CivPro

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, vs. ALS MANAGEMENT &

DEVT. CORP.

G.R. No. 151821. April 14, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of Money

against respondent, alleging that on July 22, 1983, both executed at Makati, Metro
Manila a Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin Towers
Condominium comprising of 271 square meters more or less, together with parking
stalls identified as G022 and G-63.

Petitioner advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in causing the
issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title. Under the
penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated that respondent, as vendee,
shall pay all the expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale and
such other documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the corresponding
Condominium Certificate of Title. After the petitioner complied with its obligations
under the said Deed of Sale, respondent, notwithstanding demands made by
petitioner, failed and refused to pay without any valid, legal or justifiable reason.

Respondent claimed that it has just and valid reasons for refusing to pay petitioner‟s
legal claims as petitioner jacked-up or increased the amount of its alleged advances for
the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title, by including
therein charges which should not be collected from buyers of condominium units.
Furthermore, it was claimed that the condominium unit purchased by respondent
suffered defects and/or deficiencies in contravention with the warranties given by
petitioner.

The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum of P26,300.45, with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof, representing the
amount spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit while petitioner
was ordered to repair the defects in the condominium unit. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

Promulgated on July 12, 1976, PD No. 957 -- otherwise known as “The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers‟ Protective Decree” -- provides that the National Housing
Authority (NHA) shall have “exclusive authority to regulate the real estate trade and
business.” Meanwhile, PD No. 1344 entitled “Empowering the National Housing
Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under
Presidential Decree No. 957” expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA to include
“claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and cases
involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, broker or
salesman.”

By virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of the NHA were
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). Pursuant to
Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, the functions of the HSRC were
transferred to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of

PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, the SC has ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in
a complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer
of a subdivision lot; for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or
not, and for determining whether there is a perfected contract of sale. Clearly then,
respondent‟s counterclaim -- being one for specific performance (correction of
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages -- falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No. 1344.

The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that such action
would not result in the mockery of the tenets of fair play. As an exception to the rule,
however, the issue may not be raised if the party is barred by estoppel. In the present
case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a judgment unfavorable to it
did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may no longer deny the trial court‟s
jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing so. The SC cannot countenance the
inconsistent postures petitioner has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the
regular court to which it has voluntarily submitted.

The undesirable practice of submitting one‟s case for decision, and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if it is not is
frowned upon by the Court Petitioner was found guilty of estoppel by laches for
failing to raise the question of jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed
its counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the former could have raised such issue, but
failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant‟s brief with the CA
on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of
„stale demands‟ is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness
of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
The Court applied the ruling in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, which state: “Public policy
dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties who are
disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter
disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying
that, in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the
entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to
repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.”

JURISDICTION OF RTC OVER CASES INVOLVING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY

DURISOL PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 121106. February 20, 2002]

Facts:

On January 17, 1962 and December 5, 1969, petitioner Durisol obtained industrial
loans from respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) amounting to
P1,213,000.00 and P2,698,800.00, respectively. As security therefor, petitioner
executed a mortgage on two parcels of registered land located in Polo (now
Valenzuela), Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 29906 and
29909.

After petitioner defaulted in the payment of the loans, DBP instituted on August
21, 1970 a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.In the meantime,
the foreclosure sale was held, wherein DBP emerged as the highest bidder. On
October 9, 1973, the corresponding certificates of sale were issued to DBP.

Petitioner, however, filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial

foreclosure before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Valenzuela, Bulacan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 605-V. The CFI rendered judgment upholding the
validity of the foreclosure. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the CFI. The decision of the Court of Appeals became
final on April 30, 1975.
 Respondent DBP, thus, filed a motion for execution, which was granted.
The writ, however, was returned unserved because petitioner was not found in the
address stated in the record. An alias writ of execution was issued against
petitioner‘s president, Rene Knecht, but the latter refused to comply with the order
to surrender the titles. Hence, on motion of DBP, an Order was issued on April 4,
1990 directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the seven titles and to
issue new ones in lieu thereof. Accordingly, new certificates of title were issued to
DBP.

Thereafter, DBP sold the lots covered.

More than four years later, or on September 2, 1994, petitioner instituted before the
Court of Appeals a petition to annul the trial court‘s decision dated January 10,
1989 and Resolution dated April 4, 1990, alleging for the first time that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner prayed that the certificates of title
issued in the names of all private respondents, except DBP, be annulled and that
TCT Nos. T-167751 and T-167752 and T-187023-187027 be reinstated.

On January 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered the now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. Petitioner Durisol‘s subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.

Hence this petition.

Issues: (1)Does the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new
duplicate owner‘s certificate of title; and

(2) Is petitioner estopped from challenging the court‘s lack of jurisdiction?

Ruling: 1. Yes. Petitioner argues that the then CFI had no jurisdiction when the
case was remanded to it by the then IAC because as a cadastral court, the CFI had
limited jurisdiction.

It should be noted, however, that when the CFI took cognizance of the remanded
case, the distinction between the CFI acting as a land registration court with
limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a CFI acting as an ordinary court
exercising general jurisdiction, on the other hand, has already been removed with
the effectivity of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529). The amendment
was aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits. The change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the designated trial courts the authority to act not
only on applications for ―original registration‖ but also ―over all petitions filed
after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising from such applications or petition.‖

2. Yes. Rule 47, Section 3 expressly provides that a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be filed before it is barred by laches or
estoppel. Hence, it has been held that while jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case may be raised at any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that
laches or estoppel has not supervened. Thus:

This Court has time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. Here, the principle of
estoppel lies. Hence, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question
of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court when it
failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings.

Note: The regional trial court, formerly the court of first instance, is a court of
general jurisdiction. All cases, the jurisdiction over which is not specifically
provided for by law to be within the jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court.

But the regional trial court is also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among
others, cadastral and land registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real
property, or specifically land registration cases, including its incidents such as the
issuance of owner‘s duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the
regional trial courts. It has been ruled that the regional trial courts have jurisdiction
over all actions involving possession of land, except forcible entry and illegal
detainer.

CESAR JARO, s. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DARAB, et al

G.R. No. 127536. February 19, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner Cesar Jaro seeks the reversal of the three resolutions of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 42231. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the requirements of
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Administrative Circular
No. 3-96.

In 1992, private respondent Rosario Vda. de Pelaez filed a complaint for prohibition
under Section 27 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Provincial
Adjudicator Board, Lucena City, Quezon. It was alleged in the complaint that the late
Rosenda Reyes y Padua was the original owner of a parcel of coconut land. Rosenda,
in turn, allegedly instituted respondent and her husband as tenants of the land. In
1978, Ricardo Padua Reyes, the heir of Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who,
respondent alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land.

The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. In ruling that

respondent was not a tenant, the Provincial Adjudicator noted that the affidavits
presented as evidence were conflicting and the inconsistencies therein were material
to the resolution of the case. The affidavit executed by Ricardo in November, 1992,
presented by respondent as evidence, contradicted an earlier affidavit of Ricardo,
executed by him on May 15, 1978. In the affidavit dated November, 1992, executed
14 years after he had sold the land, Ricardo stated that respondent is a tenant of the
land. However, in his 1978 affidavit, Ricardo declared that the land is not tenanted
and is not covered by the agrarian reform program since it is neither rice nor corn
land. The Provincial Adjudicator also held that the joint affidavit executed by
respondent with her husband on May 15, 1978 was an admission that they were not
tenants of the land. In that joint affidavit, the spouses stated that they are mere
occupants by virtue of the landowner‟s generosity, and they are willing to vacate the
same in case it is sold to another person.

Respondent appealed the adverse decision to the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board in Diliman, Quezon City. By reversing the decision, DARAB
ruled that the land in question is agricultural and the applicable agrarian law is
Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and not Presidential Decree
No. 27 which applies only to tenanted rice or corn lands covered by Operation Land
Transfer. While the joint affidavit of respondent and her husband and the earlier
affidavit of Ricardo declared that the land was untenanted, the DARAB nonetheless
found substantial evidence to show that respondent is indeed a tenant of the land in
question. The DARAB gave more weight to the November 1992 affidavit of Ricardo
which stated that his mother, Rosenda, instituted respondent and her spouse as
tenants of the land. The DARAB also took notice of the “practice of the landowners,
by way of evading the provision of tenancy laws, to have their tenants sign contracts
or agreements intended to camouflage the real import of their relationship.” Applying
RA No. 1199, the DARAB declared that respondent enjoys security of tenure as
tenant of the land there being no showing that she had renounced her rights as such.
A motion for reconsideration was denied.

The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner‟s appeal as well as its two amended
petitions.

Issue:

1) Did DARAB commit an error of jurisdiction?

2) Was the outright dismissal of the Court of Appeals of the amended petition
valid?

Ruling:

1) No.The perceived errors committed by the DARAB, if at all, merely amount to

errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. The errors that a court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction differ from errors of judgment. An error of judgment is
one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Such an error does
not make the court‟s decision void and it may serve only as a ground for reversal if it
is shown that prejudice has been caused by it. An error of judgment can be reviewed
only by an appeal.
 On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was
issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
An error of jurisdiction renders a judgment void or at least voidable and which error
is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.The DARAB decision on its
face does not show that the DARAB blatantly misapplied the fundamental rules of
evidence to the facts of the case.

2) No. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for two reasons. First, the appeal
was not in the form of a petition for review as required by Supreme Court Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95. Second, the annexes attached to the petition were
neither duplicate originals nor were they certified true copies. The annexes were only
certified as true xerox copies by the counsel of petitioner, not by the authority or the
corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, in contravention of
Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

While we agree with the Court of Appeals that the defective petition deserved to be
dismissed, the amended petition filed by petitioner should have been given due
course. Petitioner filed the amended petition, now in proper form, accompanied by
annexes, all of which were certified true copies by the DARAB. This is more than
substantial compliance.

In Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that Section 6 of Rule 43d oes not require
that all of the supporting papers or annexes accompanying the petition should be
certified true copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory is to attach the clearly
legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgment or final orders of
the lower courts. Not only did petitioner attach to his amended petition and motion
for reconsideration certified true copies of the assailed DARAB decision and
resolution, petitioner also attached certified true copies of other supporting
documents. Petitioner on his own initiative complied with the required attachments
when he filed the amended petition.
The amended petition no longer contained the fatal defects that the original petition
had but the Court of Appeals still saw it fit to dismiss the amended petition. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that “non-compliance in the original petition is admittedly
attributable to the petitioner and that no highly justifiable and compelling reason has
been advanced” to the court for it to depart from the mandatory requirements of
Administrative Circular No. 3-96. The hard stance taken by the Court of Appeals in
this case is unjustified under the circumstances.

If SC were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as what
the Court of Appeals would have it in this case, the ends of justice would be
defeated. In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, where the formal requirements were liberally
construed and substantial compliance was recognized, SC explained that rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and
other matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid application of technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. We
further declared that:

The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate

and give due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 42231, and to
decide the same on the merits.

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION VS. RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES

GEORGE KATON vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.

G.R. No. 151149, 9/7/2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly

appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed
motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends
useless litigations.

Facts:

On August 2, 1963, a parcel of land located in Sombrero Island, Puerto Princessa,

Palawan was reclassified from forest to agricultural land upon the request by the
above-named petitioner. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao
and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as co-
applicants of the petitioner.

Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and
OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero
Island.

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of
title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of Manuel
Palanca and the other respondents on the ground that the same were obtained
through fraud.

Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

On the other hand, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any homestead
application for the island and insisted that they already had their respective
occupancy and improvements on the island. Respondents aver that they are all
bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions and have declared said
portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes
thereon for twenty years.

Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the
island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the
owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel
by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and
unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an
application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who
requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land.

The assailed Resolution by the CA, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner. It affirmed the RTC‘s dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No.
3231, not on the grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription
and lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: 1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari
based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition?

2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on
an issue not raised in the Petition?

Ruling:

Propriety of Ruling on the Merits.

1.Yes.This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of
the CA‘s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved
for reconsideration of its December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself
in its November 20, 2001 Resolution, as follows:

"Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost
its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of
the interests and issues involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the
judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the volume of the conflicting, often
confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters. We stand corrected.

That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA‘s Resolution
on this point has rendered petitioner‘s issue moot. Hence, there is no need to
discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra
jurisdiction in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have
been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed
by the trial court in denying petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the
doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence,more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.

Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction

2. No. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the
court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject
matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to
the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance,
the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

The CA‘s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner‘s Complaint could not have been
based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of
dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.

What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers
of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule
1 of the same rules.

To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the
lower court‘s lack of jurisdiction" and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when
a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action.

Nonetheless, In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff‘s
own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be
dismissed even if the defense of prescription has not been invoked by the
defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,we also explained thus:

"x x x Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground
of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be
indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50
O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958;
Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136
SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule
16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative
defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the
merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even
if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in
the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission
House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a
defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is
essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in
the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence."45 (Italics supplied)

Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and
when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies
before them to prevent future litigations.

ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY AS SHOWN BY THE TAX DECLARATION AS BASIS

OF JURISDICTION OF COURT-EXCLUSION OF DAMAGES

JOVENAL OUANO vs. PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

CORPORATION

G.R. No. 134230 July 17, 2002

Facts:

On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC a
complaint against Jovenal Ouano, petitioner, for "Recovery of Ownership and
Possession of Real Property and Damages." In its complaint, PGTT alleged that it
is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision
located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. Sometime in October of 1996, PGTT
found that Ouano uprooted the concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them
and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTT‘s demand that he vacate the lots and
restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused, claiming he is the owner
and lawful possessor of the 380 square meters he occupied. Due to Ouano‘s
wrongful act, PGTT was deprived of the use of its property and suffered damages
in the amount of P100,000.00 a year. Likewise, PGTT was constrained to file the
subject action and hired the services of his counsel for P100,000.00.

On February 5, 1998, Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the

ground that it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over it considering that the assessed value of the lots involved is only
P2,910, as indicated in the latest tax declaration, citing Section 19 (paragraph 2)
and Section 33 (paragraph 3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.4

In its opposition to Ouano�s motion, PGTT contends that the RTC has
jurisdiction since the market value of the lots is P49,760.00. Besides, the
complaint is not only an action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property, but also for damages exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC
has exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 19 (paragraph 8) of the same law.

The trial court ruled it has jurisdiction over the case because "(i)t is of judicial
knowledge that the real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher
valuation than those indicated in the tax declaration. The observation of
plaintiff�s (PGTT�s) counsel as to the issue on damages is likewise sustained
considering that, being a corporation, it may have incurred damages in the form of
unrealized profits."

Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Orders of respondent judge
dated March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Did the RTC has jurisdiction?

Ruling: No. The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. CEB-21319.The complaint seeks to recover from private
respondent the ownership and possession of the lots in question and the payment of
damages. Since the action involves ownership and possession of real property, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is determined by the assessed
value, not the market value, thereof, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. 7691.

Section 33 (paragraph 3) of the said law, the MTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses and costs:Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by
the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by the
corresponding tax declaration, is only P2,910.00. As such, the complaint is well
within the MTC‘s P20,000.00 jurisdictional limit.

The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is higher than that
indicated in the tax declaration and that, therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case is highly speculative. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating
the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has
been issued by the proper government agency.

ROYALES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

127 SCRA 470

Facts:

Petitioners are lessees of a residential house owned by respondent Planas.

The latter instituted before the then City Court an ejectment suit against petitioners.
The trial court rendered a decision wherein petitioners where to immediately
vacate the house and restore possession thereof to Planas.

After the decision became final and executory, Planas filed a motion for
execution and the same was granted. The same was however restrained by the RTC
upon the filing by the petitioners a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, assailing that said decision on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, allegedly arising from failure of respondent Planas to submit the
dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation as required by P.D. 1508.

The RTC decided declaring the judgment of the trial court null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. Planas appealed to the IAC which
decided confirming the decision of the City Court. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: Whether non compliance of the condition prescribed by P.D. 1508,

jurisdiction of the court was not acquired

Ruling:

No. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by

P. D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff‘s cause of action and make
his compliant vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants,
as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and
even during the entire proceedings.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt inconsistent posture
by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily.

JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

SPOUSES KAKILALA vs. ILUMINADA

G.R. No. 143233 October 18, 2004

Facts:

On April 29, 1987, by virtue of a "Contract to Sell," spouses Kakilala,

petitioners, purchased on installment from Iluminada and other respondents herein,
a portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-51622 situated in, Biñan, Laguna.
Respondents, as children of the late Mariano Faraon, are co-owners of the land.

Petitioners tendered the down payment of P50,000.00,took actual

possession of the land and built a house thereon.

On October 12, 1989, respondents formally terminated their co-ownershipof the

property covered by TCT No. T-51622, resulting in the individual assignment and
allocation of the lots embraced therein. Lot 2317-B-11, containing an area of 2,631
square meters and covered by TCT No. 206891, was adjudicated to respondent
Conrado Faraon. A portion of this lot is the property now subject of the instant
case.

Petitioners paid several monthly installments in the total amount of P51,000.00.

However, they failed to pay the balance despite repeated demands, prompting
respondents to rescind the "Contract to Sell." On February 1, 1996, they sent
petitioners a copy of the "Notarial Act of Revocation."

Thereafter, respondent Conrado Faraon sent petitioners notices to vacate the land
but they refused to do so. Hence, on April 19, 1996, respondents filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna a complaint for unlawful detainer against
petitioners.

For their part, petitioners filed with the Regional Office of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) an action for "Specific Performance for Non-
development and Damages" against respondents, docketed as HLURB Case No. IV
6-080796-0637. On November 4, 1997, House Arbiter Gerardo Dean rendered a
Decision in favor of petitioners allowing them "to suspend payment until such time
that the project is fully developed.

On November 27, 1997, respondents filed with the HLURB Board of

Commissioners a petition for review.

Meanwhile, on August 1, 1999, the MTC of Biñan, Laguna dismissed the

unlawful detainer case filed by respondents against petitioners.

Feeling aggrieved because the Decision of the HLURB is adverse to them,

respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.

On May 12, 2000, the Appellate Court granted the petition and set aside the
Decision of the HLURB for want of jurisdiction.

Issue: Did the HLURB have jurisdiction over the instant case?

Ruling: No. There is no allegation in the complaint that the lot purchased by
petitioners is part of a tract of land partitioned primarily for residential purposes
into individual lots and offered to the public for sale. There is likewise no
allegation that the tract of land includes recreational areas and open spaces. Nor
does the "Contract to Sell,18 which forms part of the complaint, describe the
subject property as a subdivision lot. What the contract strongly suggests is that the
property is simply a lot offered by respondents, as vendors, to the petitioners, as
vendees, for sale on installment. As can be clearly gleaned from the same contract,
respondents are not acting as subdivision owners, developers, brokers or salesmen,
nor are they engaged in the real estate business. What is plain is that the parties are
acting only as ordinary sellers and buyers of a specific lot, a portion of a big tract
of land co-owned by the heirs of Mariano Faraon. Neither are there undertakings
specified in the contract that respondents shall develop the land, like providing for
the subdivision concrete roads and sidewalks, street lights, curbs and gutters,
underground drainage system, independent water system, landscaping, developed
park, and 24-hour security guard service.19 Even the rights and obligations of the
sellers and buyers of a subdivision lot are not provided in the agreement. All these
provisions are usually contained in a standard contract involving a sale of a
subdivision lot.

Moreover, although the receipts of payment delivered to petitioners by respondents

bear the name "Faraon Village Subdivision," the same does not automatically
convert the ordinary and isolated sale of real property into a sale of subdivision lot.

Clearly, the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the present case.

PLACIDO O. URBANES, JR., vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT , et al

G.R. No. 122791, February 19, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of
Catalina Security Agency, entered into an agreementto provide security services to
respondent Social Security System (SSS).
During the effectivity of the agreement, petitioner, by letter of May 16, 1994,
requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage
Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as the
Wage Rationalization Act.

Petitioner pulled out his agency‘s services from the premises of the SSS after several
letters were left unheeded. Another security agency, Jaguar, took over.Petitioner then
filed a complaintwith the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of
Wage Order No. NCR-03.

In its position paper, the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that petitioner is not the real party in interest and has no legal capacity to file the
same. In any event, it argued that if it had any obligation, it was to the security guards.
Petitioner, meanwhile, contended that the security guards assigned to the SSS do not
have any legal basis to file a complaint against it for lack of contractual privity.

Finding for petitioner, the Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR issued an Order of
September 16, 1994, ordering SSS to pay the wage differentials. The Regional Director
modified his September 16, 1994 Order by reducing the amount payable by the SSS to
petitioner. The SSS appealed to the Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor set
aside the order of the Regional Director and remanded the records of the case "for
recomputation of the wage differentials using P 5,281.00 as the basis of the wage
adjustment." And the Secretary held petitioner‘s security agency "JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY liable for wage differentials, the amount of which should be paid
DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned."

Issue:

What court possess jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

The Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case. In Lapanday Agricultural
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, which is a case where the security agency
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the principal or client
Lapanday for the upward adjustment of the contract rate in accordance with wage
orders, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the present case.It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-
employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may
be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective
bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its
complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but
seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged
breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. The action is within the
realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While
the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the
labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to
the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists.

In the case at bar, even if petitioner filed the complaint on his and also on behalf of
the security guards, the relief sought has to do with the enforcement of the contract
between him and the SSS which was deemed amended by virtue of Wage Order No.
NCR-03. The controversy subject of the case at bar is thus a civil dispute, the proper
forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts.

RODRIGO and ANA AMUETE vs MARCELO ANDRES and THE COURT

OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 122276, November 20, 2001

Facts:
A parcel of landl was awarded by the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) to petitioner Rodrigo Almuete in 1957. Since then, Rodrigo
Almuete exercised exclusive possession of the property, cultivating it and planting
thereon.

However, unknown to Rodrigo Almuete, on August 17, 1979, an Agrarian Reform

Technologist filed a field investigation and inspection report stating that the
whereabouts of the original awardee of the subject property, Rodrigo Almuete, was
unknown and that he had "waived all his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor
health beyond his control and financial hardship." It was also stated therein that "the
actual occupant of the land is Marcelo Andres since April 1967 to date." She
recommended to the Director of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan that the award in favor of Rodrigo Almuete be cancelled and
that the land be awarded to respondent Marcelo Andres. The latter was granted and
issued a homestead patent.

DAR issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-52521 in the name of Marcelo
Andres, which certificate was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. Shortly
thereafter, Marcelo Andres, accompanied by ten (10) other persons armed with bolos
and other bladed implements, entered the subject property, claiming exclusive right of
ownership and possession. They felled the narra trees, converting the same to lumber,
and destroyed the mongos planted by the Almuetes. Marcelo Andres gained control,
and took possession, of approximately half of the subject property.

Rodrigo Almuete wasted no time in complaining to the DAR authorities of Marcelo

Andres' encroachment into and occupation of the subject property. It was only then
that he learned that the subject property had been titled in the name of Marcelo
Andres and that the award in his favor had been cancelled because he had allegedly
abandoned the subject property. Upon Rodrigo Almuete's inquiry, the records of the
local office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
showed that he was still the listed owner of the subject property. Consequently,
Rodrigo Almuete and his daughter, Ana Almuete, filed an action for reconveyance
and recovery of possession. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
Andres failed to appeal; thus, the trial court's decision became final and executory. On
February 15, 1994, a writ of execution was issued. Marcelo Andres filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution, but the trial court did not act on it on the ground that it
had no more jurisdiction over the case. Andres filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. He argued that since the subject property was agricultural land
covered by a homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (or DARAB), not with the regular courts.
Respondent Andres also stressed that the original action was for ejectment, which was
cognizable by the municipal trial courts, not by the Regional Trial Courts.
Consequently, for want of jurisdiction, the trial court's decision was null and void; and
cannot be enforced by writ of execution or any other legal means. A motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Does the case fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB?

Ruling:

No. The action filed by petitioners before the trial court was for recovery of
possession and reconveyance of title. The issue to be resolved was who between
petitioner Rodrigo Almuete and respondent Marcelo Andres has a better right to the
subject property considering that both of them are awardees of the same property. It
was thus a controversy relating to ownership of the farmland, which is beyond the
ambit of the phrase "agrarian dispute." No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was
alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that which would so
characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. In fact, petitioner and respondent
were contending parties for the ownership of the same parcel of land.

" Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, as any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship
or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases
involving a tenancy relationship between the parties. The following elements are
indispensable to establish a tenancy relationship:

(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

(2) The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship;

(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

DENNIS DEL ROSARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

241 SCRA 519

Facts: Spouses Oseas and Loreta del Rosario through their only child and
attorney-in-fact petitioner Dennis del Rosario mortgaged in favor of private
respondent Jose Luna the questioned property for P450,000.00. Spouses
del Rosario could not pay the loan hence petitioner sold to private
respondent the questioned property for P450,000.00. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 384106 was issued in the name of private respondent. Petitioner
was allowed to stay in the property to give him enough time to find another
place. After the lapse of seven (7) months private respondent wrote to
petitioner demanding that he vacate the questioned property. Petitioner did
not heed the demand letter. After conciliation efforts at the barangay level
failed, private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

Petitioner contested the complaint alleging that his father, Oseas

del Rosario, filed against private respondent an action for quieting of title
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100. Thus, he
urged that since there is a question of ownership of the property involved,
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City had no jurisdiction over the
case. The courts ruled in favor of respondent Luna.

Issue: Did the MTC have jurisdiction over the nature of the suit?

Ruling: Yes. The MTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over private
respondent's ejectment suit against petitioner. This ruling is in accord with
section 33(2) of BP Blg. 129 which vests municipal courts with the
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (ejectment). There is no doubt that the petitioner's stay at the
questioned property was by mere tolerance. After the demand letter dated
Nov. 15, 1989 of private respondent, the continuing possession of
petitioner of the questioned property became unlawful. The action for
ejection was thus private respondent's legitimate remedy.

The fact that petitioner's father filed against private respondent an

action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the ejectment
case. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure all types of
ejectment cases are now covered by the summary procedure regardless of
whether the issue of ownership of the subject property is pleaded by a
party.

BASCO vs. CA

GR No. 125290

Facts: Petitioner was charged with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm

and Illegal Possession of Firearm before the RTC of Manila. The trial court
rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner
received a copy of the trial court's decision on 22 March 1993. Thereafter,
petitioner's counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision.
However, in the notice of hearing, petitioner's counsel failed to indicate the
date and time of the motion's hearing as explicitly required by Sec. 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. When petitioner's counsel realized his error,
he submitted a Notification and Manifestation. The TC however, ruled that
accused only had up to April 6, 1993 within which to perfect an appeal.
That the Motion for Reconsideration was without the notice required under
Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Considering that a motion
that does not contain a notice of hearing is but a mere scrap of paper, it
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the
Court, it is not even a motion for it does not comply with the rules and
hence the Clerk has no right to receive it; the Court did not act on the
motion.

Issue: Was the trial court correct to deny the motion?

Ruling: No. Under Sec. 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the applicable
law during the pendency of the case before the trial court, every written
motion must be set for hearing by the applicant and served together with
the notice of hearing thereof, in such a manner as to ensure receipt by the
other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court,
for good cause, sets the hearing on shorter notice. Under Sections 5 and 6
thereof, the notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing of the motion; no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service of the notice
thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse
party are not affected. A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a
mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, and upon
expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or decision becomes
final and executory.
 However, where a rigid application of the rules will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, then the rule may be relaxed,
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from
the recitals contained therein. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in
order to resolve the case.

In the instant case, it is petitioner's life and liberty that is at stake.

The trial court has sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and his conviction attained finality on the basis of mere
technicality. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner be given the opportunity
to defend himself and pursue his appeal. To do otherwise would be
tantamount to grave injustice. A relaxation of the procedural rules,
considering the particular circumstances herein, is justified.

Joseph v. Bautista

170 SCRA 540 (1989)

Facts: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for

conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City
to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the cargo
truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to
Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National
Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the
same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process
of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards
the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent

Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of
contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based
on quasi-delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva
filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto
Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the
Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already
paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging
further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P
1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court
decided in favor of respondents.

Issue: Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of
action.

Ruling: A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or

omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of
the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of
various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a
violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where
there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action
regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging
to one person.
 The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the-
delict or wrong violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one
injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with
the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only
one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by
petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical
since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery
under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our
law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously,
stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

City of Bacolod vs. San Miguel Brewery, Inc.

GR No. L-25134, October 30, 1969

Facts: The City Council of Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of
1949 imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
manufacturer bottling of coca-cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and
other soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of Bacolod, ... a fee of
ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus
"a surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to exceed 24% for one
whole year," upon "such local manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned
who will be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under the ordinance. In
1959, this ordinance was amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959,
by increasing the fee from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks. Appellant
refused to pay the additional fee and challenged the validity of the whole
ordinance. Appellee sued appellant in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. The trial court decided in favor of petitioner city.

Since it also failed to collect the surcharge provided for in the

ordinances in question, the petitioner city filed a second action to collect the
said surcharges. On July 24, 1964, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the
case on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment, and (2) a party may not institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action. This motion was denied by the court a quo.

Issue: Should the case be dismissed for being barred by res judicata and
splitting of suits?

Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled that position was essentially correct. There is
no question that appellee split up its cause of action when it filed the first
complaint on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the bottling
taxes or charges plus legal interest, without mentioning in any manner the
surcharges. The rule on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force then provided:

SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action, forbidden. A single cause of action

cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of
different complaints. .

SEC. 4. Effect of splitting. � If separate complaints were brought for

different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be
pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the merits in
either is available as a bar in the others.
 It is well recognized that a party cannot split a single cause of action
into parts and sue on each part separately. The rule against splitting a
single cause of action is intended "to prevent repeated litigation between
the same parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect
defendant from unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo
debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for
one and the same cause).

Whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one complaint for the same
violation of a right, the filing of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born
of the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on any of the other
possible reliefs arising from the same violation, whether the first action is
still pending, in which event, the defense to the subsequent complaint
would be litis pendentia, or it has already been finally terminated, in which
case, the defense would be res adjudicata. Indeed, litis pendentia and res
adjudicata, on the one hand, and splitting up a cause of action on the other,
are not separate and distinct defenses, since either of the former is by law
only the result or effect of the latter, or, better said, the sanction for or
behind it.

Bayang v. CA,

148 SCRA 91 (1987)

Facts: Sometime in November 1969, Juan Bayang filed a complaint for

quieting of title with damages against Benigno Biong in the Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Norte, In 1970, while the case was pending, Biong
succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question and
remained there until January 25, 1978. The case was decided in favor of
Biong, but the Court of Appeals on December 8, 1977, reversed the trial
court. This decision of Civil Case No. 1892became final on February 2,
1978. On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, with the CFI
seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned from the same land
from 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said land was
delivered to the plaintiff. Biong filed a motion for summary judgment,
reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicata raised in his answer dated
April 12, 1978, insofar as it related to the incidents concerning the case
prior to January 25, 1978. The trial court granted the motion and rendered
a summary judgment. The said decision was sustained by the Court of
Appeals.

Issue: Did the petition filed by Bayang constitute res judicata?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no genuine or triable
issue of fact raised by the parties, in view particularly of the affirmative
defense of res judicata invoked by the private respondent. A long line of
decisions has consistently held that for res judicata to apply: a) the former
judgment must be final; b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the second
case identity of parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of
action.

The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on
February 2, 1978. There is no dispute that the trial court which rendered
that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties to the
proceeding. The case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No.
1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the same petitioner and
private respondent now before us.

The Supreme Court is not unmindful of the argument that

affirmance of the challenged decision of the respondent court will result in
the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of Bayang. This assumes, of
course, that the petitioner could have proved his right to the income he now
claims belatedly. The point is that he did not make the proper claim at the
proper time and in the proper proceedings, and he cannot do it now.
Whatever right he might have had is now deemed waived because of his
neglect.

Enriquez vs. Ramos

7 SCRA 265

Facts: Rodrigo Enriquez and the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de
Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date, 11 parcels of
land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding
certificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid
P5,000.00 down, P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the
PNB, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within 90 days. To secure the
said balance, the vendee, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in
favor of the vendors. By way of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as
attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio, Milagros, and Lourdes, and as
judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage
on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the

mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-
mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos
moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action against her
in the CFI of Manila on 24 Feb. 1959 for the recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check
as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that at the time
this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable;
that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action, and under
section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00
was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. Upon
opposition by the plaintiffs, the CFI of Quezon City denied the motion to dismiss;
but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her answer.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City rendered judgment against
defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00, with 12% interest from 24 Feb.
1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as attorney's fees, and the costs of the
suit; and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of
non-payment within 90 days. Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court

Issue: Should the action be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of

appellee‟s cause of action?

Ruling: The court find no merit of the case. An examination of the first
complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment
of the check for P2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the
complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the balance of
P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was,
therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the
mortgage was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees
could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of
action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.
CUEVAS vs. PINEDA

143 SCRA 674

FACTS: Private respondent, are the owners of two adjoining parcels of

land, that as owners of said lots, they have been in open, peaceful and
adverse possession thereof in the concept of owners; they came to know
that petitioners had caused the preparation of a table survey-plan; that this
table survey-plan was prepared by petitioner Rolando C. Roxas, a geodetic
engineer, for his co-petitioner Leonardo Cuevas. Under this survey, private
respondents' two lots were subdivided into three lots. Petitioner Cuevas
filed with Bureau of Lands, an Application For Free Patent for Lot 2.
Petitioner Roxas filed in the same office an Application For Free Patents for
the other two lots; that District Land Officer, Claudio C. Batiles granted said
applications, resulting in the issuance of Free Patents to petitioners. Private
respondents filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands against the issuance
of said Free Patents, and they also made representations to recall the Free
Patents issued, and with the Register of Deeds to hold the registration of
the certificates of title for said Free Patents, but were told that, unless
enjoined by Court, the registration thereof would proceed. Before the filing
of the complaint with the respondent court, the respondents filed an
administrative protest with the District Land Office, Bureau of Lands asking
for the recall and cancellation of the disputed free patents. A hearing on the
protest did not materialize because the respondent court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

The petitioners contend that administrative remedies should first be

exhausted before judicial remedies are commenced. Since the private
respondents filed a "Protest" with the Bureau of Lands it is error for them to
institute a judicial action while the administrative case is still pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the
complaint of the private respondents.

RULING: The respondents have assumed inconsistent positions. After

filing an administrative protest with the Bureau of Lands in a pending case,
claiming that the disputed lots belong to them by ownership and
possession, they question the jurisdiction which they had just invoked of
that same agency.

The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is not a hard and fast

rule. It is true that in the case of Santiago, et al v. Cruz, et al, (98 Phil. 168),
this Court held:

... While there are precedents which hold the view that before a litigant can
bring a matter to court which has been passed upon by the Director of
Lands it is necessary that he first exhaust all the remedies in the
administrative branch of the government, we find no law expressly requiring
such a prerequisite before the courts could acquire jurisdiction. That ruling
would seem merely to apply to an action taken by an administrative official
concerning public lands and not when it concerns private property. This is
clearly implied in our decision in the case of Eloy Miguel v. Anacleta M.
Vda. de Reyes, 93 Phil., 542, wherein we made a particular emphasis on
the nature of the property involved. We there said that when the property
involved is a piece of public land the remedy of the party aggrieved by the
decision of the Director of Lands is to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, and if he fails to pursue this remedy he cannot
seek relief in the courts of justice. And the purpose behind the policy of
requiring a party to first exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting
to court would seem to be merely to provide 'an orderly procedure which
favors a preliminary administrative sifting process, particularly with respect
to matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative authority'
(42 Am. Jur., 581).

