Golden Beacon On Criminal Law - 2018

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2018 GOLDEN BEACON

CRIMINAL LAW
By:
Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE
1. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (RA 9344)

Q: What is the criminal responsibility of a child over nine years of
age and under fifteen who has acted with discernment?
A: He is exempt from criminal liability. (Paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code has been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA 9344, which provides:
“SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. --- A child fifteen (15) years
of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subject to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.”
Q: Define intervention.
A: It refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that

caused the child to commit an offense , in the form of an individualized
treatment program including counseling, skills training, education and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social
well-being.
Q: What is the criminal responsibility of a child above 15 years but

below 18 years of age?
A: He is likewise exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted with

discernment. (Sec. 6 2nd par. Of RA 9344 provides:
“A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to
an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subject to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.”
Q: Over what offenses are persons below eighteen (18) years exempt from
prosecution?
A: 1. Vagrancy and Prostitution under Art. 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Mendicancy under PD 1563
3. Sniffing of Rugby under PD 1619.
Such prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on

the Rights of the Child. (Sec. 58).
PEOPLE vs. HALIL GAMBAO, THIAN PERPETIAN et. al.

G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508
FACTS: Perpetian was 17 years old at the time of the commission of

the crime of kidnapping with ransom of a minor son of Lucia Chan.
She was convicted as principal due to her presence in the

commission of the crime.
At the time this case was reviewed by the Supreme Court , she
is already 31 years old.
ISSUES: (1) Whether Perpetian is a co-principal.
(2) Whether her minority be appreciated as mitigating circumstance.
(3) Whether she can avail of the benefit of suspension of

sentence of a child in conflict with the law under RA 9344.
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HELD: (1) NO. Perpetian is not a principal but only an accomplice .

Being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed
will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed.
Her presence and company were not indispensable and essential to

the perpetration of the kidnapping with ransom , hence, she is only
liable as an accomplice.
(2) NO. Her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting but

only as privileged mitigating circumstance. Pursuant to the passing of RA
9344, a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment
is necessary. Considering that Perpetian acted with discernment when she
was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her
minority should be appreciated not as exempting but as a privileged
mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
(3) NO. Under Section 38 of RA 9344, the suspension of sentence

of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even she is
already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of her guilt. Unfortunately, at her present age of 31 , Perpetian can no
longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of
RA 9344, the suspension of sentence can be availed of until the child
in conflict of law reaches the maximum age of 21 years.
2. What are the three cardinal features or main characteristics

of Criminal Law? Give the exceptions thereto. (1978; 1988; 1998)
A: The three cardinal principles or characteristics of criminal law are:
GENERALITY. Criminal laws apply to all persons who commit crimes in

Philippine territory regardless of their nationality, gender, age or other personal
circumstances. Exceptions to this are treaty stipulations, laws of preferential
application and principles of public international law.
TERRITORIALITY. Criminal laws apply to all offenses committed within

Philippine territory. Exceptions to this rule are those found in Art. 2 of
the RPC which provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction of our courts.
PROSPECTIVITY. Penal laws cannot make an act punishable in a

manner in which it was not punishable when committed. Exception to this
rule is whenever a new statute dealing with a crime establishes conditions
more lenient or favorable to the accused, it can be given retroactive
effect. However, this exception has no application: 1) where the new law is
expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of action
and; 2) where the offender is a habitual criminal under Art. 62 RPC.
3. Distinguish motive from intent. (1978; 1996; 1999; 2004)

A: Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a
definite result while intent is the purpose to use a particular
means to effect such result. Intent is an element of the crime
(except in unintentional felonies), whereas motive is not.
4. ACCESSORY (PD 1829)

Q: When will an accessory in a crime be liable as a principal in
another crime?
A: When he is an accessory whose act or omission is also penalized in

a special law. In crimes under special laws or crimes mala prohibita,
the offenders generally are penalized as principals unless otherwise
provided.
Those who assist the principal to escape may be prosecuted under

PD 1829 on obstruction of justice not as accessory but as a
principal, provided that a separate information shall be prepared for the
crime of obstruction.
5. What do you understand by aberratio ictus, error in personae

and praeter intentionem? Do they alter the criminal liability of
the accused? (1989; 1993; 1994; 1999)
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A: Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when the offender delivered
the blow at his intended victim but missed, and instead such blow
landed on an unintended victim. The situation generally brings about complex
crimes where from a single act, two or more grave or less grave felonies
resulted, namely the attempt against the intended victim and the
consequences on the unintended victim. As complex crimes, the penalty for
the more serious crime shall be the one imposed and in the maximum
period. It is only when the resulting felonies are only light that complex
crimes do not result and the penalties are to be imposed distinctly
for each resulting crime.
Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender

actually hit the person to whom the blow was directed but turned
out to be different from and not the victim intended. The criminal
liability of the offender is not affected , unless the mistake in identity
resulted to a crime different from what the offender intended to commit ,
in which case the lesser penalty between the crime intended and the
crime committed shall be imposed but in the maximum period (Art. 49, RPC).
Praeter intentionem or where the consequence went beyond that intended

or expected. This is a mitigating circumstance (Art. 13, par. 3, RPC) when
there is a notorious disparity between the act or means employed by the
offender and the resulting felony, i.e., the resulting felony could not be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the offender from the act or
means employed by him.
6. Distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita. (1988; 1997; 1998; 2001;

2003)
A: Mala in se is a wrong from its very nature , as most of those

punished in the RPC. Hence, in its commission, intent is an element and
good faith is a defense. The test to determine whether an offense is
mala in se is not the law punishing it but the very nature of the
act itself.
On the other hand, an act mala prohibita is a wrong because it is

prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. Hence, the mere commission of that act is what
constitutes the offense punished and criminal intent will be immaterial
for reason of public policy.
Q: Is an election offense mala in se?
A: YES. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27 (b) are mala in se. For
otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue
would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed
within a limited amount of time , errors and mistakes are bound to
happen. And it could not be intent of the law to punish unintentional election
canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of
votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral , since it is done with
malice and intent to injure others. (Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March
14, 2006, 484 SCRA 617)
Q: May a mala in se felony absorb mala prohibita crimes?
A: A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to

Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067 ,
PD 984 and RA 7942). What makes the performer a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them. (Loney vs. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 194).
Q: Is criminal intent material in crimes mala prohibita?
A: It is hornbook doctrine in mala prohibita crimes that the

only inquiry is whether the law has been violated . When the act
is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial . We held in United
States vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, (1909) that:
“It is not necessary that the appellant should have acted

with criminal intent. In many crimes made such by
statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it
were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be
substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution.
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In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which

produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid . In
those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely
the same force and result whether the intention of the
person performing the act is good or bad. (Ampo vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 1690991, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 562).
7. ANTI-FENCING LAW
Q: Convicted by the trial court for violation of Anti-Fencing Law , Bam argued
for her acquittal on appeal, contending that the prosecution failed to prove
that she knew or should have known that the jewelry recovered from
her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Is the defense
valid?
A: NO. The defense is not valid because mere possession of any article
of value which has been the subject of theft or robbery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing. The burden is upon the accused to prove
that she acquired the jewelry legitimately. (Pamintuan vs. People, July 11, 1994)
8. What is an impossible crime ? (1993; 2003)
A : It is an act which would be an offense against persons or property,

were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment , or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. (Art. 4,
par. 2)
But where the acts performed which would have resulted in an

impossible crime also 1) constitute an offense under the RPC, or 2) would
subject the accused to criminal liability although of a different category ,
the penalty to be imposed should be that for the latter and not that
for an impossible crime.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME - CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY
GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009, 592 SCRA 426
FACTS: Gemma, a collector of Mega Foam , received a P10,000 check

from Baby, a client of Mega. Instead of remitting the said collection , she
gave the check to Gener, her brother-in-law, the latter deposited it to
his bank account, however, the said check was dishonored by the
bank due to lack of sufficient funds.
ISSUE: Whether Gemma is criminally liable for qualified theft.
HELD: NO. To be liable of the crime of qualified theft under Article

308 of the Revised Penal Code , the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen . Since Gemma
unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam was
subsequently dishonored, the same was apparently without value.
Gemma is guilty of impossible crime as defined in Article 4,

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code . At the time Gemma took
possession of the check of Mega Foam, she had performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of theft , which is a crime against
property, had it not been impossible of accomplishment because it was
apparently without value when it was subsequently dishonored.
SULPICIO INTOD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Sulpicio intending to kill a person , peppered the latter’s bedroom

with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the
time, no harm came to him.
He was found guilty of impossible crime as defined and penalized

in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59 , both of the
Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of producing
the crime against person.
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AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
PEOPLE vs. LEE KONG

21 L.R.A. 626 (1898)
The accused with intent to kill , aimed and fired at the spot
where he thought public officer would be . It turned out, however,
that the latter was in a different place.
STROKES vs. STATE

21 L.R.A. 898 (1898)
Where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the

victim because the latter did not pass by the place he was lying-in
wait.
CLARK vs. STATE

17 S.W. 145 (1888)
The accused with intent to gain entered the house where he

found the same to be desolated and there was nothing to rob.
STATE vs. MITCHELL

71 S.W. 175 (1902)
Where the accused, with intent to kill, fired at the window of

the victim’s room thinking that the latter was inside, however, at
that moment, the victim was in another part of the house.
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE vs. PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
In the United States, where the offender sought to be committed

is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the
substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied.
This is not true in the Philippines . In our jurisdiction,

impossible crime is recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the
criminal intent is not merely a defense , but an act penalized itself .
Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article
4 (2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between
factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility . Ubic lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
9. When is the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law

not applicable? (1999; 2003)
A - The Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to:
1. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life

imprisonment;
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason , rebellion, sedition or

espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. Those who shall have escaped from the confinement or evaded

sentence;
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them

by the Chief Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one

year;
9. Those who, upon approval of the law (December 5, 1933) had been
sentenced by final judgment;
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.

