Political Law: Concepts, Principles, Relevant Provisions and Related

Jurisprudence with Emphasis on Del Castillo cases

Updated October 29, 2018
Professor Victoria V. Loanzon
with the assistance of Atty. Clemente Loanzon Reyes IV
(Admitted to the Bar on 24 April 2015)

NATURE OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

1. Question: What is the concept of the supremacy of the Constitution?
Answer: In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, the Court held:
”A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It
prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on
which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.”
Question 2: What are the three basic parts of the 1987 Constitution?
Answer: The 1987 Constitution has the following parts:
1. Constitution of Liberty: Bill of Rights
2. Constitution of Government: Government Organization and Functions
3. Constitution of Sovereignty: Method of Amendment or Revision

NATIONAL TERRITORY
1. What is the national territory of the Philippines?
Answer: The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines. (Article I, 1987 Constitution)
2. What are the relevant laws which define the Philippine territory?
Answer: Article I, 1987 Constitution defines the National Territory of the Philippines. The following
diplomatic instruments are likewise relevant in defining the Philippine Territory:
1. Treaty limits: Treaty of Paris, Art. III
2. Treaty between Spain and U.S. concluded at Washington on November 7, 1900 and that
between U.S. and Great Britain on January 2, 1930
The Philippine territory likewise considers the method of determining baselines under R.A. No. 3046,
June 17, 1961, R.A. No.5446, September 8, 1968; and R.A. No. 9522( Philippine Archipelagic Baselines
Law) , March 10, 2009, using the straight line approach.
Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction have been included in the
following presidential issuances:
1. P.D. No. 1596, June 11, 1978
2. Two Hundred-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone under P.D. No. 1599, June 11, 1978
3. What is the archipelagic doctrine?
Answer: The archipelagic doctrine is a concept which considers the entire archipelago as one
integrated unit of territory, not as comprising various disparate and separate islands.
4. Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity considered a political subdivision and therefore a part of the
Philippine territory?

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Answer: No. The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is not a political subdivision within the contemplation of
the Constitution but all the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays form part of the Philippine
territory. It is more in the nature of an associative state under public international law which can
eventually gain statehood. The Court held that no province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM,
is recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government.
Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence. (Consolidated Petitions: Province of Cotabato v. G.R.P., G.R. No. 208566,
October 14, 2008)
5. Did the Philippines surrender its claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (“KIG”) and the Scarborough
Shoal when it enacted RA 9522 which redefined the Philippine baselines?
Answer: No. Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “’Regime[s] of Islands’ under the
Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.(Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])
6. Does RA 9522 delineate the Philippine territory?
Answer: R.A.9522is a statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zones and continental shelf
under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine territory. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by
enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on
27 February 1984.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY AND FILIPINO FIRST POLICY
1. Question: May the tarsiers of Loboc, Bohol bring an action in court to nullify a service contract
signed by the President?
Answer: No, in Resident marine mammals of Tanon Strait joined in and represented herein by human
beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, in their capacity as legal guardians and as
responsible stewards of God's creations v. Secretary Angelo Reyes et al(G.R. No. 180771, April 21,
2015), the Court allowed the resident mammals of Tanon Strait as petitioners provided that the action
is brought in the nature of a citizen suit with natural persons acting as their legal guardians and as
friends for being stewards of creation. Under the Rules of Procedure in Environmental Cases, a citizen
suit is encouraged for the protection of the environment. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the
doctrine first enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet
unborn.
3. Question: In the action filed by the stewards of the Bohol tarsiers, can the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources claim that his execution of service contract with a
foreign company to explore the possibility extracting oil amounts to approval of the President under
the doctrine of qualified political agency?
No. The Court reiterated its ruling in Joson v. Torres. In this case, the Court explained the concept of
the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this wise: “Under this
doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation

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demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
The Court further reiterated: “As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the
President himself be the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
the exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils. This
power cannot be taken lightly. xxx it must be shown that the government agency or subordinate
official has been authorized by the President to enter into such service contract for the government.
Otherwise, it should be at least shown that the President subsequently approved of such contract
explicitly. None of these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.”

Calling Out Powers of the President

Lagman et al. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231774, July 4, 2017, Castillo, J.:
Facts: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a
written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades,
Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened
with the passing of time.
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, Maute Group, and other criminals, brought
about undue constraints and difficulties to the military and government personnel, particularly in the
performance of their duties and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians. After the submission
of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued a resolution expressing full support to the martial
law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling
reason to revoke the same".
1. Question: Is the factual basis of the declaration of Martial law a political question?
Answer: No. The Court said that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question. Section 18 of Article VII allows
judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Clearly the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended that the Court will take cognizance of a
petition in keeping with the principle of checks and balances.
Note: Remember Baker v. Carr
2. Question: What is the nature of the proceeding which looks into the factual basis of the declaration
of Martial Law?
Answer: The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII clearly indicate that it
should be treated as sui generis separate and different from those enumerated in Article VIII. It calls
for a different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also limits
the issue to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his emergency
powers. It looks into the acts prior to the declaration of Martial Law.
3. Question: Distinguish between the checking powers of congress and the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the “Calling Out” powers of the President.
Answer: 1. The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may
revoke the proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Both
are in keeping with the principle of checks and balances.
2. The Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
3. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise
events supervening the declaration.
4. Unlike the Court which does not look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis, Congress
could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
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Conclusion:
The power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different
but likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same trajectory, which
is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review
can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
5. Question: Cite the instances when the President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?
Answer: The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
declaring martial law may be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public
safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers:
"(1) a time limit of sixty days;
(2) review and possible revocation by Congress; [and]
(3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."
6. Question: Discuss the scope of the powers to declare martial law and to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.
Answer: The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus involve curtailment and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive Department has called
upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the emergency remains,
the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their exercise requires more stringent
safeguards by the Congress, and review by the Court.
7. Question: What are the safeguards which the Constitution has put in place against the President's
prerogative to declare a state of martial law?
Answer: The acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion to infringe on
the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution; neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.
Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such
instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies
only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected with invasion.
8. Question: What is the scope of the power of judicial review of the court in the “Calling Out” powers
of the President?
Answer: It is beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. As
Commander-in-Chief, the President’s powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address
exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.
9. Question: Is the recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense necessary in the exercise of
the “Calling Out” powers of the President?
Answer: The recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary of National Defense, or other
high-ranking military officials, is not a condition for the President to declare martial law. A plain
reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion
and that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego.
10. Question: Is the Proclamation of Martial Law by President Duterte vague?
Answer: No. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." "[A] statute or act
may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the statute] is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."

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11. Question: Will the “void for vagueness” apply to penal statutes?
Answer: No. The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of
possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad
or vague law thus “chills him into silence.”
12. Question: What is the "sufficiency of factual basis test“?
Answer: Under the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, the phrase "sufficiency of factual
basis" should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare
martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather it
only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases.
The Court concluded, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits the scope of judicial review by the
introduction of the "sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
13. Is a penal law subject to facial challenge?
Answer: No. The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because of
possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A
person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law
may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad
or vague law thus chills him into silence.”
14. Question: What are the elements of rebellion?
Answer: The elements of rebellion are:
1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking up arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval
or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of
their powers or prerogatives.
15. Question: Can the President declare a state of war?
Answer: No. The Constitution provides that only Congress may declare the existence of a state of war.
Congress cannot even declare a state of war but can only recognize its existence under the
Constitution Please relate with the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.
16. Question: What is the state policy on war?
Answer: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy: In the field of public
international law, the law of war has two dimensions: justifications to engage in war(jus ad bellum)
and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello or International humanitarian law). As a
humanitarian concern, the laws of war address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and the
treatment of prisoners of war; military necessity (use of an attack or action intended to help the
military objective and use of proportional and excessive force to endanger civilians(, along with
distinction (careful assessment as to who are combatants and the civilians) and proportionality( the
legal use of force whereby belligerents must make sure that harm caused to civilians or civilian
property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated attack
anticipated by an attack on military objective; and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause
unnecessary suffering.
The laws of war should mitigate the consequences of war by:
1. Shielding both combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering;
2. Ensuring that certain fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of the
enemy, particularly prisoners of war, the wounded and sick, and civilians, are protected;
and
3. Endeavoring that peace is restored.
17. Can a Governor invoke the “Calling Out” powers?
Answer: No, only the President can invoke the “Calling Out” powers as Commander-in-Chief.

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Pardoning Powers of the President
Question 1: The President granted Mr. Estrada pardon after his conviction for the crime of plunder.
Mr. Estrada was elected Mayor of Manila. Alicia, a registered voter of Manila questioned the grant of
pardon alleging the text of the pardon appears to be conditional and therefore, Mr. Estrada is not
qualified to hold the post of Mayor. Is the position of the registered voter tenable?
Answer: No. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other
acts of executive clemency, to wit: “Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.”
There can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted to Mr. Estrada was absolute in
the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the
Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon. He was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored
all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former Mr. Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
Please note that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1)
impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Congress cannot in any way delimit the pardoning powers of the
President. Grant of amnesty requires the consent of Congress.
Question 2. What is the nature of seeking an elective post?
Answer: From both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally
considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon
granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon
acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the
right to seek elective office.(Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015, En
Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])
Question 3: When can the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal take jurisdiction over an
election contest?
The HRET may take cognizance of any matter raised by a losing candidate related to the election,
returns and qualifications (ERQ) as soon as the COMELEC proclaims the winning candidate and the
latter shall have taken his oath as a member of the House of Representatives.
Please take note of the following rulings on the three electoral tribunals enshrined in the Constitution:
Reyes v. COMELEC and Tan, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013: To be considered a member of Congress,
there must be concurrence of the following requisites: a valid proclamation; a proper oath; and
assumption to duty. Absent any of the foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over said contest.
Duenas v. HRET, 593 SCRA 3166: HRET has the competence to examine questioned ballots; a
resolution signed by the majority of the members is sufficient.
Vinzons-Chato v. HRET and Panotes, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013: digital images are functional
equivalent of the paper ballots
Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010: nuisance candidates; mockery of election
process
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET): composed of 3 Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice and 6 members of the Senate based on proportional representation; the Senior Justice
acts as the Chairman.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET): composed of 3 Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice and 6 members of the House of Representatives based on
proportional representation; the Senior Justice acts as the Chairman.
Jurisdiction of Electoral Contests before the SET and the HRET: All matters pertaining to the election,
returns and qualifications of a member, including issues involving citizenship and appreciation of
ballots.
Pimentel v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008: Once COMELEC has proclaimed the winner, it
loses jurisdiction on all issues involving the election, returns and qualifications of a member of the
Senate; the losing party must file the protest before the SET.
Legarda v. de Castro: Petitioner can no longer pursue her election protest because she run for the
Senate during the pendency of the case and after having been proclaimed winner in the senatorial

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race, she took her oath. To allow her to pursue the case will result to absurdity. She cannot be Vice
President (executive branch) and be Senator (legislative branch) at the same time. This will result into
incompatibility of offices.
Note: As members of the PET, the justices of the Supreme Court are triers of facts and law and parties
may seek relief to the Supreme Court if they are not satisfied with the findings of the SET.

The Diplomatic and Treaty-Making Power of the President

Question 1: Who has the power to ratify a treaty?
Answer: The power to ratify treaty is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence,
to the ratification. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En Banc [Buena])
Question 2: May a treaty be submitted to the electorate?
Answer: Yes, a referendum may be called for the purpose. Section 25 of Article XVIII provides:
“After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
The President’s Power and Duty to Conduct Foreign Relations
Question 3: Can the President be compelled to submit to the Senate the Rome Statute for its
concurrence?
Answer: No, the President has the sole prerogative when to submit the same. (Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary)
Question 4: Can the President be directed to submit EDCA for concurrence of the Senate?
Answer: No because EDCA is only an executive agreement which does not require the President to
secure the concurrence of the Senate to make it effective. EDCA is a supplemental agreement to the
existing Visiting Forces Agreement between the United States of America and the Philippines.
Question No. 5: Does the withdrawal of the Philippines from the International Criminal Court require
the concurrence of the Senate?
Answer: If the President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign
relations, it can be argued that he does not need the concurrence of the Senate. Since every state has
the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that
every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign
states.
Upon the other hand, if the accession to the Rome Statute is considered as part of the law of the land
under the transformation method, it can also be argued that the same needs the concurrence of the
Senate.

