-old students. The crime happened 3 days before
graduation ceremony. The student was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence.

Additionally, the victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code against the school, its principal, dean, physics teacher, the offender,
two other students, and their parents.

ISSUES:
1. Is Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code applicable to establishments which are
technically not schools of arts and trades? – YES.
2. Were the students considered under the custody of the defendants at the time of
the crime? – YES.
3. Are the defendants liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code? –
NO.

RULING:
None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by their students against the
victim student.

RATIO:
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic and non-
academic.

The general rule is that all teachers shall be held liable for the acts of their students.
The exception to the rule is where the school is technical in nature, it is the head thereof
who should be held responsible. There is no substantial distinction between the
academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are

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concerned. The reasons for disparity in liability of teachers and heads are no longer
material at present BUT Art. 2180 remains unchanged and must be interpreted
according to its clear legislative intent until further amendment

The students are considered to be at the custody of the school authorities at the time of
the crime.

Custody is not co-terminous with the semester. The student shall be considered to be in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of
the school and within its premises. As long as the student is in school fora legitimate
student purpose, legitimate exercise of student rights and privileges, the responsibility of
the school authorities continues

Custody does not connote actual and physical control, but refers more to the influence
on the child and the discipline instilled in him. Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code directly
imposes liability on the teacher or the head is technical school and not on the school
itself. If any, the school may be held to answer for acts of the teachers or heads and
may be allowed to exculpate liability by proof of exercise of diligence The same
provision treats parents more favorably than teachers. Unlike parents who are only
liable for children until they turn 18 years old, teachers are held answerable by law for
acts of students regardless of their age. Nevertheless, there is leniency in assessing
liability of teachers especially in cases where students involved are no longer minors

None of the defendants may be held liable for damages.

As to the principal and the dean, they only exercise general authority since they were
not teachers-in-charge. The Dean of boys could have been held liable in view of the
undisputed evidence on his confiscation of an unlicensed gun from one of the students,
which he returned without any disciplinary measures. However, there’s no proof of the
identity of the gun used against the victim.

As to the Physics teacher, his absence during the time of the crime is not considered
negligence because he was not required to be in school at the time. The Teacher-in-
charge of the erring student was not identified.

As to the school, it may not be held liable under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code.

5. YLARDE VS. AQUINO

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary
School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. During that
time, the school had several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school
shop destroyed in World War II. Defendant decided to help clear the area so he
gathered 18 of his male students and ordered them to dig beside a one ton concrete
block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left unfinished so the
following day he called 4 of the 18 students including the NovelitoYlarde to complete the
excavation. Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he went to see
Banez for the key to the school workroom where he can get some rope. It was alleged
that before leaving, he told the children “not to touch the stone”. After he left, the
children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the concrete block slide down.
Unfortunately, NovelitoYlarde was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries

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which as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim,
herein petitioners, filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioners can be held liable for damages

RULING:

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the
death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who
should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say
that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held
liable. In the same case, We explained:

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he,
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and
'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent Soriano,
as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by
private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction
regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be
held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children
for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as earlier pointed out,
petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which
is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.

With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and
omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence
which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the
affirmative. He is liable for damages.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent
Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:

(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized
his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone
which he knew to be a very hazardous task;

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 (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished
digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or
kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area;

(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling;

(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety;
and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by
themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous
digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their
playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of
them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone
was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural
consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the
unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural
and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say,
the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real
danger.

6. St. Mary's Academy vs Carpitanos

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They
visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was
alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle.
Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE:

WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the
Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them
to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate
cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the
accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient
intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part
of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor
to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the

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school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven
on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN –

ART. 220-222 AND RULE OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS

7. SILVA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two
children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting
career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who
claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At
any rate, the two eventually parted ways.

The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children
in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was
opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.

In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered directing

respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children
without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs.1

Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an
appeal from the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated
to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales which found
that it would be more wholesome morally and emotionally for the children if the court
puts a stop to the rotation of custody of the said children. Hence, this decision prompted
Silva to come to this Court for relief.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Silva, as the noncustodial parent, has the right of access to his children?

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RULING:

Yes.

Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2)
(b)etween parents and children; . . . ." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code
states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental
authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love
and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution
itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the
youth.4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely
address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the
laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the
legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships
as well.5 Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a
situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code
provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children.

There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always
the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who
has recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with
the children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. Similarly, what
the trial court has observed is not entirely without merit; thus:

The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even

assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner
an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that
petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed
to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of
respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral
persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in
instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children.
It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his
children of tender ages.6

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant
concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have
ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call
on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has
seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can
petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother."

SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY – ART. 228-233 AND

CORRELATE WITH RA 7610

8. Eslao v. Court of Appeals and Cordero

FACTS:

When Reynaldo Eslao died,Maria Paz’s husband, she entrusted care and custody of
her youngest child Angelica to her grieving mother-in-law stating that she needed the
company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. She then
returned to her mother’s house with her another daughter, Leslie. Years later, Maria Paz
got married to a Japanese-American and lives with him in the US. She then returned to

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the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the US. She then
informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica her new husband’s
willingness to adopt her children. Teresita refused, and accused Maria of having
abandoned Angelica when she was 10 days old. Teresita added that she would be
deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her
own herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that
she maintains a store which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a
month as pension for the death of her husband, she rents out rooms in her house which
she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross
income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her
house.

Maria instituted an action against Teresita over the return of the custody of Angelica to
her. After the trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition. CA affirmed in the
full decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Teresita Sagala-Eslao should be given the custody of the child.

RULING:

No, Sagala-Eslao cannot be given the custody of the child. Article 210 of the Family
Code states that “Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or
transferred except in the cases authorized by law.”

In Santos, Sr. v Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407we stated, viz:

[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards
parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.

Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law [Article 210]. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan
institution.[Art.222-224] when a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such
as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody
and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.

The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are
duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company [Article 209 and
211].

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor
child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or
an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.

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9. LIBI VS. IAC

FACTS:

Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the
time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January
14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San
Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor
between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in
the same event on the same date.

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up
with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to
threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming
from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint
for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.

ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

RULING:
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from
criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control,
or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised
on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of
age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under
15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child
relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child.
Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising the
activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at
the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were
sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being
drug informers, 17 or even drug users..

FUNERALS

10. Valino v. Adriano

G.R. No. 182894, 22 April 2014

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law
Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The

11
couple had two (2) sons, three (3) daughters, and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah
Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients,
until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he
continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United
States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty.
Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately called
Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was
not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the
family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of
Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for
more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the
time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife.
Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to
support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of
Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also
claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still
left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his
remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by
respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of
Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents. It likewise directed respondents,
at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the
family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

RULING:

CIVIL LAW: article 305 in relation to article 1996

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the Family Code,
specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the
deceased. Thus:

12
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall
be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without
the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying
the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary
expenses;

CIVIL LAW: common law relationships

From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of
ones common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, a petition for habeas corpus
was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover,
Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his
residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.

In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have jurisdiction over
the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to the claim of Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a spouse having the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled:

x xx Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married
in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are
present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-
ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage.

13
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse”
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses.
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband
and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as
in Article 144, when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-visVitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance.

To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right
and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.

Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless prevail
pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valinos own testimony that it was Atty.
Adrianos wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be
noted, however, that other than Valinos claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at
the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim.
Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of
Atty. Adriano was unclear and indefinite.

Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been
created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN – ART. 368

11. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA

FACTS:

Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom
she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In 1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about
four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born.
Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of
them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in
the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and
throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy
of her birth certificate in Irosin, Sorsogon, where she was born, as she was required to

14
present it in connection with a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It
was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta — not Ferrer —
and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father.

On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which
she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and
confusion, Teresita petitioned the court below on March 18, 1969 for change of her
name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. After trial duly had, the
respondent judge denied her petition; hence the present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it Teresita’s petition for change of name is proper?

RULING:

Yes.

The respondent court places reliance on the doctrine, expounded in three decisions of
this Court,3 that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of
family relationship. The principle remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In the case at
bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining
brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition.
Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from the
relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government
agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the
Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen
within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a
searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin
Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or
objected to her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is
beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer
from being smeared are proud to share it with her.

MARRIED WOMAN – ART. 379

12. REMO VS. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MATERIAL FACTS
 Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose passport was then
expiring on October 27, 2000
 Being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear:
surname: Rallonza
given name: Maria Virginia
middle name: Remo
• Prior to expiry of her passport, the petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied for
renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport
• Petitioner’s request having been denied (#1), Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III,
representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar
request
• On August 28, 2000, DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied (#2) the
request, stating:

15
 “…it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for
Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a
woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet
any of these conditions.”

• Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied

(#3) in a letter dated October 13, 2000
• On November 15, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the
President. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the President dismissed (#4) the
appeal with the same argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239)
• The Office of the President further held that “in case of conflict between a general
and special law, the latter will control over the former regardless of the respective
dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general rule, it should yield to RA
8239.”
• The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28, 2004, the
Office of the President denied (#5) the motion.
• Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May 27,
2005, the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of the
Office of the President.
• Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied (#7) in its
Resolution dated August 2, 2005.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
• Whether the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport,
despite the subsistence of her marriage.
• Whether there is a conflict between the general law (Civil Code Article 370) and
the special law (RA 8239).