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Q: What is indeterminate Sentence?
A: It is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum term , which the

court is mandated to impose for the benefit of a guilty person who
is not qualified therefore, when the maximum imprisonment exceeds one (1)
year. It applies to both violations of Revised Penal Code and special
laws.
Q: A public officer is convicted of falsification of official document

penalized by prision mayor . There is one mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. What will be the indeterminate sentence?
A: MAXIMUM - prision mayor minimum, in its proper period after considering the
mitigating circumstance.
MINIMUM - prision correctional, in any of its period or anywhere within the

range of prision correctional without reference to any of its period.
Q: A was convicted of homicide penalized by reclusion temporal . There is an

aggravating circumstance of nighttime which purposely sought by A to better
accomplish his purpose. What will be the indeterminate sentence?
A: MAXIMUM - reclusion temporal in its maximum period after considering the

aggravating circumstance.
MINIMUM - prision mayor in any of its period or anywhere within its

range.
Q: What is the purpose of Indeterminate Sentence Law?
A: It is intended to favor the defendant in a criminal case particularly to

shorten his term of imprisonment depending upon his behavior.
MONINA PUCAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision

correccional to 20 years of reclusion temporal , in addition to the payment
of actual damages in the amount of P205,000.00. In this case, the penalty
of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period is the impossible penalty if the amount of the fraud is
over P12,000 but not over P22,000 . If the amount of the fraud exceeds
for each additional P10,000. The total penalty, however, shall not exceed
twenty years.
To get the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the

total number of years included in the two periods should be
divided into three. The division of the time included in the prescribed
penalty should be divided into three equal periods of time , forming one
period for each of the three portions. The maximum, medium and minimum
periods penalty are therefore: Minimum period - 4 years, 2 months and 1
day to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days; Medium period - 5 years, 5
months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days; and Maximum
period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. However, the total
penalty should not exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
10. Distinguish instigation from entrapment. (1978; 1984; 1990; 1995;

2003)
A : Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to

commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed.
Hence, it is exempting by reason of public policy . Otherwise, the peace
officer would be a co-principal.
On the other hand, entrapment signifies the ways and means devised by
a peace officer to entrap or apprehend a person who has committed a
crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been committed
already. Entrapment is not mitigating.
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PEOPLE vs. YANG

423 SCRA 82 (2004)
INSTIGATION or inducement is committed when the law enforcers lure an

Accused into committing the offense in order to persecute him . It is contrary
to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.
PEOPLE vs. DORIA

G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999
The general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator

of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
‘decoy solicitation’ of persons seeking to expose the criminal . Mere
deception by the detective will not shield defendant , if the offense
committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the
detective.
PEOPLE vs. RAMON QUIAOIT, JR.

G.R. No. 155094, July 30, 2007, 528 SCRA 474
The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a

crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges , is to be condemned as
immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and ways
for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned
and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no
crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes the
instigator a co-criminal. Under the last instance, the crime has already
been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture the law
breaker.
11. What is the purpose of the Probation Law? (1986; 1989)

A: The purposes of the Probation Law are:
a. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by

providing him with individualized treatment;
b. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender

which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence ;
and
c. To prevent the commission of offenses.
Q: What is probation?
A: Probation is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and

sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to
the supervision of a probation officer.
Q: What are the circumstances when probation shall be denied?
A: Probation shall be denied if the court finds that:
1. The offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be

provided effectively by his commitment to an institution;
2. There is undue risk of committing another crime;
3. Probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense

committed.
Q: Who are the offenders disqualified from being placed on probation?
A: The benefits of the Decree shall not be extended to those:
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of

more than 6 years;
2. Convicted of subversion or any crime against the national

security or the public order;
3. Previously convicted by final judgment of an offense punished

by imprisonment of not less than 1 month and 1 day
and/or fine not less than P200;
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4. Who are already serving sentence at the time the

substantive provisions of the Decree became applicable.
Q: What are the effects of violation of probation order?
A: Upon failure of the probationer to comply with any of the conditions

prescribed in the order, or upon his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under
which he was placed on probation.
Q: Ian was found guilty of violating Section 68 of PD 705 , as amended

(The Revised Forestry Code) for having in their possession forest
products without the requisite permits. The trial court sentenced him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. He appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed Ian’s conviction but reduced the
penalty to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional , as
maximum. Ian then filed an application for probation arguing that he
only became eligible for probation after the Court of Appeals
modified the judgment of the trial court and reduced the maximum
term of the penalty imposed. Will Ian’s application for probation be
granted?
A: NO, having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and
having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had
affirmed their conviction, Ian was clearly precluded from the benefits of
probation. For sure, he never manifested that he was appealing only
for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty -- to reduce it to within
probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after
asserting his innocence therein , Ian should be precluded from
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, he ipso facto relinquished
the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law , the purpose
of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the
part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at
once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his
appeal. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal. (Lagrosa vs. People, July 3, 2003).
URBANO MORENO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 547
FACTS: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final
judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention . The Comelec granted her
petition and disqualified Moreno.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of

action because he was already granted probation.
Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon vs. Mutia, the imposition of

the sentence of imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties , was
thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation
Law of 1976, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore
him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and
to fully discharge his liability for any fined imposed.
However, the Comelec assails Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government

Code (LGC) which provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by one (1) year
or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position . Since
Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000 , disqualification
shall commence on this date and ends two (2) years thence. The grant
of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his
sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an
elected local office.
On his petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the LGC
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to
probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence . The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the LGC
because it is a special law which applies only to probationers . Further
even assuming that he is disqualified , his subsequent election as Punong
Barangay allegedly constitutes as implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
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ISSUE
Whether Moreno’s probation grants him the right to run in public office.
RULING
YES. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that “the final discharge
of the probationer shall operate to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted.” It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40
(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
12. What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? (1998; 2003)
A: The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons

participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable
as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect, when they
act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common
purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or
deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus
the act of one shall be the act of all.
PEOPLE vs. HENRY TOGAHAN

G.R. No. 174064, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 557
From a legal standpoint, there is conspiracy if, at the time of the

commission of the offense, the appellants had the same purpose and were
united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated , or inferred from
the acts of the appellants themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent. Where
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.
13. UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION

Q: Is threat or intimidation, the first element of self defense?
A: NO. Unlawful Aggression means an actual, sudden and unexpected attack

on the life and limb of a person or an imminent attack on the life
and limb of a person or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. (Marzonia vs. People, 492 SCRA 636, June 26, 2006).
MANUEL ORIENTE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 155094, January 30, 2007, 513 SCRA 348
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would

presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on
the life and limb of a person -- not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude -- but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken
against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have
been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant
by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.
14. Are reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment the same ?

Can they be imposed interchangeably? (1991; 1994; 2001)
A - NO. Reclusion perpetua is penalty prescribed by the RPC , with a fixed
duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years , and carries
with it accessory penalties.
Life Imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by

special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment and without any
accessory penalty.
15. What is a memorandum check? Is a person who issues

a memorandum check without sufficient funds guilty of
violating BP 22? (1994; 1995)
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A: A memorandum check is an ordinary check with the word “Memorandum,”

“Memo,” or “Mem” written across the check, signifying that the maker or
drawer engages to pay its holder absolutely , thus partaking the nature of
a promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of exchange
within the purview of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instrument Law.
A person who issued a Memorandum Check without sufficient funds is

guilty of violating BP 22 as said law covers all checks whether it is
an evidence of indebtedness, or in payment of a pre-existing obligation ,
or as deposit or guarantee.
Q: What are the elements of estafa thru false pretenses or fraudulent act
by issuance of a post-dated check under par. 2 (d) Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 4885?
A: The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or

issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee thereof. It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a
check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code , and
not the non-payment of a debt. Deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact whether by words or conduct by false or misleading
allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed
which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury. Concealment which the law denotes as
fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other
party ought to have. The post-dating or issuing of a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent act.
(Recuerdo vs. People, 493 SCRA 532, June 27, 2006).
Q: Is good faith a valid defense in prosecution for estafa thru

issuance of a post-dated check?
A: YES. There can be no estafa if the Accused acted in good faith

because good faith negates malice and deceit . Good faith is an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among another things, an honest belief,
the absence of malice and the essence of design to defraud or to
seek an unsconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith
as a concept of his own mind , therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone . It implies honesty of intention
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in
the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim and
absence of intention to overreach another.
16. As a rule, if the offender in a criminal case is

acquitted, his civil liability is also extinguished . What are
the exceptions? (1975; 1984; 1988; 2000)
A - The exceptions to the rule that acquittal from a criminal case extinguishes
civil liability are:
1. When the civil action is based on obligations not arising from

the act complained of as a felony;
2. When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or acquittal is

on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt (Art. 29, NCC)
3. Acquittal due to an exempting circumstance, like insanity;
4. Where the court state in its judgment that the case

merely involves a civil obligation;
5. Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of a

separate civil action;
6. In cases of independent civil actions provided for in Arts.

31, 32, 33 and 34 of the New Civil Code;
7. When the judgment of acquittal includes a declaration that the

fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
11
8. Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the

criminal action which the accused is acquitted.
*** Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely on the offense
committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-
delicts. (People vs. Bayotas, G.R. 102007, September 2, 1994).
EMMA P. NUGUID vs. CLARITA S. NICDAO

G.R. No. 150785, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 93
FACTS: Respondent Clarita Nicdao is charged with having committed 14

counts of violation of BP 22. The criminal complaints allege that sometime
in 1996, from April to August thereof , respondent Nicdao and her husband
approached petitioner Emma Nuguid and asked her if they could borrow
money to settle some obligations.
Having been convinced by the spouses Nicdao and because of the

close relationship of Clarita Nicdao to Emma Nuguid , the latter lent the
money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100k to the
Spouses Nicdao until the total amount reached P1.15M.
As security, respondent Nicdao gave petitioner Nuguid 14 open dated

checks with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within
one year, Nuguid can deposit the checks.
In June 1997, petitioner Nuguid together with Samson Ching demanded

payment of the same, but respondent Nicdao refused to acknowledge the
indebtedness as she has fully paid the entire obligations . Thus, Nuguid
deposited all the checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1.15M .
The checks were all returned for having drawn against insufficient funds
(daif).
A verbal and written demand was made upon respondent Nicdao , but
to no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against
respondent.
MTC found respondent guilty of the charged against her . RTC affirmed.
CA reversed the decisions of the lower courts and acquitted respondent
Nicdao.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Nicdao remains civilly liable for the sum of
P1,150,000.00.
RULING
NO. From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual
character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance
of the social order and (2) as an offense against private person injured
by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others, wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the
offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there
is no private person injured by the crime.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of

everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law.
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of

civil liability, unless the extinction from a declaration in the final judgment
that the fact which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases : (1) where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the
accused’s liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where
the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal
act of which the accused was acquitted.
12
On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP

22, suffice it to say that “the gravamen of BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon
the presentment for payment or make arrangement for its payment within 5
banking days from notice of dishonor.
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012, 664 SCRA 519
FACTS: For the tragic death of Lenny Villa as a result of hazing

initiation rites, 26 members of Aquila Legis were tried and convicted . On
appeal before the Court of Appeals , only Artemio and Fidelito were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide . However,
on petition before the Supreme Court, Artemio died.
ISSUE: Whether the death of Artemio would totally extinguish his

criminal liabilities as well his pecuniary penalties.
HELD: YES. According to Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,

criminal liability for personal penalties is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties
is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment . The term
“personal penalties” refers to the service of personal or imprisonment
penalties while the term “pecuniary penalties” refers to fines and costs ,
including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO MORALES

FACTS: Alfredo Morales was convicted of illegal sale and possession of

dangerous drugs by the RTC and was affirmed by the CA.
While this case is pending appeal before the Supreme Court , Alfredo
Morales died while committed at the Bureau of Corrections.
ISSUE: Whether the civil and criminal liability of the accused are
extinguished.
HELD: YES. Under Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code , criminal
liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment.
Ordinarily, both the civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished upon
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction by the
lower courts.
However, a violation of RA 9165 does not entail any civil liability.