Due Process
Question 1: What is due process?
Answer: DUE PROCESS MEANS:
1. There shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislature;
2. It shall be reasonable in its operation;
3. It shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
4. It shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the State or to all of a class (People v. Cayat, G.R. No. L-
45987, May 5, 1939)
Question 2: What is the purpose of due process?
Answer: The due process clause is a shield against any possible intrusion of the government including
any kind of abuse and arbitrariness on the part of any of the branches of government. The due
process clause serves the following purposes:
1. To prevent undue encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.
2. To secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of powers of government, unrestrained by
the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.
3. To protect property from confiscation by legislative enactments from seizure, forfeiture and
destruction without trial and conviction.
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Question 3: What are the two types of due process?
Answer: The two types of due process are:
1. Substantial due process; and
2. Procedural due process
Question 4: What are the essential elements of due process?
Answer: The essential elements of due process:
1. The right to notice; and
2. The right to be heard
Note: In Cudia v. PMA Superintendent, the Supreme Court held that while desirable, right to counsel
is not mandatory in administrative proceedings.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, and MA. MARGARITA M. GALON v. PHIL
PHARMA WEALTH (PPW, Inc), INC., G.R. No. 182358, February 20, 2013, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
PPW, Inc. alleged that it was not accorded due process when the DOH suspended its accreditation for
a two-year period. The DOH held that it gave PPW, Inc. a copy of the Report on Violative Products it
distributed.
5. Question: Was there denial of due process?
Answer: No. Due process constitutes both substantive and procedural due process. When DOH
supplied PPW, Inc. with the list under the Report on Violative Products, it was given sufficient notice.
In fact, when it referred the matter to its counsel, PPW, Inc. was given the opportunity to be heard as
well.
Thus, it was not denied due process.
State Immunity: Concept and Basis
Concept and Basis: The Constitution declares, rather superfluously, that the State may not be sued
without its consent. This provision is merely recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts of justice
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1993: 29).
Immunity from Suit
1. Question: What is ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’?
Answer: The concept of ‘the royal prerogative of dishonesty’ is recognition of the sovereign character
of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
Immunity from Suit: Waiver of State Immunity
2. Question: May the state waive its immunity from suit?
Answer: Yes. The State’s consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.
Facts: Aggrieved by the two-year suspension, PPW, Inc. filed a suit against DOH seeking reinstatement
of its accreditation. DOH moved for dismissal of the suit invoking immunity from suit.
3. Question: Is the legal argument of DOH tenable.
Answer: Yes. The DOH can validly invoke state immunity for the following reasons: 1. DOH is an
unincorporated agency which performs sovereign or governmental functions; and 2. The Complaint
seeks to hold the DOH solidarily and jointly liable with the other defendants for damages which
constitutes a charge or financial liability against the state.
Immunity from Suit: Liability under a Contract
4. Question: Is there a distinction on the liability of the state when it executes a contract with a third
person?
Answer: The rule on liability of the state under a contract is not, however, without qualification. Not
all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity. The State will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.
5. Question: When may the state be exempt from liability under a contract?
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Answer: When the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, no such waiver may be
implied on the part of the state. Statutory provisions waiving state immunity are construed in
strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.
6. Question: DPWH refused to pay Movertrade Corporation for breach of its contract. COA sustained
the action of DPWH. Movertrade Corporation filed an action to question the action of COA which
disallowed payment of its claim from DPWH. Will the action filed by Movertrade Corporation
prosper?
ANSWER: No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA in denying Movertrade
Corporation’s money claim as the evidence on record undoubtedly supports the factual findings of
COA. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the decisions and resolutions of COA are accorded
not only with respect but also with finality, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers, but also of its presumed expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce. (Movertrade
Corporation v. Commission on Audit, September 22, 2015, Del Castillo, J.)
Note: Refer to Sec.29 (1) of Article VI on the need to enact a law to disburse public funds
Money claims must first be filed with the COA

Immunity from Suit: Liability of Public Officers

7. Question: Can public officers be held liable for damages?
Answer: The mantle of non-suability extends to complaints filed against public officials for acts done
in the performance of their official functions. The suability of a government official depends on
whether the official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the
acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the
government.
8. Question: What principle will govern the liability of state for acts performed by public officers?
Answer: The rule is that if the judgment against public officials will require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state. In such a situation,
the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
9. Question: When may a public official be held personally liable for his acts?
Answer: A public official can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed
in connection with official duties where he has acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad
faith.
Facts: The OSG delegated to the local Register of Deeds the power to represent the opposition to the
registration of a parcel of land in Calamba, Laguna. The Register of Deeds failed to appear in the
proceedings so the trial court allowed the presented of evidence ex parte. The trial court allowed the
Spouses Benigno to register the land.
Question 10: Is the government bound the negligence of a public officer?
Answer: The Court held that “[a]s a matter of doctrine, illegal acts of government agents do not bind
the State,” and “the Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so
if they are erroneous, let alone irregular.” This principle applies in land registration cases. Certainly,
the State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public domain just because its
agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of their duties. Under the Regalian
doctrine, “all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.” (Republic
v. Spouses Benigno, March 11, 2015, Del Castillo, J.)
Question 11: What are the requirements to be entitled to register land available for disposition?
Answer: Applicants for registration of title under PD 1529 must prove: “(1) that the subject land forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Section 14(1) of the law requires that the property sought to
be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.”

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION

1. Question: What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction under Administrative Law?
Answer: Under the principle of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving question within the jurisdiction of an administrative body prior to the decision of that
question by the administrative tribunal where the:

9|Page
 1. Question demands administrative determination requiring special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal;
2. Question requires determination of technical and intricate issues of a fact; and
3. Uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with purposes of the regulatory statute
administered.
2. Question: What are the exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
Answer: Exceptions to the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
1. Where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2. Where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant;
4. Where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
5. Where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice;
6. Where judicial intervention is urgent;
7. When its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8. Where the controverted acts violate due process;
9. When the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
10. When there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11. When strong public interest is involved; and
12. In quo warranto proceedings (The Province of Aklan v. Jody King Construction and Development
Corp., G.R. Nos. 197592 & 202623, November 27, 2013).
Sovereignty: Concept of Imperium and Dominium
1. Question: Distinguish between imperium and dominium.
Answer: Imperium is the authority possessed by the state embraced in the concept of sovereignty
while dominium refers to the capacity of the state to own or acquire property including those lands
held by the state in its proprietary capacity.
Sovereignty: Jurisdiction over Persons and Things
2. Question: Cite instances when the state will have no power and jurisdiction over persons and things
within its territory.
Answer: The state cannot exercise power and jurisdiction over the following persons and things within
its territory:
1. Foreign heads of state, diplomatic representatives, and consuls to a certain degree;
2. Foreign state property, including embassies, consulates and public vessels in non-commercial
activities;
3. Acts of state;
4. 4. Foreign merchant vessels exercising right of innocent passage or involuntary entry, such as
arrival under stress;
5. 5. Foreign armies passing through or stationed in its territory with its permission; and
6. 6. Such other persons or property, including organizations like the United Nations, World
Health Organization, Asian Development Bank, over which it may, by agreement, waive
jurisdiction.
3. Question: What is extraterritorial jurisdiction?
Answer: The extraterritorial jurisdiction is the authority of the state to exercise power and jurisdiction
beyond and outside its territory under the following circumstances:
1. When it asserts its personal jurisdiction over its nationals abroad, or the exercise of its rights
or punish certain offenses committed outside its territory against its national interests even if
the offenders are non-resident aliens;
2. When the local state waives its jurisdiction over persons and things within its territory, such as
when a foreign army is stationed therein remains under the jurisdiction of the sending state;
3. When it establishes a colonial protectorate, or administers a trust territory or occupies an
enemy territory in the course of war;
4. When it enjoys easements or servitudes (i.e. easement of innocent passage, freedom of over
flight)
5. When it exercises limited jurisdiction over the contiguous zone; and
6. When it exercises the principle of extraterritoriality.

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Sovereignty: Postwar Occupation
4. Question: What is the doctrine of juris postlimini?
Answer: The doctrine of juris postlimini is a principle in Public International Law where a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy state resumes power and jurisdiction during the progress of
war through conquest or otherwise, the legal state of things existing prior to the hostile occupation is
re-established. (Aruego, International Law)
Findings of Facts of a Constitutional Commission
DARAGA PRESS, INC. (DPI) v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION in
AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, G.R. No. 201042, June 16, 2015, EN BANC, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: DBM Secretary Andaya requested COA to ascertain the liability of the DepED to settle its
pending obligation to DPI in the amount of P63.638M. COA found irregularities in the transaction
which included, among others, ghost delivery of books and no appropriation for the same in G.A.A.
Despite this, DPI filed its money claim with COA. COA denied payment. DPI assailed the action of COA.
1. Question: Will DPI’s claim prosper?
Answer: NO. The respondent COA committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the money
claim. Decisions and resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and nullified only on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Question: When does grave abuse of discretion exist?
Answer: Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.
Primary Responsibility of COA
3. Question: What is the primary responsibility of COA?
Answer: The respondent COA, as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,
has acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
jurisdiction.
Read Sec. 2(1), D, Article IX
General Rule: Post audit Accounting System
Exception to the Rule: Pre-Audit (weak internal control)
4. Question: The newly-elected directors of the Philippine National Red Cross (“PNRC”) requested the
Commission of Audit to conduct an audit of the accounts of the organization. A former director sought
to enjoin the conduct of the audit. Will the objection of the former director of the PNRC prosper?
Answer: No. BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COA (G.R. No. 177131, 2011) The BSP is a public
corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality which does not fall
within the Constitutional prohibition in Art. XII, Section 16. Not all corporations, which are not
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists
another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public
corporations.”
These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are
not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating
to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative
relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices.
4. Question: Can a public officer claim reimbursement for medical expenses and other travelling
costs?
Answer: No. RAMON R. YAP v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (G.R. No. 158562, 2010). COA may disallow
expenses which do not pass the “public purpose test” (claims for executive check-up, basic monthly
allowances, reimbursement for gasoline allowance, etc.)
Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government
employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. As understood
in the traditional sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to
the general public as a matter of right. The public servant has the burden to proof to establish that
use of public funds is related to the discharge of his official functions.

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Separation of Powers: Concept and Principle
The starting point of the principle of separation of powers is the assumption of the division of the
functions of the government into three distinct classes: the executive, the legislative and the judicial.
The government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
powers into the legislative, the executive and the judicial [Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No.
45081. July 15, 1936].
Separation of Powers -Primary Jurisdiction of COA and the Power of Judicial Review
1. Question: What will impel the Court to scrutinize the findings of facts of COA?
Answer: It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one that was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA, not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

Burden of Proof on Money Claims against the Government

2. Question: In case of money claims against the government, who has the burden of proof to hold the
latter liable?
Answer: The party who has a money claim against the government has the burden of proof. In this
case, DPI has the burden to show, by substantial evidence, that it is entitled to the money claim. It has
to prove the actual delivery of the subject textbooks by presenting substantial evidence or evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support such conclusion.
3. Question: Will the principle of quantum meruit apply in money claims against the government?
Answer: The principle of quantum meruit allows a party to recover "as much as he reasonably
deserves.” The principle of quantum meruit presupposes that an actual delivery of the goods has
been made. The party has to present convincing evidence to prove the actual claim. In contracts which
call delivery of goods, the party must prove delivery of the items and that the same have been
properly acknowledged by the government agency.
Bill of Rights: The Rule on Chain of Custody
Facts: The RTC found the accused guilty. In her appeal to the Court of Appeals, she argued that the
trial court erred in finding her guilty despite the prosecution’s failure to prove the same beyond
reasonable doubt and noncompliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations resulting to a broken chain of custody over the confiscated drugs.
1. Question: Will the appeal prosper? Should the accused be acquitted?
Answer: The appeal will not prosper and her conviction should be affirmed. Accused capitalizes on
the prosecution’s alleged failure to comply with the requirements of law with respect to the proper
marking, inventory and taking of photograph of the seized specimen. However, the appellant failed to
contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial.
It is settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully observe the
requirements provided under Section 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the chain of custody remains
unbroken.
Note: Instances when objection may be raised to exclude evidence – custodial investigation,
preliminary investigation, arraignment, trial before promulgation of judgment
Right to counsel: custodial investigation, preliminary investigation, arraignment, promulgation of
judgment
Question 2: What does the prosecution need to sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165?
Answer: To sustain a conviction under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, all that is needed for the
prosecution to establish are (1) the identity of the buyer, seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, on the
other hand, it is necessary to prove that: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the drug.