In the present case, the disputed property is the subject of applications for
free patents. Both parties had already invoked the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of lands when the private respondents suddenly filed a case in court and
moved to enjoin the agency from acting on the administrative case. Orderly
procedure requires that the Bureau of Lands, on a matter within its
competence and expertise, should first resolve the issues before it.

NHA vs. BAELLO

G. R. No. 143230. August 30, 2004

FACTS:During the martial law then Pres. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 569 creating a committee to expropriate the Dagat-Dagatan
Lagoon and its adjacent areas, including the property of the Pedro Baello
and Nicanora Baello-Rodriguez heirs. The property had been identified as
a permanent relocation site for families affected by the Tondo Foreshore
Urban Renewal Project Team. The committee was headed by the Office of
the Solicitor General as chairman and by General Gaudencio V. Tobias of
the National Housing Corporation (NHC) as its Vice-Chairman. Then First
Lady Imelda Marcos launched a project dubbed as the Dagat-Dagatan
Project, a showcase program for the homeless. Among the vast areas
covered by the project were the properties of the Baello and Rodriguez
heirs. A truckload of fully armed military personnel entered the Baello
property, and, at gunpoint, forcibly ejected the caretaker of the Baello
family. The soldiers then demolished the two-storey residential structure
and destroyed all the fishpond improvements thereon. The NHA took
possession of the property of the respondents.

After the Marcos regime was cut short by the EDSA I upheaval, the
Baello and Rodriquez heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of their
estates. The NHA, herein petitioner, filed a complaint for the expropriation
of the property of the respondents Baello and Rodriguez heirs in the RTC.
The NHA secured a writ of possession over the property. Thereafter,
respondents acquired titles over the lots. Petitioners filed an amended
complaint. The respondent heirs filed separate motions to dismiss the
complaint. The trial court issued an Order granting the motion and
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of
action. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, the court rendered
a Decisionaffirming the Order of the RTC. The petitioner then filed a
petition for review on certiorari in the Supreme Court. The Court issued a
Resolution denying due course the petition on the ground that the CA
committed no reversible error.

But the petitioner was undaunted; it filed a complaint against the

respondent heirs in the RTC of Caloocan City, this time, for declaration of
nullity of OCT which was issued to Pedro T. Baello and his sister Nicanora
Baello-Rodriguez. The subject property was declared alienable and
disposable by the government only lately on 17 January 1986, and thus the
said OCT could not have been validly issued in 1954.
 The trial court dismissing the complaint on the grounds of estoppel and res
judicata. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the assailed resolution of the
RTC, ruling that the petitioner‘s complaint was barred by res judicata. It also held
that the Republic of the Philippines and the petitioner, by their own acts, had
admitted that the properties titled to the respondents were private lands, even long
before Administrative Order No. 4-1766 was issued by then Minister of
Agriculture Rodolfo del Rosario during Martial Law. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the action of the petitioner was barred by res judicata.

RULING: After a careful review of the material averments of the complaint in this
case, it is clear that it is one for the nullification of the Decision of the CFI in LRC
Case No. 520 and the nullification of OCT, which was issued on the basis of the
said decision. The ground relied upon by the petitioner in its complaint was the
lack of jurisdiction over the subject, on its claim that the said properties were
forestland; hence, inalienable and not disposable. Indeed, the petitioner did not
expressly assail or pray for the nullification of the CFI Decision, as it prayed for
the nullification of on the ground that the property was inalienable when such title
was issued. However, for all intents and purposes, the petitioner sought the
nullification of such decision. This is so because the issuance of OCT was based on
the decision of the CFI, and such title cannot be nullified unless and until such
decision is first declared null and void. Such complaint should have been filed in
the CA which had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, not in the trial court. This
is conformably to Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg – ―The Court of Appeals
shall exercise: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgments of Regional Trial Courts.‖

Even if we assume, for the nonce, that the trial court had jurisdiction over
the action of the petitioner, nonetheless, we agree with the ruling of the trial and
appellate courts that the petitioner‘s action to annul OCT was barred by the
decision in LRC Case No. 520. It must be stressed that the issue of the legal nature
of the property subject of the application and the ownership thereof was litigated
and resolved by the court in such case. A former judgment would bar a subsequent
action when the following requirements concur: (a) the first judgment must be a
final one; (b) the court rendering judgment on the same must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and (d) there must be between the two cases, identity of parties, identity
of subject matter and identity of action.
 Under the principle of judicial estoppel, a party is bound by his judicial
declarations and may not contradict them in a subsequent action or proceeding
involving the same properties. The raison d‘etre of the principle is to suppress or
prohibit fraud and the deliberate shifting of position to suit the exigencies of each
particular case that may arise concerning the subject matter of the controversy.
That the petitioner is a government agency tasked to administer the property does
not bar the application of the principle. This is so because when a sovereignty
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and
rights are justiceable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and
rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. The government, when it
comes to the Court to litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the proceedings are
substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have a
superior advantage.

RELUCIO vs. LOPEZ

GR No. 138497, January 16 2002

FACTS: Herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant
Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, in the Regional Trial Court. In the
petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who
is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole
gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four
children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.

A Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
private respondent has no cause of action against her. An Order was issued by
herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio's Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some
of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely
in her name. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
assailing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: 1. Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of
the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause of action against petitioner;

2. Whether petitioner's inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings

for a complete adjudication of the controversy.

RULING: (1.) A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant
in violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of a cause of action are: (a)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as

administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising
from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this
cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit: "If a
spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her
obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx" The administration of the
property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other
persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her
first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation
between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.

The second cause of action is for an accounting by respondent husband. The

accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J.
Lopez.

The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez'

share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. The issue is whether there is
basis in law to forfeit Alberto Lopez' share, if any there be, in property co-owned
by him with petitioner. Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J.
Lopez' share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming
the trial court finds in respondent's favor, results in a breach of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action. Such cause of action, however,
pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

(2.) A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by

the judgment of the suit. In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any
judgment in Special Proceedings.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable

party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. Petitioner's participation in Special Proceedings is not
indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J.
Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give
support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez' conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share in property co-
owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and
enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the above Special Proceedings. A

necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as
party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the context of her
petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if
Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership
property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over
his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership
or absolute community property with respondent.

WESTMONT BANK vs. ONG

G. R. No. 132560. January 30, 2002

FACTS:Respondent Ong maintained a current account with petitioner,

Westmont Bank. Ong sold certain shares of stocks through Island
Securities Corporation. To pay Ong, Island Securities purchased two
Pacific Banking Corporation manager’s checks, issued in the name of
Eugene Ong as payee. Before Ong could get hold of the checks, his friend
Tanlimco got hold of them, forged Ong‟s signature and deposited these
with petitioner, where Tanlimco was also a depositor. Even though Ong‟s
specimen signature was on file, petitioner accepted and credited both
checks to the account of Tanlimco, without verifying the „signature
indorsements‟ appearing at the back thereof. Tanlimco then immediately
withdrew the money and absconded.

Instead of going straight to the bank to stop or question the payment, Ong
first sought the help of Tanlimco‟s family and to the Central Bank to recover
the amount, unfortunately proved futile. It was only about five (5) months
from discovery of the fraud, did Ong cry foul and demanded in his
complaint that petitioner pay the value of the two checks from the bank on
whose gross negligence he imputed his loss. In his suit, he insisted that he
did not “deliver, negotiate, endorse or transfer to any person or entity” the
subject checks issued to him and asserted that the signatures on the back
were spurious.

The bank simply contended that since plaintiff Ong claimed to have never
received the originals of the two checks in question from Island Securities,
much less to have authorized Tanlimco to receive the same, he never
acquired ownership of these checks. Thus, he had no legal personality to
sue as he is not a real party in interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has a cause of action against petitioner
Westmont Bank.

RULING: Petitioner‘s claim that respondent has no cause of action against the
bank is clearly misplaced. As defined, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of
action are: (a) a legal right or rights of the plaintiff, (b) a correlative obligation of
the defendant, and (c) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.

The complaint filed before the trial court expressly alleged respondent‘s right as
payee of the manager‘s checks to receive the amount involved, petitioner‘s
correlative duty as collecting bank to ensure that the amount gets to the rightful
payee or his order, and a breach of that duty because of a blatant act of negligence
on the part of petitioner which violated respondent‘s rights.

Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:

“When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the
instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up
the forgery or want of authority.”

Since the signature of the payee, in the case at bar, was forged to make it appear
that he had made an indorsement in favor of the forger, such signature should be
deemed as inoperative and ineffectual. Petitioner, as the collecting bank, grossly
erred in making payment by virtue of said forged signature. The payee, herein
respondent, should therefore be allowed to recover from the collecting bank.

STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. VICTOR MA. and

LYDIA GASTON

G.R. No. 141961. January 23, 2002

Facts: Respondent Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston filed
a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court
in Negros Occidental at Bacolod City against petitioners Santa Clara
Homeowners Association (SCHA for brevity) thru its Board of Directors,
alleging that private respondents herein were residents of San Jose
Avenue, Sta. Clara Subdivision, Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They
purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in 1974, and at the
time of purchase, there was no mention or requirement of membership in
any homeowners‟ association. Being non-members therein, an
arrangement was made wherein they were issued „non-member‟ gatepass
stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards. This
arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle of March
1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that
only its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in
their vehicles.

Consequently, petitioners herein filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the

trial court had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate
dispute between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act No. 580,
as amended by Executive Order Nos. 535 and 90, to declare as null and
void the subject resolution of the board of directors of SCHA, the proper
forum being the Home Insurance (and Guaranty) Corporation (HIGC). To
support their claim of intra-corporate controversy, petitioners stated that the
Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4 October 1973, provides
„that the association shall be a non-stock corporation with all homeowners
of Sta. Clara constituting its membership‟. Also, its by-laws contains a
provision that „all real estate owners in Sta. Clara Subdivision automatically
become members of the association.‟

On 6 July 1998, the lower court, after having received private respondents
opposition to petitioners‟ motion to dismiss and other subsequent pleadings
filed by the parties, resolved to deny petitioners‟ motion to dismiss, finding
that there existed no intra-corporate controversy since the private
respondents alleged that they had never joined the association; and, thus,
the HIGC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. On 18 July 1998, petitioners
submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause of action as
ground for the dismissal of the case. This additional ground was anchored
on the principle of damnum absque injuria as allegedly there was no
allegation in the complaint that the private respondents were actually
prevented from entering the subdivision and from having access to their
residential abode.
The court a quo denied the said motion without however ruling on the
additional ground of lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the Petition and ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
dispute. It debunked petitioners‟ contention that an intra-corporate
controversy existed between the SCHA and respondents. The CA held
that the Complaint had stated a cause of action.

Issue: (1) Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint?

(2) Did the Complaint state a cause of action?

Ruling: (1) Yes. In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarily -- on the basis of the
allegations in the Complaint -- whether private respondents are members of
the SCHA.

The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the

freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate
oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be
noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It
does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. More to the
point, private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the
SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of
Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. True, it
may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band
themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that is possible
only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become
members of the association.

Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between petitioners and private

respondents. As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between
two persons. The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems
an agreement to exist, provided the essential requisites are present. A
contract is upheld as long as there is proof of consent, subject matter and
cause.

When private respondents purchased their property in 1974 and obtained

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and
12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was
no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no
privity of contract arising from the title certificate exists between petitioners
and private respondents.

Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that
private respondents intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to
the implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other
homeowners who were not members of the association were issued non-
member gate pass stickers for their vehicles. This fact has not been
disputed by petitioners. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were
subdivision landowners who were not members thereof, notwithstanding
the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.

To reiterate, the HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners‟

disputes. The law confines its authority to controversies that arise from any
of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members
of the association; (2) between any and/or all of them and the association
of which they are members; and (3) between the association and the state
insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.

(2) Yes. A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack

of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the
factual averments in the complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the
allegations constituting the cause of action is whether, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment on the prayers. This test
implies that the issue must be passed upon on the basis of the bare
allegations in the complaint. The court does not inquire into the truth of
such allegations and declare them to be false. To do so would constitute a
procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff‟s right to due process.

A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential

elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of
the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of
the said legal right.

In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action.

First, the Complaint alleged that, under the Constitution, respondents had a
right of free access to and from their residential abode. Second, under the
law, petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third, such right
was impaired by petitioners when private respondents were refused access
through the Sta. Clara Subdivision, unless they showed their driver‟s
license for identification.

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS vs SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 157438, 10/18/2004

Facts: Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioners‟ predecessor-in-interest, served as

governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines from 1970 to 1980, during
the incumbency of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. He died on August
3, 1983.

On July 17, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines -- through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) -- filed a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance,
restitution, accounting and damages against former President Marcos and
his alleged crony, Lucio C. Tan. Aside from the main defendants (Marcos,
his wife Imelda R. Marcos, and Tan), twenty-three other persons -- who
had purportedly acted as their dummies, nominees or agents -- were
likewise impleaded in the Complaint. It alleged, among others, that Tan --
with the connivance of some government officials, including Central Bank
Governor Gregorio S. Licaros -- had fraudulently acquired the assets of the
General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), now known as the Allied Bank.
A pertinent portion of the Complaint reads thus: “13. Defendant Lucio C.
Tan, by himself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of his
relationship and influence with Defendant spouses, among others: (a)
without sufficient collateral and for a nominal consideration, with the active
collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of Defendant Willy Co,
arbitrarily and fraudulently acquired control of the General Bank and Trust
Company which eventually became Allied Banking Corporation, through
then Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros x x x.” Despite the
allegation, Licaros was not impleaded in this Complaint or in the
subsequent Expanded Complaint.

On September 13, 1991, four years after the filing of the original
action, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and for
Admission of a Second Amended Complaint, which impleaded the
Estate/Heirs of Licaros for the first time. The Amended Complaint,
reiterating earlier allegations in the Expanded Complaint, detailed Licaros‟
participation in the alleged unholy conspiracy.

The Amended Complaint restated the same causes of action originally

appearing in the initial Complaint: (1) abuse of right and power in violation
of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code; (2) unjust enrichment; (3)
breach of public trust; (4) accounting of all legal or beneficial interests in
funds, properties and assets in excess of lawful earnings and income; and
(5) actual, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages.
On September 3, 2001, the heirs of Licaros filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint. Essentially, it raised the following grounds therefor: (1) lack of
cause of action and (2) prescription. On October 12, 2001, the Republic
filed its Opposition to the Motion.

The Sandiganbayan held that the averments in the Second Amended

Complaint had sufficiently established a cause of action against former
Central Bank Governor Licaros. Ruled untenable was the argument of
petitioners that he could not be held personally liable, because the GBTC
assets had been acquired by Tan through a public bidding duly approved
by the Monetary Board. According to the anti-graft court, this argument
was a matter of defense that could not be resorted to in a motion to
dismiss, and that did not constitute a valid ground for dismissal.

Issues: 1) Did the Second Amended Complaint state a cause of

action against petitioner?

2) Was the Second Amended Complaint barred by prescription and

laches?

Ruling: 1) A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect and not to violate that right; and (3) an act or omission
constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff or
violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages.

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly and

unequivocally outlines its cause of action against Defendant Licaros as
follows: “The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively
and in unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and
theft of public funds, plunder of the nation‟s wealth, extortion, blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust
and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described below, all at the
expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of the plaintiff and the
Filipino people. x x x Former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, now
deceased, had facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets x x x
General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC) worth over P688-Million at that
time, to favor the Marcoses and the Lucio Tan group who acquired said
GBTC‟s assets for a measly sum of P500,000.00. Hence, his Estate
represented by his heirs must be impleaded as a party defendant for the
purpose of obtaining complete relief.”

The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that

Licaros, during his lifetime, had conspired with the main defendants --
particularly former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Lucio
Tan and Philippine National Bank President Panfilo O. Domingo -- in
facilitating the allegedly questionable transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan.

This charge of “conspiracy” casts a wide net, sufficiently extensive to

include all acts and all incidents incidental, related to or arising from
the charge of systematic plunder and pillage against the main defendants
in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0005. The assailed role of Licaros as Central
Bank governor in the questioned GBTC deal is not excluded therefrom. If
proven, the allegation of conspiracy may make him liable with his co-
defendants.

The essential elements of a cause of action are a legal right of the

plaintiff, a correlative obligation of the defendant, and an act or omission of
the defendant violative of said legal right. The test of sufficiency of the
facts to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer. As stated in Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc., (25 SCRA 529), „It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself. Whether these allegations are true or not
is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted. The issue
rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? So rigid is the norm
prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the facts averred, it
must not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear
the case on the merits.”

2) No. The instant action for reconveyance, restitution, and

accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts
committed by the decedent during his lifetime, more particularly for
conspiring with the main defendants to prejudice the Republic. An action to
recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on
prescription, as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Section 15 of
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states: “The right of the State to recover
properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them
or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches or estoppel.”

The intendment of the foregoing constitutional provision -- exempting

actions to recover ill-gotten wealth from the operation of the general rules
of prescription -- presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances
and the primordial state interests involved in cases of such nature. From
the preceding discussion, it is clear that any action involving the recovery of
unlawfully acquired properties against Licaros or his transferees, may not
be deemed to have prescribed. The language of the Constitution, the law
and the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal. Clearly, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions
denying, for lack of merit, petitioners‟ Motion to Dismiss.
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. LTD vs. CECILIA DIEZ
CATALAN

G.R. No. 159591. October 18, 2004

Facts: The Amended Complaint alleges: Defendants HSBANK and HSBC

TRUSTEE, doing business in the Philippines, are corporations duly
organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands with head office at 1
Grenville Street, St. Helier Jersey, Channel Islands and with branch offices
at Level 12, 1 Queen‟s Road Central, Hongkong and may be served with
summons and other court processes through their main office in Manila
with address at HSBC, the Enterprise Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue
corner Paseo de Roxas Street, Makati City.

Sometime in March 1997, Thomson issued five HSBANK checks payable

to Catalan. The checks when deposited were returned by HSBANK
purportedly for reason of “payment stopped” pending confirmation, despite
the fact that the checks were duly funded. On March 18, 1997, Thomson
wrote a letter to a certain Ricky Sousaof HSBANK confirming the checks he
issued to Catalan and requesting that all his checks be cleared. On March
20, 1997, Thomson wrote another letter to Sousa of HSBANK requesting
an advice in writing to be sent to the Philippine National Bank, through the
fastest means, that the checks he previously issued to Catalan were
already cleared. Thereafter, Catalan demanded that HSBANK make good
the checks issued by Thomson. On May 16, 1997, Marilou A. Lozada,
personal secretary and attorney-in-fact of Thomson, wrote a letter to Sousa
of HSBANK informing him that HSBANK‟s failure to clear all the checks had
saddened Thomson and requesting that the clearing of the checks be
facilitated. Subsequently, Thomson died and Catalan forwarded her
demand to HSBC TRUSTEE. Catalan sent photocopies of the returned
checks to HSBC TRUSTEE. Not satisfied, HSBC TRUSTEE through
deceit and trickery, required Catalan, as a condition for the acceptance of
the checks, to submit the original copies of the returned checks,
purportedly, to hasten payment of her claim. HSBC TRUSTEE succeeded
in its calculated deception because on April 21, 1999, Catalan and her
former counsel went to Hongkong at their own expense to personally
deliver the originals of the returned checks to the officers of HSBC
TRUSTEE, anxious of receiving the money value of the checks but HSBC
TRUSTEE despite receipt of the original checks, refused to pay Catalan‟s
claim.

On October 2, 2001, HSBANK filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint. Me3anwhile summons for HSBC TRUSTEE was tendered to
the In House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) at the Enterprise
Center, Tower 1, Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati. Without
submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC, HSBC TRUSTEE filed a
Special Appearance for Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, dated
October 29, 2001, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over it. HSBC
TRUSTEE alleges that tender of summons through HSBANK Makati did
not confer upon the RTC jurisdiction over it because: (a) it is a corporation
separate and distinct from HSBANK; (b) it does not hold office at the
HSBANK Makati or in any other place in the Philippines; (c) it has not
authorized HSBANK Makati to receive summons for it; and, (d) it has no
resident agent upon whom summons may be served because it does not
transact business in the Philippines.

Issues: 1) Does the complaint state a cause of action?

2) Did Catalan engage in forum-shopping by filing the complaint for

damages when she also filed a petition for probate of the alleged last will of
Thomson with another branch of the RTC?

3) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over HSBANK and HSBC TRUSTEE?

Ruling: 1) Yes. The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient
basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless
of the defense that may be presented by the defendants.

Catalan anchors her complaint for damages on Article 19 of the Civil Code.
It speaks of the fundamental principle of law and human conduct that a
person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of one‟s rights but also in the performance of one‟s duties. Thus,
in order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elements
must concur, to wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.

HSBANK claims that Catalan has no cause of action because under

Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, “a check of itself does not
operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the
drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and
until it accepts or certifies it.” However, HSBANK is not being sued on the
value of the check itself but for how it acted in relation to Catalan‟s claim for
payment despite the repeated directives of the drawer Thomson to
recognize the check the latter issued. Catalan may have prayed that she
be paid the value of the checks but it is axiomatic that what determines the
nature of an action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the
allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

Anent HSBC TRUSTEE, it is being sued for the baseless rejection of

Catalan‟s claim. When Catalan parted with the checks as a requirement for
the processing of her claim, even going to the extent of traveling to
Hongkong to deliver personally the checks, HSBC TRUSTEE summarily
disapproved her claim with nary a reason. HSBC TRUSTEE gave no heed
to Catalan‟s incessant appeals for an explanation. Her pleas fell on deaf
and uncaring corporate ears. Clearly, HSBC TRUSTEE‟s acts are
anathema to the prescription for human conduct enshrined in Article 19 of
the Civil Code.

2) No. It has been held that forum-shopping exists where a litigant sues the
same party against whom another action or actions for the alleged violation
of the same right and the enforcement of the same relief is/are still pending,
the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the others; and, a final
judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus would cause the
dismissal of the rest.

Thus, there is forum-shopping when there exist: a) identity of parties, or at

least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts, and c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful would amount to res judicata in the other.
There is no identity of parties. HSBANK is not a party in the probate
proceeding. HSBC TRUSTEE is only a party in the probate proceeding
because it is the executor and trustee named in the Hongkong will of
Thomson. HSBC TRUSTEE is representing the interest of the estate of
Thomson and not its own corporate interest.

With respect to the second and third requisites, a scrutiny of the entirety of
the allegations of the amended complaint in this case reveals that the rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for therein are different from those pleaded in
the probate proceeding, such that a judgment in one case would not bar
the prosecution of the other case.

3) Yes, over HSBC Bank but no as to HSBC Trustee. The Rules of Court
provides that a court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person through
either a valid service of summons in the manner required by law or the
person‟s voluntary appearance in court.

It was found that both lower courts overlooked Section 20 of Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that “the inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”
Nonetheless, such omission does not aid HSBANK‟s case.

It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer or Motion to Dismiss. HSBANK already invoked the RTC‟s
jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion for extension of time to file
answer or a motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the
filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently,
HSBANK‟s expressed reservation in its Answer ad cautelam that it filed the
same “as a mere precaution against being declared in default, and without
prejudice to the Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition xxx now pending
before the Court of Appeals to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC over it is of
no moment. Having earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure
affirmative relief in its motion for additional time to file answer or motion to
dismiss, HSBANK, effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the
RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this
Court.

In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a motion to dismiss cannot be

considered a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a
conditional appearance, entered precisely to question the regularity of the
service of summons.

Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign corporation, organized and

existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of
summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business
in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or if there be no such agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its officers
or agents within the Philippines.

The allegations in the amended complaint subject of the present cases did
not sufficiently show the fact of HSBC TRUSTEE‟s doing business in the
Philippines. It does not appear at all that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed
any act which would give the general public the impression that it had been
engaging, or intends to engage in its ordinary and usual business
undertakings in the country. Absent from the amended complaint is an
allegation that HSBC TRUSTEE had performed any act in the country that
would place it within the sphere of the court‟s jurisdiction.

There being no proper service of summons, the RTC cannot take

cognizance of the case against HSBC TRUSTEE for lack of jurisdiction
over it. Any proceeding undertaken by the RTC is therefore null and void.
Accordingly, the complaint against HSBC TRUSTEE should have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over it.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG

G.R. No. 130907. November 27, 2001

Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, a former Senator, is the

owner of two parcels of land. On March 30, 1983, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Benitez whereby the
latter undertook to lease her property in favor of PHRDC, for a period of 20
years and/or sell a portion thereof which shall be no less than ten
hectares. PHRDC in turn agreed to lease within the same period and/or
buy said property site.

On September 22, 1983, private respondent Philippine Women‟s University

(PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land
in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network
installations and other related works necessary to attain the latter‟s
objectives. Pursuant thereto, the Construction Manpower Development
Foundation (CMDF) took possession of the property and erected buildings
and other related facilities necessary for its operations. A lease contract
was thereafter signed by PWU and PHRDC on a ten-hectare portion of the
land which stipulated, among others, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for
an initial term of four years, from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988, with
an option granted to PHRDC to renew the lease upon agreement of both
parties, for a further period of up to but not exceeding 20 years from the
expiration of the initial term thereof.

PWU‟s participation in the above transactions stemmed from its being a

donee of the property involved, as embodied in a deed of donation, which
deed was executed by Benitez in its favor only in December 1984. At the
end of the initial four-year term of the lease, negotiations began for the
purchase of a seven-hectare portion of the property. In a series of letters,
Benitez made the offer to sell the property at a price of P70.00 per square
meter.

In view of the on-going negotiations for the eventual sale of the lot, Benitez
and PHRDC, through its General Manager Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed
that the payment of rentals would cease effective July 1, 1989. Benitez
however contends that no such agreement was entered into; in fact, she
said petitioner simply failed to pay rentals from July 1, 1989 up to the
present despite repeated and friendly demands made by private
respondents.

PHRDC had by then already prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale, for the
signature of Benitez as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF as vendees.
However, Benitez refused to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale since,
according to her, there was never any perfected contract or agreement to
sell the property. In a letter dated August 15, 1995, Benitez and PWU
demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises
within thirty days from notice.

Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Benitez and PWU filed an ejectment

case based on alleged unlawful detaineragainst PHRDC and CMDF before
the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite. In the meantime,
petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, to which the
CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to
the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, which case is now pending
before the RTC, Branch 20 of Imus, Cavite and docketed as Civil Case No.
1277-96.

The MTC of Dasmariñas rendered a decision dated September 2, 1996 in

favor of PWU and Benitez, ordering the defendants therein to vacate the
premises, pay arrearages in rentals, reasonable compensation for their
continued stay in the premises and attorney‟s fees. The decision was
appealed by PHRDC and CMDF to the RTC of Imus, Cavite, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 055-96, raffled off and assigned to the RTC,
Branch 22, which was presided over by respondent Judge Mangrobang.
On October 24, 1996, PWU and Benitez filed a Petition for Consolidation of
the appealed Civil Case No. 055-96 with Civil Case No. 1277-96. PHRDC
and CMDF opposed the petition.

On April 14, 1997, respondent Judge issued the Order granting the petition
for consolidation.

Issue: Can the two cases be consolidated or be held in joint trial?

Ruling: No. The legal basis of an order for consolidation of two cases is
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of

law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, it was
declared: “The main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,
guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested
dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save unnecessary costs and
expense.”

While nothing in the rules expressly prohibits the consolidation of an

appealed case with a case being heard originally, consolidation of the two
cases involved herein would serve none of the purposes cited above.First,
it would only delay the resolution of the two cases. Note that by itself
ejectment is summary in nature for it involves “perturbation of social order
which must be restored as promptly as possible.” Similarly, speedy action
is essential in expropriation, hence the rule that the plaintiff in an
expropriation case may already take or enter upon possession of the
property after depositing with an authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property..” But
consolidation of these two diverse cases would not necessarily expedite
either of them.

The ejectment case instituted by private respondents against PHRDC and

CMDF was decided by the municipal trial court on September 2, 1996.
Now the resolution of the appeal before the RTC remains pending
notwithstanding the lapse of over five years. In regard to the case for
eminent domain, it was already ruled on the propriety of the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of herein petitioner, in the case of Republic v.
Tagle, decided in 1998. Three years have already passed despite the
urgent nature of the case. To begin consolidation of the two cases at this
time would only exacerbate the delay.

Second, as pointed out by petitioner, the two cases raise dissimilar issues,
though the facts are evidently intertwined. In the ejectment case, the issue
is possession of the disputed property, while in the eminent domain case,
the issue is the taking by the State of the property by virtue of its power of
eminent domain. Note, however, that the decision in one will not
necessarily affect the decision in the other.

Third, it does not appear certain that consolidation is a wise step where one
or both cases had already been partially heard. It might just complicate
procedural requirements. The judge to whom the consolidated case will be
assigned would not have had the opportunity to observe first-hand the
witnesses in one of the cases. Fairness and due process might be
hampered rather than helped if these cases were consolidated.

As a general proposition, the propriety of consolidation rests upon the

sound discretion of the trial court judge. But in this instance, however, we
are of the considered view that the exercise of such discretion in order to
consolidate the ejectment case with the eminent domain case was less
than judicious. We are constrained to agree with petitioner that, given the
circumstances herein cited, public respondent‟s discretion has been
gravely abused.

Filipinas Industrial Corporation v. San Diego

23 SCRA 706 (1968)

Facts: Private respondent Pastor D. Ago filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for damages with preliminary attachment and
injunction. Plaintiff Pastor D. Ago is a resident Quezon City, and is the true
and lawful attorney-in-fact of Francisco Laiz, with full power to sue and file
complaint for the protection of the rights and interests of the latter by virtue
of a special power of attorney duly executed by said Francisco Laiz.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that the venue of the action was improperly laid, it appearing that the
complaint involves a personal action and Pador D. Ago filed the complaint
merely as an attorney-in-fact of Francisco Laiz who is the real party in
interest and who is a resident of General Santos, Cotabato.

Respondent trial court judge ruled that Pastor was an agent of Laiz
hence, whatever judgment might be rendered for or against him would
surely be executed for or against Francisco Laiz himself. Since the
residence of Pastor Ago is in Quezon City he can file the suit in the Court of
First Instance of the place where he resides.

Issue: May an attorney-in-fact, when so authorized in the power of

attorney, bring an action in his own name for a disclosed principal?

Ruling: No. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court provides that
"Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
This provision is mandatory. The real party in interest is the party who
would be benefitted or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. This Court has held in various cases that an attorney-in-
fact is not a real party in interest, that there is no law permitting an action to
be brought by an attorney-in-fact, and hence an action brought by him
cannot be maintained.

In the case of "Marcelo vs. De Leon," the Supremethat even if the

principal authorizes his agent to commence actions in court for and in
behalf of the principal, such action must still be filed in the name of the
principal who is the real party in interest, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. It is clear that respondent Pastor D. Ago has no right to
bring the action in his own name. Therefore, the action commenced by
respondent Pastor D. Ago cannot be maintained and cannot prosper, and it
would be a waste of time to have the court proceed with the case, because
the decision that would be rendered in that case would not bind the parties
in the case.

Aranico-Rabino vs. Aquino

80 SCRA 254 (1977)

Facts: Petitioners-owners filed a complaint to recover from private

respondents possession of the lot in controversy. In his answer, the latter
resisted the action on the ground that the property is owned by the late
Pedro Meimban and his successors-in-interest, private respondent being
one of them. At the conference in the chambers of the respondent judge,
attended by the parties, it was agreed that the complaint be amended to
include all the heirs of the late Pedro Meimban in order that there will be a
final adjudication of the rights of the parties in this case. Petitioner‟s
counsel received an order requiring him to amend the complaint within
thirty days, he filed instead a motion to set aside said order. The motion
was denied and again was given ten days to file the amended complaint. A
motion to reconsider the order of denial was filed by Atty. Mosuela, who
contended that the heirs are not indispensable parties in the case for
ejectment. Respondent judge denied the motion and again gave petitioner
another ten days to amend the same. Instead of complying, Atty Mosuela
filed a motion for clarification of the same. Respondent judge ruled that the
order is clear and explicit and dismissed the case.

The motion to reconsider the dismissal order having been denied,

petitioners filed the instant petition for review to set aside the order of
dismissal and to order the lower court to reinstate their complaint.

Issue: Was the dismissal of the complaint correct?

Ruling: Sec. 2, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly empowers
the trial court to dismiss the action “upon motion of the defendant or upon
the court own‟s motion” if the plaintiff “fails x x x to comply with these rules
or any order of the court.” The trial court gave petitioners no less than a
total of fifty days to amend the complaint to include all the heirs of the
deceased Pedro Meimban who are indispensable parties “in order that
there will be a final adjudication of the rights of the parties in their case.”
Not only did petitioner‟s counsel refuse to comply with the order of the trial
court but, instead, he would have the trial court require the other heirs of
Pedro Meimban “to file their answer in intervention”, which is unprocedural
because under Sec. 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court intervention
is purely a voluntary act on the part of a person who “has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both.

Diaz vs. Adiong

219 SCRA 631

Facts: The Mindanao Kris, a newspaper of general circulation in Cotabato

City, published in its front page the news article captioned “6-point
complaint filed vs. Macumbal,” and its Publisher‟s notes the editorial, “toll of
corruption,” which exposed alleged anomalies by key officials in the
Regional Office of DENR. The public officers were private respondents:
Sultan Macumbal, Sultan Indol, Atty. Lanto, and Atty Abedin, instituted
separate criminal and civil complaints arising fron libel before the City
Prosecutor‟s Office and RTC in Marawi City. Petitoner Diaz and
Pagadaman were named respondents in both complaints.

On September 2, 1991, the City Prosecutor‟s Office dismissed the

criminal case. Petitoner Diaz moved for the dismissal of the action for
damages on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter. And argued that thecomplaint should have been filed in
Cotabato City not in Marawi City.
 On June 15, 1991, respondent judge denied petitioner‟s motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Petitioner Diaz contends that the civil action for damages could not
be rightfully filed in Marawi as none of the private respondents held office in
Marawi; neither the alleged libelous news items published in that city.
Consequently, it is petitioner‟s view that the Marawi RTC has no jurisdiction
to entertain the civil actions for damages. Indeed, private respondents do
not deny that their main place of work was not in Marawi City, although
they had sub-offices therein.

Issue: Was the venue properly laid?

Ruling: An offended party who is at the same time a public official can only
institute an action arising from libel in two venues: the place where he holds
office and the place where the alleged libelous articles were printed and
first published.

Consequently, it is indubitable that the venue was improperly laid.

However, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
dismiss prior to a responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to
have been improperly laid since, for all practical intents and purposes, the
venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the
parties for those whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.

His motion to dismiss was therefore belatedly filed and could no

longer deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant
civil action for damages. Well-settled is the rule that improper venue may
be waived and such waiver may occur by laches.

Withal, objections to venue in the civil actions arising from libel may be
waived; it does not, after all, involve a question of jurisdiction. Indeed, the
laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter.
Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
 Finally, Sec.1 of Rule 16 provides that the objections to improper
venue must be made in a motion to dismiss before any responsive pleading
is filed. Responsive pleadings are those, which seek affirmative relief and
set up defenses. Consequently, having already submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, petitioner may no longer object to the venue,
which, although mandatory in the instant case, is nevertheless waivable. As
such, improper venue must be seasonably raised, otherwise, it may
deemed waived.

Laperal Development Corporation vs. CA

223 SCRA 261

Facts: In a civil case before the CFI, Atty. Filoteo Banzon sought recovery
of attorney‟s fees from Oliverio Laperal, Laperal Dev‟t Corp, and Imperial
Dev‟t Corp. for professional services he rendered for 10 cases.