No civil liability needs extinguishment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS

FACTS: Democrito Paras was charged with rape against AAA , a 17

year old minor. The RTC and the CA convicted the accused the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On June 4, 2014, the SC promulgated its Decision, affirming the

judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.
However, Democrito Paras died on January 24, 2013 of pulmonary

tuberculosis at the New Bilibid Prison. The said information was received
only by the SC on August 27, 2014.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision dated June 4, 2014 still
valid in line with the death of accused-appellant.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court’s decision dated June 4, 2014 had
been ineffectual and therefore set aside . The criminal case against the
accused must be also be dismissed.
13
In this case, when the accused-appellant died on January 24, 2013 ,

his appeal to the SC was still pending. The Decision dated June 4,
2014 was thereafter promulgated as the SC was not immediately informed
of the accused-appellant’s death.
The death of the accused-appellant herein , extinguished his criminal

liability as well as his civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the crime committed.
CANCELLATION OF PAROLE UPON

PENDENCY OF ANOTHER CASE
ALEXANDER ADONIS vs. DIRECTOR VENANCIO TESORO
G.R. No. 182855, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 337
FACTS: Adonis was convicted for libel and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of 5 months and 1 day to 4 years , 6 months
and 1 day.
While he began serving his sentence, a second libel case was

likewise filed against him.
Later, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued an order for
the discharge on Parole of Adonis.
In the meanwhile, the SC issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2000

setting the guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the
imposition of fine in libel cases.
In view of these developments, Adonis filed with the RTC a

Motion to Reopen Case praying for his immediate release from detention
and for the modification of his sentence to payment of fine pursuant
to the said circular.
The said motion was granted and he was allowed to post bail
in the amount of P5,000.00.
After posting a cash bond, the order of the Court was served
to Director Tesoro of the Davao Prisons and Penal Farm but the
release of Adonis was not effected.
ISSUE: Whether Adonis is entitled to the benefit of a parole.
HELD: NO. While it is true that a convict may be released from

prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his
sentence, the pendency of another criminal case , however, is a
ground for disqualification of such convict from being released on
parole.
NOVATION IS NOT A GROUND FOR EXTINCTION

OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
NARCISO DEGAÑOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Lydia, a jeweler, entered into an agreement with Narciso and Aida ,
whereas Aida gave instruction to Narciso to receive the jewelry and gold
items for and in her behalf with the condition that she could not
pay it in cash, she should return the unsold jewelry.
Narciso got the jewelry from Lydia after signing the pink receipts
in her presence.
Narciso and Aida were able to pay only up to a certain point

until receipt nos. 614 to 745 were no longer paid and Narciso failed
to return the jewelry covered by such receipt . As a result, Narciso was
charged of Estafa.
Narciso claims that his partial payments to Lydia novated his contract
with her from agency to loan thereby converting his liability from criminal
to civil.
ISSUE: Whether Narciso’s partial payments novated his liability from

criminal to civil.
14
HELD: NO. The partial payments he made and his purported agreement to
pay the remaining obligations did not equate to a novation of the
original contractual relationship of agency to one of sale.
Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or

change of the obligation by a subsequent one that terminates the first ,
either by (1) changing the object or principal conditions; or (2)
substituting the person of the debtor; or (3) subrogating a third person
in the rights of the creditor.
Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal

liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code lists down the various
grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability.
SYNDICATED ESTAFA - ELEMENTS
JOSE RIZAL REMO et. al. vs. DOJ SEC. AGNES DEVANADERA
G.R. No. 192925, December 9, 2016, 813 SCRA 610
FACTS: In 2004, BATELEC II entered into two (2) contracts that required
it to spend a total of P81,000,000,00.
The first contract was entered into by BATELEC II with the I-SOLV
Technology, Inc. (ITI). The contract was for the enterprise-wide automation
and computerization of BATELEC II at the cost of P75,000,000.00.
The second contract was with Supertrac Motors Corporation (Supertrac)

for the procurement of ten (10) boom trucks by BATELEC II at the sum
of P6,100,000.00.
In 2005, a NEA audit report found that ITI and Supertrac contracts
as having been replete with various irregularities and violation of NEA
guidelines.
Spurred by the audit report’s findings , the City Prosecutor found

probable cause to hail petitioners who are directors of BATELEC II to
court for syndicated estafa under PD 1689 based on Article 315 (1) (b)
of the RPC.
ISSUES
1) Whether the directors of BATELEC II be considered a syndicate as
contemplated under PD 1869.
2) Whether petitioners could have committed simple estafa.
RULINGS
1) NO. Syndicate must be five (5) or more persons who used the
association that they formed or managed to defraud its own stockholders ,
members or depositors.
In the case of Galvez vs. CA, came up with the following standards:
1) They must be at least five (5) in number.
2) They must have formed or managed a rural bank,

cooperative, “samahang nayon,” farmer’s association or any other
corporation or association that solicit funds from the general
public.
3) They formed or managed such association with the

intention of carrying out an unlawful or illegal act,
transaction or scheme, i.e. they used the very association that
they formed or managed as the means to defraud its
own stockholders, members and depositors.
There is no doubt that petitioners met the first and second

standards. What is lacking on the part of the petitioners is the
third standard.
Petitioners do not constitute a syndicate under PD 1689 , as they

never used BATELEC II as a means to defraud its members . The fraud
committed through such association must pertain to its receipt of
contribution.
15
As BATELEC II received the contributions of its members via

legitimate transactions, it cannot be said that the petitioners had used the
cooperative to commit fraud on any of its members.
Any alleged misuse of such contributions committed by petitioners after

BETELEC II has already received them through legal means would not
constitute as defraudation committed through the cooperative , but would
merely be an act of mismanagement committed against it . Clearly
then, the third standard of Galvez was not met.
2) NO. As directors of BATELEC II that approved the ITI and

Supertrac contracts, petitioners did not receive funds of the cooperative.
They don’t have juridical possession of Cooperative funds.
Juridical possession is the type of possession that is required by

the transferee of a thing when he receives the same under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC. When juridical
possession is acquired, the transferee obtain such right over the
things that he can set up even against the owner.
In approving the ITI and Supertrac contracts , the petitioner merely

exercises their prerogatives - as directors of the cooperative -- to enter
into contracts that they deem to be beneficial for BATELEC II.
Though the petitioners may have committed certain lapses, errors in

judgment or even violations of NEA guideline in making such approval ,
these do not have the effect of rendering the contracts with ITI and
Supertrac illegal or void initio.
Hence, from a strictly legal perspective, any payments made by

Batelec II pursuant to such contracts - backed as they were by
the proper board approvals -- cannot be deemed a misappropriation or
conversion of the cooperative’s funds.
17. Distinguish generic aggravating circumstance from qualifying

aggravating circumstance. (1984; 1999)
A: Generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances are distinguished as to
legal effect and weight, as follows:
1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary

mitigating circumstance which is not so in a qualifying circumstance.
2. A qualifying circumstance cannot be proved unless alleged in the

information whereas a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved
even though not alleged.
3. A generic aggravating circumstance not offset has the effect of

increasing the penalty to the maximum but not beyond that provided
by law. A qualifying circumstance changes not only the nature but
also the name of the crime and the offender becomes liable for the
new offense which is more serious in nature.
18. What constitute a complex crime? Distinguish it from

delito continuado and continuing offense. (1994; 2004; 2005)
A - A complex crime is constituted when a single act caused two

or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is committed
as a necessary means to commit another offense (Art. 48 RPC).
Delito continuado or continuous offense, on the other hand, is a term

used to denote as only one crime a series of felonious acts arising
from a single criminal resolution , not susceptible of division, which are
carried out in the same place and at about the same time, and
violating one and the same penal provision . The acts done must be
impelled by one criminal intent or purpose, such that each act merely
constitutes a partial execution of a particular crime, violating a common
right, a common penal provision and impelled by a single criminal
impulse.
Meanwhile, a continuing offense is one whose essential ingredients took

place in more than one municipality or city, so much so that the criminal
prosecution may be instituted and the case tried in the competent court of
any one of such municipality or city.
16
The term “continuous/continued crime” or delito continuado and complex

crime mandates that only one information should be filed against the
offender, the term “continuing crime” is more pertinently used with
reference to the venue where the criminal action may be instituted.
RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 169727-28, August 18, 2006, 499 SCRA 375
A continuous crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts

arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division, with each act in that series being merely the partial execution of
a single delict. What is involved herein are several completed and distinct
purported criminal acts which should be prosecuted as multiple counts of
the same type of offense.
COMPLEX CRIME
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SONNY GATARIN