Settled is the rule that “possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation of such possession.”

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Question No. 4: What are the links in the “chain of custody” doctrine?
Answer: As held in People v. Domado, mere lapses in procedures need not invalidate a seizure if the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items can be shown to have been preserved. Thus, the
CA aptly held, viz:
“In the recent case of People vs. Jakar Mapan Le, the Supreme Court clarified that there are
links that must be established in the chain of custody in the buy-bust situation: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.” (People
v. Bio, February 16, 2015, Del Castillo, J.)
Question 5: Can the accused raised for the first time on appeal that he was not assisted by counsel
during his custodial investigation?
Answer: Anent appellant’s claim of denial of due process allegedly because he was not assisted by
counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings, the Court cannot accord credence to the
same. As correctly observed by the CA, this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal without
offending the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Besides, the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest proceedings does not in any way affect his
culpability. It has already been held that "the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render
inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.”
Here, appellant's conviction was based not on his alleged uncounseled confession or admission but on
the testimony of the prosecution witness. (People v. Bio, id.)

Bill of Rights: The Rule on Extrajudicial Confession

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NIEVES CONSTANCIO y BACUNGAY, ERNESTO BERRY y BACUNGAY, G.R.
No. 206226, April 4, 2016, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: The RTC found Constancio and Berry guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision finding that Constancio and Berry conspired to abduct, rape, and kill
“AAA.”
The CA gave credence to Berry’s extrajudicial confession as contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
which he executed with the assistance of Atty. Suarez. Berry’s extrajudicial confession was admitted
as corroborative evidence of facts that likewise tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused and
cousin, Constancio as shown by the circumstantial evidence extant in the records.
Berry insisted that when he executed his extrajudicial confession, he was not provided with a
competent and independent counsel of his own choice in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution.
1. Question: Can Berry move for the exclusion of his extrajudicial confession?
Answer: No. Berry’s confession is admissible because it was voluntarily executed with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In default of proof that Atty.
Suarez was remiss in his duties, as in this case, it must be held that the custodial investigation of Berry
was regularly conducted. For this reason, Berry’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence
against him.
2. Question: What is the nature of the response of a suspect in a broadcast interview?
Answer: It is already settled that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a
televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no
ample proof to show that appellant Berry’s narration of events to ABS-CBN reporter Dindo Amparo
was the product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same admissible in evidence.
3. Question: What is the general rule on admissibility of extrajudicial confession?
Answer: The general rule on admissibility of extrajudicial confession states that where the
prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extrajudicial confession of the accused
was obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantees, the confession is admissible, and is
evidence of a high order.
Note: Sec.12 (1), Article III- Miranda Rights

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Bill of Rights: Promulgation of Judgment in Absentia
1. Question: May judgment be promulgated in the absence of the accused?
ANSWER: Yes. There is no reason to postpone the promulgation because petitioner’s absence was
unjustifiable. Hence, no abuse of discretion could be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision
despite the absence of accused. (Almuete v. People, Del Castillo, J.)
Bill of Rights: The Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
LUZ S. ALMEDA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: In 2001, School Superintendent Almeda, and several other public officers and employees were
charged administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman improper use and disbursement of
the Countrywide Development Fund. The Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer found that
probable cause existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of
RA 3019.
Almeda sought for the dismissal of OMB-MIN-01-0183 as against her, with additional prayer for
injunctive relief. She alleged that the Ombudsman’s failure to promptly act on her case for nine years
from the filing of her motion for reconsideration, or from July 2003 to September 2012, is a violation
of her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case.
2. Question: Is Almeda’s right to speedy disposition of case violated?
Answer: YES. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]ll persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies." This right applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies; it is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be
it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. Hence,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
3. Question: What is the rationale behind the right to speedy disposition of cases?
Answer: The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of
spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. This looming unrest as well
as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and
in favor of the individual.
4. Question: What are essential factors to consider if there is a violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of a case?
Answer: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
5. Question: What is the balancing test under the right to speedy disposition of a case?
Answer: The balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case looks into the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant. Both are weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the
defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the
delay, are considered.

The Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

6. Question: What is the duty of the state in the prosecution of cases?
Answer: It is the State’s duty to expedite the same "within the bounds of reasonable timeliness."A
defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring
that the trial is consistent with due process. It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the
complaint, as mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the accused did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.
7. Question: How should prejudice be assessed in prosecuting a criminal offense?
Answer: Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial
was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety
and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system.
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8. Question: Why is delay considered a two-edged sword?
Answer: Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government
to carry its burden. Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in
accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the
ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed
by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile."

The Writ of Amparo

EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO and ANDREW BUISING v. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in
representation of BENHUR PARDICO, G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for
Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance,
the trial court issued the Writ of Amparo against the petitioners who are all private persons and in
charge of securing a private subdivision and the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30,
2008.
1. Question: Can a writ of amparo be issued when all the accused are private individuals?
Answer: NO. It is clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, it must also be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention
of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
2. Question: May a writ of amparo include a private individual?
Answer: Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo
petition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains
an indispensable element. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person under R.A. No. 9851.
3. Question: What are the mandatory allegations to support a claim for issuance of the writ of
amparo?
Answer: In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to
establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government
or its agents had a hand in the disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as
responsible or accountable persons.
Bill of Rights: The Rule on Chain of Custody
4. Question: What are the essential elements to prove sale of illegal drugs in a buy-bust operation?
Answer: In the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proven:
“(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment for it.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizures: Basis for Issuance of a Search Warrant
PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION and TOTAL GAZ LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION v. NENA C. ANG,
ALISON C. SY, NELSON C. ANG, RENATO C. ANG, and/or OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 199371, February 3, 2016, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioners requested the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation in the surveillance,
investigation, apprehension and prosecution of respondents for alleged illegal trading of LPG products
and/or under filling, possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG products in violation of Sections 2(a)
and (c), in relation to Sections 3 and 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1865.
The agents of the NBI conducted several surveillances in the outlets and warehouses of the
respondents. Jemil, one of the NBI agents assigned to the team conducted“test-buy” operations. The
Barba Gas employee took De Jemil’s empty cylinder and replaced it with a filled one. De Jemil paid
P510.00 for the filled cylinder and received a dated receipt for the purchase.
Based on this “test-buy” incident, two applications for search warrants were given due course by the
trial court. The respondents moved to quash the warrants raising, among others, that the applicants

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have no personal knowledge of the charges, as well as the truthfulness and authenticity of said
certifications, among others.
5. Question: As judge, will uphold the opposition of the respondents?
Answer: No. As judge, I will uphold the validity of the warrant. The facts discovered during
surveillance conducted by De Jemil and Antonio — on the basis of information and evidence provided
by petitioners — constitute personal knowledge which could form the basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. As declared in Cupcupin v. People, the surveillance and investigation conducted by an
agent of the NBI obtained from confidential information supplied to him enabled him to gain personal
knowledge of the illegal activities complained of.
6. Question: What are the requisites for the valid issuance of a search warrant?
Answer: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
7. Question: What is “probable cause” in the issuance of a search warrant?
Answer: Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
8. Question: What is the basis of the issuance of a search warrant by the trial judge?
Answer: The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances
made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.
Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant refers to “such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
9. Question: What is the nature of “probable cause” in the filing of information?
Answer: Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information refers to “such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondents
are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information, or any offense
included therein, has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.”
Bill of Rights: Basis of the Constitutional Guarantee of Right to Information
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN v. ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J. JOSEF, G.R.
No. 165036, July 5, 2010, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Antolin took the CPA licensure examinations in October 1997. Out of 6,481 examinees, only
1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. Convinced that she deserved to pass the
examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of
Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. These consisted merely of
shaded marks, so she requested for (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer
sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system used
in each subject.
Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds: first, that only permitted access to the
petitioner’s answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that reconsideration of her
examination result was only proper under the grounds allowed under PRC rules.
Petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers because the
Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employee
support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers.
10. Question: Can the request of Antolin for her Examination Paper to include her Answer Sheet and
the Questionnaire be compelled by a Writ of Mandamus?
Answer: NO. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by
mandamus. As ruled in Agustin-Ramos v. Sandoval: The function of reviewing and re-assessing the
petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented

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by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one,
hence, not within the scope of the writ of mandamus.
11. Question: What will entitle a party to the issuance of the Writ of Mandamus?
Answer: For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain
legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be equally clear. The duty of the respondent is purely ministerial because the law specifically
commands him to perform a particular act.
12. Question: Is access to the Examination Paper to an accountancy professional examination subject
to the protection of the right to information under the Constitution?
Answer: Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law".
The Court conceded that national board examinations is a matter of public concern. On the other
hand, the Court realized that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers to
protect its integrity.

Separation of Powers: Judicial Stability

1. Question: What is the doctrine of judicial stability?
ANSWER: Under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, “no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power
to grant the relief sought by injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.”(United Alloy Philippines v. UCPB, November 25, 2015, Del Castillo,
J.)
Separation of Powers: President’s Prerogative
Facts: At the end of World War II, the U.S. government and Imperial government of Japan entered
into a Reparations Agreement to help rehabilitate the Philippines and payment other forms of
damages. After a lapse of more than 50 years, a group of women known as “comfort lolas” filed an
action in court asking the Philippine government to seek compensation for each of the individual
victims and a public apology from Japan.
2. Question: Will the action prosper?
ANSWER: No, the case must fail.The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against
the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department.
The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the
Executive Department. Accordingly, the Court cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ
of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. (Vineyard
vs. Romulo, 732 SCRA 595, G.R. No. 162230 August 12, 2014, Del Castillo, J)

Citizenship: Naturalization thru Judicial Process

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013,
SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473 had been complied
with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that Azucena
failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Neither
the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. Hence,
Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. During the
November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice.
1. Question: Was the decision of the court granting the petition proper despite the absence of the
OSG during the hearing?
Answer: Azucena is entitled to become a Filipino citizen. An alien woman marrying a Filipino, native
born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of CA 473. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
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his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
said Section 4.
2. Question: How may an alien become a Filipino citizen?
Answer: Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the
"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which
provides that “any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
3. Question: How can one avail of derivative citizenship?
Answer: Under Section 15 of C.A. No. 473, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may
be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since
been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent
to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
4. Question: Discuss the steps by which derivative naturalization may be achieved.
Answer: Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as
follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the
joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition.
5. Question: If one’s petition for derivative naturalization is denied by the Bureau of Immigration, can
she avail of another relief?
Answer: Yes. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was
denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be
remembered that her application at the CID was denied not because she was found to be disqualified,
but because her husband’s citizenship was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds,
it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in
fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
6. Question: What is the main objective of granting citizenship to an alien wife?
Answer: The main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a
unity of allegiance among family members, thus: “It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and
that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that
the husband’s interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form
part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her
own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.”
7. Question: Distinguish between a judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual from a
Petition for Judicial Naturalization.
Answer: In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or
confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA 473.
8. Question: What are the assertions that one must make in the Petition for Naturalization?
Answer: The Petitioner must make the following assertions that one is not opposed to organized
government nor is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments; that one is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of men’s ideas; that
one is neither a polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of which one is a subject is not
at war with the Philippines; that one intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or

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sovereignty, and that one will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of the
Petition up to the time of naturalization.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HUANG TE FU, a.k.a. ROBERT UY, G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015,
SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Respondent Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy — a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan) — filed
a sworn Declaration of Intent to Become [a] Citizen of the Philippines with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The case was tried by RTC-QC Br.96. In his petition, Robert Uy stated that his trade or profession is a
businessman engaged in the manufacture of zipper, in which he has been connected since 1992 with a
monthly income of P15,000.00, and that he is married to a Filipina.
The trial court granted the petition and the C.A. affirmed it.
The OSG appealed the decision. It said that respondent failed to prove that he is engaged in a
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation; that respondent’s admission during trial that he is
not even in the payroll of his employer belies his claim that he is the general manager thereof, as well
as his claim that he is engaged in a lucrative trade; that respondent’s declared monthly income is not
even sufficient for his family, much less could it be considered “lucrative”; that respondent’s
admission that he received allowances from his parents to answer for the daily expenses of his family
further proves the point that he does not have a lucrative trade; and that respondent’s act of falsely
declaring himself a Filipino citizen in the August 2001 deed of sale proves lack of good moral character
and defiance of the constitutional prohibition regarding foreign ownership of land.
9. Question: Will the opposition of the OSG prosper?
Answer: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of citizenship to Robert Uy. The Court said that
the alleged employment in his family’s zipper business was contrived for the sole purpose of
complying with the legal requirements prior to obtaining Philippine citizenship.
In Republic v. Hong, it was held in essence that an applicant for naturalization must show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for
naturalization will be denied.
Naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
Note that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the
applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included in the assessment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG, G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012, FIRST DIVISION,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman/business manager since 1989,
earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has
been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or
describe the nature of his business. As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the
years 1994 to 1997.
The trial court granted the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by including in Ong’s
income the income of his spouse.
The OSG appealed the decision to the S.C. It argued that naturalization laws being construed against
the applicant, lucrative trade or profession should not include the spouse’s income.
10. Question: Is the legal argument of the OSG tenable?
Answer: Yes. The S.C. reversed the decision. It said that it was erroneous on the part of the C.A. to
include the spouse’s income to prove that Petitioner has lucrative income. It also noted that Ong does
not own any real property; that his income was not sufficient to support four children considering
they are enrolled in private schools; and that Ong’s income had an appreciable margin over his known
expenses
11. Question: May the Supreme Court review the findings of facts in judicial proceedings for
naturalization?
Answer: Yes, the Court may do so. The Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of
the applicant’s qualifications. A naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has
been differently categorized and given special treatment. The grant of a petition for naturalization
does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government another opportunity to
present new evidence.