On April 8, 1983, the case was decided on the basis of a

Compromise Agreement voluntarily and waiving all other claims of money
against the defendants. On May 19, 1987, Banzon filed a complaint against
Oliverio Laperal , Laperal Dev‟t Corp, Imperial Dev‟t Corp, Sunbeams
Convenience Foods and Vicente Acsay for the annulment of the portion of
the Compromise Agreement; collection of attorney‟s fees for his services in
the cases abovementioned; for the recovery of what was adjudged payablr
to him as attorney‟s fees by Ascario Tuazon and the payment of nominal
damages and attorney‟s fees.

In the RTC of Quezon City, the case was dismissed on the grounds
that the the TC had no jurisdiction to annul the agreement as approved by
an equal and coordinate court, and that the agreement already covered the
plaintiff‟s professional services in the aforementioned cases. On appeal,
the decision was affirmed on the issue of jurisdiction. The CA held that the
attorney‟s fees were due the private respondents in the cases of Laperal
Dev‟t vs. Tuazon and Tuazon vs. Maglalanga and Republic vs. Sunbeams.
The undetaking clearly covered the case of Laperal Dev‟t vs. Tuazon which
was still pending in the CA at the time of the agreement.

Banzon‟s claim for attorney‟s fees was among those enumerated in

his complaint against Oliverio Laperal, Laperal Dev‟t Corp, and Imperial
Dev‟t and Sunbeams referred to in the complaint as “Mr. Laperals” Corp.
was not joined by name as a party-defendant. The private respondent
believed that Oliverio Laperal, being the president of the company, was
directly obligated to him.

Issue: Should a party be joined as a party-defendant in order that the

judgment could legally affect it?

Ruling: A corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct

from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for
the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it. A stockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its
financial obligations even if he should be its president. There is no
evidence that Sunbeams and Laperal are one and the person. While it is
true that Laperal is a stockholder, director and officer of Sunm[beams, that
status does not make him answerable for the liabilities of the said
corporation.

Sunbeams should have been joined as a party-defendant in order

that the judgment of the lower court could legally affect it. But even if it was
not impleaded, the court could still validly proceed with the case because
Sunbeams was not an indispensable party but only a proper party. A
proper party is one which ought to be a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as between those already parties. A party is indispensable if no
final determination can be had of an action unless it is joined either as
plaintiff or defendant. Sunbeams was not a party to this agreement and so
could not be affected by it.
Barfel Development Corporation vs. CA

223 SCRA 268

Facts: The defendants, as sellers, and plaintiff corporation as buyer by its

President plaintiff Zaragoza entered into an agreement to Buy and Sell two
parcels of land with two houses erected thereon. Said agreement bears a
stipulation that “ the seller will apply the payment of the cash portion of the
purchase price to the removal of any and all liens on the properties; plaintiff
paid a downpayment upon signing of the aforesaid agreement; during the
negotiation and conclusion of the agreement, the defendant repeatedly
warranted that except for a mortgage in favor of BPI and the deeds of
restriction annotated at the back of the title.

Sometime on June 1987, plaintiffs found out that defendants made

a blatant misrepresentation, it was discovered that the subject properties
have a second mortgage with the PISO/Central Bank; having informed of
this discovery defendant Barrios advised plaintiff that the second mortgage
obligation is reduced and gave assurance that he will submit the necessary
documents to support the same so that a valid and acceptable
arrangement could be worked out by the Central Bank for the released of
the second mortgage; the Phil Savings Bank gave notice that it has
approved plaintiff corporations application for the loan with which to pay
subject properties under the agreement; the PSB sent a separate letter
whereby new titles to the subject properties would be transferred to the
plaintiff corporation and the mortgage in favor of PSB to be annotated
thereon and the defendants expressed their conformity to the aforesaid
agreement.

Plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant to further ensure the

consummation of the transaction; however, the former received information
that the latter had been negotiating to other parties; subsequently
defendant failed and refused to comply with their contractual transaction of
securing the release of the second mortgage. The malice, fraud and the
gross and evident bad faith of the defendant is futher demonstrated by the
fact that, BPI advised that it was disauthorized by the defendant to
consumnate the transaction. Petitioner (as defendsants) filed an answer
and averred that it was aware of the liens on the property including the
mortgage to PISO, if full payment could not be affectual, of if the PISO
mortgage is not released within 10 days each have the option to terminate
the agreement.

Plaintiff (herein private respondents) presented evidence and rested

its case. During defendant‟s (herein petitioner) presentation of evidence,
private respondent filed a motion for a leave to file an amended complaint
and motion to admit the same impleading PISO bank as additional party.
Despite petitioner‟s opposition, the trial court issued an order admitting the
amended complaint. Petitioner then proceeded to the CA for a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. CA‟s ruled in favor of private respondent and
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether an amendment to the complaint pleading a cause of action

against a new or additional party can be allowed after the private
respondents (as plaintiff) had rested its case and petitioner (as
defecndants) had commenced the presentation of their evidence.

Ruling: A real interest has been defined as a present substantial interest,

as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contigent, subordinate
or consequential interest. Therefore, a party who has not taken part in it
cannot sue or be sued for performance or for cancellation thereof, unless
he shows that he has a real interest affected thereby.

Complete relief by private respondents against petitioners may be

had even if PISO/Central Bank were not impleaded as party defendant in
the original case. PISO is not an indispensable or necessary party without
whom no final determination can be had of the action for specific
performance with damages.
 Moreover, the amendment sought by private respondents, which is
to include a new party defendant at a late stage in the proceeding, is not a
formal but a substantial one. Private respondents will have to present
additional evidence on the PISO second mortgage. The effect would be to
start trial anew with the parties recasting their theories of the case. The
correct amount of the second mortgage owed by petitioners to PISO bank,
would have to be litigated and this could be time consuming.

Oposa vs. Factoran,

224 SCRA 792

Facts: Principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of DENR. The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.” Anchoring
their claim on the constitutional right of every Filipino to decent and
healthful living, petitioners prayed that DENR cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country in order to protect and preserve the
country‟s forests.

Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to dismiss to the complaint

arguing that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him. The RTC
issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
Issue: Was there lack of cause of action in petitioner‟s complaint?

Ruling: No. The SC ruled that the plaintiffs were able allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right,
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Sec. 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology belongs to a different

category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners - the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. These basic rights are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty to protect
and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other
who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank

58 SCRA 559

Facts:The complaint in this case, filed on Dec. 24, 1963 as a class suit,
under Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, contained six causes of
action. Defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that
(a) plaintiffs-appellants had no legal standing or capacity to institute the
alleged class suit; (b) that the complaint did not state a sufficient and valid
cause of action; and (c) that plaintiffs-appellants' complaint against the
increase of the number of directors did not likewise state a cause of action.

In its order, dated March 21, 1964, the trial court granted the motion
to dismiss, holding, among other things, that the class suit could not be
maintained because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the
plaintiffs-appellants were sufficiently numerous and representative, and that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Issue: Was there a valid statement of a cause of action in plaintiff‟s

complaint?

Ruling: No. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation

of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely: (1) the
existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty in the
defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of
plaintiff's right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which
he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.

Sec. 3 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the complaint

must state the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
Hence, where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three
essential elements of a cause of action, the complaint states a cause of
action; otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion to dismiss on
that ground. The general rule is that an allegation of duty in terms
unaccompanied by a statement of the facts showing the existence of the
duty is a mere conclusion of law, unless there is a relation set forth from
which the law raises the duty." In like manner, the allegation that
individuals-defendants-appellees held said shares in trust was no more
than an interpretation by appellants of the effect of the waiver clause of the
Resolution and as such it was again a mere conclusion of law. The
allegation that the defendants-appellee acquired stockholdings far in
excess of what they were lawfully entitled, in violation of law and in breach
of trust and of contractual agreement, is also mere conclusion of law. A
mere allegation that it was the duty of a party to do this or that, or that he
was guilty of a breach of duty, is a statement of a conclusion not of fact.

From what has been said, it is clear that the ultimate facts stated under the
first cause of action are not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The further allegations in the second cause of action that the calling
of a special meeting was "falsely certified", that the seventh position of
Director was "illegally created" and that defendant Alfonso Juan Olondriz
was "not competent or qualified" to be a director are mere conclusions of
law, the same not being necessarily inferable from the ultimate facts stated
in the first and second causes of action. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth
causes of action depended on the first cause of action, which, as has been
shown, did not state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
It stands to reason, therefore, that said causes of action would also be
fatally defective. It having been shown that the complaint failed to state
ultimate facts to constitute a cause of action, it becomes unnecessary to
discuss the other assignments of errors. The Motion to Dismiss was
properly granted by the trial court.

Heirs of Elias Lorilla vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118655, April 12, 2000

Facts: Elias Lorilla was one of the sureties of two companies who loaned
sums of money from private respondent PENCAPITAL. A case for
collection of sums of money was filed by PENCAPITAL and Lorilla‟s land
was levied for execution. The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
PENCAPITAL and against the defendants therein including Elias L. Lorilla.
Despite receipt of a copy of the aforesaid decision by Alfredo Concepcion,
then counsel of record of defendant Elias L. Lorilla, no appeal whatsoever
was interposed from said judgment by said lawyer in behalf of defendant
Lorilla. Hence, the decision became final and executory.

Petitioners argue that the cause of action of private respondent

PENTACAPITAL did not survive for being in violation of Section 21 of Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court (Actions that do not survive). They claim
that under this rule, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the person of Elias
Lorilla when he died a year before the trial court‟s decision, and
consequently the action against him should have been dismissed.

Issue: Did the death of Elias Lorilla strip the Trial Court of it‟s jurisdiction to
try the case?

Ruling: No. Sec. 21 of Rule 3 provides that upon the defendant's death,
the action "shall be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially
provided in these rules." As contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, the
action has to be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff thereafter
presenting his claim as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of the
deceased defendant. The claim becomes a mere incident in the
testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased where the whole
matter may be fully terminated jointly with the settlement and distribution of
the estate.
 In the present case, however, the records do not show if any notice
of death was filed by Atty. Alfredo Concepcion, counsel of record of Elias
Lorilla in Civil Case No. 5262 before the Makati Court. Thus, neither the
Makati Court nor PENTACAPITAL were made aware of the death of Elias
Lorilla. The trial court could not be expected to know or take judicial notice
of the death of Lorilla, absent such notice.Neither could the petitioners have
been made aware of the trial court's judgment adverse to their father, for all
notices and orders of the court were sent to Lorilla's counsel of record, who
did not bother to inform the parties concerned of Elias Lorilla's death.
Apparently Lorilla's counsel failed in his duty to promptly inform the court of
the death of his client, as the Rules require.

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Gregorio S. Licaros, petitioners‟ predecessor-in-interest, served as governor of

the Central Bank of the Philippines from 1970 to 1980, during the incumbency of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. He died on August 3, 1983.

On July 17, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines -- through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) -- filed a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against former President Marcos and his alleged crony, Lucio
C. Tan. Aside from the main defendants (Marcos, his wife Imelda R. Marcos, and
Tan), twenty-three other persons -- who had purportedly acted as their dummies,
nominees or agents -- were likewise impleaded in the Complaint. It alleged, among
others, that Tan -- with the connivance of some government officials, including
Central Bank Governor Gregorio S. Licaros -- had fraudulently acquired the assets of
the General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), now known as the Allied Bank. A
pertinent portion of the Complaint reads thus: “13. Defendant Lucio C. Tan, by
himself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of his relationship and influence with
Defendant spouses, among others: (a) without sufficient collateral and for a nominal
consideration, with the active collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of
Defendant Willy Co, arbitrarily and fraudulently acquired control of the General Bank
and Trust Company which eventually became Allied Banking Corporation, through
then Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros x x x.” Despite the allegation,
Licaros was not impleaded in this Complaint or in the subsequent Expanded
Complaint.

On September 13, 1991, four years after the filing of the original action, the
Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and for Admission of a
Second Amended Complaint, which impleaded the Estate/Heirs of Licaros for the
first time. The Amended Complaint, reiterating earlier allegations in the Expanded
Complaint, detailed Licaros‟ participation in the alleged unholy conspiracy.

The Amended Complaint restated the same causes of action originally appearing in
the initial Complaint: (1) abuse of right and power in violation of Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of public trust; (4) accounting
of all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in excess of lawful
earnings and income; and (5) actual, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary
damages.

On September 3, 2001, the heirs of Licaros filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
Essentially, it raised the following grounds therefor: (1) lack of cause of action and (2)
prescription. On October 12, 2001, the Republic filed its Opposition to the Motion.

The Sandiganbayan held that the averments in the Second Amended Complaint had
sufficiently established a cause of action against former Central Bank Governor
Licaros. Ruled untenable was the argument of petitioners that he could not be held
personally liable, because the GBTC assets had been acquired by Tan through a public
bidding duly approved by the Monetary Board. According to the anti-graft court, this
argument was a matter of defense that could not be resorted to in a motion to
dismiss, and that did not constitute a valid ground for dismissal.

Issues:

1) Did the Second Amended Complaint state a cause of action against petitioner?

2) Was the Second Amended Complaint barred by prescription and laches?

Ruling:

1) A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect and not to violate that
right; and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant
to the plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages.

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly and unequivocally outlines
its cause of action against Defendant Licaros as follows: “The wrongs committed by
Defendants, acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another,
include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation‟s wealth,
extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of
public trust and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described below, all at the
expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of the plaintiff and the Filipino
people.x x x Former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, now deceased, had
facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets x x x General Bank and Trust
Company (GBTC) worth over P688-Million at that time, to favor the Marcoses and
the Lucio Tan group who acquired said GBTC‟s assets for a measly sum of
P500,000.00. Hence, his Estate represented by his heirs must be impleaded as a party
defendant for the purpose of obtaining complete relief.”
The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that Licaros,
during his lifetime, had conspired with the main defendants -- particularly former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Lucio Tan and Philippine National
Bank President Panfilo O. Domingo -- in facilitating the allegedly questionable
transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan.

This charge of “conspiracy” casts a wide net, sufficiently extensive to include all acts
and all incidents incidental, related to or arising from the charge of systematic
plunder and pillage against the main defendants in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0005.
The assailed role of Licaros as Central Bank governor in the questioned GBTC deal is
not excluded therefrom. If proven, the allegation of conspiracy may make him liable
with his co-defendants.

The essential elements of a cause of action are a legal right of the plaintiff, a
correlative obligation of the defendant, and an act or omission of the defendant
violative of said legal right. The test of sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer. As stated in Adamos vs. J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., (25 SCRA 529), „It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question
submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint itself. Whether these allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their
truth is hypothetically admitted. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? So
rigid is the norm prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the facts
averred, it must not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear
the case on the merits.”

2) No. The instant action for reconveyance, restitution, and accounting

impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by the
decedent during his lifetime, more particularly for conspiring with the main
defendants to prejudice the Republic. An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside
the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription, as contained in Article 1146 of the
Civil Code. Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states: “The right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from
them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches
or estoppel.”

The intendment of the foregoing constitutional provision -- exempting actions to

recover ill-gotten wealth from the operation of the general rules of prescription --
presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances and the primordial state
interests involved in cases of such nature. From the preceding discussion, it is clear
that any action involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties against
Licaros or his transferees, may not be deemed to have prescribed. The language of
the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal. Clearly, the
Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions denying, for lack of
merit, petitioners‟ Motion to Dismiss.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG

G.R. No. 130907. November 27, 2001

Facts:

Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, a former Senator, is the owner of two parcels
of land. On March 30, 1983, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the
Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), signed a Memorandum
of Agreement with Benitez whereby the latter undertook to lease her property in
favor of PHRDC, for a period of 20 years and/or sell a portion thereof which shall be
no less than ten hectares. PHRDC in turn agreed to lease within the same period
and/or buy said property site.
On September 22, 1983, private respondent Philippine Women‟s University (PWU)
and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question and
to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other
related works necessary to attain the latter‟s objectives. Pursuant thereto, the
Construction Manpower Development Foundation (CMDF) took possession of the
property and erected buildings and other related facilities necessary for its operations.
A lease contract was thereafter signed by PWU and PHRDC on a ten-hectare portion
of the land which stipulated, among others, a rental of P200,000.00 per annum for an
initial term of four years, from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988, with an option
granted to PHRDC to renew the lease upon agreement of both parties, for a further
period of up to but not exceeding 20 years from the expiration of the initial term
thereof.

PWU‟s participation in the above transactions stemmed from its being a donee of the
property involved, as embodied in a deed of donation, which deed was executed by
Benitez in its favor only in December 1984. At the end of the initial four-year term of
the lease, negotiations began for the purchase of a seven-hectare portion of the
property. In a series of letters, Benitez made the offer to sell the property at a price of
P70.00 per square meter.

In view of the on-going negotiations for the eventual sale of the lot, Benitez and
PHRDC, through its General Manager Juvenal Catajoy, Jr., agreed that the payment
of rentals would cease effective July 1, 1989. Benitez however contends that no such
agreement was entered into; in fact, she said petitioner simply failed to pay rentals
from July 1, 1989 up to the present despite repeated and friendly demands made by
private respondents.

PHRDC had by then already prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale, for the signature of
Benitez as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDF as vendees. However, Benitez refused to
sign the Deed of Absolute Sale since, according to her, there was never any perfected
contract or agreement to sell the property.In a letter dated August 15, 1995, Benitez
and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises
within thirty days from notice.
Thereafter, on December 14, 1995, Benitez and PWU filed an ejectment case based
on alleged unlawful detaineragainst PHRDC and CMDF before the Municipal Trial
Court of Dasmariñas, Cavite. In the meantime, petitioner, through the Department of
Trade and Industry, to which the CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for
Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, which
case is now pending before the RTC, Branch 20 of Imus, Cavite and docketed as Civil
Case No. 1277-96.

The MTC of Dasmariñas rendered a decision dated September 2, 1996 in favor of

PWU and Benitez, ordering the defendants therein to vacate the premises, pay
arrearages in rentals, reasonable compensation for their continued stay in the premises
and attorney‟s fees. The decision was appealed by PHRDC and CMDF to the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 055-96, raffled off and assigned
to the RTC, Branch 22, which was presided over by respondent Judge Mangrobang.
On October 24, 1996, PWU and Benitez filed a Petition for Consolidation of the
appealed Civil Case No. 055-96 with Civil Case No. 1277-96. PHRDC and CMDF
opposed the petition.

On April 14, 1997, respondent Judge issued the Order granting the petition for
consolidation.

Issues:

Can the two cases be consolidated or be held in joint trial?

Ruling:

No. The legal basis of an order for consolidation of two cases is Section 1, Rule 31 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, it was declared: “The

main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court
and save unnecessary costs and expense.”

While nothing in the rules expressly prohibits the consolidation of an appealed case
with a case being heard originally, consolidation of the two cases involved herein
would serve none of the purposes cited above.First, it would only delay the resolution
of the two cases. Note that by itself ejectment is summary in nature for it involves
“perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.”
Similarly, speedy action is essential in expropriation, hence the rule that the plaintiff in
an expropriation case may already take or enter upon possession of the property after
depositing with an authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property..” But consolidation of these two diverse cases would
not necessarily expedite either of them.

The ejectment case instituted by private respondents against PHRDC and CMDF was
decided by the municipal trial court on September 2, 1996. Now the resolution of the
appeal before the RTC remains pending notwithstanding the lapse of over five years.
In regard to the case for eminent domain, it was already ruled on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of herein petitioner, in the case of Republic v.
Tagle, decided in 1998. Three years have already passed despite the urgent nature of
the case. To begin consolidation of the two cases at this time would only exacerbate
the delay.

Second, as pointed out by petitioner, the two cases raise dissimilar issues, though the
facts are evidently intertwined. In the ejectment case, the issue is possession of the
disputed property, while in the eminent domain case, the issue is the taking by the
State of the property by virtue of its power of eminent domain. Note, however, that
the decision in one will not necessarily affect the decision in the other.

Third, it does not appear certain that consolidation is a wise step where one or both
cases had already been partially heard. It might just complicate procedural
requirements. The judge to whom the consolidated case will be assigned would not
have had the opportunity to observe first-hand the witnesses in one of the cases.
Fairness and due process might be hampered rather than helped if these cases were
consolidated.

As a general proposition, the propriety of consolidation rests upon the sound

discretion of the trial court judge. But in this instance, however, we are of the
considered view that the exercise of such discretion in order to consolidate the
ejectment case with the eminent domain case was less than judicious. We are
constrained to agree with petitioner that, given the circumstances herein cited, public
respondent‟s discretion has been gravely abused.

STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. VICTOR MA. and

LYDIA GASTON

G.R. No. 141961. January 23, 2002

Facts:

Respondent Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia M. Gaston filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court in Negros Occidental at
Bacolod City against petitioners Santa Clara Homeowners Association (SCHA for
brevity) thru its Board of Directors, alleging that private respondents herein were
residents of San Jose Avenue, Sta. Clara Subdivision, Mandalagan, Bacolod City. They
purchased their lots in the said subdivision sometime in 1974, and at the time of
purchase, there was no mention or requirement of membership in any homeowners‟
association. Being non-members therein, an arrangement was made wherein they were
issued „non-member‟ gatepass stickers for their vehicles for identification by the
security guards. This arrangement remained undisturbed until sometime in the middle
of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only
its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.

Consequently, petitioners herein filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between
SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act No. 580, as amended by Executive
Order Nos. 535 and 90, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the board
of directors of SCHA, the proper forum being the Home Insurance (and Guaranty)
Corporation (HIGC). To support their claim of intra-corporate controversy,
petitioners stated that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on 4 October 1973,
provides „that the association shall be a non-stock corporation with all homeowners
of Sta. Clara constituting its membership‟. Also, its by-laws contains a provision that
„all real estate owners in Sta. Clara Subdivision automatically become members of the
association.‟

On 6 July 1998, the lower court, after having received private respondents opposition
to petitioners‟ motion to dismiss and other subsequent pleadings filed by the parties,
resolved to deny petitioners‟ motion to dismiss, finding that there existed no intra-
corporate controversy since the private respondents alleged that they had never joined
the association; and, thus, the HIGC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. On 18 July
1998, petitioners submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, adding lack of cause of
action as ground for the dismissal of the case. This additional ground was anchored
on the principle of damnum absque injuria as allegedly there was no allegation in the
complaint that the private respondents were actually prevented from entering the
subdivision and from having access to their residential abode.
The court a quo denied the said motion without however ruling on the additional
ground of lack of cause of action. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition and
ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the dispute. It debunked petitioners‟
contention that an intra-corporate controversy existed between the SCHA and
respondents. The CA held that the Complaint had stated a cause of action.

Issue:

(1) Did the RTC have jurisdiction over the Complaint?

(2) Did the Complaint state a cause of action?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is
necessary to resolve preliminarily -- on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint --
whether private respondents are members of the SCHA.

The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to

associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very
foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision
guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel
others to form or join one. More to the point, private respondents cannot be
compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including
them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied
consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to
band themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that is possible only
if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the
association.

Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between petitioners and private

respondents. As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons.
The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to exist,
provided the essential requisites are present. A contract is upheld as long as there is
proof of consent, subject matter and cause.

When private respondents purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37
along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing
their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract arising from
the title certificate exists between petitioners and private respondents.

Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private
respondents intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the
implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who
were not members of the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for
their vehicles. This fact has not been disputed by petitioners. Thus, the SCHA
recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not members thereof,
notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.

To reiterate, the HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners‟ disputes. The
law confines its authority to controversies that arise from any of the following intra-
corporate relations: (1) between and among members of the association; (2) between
any and/or all of them and the association of which they are members; and (3)
between the association and the state insofar as the controversy concerns its right to
exist as a corporate entity.

(2) Yes. A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause
of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the factual averments in the
complaint. The test of the sufficiency of the allegations constituting the cause of
action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment on
the prayers. This test implies that the issue must be passed upon on the basis of the
bare allegations in the complaint. The court does not inquire into the truth of such
allegations and declare them to be false. To do so would constitute a procedural error
and a denial of the plaintiff‟s right to due process.

A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential elements:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the said legal right.

In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action. First, the
Complaint alleged that, under the Constitution, respondents had a right of free access
to and from their residential abode. Second, under the law, petitioners have the
obligation to respect this right. Third, such right was impaired by petitioners when
private respondents were refused access through the Sta. Clara Subdivision, unless
they showed their driver‟s license for identification.

Westmont Bank vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132560

Facts: Respondent Eugene Ong maintained a current account with petitioner,

formerly the Associated Banking Corporation, but now known as Westmont Bank.
Sometime in May 1976, he sold certain shares of stocks through Island Securities
Corporation. To pay Ong, Island Securities purchased two (2) Pacific Banking
Corporation manager‟s checks, both dated May 4, 1976, issued in the name of Eugene
Ong as payee. Before Ong could get hold of the checks, his friend Paciano Tanlimco
got hold of them, forged Ong‟s signature and deposited these with petitioner, where
Tanlimco was also a depositor. Even though Ong‟s specimen signature was on file,
petitioner accepted and credited both checks to the account of Tanlimco, without
verifying the „signature indorsements‟ appearing at the back thereof. Tanlimco then
immediately withdrew the money and absconded.

Instead of going straight to the bank to stop or question the payment, Ong first
sought the help of Tanlimco‟s family to recover the amount. Later, he reported the
incident to the Central Bank, which like the first effort, unfortunately proved futile.

It was only on October 7, 1977, about five (5) months from discovery of the fraud,
did Ong cry foul and demanded in his complaint that petitioner pay the value of the
two checks from the bank on whose gross negligence he imputed his loss. In his suit,
he insisted that he did not “deliver, negotiate, endorse or transfer to any person or
entity” the subject checks issued to him and asserted that the signatures on the back
were spurious.

The bank did not present evidence to the contrary, but simply contended that since
plaintiff Ong claimed to have never received the originals of the two (2) checks in
question from Island Securities, much less to have authorized Tanlimco to receive the
same, he never acquired ownership of these checks. Thus, he had no legal personality
to sue as he is not a real party in interest. The bank then filed a demurrer to evidence
which was denied.

February 8, 1989, after trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
38, rendered a decision in favor of the defendant.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals without success.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Ong has a cause of action against petitioner
Westmont Bank.

Ruling: Petitioner‟s claim that respondent has no cause of action against the bank is
clearly misplaced. As defined, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (a) a
legal right or rights of the plaintiff, (b) a correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(c) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

The complaint filed before the trial court expressly alleged respondent‟s right as payee
of the manager‟s checks to receive the amount involved, petitioner‟s correlative duty as
collecting bank to ensure that the amount gets to the rightful payee or his order, and a
breach of that duty because of a blatant act of negligence on the part of petitioner
which violated respondent‟s rights.

Under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:

When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the
instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any
party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the party
against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the
forgery or want of authority.

Since the signature of the payee, in the case at bar, was forged to make it appear that
he had made an indorsement in favor of the forger, such signature should be deemed
as inoperative and ineffectual. Petitioner, as the collecting bank, grossly erred in
making payment by virtue of said forged signature. The payee, herein respondent,
should therefore be allowed to recover from the collecting bank.

The collecting bank is liable to the payee and must bear the loss because it is its legal
duty to ascertain that the payee‟s endorsement was genuine before cashing the check.
As a general rule, a bank or corporation who has obtained possession of a check upon
an unauthorized or forged indorsement of the payee‟s signature and who collects the
amount of the check from the drawee, is liable for the proceeds thereof to the payee
or other owner, notwithstanding that the amount has been paid to the person from
whom the check was obtained.

The theory of the rule is that the possession of the check on the forged or
unauthorized indorsement is wrongful, and when the money had been collected on
the check, the bank or other person or corporation can be held as for moneys had and
received, and the proceeds are held for the rightful owners who may recover them.
The position of the bank taking the check on the forged or unauthorized
indorsement is the same as if it had taken the check and collected the money without
indorsement at all and the act of the bank amounts to conversion of the check.

Petitioner‟s claim that since there was no delivery yet and respondent has never
acquired possession of the checks, respondent‟s remedy is with the drawer and not
with petitioner bank. Petitioner relies on the view to the effect that where there is no
delivery to the payee and no title vests in him, he ought not to be allowed to recover
on the ground that he lost nothing because he never became the owner of the check
and still retained his claim of debt against the drawer. However, another view in
certain cases holds that even if the absence of delivery is considered, such
consideration is not material. The rationale for this view is that in said cases the
plaintiff uses one action to reach, by a desirable short cut, the person who ought in
any event to be ultimately liable as among the innocent persons involved in the
transaction. In other words, the payee ought to be allowed to recover directly from
the collecting bank, regardless of whether the check was delivered to the payee or not.

Considering the circumstances in this case, in our view, petitioner could not escape
liability for its negligent acts. Admittedly, respondent Eugene Ong at the time the
fraudulent transaction took place was a depositor of petitioner bank. Banks are
engaged in a business impressed with public interest, and it is their duty to protect in
return their many clients and depositors who transact business with them. They have
the obligation to treat their client‟s account meticulously and with the highest degree
of care, considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required
of banks, therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family. In the present case,
petitioner was held to be grossly negligent in performing its duties. As found by the
trial court:

xxx (A)t the time the questioned checks were accepted for deposit to Paciano
Tanlimco‟s account by defendant bank, defendant bank, admittedly had in its files
specimen signatures of plaintiff who maintained a current account with them
(Exhibits “L-1” and “M-1”; testimony of Emmanuel Torio). Given the substantial
face value of the two checks, totalling P1,754,787.50, and the fact that they were being
deposited by a person not the payee, the very least defendant bank should have done,
as any reasonable prudent man would have done, was to verify the genuineness of the
indorsements thereon. The Court cannot help but note that had defendant conducted
even the most cursory comparison with plaintiff‟s specimen signatures in its files
(Exhibit “L-1” and “M-1”) it would have at once seen that the alleged indorsements
were falsified and were not those of the plaintiff-payee. However, defendant
apparently failed to make such a verification or, what is worse did so but, chose to
disregard the obvious dissimilarity of the signatures. The first omission makes it guilty
of gross negligence; the second of bad faith. In either case, defendant is liable to
plaintiff for the proceeds of the checks in questio

These findings are binding and conclusive on the appellate and the reviewing courts.
People vs. Domantay

307 SCRA 1

Facts:

Bernardino Domantay alyas Junior otot was picked by the police at

the market because he is the suspect and the lone accused for the killing of
the 6 yrs old child, which it with fall that he is already in custody. And in the
forgoing event junior utot made admissions of the crime in different
occasion and different persons, with a police officer and a news reporter,
and this amounted to extra judicial confessions which became
inadmissible. In the lower court junior otot was convicted of rape and
homicide and was maximum penalty was sentenced to him. But on the
other hand the Supreme Court modified the sentence and lessens it.

Issue: is the picking up of junior otot amounts to arrest?( in relation with

rule 112)

Ruling: In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the

Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996, 37 he was
already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer
Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed in Art. III, � 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.
SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's
interrogation:

Accused-appellant was picked up by the police without any warrant of

arrest, although his case did not fall under any of the three instances where
warrantless arrests are authorized under Rule 113.
Andaya vs People

Facts:

Andaya the president of AFPSLAI was convicted for estafa through falsification of
private documents. He altered the name on the voucher claiming P21,000.00 for
the finders fee of the investment made by Mercader amounting P2,100,000.00, so
that it will not reflect in the income tax of Hernandez.

The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of private document were
present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in the disbursement voucher, a private
document, that Guilas, instead of Hernandez, was entitled to a P21,000.00 finder?s
fee. Second, the falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause
damage to the government because it was meant to lower the tax base of
Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finder?s fee.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court in an
Order15 dated May 13, 2002. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court and denied petitioner?s motion for reconsideration;
hence, the instant petition challenging the validity of his conviction for the crime
of falsification of private document.

Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals contradicted the ruling
of the trial court. He claims that the Court of Appeals stated in certain portions of
its decision that petitioner was guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial
document whereas in the trial court?s decision petitioner was convicted of
falsification of private document.

The information of the case states that:

―The undersigned accuses NOE S. ANDAYA of the crime of Estafa thru

Falsification of Commercial Document, committed as follows:…..‖

Issue: Is the variance between the allegation in the information fatal to the
conviction?

Ruling:

Yes. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof
adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.

We find this variance material and prejudicial to petitioner which, perforce, is fatal
to his conviction in the instant case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of the
information, the prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification of the
voucher by petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00
and not that the falsification of the voucher was done with intent to cause damage
to the government. It is apparent that this variance not merely goes to the identity
of the third party but, more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage
done to the third party. Needless to state, the defense applicable for each is
different.

More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based precisely on the
allegations in the information. A review of the records shows that petitioner
concentrated on disproving that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this was the charge
in the information which he had to refute to prove his innocence. As previously
discussed, petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no damage inasmuch as it
really owed the finder?s fee in the amount of P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the
same was placed in the name of Guilas upon Hernandez?s request. If we were to
convict petitioner now based on his intent to cause damage to the government, we
would be riding roughshod over his constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation because he was not forewarned that he was being prosecuted for intent
to cause damage to the government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to
convict petitioner on this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged.

Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause damage to the
government from the testimony of petitioner and his three other witnesses, namely,
Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the substitution of the names in the voucher
was intended to lower the tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the
finder?s fee. In other words, the trial court used part of the defense of petitioner in
establishing the third essential element of the offense which was entirely different
from that alleged in the information. Under these circumstances, petitioner
obviously had no opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that he
committed the acts with intent to cause damage to the government because this was
part of his defense when he explained the reason for the substitution of the names
in the voucher with the end goal of establishing that no actual damage was done to
AFPSLAI. If we were to approve of the method employed by the trial court in
convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning the surprise and injustice that
the accused?s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him precisely seeks to prevent. It would be plain denial of due
process.

In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to convict petitioner for acts
which purportedly constituted the third essential element of the crime but which
were entirely different from the acts alleged in the information because it violates
in no uncertain terms petitioner?s constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it deprives the government of

much needed funds in delivering basic services to the people. However, the
culpability of petitioner should have been established under the proper information
and with an opportunity for him to adequately prepare his defense. It is worth
mentioning that the public prosecutor has been apprised of petitioner?s defense in
the counter-affidavit43 that he filed before the NBI. He claimed there that
AFPSLAI really owed the P21,000.00 finder?s fee not to Guilas but to Hernandez
and that the finder?s fee was placed in the name of Guilas under a purported
financial arrangement between petitioner and Guilas. Yet in his Resolution44 dated
September 14, 1992, the public prosecutor disregarded petitioner?s defense and
proceeded to file the information based on the alleged damage that petitioner
caused to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 representing unwarranted
payment of finder?s fee.45 During the trial proper, the prosecution was again
alerted to the fact that AFPSLAI suffered no actual damage and that the
substitution of the names in the voucher was designed to aid Hernandez in evading
the payment of taxes on the finder?s fee. This was shown by no less than the
prosecution?s own documentary evidence ? the Certificate of Capital Contribution
Monthly No. 52178 in the amount of P2,100,000.00 issued to Rosario Mercader
which was prepared and identified by the prosecution witness, Judy Balangue.
Later on, the testimonies of the defense witnesses, Arevalo, Hernandez, Madet and
petitioner, clearly set forth the reasons for the substitution of the names in the
disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did not take steps to seek the
dismissal of the instant case and charge petitioner and his cohorts with the proper
information before judgment by the trial court as expressly allowed under Section
19,46 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.47 Instead, the prosecution proceeded to try
petitioner under the original information even though he had an adequate defense
against the offense charged in the information. Regrettably, these mistakes of the
prosecution can only benefit petitioner.