G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014, 721 SCRA 16
FACTS: Howel was riding a bicycle on his way home when he saw
Januario being mauled by two persons.
On the same night , SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were

performing their routine patrol duty when they met the accused who
were running at a fast speed . The policemen chased them but they
were unsuccessful in catching them.
As they continued their patrol, they saw Januario lying on the

street, severely injured. While on the way to the hospital , SPO3
Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him . He answered that it was “Jay-R
and his uncle” who stabbed him. Subsequently, Januario died due to
the fatal wounds he has sustained.
Maria, the deceased’s wife, testified on the amount allegedly stolen

from her husband. The accused allegedly took cash money amounting to
P20,000 from Januario.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the complex crime of robbery with homicide is
present in the case.
(2) Whether the crime committed instead is murder.
HELD: (1) NO. In order for the crime of robbery with homicide to
exist, it must be established that a robbery has actually taken place
and that, as a consequence or the occasion of robbery, a homicide is
committed.
Mary’s testimony was offered by the prosecutor to prove that her
husband was a victim of robbery with homicide . However, it can be
inferred from her testimony that she obviously was not at the
scene of the crime on that fateful night as she was only informed
that the incident took place. It, likewise, appears that she had no
personal knowledge that Januario was robbed. While she claimed that
P20,000 was indeed taken from him , no evidence was presented to
show that Januario indeed had that amount at that time and that
the same was in his possession.
Assuming indeed that robbery was indeed committed , the prosecution

must establish with certitude that a killing was a mere incident to
the robbery. What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly establish the
offenders’ intent to take personal property before the killing.
(2) YES. Abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the

crime which qualifies the offense to murder. This qualifying circumstance
is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which the latter selected or
took advantage of in the commission of the crime.
17
In this case, Januario was then 54 years old while appellant was
only 40 years old. Accused committed the crime with his nephew.
Moreover, assailants were armed with a bladed weapon, while Januario
was unarmed. These two accused were seen by Howel as the persons
who mauled Januario.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ

FACT: On August 19, 2011, the RTC found Chavez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
On February 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The RTC has been established the following circumstances, first, that
accused Chavez went to the parlor of the victim at around 1:00 o’clock
in the morning of 28 October 2006 and was allowed by the victim to
get inside his parlor.
Second, the victim’s two (2) units of cellular phones were declared
as part of the missing personal belonging of the victim , were handed
to SPO3 Casimiro by the mother of the accused on 05 November
2006 when the accused voluntarily surrendered accompanied by his mother
at the police station.
Third, on 28 October 2006 at about 2:45 o’clock in the morning ,

witness Peñamante, who arrived from his work , positively identified the
accused holding and/or carrying something and about to get out of the
door of the house of the victim.
Finally, Dr. Salen’s finding that the body of the victim was dead
for more or less twelve (12) hours when the victim was discovered
fatally killed on 28 October 2006 and the time when the accused
decided on 27 October 2006 to patch up things with the victim is not
so co-incidence.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the prosecution has established that the accused
is guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
(2) Whether an accused shall be released whenever an

accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period
equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged.
HELD: (1) NO. The prosecution has equally established, based on the
circumstantial evidence, that the accused had indeed killed the victim.
It is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of

robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s
intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out, otherwise, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence relied by the lower courts , do not

satisfactorily establish an original design by Chavez to commit robbery.
The 22 stab wounds in the front and back of the victim is a

strong indication that assailants made sure of the success of their
efforts to kill the victim without risk to themselves.
In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide , homicide is

committed in order (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot ; (c) to
prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses to the commission of the crime.
22 stab wounds would be overkill for these purposes . The sheer

number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie makes it difficult to
conclude an original criminal intent of merely taking Barbie’s personal
property.
The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Chavez

for the separate crime of homicide.
18
(2) YES. Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment

for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal.
If the same is under review for purposes of immediate release , the

computation of preventive imprisonment shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct allowance.
However, if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any

stage of the trial, the court may motu propio order the rearrest of the
accused.
Finally excluded from this coverage are the recidivists , habitual

delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes.
In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be

sentenced is destiero, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.
DIRECT ASSAULT WITH MURDER
PEOPLE vs. EX MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO SR., et. al.

FACTS: On April 5, 2004, Floro Casas, while in the performance of

his duty as District Supervisor of public schools , was shot to death
seven (7) times by four (4) persons that caused his instant death.
After committing the crime, the assailants went to the vehicle of

Mayor Estonilo, Sr. and told the latter “mission accomplished, sir” and
thereafter the latter told them to escape.
ISSUE: Whether the crime committed was complex crime of direct

assault with murder.
HELD: YES. When the assault results in the killing of a person in

authority for that matter , there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder.
As to fact of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the RPC , the

elements are that (1) there must be an attack , use of force, or
serious intimidation upon a person in authority ; (2) the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties ; and (3) the
accused knew that the victim is a person of authority.
In this case, Floro Casas was the duly appointed District

Supervisor of Public Schools, thus, was a person in authority and the
attack or assault was made by reason of the performance of his
duty as the District Supervisor.
As to the fact of Murder , the accused were proven guilty of the

crime of Murder and clearly established that (1) Floro Casas was
killed; (2) the five accused killed him ; (3) the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation as well as
treachery; and (4) the killing of Floro Casas was neither parricide nor
infanticide.
The prosecution witness Servando testified that he was present on

the two occasions when the accused were planning to kill Floro Casas .
His categorical and straightforward narration proves the existence of
evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro Casas as he was

successively fired seven (7) times and sustained 13 gunshot wounds
giving him no chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself
from the unexpected onslaught.
NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH HOMICIDE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO ABAYON
19
FACTS: In the evening of July 25, 2002, Abayon and his wife, Arlene
quarreled outside their residence. Since they rented an apartment adjacent
to others, their neighbors witnessed the entire incident.
On the same evening, Abayon’s neighbors heard a hissing sound and

smelled leaking gas. When they came out to check , they saw Abayon
holding an LPG gas tank outside his apartment . Abayon was also holding
an unlit cigarette inserted between his left index and middle fingers and
also match on his left arms. The neighbors then stopped Abayon from
the prospective act.
At past midnight of July 26, 2002 , the house where Abayon and his
neighbors live, started to catch fire. As a result, the houses were
completely burned down along with the personal effects of the residents .
Three (3) persons also died because of the fire.
The RTC found Abayon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of arson resulting to multiple homicide and successfully established the
elements of the crime charged through circumstantial evidence.
ISSUE
Whether there is a complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide.
RULING
NONE. There is no complex crime of arson with homicide because
the crime of arson absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime
altogether.
In People vs. Malngan, it was held that in cases both burning and
death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes were perpetrated --
whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to
ascertain the major objective of the malefactor:
a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or

edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson , and the resulting homicide
is absorbed.
b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a

particular person who may be in the building or edifice,
when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such
goal, the crime committed is murder only; lastly,
c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person,

and in fact the offender has already done so , but fire is
resorted to as a mean to cover up the killing , then there
are two separate and distinct crimes committed --
homicide/murder and arson.
From the body of the information filed , Abayon is charged with the
crime of arson because his intent was merely to destroy his family’s
apartment through the use of fire . The resulting deaths that occurred ,
therefore should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases
the imposable penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section
3 of PD No. 1613.
19. SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
WHERE THE PERSON KIDNAPPED IS KILLED

IN THE COURSE OF DETENTION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO DIONALDO et. al.

G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014, 731 SCRA 68
FACTS: Roderick dropped his brother Edwin off at the Health Is

Wealth Gym. A text message from another brother told him that Edwin
had been kidnapped. He received a phone call from Edwin’s kidnappers
who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the
police and demanded P15M as ransomed money . Roderick told them he
had no such money.
20
After negotiations, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin for

P110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to the
kidnappers at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Subsequently, an orange Mitsubishi car pulled up in front of his

vehicle. He saw one of the four men take a mobile phone and upon
uttering the word “alat,” the men returned to their car and drove away.
During the course of the investigation , Rodolfo, an employee of the

Health gym, confessed that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin ,
as in fact he tipped off the kidnappers on the conditions that he
will be given a share in the ransom money.
Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts leading

to their arrest. The dead body of Edwin was found at Laurel ,
Batangas.
The RTC convicted the accused of kidnapping with serious illegal

detention.
ISSUE: What is the crime committed by the accused in the instant

case?
HELD: The accused are guilty of Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping

for Ransom with Homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 as
amended by RA 7659.
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the

detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48 , not to be treated as separate
crime.
20. Justifying and exempting circumstances have some similar

effects but are different concept. Discuss their similarities
and distinctions. (1978; 2004)
A: In justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, and the actor does
not incur any criminal liability nor civil liability. In an exempting
circumstance, a crime is committed but there is absent in the person of the
offender any of the elements of voluntariness, and so he is not criminally
liable but is civilly liable except in the exempting circumstance of accident
and lawful or inseparable cause.
PEOPLE vs. ISAIAS CASTILLO

G.R. No. 172695, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 215
“Accident” is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened

to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The essential requisites for
this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
21. Distinguish rebellion from coup d’etat. (1991; 2004)
A: Rebellion distinguished from coup d’etat:
As to overt acts. In rebellion, there is public uprising and taking up

arms against the Government. In coup d’etat, public uprising is not
necessary. The essence of the crime is a swift attack , accompanied by
violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
constituted authorities of the Government , or any military camp or
installation, communication network, public utilities or facilities needed for the
exercise and continued possession of government power.
As to objective or purpose. In rebellion, the purpose is to remove

from the allegiance of the Philippines, the whole or any part of the
Philippines or any military or naval camps deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress from performing their functions . In coup d’etat, the objective is
to seize or diminish state powers.
21
As to participation, In rebellion, any person. In coup d’etat, any

person belonging to the military or police or holding public office, with or
without civilian participation.
VICENTE LADLAD vs. VELASCO