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A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason
supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on
the ground that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured.
Eminent Domain and the Agrarian Reform Law
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT, G.R. No. 175055, June 27, 2012, FIRST
DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts:
The heirs demanded that the just compensation be computed based on the guidelines of the new law.
1. Question: Is the argument of the heirs tenable?
Answer: YES. When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the
landowner his just compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect in 1988, it becomes more
equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad, the Court explained that it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine just
compensation for a considerable length of time. This is especially imperative considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
2. Question: Are courts bound by the formulae stipulated under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program?
Answer: The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly
restricted in their determination thereof. To do so would deprive the courts of their judicial
prerogatives and reduce them to the bureaucratic function of inputting data and arriving at the
valuation. While the courts should be mindful of the different formulae created by the DAR in arriving
at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before them do
not warrant it.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010, FIRST
DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Livioco was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of sugarland located in Dapdap, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition
under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell
(VOS) form he submitted to the DAR indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions
and to an international paper mill.
Following Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 17, series of
1989, the LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco
was not satisfied with the valuation and filed a suit.
LBP also assailed the Decision of the trial court which valued the land as of 1997 when the rule is that
just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, which in this case was in 1988. CA assented
to the valuation of Livioco’s property as a residential land. LBP maintained that it is not the State’s
policy to purchase residential land but only agricultural lands under CARP.
3. Question: Is the legal argument of LBP tenable?
Answer: Yes, LBP’s argument is proper. For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. As to the
character of the property, both trial and appellate courts erred in treating the land as residential and
accepting the change in the character of the property, without any proof that authorized land
conversion had taken place. In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian
reform), the property’s character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential uses.
4. Question: Can the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and other circumstances necessarily convert the
property from agricultural to residential?
Answer: No. First, there was no conversion order from DAR, or even an application for conversion
with DAR, to justify the CA’s decision to treat the property as residential. Second, respondent himself
testified that his property was not affected by the volcanic ashfall, which can only mean that its
nature as an agricultural land was not drastically affected.
The Mt. Pinatubo eruption only served to make his property attractive to government agencies as a
resettlement area, but none of these government plans panned out; hence, his property remained
agricultural. Third, the circumstance that respondent’s property was surrounded by residential
subdivisions was already in existence when he offered it for sale sometime between 1987 and 1988. It
was not therefore a drastic change caused by volcanic eruption. All together, these circumstances

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negate the CA’s ruling that the subject property should be treated differently because of the natural
calamity.
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 196707, June 17,
2015, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Spouses Mercado were the registered owners of 9.8940 hectares of agricultural land and 5.2624
hectares of their aforesaid property was placed under the CARP coverage, for which petitioners were
offered P287,227.16 as just compensation. Petitioner rejected respondent’s valuation claiming that
the fair market value of their property is ₱250,000.00 per hectare.
Petitioner filed an action in court to determine just compensation.
The RTC fixed the just compensation of the subject portion at ₱25.00 per square meter. Respondent
eventually filed a Petition for Review before the CA. The CA emphasized the mandatory nature of
complying with the formula, as set forth under DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, in computing just
compensation.
5. Question: Is the trial court strictly bound by the rules set by DAR?
Answer: Both Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR A.O. No. 5 rules should be used. However, the Court
may deviate from these rules with a clear explanation why it has done so. The rule is that the RTC
must consider the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and as translated into a formula
embodied in DAR A.O. No. 5. However, it may deviate from these factors/formula if the circumstances
warrant or, as stated in the case of Sta. Romana, "if the situations before it do not warrant its
application." In such a case, the RTC, must clearly explain the reason for deviating from the aforesaid
factors or formula.
6. Question: What are basic limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain in CARP
cases?
Answer: Eminent domain refers to the inherent power of the State to take private property for public
use. This power has two basic limitations: (1) the taking must be for public use; and (2) just
compensation must be given to the owner of the property taken. Notably, in agrarian reform cases,
the taking of private property for distribution to landless farmers is considered to be one for public
use. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property expropriated.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN v.SUSIE
IRENE GALLE, G.R. No. 171836, August 11, 2014, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: In August 1992, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued 356.2257 hectares of the estate of
Galle at ₱6,083,545.26. Galle rejected the amount but LBP deposited the same in the form of cash
and bonds. On November 17, 1993, the Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled Galle’s titles and
transferred the entire estate to the State.
On November 25, 1994, new titles were issued in the name of "Patalon Estate Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Association" (PEARA)for 307.5369 hectares.
Galle instituted action against the government for "Cancellation of of Transfer Certificates of Title and
Reconveyance, Determination and Payment of Just Compensation, and Damages." The trial court
issued an Order, among others, declaring just compensation for plaintiff’s expropriated landholdings
at an amount not less than ₱345,311,112.00 and directing Land Bank of the Philippines to pay plaintiff
the said amount.
DAR and LBP assailed the decision since the trial court failed to consider Section 17 of R.A. 6657 and
apply the valuation formula of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of1992, as amended. Section 17
is an enumeration of the factors that shall be considered in the determination of just
compensation.DAR and LBP contend that because the Court did not determine just compensation
using the formula in an administrative issuance, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, the Court
consequently failed to consider Section 17 of RA 6657.
7. Question: In determination of just compensation under CARP, is a need to consider the
administrative order of DAR in computing for just compensation?
Answer: YES. While the Supreme Court acknowledges that Galle’s estate was expropriated to the
extent of 356.8257 hectares as the CA has found, the computation of the exact amount of just
compensation remains an issue that must be resolved, taking into consideration both Section 17 of RA
6657 and AOs 6 and 11.The need to apply the parameters required by the law cannot be doubted. The
courts must apply them.
8. Question: In cases involving agrarian reform land, can CARP restrict the court’s judicial
determination of just compensation?

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Answer: In the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation,
the trial courts s are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-
enumerated factors and the DAR formula that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide
the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation for a property
subject to agrarian reform.
9. Question: What is the remedy in the event that the trial court did not consider the factors set forth
under CARP and the various issuances of the DAR?
Answer: There is a need to remand the case to the trial court in order to properly compute the just
compensation that Galle and her heirs are entitled to, including interest and attorney’s fees, if any.
This prevents any arbitrariness and ensures uniformity.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON, G.R. No. 173520,
January 30, 2013, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: NAPOCOR instituted expropriation proceedings against Spouses Zabala and Baylon for aerial
easement of right of way for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa Transmission Lines. The RTC ruled that since
the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their property, they are entitled to the
actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it fixed the just compensation at ₱150.00 per square
meter. NAPOCOR appealed to the CA.

NAPOCOR imputed error on the part of the RTC in not applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No.
6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the
property traversed by its transmission lines.
10. Question: Is the contention of NAPOCOR that RA 6395 is controlling as to the determination of just
compensation by the Court?
Answer: NO. Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to
determine just compensation. In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the
market value of the affected property, NAPOCOR relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395.
No legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether
the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that
cannot "be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.”

Delay in Payment of Just Compensation

CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS, City Mayor v.HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-
BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, G.R. No. 168967,
February 12, 2010, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: In 1981, the City of Iloilo expropriated the property of Javellana to be used as a school site for
La Paz High School. In 1983, the trial court issued an Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner
to take immediate possession of the Javellana Property. Since1984, the expropriation proceedings
remained dormant.
In 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally
sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such
deposit was ever made.
Javellana demanded his just compensation as well as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution and
a negotiated sale were unsuccessful.
In 2003, Javellana filed a Complaint against petitioner for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery
of Rental and Damages.
11. Question: Will the case prosper despite the fact that the action was filed more than 25 years after
the Writ of Possession was issued?
Answer: Yes, the case will prosper. It is arbitrary and capricious for the government to initiate
expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s property, allow the order of expropriation to become
final, but then fail to justly compensate the owner for over 25 years. This is government at its most
high-handed and irresponsible, and should be condemned in the strongest possible terms.
12. Question: Can the City of Iloilo be held liable for damages for the delay in the payment of just
compensation?
Answer: Yes. For its failure to properly compensate the landowner, the City of Iloilo is liable for
damages. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that a government
agency’s prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings
undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages: “Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate

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compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal
interest (6%).
13. Question: What is the basis of the award of damages in expropriation cases?
Answer: The award of damages is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and
follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as
of the date of the taking.”
Stages of an Expropriation Case
14. Question: What are the distinct phases of an expropriation case?
Answer: Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase ends with an order of dismissal,
or a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. The second phase consists
of the determination of just compensation. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
landowner. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
Finality of Order in Expropriation Cases
15. Question: When does an order in an expropriation case become final?
Answer: An order of condemnation or dismissal is final when the trial court resolves the question of
whether or not the government has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once
the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its
public use can no longer be questioned. Once it has become final, and the government’s right to
expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review.
Basis of Computation of Just Compensation
16. Question: What is the reckoning date to determine just compensation?
Answer: As to the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation, the computation should
be the date when the expropriation complaint was filed. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of
the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the initiation of the expropriation proceedings.
Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
Law on Public Officers: Complainant’s Burden
MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS v. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO, G.R. No. 190524, February 17, 2014,
SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner accused respondent Patricia B. Monayao – then employed by the DSWD – of
misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to implement DENR Order in a land dispute filed
sometime in 1987 by petitioner’s brother against respondent’s father. It appears that in said case,
respondent appeared in lieu of her father, who she claimed passed away.
However, she presented a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by her father, which was simulated
considering that as early as 1987, respondent’s father was already deceased.
Petitioner pursued her complained before the Mayor of the municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao
Province where respondent transferred. No action was taken on the complaint because the CSC said
that the subject matter of the complaint was purely personal. Thus, this appeal.
1. Question: In a complaint against a public officer, who has the burden to prove dishonesty?
Answer: The Complainant has the burden to prove that dishonesty was committed the public officer.
The Court dismissed the petition holding that acts and omissions (dishonesty) of the respondent
and the discipline and morale of the service arising out of her private transactions do not constitute as
administrative offenses.
2. Question: What is dishonesty?
Answer: Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to
one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in
principle; and lack of fairness and straight forwardness.
3. Question: In a complaint for dishonesty, what will merit the dismissal of a public officer?
Answer: Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the
performance of duty by the public officer, for it inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or
employee to continue in office but the complainant must produce evidence to support the claim of
dishonesty.
Law on Public Officers: Definition of Misconduct
4. Question: What is misconduct?