In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public prosecutors of their important

duty to carefully study the evidence on record before filing the corresponding
information in our courts of law and to be vigilant in identifying and rectifying
errors made. Mistakes in filing the proper information and in the ensuing
prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the State?s interest in enforcing its
criminal laws and adversely affect the administration of justice.

Obosa vs.CA

266 SCRA 281

FACTS:

The accused was charged with two counts of murder. The trial court
convicted him of two counts of homicide and granted him bail pending
appeal on ground that the offense for which the offense which he was
convicted were not capital.

Issue: Can he be granted of bail?

Ruling:

The appeal of the accused open the whole case for review, and the penalty
may be increased. The possibility of his being convicted upon the original
charge is present. Since the prosecution has demonstrated that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the determination subsists on
appeal, despite his conviction for a lesser offense. Such determination is
for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not
have any bearing on whether the accused will ultimately be acquitted or
convicted of the crime charged.

People vs. Ramirez

Facts:
 The accused – appellants was accused of the crime murder. The
accused- appellant was a brother of Paterno who was stubbed to death in
different scene the wife and a child was also stubbed by three individuals.
In all the scenes the accused – appellants was not present. But by the
testimony of Bagispas that the spouses accused –appellants was the
master mind of the crime for inducing the killers to kill the victims in return
of a cash reward. And the neighbors also testified that there was a feud
between the brothers and that the accused – appellant even threat the life
of the victim. And the lower court accepted such testimonies against the
accused – appellants.

Issue: can the case be decided by the testimonies about the motive?

Ruling:

NO. the testimony of the state witness has flaws because he was a former
house help of the accused appellant for one month and was asked to look
for someone to kill paterno and his family. And after being apart from
employment of the accused – appellant because he was not paid the P60
salary for one month, by that reason he went to Paterno and work there.
But did not even notify Paterno about the offer. And after that he already
conspired with two more person to kill Paterno and his family for the sum of
3,000. And later was for the price of 1,500 that they will find in the house.
The two killers didn‟t even try to verify about the deal, but immediately
belive the 17yrs old Bagispas, even without down payment. And the other
testimonies just prove that the spouses has the motive to kill paterno and
family. But motive alone cannot prove the crime. and the accused –
appellants was not given the presumption of innocence. And there's the
rub. The prosecution has failed to establish that evidence and so to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence to which the
accused-appellants are entitled. In the case at bar, the Ramirez spouses
are confronted not so much with legally admissible and believable proof of
wrongdoing as by the charged emotions of a community that apparently
has already pronounced their guilt on the strength of an old quarrel and the
testimony of a young culprit. This is not enough. There are whispers of
doubt about their guilt that the prosecution, for all its efforts, has failed to
still. That doubt must set them free. The motive, which the prosecution has
taken such pains to establish, has not been shown to have provoked the
alleged instigation At any rate, motive alone is not proof of crime, and much
less in this case where the alleged assailant and his victim are brothers of
the full blood. If it is true that the accused-appellants showed no interest in
the tragedy that had befallen Paterno and his family, this fact alone, or
even in relation to the other evidence against them, is not sufficient to
convict the Ramirez spouses. If, as they admitted, they did not attend the
novena for the dead Jesusa and Ian, it was because they were then
already feeling the people's suspicion against them and wanted to avoid
their silent accusations. Their absence was not unnatural, as the decision
would consider it, but in fact the most natural thing to expect in the
circumstances. Even assuming that Hermenegildo's resentment against his
brother was hardly affected by Paterno's misfortune, that attitude alone,
deplorable as it may be, is not enough to convict him and his wife. Lack of
love for a brother does not translate to a desire to kill him in the absence of
the most convincing evidence.

People vs. Grospe

January 20, 1988 157 SCRA 154

FACTS:

The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the criminal
cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that make up the
offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where false assurances
were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks he had issued were
dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that jurisdiction is properly
vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of

petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan. (1) On June 13,
1983, Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria,
Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of
SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The
check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then
deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando
Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository
bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds"
from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is
the subject of the charge of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case).

(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No.
19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also
by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale
of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC
Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the check with the SMC depository bank
in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a
notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in
Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the
Estafa Case).

Issue: is the ground of lack of jurisdiction for dismissal correct?

HELD: As pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined

by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo,
81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66
SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was
committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of
the Court below.

The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge,

predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error
committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits.
Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of
discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs.
Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An
error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void.

People vs. Soriano

407SCRA367-Arson

FACTS:

This case started out as an ordinary lovers‟quarel turned out to be a

nightmarish inferno for the resident of Calinan, Davao City.

At dawn of September 18, 1998 accused-apellant Nestor Soriano

was having an Argument with his live-in partner Honey Rosario Cimagala
concerning their son Nestor “ontoy” Jr. The disagreement stemmed from
the fact that Honey‟s brother, Oscar, took their child out without the consent
of accused-appellant who wanted both Honey and Ontoy instead to return
with him to manila. But Honey refused. As their discussion wore on
accused-appellant intimidated to Honey his desire to have sex with her but
Honey did not relent to baser instincts of Nestor, instead, kicked him as her
stern rebuke to his sexual importing. In the heated exchanges, Nestor
struck honey in the forehead. Nestor then move away and took a match
from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette and set fire to the plastic
partition that served as divided of Honey‟s room. With her naked body,
honey rushed to her cabinet to get a T-shirt but Nestor did his worst; he
went on Honey‟s room and set on fire her clothes in the cabinet. Honey
was shouting to her uncle who was residing next door but Nestor grappled
with Honey and choked her as he dragged her towards the kitchen. She
told him that it would endanger the neighboring houses. Nestor finally laid
down his knife and went back to the cabinet to see the fire, they had no
choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly. As a result, the house was
totally burned as well as 5 neighboring houses.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of Destructive Arson as

charged pursuant to RA 7659, sec.10 par.1 as amended, and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua to death.

ISSUE: Is the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Destructive Arson?

RULING:

No. The legal basis of the trial court for convicting the accused-
appellant of Destructive Arson where the burning affects one (1) or more
buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result
of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several different occasions.
However, it is not applicable. The applicable law should be therefore be
sec.3, par 2, of PD 1613, and not Art.320,par.1 of the Penal Code.

Art.320-Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for

being grievous, odious and hateful offenses which…repugnant and
outrageous to the common standard of the society. Simple Arson are
crimes with lesser degree of perversity, and contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications.

The elements of Arson under sec.3,par.2, of PD 1613 are (1) there

is intentional burning; and (2) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. Incidentally, this element concur in the case at bar. The
act committed by the accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous nor
represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished
from those acts punishable under Art.320 of the RPC. No qualifying
circumstances to convert the defense into Destructive Arson. The crime
committed was simple Arson.

Rivera vs. People

350SCRA462-Direct Assault

FACTS:

Petitioner Enrique Rivera was charged of the crime of Direct

Assault.

On March 20, 1993, at around 8:00 o‟clock in the evening, Police

Inspector Edward M. Leygo were conducting a routinary patrol when they
came upon the a truck unloading sacks of chicken dung which it is
prohibited under Municipal ordinance No. I-91. Then, the driver complied
with the police order and the policemen escorted the truck and proceeded
the police headquarters. Thereafter, Police Inspector Leygo received a call
from radio and informed that they stooped a truck carrying chicken dung.
Leygo ordered to restrain the truck as he would be proceeding to the area.
He felt insulted because it was the same truck which they escorted earlier.
Meanwhile, the accused arrived before the group of Inspector Leygo and
ordered not to obey him as he was the boss and ordered to drive the car.
Inspector leygo and his group chase the truck and confronted the truck
driver and asked why he insisted on proceeding. The truck driver stated
that he was just following the order of the accused. Leygo ask the accused
why he insisted on it, but the accused insulted the policeman. The accused
removed his jacket and ask a fighting stance with him but Leygo told him
that he was arrested but the latter punches Leygo. With the help of his
group the accused was arrested.

The trial court as well as the RTC rendered decision convicting

petitioner of the crime of Direct Assault.

Petitioner contends that Leygo (1) doesn‟t have a clear and

convincing evidence, and that leygo was mumbling while giving his
testimony and (2) was not in the performance of his official duty at that
time.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner guilty of the crime of Direct Assault?

RULING:

Yes. It falls under the second mode of committing Direct Assault,

“by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidated or resist any person in authority or
any of his agent, while engage in the performance of official duties”. which
is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when (a) the assault
is committed with a weapon or (b) when the offender is a public officer or
employee; (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority.

Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual performance of his duty. He

was wearing his designated uniform and was on board conducting a
routinary patrol. Thus, it simply defies reason to argue that Lt. Leygo was
not in the performance of his official duties as a police officer when the
assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.

Marifosque vs. People

234SCRA332 -Direct Bribery

FACTS:

The accused was charged of the crime of Direct Bribery.

On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Yu

Sy and her Husband, Arsenio Sy went t the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the gasoline station of her
father, and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant
Narciso Marifoque, in exchange for the recover of the items. Captain Salvo
and his men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Sy prepared the pay-off
money which was scheduled at 7:00 in the evening. At 6:15 Captain Salvo
and his men arrived and strategically positioned themselves. Shortly
thereafter, petitioner arrived on board tricycle. He went inside the Store and
demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy. The latter handed to him the
marked money, which was wrapped I a newspaper. When petitioner
stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal,
whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down the suspect and arrest
him. On Sept.23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision convicting petitioner of direct bribery. Petitioner on his counter-
argument contends that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses do not
demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged “bribr money”
constitutes the act punishable by the RPC.
ISSUE:

Is Narciso Marifoque guilty of the crime of Direct Bribery?

RULLING:

Yes. The crime of Direct Bribey as defined in Aricle 210 of the

Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the
accused is a Public Officer (2) that he received directly or through another
some gift or present, offer or promise (3) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime… (4) that
the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as public officer.

The is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the

contemplation of Article 203 of the RPC, which includes all persons “who,
by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the Phil.
Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches,
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or
class. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant, he
directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian
Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of the stolen Cylinder tanks, which
was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210 of the
RPC. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police
officer.

People vs. Lopez

395SCRA210- Theft

FACTS:
 The accused Felix Lopez was charged of the crimes of robbery
and murder.

On August 22, 1995, at Brgy. Sampiruhan, Municipality of Calamba,

Province of Laguna, Mauricio Lanzanas was attacked and shot to death by
Felix Lopez and feloniously take, steal and carry away two handled radios
having a total value of P25,000 owned and belonging to Mauricio Lazanas.

Richard Lazanas, 11-year-old son of the victim, testified that on

about 7.00am of the same date, he heard a two gunshots and upon turning
his head, he saw the accused, shot his father twice more and then got the
latter’s two handled radios.

Bonifacio Lazanas, son of the victim also testified that on about

7:10am, of the same date, they were working in their sash factory when a
man carrying a baby Armalite riffle suddenly appeared. His father
approached the man and suddenly he heard a three successive shots.
Looking at the direction, he saw his father already laying on the ground. He
was so afraid because the accused stared at him, then the accused
approached his father and shot him again before taking his handled
radios.

The widow of the victim also testified that she was washing clothes
in their house located at the back of the Barangay hall when she heard four
shots emanating near the Barangay hall.

The trial court rendered decision finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and Robbery.

ISSUE:

Is the accused guilty of the crime of Robbery?

RULLING:

No. The record shows that the accused had already shot the victim
before unlawfully taking his two handled radios. Thus, the probability was
that the unlawful taking was merely an afterthought. There is no evidence
to prove that appellant originally planned to commit robbery. Any
conclusion on his primary intent based on the proven facts is therefore
speculative and without basis.

In as much as the taking did not entail the use of violence or force
upon the person of the victim, the appellant can only be held guilty of the
crime of theft under Article 308, penalized under Article 309. of the RPC.

Reference:

Who are guilty of robbery---Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take
any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty
of robbery.

Art.308. who are liable for theft---Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of person nor
force upon things, shall take property of another without the latter‟s
consent.

DIZON VS PEOPLE

490 SCRA 593

FACTS:

Sometime in July 1986, Fernando Dizon did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously commit falsification of private document. He
prepared a certification by stating and making it appear that the First United
Construction Corporation has undertaken building construction, sewage,
water, and other civil works, for the projects of Titan Construction
Corporation. The same was executed and signed by the President of Titan
Corporation, when in truth and in fact, said accused well knew that said
certification was not issued nor authorized to be issued by Titan
Corporation, and that it is false because First United Construction never
had any participation of the projects listed therein which were undertaken
by Titan Corporation.

A witness for the prosecution, Atty. Linsangan testified that he had

presented a copy of said certification to the officers of Titan Corporation,
and upon verification learned that the projects mentioned were never
undertaken by First United Corporation. He was likewise informed by the
same officers that the signature on the said certification was not the
signature of the former President of Titan Corporation, Vicente Liwag.

Another witness, Jose Caneo alleged that petitioner, as the

possessor of the questioned certification, which petitioner submitted to the
PEA in support of their bid, must be presumed to be the author and/or
perpetrator of the falsification. He further claimed that he has no personal
knowledge as to who affixed the forged signature on the document.

The trial court finds Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
falsification of private document.

ISSUE:

Was the decision of the trial court correct?

RULING:

No. In order that petitioner may be convicted of falsification under

paragraph 2 of Article 171, it is essential that it be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that he had caused it to appear that Liwag had
authorized the issuance of said certification. The Court holds that the
prosecution fell short of sufficiently ascertaining that the signature
appearing in the certification was, in fact not that of Liwag, mush less, that
petitioner is the author of the certification. Linsangan was merely informed
that the signature appearing in the certification was not that of Liwag. On
the other hand, Caneo only presumed that petitioner was the possessor of
the alleged falsified document as he assumed that it was petitioner who
delivered the certification to the PEA.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Linsangan and Caneo had no

personal knowledge as to the matter they testified to. There was no
competent evidence to prove the allegation of the officers of Titan
Corporation that the signature affixed on the certification was not that of
Liwag, thus making the issuance of the certification unauthorized. The
prosecution did not present Liwag, or any other knowledgeable witness to
testify whether the signature appearing on said certification was indeed not
by Liwag, thus establishing the fact that the certification was falsified by
making it appear that the issuance was actually consented to by the
president of Titan Corporation.

From the totality of evidence presented, it cannot, with propriety and

due respect for the law, be held that there is sufficiency of competent
evident on which to base an affirmative finding of guilt in relation to the
requisite degree of moral certainty. The court finds the testimonies and
documents for the prosecution rather weak. While there may be inherent
weaknesses for the defense, at most, the proofs in this case only cast
suspicion on petitioner.

Wherefore, the accused is acquitted, the decision of the trial court is

reversed and set aside.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. OSCAR OLIVA, ET. AL

G.R. No. 106826 January 18, 2001

Facts:
On May 26, 1986, four persons including Oscar Oliva wearing a green fatigue
uniform, arrived and entered the house of Jacinto Magbojos Jr. where he was
kidnap and detain and hogtied by tying his hands at his back against the latter‘s
will and went away. The accused‗s took turns in stabbing and shooting the victim
in different parts of his body causing his instantaneous death.

On the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the court found Oliva
and Salcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, not kidnapping with
murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Hence, insisting on their
innocence, Oliva and Salcedo instantly appealed. In his brief, Oliva contended that
if lawfully be presumed as the killer of the victim, he should be charged of
rebellion as a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and New
People‘s Army and thus he cannot therefore be charged separately for kidnapping
and murder for these crimes are absorbed in rebellion.

Issue: Can the contention of the accused be given credence?

Ruling:

No. Oliva's contention that he should have been charged with and tried for
rebellion lacks factual and legal basis, hence, bereft of merit. True, one can be
convicted only of rebellion where the murders, robberies and kidnapping were
committed as a means to or furtherance of rebellion. Corollary, offenses, which
were not committed in furtherance of rebellion, but for personal reasons or other
motives, are to be punished separately even if committed simultaneously with the
rebellious acts.

In the instant case, there was no evidence at all to show that the killing of
Jacinto Magbojos Jr. was in connection with or in furtherance of their
rebellious act. Besides Jr. was not indubitably proved that Oliva was indeed
a member of the New People's Army.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN

G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

Facts:

The petitioner, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile is now facing charges of

rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Colonel Gringo Honasan. Consequently,
the prosecution filed another information charging Enrile for violation of
Preseidential Decree No. 1829 on the ground that he knowingly obstruct, impede
and frustrate or delay the apprehension by harboring or concealing the Colonel
Gringo Honasan at his residence in Dasmariñas Makati.

Respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar

Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a
special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in
refusing to quash/ dismiss the information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him?

RULING:

No. The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v.
Hernandez which remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes
rebellion. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on
his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and
Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

PEOPLE vs. HIPOL

G.R. No. 140549, July 22, 2003

Facts: On December 19, 1993, appellant was employed as Cash Clerk II at

the City Treasurer‟s Office of Baguio City. He was assigned at the Cash
Division, headed by the Cashier IV, Mrs. Nelia De Jesus. Appellant‟s duties
included assisting the Cashier in the preparation of payments of vouchers,
correspondences, daily cash reports and cash items reports, Journal of
Checks issued by the Cashier, Cash Disbursement Reports, other
communications and documents necessary in connection with the handling
of cash, and the performance of any other duties that may be assigned to
him by the City Treasurer, Assistant City Treasurer and by the Cashier.
Appellant was likewise tasked to make almost daily deposits of the
collections of the City Treasurer to the PNB. Whenever appellant was
absent, De Jesus would ask Lerma G. Roque, a Utility Worker at the
Baguio City Treasurer‟s Office, to do the typing jobs and sometimes deposit
money collected for the City accompanied by an officer from the City
Treasurer‟s Office.

On January 10, 1997, at 4pm, Roque was instructed by De Jesus to gather

all deposit slips covering all deposits of funds of the City Treasurer‟s Office
with PNB. As was her usual practice, Roque opened the unlocked desk
drawer of appellant to get the deposit slips kept therein. Roque
inadvertently stumbled upon three PNB deposit slips inside appellant‟s
drawer which did not appear to have been actually deposited and received
by the depositary bank. Two of the three bank slips were dated Jan. 2,
1997 for P20,571.38, and P64,795.50, respectively, while the third slip was
dated Jan. 9, 1997 in the amount of P49,737.48, Sensing an irregularity,
Roque showed said deposit slips to De Jesus, the Cashier IV, and Mrs.
Rosita de Vera, the Acting Assistant Cashier.

Upon verification from her records, De Jesus confirmed that the amounts
stated on the aforesaid three deposit slips indeed appeared on her ledgers
of collection. On the other hand, the PNB, likewise confirmed to De Vera
that the amounts corresponding to the aforesaid three deposit slips were
not deposited to the city‟s account. When the desk drawers of appellant
were further searched, Roque also unearthed other undeposited bank slips.
Subsequently, the Commission on Audit of the City of Baguio conducted
the corresponding audit of the books of the Treasurer‟s Office. The Initial
Audit of Rosevida Lopez, City Auditor II, showed that the total amount of
money collected but not deposited in the City‟s bank account was
P1,097,063.44.

Further audit of the records of the City Treasurer‟s Office revealed that an
additional amount of P1,293,315.10 was collected but not deposited. Thus,
the total amount of money unaccounted for was Two Million Three Hundred
Ninety Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Eight Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P2,390,378.57).

Issue: Whether accused is guilty of the crime of malversation of public

funds charged?

Ruling: Conviction for malversation of public funds or property under

Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code requires proof that (a) the offender is
a public officer; (b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property involved are
public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has
appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of
such funds or property.

It is clear from the facts established in this case that appellant is a public
officer occupying the Cash Clerk II position at the City Treasurer‟s Office.
By reason of his position, appellant was tasked to regularly handle public
funds every time he deposited the collections of the City Treasurer‟s Office
to the city‟s depositary bank. The fact that the obligation to deposit the
collections of the City Treasurer‟s Office is not covered by appellant‟s
official job description is of no legal consequence in a prosecution for
Malversation. What is essential is that appellant had custody or control of
public funds by reason of the duties of his office. He is an employee of, or
in some way connected with, the government and, in the course of his
employment, he receives money or property belonging to the government
for which he is bound to account. Accordingly, what is controlling is the
nature of the duties of appellant and not the name or relative importance of
his office or employment.
Under Article 217 of the Code, the failure of the public officer to have duly
forthcoming such public funds or property, upon demand by a duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. Being an accountable officer,
appellant may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct
proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his
accounts which he is unable to explain. As the trial court aptly noted:

However, we find merit in appellant‟s argument that the trial court erred in
appreciating the element of taking advantage of public office as an
aggravating circumstance. The element of taking advantage of public office
is inherent in the crime of malversation of public funds or property under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The said crime can not be
committed without the abuse of public office. Also, the fact that the amount
malversed may constitute a crime of economic sabotage cannot be
considered to aggravate the penalty to reclusion perpetua, there being no
such aggravating circumstance in Article 14 of the same Code.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 14716-R,
convicting appellant John Peter Hipol of Malversation of Public Funds as
defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal,as maximum, to indemnify the Baguio City Government
the amount of P2,394,960.67, with legal interest, to pay a fine of
P2,394,960.67, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office, and to
pay the costs of the suit.

Pablo vs. People

456 SCRA 325, April 15, 2005

Facts: Diosdada Montecillo and her brother Mario Montecillo were standing
at the car with three policemen on board stopped in front of them. The
policeman alighted and frisked Mario, took Mario‟s belt, pointed a
supposedly blunt object in its buckle and uttered the word “evidence”. The
driver and another policeman grilled Mario and frightened him by telling him
that for carrying a deadly weapon outside his residence, he would be
brought to Bicutan police station. Diosdada was also forced to take out her
wallet and rummaged through its contents and the driver took 1,500. Once
in the car Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front passenger
seat to place all her money on the console box near the gearshift. The car
then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to
disembark.

The RTC found the 3 policemen guilty of simple robbery under par.
5, Article 294 of the RPC. The CA affirmed the trial court‟s verdict. Herein
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the CA erred on convicting petitioner the crime of simple

robbery?

Ruling: No. We see no reason to depart from our ruling in Fortuna, except
to stress again what we said therein:

We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the

aggravating circumstance of “abuse of public position”. The mere fact that
the 3 accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed
them in a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers
they could not have terrified the Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol
car and forced them to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account
of their authority that the Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact
committed a crime and would be brought to the police station for
investigation unless they gave them what they demanded.

Thus, the penalty of the TC should also be modified. Considering the

aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court‟s judgment is hereby affirmed with
modification. Petitioner Pablo is declared guilty of robbery aggravated by
abuse of public position.

G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DON RODRIGUEZA

Facts:

Appellant Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia

and Antonio Lonceras was convicted of violation section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00 and costs.

At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, the narcom

made a buy bust operation and was able to buy marijuana from the
accused.

Later on in the evening of the same day the NARCOM agents conducted a
raid without Taduran in the House of Jovencio Rodrigueza the father of the
appellant and was able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves. And the father
was brought with them.

On the other hand the accused testified and contended that the evidence
against them was not admissible as evidence in the court for the
testimonies was done without a caounsel which is violative to their rights.
They even testified that they were made to hold a ten peso bill and later on
subjected for examination and as a result they were positive from ultraviolet
powder.

Issue: was there a valid arrest?

Ruling:

No. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace

officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the
case at bar, the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug
dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any
prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case,
however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the
alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran
immediately released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking
him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the
supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the
natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a
buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape
without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in
fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.

3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial court in

admitting in evidence against appellant the articles allegedly confiscated
during the raid conducted in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza.

As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must

generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper
government authority. 15 True, in some instances, this Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion; 16 when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest;
17 when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; 18
when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws; 19 when it involves prohibited articles in
plain view; 20 or in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for
the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, 21 a search may
be validly made even without a search warrant.

In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in
the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search
warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under any of the
aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable
search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not
have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had
it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they
easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification
of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug
paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant.

CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold
him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag.
Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor,
what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized
as evidence against the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:Exh.
"A"�Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained
inside a transparent plastic bag.Exh. "B"� Fifty (50) grams of suspected
dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic
labelled "Robertson".Exh. "C"� Four (4) aluminum foils each containing
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven
grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.Exh. "D"� Five
(5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.Exh. "E"�
One plastic syringe.

Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during

the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza. The
unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves
that became the basis of appellant's conviction. 23 In People vs. Rubio, 24
this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried
marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the
prosecution.

Acquitted

G.R. Nos. 138539-40 January 21, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
ANTONIO C. ESTELLA,

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, 7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the
prosecution's version of the facts as follows:

"Prior to November 20, 1996, Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the

Regional Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the conduct of a
search and seizure in the residence of appellant at Purok Yakal, Barangay
Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.

"In the morning of November 20, 1996, Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1)
Antonio Bulor[o]n, then Intelligence and Investigation Officer, together with
SPO1 Jose Arca and several other members of the Provincial Special
Operation Group based in Burgos, San Marcelino, Zambales proceeded to
Masinloc. They coordinated with the members of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Masinloc and sought the assistance of Barangay Captain
Rey Barnachea of Baloganon, Masinloc for the enforcement of the search
warrant. Barangay Captain Barnachea accompanied the police officers to
Purok Yakal, Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, the place mentioned in the
search warrant.

"On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw appellant sitting on a
rocking chair located about two (2) meters away from a hut owned by
Narding Estella, brother of appellant, and being rented by appellant's live-in
partner, named Eva. They approached appellant and introduced
themselves as police officers. They showed appellant the search warrant
and explained the contents to him. SPO1 Buloron asked appellant if indeed
he had in his possession prohibited drug and if so, to surrender the same
so he would deserve a lesser penalty.

"While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team two cans
containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One can contained twenty (20)
bricks of fruiting tops. The team searched the hut in the presence of
appellant and his live-in partner. They found a plastic container under the
kitchen table, which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana leaves
and a .38 caliber revolver with four live ammunitions. The team seized the
prohibited drug, the revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and
signed a receipt for the seized items. Barangay Captain Barnachea and
SPO1 Edgar Bermudez of the Masinloc Police Station also signed the
receipt as witnesses. SPO1 Buloron and his companions arrested appellant
and brought him to San Marcelino, Zambales.

"At their office in San Marcelino, Zambales, SPO1 Buloron and SPO1 Arca
placed their markings on the seized items for purposes of identification.
SPO1 Arca kept the seized items under his custody. The next day, SPO1
Buloron and SPO1 Arca brought the seized items to San Antonio,
Zambales, where Police Senior Inspector Florencio Sahagun examined the
suspected marijuana dried leaves. Inspector Sahagun prepared a
certification of field test.

"On November 29, 1996, the suspected marijuana dried leaves were
delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas for further
examination. Senior Inspector Daisy Babor, a forensic chemist, examined
the suspected marijuana dried leaves and issued Chemistry Report No. D-
768-96 stating that the specimens are positive for marijuana, a prohibited
drug. Specimen A weighed 1.710 kilograms, while Specimen D weighed
1.820 kilograms." 8 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

For his version of the facts, appellant merely reproduced the narration in
the assailed RTC Decision as follows:

"Accused Antonio C. Estella [i]s married to Gloria Atrero Estella. They have
three (3) children, namely: Carmen Estella (8 years old), Antonio Estella,
Jr. (5 years old) and Roen Estella (3 years old). Since 1982, Antonio
Estella has been [a] resident of Barangay Baloganon, Masinloc, Zambales.

"On 20 November 1996 between 10:30 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the
morning, while accused was talking with his friends Rael Tapado and Victor
de Leon at a vacant lot just outside the house of Camillo Torres and about
70 meters away from his house, a group of men approached them. The
group introduced themselves as policemen and told them that they were
looking for Antonio Estella because they have a search warrant issued
against him. Accused identified himself to them. The policemen inquired
from the accused as to where his house is located and accused told them
that his house is located across the road. The police did not believe him
and insisted that accused's house (according to their asset) is that house
located about 5�8 meters away from them. Accused told the policemen to
inquire from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and
heard the latter telling the policemen that his house is located near the
Abokabar junk shop. After about half an hour, the policemen went inside
the house nearby and when they came out, they had with them a bulk of
plastic and had it shown to the accused. They photographed the accused
and brought him to their office at San Marcelino, Zambales. Accused
Antonio Estella was investigated a[t] San Marcelino, Zambales where he
informed the police officers of the fact that the house they searched was
occupied by Spouses Vicente and Fely Bakdangan.

"Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans

containing marijuana and likewise having any firearm.

"Miguel Buccat, who personally knew the accused for about ten (10) years,
identified the house depicted on a photograph as that house belonging to
the accused." 9 (Citations omitted)

Issue: Legality of the Search Undertaken

Ruling:

The Presence of the Accused or the Witnesses During the Search

Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellant's ownership,

control of or residence in the subject hut, we hold that the presence of
appellant or of witnesses during the search now becomes moot and
academic.

Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search, if he
was neither the owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question.
Besides, as we have noted, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
regarding these crucial circumstances were contradictory. They erode
SPO1 Buloron's credibility as a prosecution witness and raise serious
doubts concerning the prosecution's evidence. This Court is thus
constrained to view his testimony with caution and care.
With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search
undertaken � during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly
recovered � we hold that the search was illegal. Without the badge of
legality, any evidence obtained therein becomes ipso facto inadmissible.

The conviction or the acquittal of appellant hinges primarily on the validity

of the police officers' search and seizure, as well as the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof. Without that evidence, the prosecution
would not be able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ownership of the Subject House

Appellant claims that the hut, 14 which was searched by the police and
where the subject marijuana was recovered, does not belong to him. He
points to another house 15 as his real residence. To support his claim, he
presents a document 16 that shows that the subject hut was sold to his
brother Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the
other hand, argues that just because "appellant has another house in a
place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily mean that
the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control." 17 The prosecution
cites the testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place,
to show that the hut in question belongs to appellant.

The only link that can be made between appellant and the subject hut is
that it was bought by his brother Leonardo a.k.a. "Narding" Estella. 18 We
cannot sustain the OSG's supposition that since it was being rented by the
alleged live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it
or was in full control of it. In the first place, other than SPO1 Buloron's
uncorroborated testimony, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the person renting the hut was indeed the live-in
partner of appellant � if he indeed had any. Moreover, the testimony of
Barnachea serves to undermine, not advance, the position of the
prosecution.

Objections to the Legality of the Search

Finally, the OSG argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right
to object to the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence
seized through that search because, during the trial, he did not raise these
issues.

On the contrary, during the trial, appellant constantly questioned the legality
of the search. In fact, when SPO1 Buloron was presented as a prosecution
witness, the former's counsel objected to the offer of the latter's testimony
on items allegedly confiscated during the search. Appellant's counsel
argued that these items, which consisted of the marijuana and the firearm,
had been seized illegally and were therefore inadmissible. 37

Further, in his Comments and Objections to Formal Offer of Exhibits, 38

appellant once again questioned the legality of the search conducted by the
police, a search that had yielded the evidence being used against him.

Finally, on October 21, 1997, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence 39 reiterating

his objection to the search and to the eventual use against him of the
evidence procured therefrom.

All told, without sufficient admissible evidence against appellant, the

prosecution failed to establish his guilt with moral certainty. 40 Not only did
its evidence fall short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction, it
has also failed to present any evidence at all. Under our Bill of Rights,
among the fundamental rights of the accused is to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. 41 To overcome such presumption, the
prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Our criminal
justice system dictates that if the prosecution fails to do so, it becomes not
only the right of the accused to be set free, but also the constitutional duty
of the court to set them free. 42 This principle leaves this Court no option
but to acquit Appellant Antonio C. Estella for insufficiency of evidence.
JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES

1. SUPREME COURT

A. Original

1. Exclusive

Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus against the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan.

2. Concurrent

a. With the Court of Appeals: Petitions for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus against the Regional Trial Courts.

b. With the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts: Petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the lower courts.

c. With the Sandiganbayan: Petitions for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,

habeas corpus, injunctions and ancillary writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

B. Exclusive Appellate

1. By appeal:

a. From the Regional Trial Courts in all criminal cases involving offenses for
which the penalty is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and those involving
other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence
or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion.

b. Automatic review in criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed.

2. By petition for review on certiorari:

a. From the Court of Appeals;

b. From the Sandiganbayan; and

c. From the Regional Trial Courts where only an error or question of law is
involved.
ll. COURT OF APPEALS

A. Original

1. Exclusive

a. Actions for annulment of judgments of the Regional Trial Courts.

2. Concurrent

a. With the Supreme Court: (See par. 2, subpar. a. on the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court).

b. With the Supreme Court and the Regional Trial Courts: (See par. 2, subpar. b.
loc. cit.).

B. Exclusive Appellate

1. By Appeal:

a. From the Regional Trial Courts in cases commenced therein, except those
appealable to the Supreme Court or the Sandiganbayan.

2. By petition for review:

a. From the Regional Trial Courts in cases appealed thereto from the lower courts
and not appealable to the Sandiganbayan.

lll. SANDIGANBAYAN

A. Original

1. Exclusive

a. Violations of R.A. 3019, as amended (Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act),

R.A. 1379, and Chapter ll, Title Vll, Book ll of the Revised
Penal code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
Government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the

positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher in R. A. 6758
(Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989), specifically
including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,

members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of

the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

© Officials of the diplomatic service

occupying the position of consul and
higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels,

naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National

Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and

their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutors;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or

managers of government- owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof

classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to

the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional

Commissions without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as

Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
 b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed in relation to their
office by the public officials and employees mentioned in
Section 4(a), P.D. 1606, as amended by R. A. 7975.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection

with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986.

2. Concurrent

a. With the Supreme Court (See par. 2, subpar. c on the

original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).

B. Exclusive Appellate

1. By Appeal:

a. From the Regional Trial Courts in cases under P.D. 1606, as

amended by P.D. 1861, R.A. 8294, whether or not the cases
were decided by tem in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdictions.

lV. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

A. Exclusive Original

1. All criminal cases which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body.

B. Exclusive Appellate
 1. All cases decided by lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

V. FAMILY COURTS

A. Exclusive Original

1. Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below 18 but not less
than 15 years of age, or where one of the victims is a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense;

2. Cases against minors, cognizable under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

Act, as amended;

3. Violations of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,

Exploitation and Discrimination Act), as amended by R.A. 7659; and

4. Criminal cases of domestic violence against women and children, as defined

in Sec. 5(k), R.A. 8369.

Vl. METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL

COURTS

A. Exclusive Original

1. All violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their

respective territorial jurisdictions.

2. All offenses punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years

irrespective of the amount of fine, and in all cases of damages to property through
criminal negligence, regardless of other penalties and the civil liabilities arising
therefrom; and

3. All offenses (except violations of R.A. 3019 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act], R.A. 1379 [Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property] and Arts.
210 to 212 of the Revised Penal Code [bribery, indirect bribery, corruption of
public officials]) committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
and by private individuals charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories,
punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years or where none of the
accused holds a position classified as Grade 27 and higher.

B. Summary Procedure

1. Traffic violations;

2. Violations of the rental law;

3. Violations of city or municipal ordinances

4. Violations of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law); and

5. All other offenses where the penalty does not exceed 6 months imprisonment
and/or Php1,000 fine, irrespective of other penalties or civil liabilities arising
therefrom, and in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed Php10,000.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

ANAYA vs. PALAROAN

RULE 5

FACTS:

The parties in this case are married to each other, which later the
respondent the husband filed an annulment of marriage for the on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, the
case was dismissed and the marriage remains valid. The wife in turn filed
an annulment case with moral damages on the ground of disclosure of pre
marital relationship of his husband which was the reason for him to marry.
The husband did not pray for the dismissal of the case but only for the
dismissal of damages.

The wife in reply: aside from the disclosure she also included that
the defendant paid court to her.

Issue: was there a change of cause of action in the reply?

Ruling:

Yes. plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she

alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital
relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but
that she has, likewise, alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid
court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and
obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-
appellant contends that the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations
in her reply.