G.R. No. 172074-76 & 175013, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318
Rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd

action done in furtherance of a political end.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms

against the government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either --
a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its

laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof;

or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or

partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
22. Is it necessary that the principal of a crime be

convicted first before one may be found guilty and
punished as an accessory? Explain. (1978, 1981).
A - It is not necessary that the principal be convicted before the
accessory be found guilty and punished . Neither the letter nor the
spirit of the law (Art. 19, RPC) requires that the principal be
convicted before one may be punished as an accessory . As long as the
corpus delicti is conclusively proved and the accessory’s participation is
established, he can be held criminally responsible and meted the
corresponding penalty.
23. Distinguish between recidivism and quasi-recidivism; habitual

delinquency from recidivism. (1986; 1998)
A: In recidivism, the convictions of the offender are for crimes
embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code and this
circumstance is generic aggravating and therefore can be offset by
an ordinary mitigating circumstance . Whereas, in quasi-recidivism, the
convictions are not for crimes embraced in the same title of the
Revised Penal Code, provided that it is a felony that was
committed by the offender before serving sentence by final judgment
for another crime or while serving sentence for another crime and
this circumstance is a special aggravating circumstance which cannot
be offset by any mitigating circumstance.
Meanwhile, the distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism are

the following:
1. In habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, which are robbery,

theft, estafa, falsification, serious and less serious physical injuries .
In recidivism, the crimes are embraced in the same title of the
Revised Penal Code.
2. In recidivism, no period of time is fixed between the former

conviction and the last conviction. In habitual delinquency, conviction
of any of the specified crimes must take place within 10 years from
the last conviction or release.
3. In recidivism, it is enough that there be a second conviction

of any crime embraced in the same title of the last or the first
crime. In habitual delinquency, there must be at least a third
conviction of any of the specified crimes.
4. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance and if not offset, serves

to increase the penalty. Habitual Delinquency provides for the
imposition of additional penalty.
22
24. Brig. General Danilo Lim heads an elite Scout Ranger unit . In conspiracy
with other military officers, he planned and decided to lead his men to
an opposition rally and call for President Arroyo’s resignation. He was then
arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit coup d’etat . If you
were the judge, would you convict Gen. Lim and his co-conspirators ?
Why and why not?
A: If I were the judge , I will not convict Gen. Lim and his co-
conspirators of the crime of conspiracy to commit coup d’etat . While
Gen. Lim, a person belonging to the military is actually in conspiracy
with other military officers, and their conspiracy is directed against duly
constituted authority of the Philippines, in order to diminish if not
to seize state power, their conspiracy was only to stage a rally that
would call for the resignation of the President . It was not a
conspiracy to make a swift attack , accompanied by violence, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth as in coup d’etat. Hence, conspiracy to
commit coup d’etat was not committed. (Art. 136, RPC).
25. ANTI-TERRORISM LAW (RA 9372 – HUMAN SECURITY ACT

OF 2007)
Q: Is mere conspiracy to commit terrorism a punishable offense?
A: YES. Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall

suffer the penalty of 40 years of imprisonment. (Sec. 40).
Q: When is there a conspiracy?
A: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as
Defined in Section 3 thereof and decide to commit the same.
Q: Is mere proposal to commit terrorism a punishable offense?
A: NO. The law punishes only conspiracy , not proposal to commit

terrorism. A person who has decided to commit terrorism who
proposes its execution to another person is not punishable under
the law.
Q: What is the prescriptive period for the police officer to file

criminal complaint for terrorism with the Public Prosecutor’s Office?
A: Within 30 days from the termination of the period granted by

the Court of Appeals.
Q: Which Court may authorize to examine Bank deposits , accounts and

records?
A: The Justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special

court to handle anti-terrorism.
Q: Are the provisions of Book 1 of the Revised Penal Code

applicable to the Anti-Terrorism Law?
A: YES, by express provision of Sec. 52 of the law . The

applicable penalties conform to the classification even under Book II of
the Revised Penal Code. Terrorism is inherently evil, and is therefore
a crime mala in se governed by the provisions of Book I of the
Revised Penal Code.
26. P.D. 533 - ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974

Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser;
(4) the taking is done by any means , method or scheme; (5)
the taking is done with or without intent to gain ; and (6) the
taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation
against persons or force upon things.
Considering that the gravamen of the crime is the taking or killing

of large cattle or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the
owner or raiser, conviction for the same need only to be supported by
the fact of taking without the cattle owner’s consent . ( Pil-ey vs. People, G.R.
No. 154941, July 9, 2007, 527 SCRA 76)
23
27. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
CELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 195
When the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under

RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearms should be
quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be
tried together with such other offense , either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an
element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.
Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of

those enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for
illegal possession of firearm.
28. P.D. 705: FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
TIGOY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 144640, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 539
There are two ways of violating the said Section 68 of PD 705 : (1)
by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without a license; and (2) by possessing timber or other forest products
without the required legal documents.
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an

act is prohibited by a special law as in the present case , the
commission of the prohibited act is the crime itself . It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by
the special law and that it is done knowingly and consciously.
29. R.A. 7610: SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST

CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
PEOPLE vs. DELANTAR

G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 punishes not only the

person who commits the acts of sexual intercourse or
lasciviousness conduct with the child but also those who engage
in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution.
NAVARETTE vs. PEOPLE

The law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused

for profit but also one in which a child , through coercion or
intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct. The very title of
Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse ) of RA
7610 shows that it applies not only to a child subjected to
prostitution but also to a child subjected to other sexual abuse .
A child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” when he
or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult. Here, BBB was sexually abused because she was
coerced or intimidated by petitioner (who poked her neck with a
knife) to indulge in lascivious conduct.
FELINA ROSALDES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan, a grade 1
pupil, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped
the knee of his teacher , Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa.
Roused from sleep, Rosaldes asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.

Michael Ryan did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat . Rosaldes
went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh , held him up by his
armpits and pushed him to the floor causing him to hit a desk and ,
consequently, losing his consciousness.
Rosaldes contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical
injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a
24
manner that would debase or degrade his dignity. She avers that her
maltreatment is only an act of discipline that she as a school teacher
could reasonably do towards the development of the child.
ISSUE: Whether Rosaldes is guilty of the crime of child abuse

punishable under RA 7610.
HELD: YES. Rosaldes is guilty of violation of RA 7610 . Although, as

a school teacher, she could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil ,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary , violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence he suffered at her
hands.
Section 3 of RA 7610 defines child abuse as maltreatment, whether

habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following : any
act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
The act need not be habitual. The physical pain experienced by the
victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to
stop going to school altogether out of fear of Rosaldes, compelling his
parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again.
Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that

Rosaldes was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human
being.
30. PARRICIDE (ART. 246 of the RPC)

ELEMENTS OF PARRICIDE
1. That a person is killed.
2. That the deceased is killed by the accused.
3. That the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate

or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.
IMPORTANT NOTES ABOUT PARRICIDE
1. The relationship of the offender with the victim is the essential

element of the felony.
2. Parents and children are not included in the term “ascendants”

or “descendants”
3. The other ascendant or descendant must be legitimate. On the

other hand, the father, mother or child may be legitimate or
illegitimate.
4. The child should not be less than 3 days old , otherwise, the
offense is infanticide.
5. Relationship must be alleged.
6. A stranger who cooperates in committing parricide is liable for murder

or homicide.
7. Even if the offender did not know that the person he had
killed is his son, he is still liable for parricide because the law
does not require knowledge of the relationship.
31. R.A. 3019: ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
ROLANDO VALDERAMA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

542 SCRA 423, G.R. No. 147578-85, January 28, 2008
To hold a person liable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the

concurrence of the following must be established beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution:
25
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private

person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that the said public officer commits the prohibited

acts during the performance of his or her official duties
or in relation to his or her public positions:
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party , whether

the government or a private party;
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality ,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The Sandiganbayan found that petitioner participated directly in the

malicious apprehension and impounding of the taxi unit of the
respondent, causing him undue injury.
CONSPIRACY OF PUBLIC OFFICER WITH PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
EDELBERT C. UYBOCO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Uyboco, president of Gaikoku, and Valencia, a public officer,

were found engaged in transaction wherein there was an overpayment
of the purchase of dump trucks.
These dump trucks were directly imported by the Provincial

Government from the distributor in Japan. With this direct importation, the
Provincial Government should have only paid the tax-free amount of
P4,594,119.85. Instead, Valencia had already authorized and caused the
disbursement of P6,994,286 or an excess of P2,400,166.15 in favor of
Uyboco’s company, Gaikoku.
This transaction clearly caused unjust injury to the government.
ISSUE: Whether Uyboco, a private individual, is liable for violation of

RA 3019.
HELD: YES. Although a private individual, Uyboco has been found to

have been in conspiracy with Valencia, who was then the provincial
governor.
Under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, it provides that an act shall

constitute corrupt practices if any public officer may cause any unduly
injury to any party including the Government or giving any private
party unwarranted advantage or preference.
This transaction clearly caused unjust injury to the government.
32. MALVERSATION THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
ESTEPA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

182 SCRA 269, G.R. No. 59670, February 15, 1990
In the crime of malversation , all that is necessary for

conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public
funds and that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefore was made and he could not satisfactorily explain
his failure so to account. An accountable officer may be convicted for
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of personal
misappropriation, where he has not been able to explain satisfactorily
the absence of public funds involved . Under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, there is prima facie evidence of malversation
where the accountable public officer fails to have duly forthcoming any
public funds with which he is chargeable upon demand by duly
authorized officer. As this Court has pointed out, this presumption juris
tantum is founded upon human experience.
33. BP 22 and ESTAFA

26
ARTICLE 315 - JUDICIAL POSSESSION INDISPENSABLE

IN ESTAFA
MARGIE BALERTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014, 743 SCRA 166
FACTS: Margie worked as one of the three cashiers in BABMPC .

She used to receive daily remittances, deposit to the bank, withdraw
and issue loans in connection with Care Philippines account.
Upon internal audit, BABMPC found there was a discrepancy of

P185,000 being kept allegedly by Margie.
Timonera, the manager of BABMPC, without the presence and

permission of Margie, opened the table and drawers of Margie through
the use of duplicate keys kept by De Asis , one of the three
cashiers.
Margie reported the forced opening of her table and drawers to the
police station. She also informed the police that the amount of P5,000
kept in the drawer was missing . More importantly, she can no longer
find the receipts, vouchers and books in her drawers showing the cash
advances of Timonera. Her plea for the conduct of an independent
audit also fell on deaf ears.
The criminal complaint for estafa against Margie was filed on the
basis of the findings of an internal auditor and not an independent
accountant.
In the course of the trial, only Timonera appeared to testify.