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Answer: Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden
act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. More particularly it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.
Law on Public Officers: Non-Disclosure of Information
MACARIO CATIPON, JR. v. JEROME JAPSON, G.R. No. 191787, June 22, 2015, SECOND DIVISION, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Catipon holds a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio Colleges Foundation despite a
deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with
deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction
came after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a
graduate.
Catipon qualified for a post in the SSS. Catipon took the Career Service Professional Examination
(CSPE) with a rating of 80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-
Charge Branch Head of the SSS at Bangued, Abra.
Catipon was only able to remove his 1.5 deficiency after passing the CSPE. Jerome Japson, a former
Senior Member Services Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE
application.
After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-
CAR. Petitioner pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He maintained that at the
time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the policy of the CSC – that
any deficiency in the applicant’s educational requirement may be substituted by his length of service –
was still subsisting.
The CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a Decision, Catipon was
exonerated of the charges of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Grave Misconduct.
However, he was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
5. Question: Can Caitpon, relying on his knowledge of an old rule which has already been modified,
thereby affecting his qualifications, be held guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
government service?
Answer: Yes. Catipon was negligent in filling up his CSPE application form and in failing to verify
beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination. His claim of good faith and absence
of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense
as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under
our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Law on Public Officers: Role of the CSC
6. Question: What is the primary responsibility of the Civil Service Commission?
Answer: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
Law on Public Officers: Judicial Intervention
7. Question: Was recourse to the court proper under the set of facts?
Answer: No. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus dismissible. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him or her. The administrative agency concerned – in this case the Commission Proper – is in the "best
position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.”
Law on Public Officers: Equity and Justice
8. Question: Can Catipon invoke equity and justice and appeal that his eligibility be not revoked?
Answer: The Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of
the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility." The act of using a fake or spurious
civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations
or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a transgression of
the law which has no place in the public service.“ A person aspiring for public office must observe
honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected.

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Public Officers: Suspension and Effect of Acquittal
9. Question: When may a trial court continue to exercise the power of judicial review challenging the
order of suspension pendente lite when the petitioner had already been acquitted?
ANSWER: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case or
controversy.
In Mattel, Inc. v. v. Francisco, the Court has ruled that "Where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or
value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging."
In fine, the Court reiterated that the issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner's suspension had
been mooted considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan in its November 24, 2009 Decision.
(Abdul v. Sandiganbayan, December 2, 2013, Del Castillo, J.)
Law on Public Officers: Citizenship Requirement
ROMMEL C. ARNADO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE CAPITAN, G.R. No. 210164,
August 18, 2015, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was
naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA). He applied for repatriation under
Republic Act No. 9225 in San Francisco, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and he received an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition was
issued in his favor. He executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post in 2010.
In 2013, Arnado once again filed his CoC.
Capitan, Amado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition seeking to disqualify him from
running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of the Court
in Maquiling. The resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections
where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16%
ofthe total votes cast) votes only. On May 14, 2013, Amado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Amado's proclamation. He
argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Amado
is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Amado's proclamation is void and
without any legal effect. The COMELEC Second Division noted that Amado failed to execute another
Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections.
Hence, this Petition.
10. Question: Will a subsequent compliance of the act of renunciation of a foreign citizenship suffice
to qualify a candidate to run in an election?
Answer: NO. Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) o f RA 9225 at the
time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice. Under
Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from
running for any elective local position.
11. Question: Can popular vote cure the ineligibility of a candidate?
Answer: In Maquiling, the Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a
candidate. Thus, while Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of
the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications." If in Velasco, the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override
the required qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC, a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court
should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064
of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the
requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section
which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local candidates." In short, Arnaldo’s victory cannot
cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of
a disqualified candidate because the application of constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
12. Question: What is dual citizenship under the Local Government Code?
Answer: In Mercado v. Manzano, it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d)
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225
allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights
upon compliance with the requirements of the law.
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They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Law on Public Officers: Standards of Morality
PO2 PATRICK MEJIA GABRIEL v. SHERIFF WILLIAM JOSE R. RAMOS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 166,
Pasig City, A.M. No. P-06-2256, April 10, 2013, RESOLUTION, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Sheriff Ramos was charged with Alarms and Scandals and Violation of Domicile. He destroyed
personal belongings inside the house of Consolacion Dela Cruz Favillar (Consolacion), the mother of
his common-law-wife, Jenelita Dela Cruz (Jenelita) and thereafter indiscriminately fired a gun outside
the said house. Jenelita has been the mistress of Ramos for 15 years.
As a public officer, Ramos violated Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution.
For his defense, he said Ramos admitted his common-law relationship with Jenelita but denied living
under scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock common decency. He argued that their
relationship having spanned 15 years already and the fact that they have two children dispel any
vestiges of immorality. He alleged Consolacion resented the fact that he and Jeneilta were
transferring to another place and thus charged him with Violation of Domicile.
13. Question: Will the length of an illicit relationship and the tolerance of the members of society to
such relationship be sufficient to condone the immoral act of Ramos?
Answer: The illicit relationship between a married man and a woman not his wife will remain illicit
notwithstanding the lapse of considerable number of years they have been living together. Passage of
time does not legitimize illicit relationship; neither does other people's perceived tolerance or
acquiescence or indifference toward such relationship.
14. Question: What is immorality?
Answer: Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also "conducts
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare."
15. Question: What is the appropriate penalty for Ramos for his behavior?
Answer: Ramos is found GUILTY of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Accordingly, he is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for twelve (12) months without pay,
with WARNING that commission of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty. He
is ADMONISHED to terminate his common-law relationship with Jenelita Dela Cruz Favillar.
Law on Public Officers: Gross Neglect
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v. ROGELIO MANALO, G.R. No. 208979, 21
September 2016, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: GSIS and the CSC found Manalo guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct for his failure
to perform his task of checking the completeness and authenticity of the application forms and
supporting documents submitted and for deliberately using his access/operator and terminal codes to
process fake membership records and create policy contracts – which thus led to the granting of
anomalous loans to non-existent GSIS members.
C.A. found Manalo guilty of gross neglect. The CA said that responsibility of Computer Operator was
merely ministerial and it added that there is no evidence to prove that respondent directly
participated in the approval and grant of spurious loans to these fake members, or that he benefited
from these loans; his only fault is that fictitious persons and persons already separated from the
service were entered into the membership database and issued membership records.
GSIS appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
16. Question: What is gross neglect?
Answer: Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the consequences,
insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or
unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Law on Public Officers: Misconduct
17. Question: What is misconduct?
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Answer: Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous,
and not trifling.
Law on Public Officers: Dishonesty
18. Question: What is dishonesty?
Answer: Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive, or betray.
Law on Public Officers: Gross Neglect of Duty
19. Question: Given the facts, what is the appropriate charge against Manalo?
Answer: For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation of 17 anomalous policy
records which were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, respondent is guilty not of grave
misconduct or dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty which is punished with dismissal under Rule 10,
Section 46(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
Law on Public Officers: Dismissal from Service
20. Question: What is the proper penalty against Manalo?
Answer: The appropriate penalty is dismissal from government service for gross neglect of duty, with
cancellation of civil service eligibility; forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any; perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or
instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial
institution; and bar from taking civil service examinations.
Law on Public Officers: Fiduciary Duty
GLORIA G. HALLASGO v. COA Region X, et al., G.R. No. 171340, September 11, 2009, EN BANC, DEL
CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Petitioner (Hallasgo) was the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Damulog, Bukidnon. On
15 June 2001, she was accused before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao of
unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public treasury amounting to malversation of public funds
by outgoing and incumbent officials of the municipality.
The salient points of the audit teams findings of the audit team are summarized as follows: 1. alleged
unrecorded withdrawals of P360,000.00 through three (3) checks made without supporting vouchers;
2. alleged unliquidated cash advances of P171,256.00; 3. alleged unrecorded withdrawals of
P700,000.00 encashed by petitioner on 16 June 1997 under PNB Check No. 586577-W for P350,000.00
and LBP Check No. 15627907 for P350,000.00; 4. Petitioner failed to remit intact and promptly the
amounts she received in cash totalling P980,000.00, thus exposing government funds to probable
misuse/misapplication.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Hallasgo guilty of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Misconduct in office
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. In the instant case, the respondent
appears to have used her expertise in financial management to obfuscate the subject transactions for
the purposes of concealing financial anomalies. Her acts cannot be considered as done in good faith or
constituting only errors of judgment. It is to be emphasized that the tasks and functions of a treasurer
is highly fiduciary in nature. Public office is a public trust.
The Ombudsman imposed the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service. The Court of Appeals the
dismissal of Hallasgo.
Hence, this appeal.
Law on Public Officers: Misconduct
21. Question: What is misconduct?
Answer: Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty. Qualified by the term gross, it means conduct that
is "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.“
Law on Public Officers: Penalty for Misconduct
22. Question: What is the appropriate penalty for Treasurer Hallasgo?
Answer: She should be DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