This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended
love and absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely
new and additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the
second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier
averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations
were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a
party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as
set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more
reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of
action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could
become interminable.
CAVILE vs. HEIRS OF
CAVILE RULE 7

FACTS:

This case is about partition of property and all the parties are relatives. In
this case the respondents prayed for the denial of the petition and one of
the grounds is that among the 22 petitioner only one signed the certification
of none forum shopping when the Rules require that said certification must
be signed by all the petitioners.

Issue: is it valid that only one petitioner will sign the non forum shopping in
case when there is numerous petitioners?

RULING:

Yes. The rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be

signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the signing by only
one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed that the
rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective.
The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum
shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification
cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely
disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances.

We find that the execution by Thomas George Cavile, Sr. in behalf of all the
other petitioners of the certificate of non-forum shopping constitutes
substantial compliance with the Rules. All the petitioners, being relatives
and co-owners of the properties in dispute, share a common interest
thereon. They also share a common defense in the complaint for partition
filed by the respondents. Thus, when they filed the instant petition, they
filed it as a collective, raising only one argument to defend their rights over
the properties in question. There is sufficient basis, therefore, for Thomas
George Cavili, Sr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners that they
have not filed any action or claim involving the same issues in another
court or tribunal, nor is there other pending action or claim in another court
or tribunal involving the same issues. Moreover, it has been held that the
merits of the substantive aspects of the case may be deemed as “special
circumstance” for the Court to take cognizance of a petition for review
although the certification against forum shopping was executed and signed
by only one of the petitioners

G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967

AGUSTIN O. CASEŇAS vs. CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE
ROSALES, ET AL.

Facts:

Rodolfo Araňas assigned a property to Agustino Caseňas, this

property is a lot transferred to Rodolfo by a deed of sale by Jose Rosales
and by a given date there will be a transfer of title. The defendants refused
to perform such obligation, which make the petitioners Rodolfo and
Agustino go to court with , Thus, the principal relief prayed for in the above
complaint was for an order directing the defendants-spouses to "execute a
deed of absolute sale of the property described in the complaint in favor of
the assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseňas. before the case was decided,
Rodolfo and Jose from opposite parties died, by the death the court
ordered the surviving plaintiff to amend the case, within the time granted by
the court, and in case of failure of the plaintiff to amend the case within the
time granted the case will be dismissed. And so the plaintiff failed to amend
the case which made the court decide to dismiss the case without
pronouncement.

After a 3 yrs Rodolfo filed a new complaint civil case no 780, to

quiet the title, and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several
grounds, namely: res judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, failure
to include indispensable parties, and that the contract subject of the
complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had filed his opposition to the
above motion, the lower court issued the order under appeal dismissing the
complaint. Of the above grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on
the defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of action and
prescription. The court believed that the plaintiff is barred by prior
judgment.

ISSUE: Was the ground for dismissal of the original case correct that
makes the plaintiff barred by that decision?

Ruling:

No. SEC. 17. Death of Party. � After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court
may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court,
and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

The court must hold, therefore, as they did in Barrameda that

inasmuch as there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff-appellant
herein to amend his complaint in Civil Case No. 261, any such imposition
being void, his failure to comply with such an order did not justify the
dismissal of his complaint. Grounded as it was upon a void order, the
dismissal was itself void.

Finally, the court finds there selves unable to share the appellees' view that
the appellant's complaint under Civil Case No. 780 failed to state a
sufficient cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission of one
party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar
Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666) and both these elements were clearly
alleged in the aforesaid complaint.

Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, this Court is of the view

that it should defer resolution on it until after Civil Case No. 780 shall have
been tried on the merits, considering that one of the defenses set up by the
appellant against the said issue is the existence of a trust relationship over
the property in dispute.

G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989

NG SOON vs. ALOYSIUS ALDAY

FACTS:

The plaintiff here is a widow of Mr. Gan bun Yaw, that during the life time of
her husband he made a deposit with the respondent bank China Banking
Corporation, amounting more or less P900,000.00 which still showed in his
passbook. For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit
passbook with the help of her children to no avail. She discovered finally
that defendant Billie T. Gan connived and colluded with the officers and
officials of CBC to withdraw all of the aforesaid savings account of Mr. Gan
Bun Yaw by forging his signature. This has to be done because Mr. Gan
Bun Yaw slipped into a comatose condition in the hospital and could not
sign any withdrawal slip.

Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of defendants to heed
her just and valid demands, she suffered actual damages in the form of
missing money in aforesaid savings account and expenses of litigation. she
suffered moral damages, the amount whereof she leaves to the discretion
of the Court. she suffered exemplary damages, the amount whereof she
leaves to the discretion of the Court. she was constrained to hire the
services of counsel, binding herself to pay the amount equivalent to twenty
percent payable to her, thereby suffering to the tune thereof.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court render

judgment:
1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to reconstitute Savings
Account No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw in the amount of
P900,000.00 with interest from December 8,1977 or ordering them both to
pay her the principal and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and
severally.

2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages of not

less than P50,000.00.

3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorney's fees equivalent to twenty

percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her, but not less than
P50,000.00.

She prays for such other and further relief to which she may be entitled in
law and equity under the premises. [Emphasis supplied] (pp. 11-13,
Rollo)For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of
P3,600.00 as docket fees.

Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal
of the Complaint. Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the Bank,
moved to expunge the said Complaint from the record for alleged non-
payment of the required docket fees.

On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order

granting the "Motion to Expunge Complaint."

Issue: Did the complainant failed to pay the docket fees?

Ruling:

No.It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should
specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the body of the
complaint but also in the prayer; that said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any pleading that
fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall, otherwise, be expunged from the record.

While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was

silent as to the exact amount of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and
enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees
payable.

Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money"

was fixed at P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of interest demanded
was not fatal not only because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the same,
but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, itemizing the
filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly
implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.

Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent

Judge has opined. The sums claimed were ascertainable, sufficient enough
to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141, section 5(a).

Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge, the

amounts claimed need not be initially stated with mathematical precision.
The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph), allows an appraisal
"more or less.

In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or
more in accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee
shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.

In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and

the fees ultimately found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the
party concerned or refunded to him, as the case may be. The above
provision clearly allows an initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to
the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later
may be proved.

Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon.
Maximiano Asuncion et al. (G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this
Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule when it held, inter alia,:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory

pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period
(Italics ours).

HYATT vs. Goldstar G.R. No. 161026

Facts:

HYATT was appointed as the exclusive distributor of elevators for LGISC

agreed and became a joint venture, later the LGIS and LGIC withdraw
from the agreement, by this the HYATT filed a complaint for unfair trade
practices and for damages against the LGISC. HYATT filed a motion for
leave of court to amend the complaint, alleging that subsequent to the filing
of the complaint, it learned that LGISC transferred all its organization,
assets and goodwill, as a consequence of a joint venture agreement with
Otis Elevator Company of the USA, to LG Otis Elevator Company (LG
OTIS, for brevity). Thus, LGISC was to be substituted or changed to LG
OTIS, its successor-in-interest. Likewise, the motion averred that
GOLDSTAR was being utilized by LG OTIS and LGIC in perpetrating their
unlawful and unjustified acts against HYATT. Consequently, in order to
afford complete relief, GOLDSTAR was to be additionally impleaded as a
party-defendant. Hence, in the Amended Complaint, HYATT impleaded
GOLDSTAR as a party-defendant, and all references to LGISC were
correspondingly replaced with LG OTIS.

LG OTIS (LGISC) and LGIC filed their opposition to HYATT‟s motion to

amend the complaint. It argued that: (1) the inclusion of GOLDSTAR as
party-defendant would lead to a change in the theory of the case since the
latter took no part in the negotiations which led to the alleged unfair trade
practices subject of the case; and (b) HYATT‟s move to amend the
complaint at that time was dilatory, considering that HYATT was aware of
the existence of GOLDSTAR for almost two years before it sought its
inclusion as party-defendant.

The [trial] court admitted the Amended Complaint. LG OTIS (LGISC) and
LGIC filed a motion for reconsideration thereto but was similarly rebuffed.

LGISC and LGIC filed a Motion to Dismiss raising the following grounds: (1)
lack of jurisdiction over the persons of defendants, summons not having
been served on its resident agent; (2) improper venue; and (3) failure to
state a cause of action. The [trial] court denied the said motion. And on the
latter Goldstar filed a petition for a motion to dismiss with similar grounds
and than none of the parties are resident of mandaluyong was also denied
by the court.

The CA ruled that the trial court had committed palpable error amounting to
grave abuse of discretion when the latter denied respondent‟s Motion to
Dismiss. The appellate court held that the venue was clearly improper,
because none of the litigants “resided” in Mandaluyong City, where the
case was filed.

According to the appellate court, since Makati was the principal place of
business of both respondent and petitioner, as stated in the latter‟s Articles
of Incorporation, that place was controlling for purposes of determining the
proper venue. The fact that petitioner had abandoned its principal office in
Makati years prior to the filing of the original case did not affect the venue
where personal actions could be commenced and tried.

Issue: Was there an error on the venue?

Ruling:

Yes. “Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiff
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendant resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff.”

Both the parties are Juridical person. Residence is the permanent home --
the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends
to return. Residence is vital when dealing with venue. A corporation,
however, has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied
to a natural person. This is precisely the reason why the Court in Young
Auto Supply Company v. Court of Appeals ruled that “for practical
purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place
where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation.” Even before this ruling, it has already been established that
the residence of a corporation is the place where its principal office is
established.

This Court has also definitively ruled that for purposes of venue, the term
“residence” is synonymous with “domicile.” Correspondingly, the Civil Code
provides:

“Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision
does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood
to be the place where their legal representation is established or where
they exercise their principal functions.”

It now becomes apparent that the residence or domicile of a juridical

person is fixed by “the law creating or recognizing” it. Under Section 14(3)
of the Corporation Code, the place where the principal office of the
corporation is to be located is one of the required contents of the articles of
incorporation, which shall be filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).

In the present case, there is no question as to the residence of

respondent. What needs to be examined is that of petitioner. Admittedly,
the latter‟s principal place of business is Makati, as indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. Since the principal place of business of a corporation
determines its residence or domicile, then the place indicated in petitioner‟s
articles of incorporation becomes controlling in determining the venue for
this case.

Inconclusive are the bare allegations of petitioner that it had closed its
Makati office and relocated to Mandaluyong City, and that respondent was
well aware of those circumstances. Assuming arguendo that they
transacted business with each other in the Mandaluyong office of petitioner,
the fact remains that, in law, the latter‟s residence was still the place
indicated in its Articles of Incorporation. Further unacceptable is its faulty
reasoning that the ground for the CA‟s dismissal of its Complaint was its
failure to amend its Articles of Incorporation so as to reflect its actual and
present principal office. The appellate court was clear enough in its ruling
that the Complaint was dismissed because the venue had been improperly
laid, not because of the failure of petitioner to amend the latter‟s Articles of
Incorporation.

Indeed, it is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions
are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally
settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not
left to a plaintiff‟s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.
Allowing petitioner‟s arguments may lead precisely to what this Court was
trying to avoid in Young Auto Supply Company v. CA: the creation of
confusion and untold inconveniences to party litigants.

Thus enunciated the CA: To insist that the proper venue is the actual
principal office and not that stated in its Articles of Incorporation would
indeed create confusion and work untold inconvenience. Enterprising
litigants may, out of some ulterior motives, easily circumvent the rules on
venue by the simple expedient of closing old offices and opening new ones
in another place that they may find well to suit their needs.”

“The rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure
a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will
not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose the
court where he may file his complaint or petition.

“The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff‟s whim or caprice.
He may be impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in
a particular court even if not allowed by the rules on venue.”

GALOFA vs. NEE BON SING

FACTS:

In this case a recovery of possession the defendant denied parts of

the complaint of the plaintiff. The defendant denied all the facts that could
lead for his right of possession of the property and had denied that he
deprive the plaintiff of the possession of the property. And defendant still
filed a motion of reconsideration.
Issue: Despite the denial is there still an issue?

RULING:

No. The defendant's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial furnished
no justification to the lower court to set aside or reconsider its judgment.
Said motion prayed that the defendant be allowed to amend his answer,
but annexed to it is the defendant's own affidavit (Annex A, Rec. on Appeal,
p. 57) reiterating that he had "no real right or interest whatsoever not
having been involved in any way with any transaction affecting the title or
possession of the same. Definitely, therefore, there was no issue to be tried
and the court's denial of the motion was proper. And why should the
defendant resist the judgment when he simultaneously asserts that he has
no right to the land?

It is to be noted that, to the plaintiff's allegation of his inability to take actual

possession of the parcel of land due to "an unwarranted adverse claim of
rights of ownership and possession by the defendant . . .", followed by an
allegation of how such claim was exercised, the defendant's denial is as to
"the materials averments contained in paragraph 4 of the Complaint, . . ."
conjoined with his disclaimer or dominical or possessory rights in the
manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant's denial is, therefore, a
negative pregnant, which is equivalent to an admission.

As to the plaintiff's allegations of his having contracted a lawyer for a fee,

the defendant does not deny the alleged fact; what he denies in his liability
therefor, which is an issue of law. Since the defendant neither denies nor
admits the material allegation about the services of plaintiff's counsel,
judgment on the pleadings is proper. (Alemany vs. Sweeney, 3 Phil. 114)

The defendant, however, had specifically denied the plaintiff's

allegations in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint. He traversed these
allegations in his answer by stating that he "does not possess any
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the (original) Complaint
and therefore, denies the same." But paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint
referred to damages, while paragraph 5 of the complaint merely alleged a
conclusion (that by defendant's acts a cloud over plaintiff's title had been
raised) so that the defendant's specific denials served no purpose at all. As
to the amount of damages, alleged in paragraph 6 of the complaint
(P2,000.00 per agricultural year) and specifically denied by the defendant,
as aforesaid, a specific denial is not required by the Rules. (Sec. 1, Rule 9,
Rules of Court) At any rate, the appealed judgment did not condemn the
defendant-appellant to pay damages.

A denial in the form of a negative pregnant is an ambiguous pleading, since

it cannot be ascertained whether it is the fact or only the qualification that is
intended to be denied.

(Jurisdiction is w/ the MTC; assessed value of property is P15K; bases is

on the allegations of the complaint and not the caption)

Petitioners bought a 50 sq. m lot for P15,000 from their son-in-law,

respondent Teofedo. Respondent failed to execute a deed of sale and
partition the lot in favor of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then brought an action for
"Annulment of TCT No. 99694, (and for the issuance of a new TCT in their
favor for the 50 sq. mete lot), Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of
Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorney‟s Fees,".

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss4 the complaint on the ground of lack

of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the total
assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section
33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section
19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case?

Held: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which

is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim (the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable
by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real
property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere). However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts (Cañiza v. Court of
Appeals).

Petitioners‟ argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary

estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition
is not well-taken. The nature of an action is not determined by what is
stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for. In this case, the purpose of petitioners was to
secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property which they
purchased from respondents. Thus, their complaint involved title to real
property or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they
purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal
Trial Court.

JOSE SANTOS vs. LORENZO J. LIWAG

FACTS:

the complainantClaiming that the allegations in the complaint are

indefinite and uncertain, as well as conflicting, the defendant filed a motion
tion on July 4, 1964, asking the trial court that the plaintiff be ordered to
submit a more definite statement or bill of particulars on certain allegations
of the complaint, as well as the facts constituting the misrepresentations,
machinations, and frauds employed by the defendant in the execution of
the documents in question in order that he could be well informed of the
charges filed against him, for him to prepare an intelligent and proper
pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises. 2

The plaintiff opposed the motion saying that the allegations in his complaint
are sufficient and contain ultimate facts con- constituting his causes of
action and that the subject of the defendant's motion is evidentiary in
nature. 3

The trial court, however, granted the motion and directed the plaintiff "to
submit a bill of particulars with respect to the paragraphs specified in
defendant's motion", 4 and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the
order, the court, acting upon previous motion of the defendant, 5 dismissed
the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. 6 Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE: Is the appeal of the plaintiff with merit?

PASTE:

We find no merit in the appeal. The allowance of a motion for a more

definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the sound judicial
discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the
ruling of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has
been a palpable abuse of discretion or a clearly erroneous order. In the
instant case, the complaint is without doubt imperfectly drawn and suffers
from vagueness and generalization to enable the defendant properly to
prepare a responsive pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court In an
orderly and expeditious disposition in the case.

Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a
bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint.

Lydia Flores-Cruz, et al. vs. Spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-

Cruz, et al.,

G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009.

FACTS: Petitioners purchased a property for Lydia‟s siblings. Their father,

Estanislao Flores, used to own the land as an inheritance from his parents
Gregorio Flores and Ana Mangahas. Estanislao died in 1995.

After the death of Estanislao, petitioners found out that respondent spouses
Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et al. were occupying a section of the
land. They alleged that the former owner (Estanislao, their predecessor)
allowed respondents to live on the land. Initially, Lydia talked to
respondents and offered to sell the portion of the property they‟re
occupying but they failed to agree on the price. Petitioners, thru their
lawyer, sent a demand letters asking the respondents to leave however,
such demands were ignored. Efforts at barangay conciliation also failed.

On August 6, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession

of the land in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch
82. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) since it was a summary action for ejectment
under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:No. When the case was filed in 2001, Congress had already
approved Republic Act No. 7691 which expanded the MTC‟s jurisdiction to
include other actions involving title to or possession of real property (accion
publiciana and reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of the property
does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila).
Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving
possession of real property has been filed in the proper court no longer
depends solely on the type of action filed but also on the assessed value of
the property involved.
Since petitioners‟ complaint contained no allegation on the assessed value
of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in proceeding with the
case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its
decision, are null and void.

Pioneer Insurance vs. Hontonasas

Rule 9

Facts:

In a complaint for sum of money filed by Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd.,
against the respondent-appellee Ben Uy Rodriguez, wherein it decided against the
latter, a preliminary attachment was issued upon filing a bond duly posted by
herein petitioner-appellant. Subsequently, respondents-appellees Rodriguez
spouses filed a complaint for damages against Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp.
and Allied Overseas. Petitioner-appellant, filed an answer alleging affirmative and
special defenses and thereafter, filed a motion for preliminary hearing of its
affirmative defenses, which are grounds to dismiss. The Motion was denied as well
as the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner-appellant, filed an answer alleging
affirmative and special defenses and thereafter, filed a motion for preliminary
hearing of its affirmative defenses, which are grounds to dismiss. Consequently,
an order for pre-trial was ordered for February 28, 1972 and was received by the
counsel of petitioner appellants. Because of their failure to appear on the said date,
they were declared in default.

Issue: Can the defendant be allowed to file an answer in case of improperly

default?

Ruling:

Where however, the defendant was improperly, declared in default, as

where the reglementary period to answer has not yet expired, he can, if such
default order is not yet lifted, elevate the matter by certiorari without waiting for
the default judgment.
Remington vs. CA
Rule 10

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of
contract. Upon denial of their motion to dismiss, they filed an answer to the
complaint. Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by incorporating
therein additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of action against
respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of right because respondent
has not yet filed a responsive pleading thereto. On the other hand, respondent
British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals claiming that the complaint did not contain a single averment that
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of
petitioner's legal rights. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion
in the CA case stating that it had filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
together with said Amended Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner
prayed that the proceedings in the special civil action be suspended. The CA
granted the writ of certiorari of respondent dismissing the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action, despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend
the defective complaint.

Ruling:

It has also been held that a complaint can still be amended as a matter of
right before an answer thereto has been filed, even if there was a pending
proceeding in a higher court for the dismissal of that complaint.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 10, substantial amendments of the complaint are

not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, and this is
because any material change in the allegations in the complaint could prejudice the
defendant who has already set up his defenses in his answer. Conversely, no rights
of the defendant will be violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to
file an answer thereto. The defendant has not presented any defense that can be
altered or affected by an amendment made in accordance with Sec. 2 of the Rule.
In fact, he can thereafter address the amended allegations by setting up the
defenses thereto in his projected answer.

2006 Remedial Law Case Digests

CIVIL PROCEDURE

MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S

HOUSE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 158245. June 30, 2005

Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of three parcels of agricultural land.
They entered into a Contract of Sale with respondent and agreed that "in the event
that the parties herein are unable to effect the transfer and sale of the said
properties in whole or in part in favor of the vendees, all the paid-in amounts shall
be applied to another similar property also owned by the vendors in substitution of
the above-described properties."
Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down payment however;
it refused to remit any monthly installment due to petitioners' failure to obtain a
clearance and/or approval of the sale of the subject land from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent demanded that petitioners either solve the
problem with the land tenants or substitute the lots with another acceptable,
suitable and untenanted land, pursuant to their agreement.
Petitioners informed respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in
accordance with the legal opinion of the DAR. In a letter, respondent informed
petitioners that the scheme proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from
acceptable." Respondent offered to purchase the property on a direct sale basis.
Petitioners did not respond to respondent hence, the latter, through counsel,
requested the return of its down payment. As petitioners did not acquiesce,
respondent filed a complaint for rescission with damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. As a countermove, petitioners filed the instant case for
specific performance with the RTC of Laguna.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners
opposed contending that the instant complaint for specific performance was served
on respondent ahead of the service of the complaint for rescission on petitioners.
Later, however, respondent withdrew its motion to dismiss in view of the order of
the RTC of Makati dismissing the complaint for rescission. In its Answer with
Counterclaim, respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense that "specific
performance is not possible because the respondent had already bought another
property which is untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now
converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose in accordance with DAR
Administrative Order.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering
respondent's special defense that specific performance was no longer possible.
They prayed that their complaint and respondent's counterclaim be ordered
withdrawn or dismissed, arguing that respondent's counterclaim would have no leg
to stand on as it was compulsory in nature.

Issue: Whether respondent's counterclaim should be dismissed.

Held: There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance
of the plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is
filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been
served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court
when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage
of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice
of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority
of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the
dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant
should always be taken into consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint after respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the
reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its
answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another
property in lieu of the subject lots under the contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable
how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully withdrawn upon
the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged
in this petition that "private respondent objected to the withdrawal and the Trial
Court sustained the objection."

LUCIANO ELLO and GAUDIOSA ELLO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS ET

AL.
G.R. No. 141255. June 21, 2005

Facts: Respondent Springfield Development Corporation is the owner and actual

possessor of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92571,
while respondent Constantino Jaraula is the owner and actual possessor of a
covered by TCT No. T-63088, both situated at Cagayan de Oro City. The two lots
adjoin each other and were originally parts of a 12-hectare lot which has been
developed by respondents as the Mega Heights Subdivision. Sometime in 1996,
petitioner spouses Luciano and Gaudiosa Ello and their hired personnel
surreptitiously and stealthily occupied respondents‘ lots, built a make-shift shed
under the trees, and fenced the area they occupied. Respondents then demanded
that petitioners and their hired personnel vacate the area but they refused. Instead,
they threatened and prevented respondents from developing their lots into a
subdivision. Thus, respondent Springfield Development Corporation and
Constantino G. Jaraula, filed a complaint against them for forcible entry with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed outright petitioners‘ petition for review on the sole technical ground that
it does not contain the affidavit of service as required by Section 11 in relation to
Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held: Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
prescribe two modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders,
judgments and other papers. These are: (a) by personal delivery, governed by
Section 6 of the same Rule; and (b) by mail, under Section 7 thereof.
However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that ―whenever practicable,‖ the filing of
pleadings and other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers on the
adverse party or his counsel, must be done ―personally.‖ But if such filing and
service were through a different mode, the party concerned must submit a ―written
explanation‖ why they were not done personally.
There is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to
append the affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals‘ challenged Resolution
dismissing outright their petition due to such omission, promptly filed a motion for
reconsideration, readily acknowledging their procedural lapse and attaching
therewith the required affidavit of service. Rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure.

EXECUTION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; DELAY BY ONE PARTY

JUSTIFIES EXECUTION

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. ALA INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004

Facts: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT
building of the NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent
ALA. Respondent made the necessary repair and waterproofing.
After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received
partial payments. Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by
the respondent. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the
ground that respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion
date.
Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its
claims. The trial court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties
executed a compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment
based on the compromise agreement. The Court a quo rendered judgment
approving the compromise agreement.
For petitioner‘s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a
motion for execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed
the delays to its being a government agency. The trial court denied the
respondent‘s motion. Reversing the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of
execution to enforce respondent‘s claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a
judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement was immediately
executory, and that a delay was not substantial compliance therewith.

Issues: 1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and

executory.

2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution.

Held: 1) A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of
res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and
executory. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the
parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with
the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement
and enforce it.
2. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the
Agreement. Thus, non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified
execution. It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous
event its delayed payment. Petitioner‘s explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion
that borders callousness.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; ISSUANCE OF TRO EX-PARTE;

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; DUE PROCESS; PRESUMPTION OF COLD
NEUTRALITY OF A JUDGE

BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG

G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for
injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of
Marohombsar‘s appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-
ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the
hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also served on
both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO.
Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent judge issued an order
stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had
waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge gave another time to file her comment
again.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it
submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction. Hence, this
complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming
a judge.

Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case.

2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process.

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is
intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary
injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo
until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex
parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice
and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being
doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied
due process when he was given the opportunity to present his position.
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the
bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that
preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the
guarantee of due process.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS, SUBSTITUTED SERVICE; SEVICE BY

PUBLICATION; ACTIONS IN REM; ACTIONS QUASI IN REM

SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND

ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents

to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return of
the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
because efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners
filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by
publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were
declared in default and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners
were allowed to submit their evidence ex parte.
Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister
of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the
court a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the
defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the
respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution
of the controverted judgment which the judge granted.
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that
the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

Held: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service,
where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However,
extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when
the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself
instead of against the defendant‘s person if the action is in rem or an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual‘s interest in a piece
of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover,
court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.

JURISDICTION; RTC

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF

APPEALS
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002
Facts: Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal
Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection
of unpaid rentals.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent.

Held: RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint
reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific
performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would
incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject
contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner‘s failure to pay
rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of
their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals
for the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the action for specific performance,
irrespective of the amount of the rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of
Bulacan
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005

Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun Rances, Zoilo Salamat and
Rey Santos were drinking together at the same table. While waiting to be seated,
Pedrito Alonzo was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as
the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat.
Pedrito and his companions took their seats and started drinking at the table across
SPO4 Alonzo‘s table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of
the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances
likewise followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the
bag as he hurriedly left. The wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and
Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos. Pedrito‘s uncle, Jose Alonzo,
sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and even
disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4
Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses
testified. Upon review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as principal,
and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro
Atienza, the prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish
their conspiracy with Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC issued an Order
directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to
include all the aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as principals.

Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a
respondent for the purpose of amending the Information.

Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is

sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor
determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution
of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and
control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting officers have the
authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime they have equally the
legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the
prosecutor's should normally prevail.

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005

Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing
Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence
which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the
absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson‘s death. The
petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of
the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely
based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did
not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and
settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.

Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent‘s criminal liability carries with
it the extinction of their civil liability.

Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.

SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO

QUESTION LEGALITY OF SEARCH; EVIDENCE IN ILLEGAL SEARCH
PEOPLE VS. BENHUR MAMARIL
G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004

Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant
authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur.
During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected
marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and
prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly
searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search.
After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles
to the PNP station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP
Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test
for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the person who conducted the
examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the
same.
Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent‘s house since he has been
residing at a rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latter‘s
family who were residing with his mother, but on said search operation, his brother
and family were out. He testified that he was at his parent‘s house because he
visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time
during the trial and admitted that the signature on the certification that the house
was properly search was his.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.

2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of
the search.

3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence

against the accused.

Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of

probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of
probable cause, it is required that: 1) The judge must examine the complaint and
his witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put
into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of
searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. Such written
examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine
the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not
determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with law. It was only
during the trial that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the
search warrant was illegally issued. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on
constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said
warrant during the trial, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under
the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his
conduct before or during the trial.
3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law
that the examination of the complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not
complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence
seized pursuant to illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article III of the Constitution.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON; MOTION TO QUASH; ARREST

WITHOUT WARRANT

PEOPLE VS. CRISPIN BILLABER

G.R. No. 114967-68. January 26, 2004

Facts: Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin

Billaber by her friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire
the necessary papers and find her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the accused to
Raul Durano. The accused offered Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S.
Durano and Genteroy paid the accused and asked for receipt, but the accused said
that it was not necessary since they will leave together.
Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to Tersina Onza and offered a job
abroad. Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants,
Genteroy, Durano and Onza to meet him at the airport on the agreed date, however,
the accused failed to show up.
Durano chanced upon the accused at the canteen. A commotion ensued when
Durano tried to stop the accused from leaving. A police officer brought both
Durano and the accused to the PNP station. The prosecution offered in evidence a
certificate from the POEA stating that the accused was not licensed or authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad. The accused denied receiving money
from private complainants and interposed a defense of frame-up and extortion
against Durano.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering that the accused
arrested without warrant.

2) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held: 1) It appears that accused-appellant was brought to the police station,

together with the complainant Durano, not because of the present charges but
because of the commotion that ensued between the two at the canteen. At the
police station, Durano and the other complainants then executed statements
charging appellant with illegal recruitment and estafa. As to whether there was an
actual arrest or whether, in the commotion, the appellant committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit an offense, have been rendered moot.
2) Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a motion to quash before entering his
plea, and is therefore deemed to have waived any question of the trial court‘s
jurisdiction over his person.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

PEOPLE VS. NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG

G.R. No. 144037, Sept.ember 26, 2003

Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of
marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry
a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the
two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box,
beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in
newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what
seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged
with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed
the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime
charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly
obtained.

Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise such ―search and seizure‖ becomes reasonable within
the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the
following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a
moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and
frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is
that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.
Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation
of the accused‘s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM DELICT; EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE

CIVIL ASPECT; EFFECT OF GRANT OF DEMURRER ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CASE

ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE AND J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING

CORP.
G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers
Marketing. As payment for these, she gave a check drawn against the Prudential
Bank by one Nena Timario. J.Y. accepted the check upon the petitioner‘s
assurance that it was good check. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored
because it was drawn under a closed account. Upon being informed of such
dishonor, petitioner replaced the check drawn against the Solid Bank, which,
however, was returned with the word ―DAUD‖ (Drawn against uncollected
deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of
the crime charged but ordering her to pay, as payment of her purchase. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with
a plea that she be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court, but the court denied the motion.
Issues: 1) Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal offense prevent a
judgment against her on the civil aspect of the case?
2) Was the denial of the motion for reconsideration proper?

Held: 1) The rule on the Criminal Procedure provides that the extension of the
penal action does not carry with it the extension of the civil action. Hence, the
acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect
of the case where a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; b) where the court declared that the liability
of the accused is only civil; c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
2) No, because after an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the trial shall proceed for
the presentation of evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so because
when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to set
the case for continuation of the trail for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect and for the private offended party adduce evidence by way of rebuttal
as provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Otherwise, it would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated.

AMENDED RULES ON DEATH PENALTY CASES‘ REVIEW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004

Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-
daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imelda‘s testimonies regarding the rape
incident were inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened
inside her bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their
sala. She also told the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when
asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the
victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual
findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court.
Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the
evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an
error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing
the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its
final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally
vested in the Supreme Court –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
―(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.‖
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The
rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125,
and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in ―Internal Rules of the Supreme Court‖
in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TO GOVERN DEATH PENALTY CASES

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court‘s consideration and approval the Proposed Amendments
to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The amendment shall take effect on October 15, 2004 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than September 30, 2004
September 28, 2004
_____________________________________
AMENDED RULES TO GOVERN REVIEW OF
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, and Rule 124, Sections 12 and 13, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, are amended as follows:
RULE 122
Sec. 3. How appeal taken – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases whereby the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same occasion on the or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the
judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
xxx
RULE 124
Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. – The Court of Appeals shall have the power
to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary
to resolve the factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearing in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
(12a)
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. – (a) Whenever the
Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall
render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith
certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on
the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more severe offense for which the penalty is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such
penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
file with the Court of Appeals. (13a)

EVIDENCE

INOCELIA S. AUTENCIO VS. CITY ADMINISTRATOR, RODEL M.

MAÑARA ET AL.
G.R. No. 152752. January 19, 2005

Facts: City Administrator Rodel M. Mañara lodged a complaint against petitioner

Inocelia S. Autencio with the Office of the City Mayor for dishonesty and
misconduct in office. The complaint alleged that Riza Bravo, an employee of the
City Assessor‘s Office charged with the preparation of the payroll of casual
employees, changed the September 1996 payroll prepared by her upon the order of
petitioner. After hearing, the Office for Legal Services issued a resolution/decision,
declaring the petitioner guilty of misconduct in office for allowing irregularities to
happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. However, as regards to
the charge of dishonesty, the same was found wanting due to insufficiency of
evidence. A penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except for earned leave accumulated before the filing of the complaint was
imposed. In return, petitioner alleged that she had waived her right to present her
evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case for resolution, only
because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she
could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence.

Issue: Was the petitioner deprived of substantial due process?‖

Held: Petitioner was afforded due process. On the formal charge against her, she
had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her
defense. She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted
Affidavits of personnel in the Assessor‘s Office to support her claim of innocence.
A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she --
assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the
ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.
Finally, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court to weigh once more the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any
event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty
of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial
evidence.

TURADIO C. DOMINGO VS. JOSE C. DOMINGO ET AL.

G.R. No. 150897. April 11, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Turadio Domingo is the oldest of the five children of the late
Bruno B. Domingo, formerly the registered owner of the properties subject of this
dispute. Private respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro, Nuncia Domingo-Balabis,
Abella Domingo, and Jose Domingo are petitioner‘s siblings. A family quarrel
arose over the validity of the purported sale of the house and lot by their father to
private respondents. Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the
disputed property, received a notice, declaring him a squatter. Petitioner learned of
the existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was
filed against him. Subsequently, he had the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or PNP)
Crime Laboratory compare the signature of Bruno on the said deed against
specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned
Document Report to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard
signatures were written by two different persons Thus; petitioner filed a complaint
for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private individuals
against his siblings. But after it conducted an examination of the questioned
documents, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the
conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen signatures were written
by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. Consequently, petitioner
instituted a case for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance
of the disputed property, and cancellation of TCT.

Issue: Whether or not the court errs when it held that the trial court correctly
applied the rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI
questioned document reports.
Held: Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the
credibility of the respondent‘s witnesses below should be disturbed. Findings by
the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect,
and even finality by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to
observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.
Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized
document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
expressed. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all
these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this case.
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr.

G.R. No. 186418, October 16, 2009

(Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, Evidence, Chain of Custody, RA 9165)

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
thereof. In prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti as evidence. In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to
establish, through testimonial, documentary and object evidence, the said elements.

xxx

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court
with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing
evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient evidence in
support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof
was presented to bolster his allegations.

xxx

For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis

for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of
the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do with
the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the accused.

The inconsistency cited by appellant refers to trivial matter and is clearly beyond
the elements of illegal sale of shabu because it does not pertain to the actual buy-
bust itself – that crucial moment when appellant was caught selling shabu. Such
inconsistency is also irrelevant to the elements of illegal possession of shabu.
Besides, the inconsistency even bolsters the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
as it erased any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

xxx

Moreover, we have held in several cases that non-compliance with Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accused‘s
arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In the present case, the integrity of the drugs seized from
appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the
instant case was shown not to have been broken.