When the proceeding was concluded , both the prosecution and the
defense did not formally offer any documentary evidence.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused is entitled to an acquittal
considering that a cashier does not have juridical
possession over the funds she holds.
(2) Whether her guilt had been proven beyond reasonable

doubt.
HELD: (1) YES. There is no question that Margie was handling the
funds lent by Care Philippines to BABMPC , however, she held the
funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds, she had mere physical
or material possession, but she held no independent right or title,
which she can set up against BABMPC. Margie was nothing more
than a mere cash custodian , she had no juridical possession over
the allegedly misappropriated funds as an element of the crime of
estafa by misappropriation.
She did not have the sole access over the records and funds .
Consequently, the authorship of the falsified entries in the passbook
cannot be attributed with certainty to Margie alone.
Moreover, Timonera failed to state with certainty where in the

records held by Margie were the discrepancies.
(2) NO. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal

unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt.
At the outset, it is significant to point out that neither the

prosecution nor the defense had made any formal offer of documentary
evidence. The two passbooks, ledger and three demand letters , while
mentioned by Timonera in his testimony, were not offered as evidence.
The contending parties each had one witness , namely, Timonera, for
the prosecution and Margie, for the defense. Both of their testimonies
were therefore without any corroboration. Considering the absence of formal
offer of evidence, the judgment rendered by the RTC and the CA
solely hinged on who was more credible between the two witnesses.
Timonera’s testimony is incredible, by itself alone and it is

insufficient to discharge the burden of proof required for conviction in
criminal cases.
27
Margie was indicted for allegedly misappropriating the amount of

P185,584.06, however, Timonera failed to state with certainty where in the
records held by Margie were the discrepancies shown . Timonera evaded
answering the question by emphasizing that he is not an accountant
and that Ambros knew more about the matter.
Hence, Margie did not have the sole access over the records and
funds. Consequently, the authorship of the falsified entries in the
passbook cannot be attributed with certainty to Margie alone . It was thus
fatal for the prosecution’s cause that Ambros, the internal auditor, Asis,
the cashier and the bank personnel did not take the witness stand
especially since documentary evidence were never formally offered as
well.
The RTC and the CA faulted Margie for not offering countervailing
evidence, including an audit conducted in her own behalf. Still, it
does not justify a conviction to be handed on the ground because
the courts cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and overlook the
prosecution’s failure to discharge the onus probandi.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated .

This, however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the
prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.
Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more

inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with
the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt ,
the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.
BP 22 - ELEMENTS & REMEDIES

Evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of fund:
1. Making, drawing and issuance of check which is refused.
2. Prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds.
Requisites:
a) Check presented within 90 days.
b) Dishonored, and
c) Failure to make good the check within 5 banking days after

receiving notice of dishonor.
** The presumption of knowledge can exist only after it is proved

that the issuer had received the notice of dishonor . The prosecution
must prove receipt, i.e., registered mail or authenticated signature on
registry return receipt. The registry receipt alone is insufficient .
Testimony or affidavit of person mailing the letter is registered. (Ting
vs. CA (2000).
** Verbal notice of dishonor is insufficient . Must be written.

(Domangsang vs. CA (2000).
** What the law prohibits is issuance. The purpose or conditions of

issuance is immaterial. Issuance is malum prohibitum. That the check
was issued as a guarantee is immaterial , unless the check was not
issued for account or value. (Wong vs. CA (2001).
** BP 22 does not state that the issuer must maintain funds for
only 90 days. That the check must be deposited within 90 days is
merely one of the conditions for the presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency. It is not an element of the offense. Where presentment
was made after 90 days, only the presumption was lost. Knowledge
could still be proven by evidence . By current banking practice , the
check must be presented within 180 days. Afterwards it becomes stale.
Presentment after 180 days is then a defense. (Wong vs. CA (2001).
** Absence of the notice merely prevents the presumption of

knowledge of insufficiency. The prosecution must then prove knowledge
with evidence. Thus, the nature is NOT a pre-requisite for a BP 22
prosecutions. (Young vs. CA (2005)
28
** Payee’s knowledge of insufficiency of funds is immaterial because

deceit is not an element of BP 22 . The exception is when there
was no intention to apply said checks for account or for value.
(Young vs. CA (2005).
** Responsibility under BP 22 is personal to the accused . Hence, the

nature must also be personal . Thus, if the issuer is a corporation ,
notice to the corporation is not notice to the officer . (Marigomen vs.
People (2005).
PAYMENT OF DISHONORED CHECKS
ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. 190834, November 26, 2914, 742 SCRA 684
FACTS: Ariel Lim issued two (2) checks dated June 30, 1998 and July
14, 1998 payable to CASH in the amount of P100,000 each to Willie
Castor as his campaign donation to the latter’s candidacy.
It was Castor who ordered the delivery of printing materials and

used Ariel Lim’s checks for payment of the same . Due to late delivery
of printing materials, Castor instructed Ariel Lim to issue a “Stop
Payment” order for the two checks.
The checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order

and that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds.
Private complainant sent two demand letters to Ariel Lim and filed
complaint against Lim before the Office of the Prosecutor.
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand
letters, and upon receipt of the subpoena from the Office of the
Prosecutor, Ariel Lim issued a replacement check in the amount of
P200,000. Private complainant was able to encash said replacement check.
Six months after Ariel Lim had paid the amount of the bounced
check, two informations were filed against him before the MeTC of
Manila.
ISSUE: Whether the accused would still be penalized for violation of

BP 22 after having paid the amount of the checks upon receipt of a
subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor.
HELD: NO. The fact that the issuer of the checks had already paid
the value of the dishonored checks after having received the subpoena
from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of
the information in court.
The spirit of the law which, for B.P. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system , would not be served by
penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and
made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against
them.
In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the

information has already attained the purpose of the law.
MARCIANO TAN vs. PHIL. COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK

G.R. No. 152666, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 532
FACTS: Marciano applied for a Letter of Credit with PCIB for the
importation of four tourist buses with a total value of US$430,000.
The parties entered into a trust receipt agreement with PCIB as

trustor and Marciano as entrustee.
When the tourist buses arrived, Marciano issued 14 postdated checks.

Of the 14 checks, only the first five checks were honored , the other
nine checks were dishonored in the amount of P1,785,855.75.
Marciano having suffered financial reverses, availed of Section 7 of

the Trust Receipt by surrendering the buses to PCIB. At the time of
surrender, the buses were estimated to be “about 6.6 million pesos.”
Subsequently, PCIB sent Marciano a demand letter and followed by

a criminal complaint for violation of B.P 22.
29
ISSUE: Whether the accused would still be liable for violation of BP 22

after PCIB had received and keeping in possession the four buses
pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipt.
HELD: NO. PCIB already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh by

receiving and keeping in possession the four buses - trust properties
surrendered by Marciano pursuant to Section 7 of the Trust Receipt
Agreement.
The estimated value of the surrendered buses was “about P6.6

million” while the amount of the dishonored checks was P1,785,855.75 . It
is clear that Marciano had more than fully satisfied the amount of
dishonored checks prior to the receipt of the demand letter from
PCIB.
In keeping with jurisprudence , the Court then considers such payment

of the dishonored checks to have obliterated the criminal liability of the
accused.
While issuing of a bouncing check is malum prohibitum , the

prosecution is not excused from its responsibility of proving beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
Respecting the second element of the crime , the prosecution must

prove that the accused knew, at the time of issuance, that he does
not have sufficient funds or credit for the full payment of the check
upon its presentment.
GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129764, March 12, 2002, 379 SCRA 94
FACTS: Griffith, president of Lincoln - Gerald, Inc., incurred rental arrearages

and issued two (2) post-dated checks in favor of Phelp Dodge.
Due to four - week labor strike that paralyzed the business operation
of Lincoln – Gerald, the checks issued were not funded and in so
doing, the checks when presented to the drawee bank for payments
were dishonored on the ground of drawn against insufficient funds.
Phelp Dodge foreclosed the properties of Lincoln – Gerald and at

the sale on public auction, the former realized a proceeds more than
the value of the two (2) checks issued.
A criminal case for violation of BP 22 was filed against Griffith

where the latter was convicted by MeTC , sustained by RTC and
affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: Whether the debtor’s president would still answer for a criminal
offense under BP 22 after two years the creditor had collected more
than sufficient to cover the value of checks dishonored.
HELD: NO. The checks were dishonored and Phelp Dodge filed criminal
cases for violation of BP 22 against Griffith . But this filing took place
only after Phelp Dodge had collected the amount of the checks , with
more than one million pesos to spare , through notarial foreclosure and
auction sale of Lincoln - Gerald properties earlier impounded by the Phelp
Dodge.
The Bouncing Check Law was designed to safeguard the interest

of the banking systems and the legitimate public checking account user .
It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to
enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose
of the law.
We must find if the application of the law is consistent with

the purpose of and reason of the law.
“Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex” means that “when the reason for
the law ceases. It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life.
PROOF OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR

MA. ROSARIO P. CAMPOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
30
FACTS: Campos obtained a loan from FWCC payable on installments .

She issued several post-dated checks in favor of FWCC to cover the
agreed installment payments.
Fourteen (14) of these checks, however, were dishonored when

presented for payment with the drawee bank on the basis of “closed
account.”
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC

despite demand, she was charged before the MTC with violations of
B.P. 22.
The MTC, RTC and CA found Campos guilty of 14 counts of

violations of BP 22 and found that the required Notice of Dishonor for
FWCC was received by Campos.
Campos denies having received a notice of dishonor from FWCC and

categorically declared that “she has in her favor evidence to show that
she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment
of her obligations subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.”
ISSUE: Whether the notice of dishonor was received by the accused.
HELD: YES. The mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover
registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of
dishonor had been sent to or served on issuer of checks. The
authentication by affidavit of the mailers was necessary in order for
service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of giving of
notice of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element
of the offense.
Campos’ declaration that she subsequently in good faith made

arrangement for the payment of her obligation after the dishonor of the
checks was a confirmation that she actually received the notice of
dishonor from FWCC. Campos would not have entered into the alleged
arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her
creditor and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with
the bank and the dishonor of her checks.
Jurisprudence has emphasized the importance of proof of receipt of

such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but
as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of
insufficiency of funds when he issued the check and the bank
dishonored it, in relation to the second element of the offense and
Section 2 of BP 22 which creates a presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds.
BP 22 TO CONSTITUTE ESTAFA
To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient
cause of defraudation, and as such it should be either prior to or
simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to
obtain money or property from the offended party because of the
issuance of a check whether postdated or not. That is, the latter
would not have parted with his money or other property were it not
for the issuance of the check.
34. LIBEL - ARTICLE 354 OF RPC
ELIZALDE S. CO vs. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ, JR.