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There is sufficient evidence on record which demonstrates a pattern of negligence and gross
misconduct on the part of the petitioner that fully satisfies the standard of substantial evidence to
support the conclusion.
Law on Public Officers: Substantial Evidence
23. Question: What is the substantial evidence to support Hallasgo’s misconduct?
Answer: Hallasgo’s failure to keep current and accurate records, repeated withdrawal of funds
without the appropriate disbursement vouchers, failure to ensure the timely liquidation of her cash
advances even after the lapse of over a year, and failure to account for funds in her custody not only
constitute violations of applicable laws, but also reflect poorly on the government and provide ripe
opportunity for fraud and corruption.
Law on Public Officers: Separation from Service
EFREN M. HERRERA and ESTHER C.GALVEZ, for and on their behalf and on behalf of OTHER
SEPARATED,UNREHIRED and RETIRED EMPLOYEES OF THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGETAND MANAGEMENT and THEOFFICE
OF THE SOLICITORGENERAL, G.R. No. 166570, December 18, 2009, SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO,
J.:
Facts: Congress enacted RA No. 9136 to provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric
power industry, including the privatization of NPCs assets and liabilities.
One necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of employees from the
Department of Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification Administration and
the NPC. To soften the blow from the severance of employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of
the EPIRA, for a separation package superior than those provided under existing laws.
all NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated from the service. As a result, all the
employees who held permanent positions at the NPC as of June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the
corresponding separation pay equivalent to one and a half months salary per year of service.
Nonetheless, in addition to the separation package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC
employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as amended. Under these laws,
government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service
One necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of employees from the
Department of Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification Administration and
the NPC. To soften the blow from the severance of employment, Congress provided in Section 63 of
the EPIRA, for a separation package superior than those provided under existing laws.
All NPC employees, including the petitioners, were separated from the service. As a result, all the
employees who held permanent positions at the NPC as of June 26, 2001 opted for and were paid the
corresponding separation pay equivalent to one and a half months salary per year of service.
Nonetheless, in addition to the separation package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC
employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as amended. Under these laws,
government employees who have rendered at least 20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity
equivalent to one months salary for every year of service for the first 20 years, one and a half months
salary for every year of service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months’ salary for every year of
service in excess of 30 years.
The NPC argued that the grant of retirement benefits to displaced employees in addition to
separation pay was inconsistent with the constitutional proscription on the grant of a double gratuity.
The Petitioners filed an action for Declaratory Relief before the RTC of Quezon City. It ruled that the
petitioners are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186 (CA No.
186),as amended, over and above the separation benefits they received under Republic Act (RA) No.
9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA).
24. Question: Are the petitioners entitled to separate benefits under two different laws?
Answer: No. Absent explicit statutory authority, the cannot provide an imprimatur to the grant of
separation pay and retirement benefits from one single act of involuntary separation from the service,
lest there be duplication of purpose and depletion of government resources.
25. Question: What is the nature of separation pay in a reorganization of a government entity?
Answer: Within the context of government reorganization, separation pay and retirement benefits
arising from the same cause, are in consideration of the same services and granted for the same
purpose. Whether denominated as separation pay or retirement benefits, these financial benefits
reward government service and provide monetary assistance to employees involuntarily separated
due to bona fide reorganization.
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Thus, absent an express provision of law to the contrary, separation due to reorganization gives rise
to two possible scenarios: first, when the separated employee is not yet entitled to retirement
benefits, second, when the employee is qualified to retire.
In the first case, the employee’s separation pay shall be computed based on the period of service
rendered in the government prior to the reorganization.
In the second case, where an employee is qualified to retire, he or she may opt to claim separation or
retirement benefits.
Law on Public Officers: Nature of Civil Service
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 179370, November 19, 2009, EN
BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Capablanca was initially conscripted as PO1 with a temporary status. He took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOM and passed the same. Then he took the Career Service
Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) and likewise passed the same. Thereafter, he was given permanent status as PO1.
The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) through its Regional Director (Clavite-Vidal) informed
PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT because the person in the
picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in
the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the
signature affixed to the PDS. The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged
examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was
established.
CSC-Caraga conceded that NAPOLCOM had the sole authority to conduct the entrance and
promotional examinations of police officers. However, it took cognizance of case since Capablanca’s
permanent appointment was based on his Civil Service eligibility.
To enjoin, CSC from conducting its investigation Capablanca sought relief from the trial court.
The trial court ruled that CSC had no jurisdiction over Capablanca.
CSC appealed the decision to the C.A. The Court of Appeals found that PO1 Capablanca prematurely
resorted to court intervention when the remedy of appeal to the CSC Central Office was still available.
Hence, this petition by Capablanca.
Law on Public Officers: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
26. Question: Was Capablanca’s resort to the trial court under the circumstances proper?
Answer: No. Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing before the CSC
Central Office instead of filing a petition before the trial court.
Law on Public Officers: Jurisdiction of the CSC
27. Question: Did the CSC have the jurisdiction over Capablanca’s civil service eligibility?
Answer: Yes. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a
career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
28. Question: Are uniformed men of the PNP subject to CSC laws and regulations?
Answer: Yes. Uniformed members of the PNP are considered employees of the National Government,
and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service laws and regulations. Petitioner cannot evade
liability under the pretense that another agency has primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule
that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. When it clearly declares that a
subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the party involved in the controversy must
bow and submit himself to the tribunal on which jurisdiction is conferred.
Law on Public Officers: Midnight Appointment
LEAH M. NAZARENO, et al. v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE, represented by CITY MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES,
DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA TUMONGHA, JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI CAMPOS,
G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.
Facts: Former Dumaguete City Mayor Remollo sought re-election in the May 2001 elections, but lost
to respondent Mayor Perdices. Thereafter, on June 5, 7, and 11, 2001, outgoing Mayor Remollo
promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees, including the herein
52 petitioners.
On July 2, 2001, Mayor Perdices publicly announced at the flag raising ceremony at the Dumaguete
City Hall grounds that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. He
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instructed the City Administrator to direct the City Assistant Treasurer to refrain from making any
cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions.
Petitioners filed an action seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments.
Law on Public Officers: Professionalism in Civil Service
Relative to this main case, the CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City, revoked and invalidated the
appointments of the petitioners as the same were done in violation of CSC regulation which prohibits
"mass appointments."
29. Question: What does the term “mass appointments” mean?
Answer: The term refers to those issued in bulk or in large number after the elections by an outgoing
local chief executive and there is no apparent need for their immediate issuance.
30. Question: Was the action of the CSC to invalidate the “mass appointments” proper?
Answer: Yes. The Court finds that the CSC has the authority to issue CSC questioned regulation and
that the invalidation of petitioners’ appointments was warranted.
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules
and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No.
807 or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines
Law on Public Officers: Midnight Appointment
The CSC has been authorized by statutes to "prescribe, amend, and enforce" rules to cover the civil
service. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated
authority are set out in the statutes, to wit: to promote "economical, efficient, and effective
personnel administration."
31. Question: Is there a distinction between “mass appointments” and “midnight appointment”
within the perspective of the prohibition covered by the election ban?
Answer: It is true that there is no constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass
appointments" by defeated local government officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly,
this is not the same as a "midnight appointment," proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to
those appointments made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential election. This
case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue "midnight"
appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause
animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local
governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments
instead of attending to their functions.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:QUASI-JUDICIAL (ADJUDICATORY) POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
SALVA CION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD BUNDAC, DANNY CABIGUEN, GREGORIO
DELGADO, and BILLY BUNGAR v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, represented
by Executive Director ROMEO DORADO, and PATRICIA LOUISE MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, represented by Engineer FERNANDO ESGUERRA, G.R. No. 178347, February 25, 2013,
SECOND DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Republic Act (RA) No. 7611called for the establishment of the Environmentally Critical Areas
Network (ECAN) by Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD). PCSD promulgated the SEP
Clearance Guidelines requiring an SEP Clearance before application for permits, licenses, patents,
grants, or concessions with the relevant government agencies.
PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to PLMDC in Barangay Calategas in the Municipality of Narra, Province
of Palawan. PCSD denied request of the farmers for the recall of the subject SEP Clearance.
Aggrieved, the farmers filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC-Puerto Princesa praying for the
issuance of Writ of Mandamus annulling the SEP Clearance issued to PLMDC. The trial court denied
the petition since PCSD has no adjudicatory powers.
Thus, this appeal.
1. Question: What will be the basis for an administrative agency to exercise quasi-adjudicatory
powers?
Answer: There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon the
administrative body. Normally, an agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper discharge of its
functions is always circumscribed by the enabling statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with rule-
making power, may circumvent legislative intent by creating new powers for itself through an
administrative order.
Rule-making powers may not necessarily in include quasi-adjudicatory powers.

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2. Question: What are the factors that will indicate an administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial
functions?
Answer: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards
that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a
judgment of the court. These decisions are binding, such that when they attain finality, they have the
effect of res judicata that even the courts of justice have to respect.
The Court has held in one case, "judicial or quasi-judicial function involves the determination of what
the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in
controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective
rights. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function must
be clothed with power and authority to pass judgment or render a decision on the controversy
construing and applying the laws to that end."
3. Question: Does ascertainment of facts constitute quasi-judicial function?
Answer: PCSD’s receipt of documents and ascertainment of their sufficiency and accuracy are not
indicative of a judicial function. It is, at most, an investigatory function to determine the truth behind
the claims of the project proponent. This Court has held that the power to investigate is not the same
as adjudication, so long as there is no final determination of the parties’ respective rights and
obligations.
4. Question: Does the conduct of public consultation constitute quasi-judicial function?
Answer: The fact that an administrative agency conducts public consultations or hearings does not
mean that it is performing quasi-judicial functions. The purpose of public consultations is not for
adversaries to pit their claims against each other.
Note: Where an administrative body or officer does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power,
certiorari does not lie.
POWERS OF COA: DISALLOWANCE OF DISBURSEMENT
RONNIE H. LUMAYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G. R. No. 185001, September 25, 2009, EN BANC,
DEL CASTILLO, J. :
Facts: On 15 June 2001, DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 74 (LBC No. 74), authorizing the grant of
a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the LGUs effective 1 July 2001, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9137 dated 8 June 2001.
COA affirmed the Notice of Disallowance of the 5% salary increase of the municipal personnel of the
Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao covering the period 15 February to 30 September 2002, in the
amount of P895,891.50, and requiring petitioners to refund the same. Also assailed is the COA
Decision No. 2007-040 dated 25 October 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
The declaration by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the Resolution that the 2002 municipal budget
was operative did not include the grant of the 5% salary increase, as the same was not contained in
the said budget but in Resolution No. 66, s. 2002.
1. Question: Was the disallowance of the salary adjustment without appropriate compliance with
DBM rules proper?
Answer: Yes. The COA correctly affirmed the disallowance of the amount of P895,891.50. Factual
findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great
weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of
the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
2. Question: Is there a need for the employees of the municipality to reimburse the government the
amount they received under the erroneous resolution?
Answer: There is no need for the employees to reimburse the amount received because they acted in
good faith. They should be held personally liable for the refund, the same cannot be sustained. Absent
a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from
the performance of official duties. Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in
the discharge of official duties.
3. Question: Is there a need for the employees of the municipality to reimburse the government the
amount they received under the erroneous resolution?
Answer: There is no need for the employees to reimburse the amount received because they acted in
good faith. They should be held personally liable for the refund, the same cannot be sustained. Absent
a showing of bad faith or malice, public officers are not personally liable for damages resulting from

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the performance of official duties. Every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in
the discharge of official duties.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS, MARIANITA A. BULANAN, REMEDIOS S. DE JESUS, and
NUNILON J. MABINIvs. SONIA R. LORENZO, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija, CECILIO DE GUZMAN, Vice Mayor, CESARIO LOPEZ, JR., EMILIO PACSON, BONIFACIO CACERES,
JR., NAPOLEON OCAMPO, MARIO CRUZ, PRISCILA REYES, ROLANDO ESQUIVEL, and CRISENCIANO
CABLAO in their capacity as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and
EDUARDO N. JOSON
Facts: Resolution No. 27 s. 2001 of the Municipality of San Isidro declared the reorganization of all its
offices of the municipal government. Consequently, the Municipal Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a
memorandum informing all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the
reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective
applications for the newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern on or before
January 10, 2002. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.
Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, on January 17, 2002, filed with the CA
a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioners sought to prohibit respondents from
implementing the reorganization. While the case was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo
issued a letter terminating the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not
selected for the new positions effective April 21, 2002.
1. Question: Was direct resort to the Court of Appeals proper?
Answer: NO. The CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. The CSC, as the central personnel
agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all
employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter
of controversies relating to the civil service.
2. Question: What is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Answer: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it
admits of exceptions.
POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. What are political questions?
Answer: Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”(Vinuya, et al. v. The Honorable
Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28. 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])
2. May the Supreme Court annul the directive of President Duterte allowing that the remains of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos be laid to rest in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani?
Answer: There is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its
authority to check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another branch. Truly, the
President’s discretion is not totally unfettered. X x x. At bar, President Duterte x x x acted within the
bounds of the law and jurisprudence, Notwithstanding the call of human rights advocate, the Court
must uphold what is legal and just. And that is not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB.
For even the Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is available at any
stage of a person’s development, from the time he or she becomes a person to the time he or she
leaves this earth. [Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No.
225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc (Peralta)]
3. What are the requisites for the Court to take cognizance of a case which involve issues on
constitutionality?
Answer: The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
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must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
important. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 89, Nov.
19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])
4. What is actual controversy?
Answer: An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute. There must be contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law or jurisprudence.
5. When is an issue “ripe” for adjudication?
Answer: “Ripeness” means that something had been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.
6. When is an action deemed moot?
Answer: An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issued involved have become academic or dead, or when the matter in dispute has already been
resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised
again between the parties (Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 792, 800 [1998]). Time and again,
courts have refrained from even expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have become moot
and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination
thereof would be of no practical use or value (Barbieto v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 184646, October
30, 2009, 604 SCRA 825, 840).(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications,
Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc
[Villarama])
7. What are the exceptions to the Moot and Academic Principle?
Answer: The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 93, Nov. 19,
2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])
8. What is locus standi?
Answer: Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, locus standi
requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such party has no standing.
(Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973, November 8,
2016, En Banc [Peralta])
ELECTION LAW: REMEDIES AND JURISDICTION OF TRIBUNALS
ROSE MARIE D. DOROMAL v. HERNAN G. BIRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 181809,
February 17, 2010, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1. Question: What are issues involved in an election contest?
Answer: The following are the issues which need to resolved in an election contest:
1. Election
2. Returns
3. Qualifications
2. Question: Who may file an election contest?
Answer: Only a losing candidate may file an election contest.
3. Question: May a registered voter challenge the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy by an aspirant to
a position?
Answer: Yes. A registered voter may question the qualification of a candidate and move for the
cancellation of the COC.
4. Question: When may an election tribunal take jurisdiction over an election contest?
Answer: An electoral tribunal may take cognizance of an election contest provided that the following
conditions are met:

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 1. Valid proclamation;
2. Valid oath-taking; and
3. Assumption to duties
5. Question: When may COMELEC reject a certficate of votes?
Answer: A certificate of votes has to be rejected if it did not state (1) the number of votes obtained in
words, (2) the number of the precinct, (3) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and
(4) the time of issuance.

6. Question: When may certificates of votes be considered defective?

Answer: The certificates of votes are defective if they do not contain (1) the thumbmarks of the
members of the BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the time of the
issuance of the certificates, among others.
7. Question: When may a certificate of votes be considered as tampered?
Answer: Before the certificate of votes may be admitted as evidence of tampering, Section 17 of the
Omnibus Election Code requires that the certificate be duly authenticated by testimonial or
documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of the board of
election inspectors who issued the certificate.
8. Question: What is the rationale behind compliance with Section 17 of the Omnibus Code?
Answer: By requiring that the certificate of votes be duly authenticated by at least two members of
the BEI who issued the same, the law seeks to safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time
it is issued by the BEI to the watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time
that it is presented to the board of canvassers to prove tampering.
THEMISTOCLES A. SAÑO, JR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
OF DULAG, LEYTE, FERDINAND A. SERRANO (Acting Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Dulag, Leyte) and MANUEL SIA QUE, G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010, EN BANC, DEL CASTILLO J.:
9. Question: What is a pre-proclamation controversy?
Answer: A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, is: any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.
10. Question: What is the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy?
Answer: It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the
policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass
and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are
not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
The Law on Public Corporations (Local Governments)
DANILO A. DU v.VENANCIO R. JAYOMA, then Municipal Mayor of Mabini, Bohol, VICENTE GULLE, JR.,
JOVENIANO MIANO, WILFREDO MENDEZ, AGAPITO VALLESPIN, RENE BUCIO, JESUS TUTOR,
CRESCENCIO BERNALES, EDGARDO YBANEZ, and REY PAGALAN, then members of the Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) of Mabini, Bohol, G.R. No. 175042, April 23, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No.
1, series of 1988 requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said
municipality every four (4) years. For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning
bidder was Carabuena. But Carabuena failed to comply with the legal requirements. The Sangguniang
Bayan on December 1, 1988 authorized Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder
complies with the legal requirements.
On July 11, 1997, pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, Mayor Jayoma ordered
petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting activity effective immediately due to irregularities in
its operations.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with the RTC against respondent mayor
and nine members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabinito prevent respondents from suspending his
cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate until December 31,
1997; and that the Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, was unlawfully issued as it deprived
him of due process.

