Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil.

1051

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the
Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s
Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was
contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to
choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the
following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the
minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court.
So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a
member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano
Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is
vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD:

No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term
Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada
to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the
elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a
separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.

But how should the gridlock be resolved?

The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members)
must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already
appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority
party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting)
concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.
Ople v Torres G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998.

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the
Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O.
NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM
WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code
of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a
System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies,
etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important
freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot
transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can
avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have
difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing

Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds
to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se
and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the
sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to
be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond
the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification
that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make
laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and
cannot be allowed.

In view of right to privacy

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on
two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are
compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness,
the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number
(PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the
use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308 should also raise our
antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the
adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but
for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly,
the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve
information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication,
hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities
to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the
system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which
will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. 60 The
lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of
abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may
pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can
be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an
annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on
the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by
curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
Fransisco vs house of representative

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee
on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being
insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court
against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of
the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very
lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules
were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for
other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have
the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within
a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
Tatad vs secretary of department of finance

Petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act 8180 deregulating the Philippine oil industry.
This case addresses a range of issues, including, prohibition against monopolies, and the extent of
judicial authority.
Date of the Ruling: Dec 3 1997
Forum: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Type of Forum: Domestic
Summary:
A group of Philippine legislators brought this case to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
8180, otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, specifically Sections
5(b), 6 and 9(b) of the Act.
The petitioners alleged that the Big Three oil companies – Petron, Shell and Caltex -- were producing and
processing almost identical products which they were selling to the general public at identical prices.
When one company adjusted its prices upwards or downwards, the other two followed suit at
practically the same time, and by the same amount. The aforementioned oil companies were able,
among other things, to determine gas prices because Republic Act 8180, the Oil Deregulation Law, lifted
government controls over downstream oil industry.
The Supreme Court found that RA 8180 enabled the three oil companies to effectively form a monopoly
or a cartel in the oil industry. Additionally, three specific provisions in the law (on tariff differential,
stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing) tended to obstruct the entry or competitiveness of new
players. Noting the centrality of electricity in people’s lives, the Court cautioned that higher oil prices
facilitated by RA 8180, “threatens to multiply the number of our people with bent backs and begging
bowls.” Upon full consideration of the issues at stake in this case, the Court held that RA 8180 offended
the constitutional prohibition against monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, specifically
Article XII, Sec. 19, of the 1997 Constitution which mandates that "[t]he State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed."
Enforcement of the Decision and Outcomes:
With respect to enforcement, the Court held that the offending provisions of the legislation so permeate
its essence that the entire law had to struck down. Following the judgment, a motion for reconsideration
of the decision was filed by the government but was dismissed by the Court for lack of merit. To counter
the Tatad decision declaring RA 8180 unconstitutional, the Philippines passed the Republic Act No. 8479
(“RA 8479”) otherwise known as the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998, on February
10, 1998. This new legislation omitted the offending sections of RA 8180. The constitutionality of this
law was challenged as well but the claim was not successful at court where the judiciary demonstrated
significant deference to the legislature stating that “...the challenged provision is a policy decision of
Congress and that the wisdom of the provision is outside the authority of this Court to consider.”
Groups involved in the case: Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
Significance of the Case:
The Tatad decision is an example of socio-economic litigation which focuses on processes associated
with privatization. (Malcolm Langford ed., Social Rights Jurisprudence, 2008, p. 19) This is particularly
significant given current global trends regarding privatization. The case is considered a landmark
judgment with respect to the Philippines’ nascent anti-trust scene.
The Tatad decision is noteworthy for its clear recognition of the role of the judiciary in protecting the
political and economic rights of the people of the Philippines as demonstrated in its observations that
the Court could not “shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution,” even if such law
was an economic decision of the legislature. However subsequent related decisions have demonstrated
the impact the separation of powers doctrine can have on cases dealing with economic and social
policies.