FACTS: In several interviews with radio stations in Legazpi City , Muñoz, a

contractor, revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public
duty of Elizalde Co, who is a public figure considering his participation
in government projects and his prominence in the business circles.
Muñoz claimed that the imputation dealt with matters of public

interest and thus, a privileged communication.
31
ISSUE: Whether Muñoz be held liable for libel.
HELD: NO. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as an element

of the crime.
Article 354 of the RPC states that malice is not presumed

when (1) a private communication made by any person to another in
the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (2) fair and true
reports, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings or any other act performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions.
Muñoz’ statements were protected as privileged communications

considering that Co is a public figure and as such , Co is subject to
criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.
ALFONSO LAGAYA vs. PEOPLE & MARILYN MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 176251, July 25, 2012, 677 SCRA 478
FACTS: Dr. Lagaya issued a memorandum addressed to the HPPs Plant

Managers and Staff and distributed to the different plants all over the
country against Dr. Martinez about “Disclosure and Misuse of Confidential
and Classified Information” and a salient portion thereof states that Dr.
Martinez needs to undergo psychological and psychiatric treatment to prevent
deterioration of her mental and emotional stability.
On account of the issuance of the memorandum , Dr. Martinez claimed

that she was exposed to public ridicule and humiliation.
ISSUE: Whether the subject memorandum libelous.
HELD: YES. The subject memorandum dealt more on the supposedly

abnormal behavior of Dr. Martinez which to an ordinary reader
automatically means a judgment of mental deficiency.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person

the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real
or imaginary which tends to dishonor or discredit or put her in
contempt.
The element of malice was also present when the right of Dr.
Martinez’ reputation was injured by the defamatory imputation.
35. QUASI OFFENSES - Reckless Imprudence Resulting

in Physical Injuries
DR. FERNANDO SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192123, March 10, 2014, 718 SCRA 263
FACTS: Gerald was born with imperforate anus . Two days after his birth ,
he underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a
colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
When Gerald was already three years old, he was admitted at Ospital
ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Solidum assisted the surgical
team as one of the anesthesiologists.
During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycordia and went into a

coma. His coma lasted for two weeks but he regained consciousness only
after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Luz lodged a

complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries against
the attending physicians.
ISSUE: Whether Dr. Solidum be held criminally liable under the principle
of Res Ipsa Loquitor.
32
HELD: NO. The principle of Res Ipsa Loquitor is not applicable in this
case. It is necessary to prove by competent evidence the following
elements:
1. the duty owed by the physician to the patient as

created by the physician-patient relationship.
2. the breach of duty by the physician’s failing to act

in accordance with the applicable standard of care;
3. there must be a reasonable close and casual connection

between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury;
and
4. the damages suffered by the patient.
There is no definition of the duty of a particular physician in a

particular case exists and the standard of care must be determined in
every case, with the judge weighing the testimonies of experts on both
sides to ultimate determine the standard, on the trier of facts.
36. THEFT - Crime Against Property
WORDWIDE WHITE WEB CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE & PLDT

G.R. Nos. 161106/161266, January 13, 2014, 713 SCRA 18
Use of Communications facilities without consent constitutes theft.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must

be shown to exist:
(1) the taking by petitioner;
(2) of PLDT ‘s personal property;
(3) with intent to gain;
(4) without the consent of PLDT;
(5) accomplished without the use of violence against or

intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.
In the light of Laurel vs. Abrogar, it was held that the use of
PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its
telephone services and business.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent

of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft , which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.
37. FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT

CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CSC & REMA MARTIN SALVADOR

FACTS: Cecilia filed a complaint with CSC against Rema on the

ground of falsification and misrepresentation of facts indicated in her
Personal Data Sheet (PDS). The CSC found Rema to be liable for
simple misconduct, ruling that her act was mere error of judgment . As
a penalty, Rema was suspended for one (1) month. Cecile ceased her
pursuit and did not appeal the CSC decision.
Prior to CSC order, Cecile filed a criminal charge against Rema

with the MTCC for falsification of public documents for making false
statements in her PDS. Later, MTCC found Rema guilty of the crime
charged. Rema did not appeal and then applied for probation . Her
application was granted and she was placed under probation for a
period of one (1) year.
33
By reason of the said conviction, Cecile filed the second

administrative complaint for the offense of conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The CSC and CA ruled that Rema’s misrepresentation was merely

an error of judgment and no moral turpitude is involved.
ISSUES
(1) Whether Rema was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
(2) Whether her conviction and eventual discharge from

probation prevent another administrative case to be filed against
her.
HELD: (1) YES. Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude.
The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice ,
honesty and good morals and therefore, involves moral turpitude.
The court found that she made an untruthful statements in a

narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.
Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of

falsification of public document is the violation of the public faith and
the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed , the elements of
the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude clearly exist in this case.
(2) NO. Probation does not erase the effects and fact of
conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed.
The purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human

material, unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which
the person under probation has been convicted.
The reform and rehabilitation of the probation cannot justify her in

the government service. Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal
liability of the accused and not her administrative liabilities, if any.
FAILURE TO PROVE THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME
FELIX L. ARRIOLA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 217680, May 30, 2016, 791 SCRA 478
FACTS: Arriola occupied the position of an accountable officer at the City

Hall who held the responsibility of requisitioning CTCs . He had five (5)
employees under him who issued the CTCs to individual taxpayers from the
booklets he issued to them for such purpose . Such booklets were under
Class “A” at the cost of P5.00 each. After receiving the amount of P250.00
from each booklet from his employees , he immediately remitted the same to
the Office of the City Treasurer.
Meanwhile, Gregg Business Agency needed to procure Community Tax

Certificates (CTCs) for 21 of its clients . Pagapong, its Liaison Officer, was
instructed to coordinate with a certain “Girlie Moore” to obtain the same.
Moore personally visited the agency to get the names of the clients after
receiving the amount of P38,500.00 to process the CTCs.
After frequent follow-ups, Pagapong was able to obtain from Girlie

Moore the CTCs at the City Hall . As soon as she received the CTCs ,
she proceeded to the Releasing Area of the Treasurer’s Office to secure
Order of Payment and presented the CTCs as a requirement and upon
verification, the CTCs were found to be fake or falsified. So Pagapong
was subjected to investigation.
Further verifications from the records disclosed that the CTCs with the
same serial numbers were requisitioned by and issued to Arriola , Local
Operations Officer I.
The RTC convicted Arriola of 21 counts of the crime of Falsification of

Public Documents based on circumstantial evidence and the same was affirmed
by the CA on appeal.
I S S U E S
(1) Whether Arriola being an accountable officer is guilty of the crime
of Falsification of public document.
34
(2) Whether the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution failed

to evoke the moral certainty that Arriola was guilty.
(3) Supposing Arriola had actually participated in the commission of the

crime, could he be convicted if the circumstantial evidence is plainly
inadequate and unconvincing?
RULINGS
(1) NO. Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two
things: a) the fact of the crime , that the presence of all the elements
of the crime with which the accused stands charged, and b) the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to

prove the identity of the perpetrator even if the commission of the crime
is established.
In the case at bench , the State, aside from showing the existence
of the crime of falsification of public document, has the burden of
correctly identifying the author of such crime . Both facts must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of the prosecution evidence and
without solace from the weakness of the defense.
(2) YES. It is true that conviction is not always based on direct

evidence for it may also rest purely on circumstantial evidence.
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on

circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites
concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven ; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an

unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing
to the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the guilty person.
The circumstances proven must be consistent with each other ,

consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
any other rationale hypothesis except that of guilt.
On the basis of these principles, the circumstantial evidence of the

prosecution failed to muster the quantum of proof required in criminal
cases - guilty beyond reasonable doubt . Moreover, the circumstances
enumerated by the trial court did not completely discount the possibility
that other than Arriola, another person or persons could have falsified the
subject CTCs.
There was no showing either that the replicas of the Class A CTC ,
which Girlie Moore delivered to Pagapong , came from Arriola, or that he
was the one who actually made the duplicates . These gaps in the
prosecution account spawn doubts in the mind of a reasonable person .
Verily, there was no concrete prosecution evidence that would link Arriola to
the falsification.
(3) NO. Supposing that Arriola had actually participated in the

commission of the crime. The Court, cannot convict him when the
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the RTC and subscribed to by the
CA is plainly inadequate and unconvincing. Thus, it cannot be said that
the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
And where there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of an

accused, he must be acquitted even though his innocence may be
questioned, for it is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability
even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be true
than the contrary.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt, more than mere likelihood, requires moral
certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience
of those who are to act upon it.
38. ART. 218 - FAILURE TO RENDER ACCOUNTS
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

35
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 191
FACTS: In 1994, Mayor Lumauig of Alfonso Lista obtained a cash

advance of P101,736.00 intended for the payment of freight and insurance
coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality
by the City of Manila.
However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses

and five patrol cars. It never came to his mind to settle or liquidate
the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to
the municipality.
He claimed that he was neither informed or did he receive any

demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances . It was in 2001
while he was claiming for separation pay when he came to know he
still has an unliquidated cash advance.
And so as not to prolong the issue , he paid the amount of

P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer, for which reason, the incumbent
Mayor Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Lumauig for the violation of RA 3019

but convicted him for the felony of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts under Art. 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the acquittal under RA 3019 a bar to his
conviction under Art. 218 of RPC.
(2) Whether prior demand is a requisite for conviction under

Article 218 of the RPC.
HELD: (1) NO, acquittal from violation of RA 3019 is not a bar

against conviction for Article 218 of the RPC.
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident .
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the same act
may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges.
The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the

RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a public officer whether in the

service or separated therefrom.
(2) that he must be an accountable officer for public funds

or property.
(3) that he is required by law or regulation to render

accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and
(4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months

after such account should be rendered.
(2) NO, demand is not element of the offense and that it is

sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring the public officer to
render an account.
Since Lumauig received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994,

he was, thus, required to liquidate the same on or before January 20,
1995. Further, to avoid liability under Article 218, he should have
liquidated the cash advance two months from the time it was due , or
on before March 20, 1995.
In the case at bar , Lumauig liquidated the subject cash advance

only on June 4, 2001 . Hence, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan ,
he was liable for violation of Article 218 because it took him over six
years before settling his accounts.
Considering the two mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and

return or full restitution of the funds, Lumauig is sentenced to a
straight penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor.
39. ARTICLE 335 - RAPE

36
PREGNANCY IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF RAPE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARAS

G.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014, 724 SCRA 691
FACTS: While AAA was weeding grass at her employer’s farm, Paras
approached her from behind. He pulled AAA towards the lower portion
of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her mouth . AAA struggled
and tried to kick but proved futile as Paras was physically stronger.
Since AAA was afraid of Paras and that she was also afraid to
kill a person, she did not strike him with the bolo she was holding .
While struggling, AAA even threw stones at the accused . As a result
of such incident, AAA got pregnant.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
(2) Whether pregnancy is an essential element of rape.
HELD: (1) YES, the accused is guilty of rape by having carnal

knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation.
The court a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive
identification of the accused. AAA was indeed categorical who pointed a
gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.
(2) NO. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of

rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the
accused or by some unknown individual is of no moment . What is
important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the
victim against the latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact
was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.
40 - ARTICLE 352 - PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL