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1. Question: As judge, how will you rule on the case filed by Du?
Answer: As judge, I will dismiss the case as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the
municipality. The latter allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning
bidder failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said
resolution, petitioner’s authority to operate the cockpit would end on December 31, 1992 or upon
compliance by the winning bidder with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever
comes first.
2. Question: What is the basis for the dismissal of the case?
Answer: Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit and therefore, he has no cause of action
agianst the municipality. A cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another.” Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or
damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
3. Question: What is the nature of a license to operate a cockpit?
Answer: License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. It is not property of which the holder may not
be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public
interests so require.
Abatement of Nuisance per se
Question 1. May a judge order the abatement of a nuisance per se?
Answer: No, only a mayor is empowered to do so. (Cruz v. Judge Gingoyon, September 28, 2011)
National Projects in the Jurisdiction of Local Governments
Question 1: What are the requisites to implement a national project within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit?
Answer: Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC contemplate two requirements: (1) prior consultations and (2)
prior approval of the concerned sanggunian.
Creation of LGUs and Powers of LGUs
Question 1: What are the mandatory requirements to create a local government unit?
Answer: The factors to be considered in the creation of local government unit are: (PILA)
1. Population to be authenticated by the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics
Authority); population must be actual and certification can only be issued by the Chief Statistician
(Aldaba v. COMELEC, 2010);
2. Income: Average of two-year of the local government unit to be certified by the Department of
Finance. Note that all treasurers of all local government units are appointed by the Secretary of
Finance.
The share of the local government in the IRA is included in the computation of income. (Alvarez v.
Guingona, 1996)
3. Land Area: Area must be contiguous except for provinces comprising of islands. The land area
must be authenticated by the Land Management Bureau of the DENR. (Navarro v. Ermita, 2011),
where the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Dinagat as a province despite the fact
that it did not meet the prescribed 2,000 square meter area. It is impossible to achieve the
minimum area requirement since the province of Dinagat is composed of islands and cannot be
contiguous.
4. What is the rule on the conduct of a plebiscite in the creation of local government units and
additional congressional districts?
Answer: A plebiscite is required in the creation of local government units but not in the
creation of additional congressional districts.
5. Can the ARMM Legislative Assembly create a province?
Answer: In Sema v. COMELEC, the Court held that the ARMM Legislative Assembly cannot
create provinces and the grant of such power under the ARMM Organic Act is deemed
unconstitutional. It is not a valid delegation of power. The creation of local government units
in provinces, cities, municipalities, and other political subdivision is a congressional/legislative
prerogative while the creation of barangays shall be done by local ordinances in cities and
provinces (for component cities and municipalities) through the Sangguniang Panglungsod and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as the case may be.

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6. A law was enacted prescribing a higher income requirement. Will this new requirement apply to
pending bills of municipalities sought to be upgraded to cities?
Answer: In League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (2010), in upholding the legality of the
creation of additional 16 cities, the Court held that Congress may not apply the revised
requirements in a new law during the pendency of the approval of all the bills creating such new
local government units.

7. How are boundary disputes among local government units resolved?

Answer: In resolving boundary disputes among local government units, the following rules will
apply:
1. Regional trial courts exercise original jurisdiction over boundary disputes in involving a
MUNICIPALITY and an independent component city.
2. Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving
two municipalities of the same province.
3. Joint Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes
involving two municipalities of the different provinces.
4. Sangguniang Panlungsod exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes involving
two barangays of the same city.
5. Joint Sangguniang Panlungsod exercises original jurisdiction over boundary disputes
involving two barangays of two different cities.
6. The regional trial court exercises APPELLATE jurisdiction over boundary disputes among
local government units.
8. What is public use in condemnation proceedings?
Answer: In City of Manila v. Chinese Community (1919), the Court said that the right to take private
property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking must be limited by such necessity.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and
not follow, the taking of the land. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no
part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. A local government
may not takeover a property for expansion of a public street when such property (cemetery) already
serves a public purpose.
9. Does MMDA have a legislative power?
Answer: MMDA has no legislative powers. In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Homeowners Assn., Inc., the
Court held that MMDA cannot require the opening of certain streets inside a private subdivision since
it cannot make an ordinance because it has no rule-making powers. The opening of a street is a way of
regulating use of property. Therefore, MMDA cannot also validly exercise police power.
10. Can a local government be held liable for tort?
Answer: In Teotico v. City of Manila, the Supreme Court held that the City of Manila was liable under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code which mandates it to maintain and ensure the safety of the public in all
public places like roads (even national roads) in its territorial jurisdiction.

Public International Law: Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes

1. Question: Distinguish between jus cogens and erga omnes.
Answer: Jus cogens literally means “compelling law.” As defined, it means a peremptory (mandatory)
norm of general international law which is recognized and accepted by the international community
of States as a norm that does not permit of any derogation and which can be replaced or modified
only by a subsequent norm of the same character.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty that violates a jus cogens norm will
have to be invalidated.
Erga omnes literally means “in relation to the whole.” An erga omnes refers to an obligation of a
State towards the international community of States as a whole. Between an erga omnes obligation
and an obligation of a State towards another State pursuant to a treaty, an erga omnes is superior.
Public International Law: UNCLOS
2. Question: What is UNCLOS?

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Answer: The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State sovereignty
(mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare liberum). The freedom to use the
world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary principle of international law (Anne Bardin,
“Coastal State’s Jurisdiction Over Foreign Vessels” 14 Pace Int’l. Rev. 27, 28 [2002]). The UNCLOS gives
to the coastal State sovereign rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are:
1) internal waters,
2) territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas.
It also gives coastal states more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the
vessel is located (Id. At 29).
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal States exercise sovereignty,
subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty extends to the air apace
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil (Art. 2, UNCLOS). (Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et
al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])
3. As a signatory of UNCLOS, may the Philippines seek legal relief on its claim as a coastal state against
another signatory to the agreement?
Answer: Yes. The Philippines filed an arbitration case-“The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s
Republic of China”-to challenge China’s nine-dash line claim in the South China Sea.
On October 29, 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration has ruled that it has jurisdiction on the
Philippines’ case questioning the legality of China’s enormous claims in the South China Sea.
The Philippines’ case is anchored on the 1982 convention which allows coastal states the right to
manage, explore and exploit areas within its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.
It also tackles the status of certain maritime features in the South China Sea (which the Philippines
calls the West Philippine Sea) and the maritime entitlements they are capable of generating, and the
lawfulness of certain actions by China in the South China Sea that are alleged by the Philippines to
violate the UNCLOS.
The Philippines said China’s assertion of having “indisputable” and “historical” claims that extends
beyond what is allowed by the UNCLOS infringes on the country’s maritime jurisdiction and prevents
it from exercising its right under the convention.
4. What are the significant pronouncements of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) in its July
12, 2016 ruling?
Answer: The following are the significant ruling of the PCA:
1. The so-called "9-dash line" of China is invalid. The Tribunal declared this “9-dash line” as a
clear violation of the UNCLOS. This is very important. If China’s claim was upheld, the
Philippines would have lost 80% of its EEZ in the West Philippine Sea.
2. Reclaimed islands have no exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal found that it could –
without delimiting a boundary – declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible
entitlement of China.
3. China has behaved TTunlawfully. China had violated the Philippines' sovereign rights in its
exclusive economic zone. The Tribunal further held that Chinese law-enforcement vessels had
unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine
vessels.
4. Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines. The Tribunal ruled that all constructed infrastructure in
the reef and shoal should now be turned over to the Philippines.
5. China’s non-participation will not affect the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Article 9 of Annex
VII UNCLOS, Default of appearance, and Article 25 of the Rule of Procedure of the Arbitral
Tribunal both state that the non-appearance of one party will not constitute a bar to the
proceedings and at the same time require the tribunal to “satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction
and that claim is well founded in fact and in law.”
The Tribunal ruled that China’s refusal to appear does not negate the consent that it has given
to the compulsory jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal when it signed the UNCLOS.
6. Beijing has damaged the environment. China's large-scale land reclamation has "caused severe
harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile
ecosystems.”

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 7. Island building should have stopped during the dispute process. The panel said it had no
jurisdiction over the military standoff at Second Thomas Shoal, where Chinese and Philippine
military and law enforcement vessels are locked in confrontation.
However, "China's recent large-scale reclamation and construction of artificial islands was
incompatible with the obligations on a state during dispute resolution proceedings, insofar as
China has... destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features of the South China Sea that
formed part of the Parties' dispute."
5. How may the judgment in the case be enforced?
Answer: The UNCLOS dispute settlement system does not contain an enforcement mechanism
comparable to that of the ICJ with the Security Council, at least in theory. This means that should
China refuse to comply with a decision perceived to be unfavorable to its interests, it is unlikely that
there can be any legal sanctions against such non-compliance.
The reaction of non-appearing States in the aftermath of an adverse decision has been varied.
Despite affirming its rejection to the judgment of the Court, some non-appearing parties have
eventually taken courses of action that were in compliance with the final award.
6. What are some of the maritime zones of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, April 30, 1982
which are pertinent to the Philippine territory?
Answer: The following provisions of UNCLOS are relevant to the Philippine government:
1. Internal waters of the Philippines consist of waters around, between and connecting the
islands of the Philippine Archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including
the waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of innocent passage for foreign vessels exists in
the case of internal waters. (Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p.
407).
Under UNCLOS, however, warships enjoy a right of innocent passage when a portion of the
territorial water of the coastal state is used for international navigation.
Article 42(2) of UNCLOS provides that there shall be no suspension of innocent passage through
straits used for international navigation. The right of the coastal state to suspend the same
requires that the coastal nation must publish the same and without any publication, it cannot
insist to suspend the use of such body of water. A claim that suspension of innocent passage is
necessary for national security may be cited by the coastal state. Upon the other hand, if a war
ship delayed its right of innocence, the same may justified under Article 18(2) of UNCLOS if the
delay was caused by rendering assistance to persons or ship in distress.
2. Territorial Sea which is 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
3. Contiguous zone is the zone contiguous to the territorial sea and extends up to 24 nautical
miles from the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may exercise control necessary
to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
within the territory or territorial sea. (Article 33 of UNCLOS)
4. Exclusive Economic Zone is the zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a
state over which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing its natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters super adjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and subsoil and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57,
UNCLOS)
7. What are the three navigable rivers?
Answer: The following are the navigable waters:
1. Inland or internal waters
2. Territorial Sea or maritime belt
3. High Seas or Open Seas (belongs to the humankind; cannot be owned by any state)
8. What activities are permissible in the high seas?
Answer: Activities in the high seas include, among others, navigation, flight over them, laying
submarine cables and papers, fishing, research, mining or pursuing any lawful business.
9. What is the freedom of navigation?
Answer: Freedom of navigation (FON) is a principle of customary international law which states that
ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer interference from other states while in
international waters. This right is now also codified as Article 87(1) a of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
10. Distinguish between flag state and flag of convenience.