The fact that Forensic Analyst Albon and the persons who had possession or
custody of the subject drugs were not presented as witnesses to corroborate SPO1
Indunan‘s testimony is of no moment. The prosecution dispensed with the
testimony of Forensic Analyst Albon because the defense had already agreed in the
substance of her testimony to be given during trial, to wit: (1) that she examined
the subject drugs; (2) that she found them to be positive for shabu; and (3) that she
prepared and issued a chemistry report pertaining to the subject drugs.

Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to
testify in court. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule
implementing the same that imposes such a requirement. As long as the chain of
custody of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that
the prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not
indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the drugs
should take the witness stand.

Selected Cases in Provisional Remedies

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Sta. Ines vs. Macaraeg, December 2, 1998

Specifically, attachment is a juridical institution intended to secure the outcome of

the trial. xxx The overriding purpose of attachment is to secure a contingent lien on
defendant's property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a
judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make provision
for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be
removed beyond the jurisdiction or improperly disposed of or concealed, or
otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. xxx Indeed attachment is primarily
in aid of creditors. As used in the rules, however, the term, "creditors", should not
be construed in its strict, technical sense. Rather, it should be given a broad
construction as to embrace not only a creditor established as such by a contractual
relation alleged in the complaint but also all parties who put in suit demands,
accounts, interests or causes of action, for which they might recover in the suit any
debt or damages.

Chuidian vs. Sandiganbayan, January 19, 2001

The rule contemplates that the defect must be in the very issuance of the
attachment writ. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of
the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule.

When the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground. which is at the same
time the applicant's cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to
dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity
of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the
writ was based, the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution
of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. Thus, this
Court has time and again ruled that the merits of the action in which a writ of
preliminary attachment has been issued are not triable on a motion for dissolution
of the attachment, otherwise an applicant for the lifting of the writ could force a
trial of the merits of the case on a mere motion.

Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground
which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action, the only other way the
writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance with Section 12
of the same rule.
To reiterate, there are only two ways of quashing a writ of attachment: (a) by filing
a counterbond immediately; or (b) by moving to quash on the ground of improper
and irregular issuance. These grounds for the dissolution of an attachment are fixed
in Rule 57 of the Rules of Court and the power of the Court to dissolve an
attachment is circumscribed by the grounds specified therein.

PBC vs. CA, February 23, 2001

The petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment hinges on the

allegations which are couched in general terms devoid of particulars of time,
persons and places to support such a serious assertion that "defendants are
disposing of their properties in fraud of creditors." There is thus the necessity of
giving to the private respondents an opportunity to ventilate their side in a hearing,
in accordance with due process, in order to determine the truthfulness of the
allegations. But no hearing was afforded to the private respondents the writ having
been issued ex parte. A writ of attachment can only be granted on concrete and
specific grounds and not on general averments merely quoting the words of the
rules.

Time and again, we have held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment
must be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required
because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary in nature.
If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present, then the court which
issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Dadizon vs. Asis, January 15, 2004

Issuance of said writ is entirely within the discretion of the trial court. The only
limitation is that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in
the manner provided by law. The requisites for injunctive relief are (1) there must
be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against
which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Tayag vs. Lacson, March 25, 2004

The only issue before the appellate court was whether or not the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in denying the respondents‘ motion to deny or dismiss the petitioner‘s plea for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Not one of the parties prayed to permanently enjoin
the trial court from further proceeding with the case or to dismiss the complaint.
By permanently enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the case, the
appellate court acted arbitrarily and effectively dismissed the complaint motu
proprio, including the counterclaims of the respondents and that of the defendants-
tenants. The defendants-tenants were even deprived of their right to prove their
special and affirmative defenses.

Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003

Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an

interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved
by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the
main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed
order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious
relief. Therefore, respondent's special civil action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances.

Savellano v. CA, January 30, 2001

In fine, petitioner has not made out a clear case, free from any taint of doubt or
dispute, to warrant the issuance of a prohibitory mandatory injunction. It is true
that he possesses certificates of title in his name covering several parcels of land
located in San Mateo, Rizal. But inasmuch as it relates solely to the issuance of a
writ of injunction, the issue is not one of ownership but, as correctly noted by the
appellate court, "whether or not the titles of (petitioner) cover the premises being
occupied by the (private respondents)."

Private respondents vigorously maintain that the property being occupied by them
lies outside of the property covered by petitioner's certificates of title. While it may
have been desirable for them to produce certificates of title over the property which
they occupy, the absence thereof for purposes of the issuance of the writ does not
militate against them. And if the defense interposed by them is successfully
established at the trial, the complaint will have to be dismissed.

The effect of the preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issued by the
lower court is to dispose of the main case without trial. Private respondents will
have to be hurled off into the streets, their houses built on the premises demolished
and their plantings destroyed without affording them the opportunity to prove their
right of possession in court. In view of the rights to be affected through the
issuance of injunctions, courts should at best be reminded that "(t)here is no power
the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation
and sound discretion, or which is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the
issuing of an injunction."

Shin vs. CA, February 6, 2001

Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear

showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. As the facts
reveal, petitioners are in effect sublessees, having leased the land from a lessee of
the property. "A sublessee can invoke no right superior to that of his sublessor. The
sublessees' right, if any, is to demand reparation for damages from his sublessor,
should the latter be at fault. The sublessees can only assert such right of possession
as could have been granted them by their sublessor, their right of possession
depending entirely upon that of the latter. Considering that the lessor and real
owner of the property manifested objections to the improvements introduced by
petitioners and the subsequent termination of the lease contract between the lessor-
owner and the lessee-sublessor, petitioners, being mere sublessees, are not in a
position to assert any right to remain on the land. Therefore, the Court of Appeals
did not err in setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction that the trial court
issued.

Spouses Crystal v. Cebu International School, April 4, 2001

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued only upon proof of the following: (1) a
clear legal right of the complainant, (2) a violation of that right, and (3) a
permanent and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Unlike an
ordinary preliminary injunction which is a preservative remedy, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act that
tends to go beyond maintaining the status quo and is thus more cautiously
regarded. Hence, the applicant must prove the existence of a right that is "clear and
unmistakable."

Even assuming that petitioners have a clear and unmistakable legal right, they are
still not entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. They have not
shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it, considering that Monica Claire
and Frances Lorraine are already enrolled at the Colegio de Immaculada
Concepcion. In other words, there is no more need for the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction to compel the school to admit them.

Valencia vs. CA, February 19, 2001

On the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, there are three requisites for the
grant of the same: 1) The invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2) The
right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3) There is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Petitioner merely
alleged the presence of these elements, but did not substantiate the same with
convincing evidence. Consequently, we find no meritorious reason for the issuance
of said writ.

Gonzales vs. State Properties, January 25, 2001

Nonetheless, the 1997 rule barring the raffle of these cases without effecting the
service of summons is not absolute. As earlier noted, the second paragraph of
Section 4 (c) of Rule 58 clearly provides that the service of summons may be
dispensed with "where the summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service despite diligent efforts." Furthermore, even Justice Feria opines
that the exceptions to the rule are the same as those in Section 5 of Rule 57, the
second paragraph of which reads thus: "The requirement of prior or
contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply where the summons could
not be served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the
defendant is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom, or the
defendant is a non-resident of the Philippines, or the action is one in rem or quasi
in rem."

In the present case, respondent was able to show that the whereabouts of the other
defendants were unknown, and that summons could not be served personally or by
substituted service. Hence, it cannot be required to serve such summons prior to or
contemporaneous with the notice of raffle. The raffle, therefore, may proceed even
without notice to and the presence of the said adverse parties.

Manansala vs. CA, January 20, 2000

Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's

substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon
the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case can be
regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive
relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute
a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending
parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the
plaintiff pending the litigation. Two requisites are necessary if a preliminary
injunction is to issue, namely, the existence of a right to be protected and the facts
against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. In
particular, for a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the existence of the right
and the violation must appear in the allegation of the complaint and a preliminary
injunction is proper only when the plaintiff (private respondent herein) appears to
be entitled to the relief demanded in his complaint.

Unionbank vs. CA, August 5, 1999

There is, moreover, nothing erroneous with the denial of private respondents‘
application for preliminary prohibitory injunction. The acts complained of have
already been consummated. It is impossible to restrain the performance of
consummated acts through the issuance of prohibitory injunction. When the act
sought to be prevented had long been consummated, the remedy of injunction
could no longer be entertained, hearing the application for preliminary injunction
would just be an exercise in futility.

Gateway vs. Land Bank, July 30, 2003

A writ of mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act and is

granted only upon a showing of the following requisites — (1) the invasion of the
right is material and substantial; (2) the right of a complainant is clear and
unmistakable; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Since it commands the performance of an act, a
mandatory injunction does not preserve the status quo and is thus more cautiously
regarded than a mere prohibitive injunction. Accordingly, the issuance of the
former is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.

Marohombsar vs. Adiong, January 22, 2004

A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended
only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can
be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo until that
determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to
his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.

Merontos vs. Zerna, August 9, 2001

A temporary restraining order (TRO) may be issued ex parte by an executive judge

in matters of extreme emergency, in order to prevent grave injustice and
irreparable injury. Because such issuance of a TRO shall be effective only for
seventy-two hours therefrom, as provided under Administrative Circular No. 20-
95, the ex-parte issuance of a 20-day TRO is unauthorized and may make the judge
administratively liable.

The Circular aims to restrict the ex parte issuance of a TRO only to cases of
extreme urgency, in order to avoid grave injustice and irreparable injury. Such
TRO shall be issued only by the executive judge and shall take effect only for
seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance. Furthermore, within the said period, a
summary hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the Order can be
extended for another period until a hearing on the pending application for
preliminary injunction can be conducted. Untenable is respondent judge's
contention that the Circular allows an executive judge, in case of extreme urgency,
to issue an ex parte TRO effective for twenty days.

RECEIVERSHIP

Commodities vs. CA, June 19, 1997

A petition for receivership under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property
or fund which is the subject of the action must be in danger of loss, removal or
material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding principle
is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature,
does not require such protection or preservation, said remedy cannot be applied for
and granted.

SUPPORT

Lam vs. Chua, March 18, 2004

Thus, there is no merit to the claim of Jose that the compromise agreement
between him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati RTC and embodied in its
decision dated February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains, is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child
John Paul. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child John
Paul, as embodied in the compromise agreement between herein parties which had
been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be considered final and res judicata
since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon
the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support.

Selected Cases in Special Civil Actions

IN GENERAL

Marantao v. CA, January 16, 2001

In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of other parties. In such case, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or record on appeal, the court may only issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated
by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal In accordance with section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal.

Generally, the special civil action for certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved
party has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration, so as to allow the lower
court to correct the alleged error. However, there are several exceptions where the
special civil action for certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, namely:

a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

INTERPLEADER

Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know the person to
whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims on the property. The remedy is
afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against
a double vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that the
claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality a new action and the
former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the
action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

RCBC vs. Metro, G.R. No. 127913, September 13, 2001

It should be remembered that an action of interpleader is afforded to protect a

person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one
liability. It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who
claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants."

DECLARATORY RELIEF

Mejia vs. Gabayan, G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005

The petitioner ought to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial
recourse. Based on case law, an action for declaratory relief is proper only if
adequate relief is not available through other existing forms of actions or
proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief cannot be made a substitute for all
existing remedies and should be used with caution. Relief by declaratory judgment
is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable yet its historical affinity is
equitable. The remedy is not designed to supplant existing remedies.

It may be reiterated that the action for declaratory relief which originated in the
classical Roman law, had been used in Scotland for four centuries and adopted in
England and other European countries. The remedy is purely statutory in nature
and origin. The remedy is an extension of the ancient quia timet. A declaratory
judgment does not create or change substantial rights or modify any relationship or
alter the character of controversies.

Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

The essential requisites of the action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there
is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests
are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely
anticipatory.

… It merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of
religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the
constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a
declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any
threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from
rendering an advisory opinion.

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright
dismissal. 30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of
a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for
this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has
been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least
threatened.

… Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too
vague, highly speculative and uncertain. The Rules require that the interest must be
material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of
fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In
any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to
protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the
said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the
Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that
it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those
respondents.

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

Paradero vs. Abragan, et al., G.R. No. 158917, March 1, 2004

The Court is aware of the doctrine that the availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy
or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. Indeed, it is the inadequacy — not the
mere absence — of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. This has
been the consistent ruling of the Court in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company,
reiterated in the subsequent cases of Valencia v. Court of Appeals, 18 Echauz v.
Court of Appeals, and International School v. Court of Appeals.

Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity
of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. While there is an identity of
parties in the appeal and in the petition for review on certiorari filed before this
Court, it is clear that the causes of action and reliefs sought are unidentical,
although petitioner ISM may have mentioned in its appeal the impropriety of the
writ of execution pending appeal under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar. Clearly, there can be no forum-shopping where in one petition a party
questions the order granting the motion for execution pending appeal, as in the
case at bar, and, in a regular appeal before the appellate court, the party questions
the decision on the merits which finds the party guilty of negligence and holds the
same liable for damages therefor. After all, the merits of the main case are not to
be determined in a petition questioning execution pending appeal and vice versa.
Hence, reliance on the principle of forum-shopping is misplaced. [International
School v. Court of Appeals]

Moreover, even assuming that petitioner‘s recourse to certiorari is correct, the

same is still dismissible for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. While we have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to
issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained
freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum
for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court‘s original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition. Petitioner failed to show that such special and important reasons
obtain in this case.

Asian Transmission Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March 15, 2004

For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner
must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and
adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not
only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception
to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the
Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65. But
where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy
and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.

PCGG vs. Desierto, January 19, 2001

As regards the manifestation of the Office of the Ombudsman of its willingness to

have the case remanded for preliminary investigation, in PCGG vs. Desierto, the
Court has also enunciated the rule that when the merits of the complaint have
evidently and thoroughly been examined by the Ombudsman, it would not be right
to yet subject respondents to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish. The Court
finds no cogent reason to divert in the instant case from making that same
pronouncement.

ELPI vs. CA, G.R. No. 129184, February 28, 2001

The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an

interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil
action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.

The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to
interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to
trial, and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse to
certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court
issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy
and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant
from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's
baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted
trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."
Santos, v. CA, GR 141947, July 5, 2001

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required
to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed
forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is
hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when
this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself
was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed
that in no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical
rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are
provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively
prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

Indiana Aerospace University vs. CHED, G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001

We hold that respondent's Petition for Certiorari was seasonably filed. In

computing its timeliness, what should have been considered was not the Order of
August 14, 1998, but the date when respondent received the December 9, 1998
Order declaring it in default. Since it received this Order only on January 13, 1999,
and filed its Petition for Certiorari on February 23, 1999, it obviously complied
with the sixty-day reglementary period stated in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court. Moreover, the August 14, 1998 Order was not a proper subject of
certiorari or appeal, since it was merely an interlocutory order.

Petitioner also contends that certiorari cannot prosper in this case, because
respondent did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing its Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. Respondent counters that reconsideration should be
dispensed with, because the December 9, 1998 Order is a patent nullity.

The general rule is that, in order to give the lower court the opportunity to correct
itself, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to certiorari. It is also basic that
a petitioner must exhaust all other available remedies before resorting to certiorari.
This rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions such as any of the following:
(1) the issues raised are purely legal in nature, (2) public interest is involved, (3)
extreme urgency is obvious or (4) special circumstances warrant immediate or
more direct action. It is patently clear that the regulation or administration of
educational institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public
interest. Hence, the haste with which the solicitor general raised these issues before
the appellate court is understandable. For the reason mentioned, we rule that
respondent's Petition for Certiorari did not require prior resort to a motion for
reconsideration.

Olan vs. CA, G.R. No. 116109, September 14, 1999

Finally, it must be pointed out that the writ of mandamus is not the proper remedy
to compel a court to grant a new trial on the ground of "newly discovered
evidence". Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty. It is
nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken
in the exercise of either.

Liga v. City Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. 154599, January 21, 2004

Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to

determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the
parties.

Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . . required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.

The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the
respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance
and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done
in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in

essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality
of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.

DBP vs. Pingol, G.R. No. 145908, January 22, 2004

Basic is the doctrine that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; it cannot be the subject of appeal,
until final judgment or order is rendered. But this rule is not absolute.

Indeed, where the questioned order is a patent nullity, or where it was issued in
excess or without jurisdiction, resort to certiorari may be allowed. Here, the
violation of the rule on forum shopping is obvious. Disregarding such fact
constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The remedy of certiorari is therefore proper to assail
the patently null order of the Naga court which denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss.

Perez vs. Ombudsman, May 27, 2004

As the present controversy pertained to a criminal case, the petitioners were correct
in availing of the remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but they erred in
filing it in the Court of Appeals. The procedure set out in Kuizon vs. Ombudsman
and Mendoza-Arce vs. Ombudsman, requiring that petitions for certiorari
questioning the Ombudsman's orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed
in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is still the prevailing rule.

But even if the petition for certiorari had been filed in this Court, we would have
dismissed it just the same. First, petitioners should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing a petition for certiorari
directly in the Supreme Court. Second, the Office of the Ombudsman did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ombudsman resolution.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the exercise of power is in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

La Bugal-B'laan vs. Ramos, January 27, 2004

We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a
ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the
affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and
validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to
avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, it
is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality
issue be resolved now.

Lopez vs. Ombudsman, September 6, 2001

This Court has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance of an official act
or duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot
be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not apply in cases where there is gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority."

G & S Transport vs. CA, May 28, 2002

It is a settled rule that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty but does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations.
Only such duties as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of
official station are to be enforced by the writ. Whether MIAA will enter into a
contract for the provision of a coupon taxi service at the international airport is
entirely and exclusively within its corporate discretion. It does not involve a duty
the performance of which is enjoined by law and thus this Court cannot direct the
exercise of this prerogative. Indeed the determination of the winning bidders
should be left to the sound judgment of the MIAA which is the agency in the best
position to evaluate the proposals and to decide which bid would most complement
the NAIA's services.

FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE

DBP vs. Aguirre, September 7, 2001

However, although the notice of foreclosure sale was duly published, the sale did
not take place as scheduled on September 25, 1985. Instead, it was held more than
two months after the published date of the sale or on January 7, 1986. This renders
the sale void. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish the notice of auction sale
as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the
sale. Although the lack of republication of the notice of sale has not been raised in
this case, this Court is possessed of ample power to look into a relevant issue, such
as the lack of jurisdiction to hold the foreclosure sale.

Metrobank v. Wong, June 26, 2001

It is bad enough that the mortgagor has no choice but to yield his property in a
foreclosure proceeding. It is infinitely worse, if prior thereto, he was denied of his
basic right to be informed of the impending loss of his property. This is another
instance when law and morals echo the same sentiment.

The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public places, and
(2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation. Personal
notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the mortgage
contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. Precisely, the
purpose of a stipulation in the contract for an additional requirement is to apprise
respondent of any action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus
according him the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to
send the notice of foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual
breach sufficient to render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and
void.

Unlike in Olizon where there was a valid publication of the notice of foreclosure
sale, the publication in the case at bar was defective. Not only did it fail to conform
with the requirement that the notice must be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, but also, there were
substantial errors in the notice of sale published in the Pagadian Times as found by
the scrutinizing eyes of the trial court.

PARTITION

Figuracion-Gerilla vs. Vda. De Figuracion, August 22, 2006

There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement
under Section 2 and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be
reached, under Sections 3 to 6.

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the

decedent‘s estate. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an
accounting of the real property's income (rentals and profits) in the course of an
action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which
property belonging to the decedent's estate may be answerable, such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the

estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion's only
legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses"
including those related to her father's final illness and burial have not been properly
settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father's
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in
an action for partition.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Varona vs. CA, May 20, 2004

It is settled that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law.

Lopez vs. David, March 30, 2004

Under Section 1 of Rule 70, the one-year period within which a complaint for
unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand, because
only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful. In the
present case, it is undisputed that petitioners‘ Complaint was filed beyond one year
from the time that respondents‘ possession allegedly became unlawful.

We have ruled that ―forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting processes
and the one-year time bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action.‖ Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MeTC when it improperly
assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession had exceeded one year.

Del Rosario vs. Sps. Manuel, January 16, 2004

As found by the trial court, petitioner's possession of the land was by mere
tolerance of the respondents. We have held in a number of cases that one whose
stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment he is required
to leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in the absence of a contract, that he
will vacate upon demand.

Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs. CA, September 3, 2003

It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein

the judgment is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not
been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or
occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee
pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family, relative
or privy of the defendant.

Sps. Tirona v. Alejo, October 10, 2001

A reading of the allegations in the complaints leads us to conclude that petitioners'

action was one for forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. The distinctions between
the two actions are: (1) In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and
prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived
thereof, while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant is unlawful
ab initio because he acquires possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is originally lawful but becomes
illegal by reason of the termination of his right of possession under his contract
with the plaintiff. In pleadings filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special
facts giving the court jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise,
the complaint is demurrable.

Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the
municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: First, the plaintiff must allege his prior
physical possession of the property. Second, he must also allege that he was
deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
Recall that the complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 failed to allege prior
physical possession of the property on the part of petitioners. All that is alleged is
unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents. The deficiency is
fatal to petitioners' actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela. Such
bare allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction. No reversible
error was, therefore, committed by the RTC when it held that the Metropolitan
Trial Court acquired no jurisdiction over Civil Cases Nos. 6632 and 6633 for
failure of the complaints to aver prior physical possession by petitioners.

Uy v. Santiago, July 31, 2000

Private respondents' argument that execution pending appeal would deprive them
of their right to due process of law as it would render moot and academic their
Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals deserves scant consideration. We
must stress that what is in issue is only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution
pending appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of possession of the land and shall
not have any effect on the merits of the ejectment suit still on appeal. Moreover, it
must be remembered that ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible.

Finding the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of
respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should lie against him. Indeed,
mandamus will lie to compel a judge or other public official to perform a duty
specifically enjoined by law once it is shown that the judge or public official has
unlawfully neglected the performance thereof.

Cansino vs. CA, August 21, 2003

It is fundamental that complainants in an ejectment case must allege and prove that
they had prior physical possession of the property before they were unlawfully
deprived thereof by defendants. Respondents, being the complainants before the
lower court, had the burden of proving their claim of prior possession.

Lariosa vs. Bandala, August 15, 2003

Ejectment cases are summary in nature for they involve perturbation of social
order which must be addressed as promptly as possible. Respondent Judge has
acted within the bounds of his authority in issuing the orders for the alias writ of
execution and the alias writ of demolition.

Bustos vs. CA, January 24, 2001

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment
admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the Supreme
Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the
ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as
in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v.
Geronimo, 59 O.G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of
justice (Pascual v. Tan, 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment became final which could render the execution of the
judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners
are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute
the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly
result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when
the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of
sale.

Laurora vs. Sterling, April 9, 2003

We stress that the issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only

when it is intimately intertwined with the issue of possession, to such an extent that
the question of who had prior possession cannot be determined without ruling on
the question of who the owner of the land is. No such intertwinement has been
shown in the case before us. Since respondents' claim of ownership is not being
made in order to prove prior possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or
dwell upon the issue of ownership.

Notwithstanding the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in

possession cannot be ejected by force, violence or terror — not even by the
owners. If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the present
case, the party who proves prior possession — in this case, petitioners — can
recover possession even from the owners themselves.

Granting arguendo that petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property
in question, respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and
summarily or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.

The availment of the aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent

breaches of peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by
claimants out to gain possession. The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the
privileged to take the law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. They
should go to court and seek judicial vindication.

CONTEMPT
Macrohon vs. Ibay, November 30, 2006

Those who don the judicial robe have been reminded time and again that besides
the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate
must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. It has repeatedly been
stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court
must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. A judge who is commanded at
all times to be mindful of his high calling and his mission as a dispassionate and
impartial arbiter of Justice is expected to be "a cerebral man who deliberately holds
in check the tug and pull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he
shares with the rest of his fellow mortals."

Bugaring vs. Español, January 19, 2001

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of
justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge,
as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence,
petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent
judge in issuing the contempt order inside her chamber without giving the
petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an immediate reconsideration.

De Leon vs. CA, February 5, 2004

The general rule is that a corporation and its officers and agents may be held liable
for contempt. A corporation and those who are officially responsible for the
conduct of its affairs may be punished for contempt in disobeying judgments,
decrees, or orders of a court made in a case within its jurisdiction.

Espinosa vs. CA, May 28, 2004

Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and

punished by a fine, a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a
charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and
to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing. The Court of Appeals erred in
summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against
them only constitutes indirect contempt. In cases of indirect contempt, no matter
how palpable the errant's bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid
down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed.

Land Bank vs. Listana, August 5, 2003

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating
them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the
province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt
charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it
was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.

Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for

Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following
reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The
charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion
filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction
to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of
arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.

Robert Remiendo y Siblawan vs. The People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 184874. October 9, 2009

Ponencia: Justice Nachura

A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding

the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of the
fact of birth of a child, and it does not need authentication.

(Evidence, Public document)

Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence,
inasmuch as no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself
by being the subject of a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not
yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious
as rape if what she claims is not true.

What is more, AAA‘s testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal
examination showing healed lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. When the
consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential
requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence to
show any improper motive on the part of the rape victim to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical
conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

(Evidence, Statutory Rape)

Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with
discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of
the crime and the minor‘s cunning and shrewdness.

(RA 9344, Discernment)

Jurisprudence on Forum Shopping

Equitable Phil. Commercial International Bank, et al vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 143556, March 16, 2004

A party is guilty of forum shopping when he repetitively avails of several judicial

remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved
adversely, by some other court. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there
must exist between an action pending in one court and another action before
another court:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.

In the cited cases, we find there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. 6014, Sa Amin, is not a party in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073,
although both Sta. Rosa and petitioners are impleaded as parties in different
capacities. In Civil Case No. 6014 petitioner PCIB (now Equitable-PCIB) is an
intervenor, while Sta. Rosa is the defendant. On the other hand, in Civil Case No.
Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is the plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants.
Apparently, the parties represented different interests in these cases.

Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. In Civil Case No. 6014,
Sta. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where petitioners are
the intervenors, while in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is asserting its right
as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant, now petitioner bank.
Indeed, the two proceedings are far from identical so that a judgment in Civil Case
No. 6014 will not amount to res judicata in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, a matter
we shall discuss later in detail.

Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that
has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have
been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation
between the same parties and for the same cause. 19 For a claim of res judicata to
prosper, the following requisites must concur:

(1) there must be a final judgment or order;

(2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action.

People of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003

Such move clearly constitutes forum-shopping. As held by Candido v. Camacho,

forum-shopping exists "when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial
remedies in different venues, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, all raising
substantially the same issues and involving exactly the same parties."

A becoming regard for this Court should have prevailed upon to await the outcome
of the instant Petition. Making petitioner attend to separate trials is an all too
familiar plaint of prosecutors. This fact does not, however, justify a disregard of
the rule against forum-shopping or relieve petitioner from the negative
consequences of its act. Violation of the forum-shopping prohibition, by itself, is a
ground for summary dismissal of the instant Petition.

Luz E. Taganas, et al. vs. Meliton G. Emuslan, et al., G.R. No. 146980,
September 3, 2003

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.

The elements of res judicata are as follows:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
(4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of
subject matter and cause of action.

For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.

Reynaldo L. Laureano vs. Bormaheco, INC., et al., G.R. No. 137619, February
6, 2001

Upon the claim of forum shopping, the private respondent has listed down a
number of cases filed by the spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Laureano, allegedly
involving the same properties, and is asking this Court to declare the Laureano
spouses guilty of forum shopping. This is the second time that this Court has
encountered this long list of cases, the first instance being in the case of Laureano
Investment and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. Unfortunately, as
in the aforecited case, Bormaheco did not go beyond the enumeration of the cases,
leaving its allegation of forum shopping bare and unsubstantiated. Without any
showing that the cases listed have identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs
sought, neither can we make any valid determination as to whether the rules on
non-forum shopping were violated.

Rufino Valencia vs. Court Of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119118, February 19,
2001

On the issue of forum-shopping, the rule is, there is forum-shopping when as a

result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another and that the actions that were filed involve
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. There must
also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issues in the cases before the
two fora.

The petition for relief in the trial court and the petition for annulment of judgment
in the Court of Appeals emanate from the same transaction, which is the lease
contract between petitioner and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos (RCBM).
They also involve the same facts and circumstances. Recall that upon the execution
of the aforecited contract, petitioner occupied the fishpond where he invested
considerable amount of money. When private respondents filed their complaint for
cancellation of RCBM's title over the fishpond, its possession was removed from
petitioner, who consequently filed an answer in intervention, with counterclaim for
the damages he incurred. The trial court disposed the complaint upholding the
RCBM's title. However, the same court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim. As
petitioner failed to move for reconsideration or appeal the portion of the decision
adverse to him, he filed the petition for relief with the trial court, which in turn
deferred action thereto. Consequently, petitioner filed the petition for certiorari
with annulment of judgment with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, the two actions
resulted from the same facts and circumstances. The two petitions also involve
identical cause of action. Both were for the setting aside or annulment of that
portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing petitioner's counterclaim on the
ground of fraud. The two petitions also involve the same subject matter or issue of
whether petitioner has meritorious counterclaim which, for alleged lack of notice
for the pre-trial conference, he failed to prove. Clearly, there is forum-shopping
and the Court of Appeals did not err when it declared so in its February 10, 1995
resolution.

United Residents of Dominican Hills, Inc. vs. Comm. on the Settlement of

Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001

In the same manner, the plaintiffs in the three (3) different cases were made to
appear as dissimilar: in Civil Case No. 3316-R, the plaintiff was ASSOCIATION
of which private respondent Mario Padilan was head, while the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 3382-R was the BENEFICIARIES. Before the COSLAP, private
respondents themselves were the petitioners, led again by Padilan. 34 Private
respondents also attempted to vary their causes of action: in Civil Case No. 3382-R
and COSLAP Case No. 98-253, they seek the annulment of the Memorandum of
Agreement executed by and among UNITED, the PMS, and HIGC as well as the
transfer certificates of title accordingly issued to petitioner. All three (3) cases
sought to enjoin the demolition of private respondents' houses.

It has been held that forum shopping is evident where the elements of litis
pendentia or res judicata are present. Private respondents' subterfuge comes to
naught, for the effects of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by
varying the designation of the parties or changing the form of the action or
adopting a different mode of presenting one's case.
Marcelo Lee et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118387, October11,
2001

Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity
of parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought. Even a cursory examination
of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against
petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes
of action and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions
filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain
entries in petitioners' birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these
Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in
the criminal complaint against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of
action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the
cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng naturalization certificate which has for its cause of
action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate
deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok
Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents' right under
the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's estate.

We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum
shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in
Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.

Roberto S. Benedicto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4,

2001

For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action
pending in one court and another action before another court:

(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
Here, we find that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on
Treasury Notes held abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and
unrelated laws, Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses,
penalize different acts, and can be applied independently. Hence, no fault lies at
the prosecution's door for having instituted separate cases before separate tribunals
involving the same subject matter.

Virginia Gochan et al vs. Mercedes Gochan et al., G.R. No. 146089, December
13, 2001

Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions

before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there was
no forum-shopping as there was no identity of issues or identity of reliefs sought in
the two petitions.

We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping. The
deplorable practice of forum-shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the
purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort to two different fora to increase his or
her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one. In the case of
Golangco v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the following test to determine
whether there is forum-shopping:

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-

shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a
person who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same
or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.

In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and
issues were raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum shopping cannot
be said to exist in the case at bar.

Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The first
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the
instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by
petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second petition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge
Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further
hearing Civil Case No. CEB-21854.

More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of
Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the
annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs
are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the
issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further
trying the case and to assign a new judge in his stead.

Sps. Angel Sadang vs. CA , G.R. No. 140138. October 11, 2006

This Court fully agrees with the Court of Appeals that there has been a violation of
the rule on forum shopping by the non-disclosure of the filing with an
administrative agency, the HLURB, of a complaint raising the same issues as those
brought before the Regional Trial Court by petitioners herein. For while the
decision of the HLURB may not necessarily constitute res judicata to bar the suit
filed in the Regional Trial Court, so that strictly speaking it is not a lis pendens
relative to the suit filed in court, the purpose of including the words "or agency" in
addition to "any other tribunal" in the non-forum shopping certificate required is to
advise the court of the possible application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
namely, that technical matters such as zoning classifications and building
certifications should be primarily resolved first by the administrative agency whose
expertise relates thereto.

As the Court of Appeals rightly pointed out, petitioner Angel I. Sadang himself
filed the complaint before the HLURB and took the appeal from its decision to the
Office of the President. The non-disclosure of this fact in his non-forum shopping
certification provided sufficient ground to dismiss the complaint. After all, the
dismissal is, as stated in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, "without prejudice."

Marcelina Venzon vs. Sps. Santos, G.R. No. 128308. April 14, 2004

Respondent spouses charge petitioner with violating the rule against forum-
shopping by the simultaneous institution by the latter of the action before the
HLURB with the action before the RTC. Forum-shopping is the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court might look with favor upon the party.
The HLURB Complaint is grounded upon the alleged refusal of the therein
respondent Encarnacion Gonzales to accept payment of the balance of the purchase
price in accordance with the contract to sell between her and petitioner, causing
damage to the latter. It prayed for, among other things, the conveyance of the
subject property to, and an award of damages in favor of, petitioner.

On the other hand, the action before the RTC arose from the purported failure of
the defendant deputy sheriff, in connivance with respondent spouses, to notify
petitioner of the auction sale, for which petitioner suffered damage. It asked for,
among other things, the annulment of the certificate of said sale as well as an
adjudication of damages.

Plainly, the two actions spring from different causes arising from different factual
circumstances and seek different reliefs. The charge of forum-shopping is patently
without merit.

Marina Properties Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. 125447. August 14, 1998

The issue of forum shopping raised by MARINA deserves scant consideration.

H.L. CARLOS was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued MARINA before
the HLURB to enforce their Contract To Purchase and To Sell. Forum shopping is
the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2)
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court might look with favor upon the party. Contrary to
MARINA's, assertion, H.L. CARLOS' complaint was hardly a duplication of Civil
Case. No. 89-5870 which was filed to collect the sum of money corresponding to
unpaid billings from their Construction Contract. The cause of action in the civil
case was, therefore, totally distinct from the cause of action in the complaint before
the HLURB. For this reason, neither could there have been splitting of a cause of
action.

Lorenza Ortega vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125302,
November 16, 1998
Remedial Law, Civil Procedure

FACTS:

The deputy sheriff auctioned the attached real properties of the defendant spouses
Tibajia and awarded it to the highest bidder Lorenza Ortega in the amount of
P448,989.50, credited to fully pay the judgment debt of spouses Tibajia to the
Heirs of Felipe L. Abel.

As the twelve-month redemption period was about to expire, the defendants filed a
motion to lift or set aside the writs of attachment and execution after paying
through Aurora Tibajia Vito the redemption price plus other charges required by
law. On the other hand, petitioner Ortega filed an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for an
Order of New Title and Issuance of Owner's Certificate of Title,", followed by a
"Supplementary Motion for Issuance of New Titles". She also participated in
evidentiary hearings regarding the issue of padded costs in computing the
redemption price.

The trial court ordered petitioner Ortega to accept the payment of redemption
price, and to refund to defendant spouses Tibajia the excess deposit. It also ordered
issuance of the certificate of redemption in favor of the defendants.