MARRIAGE CEREMONY
RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 675
FACTS: Joey and Claire were scheduled to marry each other at Sta.
Rosa Catholic Church. However, on the day of wedding , Fr. Ragaza
refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed
to secure a marriage license.
As recourse, Joey and Claire, together with their parents, sponsors

and guests, proceeded to the Independent of Aglipayan Church . They
requested Priest Ronulo to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they have no
marriage license.
Fr. Ronulo conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom ,

the bride, the parents, the sponsors and invited guests.
ISSUE: Whether Ronulo is guilty of violating Article 352 of the RPC

on solemnizing illegal marriage.
HELD: YES. Fr. Ronulo is guilty of violating Article 352 of the RPC
on solemnizing illegal marriages. The elements of the crime are as
follows: (1) that the accused has the authority of the solemnizing officer ;
and (2) that he performs an illegal marriage ceremony . In the present
case, Fr. Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize marriage.
The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage

ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as
husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, Fr. Ronulo admitted that the parties

appeared before him. Second, the contracting parties personally declared that
they take each other as husband and wife.
37
Undoubtedly, Fr. Ronulo conducted the marriage ceremony despite

knowledge that the essential and formal requirements set by law were
lacking as the couple had no marriage license.
The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. Fr. Ronulo’s knowledge

of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
41 ARTICLE 151 - RESISTING ARREST AND

DISOBEDIENCE
RA - ANTI-DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING ACT OF 2013
EDMUND SYDECO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Edmund, together with the cook and waitress of his restaurant ,
were on their way home on board his pick up when police officers
manning a checkpoint signaled them to stop.
According to the policemen , they spotted that his vehicle had been
swerving and this prompted them to flag it down . They asked Edmund
to alight from the vehicle so that he could take a rest at the police
station situated nearby before he resumes driving.
Their flashlights trained up inside of the vehicle and its occupants ,

the policemen then asked Edmund to open the vehicle’s door and alight
for a body and vehicle search , a directive he refused to heed owing
to a previous extortion experience . Instead, he opened the vehicle’s
window, uttering, “plain view lang boss, plain view lang.”
Obviously irked by this remark, one of the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar

then told Edmund that he was drunk pointing to three cases of empty
beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle.
Edmund’s explanation about being sober and that the empty bottles
adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored as P/Insp. Aguilar
suddenly boxed him in the mouth, poked a gun at his head and
blurted curse words against him. The officers then pulled Edmund out of
the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police mobile car . The
policemen then brought Edmund to a hospital when they succeeded in
securing a medical certificate depicting Edmund as “positive” of alcoholic
breath.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the elements of resistance and serious
disobedience under Art. 151 RPC present in the instant
case.
(2) Whether the accused Edmund be held liable under new

RA 10586 or the “Anti-Drunk Driving Act of 2013.”
HELD: (1) NO. The two key element of resistance and serious
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1) that a
person in authority or an agent is engaged in the performance of
official duty or gives a lawful order and (2) that the offender resists
or seriously disobeys such person or his agent.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending

team as persons in authority manning a legal checkpoint . However, the
officers involved appeared not to have performed their duties as
required by law. They spotted Edmund’s purported swerving vehicle. Then
they signaled him to stop, which he obeyed. But they did not demand
the presentation of the driver’s license or issue any ticket or similar
citation paper as required by Sec. 29 of RA 4136.
Moreover, Edmund’s act of exercising one’s right against unreasonable

searches to be conducted in the middle of the night , in context, be
equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in contemplation
of Art. 151 of the RPC.
38
(2) NO. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval
in May 2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA
10586) which also penalizes driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),
a term defined under its Sec. 3 (e) as the act of operating a motor
vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has , after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication
as established jointly by the DOH, the Napolcom and the DOTC.
Viewed from the prism of RA 10586 , Edmund cannot plausibly be

convicted under the influence of alcohol for the obvious reason : he
had not been tested beyond reasonable doubt , let alone conclusively, for
reaching during the period material the threshold level of intoxication set
under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or over.
42 CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW

OF THE STATE
VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
EDIGARDO GEROCHE et. al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On May 14, 1989 at 10 o’clock in the evening , Limbag roused

from sleep inside his house when Geroche , a Barangay captain, Garde
and Marfil, members of CAFGU, who were not armed with search warrant ,
suddenly entered the house by destroying the main door.
The accused mauled Limbag, striking him with a garand rifle which
caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took
away his airgun.
ISSUES
(1) What is the crime committed?
(2) Whether the accused are criminally liable.
HELD: (1) The crime committed is Violation of Domicile under Article

128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Violation of Domicile is committed by any public officer or employee,

not being authorized by judicial order , shall enter any dwellings against
the will of the owner thereof , search papers or other effects found
therein without the previous consent of such owner , or having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the
premises, shall refuse to do so.
(2) YES. vThey are guilty of violation of domicile considering their

judicial admissions that they were Barangay captain (in case of Geroche)
and part of CAFGU (in the case of Garde and Marfil).
By holding such positions, they are considered public officers/employees.
43 ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS - INVITATION BY

THE VICTIM NEGATES LEWD
AVELINO ANGELES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: In the early evening of May 31, 2007, Jacqueline and her
housemaid, Sheryl, went to the “kubo” managed by appellant Avelino to
dance and sing.
During that evening, Jacqueline was drinking and flirting with Avelino.
She was so drunk and started dancing and while dancing , she took off
her bra and tossed it to Sheryl . As she kissed Avelino, she asked him
if he could make her happy and he replied “try me.”
Jacqueline led him behind a mango tree . It was there when she
pulled up her blouse and pulled Avelino’s head towards her breast and
he sucked it.
39
Towards the end of the evening gathering , Jacqueline wanted him to

accompany her home but Avelino opted to stay in the “kubo” to clean
up, however, she just told him “pare, sumunod ka ha.”
Maintaining that an invitation was extended to him , Avelino proceeded

to Jacqueline’s house after cleaning up . The gate was unlocked and the
main door was left open.
He entered and found Jacqueline and Sheryl lying on the bed . When
Sheryl left the room, Avelino laid down beside Jacqueline.
When Jacqueline was awakened, she pushed Avelino away demanding to

know how he was able to enter the room.
ISSUE
Whether the invitation was sufficient to remove the lewd design made
by Avelino from the ambit of criminal acts of lasciviousness.
RULING
YES. The invitation indicative of the purported victim’s consent must
be interpreted vis-à-vis the incidents which occurred a few minutes and
after they parted ways.
The invitation was made when Jacqueline left the gathering which
before the said incident. From the time the invitation was extended and
until the time Avelino entered the room, there was no significant
occurrence which could have led Avelino to conclude Jacqueline changed
her mind. Simply put, in the span of an hour , there was no reason
for appellant Avelino to believe that the invitation was withdrawn.
In this case, the element that criminalizes lewdness or the criminal

circumstances of its commission was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts indicate that the alleged acts of Avelino are in the nature
of amorous advances made by ardent lover from the sexual partner , at
the very least.
Such conclusion can be drawn from the invitation made by the

purported victim an hour before the said incident . Plainly, Avelino went to
Jacqueline’s bedroom with what he had reason to think was an invitation
to a tryst. There was, however, either a change of mind or a completed
teasing.
*** NOTHING IS IMPOSSIBLE WITH GOD ***

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1

2018 GOLDEN BEACON

1. JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (RA 9344)

A: He is exempt from criminal liability. (Paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised

A: It refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that

Q: What is the criminal responsibility of a child above 15 years but

A: He is likewise exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted with

Such prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on

PEOPLE vs. HALIL GAMBAO, THIAN PERPETIAN et. al.

FACTS: Perpetian was 17 years old at the time of the commission of

She was convicted as principal due to her presence in the

ISSUES: (1) Whether Perpetian is a co-principal.

(2) Whether her minority be appreciated as mitigating circumstance.

(3) Whether she can avail of the benefit of suspension of

HELD: (1) NO. Perpetian is not a principal but only an accomplice .

Her presence and company were not indispensable and essential to

(2) NO. Her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting but

(3) NO. Under Section 38 of RA 9344, the suspension of sentence

2. What are the three cardinal features or main characteristics

GENERALITY. Criminal laws apply to all persons who commit crimes in

TERRITORIALITY. Criminal laws apply to all offenses committed within

PROSPECTIVITY. Penal laws cannot make an act punishable in a

3. Distinguish motive from intent. (1978; 1996; 1999; 2004)

4. ACCESSORY (PD 1829)

A: When he is an accessory whose act or omission is also penalized in

Those who assist the principal to escape may be prosecuted under

5. What do you understand by aberratio ictus, error in personae

Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender

Praeter intentionem or where the consequence went beyond that intended

6. Distinguish mala in se from mala prohibita. (1988; 1997; 1998; 2001;

A: Mala in se is a wrong from its very nature , as most of those

On the other hand, an act mala prohibita is a wrong because it is

Q: Is an election offense mala in se?

Q: May a mala in se felony absorb mala prohibita crimes?

A: A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to

Q: Is criminal intent material in crimes mala prohibita?

A: It is hornbook doctrine in mala prohibita crimes that the

“It is not necessary that the appellant should have acted

In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which

8. What is an impossible crime ? (1993; 2003)

A : It is an act which would be an offense against persons or property,

But where the acts performed which would have resulted in an

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME - CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY

GEMMA T. JACINTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: Gemma, a collector of Mega Foam , received a P10,000 check

ISSUE: Whether Gemma is criminally liable for qualified theft.

HELD: NO. To be liable of the crime of qualified theft under Article

Gemma is guilty of impossible crime as defined in Article 4,

SULPICIO INTOD vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Sulpicio intending to kill a person , peppered the latter’s bedroom

He was found guilty of impossible crime as defined and penalized

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME

PEOPLE vs. LEE KONG

STROKES vs. STATE

Where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the

CLARK vs. STATE

The accused with intent to gain entered the house where he

STATE vs. MITCHELL

Where the accused, with intent to kill, fired at the window of

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE vs. PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

In the United States, where the offender sought to be committed

This is not true in the Philippines . In our jurisdiction,