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Answer: Flag state means a ship has the nationality of the flag of the state it flies, but there must be a
genuine link between the state and the ship. (Article 91, UNCLOS) while flag of convenience refers to a
state with which a vessel is registered for various reasons such as low or non-existent taxation or low-
operating costs although the ship has no genuine link with that state. (Harris, ibid. p.425)

PIL: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)

11. Question: What is the Convention on Biological Diversity?
Answer: The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is a multilateral treaty recognizing that
“modern biotechnology has great potential for human well-being if developed and used with
adequate safety measures for the environment and human health.” Its main objectives, as spelled
out in Article I, are the “conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources.”
(International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast
Asia (Philippines), et al., GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015, En Banc [Villarama])
12. Question: What is the precautionary principle?
Answer: The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the normative
idea that governments are obligated to “foresee and forestall” harm to the environment. In the
following decades, the precautionary principle has served as the normative guideline for policymaking
by many national governments. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the outcome
of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro,
defines the rights of the people to be involved in the development of their economies, and the
responsibilities of human beings to safeguard the common environment. It states that the long term
economic progress is only ensured if it s linked with the protection of the environment. The
precautionary approach, which indicates that lack of scientific certainty is no reason to postpone
action to avoid potentially serious or irreversible harm to the environment. It has been incorporated
in various international legal instruments. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, finalized and adopted in Montreal on January 29, 2000, establishes an
international regime primarily aimed at regulating trade in GMOs intended for release into the
environment, in accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.
13. What is the Writ of Kalikasan?
Answer: The Writ of Kalikasan is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual violation/s of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends
political and territorial boundaries. It is intended “to provide a stronger defense for environmental rights
through judicial efforts where institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have
fallen short” and seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats.” (Paje v.
Casino, February 3, 2015, Del Castillo, J)
Public International Law: Right to Self-Determination
14. Question: What is the right to self-determination?
Answer: The right to self-determination of peoples has gone beyond mere treaty or convention; in
fact, it has now been elevated into the status of a generally accepted of international law. However,
this right to self-determination of peoples may be understood in two senses, i.e., the right to internal
self-determination (a people’s pursuit of its own political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing State), and the right to external self-determination (which
consists of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession). (The Province of North Cotabato v. GRP
Philippines Peace Panel, Oct.14, 2008)
Public International Law: Associated State
15. Question: What is an associated state?
Answer: An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable
links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the
principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle
ground between integration and independence.
16. Question: What is an associated state in the context of public international law?
Answer: In international practice, the “associated state” arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
17. Question: Is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity constitutional?

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Answer: The 1987 Constitution provides that no province, city, or municipality, not even the
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is recognized under our laws as having
an“associative” relationship with the national government. The concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State.
Public International Law: Auto-Limitation
18. Question: What is the concept of auto-limitation under public international law?
Answer: While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the
Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law may limit
certain aspects of sovereignty. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is
pacta sunt servanda which requires compliance of obligations in good faith.
Public International Law: Extradition and Asylum
19. Question: Define the term refugee.
Answer: A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence, is unable or, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1 A[2]) (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law,
2005 Ed., p. 287)
20. What is the Right to Asylum?
Answer: The right of asylum is a privilege granted by a State to allow an alien escaping from the
prosecution of his country for political reasons to remain and grant him asylum.
It is the responsibility of the State to prevent individuals from endangering the safety of another State
by committing hostile acts or even committing ordinary crimes. (Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, p.678)
21. What are the four elements which underlie the right to asylum?
Answer: The principle of asylum implies at least four elements:
(a) A State does not only have the right, but also the obligation, to grant temporary
asylum;
(b) An asylee should be expelled or returned to a territory, with respect to which he has
well-founded fear of persecution;
(c) An asylee is immune from persecution and penalty on account of his illegal entry or
presence; and
(d) An asylee is entitled to temporary residence within the state of asylum until his
reintegration, resettlement or voluntary repatriation.
22. Question: What is the Non-Refoulement Principle?
Answer: The non-refoulement principle is the right of a refugee not to be expelled or returned “in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
The prohibition of such expulsion or return becomes an obligation of States parties to the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 Ed.,
p. 289) .
Public International Law: State Responsibility to Aliens
23. Question: What is the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens?
Answer: An important premise for the doctrine of state responsibility to aliens to be validly invoked is
that a State is under no legal obligation in international law to admit an alien in its territory.
However, the moment it admits an alien, it is duty-bound to provide protection to that alien so that
once the State is remiss in the performance of this duty and the alien dies, or suffers injury or loss,
this could lead to liability on the part of the State.
24. Question: What are the requisites for the doctrine to apply?
Answer: The requisites for the state responsibility to aliens doctrine to apply are:
• An act or omission in violation of international law;
• The act is attributable to the State; and

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 • The causes damage or injury to a third State directly, or indirectly, to a national of the third
State.
25. Question: What are the conditions to enforce the claims under the doctrine of state responsibility
to aliens?
Answer: The conditions for the enforcement of claims under this doctrine are:
1. The nationality of the claim;
2. Exhaustion of local remedies;
3. No waiver;
4. No unreasonable delay in filing the claim; and
5. No improper conduct on the part of the injured alien.

PIL: International Humanitarian Law

26. Question: Define International Humanitarian Law.
Answer: International Humanitarian Law is the branch of public international law which governs
armed conflicts to the end that the use of violence is limited and that human suffering is mitigated or
reduced by regulating or limiting the means of military operations and by protecting persons who do
not or no longer participate in the hostilities.(Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law,
2005 ed., p. 291)
27. Question: What is the scope of International Humanitarian Law?
Answer: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) encompasses both humanitarian principles and
international treaties that seek to save lives and alleviate suffering of combatants and noncombatants
during armed conflict. Its principal legal documents are the Geneva Conventions of 1949, four treaties
signed by almost every nation in the world. The Conventions define fundamental rights for
combatants removed from the fighting due to injury, illness, or capture, and for civilians.
The 1977 Additional Protocols, which supplement the Geneva Conventions, further expand those
rights under -
1. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (First Geneva Convention);
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Second Geneva Convention);
3. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Third
Geneva Convention);
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12,
1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention);
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977; and
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.
28. Question: What are the categories of armed conflicts?
Answer: The categories of armed conflicts are:
1. International Armed Conflicts
2. Internal or Non-international Armed Conflicts
3. War of National Liberation
29. Question: What is the principle of distinction under IHL?
Answer: An important principle to be observed under IHL is the Principle of Distinction. Under this
principle, persons directly engaged in armed conflict must, at all times, distinguish between
civilians and combatants; between civilian objects and military objectives, so that only
combatants and military objectives may be subject of attack.
30. Question: What is the concept of war of national liberation?
Answer: An armed conflict may be of such nature in which “peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”
This conflict involving the right of peoples to self-determination is an international armed conflict.
It is so classified under Article I, paragraphs 3 and 4 of Protocol I.
Under these provisions, this conflict which may be referred to as “war of national liberation,” is
included in the classification set out in Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
x x x. (Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 ed., p. 307)

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 PIL: International Criminal Court
31. Question: What is the Rome Statute?
Answer: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which “shall have the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern
x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome Statute)
Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). The Statute was opened for
signature by all States in Rome on July 17, 1988 and
had remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters in
New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000 x x x. Its provisions,
however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states
(Article 25, Rome Statute). (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622, July 6,
2005, En Banc [Puno])
32. Question: What is the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court?
Answer: The International Criminal Court (ICC) shall have the power to exercise jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the
Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). (Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA 622,
July 6, 2005, En Banc [Puno])
33. Question: Explain the principle of complementarity under the ICC.
Answer: The tenth preambular paragraph of the ICC Statute emphasizes that “the International
Criminal Court x x x shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.” This principle
becomes operative in Article 1 of the Statute. This, however, has to be correlated with the sixth
preambular paragraph of the Statute which declares that “it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”
The principle of complementarity produces a correlation of the ICC jurisdiction with that of every
state over international crimes under the ICC Statute.
The principle of complementarity gives primacy to national jurisdiction x x x.
The principle of ne bis in idem in Article 20, paragraph 3, of ICC Statute strengthens
complementarity, thus: Unless the proceedings in the national court is for the purpose of shielding
the person concerned from liability, or not conducted independently or impartially,
“no person who has been tried by another court for conduct … [constituting crimes within its
jurisdiction] shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct x x x.” (Magallona,
Fundamentals of Public International Law [2005 ed.])

PIL: Diplomatic Relations

34. Question: What are the three distinct legal disciplines in international law?
Answer: The three distinct legal disciplines in international law are:
(1) public international law (treaty law, law of the seas, international criminal law, human rights
law, international humanitarian law, law on war);
(2) conflict of laws (question of which entity would have jurisdiction; and what law will be
applied in the issues to be resolved); and
(3) supranational law (regional agreements which may render inapplicable domestic law if it
conflicts with the supernational legal system).
35. What are the different approaches to recognition of governments by other states?
Answer: The different approaches to recognition of governments by other states are:
(a) Traditional approach: States consider four factors in deciding whether to recognize a state:
(1) effectiveness of control
(2) stability and permanence
(3) popular support
(4) ability and willingness to fulfill obligations
(b) ESTRADA DOCTRINE: when a new government comes to power either through constitutional
means or otherwise, its relations with other states remain unchanged. This was created by the
Mexican government, which found that it would be insulting to make determinations about
recognition of governments because it would involve passing judgment on the internal affairs of other
states.

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(c) TOBAR DOCTRINE: States will not recognize governments which come into power as a consequence
of a coup or of a revolution against the government, so long as the freely elected representatives of
the people thereof have not constitutionally reorganized the country.
36. What is the ICJ?
Answer: The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations. All members of the United Nations are
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the ICJ. A non-member may become a party on conditions to be
determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
37. What are the principal functions of the ICJ?
Answer: The principal functions of the ICJ are:
(a). To render advisory opinions; and
(b).To decide contentious cases which includes:
(i). the interpretation of any treaty, any question of international law,
(ii). the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of
international obligation; and
(iii). the nature and extent of reparation to be made for the breach of international
obligation.
38. What principles govern diplomatic and consular law?
Answer: The following principles govern diplomatic and consular law:
1. Diplomats have personal inviolability - The rational for diplomatic immunity has changed over
time:
 formerly, it was justified in terms of the sovereignty of the state and the respect due
to the state
 now, the rationale is for functional necessity – we give diplomats the protection they
need to discharge their duties, and we want other states to treat our diplomats
similarly
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides -
Article 29: diplomatic agents are not liable to any form of arrest or detention, subject
to wavier by the sending state.
Article 31: diplomatic agents are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction,
except in the case of…an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
By way of customary and conventional international law, a diplomatic agent enjoys a wide range of
privileges and immunities, to include among others, the following:
1. Personal inviolability;
2. Inviolability of premises and archives;
3. Right of an official communication;
4. Exemption from local jurisdiction;
5. Exemption from subpoena as witness;
6. Exemption from taxation
39. What is the right of legation?
Answer: The right of legation is the right to send and receive diplomatic missions. It is strictly not a
right since no State can be compelled to enter into diplomatic relations with another State. Diplomatic
relations is established by mutual consent between two States.
The right of legation is purely consensual.
The appointment of diplomats is not merely a matter of municipal law for the receiving state is not
obliged to accept a representative who is a persona non grata to it. Indeed, there have been cases
when duly accredited diplomatic representatives have been rejected, resulting in strained relations
between the sending and receiving state.
40. Enumerate the classification of diplomatic representatives.
Answer: The following are considered diplomatic representatives: [ANEMIC]
1. Ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State and other heads of missions of
equivalent rank, who when abroad are allowed to represent the person of their sovereign;
2. Envoys, Ministers or persons accredited to the sovereign; and
3. Charge’s d’ affaires who are accredited to the minister of foreign affairs.
41. What is agreation?

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Answer: Agreation is a practice of the states submit the credentials of a nominee before appointing a
particular individual to be the chief of their diplomatic mission in order to avoid possible
embarrassment.
It consists of two acts:
(i). The Inquiry, usually informal, addressed by the sending state to the receiving state
regarding the acceptability of an individual to be its chief of mission; and
(ii). The Agreement, also informal, by which the receiving state indicates to the sending state
that such person, would be acceptable.

42. What instances will allow termination of diplomatic relations?

Answer: A diplomatic mission may come to an end by any of the usual methods of terminating official
relations like:
1. Under Municipal Law: [RADAR]
(a) Resignation
(b) Accomplishment of the purpose
(c) Death
(d) Abolition of the office
(e) Removal
2. Under the International Law: [WER]
(a) War - the outbreak of war between the sending and receiving states terminates their
diplomatic relations, which is usually severed before the actual commencement of hostilities;
(b) Extinction - extinction of either the sending state or the receiving state will also
automatically terminate diplomatic relations between them; or
(c) Recall – may be demanded by the receiving state when the foreign diplomat becomes a
persona non grata to it for any reason. Where the demand is rejected by the sending state,
the receiving state may resort to the more drastic method of dismissal, by means of which the
offending diplomat is summarily presented with his passport and asked to leave the country.

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