Eden Tan (assignee of the Heirs of Felipe L. Abel) and petitioner Ortega
(purchaser at the execution sale) appealed the order. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Ortega‘s petition for lack of locus standi, citing that only parties can
appeal from a final judgment or order of a court pursuant to Sec. 1 Rule 41 and
Sec. 1, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

According to the Court of Appeals, the Brief filed by Eden Tan is styled: 'Felipe L.
Abel substituted by Eden Tan, plaintiff-appellant.‘ This is misleading, it said,
because Felipe L. Abel was never substituted as plaintiff except by his heirs upon
his death. If an order of substitution is needed before the heirs of a deceased party
can become parties in a case, more so in the case of a mere assignee of the interest
of a party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Ortega has the standing to appeal as purchaser in the
execution sale in an order of redemption in favor of the judgment debtors?
HELD:

No, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Admittedly, no formal motion for intervention was filed by petitioner, her

participation being merely confined to filing an "Urgent Ex Parte Motion for an
Order of New Title and Issuance of Owner's Certificate of Title,", followed by a
"Supplementary Motion for Issuance of New Titles" of 12 July 1989, as well as in
the evidentiary hearings regarding the padded costs in the redemption price.

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, ―a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof,‖ may
file a motion for intervention with leave of court with notice upon all the parties to
the action.

Such motion may be allowed or disallowed by the court after considering if the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties, and if the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.

There was no such motion for intervention filed. As such, she was thereby never
recognized as an intervenor. The filing of pleadings incidental to the execution
process did not, ipso jure, give her the legal standing of a party in interest to the
main case.

Petitioner insists that it would be the "quintessence of injustice to deny her the
right to appeal from trial court‘s order." ―Not even a deeply held persuasion in the
righteousness of a cause can justify playing loose with the rules,‖ the Court said.

"Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed."

The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

Peñaverde vs. Peñaverde, GR No. 131141, Oct. 20, 2000

The two cases filed by petitioners are: (1) Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, which seeks
letters of administration for the estate of Mariano Peñaverde; and (2) Civil Case
No. Q-95-24711, which seeks the annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
executed by Mariano Peñaverde and the annulment of titles in his name as well as
the reopening of the distribution of his estate.

Evidently, in filing Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471, petitioners sought to share in the
estate of Mariano, specifically the subject land previously owned in common by
Mariano and his wife, Victorina. This is also what they hoped to obtain in filing
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711.

Indeed, a petition for letters of administration has for its object the ultimate
distribution and partition of a decedent's estate. This is also manifestly sought in
Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, which precisely calls for the "Reopening of
Distribution of Estate" of Mariano Peñaverde. In both cases, petitioners would
have to prove their right to inherit from the estate of Mariano Peñaverde, albeit
indirectly, as heirs of Mariano's wife, Victorina.

Under the circumstances, petitioners are indeed guilty of forum-shopping. When

their appointment as judicial administrators of the estate of Mariano in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-94-19471 was questioned by herein respondent, Bernardita Feranil, 10
petitioners filed the second case, Civil Case No. Q-95-24711, as an alternative
remedy, obviously to fortify their chances of obtaining a share in the same estate.

xxx

In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the parties to Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-19471
and Civil Case No. Q-95-24711 are identical. There is also no question that the
rights asserted by petitioners in both cases are identical, i.e., the right of succession
to the estate of their aunt, Victorina, wife of Mariano. Likewise, the reliefs prayed
for — to obtain their share in the estate of Mariano — are the same, such relief
being founded on the same facts — their relationship to Mariano's deceased wife,
Victorina.
Avelino vs. CA, GR No. 115181, March 31, 2000

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for
the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.

xxx

Petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a
motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial
partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and
should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

http://barops-philjuris.blogspot.com/2008/06/lorenza-ortega-
vs-court-of-appeals.html

EVIDENCE: REPUTATION OF A RAPE VICTIM

PEOPLE vs. HAROLD WALLY CABIERTE

G.R. No. 170477 August 07, 2007

Justice Carpio-Morales

DOCTRINE: The victim‘s character in rape is immaterial.

FACTS:
On complaint of AAA, accused Harold Wally Cabierte, together with Jerry
Macabio and Norbert Viernes, was charged with rape. Upon reinvestigation, the
prosecution found that three crimes of rape were committed by appellant and his
co-accused; hence, two additional informations were filed.

On December 02, 1997, AAA sneaked out of her house to meet her boyfriend. As
she approached the meeting place, she saw a bonfire, a makeshift tent, and five
members of her barkada including all the accused herein. As she whistled to
indicate her presence, her friends invited her to join them which she did. AAA then
asked where her boyfriend was. Viernes told her to wait. She thus conversed with
the group who was engaged in drinking. Subsequently, the accused acted in
concert with each other to rape her. The two held her hands and knees and pinned
her to the ground while the other raped her. Each had their own turns.

All the accused admitted having sexual intercourse with the victim on that night
but denied the commission of rape. According to them, AAA consented to the act.
To bolster this contention, they alleged that AAA had the reputation as a ―pokpok‖
girl, one who is willing to have sexual intercourse with anybody. The trial court
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals upheld the conviction. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reputation of a victim is material in cases of rape?

HELD:
NO. In an attempt to destroy AAA‘s credibility, the defense draws attention to her
supposed reputation as a pokpok girl and her admission that prior to December 2,
1997 she already had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend.

In a further attempt to show that AAA consented to having sexual intercourse with
appellant, the defense cites AAA‘s having lingered with the group despite the
following circumstances: her boyfriend was not around, none of the female
members of the barkada was present, the male members of her barkada were
removing each other‘s pants, and Viernes put the cigarette offered to her at his
crotch.

Assuming that AAA is, indeed, a pokpok girl, it is settled that the victim‘s
character in rape is immaterial. Even the fact that the offended party may have
been of unchaste character constitutes no defense to the charge of rape, provided
that it is proved that the illicit relations described in the complaint was committed
with force and violence.

EVIDENCE: TESTIMONY OF VICTIM IN RAPE CASES

PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO MIRANDA y DOE

G.R. No. 176064 August 07, 2007
Justice Tinga

DOCTRINE: Where the act of rape was done in the presence of a credible witness,
the testimony of the victim is dispensable.

FACTS:
On May 16, 2001, an information for the commission of rape was filed against
Antonio Miranda y Doe. The information alleged that the accused succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with AAA, a 13-year old minor and mentally
incapacitated, against the latter‘s will and consent. Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded not guilty and trial thereon ensued.

During the trial, Lourdes Pante testified for the prosecution. According to her, on
Mar. 16, 2001, she went to the house of the accused looking for her sister, who is
the wife of the accused. Through the bedroom window, she saw appellant lying on
top of AAA. Both were naked and appeared to be having sexual intercourse. Upon
seeing her, the accused pushed AAA aside and both of them immediately dressed
up. Lourdes was shocked with what she saw and upon regaining her composure
asked the accused where her sister was. After answering, Lourdes went out to see
her sister and told the latter what she had witnessed. Subsequently, they reported
the incident to the police which lead to the filing of the information.

On account of her mental condition, the prosecution never presented AAA, the
victim, as a witness. In his defense, the accused denied the allegations and said that
the person with whom he was having sexual intercourse with when Lourdes Pante
saw them was his wife and not the victim. He said that Lourdes Pante concocted
the story to exact revenge against him because of an incident where he confronted
Lourdes for not returning kitchen utensils which she borrowed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was fatal for the prosecution not to have presented the testimony
of the victim?

HELD:
NO. It is of no moment that the prosecution failed to present AAA to testify. The
appellate court correctly held that the testimony of the offended party is of utmost
importance in a rape case because the victim and the accused are the only
participants who can testify as to its occurrence. In the instant case, the incident
was witnessed by Lourdes and her positive testimony carries much greater weight
than appellant‘s mere denial especially since said denial is unsubstantiated

Lourdes‘s testimony as an eyewitness sufficiently established the commission of

the crime and the identity of the perpetrator. She was also positive that it was AAA
and not Anita whom appellant had sex with. It can be fairly believed that she could
not have confused Anita, hew own sister, with AAA, who has been her neighbor
years before the incident. More importantly, Anita was not even presented to refute
Lourdes‘s testimony and to corroborate appellant‘s. Moreover, Lourdes‘s
testimony is corroborated by the physical evidence on record showing that AAA
sustained hymenal lacerations at the 6 o‘clock and 9 o‘clock positions and her
vagina was still bleeding when she was examined. This is definitive proof that
penetration did, in fact, occur. It is well-settled that lacerations, whether fresh or
healed, are the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

[G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005]

CORONA, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against
the private respondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners‘
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On
July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on
July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on
August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was
filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65,
petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. In the
appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of
appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run
only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the
trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of
appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the ―final order‖
appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:

1. What should be deemed as the ―final order,‖ receipt of which triggers the start of
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

2. Did the petitioners file their notice of appeal on time?

HELD:

1. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be
deemed as the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial
court declared petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the
order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise

dismissed ― for having been filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner
should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this
was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed the trial
court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an
order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what
ended the issues raised there. This pronouncement was reiterated in the more
recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the order
denying petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the
SC sustained petitioners‘ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.

2. YES. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow
a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Henceforth, this ―fresh period rule‖ shall also apply to Rule 40,
Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word ―or‖ signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of ―or‖ in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the ―final order,‖ which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of
cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and
the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed
decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process,
minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the RTC‘s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the
order (the ―final order‖) denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse
of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order
denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of
appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.

The ―fresh period rule‖ is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15

days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for
reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of
procedural laws, the ―fresh period rule‖ should be applied to pending actions...
(Sps. Ricardo Delos Santos, et al. Vs. Ma. Socorro V. Vda De Mangubat, et al.,
G.R. No. 149508. October 10, 2007)

CRIMPRO: POWER OF COURTS TO REVIEW FINDINGS IN PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATIONS

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 158131 August 08, 2007

Justice Carpio

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to
review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.

FACTS:
Respondents Jose V. Martel and Olga S. Martel are directors of Systems Encoding
Corporation (SENCOR). In 1998, petitioner SSS filed with the Prosecutor‘s Office
a complaint against respondents for non-payment of contributions covering the
period January 1991 – May, 1997 in violation of RA 1161 as amended by RA
8282. To pay this amount, respondent Martels offered to assign to petitioner a
parcel of land in Tagaytay City. SSS accepted the offer subject to the condition that
Martels will settle their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash
settlement within a reasonable time. Thus, petitioner withdrew its complaint but
reserved its right to revive the same in the event that no settlement is arrived at. In
Dec. 07, 2001, because of their failure to arrive at a settlement, SSS, filed another
complaint with the prosecutor for non-remittance of contributions. The prosecutor
found probable cause in the complaint and filed the corresponding information. In
the meantime, an appeal was filed by respondents with the Department of Justice.
The DOJ granted the appeal and ordered the withdrawal of the information filed
with the court. With their motion for reconsideration denied, SSS filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of
the DOJ. The CA deferred to the DOJ‘s power to review rulings of prosecutors.
Hence, SSS filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts have the power to review findings of prosecutors during
preliminary investigation.

HELD:
YES. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review findings of
prosecutors in preliminary investigations. Although policy considerations call for
the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor‘s findings, courts should never
shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether the prosecutor‘s findings are supported by the facts, or as in this case, by
the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary,
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial
rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Court‘s review
power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the
other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.

CIVPRO: INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK vs. HON. JUDGE REYNALDO ROS

G.R. No. 171532

Justice Chico-Nazario

DOCTRINE: No appeal, under Rule 45 may be taken from an interlocutory order.

FACTS:
Rosemoor Mining Corporation (RMC) obtained a loan from United Overseas Bank
(UNITED) in the amount of 80,000,000 pesos. The parties agreed that 50,000,000
pesos of the amount will be handled by UNITED in behalf of RMC. The loan was
secured by two real estate mortgage contracts covering several pieces of real
property owned by RMC. On Aug. 05, 1998, RMC filed an action for damages,
accounting, release of the balance of the loan and machinery and annulment of
foreclosure sale with the RTC of Manila. The complaint alleged that UNITED
mishandled the 50,000,000 pesos entrusted by RMC. The complaint was amended
to delete annulment of foreclosure sale. Subsequently, UNITED filed its answer
with counterclaim.

On Sept. 29, 2003, UNITED filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It claimed that RMC failed to specify the amount of damages in the
complaint. As a result, the RTC of Manila cannot acquire jurisdiction. The trial
court denied the motion on the ground that UNITED is estopped to raise the issue
having participated in several stages of the proceedings and having invoked the
authority of the court by seeking an affirmative relief. UNITED filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The latter dismiss the petition on the ground that the order
of the trial court is interlocutory which cannot be appealed before judgment is
rendered. Hence, the present petition with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order denying the motion to dismiss is appealable.

HELD:
NO. No appeal, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, may be taken from
an interlocutory order.
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the
commencement and the end of the suit which decides some point or matter but is
not a final decision of the whole controversy

Since an Order denying a Motion to Dismiss does not finally dispose of the case,
and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final adjudication thereof by the
court, then such order is merely interlocutory in nature.
This rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless
appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail
orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested
in a single appeal

However, the aggrieved party is not without remedy under the law after his Motion
to Dismiss the case was denied by the lower court. As stated above, the aggrieved
party may wait for the court a quo to render a judgment or decision and reiterate
such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.

EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF VESSEL‘S LOGBOOK

CRISLYNDON SADAGNOT vs. RENIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL

SHIPPING
G.R. No. 152636 August 08, 2007

Justice Carpio

DOCTRINE: The entries made in the ship‘s logbook by a person performing a

duty required by law are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the book.

FACTS:
Reinier Pacific International Shipping Inc. and its foreign principal Neptune
Shipmanagement Services hired Crislyndon Sadagnot as Third Officer of the
vessel MV Baotrans. The contract was for ten months. While on board MV
Baotrans, the vessel‘s master ordered him to perform hatch stripping, a deck work.
Petitioner refused the order on the ground that it was not related to his duties as
Third Officer. Such refusal was noted by the master in the logbook.

On March 02, 1996, respondents repatriated petitioner to the Philippines. On May

09, 1996, petitioner filed an action for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The
Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was dismissed without observance of due
process. The NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter with modifications as
to the award for damages. On appeal to the CA, the latter ruled that the act of
petitioner is a serious misconduct or willful disobedience. The CA noted that the
repatriation of petitioner was based on a report in the logbook. Hence, this present
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for the CA to rely on the logbook of the vessel.

HELD:
YES. The ship‘s logbook is the official record of a ship‘s voyage which its captain
is obligated by law to keep. It is where the captain records the decisions he has
adopted, a summary of the performance of the vessel, and other daily events. The
entries made in the ship‘s logbook by a person performing a duty required by law
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the logbook.

Petitioner failed to prove that the entry was fabricated by the Master. While
petitioner claimed that the Master entered untruthful reports in the logbook, he also
admitted that he did not obey the Master‘s order and ―even suggested that it would
be better if the hatch stripping shall be performed, as it should, by an able-bodied
seaman.‖ Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in giving weight to the logbook
entry.

October 14, 2005; J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ponente; Third Division

Facts : Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case
for arson pending before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez,
estranged husband of Esperanza Alvarez, sister of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first
witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court on marital disqualification.

Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion,

the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other
witnesses.

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying
Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her testimony from the
records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in the
other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999.

This prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On
May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside
the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue : May Esperanza testify over the objection of her estranged husband on the
ground of marital privilege?

Ruling : Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The
disqualification of a witness by reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as where the marital relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The acts of the petitioner
stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has an
interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the
right to offer the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

July 12, 2007; J. Corona, Ponente; First Division

Facts :

Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married

on July 7, 1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a
bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and
took their three sons with him to Albay and subsequently to Laguna.

Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up
between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.

Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in the Court of
Appeals, alleging that petitioner‘s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived
them of their mother‘s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and
produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned
to her custody.

On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that respondent

was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk,
frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much
of her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother.

He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left,
taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Laguna where he
worked as a tricycle driver.

He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the ―Family Courts Act of 1997‖)
family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for
habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002
but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an
alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioner‘s alcoholism and drug addiction
impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her
and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was
adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the
Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of the two younger sons who
were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of
petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then eight years old, the court ruled
that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special
proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. Hence, this recourse.

Issue :

Whether the CA had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus as

jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under R.A. 8369.

Ruling :

RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over
habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369
reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue
said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with the provisions of RA 7092
(expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and
the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This
is in fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.

In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, he
twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By
giving the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result
in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like the respondent without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of her children. Individuals who do not know the
whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot
seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of RA 8369.

Moreover, under RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus
which may be issued exclusively by the family courts under said law pertain to the
ancillary remedy that may be availed of in conjunction with the petition for
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Salvanera vs. People, G.R. No. 143093

Facts: Petitioner Salvanera, together with Abutin, Lungcay and Tampelix, were
charged with murder. As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged
mastermind; Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle
which carried Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while
Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. The prosecution moved for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix to serve as state witnesses, but the
motion was denied by the court. The CA sustained the prosecution. It discharged
accused Abutin and Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses.

In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the

following conditions must be present, namely:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
Quote:a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the
very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. A
conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any
other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated
by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the
confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that
the witness has told the truth in other respects. It is enough that the testimony of a
co-conspirator is corroborated by some other witness or evidence. In the case at
bar, the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points
by each other‘s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and ―to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest.‖

As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of
the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime. The other
prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none.
No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of
the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link
petitioner to the commission of the crime.

To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of
Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other
requisite that ―there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness.‖

In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction

of the respondent court is limited. The decision to grant immunity from
prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a
tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a
higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute
all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals
who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the
delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the
prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be
prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.

Pilipino Telephone Corporation vs. Tecson, G.R. No. 156966, 7 May 2004;
Vitug, J.; Third Division)

Mr. Tecson applied for six cellular phone subscriptions with PILTEL. The
applications were approved and covered by six mobiline service agreements, all of
which provides: ―Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit
directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber
shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila. Subscriber hereby expressly
waives any other venues.‖

Mr. Tecson filed with the RTC, Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, a complaint against
petitioner for a ―Sum of Money and Damages.‖ PILTEL moved for the dismissal
of the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint was filed in the wrong venue.
Ruling:

Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to
agree and stipulate in writing, before the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue
of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and binding
provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent,
that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into
before the filing of the suit.

The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the ―Mobile Service Agreement,‖ a

standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers, apparently
accepted and signed by respondent, states that the venue of all suits arising from
the agreement, or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship
between PILTEL and subscriber, ―shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro
Manila.‖ The added stipulation that the subscriber ―expressly waives any other
venue‖ should indicate, clearly enough, the intent of the parties to consider the
venue stipulation as being preclusive in character.

CIVPRO: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

AZUCENA B. DON vs. RAMON H. LACSA

G.R. No. 170810 August 07, 2007
Justice Carpio Morales

DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari must be filed only when there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS:
A complaint was filed in the Sangguniang Bayan of Juban, Sorsogon for grave
threats, oppression, grave misconduct and abuse of authority against Ramon Lacsa,
Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon. A special investigation committee,
created to investigate the case, found sufficient evidence for the preventive
suspension of respondent. Accordingly, a resolution was passed recommending his
preventive suspension. Acting on the recommendation, the Mayor slapped a 2
month preventive suspension against respondent.

On Mar. 07, 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution removing

respondent from office. The Mayor issued an executive order implementing the
resolution to remove respondent. Twenty one days after receiving the order,
Ramon Lacsa filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of Sorsogon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper recourse.

HELD:
NO. Respondent should have filed an appeal with the proper body pursuant to Sec.
67 of the Local Government Code. The conditions that would afford respondent to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as he did file one
before the RTC – that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
– are not here present.

CIVPRO: FAILURE TO RAISE LACK OF JURISDICTION AMOUNTS TO

ESTOPPEL

CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. vs. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

G.R. No. 171815 August 07, 2007

Justice Chico-Nazario
DOCTRINE: A party raising lack of jurisdiction may be estopped if he has actively
taken part in the proceedings.

FACTS:
Union Cement Corporation (UCC), a publicly listed company, has two principal
stockholders – UCHC, a non listed company, and petitioner CEMCO. A majority
of UCHC‘s stocks were owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries (BCI) and
Atlas Cement Corporations (ACC). CEMCO holds 9% of UCHC‘s stocks. In July
05, 2004, BCI informed the Philippine Stock Exchange that it and its subsidiary
ACC had passed resolutions to sell to CEMCO all their stocks in UCHC. PSE sent
a letter to SEC to inquire as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under the Securities
Regulation Code would apply. The SEC replied that the transaction is not covered
by the tender offer rule.

On August 12, 2004, the sale of the stocks was consummated and closed. On Aug.
19, 2004, National Life Insurance Co. of the Philippines, a minority stockholder in
UCC filed a complaint with the SEC asking the latter to declare the purchase
agreement void for being violative of the tender offer rule. CEMCO filed a
comment to the complaint. On Feb. 14, 2005, the SEC ruled in favor of National
Life Insurance and declared the transaction to be void for being in violation of the
tender offer rule. CEMCO filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging
the SEC‘s jurisdiction on the ground that the SEC‘s authority is purely
administrative and does not extend to adjudication. The CA upheld the SEC‘s
ruling. It ruled that CEMCO is estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the SEC.
Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CEMCO is estopped in raising lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner did not question the jurisdiction of the SEC when it rendered an
opinion favorable to it, such as the 27 July 2004 Resolution, where the SEC opined
that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the mandatory tender offer rule. It
was only when the case was before the Court of Appeals and after the SEC
rendered an unfavorable judgment against it that petitioner challenged the SEC‘s
competence. As articulated in Ceroferr Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the
court‘s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him.

EVIDENCE: TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM

PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO MANGUBAT

G.R. No. 172068 August 2007

Justice Garcia

DOCTRINE: When a rape victim‘s testimony is straightforward and candid,

unshaken by rigid cross-examinations and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.

FACTS:
On July 20, 1998, 2 separate informations for rape were filed against the accused.
The accused is the common-law husband of the grandmother of the victim,
hereinafter referred to as AAA. In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented in
evidence the oral testimonies of AAA herself and that of Dra. Adelaida Malaluan,
Municipal Health Officer of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro who conducted a
physical examination of the victim, plus documents marked in the course of the
proceedings. For its part, the defense adduced in evidence the testimonies of the
accused himself and that of BBB, the grandmother of the victim and the common-
law wife of the accused. Alibi was the main theory of the defense. Accordingly, at
the time of the alleged incident, the accused was so sick and infirm and was lying
in bed. BBB testified that she even brought the accused to a doctor for a check-up
and was even issued a prescription of medicine. The defense, however, failed to
present the prescription as evidence.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. Hence, this present petition with the
Supreme Court. The accused alleged that the evidence failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not testimony of the rape victim is sufficient to convict the accused?

HELD:
YES. In the review of rape cases where, most often than not, the credibility of the
victim is in issue, the Court consistently relies on the assessment of the trial court.
It has long been held that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
should be viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness
box, and the manner in which they give their testimony. For this reason, the trial
court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears on record some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which that court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter
the outcome of the case. None of the exceptions obtain herein.

It is noteworthy that despite rigid cross-examinations, AAA remained consistent

and categorical in recounting the sordid details of the two (2) incidents of rape
perpetrated against her by appellant. Most importantly, AAA‘s rape on June 13,
1998 was confirmed by the medical findings of the medico-legal officer who
examined her. The rule is that when a rape victim‘s testimony is straightforward
and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examinations and unflawed by inconsistencies
or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.
Hence, the testimony of the rape victim alone is sufficient to convict. More so,
when, as here, such testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of
penetration.

CIVPRO: POWER OF ADJUDICATION

REPUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS vs. JOSE SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 140338 August 07, 2007

Justice Tinga

DOCTRINE: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereon would have no practical use or
value.

FACTS:
The instant petition originated from a derivative suit filed by A2
Telecommunications International Holding Co. (A2 Telecom) and Beauty Fortune
Investments (Beauty) with the Securities Investigation and Clearing Department of
the SEC (SICD). The two are stockholders of Republic Telecommunications
Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). RETELCOM is the holding company of PT&T,
PWI, and Capitol Wireless. The Board of Directors of RETELCOM passed 3
resolutions authorized certain transactions with Qualcomm, Inc, a foreign
corporation and supplier of wireless local loop equipment and facilities which were
needed by PT&T and PWI to comply with the conditions under their legislative
franchises. Petitioners questioned these resolutions through a derivative suit
alleging that the provisions therein are grossly disadvantageous.

The SICD issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction. The matter was
elevated to the Court of Appeals who set aside the orders issued by the SICD and
ordered the latter to proceed with the hearing. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. They submitted a manifestation
stating that Qualcomm had backed out of the deal and was no longer interested in
pursuing the investment. The Court directed the parties to explain why the petition
should not be considered moot and academic.

ISSUE:
Whether or not case has become moot and academic.

HELD:
YES. The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy — one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon
would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although
supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant
case does not fall under the exceptional cases. In those cases, the Court was
persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future
guidance of both bench and bar.

CIVPRO: ADMISSION MADE OUT OF CONTEXT

ROBERTO C. SICAM vs. LULU V. JORGE AND CESAR JORGE

G.R. No. 159617 Aug. 08, 2007

Justice Austria-Martinez
DOCTRINE: If a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, but cites the
admission "out of context," then the one making the "admission" may show that he
made no "such" admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
FACTS:
Lulu V. Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam to
secure a loan in the total amount of 59,500. On Oct. 19, 1987, two armed men
entered the pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside
the pawnshop vault. Roberto R. Sicam, owner of the pawnshop, sent a letter to
Lulu Jorge informing her of the robbery and the lost of her jewelry pawned. Lulu
Jorge responded in a letter dated November 02, 1987, expressing disbelief and
demanded the return of the jewelries. When the same were not returned., Lulu V.
Jorge and her husband, Cesar Jorge filed a complaint against Roberto R. Sicam
seeking indemnification for the loss of the jewelries and payment of actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as atty‘s fees. The complaint was amended to
include Agencia de R.C. Sicam Inc. as defendant considering the fact that the
business was incorporated.

The trial court ruled that Roberto R. Sicam cannot be held personally liable on
account of the separate juridical personality of the corporation. This was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. The CA pierced the veil of corporate personality and
adjudged Roberto R. Sicam liable because of the alleged misrepresentations
consisting in the fact that the receipts of the transaction indicated that the business
is a sole proprietorship and did not reflect the fact that it was already incorporated
at the time of the transaction. Roberto R. Sicam appealed with the Supreme Court
contending among others that the Respondents conclusively asserted in paragraph
2 of their Amended Complaint that Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc. is the present
owner of Agencia de R.C. Sicam Pawnshop, and therefore, the CA cannot rule
against said conclusive assertion of respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is bound to by the admission of respondents in the amended
complaint.

HELD:
NO. Section 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. Thus, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
the party making it and does not require proof, admits of two exceptions, to wit: (1)
when it is shown that such admission was made through palpable mistake, and (2)
when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception
allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission.17
While it is true that respondents alleged in their Amended Complaint that
petitioner corporation is the present owner of the pawnshop, they did so only
because petitioner Sicam alleged in his Answer to the original complaint filed
against him that he was not the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was
incorporated in April 1987. Moreover, a reading of the Amended Complaint in its
entirety shows that respondents referred to both petitioner Sicam and petitioner
corporation where they (respondents) pawned their assorted pieces of jewelry and
ascribed to both the failure to observe due diligence commensurate with the
business which resulted in the loss of their pawned jewelry.

CIVPRO: INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY PREROGATIVES OF

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

DR. JUANITO RUBIO vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 171609 August 17, 2007

JUSTICE SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion
of the Office of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts if necessary. It has been the policy to vest upon the Office of the
Ombudsman wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the
exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints. However, this seemingly
exclusive and unilateral authority of the Ombudsman must be tempered by the
Supreme Court when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for
persecution.

FACTS:
The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Lung Center of the Philippines
conducted an open bidding for its security service. Starforce Security and Allied
Services brought to the attention of petitioner Dr. Juanito Rubio, Assistant
Secretary for Finance and Management of the DOH and the Executive Director of
the Lung Center that Merit Protection Investigation Agency failed to comply with
Memorandum Circular NR. 1, Series of 2001 issued by the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Inc. providing for
standard contract rate for security guard services. Petitioner also noted that Merit‘s
bid proposal was below the standard contract rate provided by the Memorandum
Circular of PADPAO; and that the current rate of monthly salary per guard of
Starforce, the Lung Center‘s incumbent security agency, is more advantageous to
the government. Consequently, the BAC prepared and signed a resolution
awarding the security service of the Lung Center to Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency.

Private respondent Bayani Mira, Operations Officer of Merit, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) against petitioner. The complaint alleges,
among others, that petitioner, in disregarding the results of the public bidding and
entering into a contract of security service with Starforce, caused undue injury to
the government; and conferred to a private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable
negligence. The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan the
corresponding information against petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction in filing an Information against petitioner with the
Sandiganbayan for violation of R.A. 3019.

HELD:
YES.

Under R.A. 3019, what contextually is punishable is the act of causing any undue
injury to any party, or the giving to any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of the public officer‘s functions. The
records disclose that Merit indeed tendered the lowest bid of P12,000 salary per
month for every guard. However, petitioner was justified in not awarding the
security contract to Merit as its bid was below the rate mandated by PADPAO. In
addition, no undue injury could have been suffered by the government when the
Lung Center retained the service of Starforce. It also bears stressing that it was the
BAC which resolved to renew the Lung Center‘s security service contract with
Starforce, while it was the Lung Center‘s Management Committee which decided
to increase the salary rate for each guard. For his part, petitioner merely
implemented the collegial decisions of the BAC and the Management Committee.
Clearly, there is no indication that petitioner violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 to warrant his criminal prosecution. Thus, in filing with the Sandiganbayan
the Information for such violation against petitioner, the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
CIVPRO: LACK OF JURISDICTION AS A GROUND OF ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT

GO KE CHONG, JR. vs. MARIANO CHAN

G.R. No. 153791 August 24, 2007

JUSTICE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

DOCTRINE: The MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases on forcible entry
and unlawful detainer regardless of whether said cases involve questions of
ownership or even if the issue of possession cannot be determined without
resolving the question of ownership. This however is subject to the condition that
the lower court‘s adjudication of ownership in the forcible entry or unlawful
detainer case is merely provisional and the Court‘s affirmance of the lower court‘s
decision would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving
title to the property.

FACTS:
Petitioner Go Ke Chong, Jr. filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages
and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against respondent Mariano Chan before the
MTCC of San Fernando, La Union, claiming that respondent‘s men illegally
fenced off Lot No. 553, and demolished the building and improvements
constructed by petitioner thereon, depriving him of lawful physical possession
thereof. He claims that he is the lawfully declared owner and possessor of the lot
by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership/Possession and an Affidavit of Declaration
of Facts which he both executed in 1998 and registered with the Register of Deeds.
He also asserts that he has been actually and physically occupying the lot.
Respondent on the other hand asserted that he inherited from his father the 538-sq
m lot, of which the disputed property is part; in 1987 he and petitioner entered into
a lease contract over the property; and when respondent no longer wanted to renew
the lease, petitioner, in a desperate attempt to keep the property, surreptitiously
executed an Affidavit of Ownership/Possession claiming ownership over a portion
of the leased property; respondent subsequently filed a case for Illegal Detainer
against petitioner, and judgment was rendered, ordering petitioner to vacate the
property and demolish the building therein; the RTC affirmed the said decision and
a writ of execution was issued. In moving for the dismissal of the complaint,
respondent also pointed out that there is another action for quieting of title and
cancellation of tax declaration pending between the parties.
The MTCC rendered a decision dismissing petitioner‘s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner‘s Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the MTCC erred in dismissing his complaint for forcible entry on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes.

Even when the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately
interwoven, such fact will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer based on jurisdictional grounds. In forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the MTC, nonetheless, has the undoubted competence to
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining
the issue of possession.

In the present case, the MTCC held in its decision that since ―the question of
possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership,
because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, (then) the case should be
dismissed, for the inferior court loses jurisdiction over the same.‖ Finding that the
MTCC erred in dismissing petitioner‘s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, it is thus proper to remand the case to the MTCC for it to rule on the
merits of the complaint for forcible entry.

CIVPRO: DISMISSAL OF ACTION ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS

HEIRS OF MIGUEL MADIO vs. HENRY LEUNG

G.R. No. 169161 August 17, 2007

JUSTICE GARCIA

DOCTRINE: Judicial action by a party-litigant must be given the fullest

opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. This rule rings true in
administrative proceedings where technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.

FACTS:
The Director of Lands issued in favor of respondent Henry Leung an Order of
Award over Lot No. 8 in Baguio Townsite. Protestants Madio, Quiambao, Perposi
and Capiao filed a protest for the cancellation of the Order of Award. Records
show that the initial hearing for the investigation of the Bureau of Lands on the
protest was reset upon request of Leung‘s counsel, Atty. Leon Dacanay. On the re-
scheduled date, only Madio and his counsel, Atty. Hector Donato appeared for the
protestants. Atty. Dacanay moved for dismissal of the protest for non-appearance
of the other protestants, while Atty. Donato asked for postponement. The Land
Investigator granted the motion for postponement. On the next hearing, Atty.
Edilberto Tenefrancia, counsel for the other protestants entered his special
appearance for Atty. Donato and asked for postponement, to which Atty. Dacanay
interposed no objection. Accordingly, the hearing was reset with the warning that
no further request for postponement would be entertained. On the next hearing,
only Atty. Dacanay appeared for hearing. He moved for the dismissal of the protest
for failure to prosecute the same. Accordingly, the Land Investigator cancelled the
other scheduled hearing and recommended the dismissal of the protest. The
District Land Officer forwarded the case to the Regional Land Officer of the
Bureau of Lands, who in turn issued an order, directing that the protest and claim
of the claimants-protestants be dropped and that they vacate the premises within 60
days from the date of their receipt of said order.

Madio filed a petition with the Bureau of Lands opposing the award of Lot No. 8 to
Leung, but the petition was not be given due course. Madio filed another petition,
this time with the Office of the Secretary of DENR, and for reopening of the case,
alleging the he has preferential right to Lot No. 8. Ricardo Umali, OIC-Secretary,
DENR, rendered a decision for Madio. Aggrieved, Leung elevated the case to the
Office of the President (OP). However, his appeal was dismissed on the ground
that no appeal memorandum has been filed by Leung as of the last day for filing
the same. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Leung took recourse
with the CA by way of a petition for review. The CA rendered a decision, granting
the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the OP erred in dismissing Leung‘s appeal from the DENR‘s decision on
the ground that no appeal memorandum has been filed by Leung as of the last day
for filing the same.
HELD:

YES.

Leung did file the required memorandum as found by the CA. Leung‘s file copies
of said documents clearly bear stamp markings indicating receipt by the OP Legal
Office. The OP‘s dismissal action has thus no factual support. But assuming that
the necessary documents were indeed not filed, the imperatives of fair play would
have impelled the OP to ask for an explanation, instead of proceeding with its
outright dismissal action based on technicality, given that Leung‘s case appears to
be prima facie meritorious. Dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.
The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense
for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.

MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

CORP., INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO
GR No. 140717
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Annie, Anne Marie, James John, James Francis and Anne Margareth
Manubay and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation owned a 124-
hectare land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage
placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP).
Petitioners did not protest the notice.

In Jul 1996, petitioners filed an application at the Department of Agrarian Reform

(DAR) for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. On August
26, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving the Pili
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from
agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use.
Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the
November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified
and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was
denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage
which must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption.
Respondent Ernesto Garilao, then DAR Secretary, denied petitioners‘ application
for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the
CARP.

In April 1998, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application.
According to them, the issuance of a mere notice of coverage placing agricultural
land under the CARP was not a ground for the denial of such application.