RULES/LAW
1. Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:

A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname, or
(3) Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife,
such as “Mrs.”

2. RA 8239: The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport

Act of 1996

Section 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No passport shall be issued

to an applicant unless the Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied
that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied with the following
requirements: xxx

(d) In case of a woman who is married, separated, divorced, or widowed, or whose

marriage has been annulled or declared by court as void, a copy of the certificate of
marriage, court decree of separation, divorce or annulment or certificate of death of

16
 the deceased spouse duly issued and authenticated by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General: Provided, That in case of a divorce decree, annulment or
declaration of marriage as void, the woman applicant may revert the use of her
maiden name: Provided, further, That such divorce is recognized under the existing
laws of the Philippines; xxx

3. Section I, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239

The passport can be amended only in the
following cases:

(a) Amendment of woman’s name due to marriage

(b) Amendment of woman’s name due to death of spouse, annulment of
marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or
(c) Change of surname of a child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent
marriage of his parents

4. The DFA allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to
use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt to her
husband’s name

5. In case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s
surname or continuously use her maiden name.

6. Once a the woman adopted her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section
5(d) of RA 8239.

APPLICATION
1. The petitioner used her maiden first name and her husband’s last name, thus,
Maria Virginia V. Remo. This is in accord to Article 370(2), Title XIII of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
2. “…it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not
been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for
Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a
woman may revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases nnulment of
marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet
any of these conditions.” –DFA Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota

CONCLUSION
• No. Ms. Remo cannot revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement
passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage because she used her
husband’s last name when she applied for her passport for the first time.
According to the rule, upon renewal of passport, “a married woman may either
adopt her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name”. And “once
a the woman adopted her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in cases enumerated in section
5(d) of RA 8239.”
• No. There is no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil Code and Section 5(d) of
RA 8239.
“Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA
8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport issuance must
prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is a general law
on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that special
law prevails over a general law.”

17
 • The Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the May 27, 2005 Decision and
August 2, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.

IN CASE OF LEGAL SEPARATION – ART. 372

13. LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria on March 1939. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued
to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique. During their marriage,
she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to
resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was
claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her
finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the
specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally
separated from his husband.

HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be
considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that
the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved
and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of
the conjugal assets. Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify
a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy
circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372. Petition was dismissed.

CIVIL REGISTRAR

14. Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court
Branch 67, Paniqui,Tarlac

A.M. No. 06-7-414-RTC,19 October 2007

FACTS:

This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23
February 2006. The Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated 11 July 2005
that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to explain the
following within ten (10) days from notice among others, why 375 petitions for change of
name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the required

18
hearing and publication, in gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure.

Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of these petitions
may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 which authorizes city or municipal civil
registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first
name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The petitions
were filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar
and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since
R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without hearing and publication for as long
as the necessary documents are submitted, the trial court considered the same
procedure as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk
of Court still held ex parte hearings to receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions
which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court adopted the procedure
in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment
based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such relief as may be warranted,
following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court adopted this
procedure to expedite the resolution of said petitions to afford the court more time to
devote to the resolution of criminal and civil cases that required more attention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting petitions
for change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without
the required hearing and publication.

RULING:

The Court agrees that indeed Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Articles 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering the
alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are public
documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein,
which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or corrections thereof
could be made only upon judicial authorization. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide the procedure for such alterations in the civil registry.

The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as such
strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is
essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. The reason for this is that a change
of name is a matter of public interest.

Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed by
Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or
corrections in entries for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are
followed. In Republic v. Bautista, citing Republic v. Valencia, it was declared that the
proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be adopted
is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party,
it is deemed substantial and the procedure to be adopted is adversarial. The procedure
under Rule 108 becomes the appropriate adversarial proceeding to effect substantial
changes in the registry only if the procedural requirements therein are complied with.

R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of the New
Civil Code, to wit:

19
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname.No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or municipal registrar or
consul general, without need of any judicial order.

A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it was enacted to give
the people an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records corrected via an
administrative proceeding before the local civil registrar that is less expensive and more
expeditious.

Under the bill, any person who wants an entry corrected needs only to file a verified
petition supported by certain documents with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the records sought to be corrected are kept and, in case the
petitioner has already migrated to another place, the petition may be filed with the local
civil registrar where he resides. Publication of the petition for correction of entry is
dispensed with and in lieu of publication; the petition needs only to be posted in a
conspicuous place in the office of the local civil registrar for ten (10) consecutive
working days. However, regarding petitions for change of first name, the petition has to
be published once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, with the petitioner also submitting a certification that he has no pending case
or prior criminal record. The local civil registrar is mandated to decide the petition not
later than five (5) working days after the prescribed posting period. The decision of the
local registrar is subject to the automatic review of the Civil Registrar General who shall
act within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision. If the Civil Registrar
General finds that the correction is not clerical or typographical in nature or that it affects
the civil status of the person, he shall set aside the decision and advise the petitioner to
file the necessary petition with the RTC in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.

Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding before
the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions
for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The promulgation of
rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, as observed by the OCA, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9048 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set
therein for petitions before the courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution
of said petitions.

Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if R.A. No.
9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised
Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts.
The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied
with. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have applied the procedure prescribed in
Rules 103 and 108 in resolving the petitions before him, not the procedure prescribed in
R.A. No. 9048 or the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 9 which applies in civil
cases where the defendant is declared in default.

Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed and verified by the
person desiring a change of name, and set forth compliance with the residency
requirement, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the new name
asked for. The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

20
shall issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition and fixing the date and place for
the hearing of the petition, and direct the publication of the order before the hearing at
least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition, with the Solicitor General or city fiscal appearing on behalf of the Government.
The court shall grant the petition only when satisfactory proof has been presented in
open court that the order had been published as directed, the allegations in the petition
are true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for changing the name of the
petitioner.

Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation or correction of
entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim any interest and
who would be affected by the petition be made parties to the proceeding and be allowed
to file their opposition to the said cancellation or correction within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition or from the last date of publication. It is only after a hearing that the
court may either dismiss or grant the petition. Whether the proceeding under this rule is
summary or adversarial, depending on the type of errors to be corrected, the procedural
requirements under this rule still need to be complied with, the nature of the proceeding
becoming adversarial only when any opposition to the petition is filed and actively
prosecuted.

Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are actions in
rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties thereto but on the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication gives notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party to the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries filed before the
RTC of Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not fall within the purview of R.A. No.
9048. In other words, not all of said petitions pertain to the change of first name or
nickname or the correction of typographical errors in the entries of the registry. Some of
said petitions involve substantial changes in the registry such as change of age, sex,
status, and nationality, and even of middle names and surnames of the petitioners.
Judge Soteros conduct in acting on the petitions, without full compliance with the
procedural requirements under Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, is
appalling. The records of the cases show that Judge Sotero did not comply with the
administrative procedure under the said law. Thus, while R.A. No. 9048 requires that
the petition for correction of entries be posted in a conspicuous place for ten (10)
consecutive days, the records show that some of the petitions were decided less than
ten (10) days from the date of filing. Clearly then, there was no way that the 10-day
posting requirement could have been accomplished. The petitions for change of name
were also granted even without publication of the order of hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation.

As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to

be proficient in the interpretation and application of our laws. Competence and diligence
are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less than that would
be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary,
not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

21
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent retired Judge Cesar M. Sotero of the
Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law.

15. SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court.
The petition impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. That he underwent psychological

examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to
"Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner which decision was challenged
by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, by filing a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court of Appeals rendered
a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Rommel can legally change his name and sex in his birth certificate the ground of
sex reassignment

HELD:

No, Rommel cannot legally change his name and sex in his birth certificate on the
ground of sex reassignment on the grounds of: (1) A Person’s First Name Cannot Be
Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment; (2) No law allows the change of entry in
the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; and (3) Neither may
entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.

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 I. A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.

In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that No person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by
RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of

First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname
in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only
create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.

II. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment

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Article 412 of the Civil Code provides, No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not
a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such
as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast,
sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is
it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a

person’s legal capacity and civil status.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

III. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences.

24
 First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties
who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations.
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the
Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy
in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to
be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law."
However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the
courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. The Court cannot enact a
law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal
branch of government, Congress.

Thus, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT

16. REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA

FACTS:

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and
Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry
of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for
correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a
summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil status,
nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order
directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that
the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality
or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry
records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with
these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction

25
of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and
that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the
petition and have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to
Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the
corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the correction of the petitioner’s
citizenship and civil status and the citizenship and civil status of her minor children?

RULING:

No.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate
remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of
fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning
the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an
appropriate proceeding.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines

"adversary proceeding as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte

application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning
to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716, 718,
110 Was. 39).

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to
ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering
justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary
system.

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.

26
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial
court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil
Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local
civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under the
entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An
opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970.
Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and
presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The Republic on the
other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way
of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register
with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took
place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding
without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding
exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.

Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1)
other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered as
Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a
mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding
professional examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for
pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural born citizenship.

In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by

arguing that the proper procedure was not followed.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be

Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother and
father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument
that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been followed.

We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

17. Republic v. Cagandahan

GR No. 166676, 12 September 2008

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction
of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. In her
petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
27
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy
in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and
her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is

suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael
Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme
Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH under Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court

RULING:

NO

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,
like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her
sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the
gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

That respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent
as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED.

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