The CA dismissed the petition, holding that since the issue raised by petitioners
involved the administrative implementation of the CARP, the Office of the
Prsident (OP) was more competent to rule on the issue. Moreover, by failing to
bring the matter to the said office, petitioner did not exhaust all available
administrative remedies before resorting to a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not the act of a department secretary may be directly

challenged in a petition for certiorari.

HELD:

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter
egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the
latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party
affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may
file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the
said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari
to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown

that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such
abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public
respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or
hostility.

Here, inasmuch as respondent had a valid ground to deny petitioners‘ application,

he did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997
requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the OP. It was the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an
administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority
before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be
dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 164170
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

At about 10:00 in the morning of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were

cruising on board a vehicle along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan
bumped their vehicle from behind. When they went out of their vehicle to assess
the damage, several armed men, herein respondents (Police officers Michael
Angelo Martin, Allanjing Medina, Arnold Asis, Pedro Gutierrez, Ignacio De Paz
and Antonio Berida, Jr., who were assigned at the Northern Police District)
alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at petitioners, blindfolded, and forced
them to ride in the car. Petitioners were brought to an office where P10,000,000
and two vehicles were demanded from them in exchange for their freedom. After
haggling, the amount was reduced to P700,000 plus the two vehicles. The money
and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11 September 2001; they were
released in the early morning of 12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed
the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles.

The State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation, and issued a

Resolution dated 14 January 2002, recommending that the accused be indicted for
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Resolution was endorsed for approval by
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and approved by Chief State Prosecutor.

On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold
Departure Order and on even date, issued a Warrant of Arrest against all the
accused. Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of
the Resolution of State Prosecutor with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. On
18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the
ground that the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so.

In an Order dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the motion to quash on
the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao, an accused who is at large is
not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and
power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA
6770), as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are
not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the
authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and
prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.

In a Resolution promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice

Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to
cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom.
The Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the Office of the
Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping was filed with the trial court.
He also found that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation,
not kidnapping for ransom.

ISSUES:

(1.) Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is
required for the investigation and prosecution of the instant case against the
accused;

(2.) Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State
Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an ―executive acquittal;‖

(3.) Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the
information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet; and

(4.) Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

HELD:

On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of
the case against the accused policemen

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of
Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not
required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused policemen. The OSG correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, where the Court held that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. In
view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice
clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.

On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor

Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review
resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in
court. In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul forecloses the power
or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in
criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The
nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was
explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of
justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct
control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify,
reverse or modify their rulings.

Contrary to petitioners‘ contention, the Secretary of Justice‘s reversal of the

Resolution of State Prosecutor did not amount to ―executive acquittal‖ because the
Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which included the
power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its
continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are not bound
by the Secretary of Justice‘s reversal of the prosecutor‘s resolution finding
probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own assessment of the
existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the evaluation by the
Secretary of Justice.

On the motion to quash the information when the accused had not been arrested yet

People v. Mapalao correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the
present case. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to
quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior
to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the
information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the
accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

At any rate, the accused‘s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of
the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the
Ombudsman‘s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government.

On the existence or non-existence of probable cause

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its
duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction. However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining
the records of the preliminary investigation.
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied; and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial
court, any disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court.
The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of
probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
amounts to an abdication of the trial court‘s duty and jurisdiction to determine the
existence of probable cause.

http://phbar.org/forum/viewforum.php?f=22&sid=c3e75f4844ec1b670b42588f0be
7df9e

2006 Remedial Law Case Digests

CIVIL PROCEDURE

MIGUELITO LIMACO, ET AL. VS. SHONAN GAKUEN CHILDREN'S

HOUSE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 158245. June 30, 2005

Facts: Petitioners are the registered owners of three parcels of agricultural land.
They entered into a Contract of Sale with respondent and agreed that "in the event
that the parties herein are unable to effect the transfer and sale of the said
properties in whole or in part in favor of the vendees, all the paid-in amounts shall
be applied to another similar property also owned by the vendors in substitution of
the above-described properties."
Pursuant to the contract, respondent corporation paid the down payment however;
it refused to remit any monthly installment due to petitioners' failure to obtain a
clearance and/or approval of the sale of the subject land from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). Respondent demanded that petitioners either solve the
problem with the land tenants or substitute the lots with another acceptable,
suitable and untenanted land, pursuant to their agreement.
Petitioners informed respondent that they were ready to finalize the transaction in
accordance with the legal opinion of the DAR. In a letter, respondent informed
petitioners that the scheme proposed in the DAR Opinion was "far from
acceptable." Respondent offered to purchase the property on a direct sale basis.
Petitioners did not respond to respondent hence, the latter, through counsel,
requested the return of its down payment. As petitioners did not acquiesce,
respondent filed a complaint for rescission with damages with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati. As a countermove, petitioners filed the instant case for
specific performance with the RTC of Laguna.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners
opposed contending that the instant complaint for specific performance was served
on respondent ahead of the service of the complaint for rescission on petitioners.
Later, however, respondent withdrew its motion to dismiss in view of the order of
the RTC of Makati dismissing the complaint for rescission. In its Answer with
Counterclaim, respondent alleged by way of affirmative defense that "specific
performance is not possible because the respondent had already bought another
property which is untenanted, devoid of any legal complications and now
converted from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose in accordance with DAR
Administrative Order.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint considering
respondent's special defense that specific performance was no longer possible.
They prayed that their complaint and respondent's counterclaim be ordered
withdrawn or dismissed, arguing that respondent's counterclaim would have no leg
to stand on as it was compulsory in nature.

Issue: Whether respondent's counterclaim should be dismissed.

Held: There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance
of the plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is
filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been
served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court
when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage
of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice
of plaintiff without need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority
of the court before dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the
dismissal of an action, the effect of the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant
should always be taken into consideration.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioners filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint after respondent already filed its answer with counterclaim. In fact, the
reason for their motion for withdrawal was the special defense of respondent in its
answer that substitution was no longer possible as it already bought another
property in lieu of the subject lots under the contract. It is, therefore, inexplicable
how petitioners could argue that their complaint was successfully withdrawn upon
the mere filing of a Motion to Withdraw Complaint when they themselves alleged
in this petition that "private respondent objected to the withdrawal and the Trial
Court sustained the objection."

LUCIANO ELLO and GAUDIOSA ELLO, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS ET

AL.
G.R. No. 141255. June 21, 2005

Facts: Respondent Springfield Development Corporation is the owner and actual

possessor of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-92571,
while respondent Constantino Jaraula is the owner and actual possessor of a
covered by TCT No. T-63088, both situated at Cagayan de Oro City. The two lots
adjoin each other and were originally parts of a 12-hectare lot which has been
developed by respondents as the Mega Heights Subdivision. Sometime in 1996,
petitioner spouses Luciano and Gaudiosa Ello and their hired personnel
surreptitiously and stealthily occupied respondents‘ lots, built a make-shift shed
under the trees, and fenced the area they occupied. Respondents then demanded
that petitioners and their hired personnel vacate the area but they refused. Instead,
they threatened and prevented respondents from developing their lots into a
subdivision. Thus, respondent Springfield Development Corporation and
Constantino G. Jaraula, filed a complaint against them for forcible entry with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed outright petitioners‘ petition for review on the sole technical ground that
it does not contain the affidavit of service as required by Section 11 in relation to
Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Held: Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
prescribe two modes of filing and service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders,
judgments and other papers. These are: (a) by personal delivery, governed by
Section 6 of the same Rule; and (b) by mail, under Section 7 thereof.
However, Section 11 of Rule 13 requires that ―whenever practicable,‖ the filing of
pleadings and other papers in court, as well as the service of said papers on the
adverse party or his counsel, must be done ―personally.‖ But if such filing and
service were through a different mode, the party concerned must submit a ―written
explanation‖ why they were not done personally.
There is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to
append the affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners, upon receipt of the Court of Appeals‘ challenged Resolution
dismissing outright their petition due to such omission, promptly filed a motion for
reconsideration, readily acknowledging their procedural lapse and attaching
therewith the required affidavit of service. Rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure.

EXECUTION OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT; DELAY BY ONE PARTY

JUSTIFIES EXECUTION

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS. ALA INDUSTRIES

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 147349. February 13, 2004

Facts: The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT
building of the NAIA airport was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent
ALA. Respondent made the necessary repair and waterproofing.
After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received
partial payments. Progress billing remained unpaid despite repeated demands by
the respondent. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the contract on the
ground that respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion
date.
Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its
claims. The trial court directed the parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties
executed a compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion for judgment
based on the compromise agreement. The Court a quo rendered judgment
approving the compromise agreement.
For petitioner‘s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a
motion for execution to enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed
the delays to its being a government agency. The trial court denied the
respondent‘s motion. Reversing the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of
execution to enforce respondent‘s claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a
judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement was immediately
executory, and that a delay was not substantial compliance therewith.
Issues: 1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and
executory.

2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution.

Held: 1) A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of
res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgery. Hence, a decision on a compromise agreement is final and
executory. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the
parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties
thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with
the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement
and enforce it.
2. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the
Agreement. Thus, non-fulfillment of the terms of the compromise justified
execution. It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a fortuitous
event its delayed payment. Petitioner‘s explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion
that borders callousness.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; ISSUANCE OF TRO EX-PARTE;

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; DUE PROCESS; PRESUMPTION OF COLD
NEUTRALITY OF A JUDGE

BAILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG

G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004

Facts: Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the civil case for
injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira Pangadapun questioning the legality of
Marohombsar‘s appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the DSWD-
ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun used to occupy said position.
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the
hearing on the application for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was also served on
both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO.
Pangadapun was given the time to comment. Respondent judge issued an order
stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had
waived the raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of injunction. The judge gave another time to file her comment
again.
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it
submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction. Hence, this
complaint for gross ignorance of law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming
a judge.

Issues: 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant case.

2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due process.

3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Held: 1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is
intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting a temporary
injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo
until that determination. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex
parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice
and hearing before injunction may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being
doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. It is a rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied
due process when he was given the opportunity to present his position.
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts
in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or any other member of the
bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that
preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the
guarantee of due process.

SERVICE OF SUMMONS, SUBSTITUTED SERVICE; SEVICE BY

PUBLICATION; ACTIONS IN REM; ACTIONS QUASI IN REM

SPOUSES PATRICK AND RAFAELA JOSE VS. SPOUSES HELEN AND

ROMEO BOYON
G.R. No. 147369. October 23, 2003
Facts: Petitioners lodged a complaint for specific performance against respondents
to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. The RTC issued a summons to respondents. As per return of
the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
because efforts to serve personally to re respondents failed. Meanwhile, petitioners
filed before the RTC an ex parte motion for leave of court to effect summons by
publication and the judge issued an order granting the same. The respondents were
declared in default and as a consequence of the declaration of default, petitioners
were allowed to submit their evidence ex parte.
Helen Boyon, who was then in United Sates, was surprised to learn from her sister
of the resolution issued by the court. Respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion
questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the
court a quo. The court issued an order denying the said motion on the basis of the
defaulted respondent supposed loss of standing in court. Once again, the
respondents raised the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration and the same was denied. The petitioners moved for the execution
of the controverted judgment which the judge granted.
Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari which held that
the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned resolution and orders.

Issue: Whether or not summons by publication can validly serve in the instant case.

Held: In general, courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the
service of summons, such service may be done personal or substituted service,
where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines. However,
extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when
the action is in rem or quasi in rem. That is, the action against the thing itself
instead of against the defendant‘s person if the action is in rem or an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose is to subject the individual‘s interest in a piece
of property to the obligation or loan burdening it if quasi in rem.
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue. Moreover,
court has consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action
in personam. Hence, summons by publication cannot be validly served.

JURISDICTION; RTC

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. COURT OF

APPEALS
386 SCRA 67. August 1, 2002

Facts: Private respondent Manuel Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court a
complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal
Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection
of unpaid rentals.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent.

Held: RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint. The averments in the complaint
reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one for specific
performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would
incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject
contract of lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner‘s failure to pay
rentals due for the period from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of
their contract which had the effect of accelerating the payment of monthly rentals
for the years 1997 and 1998. Clearly, the action for specific performance,
irrespective of the amount of the rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence, cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

CRIM PRO

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
SPO4 EDUARDO ALONZO VS. JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 12, Province of
Bulacan
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1879. January 17, 2005

Facts: In a wedding party, SPO4 Eduardo Alonzo, Jun Rances, Zoilo Salamat and
Rey Santos were drinking together at the same table. While waiting to be seated,
Pedrito Alonzo was introduced by SPO4 Alonzo to Rances as his nephew and as
the son of ex-Captain Alonzo. SPO4 Alonzo then introduced him to Salamat.
Pedrito and his companions took their seats and started drinking at the table across
SPO4 Alonzo‘s table. After some time, Pedrito stood up to urinate at the back of
the house. Santos passed a bag to Salamat, and they followed Pedrito. Rances
likewise followed them. A shot rang out. Salamat was seen placing a gun inside the
bag as he hurriedly left. The wedding guests ran after Salamat. They saw him and
Rances board a vehicle being driven by Santos. Pedrito‘s uncle, Jose Alonzo,
sought the help of SPO4 Alonzo to chase the culprits. He refused and even
disavowed any knowledge as to their identity.
Jose Alonzo filed a complaint for murder against Salamat, Rances, Santos, SPO4
Alonzo and a certain Isidro Atienza. A preliminary investigation1 was conducted
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor where Jose Alonzo and his four witnesses
testified. Upon review of the records of the case by the 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, it was recommended that Salamat be charged with murder as principal,
and Santos and Rances as accessories. With regard to SPO4 Alonzo and Isidro
Atienza, the prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence was adduced to establish
their conspiracy with Salamat. Judge Concepcion of the RTC issued an Order
directing the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information, so as to
include all the aforenamed persons as accused in this case, all as principals.

Issue: Whether or not the court has authority to review and reverse the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor or to find probable cause against a
respondent for the purpose of amending the Information.

Held: The function of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether there is

sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the prosecutor
determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution
of a case. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor's discretion and
control of the criminal prosecution. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution
under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. However, while prosecuting officers have the
authority to prosecute persons shown to be guilty of a crime they have equally the
legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation, the evidence adduced is not
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the prosecutor
who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the accused, that of the
prosecutor's should normally prevail.

MELBA QUINTO VS. DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO

G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
Facts: An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court that the accused
Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco, conspiring, confederating, and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
and maul Wilson Quinto inside a culvert where the three were fishing, causing
Wilson Quinto to drown and die. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence
which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also
held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the
absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson‘s death. The
petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil aspect of
the case was concerned. The CA ruled that the acquittal in this case is not merely
based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did
not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and
settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a
criminal action bars the civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of
acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the criminal acts imputed to them.

Issue: Whether or not the extinction of respondent‘s criminal liability carries with
it the extinction of their civil liability.

Held: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter
him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from
society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The
sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or indemnification of
the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. In this case, the petitioner
failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the
deceased and as held by the the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the
respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the
respondents for damages.
SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO
QUESTION LEGALITY OF SEARCH; EVIDENCE IN ILLEGAL SEARCH

PEOPLE VS. BENHUR MAMARIL

G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004

Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant
authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Benhur.
During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected
marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and
prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was properly
searched which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search.
After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles
to the PNP station. After weighing the specimens and testing the same, the PNP
Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the specimens to be positive to the test
for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the person who conducted the
examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the
same.
Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent‘s house since he has been
residing at a rented house and declared that it was his brother and the latter‘s
family who were residing with his mother, but on said search operation, his brother
and family were out. He testified that he was at his parent‘s house because he
visited his mother, that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time
during the trial and admitted that the signature on the certification that the house
was properly search was his.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.

2) Whether or not the accused-appellant waived his right to question the legality of
the search.

3) Whether or not evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search be used as evidence

against the accused.

Held: 1) The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of

probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of
probable cause, it is required that: 1) The judge must examine the complaint and
his witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; 3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put
into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses on the form of
searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. Such written
examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine
the existence and non-existence of probable cause. Therefore, the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by failure of the judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the examination in writing and attaching to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
2) At that time the police officers presented the search warrant, appellant could not
determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with law. It was only
during the trial that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the
search warrant was illegally issued. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on
constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said
warrant during the trial, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under
the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his
conduct before or during the trial.
3) No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. The requirement mandated by the law
that the examination of the complaint and his witnesses must be under oath and
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not
complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence
seized pursuant to illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2) Article III of the Constitution.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON; MOTION TO QUASH; ARREST

WITHOUT WARRANT

PEOPLE VS. CRISPIN BILLABER

G.R. No. 114967-68. January 26, 2004

Facts: Private complainant Elizabeth Genteroy was introduced to accused Crispin

Billaber by her friends. The accused told Genteroy that he could help her acquire
the necessary papers and find her a job abroad. Genteroy introduced the accused to
Raul Durano. The accused offered Durano a job as his personal driver in the U.S.
Durano and Genteroy paid the accused and asked for receipt, but the accused said
that it was not necessary since they will leave together.
Meanwhile, Genteroy introduced the accused to Tersina Onza and offered a job
abroad. Thereafter, the accused instructed the three private complainants,
Genteroy, Durano and Onza to meet him at the airport on the agreed date, however,
the accused failed to show up.
Durano chanced upon the accused at the canteen. A commotion ensued when
Durano tried to stop the accused from leaving. A police officer brought both
Durano and the accused to the PNP station. The prosecution offered in evidence a
certificate from the POEA stating that the accused was not licensed or authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad. The accused denied receiving money
from private complainants and interposed a defense of frame-up and extortion
against Durano.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering that the accused
arrested without warrant.

2) Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held: 1) It appears that accused-appellant was brought to the police station,

together with the complainant Durano, not because of the present charges but
because of the commotion that ensued between the two at the canteen. At the
police station, Durano and the other complainants then executed statements
charging appellant with illegal recruitment and estafa. As to whether there was an
actual arrest or whether, in the commotion, the appellant committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit an offense, have been rendered moot.
2) Appellant did not allege any irregularity in a motion to quash before entering his
plea, and is therefore deemed to have waived any question of the trial court‘s
jurisdiction over his person.

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

PEOPLE VS. NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG

G.R. No. 144037, Sept.ember 26, 2003

Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of
marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry
a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the
two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box,
beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in
newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what
seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged
with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed
the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime
charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly
obtained.

Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise such ―search and seizure‖ becomes reasonable within
the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the
following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a
moving vehicle, 4) Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and
frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is
that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.
Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation
of the accused‘s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

CIVIL ACTION ARISING FROM DELICT; EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL ON THE

CIVIL ASPECT; EFFECT OF GRANT OF DEMURRER ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF THE CASE

ANAMER SALAZAR VS. PEOPLE AND J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING

CORP.
G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers
Marketing. As payment for these, she gave a check drawn against the Prudential
Bank by one Nena Timario. J.Y. accepted the check upon the petitioner‘s
assurance that it was good check. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored
because it was drawn under a closed account. Upon being informed of such
dishonor, petitioner replaced the check drawn against the Solid Bank, which,
however, was returned with the word ―DAUD‖ (Drawn against uncollected
deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court. The trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of
the crime charged but ordering her to pay, as payment of her purchase. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with
a plea that she be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court, but the court denied the motion.

Issues: 1) Does the acquittal of the accused in the criminal offense prevent a
judgment against her on the civil aspect of the case?
2) Was the denial of the motion for reconsideration proper?

Held: 1) The rule on the Criminal Procedure provides that the extension of the
penal action does not carry with it the extension of the civil action. Hence, the
acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect
of the case where a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; b) where the court declared that the liability
of the accused is only civil; c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
2) No, because after an acquittal or grant of the demurrer, the trial shall proceed for
the presentation of evidence on the civil aspect of the case. This is so because
when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspect of the case. The only evidence on
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to set
the case for continuation of the trail for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect and for the private offended party adduce evidence by way of rebuttal
as provided for in Sec.11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Otherwise, it would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated.

AMENDED RULES ON DEATH PENALTY CASES‘ REVIEW

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004

Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-
daughter Imelda Mateo. During the trial, Imelda‘s testimonies regarding the rape
incident were inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened
inside her bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their
sala. She also told the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when
asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the
victim, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual
findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of the appellant.
Issue: Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court.
Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment,
or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to
determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the
evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an
error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing
the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering
judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its
final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally
vested in the Supreme Court –
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
―(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.‖
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The
rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125,
and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme
Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in ―Internal Rules of the Supreme Court‖
in cases similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified
accordingly.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC

RE: AMENDMENTS TO THE

REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TO GOVERN DEATH PENALTY CASES

RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court‘s consideration and approval the Proposed Amendments
to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The amendment shall take effect on October 15, 2004 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than September 30, 2004
September 28, 2004
_____________________________________
AMENDED RULES TO GOVERN REVIEW OF
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Rule 122, Sections 3 and 10, and Rule 124, Sections 12 and 13, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, are amended as follows:
RULE 122
Sec. 3. How appeal taken – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof
upon the adverse party.
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.
(c) The appeal in cases whereby the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for
offenses committed on the same occasion on the or which arose out of the same
occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court
imposed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the
judgment as provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
xxx
RULE 124
Sec. 12. Power to receive evidence. – The Court of Appeals shall have the power
to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform all acts necessary
to resolve the factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate
jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings. Trials or hearing in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and
must be completed within three months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
(12a)
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. – (a) Whenever the
Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall
render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and forthwith
certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on
the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more severe offense for which the penalty is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such
penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
file with the Court of Appeals. (13a)

EVIDENCE

EVIDENCE

INOCELIA S. AUTENCIO VS. CITY ADMINISTRATOR, RODEL M.

MAÑARA ET AL.
G.R. No. 152752. January 19, 2005

Facts: City Administrator Rodel M. Mañara lodged a complaint against petitioner

Inocelia S. Autencio with the Office of the City Mayor for dishonesty and
misconduct in office. The complaint alleged that Riza Bravo, an employee of the
City Assessor‘s Office charged with the preparation of the payroll of casual
employees, changed the September 1996 payroll prepared by her upon the order of
petitioner. After hearing, the Office for Legal Services issued a resolution/decision,
declaring the petitioner guilty of misconduct in office for allowing irregularities to
happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. However, as regards to
the charge of dishonesty, the same was found wanting due to insufficiency of
evidence. A penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except for earned leave accumulated before the filing of the complaint was
imposed. In return, petitioner alleged that she had waived her right to present her
evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case for resolution, only
because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she
could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence.

Issue: Was the petitioner deprived of substantial due process?‖

Held: Petitioner was afforded due process. On the formal charge against her, she
had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her
defense. She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted
Affidavits of personnel in the Assessor‘s Office to support her claim of innocence.
A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she --
assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the
ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.
Finally, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an
administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. It is not the task of this Court to weigh once more the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any
event, the Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty
of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial
evidence.

TURADIO C. DOMINGO VS. JOSE C. DOMINGO ET AL.

G.R. No. 150897. April 11, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Turadio Domingo is the oldest of the five children of the late
Bruno B. Domingo, formerly the registered owner of the properties subject of this
dispute. Private respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro, Nuncia Domingo-Balabis,
Abella Domingo, and Jose Domingo are petitioner‘s siblings. A family quarrel
arose over the validity of the purported sale of the house and lot by their father to
private respondents. Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the
disputed property, received a notice, declaring him a squatter. Petitioner learned of
the existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was
filed against him. Subsequently, he had the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or PNP)
Crime Laboratory compare the signature of Bruno on the said deed against
specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned
Document Report to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard
signatures were written by two different persons Thus; petitioner filed a complaint
for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private individuals
against his siblings. But after it conducted an examination of the questioned
documents, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the
conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen signatures were written
by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. Consequently, petitioner
instituted a case for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance
of the disputed property, and cancellation of TCT.

Issue: Whether or not the court errs when it held that the trial court correctly
applied the rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI
questioned document reports.

Held: Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the
credibility of the respondent‘s witnesses below should be disturbed. Findings by
the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect,
and even finality by appellate courts, since the former is in a better position to
observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial.
Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized
document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
expressed. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all
these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.
Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this case.

EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo

Oculam‘s regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990
issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first
week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990
issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136,
post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason ―CLOSED ACCOUNT‖; when the Ladonga spouses
failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because
there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses
claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they mature; and, that
petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three
checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter‘s account could
be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that ―a
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.‖ To be held guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of
the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving
them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be
attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued.
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal
design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES

G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-

appellant of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No.
152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-
appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
and instead, we adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld
the ruling of the court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding
accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we
sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of

lasciviousness.
Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find
no sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when
the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand,
Article 366 of the Revised Penal Code states: ―(a)ny person who shall commit any
act of lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision
correccional.‖ As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of
lasciviousness have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference
between the two. In rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this
element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling
events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of
private complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter
intended to ravish his very own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private
complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover
of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private complainant‘s)
clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was
similarly naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he
likewise touched her breasts until finally, he rendered private complainant
unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts of accused-
appellant constitute ―the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.‖ Far from
being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts executed in
order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private complainant.

SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City,
against the petitioner and Ramos who were then the managing editor and
correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local weekly newspaper
circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th
day of August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay,
Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate, Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the
Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused who are
the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly
newspaper Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
without justifiable motive and with malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting
and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and reputation of the complainant
as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization and
concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to
public hatred, ridicule and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of
the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM throughout the Bicol Region, with
banner headline and front page news item read by the public throughout the Bicol
Region ―VILLAFUERTE‘S DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE‖. The trial court
found the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of
the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.

Held: No. Libel is defined as ―a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a

vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.‖ The law
recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as
absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the
existence of malice in fact. The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly
or conditionally privileged communications which, unlike the first classification,
may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes the
presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code fall into this category. The interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. Rising superior to
any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the
Judiciary – to any or all the agencies of Government – public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime
of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under
Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged
under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A.
ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President
and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their
positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration,
while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating with
MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative
Officer V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals,
the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency,
which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of
secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service .Appellant‘s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in
its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellant‘s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed
upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas
innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant‘s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is

present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on
Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon
appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all
charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public
use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed
an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its
employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to
under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for
a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers‘ wages
enjoy as claims against the employers‘ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that
conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan‘s improper reliance on Sec.
5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution‘s deficiency in proving
the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the
constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal
intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant‘s conviction. 2. The Court notes
that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of
technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been
appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the
Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school
teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot
be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in
RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials
only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

ENRIQUE ―TOTOY‖ RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an

information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as
follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one
Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there
challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said
policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually
engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted
petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of
conviction rendered by the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways:
first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining
the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
Unquestionably, petitioner‘s case falls under the second mode, which is the more
common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with
a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said
time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here,
of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance,
are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE

SELF-DEFENSE

CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened
by his wife Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her
husband, viz: ―You ought to be killed, you devil.‖ So Romeo stood up and peeped
to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the
road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo
which was more that 1 foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized
him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970‘s and whose face he
clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on
hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body, including ears and the head.
While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him
with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he
sustained 11 wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner‘s plea of self-
defense and convicted him of frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the
person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the
unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby submitted
having deliberately caused the victim‘s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to
him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the weakness of that of
the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the
victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim‘s wounds belie the petitioner‘s claim
that the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could
not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had
injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to
defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.

BIGAMY; ELEMENTS, EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF NULLITY

OFSECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; PENALTY

VERONICO TENEBRO VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

Facts: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together
continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes
on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going
to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes
confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial,
Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?

Held: (1) Yes, petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The prosecution sufficient evidence, both documentary and
oral, proved the existence of the marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
(2) A second or subsequent marriage contracted during subsistence of petitioner‘s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner‘s marriage to Ancajas would be null and
void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner‘s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
RPC criminalizes ―any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings‖. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 137182, Apirl 24, 2003

Facts: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat
with three other men to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander
Lambada. They arrived in the morning and were able to talk to Macapagal
concerning the gold nuggets that purportedly being sold by the latter. The business
transaction was postponed and continued in the afternoon due to the death of
Macapagal‘s relative and that he has to pick his brother in Cotabato City.
Then at around 8:30 PM, as they headed to the highway, Macapagal ordered the
driver to stop. Suddenly, 15 armed men appeared. Alexander and his three
companions were ordered to go out of the vehicle, they were tied up, and
blindfolded. Macapagal and Teddy were also tied and blindfolded, but nothing
more was done to them. Alexander identified all the abductors including the
brothers of Macapagal.
The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The
kidnappers demanded P15, 000,000 from Alexander‘s wife for his release, but the
amount was reduced to twelve million. The victims were then transferred from one
place to another. They made Alexander write a letter to his wife for his ransom.
But on several occasions, a person named Mayangkang himself would write to
Alexander‘s wife. The two other victims managed to escape but Alexander was
released after payment of ransom. The trial court convicted Macapagal and his
companions of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal
Detention.

Issue: Whether it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime
of Kidnapping.

Held: No, it is necessary that there is actual payment of ransom in the crime of
Kidnapping. For the crime to be committed, at least one overt act of demanding
ransom must be made. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of ransom
because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding
ransom. In this case, the records are replete with instances when the kidnappers
demanded ransom from the victim. At the mountain hideout where Alexander was
first taken, he was made a letter to his wife asking her to pay ransom of twelve
million. Also Mayangkang himself wrote more letters to his family threatened the
family to kill Alexander if the ransom was not paid.

ESTAFA; TRUST RECEIPTS LAW

EDWARD ONG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119858, April 29, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Edward Ong, representing ARMAGRI International Corporation

(ARMAGRI), executed two trust receipts acknowledging receipt from the Solid
Bank Corp. of goods valued at P 2,532,500 and P 2, 050,000. In addition, he
bounded himself to any increase or decrease of interest rate in case Central Bank
floated rates and to pay any additional penalty until the trust receipts are fully paid.
When the trust receipts became due and demandable, ARMAGRI failed to pay or
deliver the goods to the Bank despite several demand letters. The trial court
convicted Ong of two counts of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law.

Issue: Whether the appellant is guilty of two counts estafa for violation of the Trust
Receipts Law.

Held: Yes, he is guilty for failure by the entrustee to account for the goods received
in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law is violated whenever the
entrustee fails to: (1) turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods, or (2) return the
goods covered by the trust receipts if the good are not sold. The mere failure to
account or return gives rise to the crime which is malum prohibitum. There is no
requirement to prove intent to defraud.
The Bank released the goods to ARMAGRI upon execution of the trust receipts
and as part of the loan transactions of ARMAGRI. The Bank had a right to demand
from ARMAGRI payment or at least a return of the goods. ARMAGRI failed tom
pay or return the goods despite repeated demands by the Bank.
It is well-settled doctrine long before the enactment of the Trust Receipts Law, that
the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence
of conversion or misappropriation. Under the law, mere failure by the entrustee to
account for the goods received in trust constitutes estafa. The Trust Receipts Law
punishes dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to
prejudice the public order. The mere failure to deliver proceeds of the sale or the
goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the
creditor, but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for
neither money nor the goods were turned over the Bank.

PARRICIDE; ELEMENTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PO3 ARMANDO DALAG

G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003

Facts: Armando Dalag, a member of the Philippine National Police, was lawfully
married to Leah Nolido Dalag. They had three children. Their marriage was far
from idyllic. Their covertures were marred by violent quarrels, with Leah always at
the losing end. Each time the couple had a quarrel, she sustained contusions,
bruises and lumps on different parts of her body.
On August 15, 1996, Armando was drinking when Leah admonished him not to do
so. Leah was then banged on the wall by Armando. Then he pushed and kicked
Leah on the left side of her body which caused her to fall on the ground. Even as
Leah was already lying prostrate, Armando continued to beat her up, punching her
on the different parts of her body. Leah then fled to the house of Felia Horilla but
Armando ran after her and herded her back to their house. Leah fell again to the
ground and lost her consciousness. The trial court convicted Armando of parricide.

Issue: Whether the trial court correctly convicted the accused.

Held: Yes, the trial court correctly concluded that the injuries sustained by Leah
that caused her death were the consequence of the appellant‘s deliberate and
intentional acts.
The crime of parricide is defined by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code thus:
Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty
of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
The prosecution is mandated to prove the following essential elements: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is
the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The
prescribed penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua to death. The key element in
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased would be the marriage certificate.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME NOT AN ESSENTIAL

ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. BENJAMIN HILET

G.R. No. 146685-86, April 30, 2003

Facts: Sometime in 1998, ten-year old Richelle Cosada was told by appellant
Benjamin Hilet, the common law husband of her mother not to go to school and
watch the house. At about 10 AM, while her mother was out selling fish, Richelle
saw appellant sharpening his bolo. Moments later, appellant dragged her towards
the room and raped her. She kept the afternoon of March 17, 1999. Richelle finally
confided to her mother. The latter asked their neighbor to report the incident to the
police. The trial court convicted the appellant guilty of two counts of statutory
rape.

Issue: Whether time is an essential element of statutory rape.

Held: No, time is not an essential element of statutory rape. An information is valid
as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential
element of rape. Thus, in a prosecution of rape, the material fact or circumstance to
be considered is the occurrence of rape, not the time of its commission.
It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an
essential element. What is important is the information alleges that the victim is a
minor under twelve years of age and the accused had carnal knowledge of her,
even if no force or intimidation was used or she was not otherwise deprived of
reason.

STATUTORY RAPE; INFORMATION; TIME IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL

ELEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LOZADA

Facts: Reynaldo Diaz, a tricycle driver, went to a coffee shop to meet Ronnie
Sanchez and this Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy. Thereafter
Belleza Lozada arrived. They planned to wait Rosita Sy as she would normally
leave her drugstore between 10:30 and 11 PM. They have also planned to kill
Rosita Sy, upon realizing that Sy would be killed, Diaz excused himself on the
pretext that he would get a weapon but he delayed himself and the plan was not
implemented that night because of the delay. They have agreed to pursue it the
next day. Diaz deliberately stayed away from their meeting place the next day. The
following day, he learned over the radio that a lifeless body of Rosita was found in
a remote area.

Issue: Whether or not all elements of a Robbery with Homicide are present to
constitute a penalty of death.

Held: The SC ruled that all the elements were present. The taking with animo lurid
or personal property belonging to another person by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or using force upon thing constitutes robbery, and the
complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion
of robbery, someone is killed. All these elements have satisfactorily been shown by
the prosecution.

―BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME‖AS A VIABLE PLEA WITHIN THE

CONCEPT OF SELF-DEFENSE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA
G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,

Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the
penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated
and severe beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court
failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the ―battered woman syndrome‖ as a viable plea within the
concept of self-defense is applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First,
each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at
least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person‘s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm,
from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save
her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—
not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

RAPE; ―TOUCHING‖ WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES

PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO

G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them
were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza. Teodora left Vivencio and kept
custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as
husband and wife.
Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood
with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they were nearing a guava tree, the
appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had
her clothes when she woke up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her
vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her right leg. The appellant
warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.
The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and
eventually her mother. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime rape
and sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held
guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the
accused achieves the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the
latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal knowledge of the
victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial
evidence that rape had been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator
thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely on the
victim‘s testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating
testimony frequently unavailable in rape cases is not indispensable to warrant a
conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman
states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show
rape did take place. However, the testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with
extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be
assailed simply because her admission that it took the appellant only short time to
insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis
into the labia of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as
the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the brevity of time that the
appellant inserted penis into the victim‘s vagina is of no particular importance.
Posted by UNC Bar Operations Commission