Classroom Maoists. The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers Under Military Government - Alan Angell

Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
Classroom Maoists: The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers under Military Government

Author(s): Alan Angell
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1982), pp. 1-20
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3338537 .
Accessed: 12/11/2012 21:57
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Wiley-Blackwell and Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Bulletin of Latin American Research.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.232 on Mon, 12 Nov 2012 21:57:13 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Classroom Maoists:
The Politics of
Peruvian Schoolteachers
Under Military Government
ALAN ANGELL
St. Antony's College,Oxford
Peru has witnessed many and profound changes in her political, economic
and social system since the advent of a military governmentin 1968 deter-
mined to reform rather than maintain the status quo. The sight of a poor
dependentcountry attemptinga reformprogrammeof some originalityattracted
a great deal of scholarlyinterest both nationallyand abroad.A seriesof import-
ant, thorough and well known studies examined the economic history of the
country, its political economy, especially its agrarianstructure, and the be-
haviour of the military. Other aspects, especially in the realm of politics,
remainneglected. We still lack an adequatestudy of the Apraparty for example.
Anotherareaof neglect lies in the investigationof union and popularmovements.
Studying labour movementsin countries like Peru is not easy if one intends
to go beyond a recitalof dates of formationof unions and of early strikes.There
is often a temptation to assume, rather than demonstrate,the existence of a
working class with clearly defined political ideas and behaviour.There is an
even stronger temptation to ascribe to that small minority who are organized
a vanguardrole in popularstruggles.But that can be very misleadingin a country
like Peru where popular struggles simply cannot be reduced to industrialor
work conflict. Any real understandingof the political activities of the urban
andruralpoormust considersuch actions in their culturaland economic context,
broadly defined. We need to know a greatdeal more about whereworkerscome
from, how they are recruitedinto employment, how mobile they are, how they
relate to their often ruralbackgrounds,how the family economy is organized,
how they see themselves and their society, and what form of political action
they find most appropriate.
Such questions are not difficult to pose, but they are difficult to answer.
Attempts to answer them come from studies of the mining and sugarsectors,
and there are some impressivestudies of these groups as there are of shanty
towns.l But urban workersin the service sector, especially in the public sector,
tend to be ignored. Given the importance of public sector unions since 1968
and given the associated growth of the Maoist left, it is important to try to
evaluate the aims and activities of such groups. Amongst the public sector
unions by far the most important were the schoolteachers,organizedin the
Sindicato Unico de los Trabajadoresde la Educacion Peruana(SUTEP).
2 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
Schoolteachersplay an important role in the union movement;they were a
constant source of troublesome opposition to the military governmentfrom
1968 to 1980; and they express the interests of an importantsector of the
urban, often provincial,lower middle class. This class has expandedrapidly
since the 1960s and its expansion has been associatedwith an increasingeco-
nomic and political frustrationand resentment.SUTEP,under Maoistcontrol,
turnedthat resentmentinto politicalmilitancywith revolutionaryovertones.
SUTEP is not simply a disgruntledgroup of white collar state employees
grumblingaboutthelevelof salaries,socialstatusandteachingconditions.Peruvian
schoolteachersare relativelywell organized,highly politicizedand militant.An
indicationof how seriouslythe governmenttook SUTEPwas shownby Velasco's
remarksin a pressconference:
In SUTEPare involved extremistsof the worst kind, and also a political
party, very old, that you know all about, that is plotting and intriguing
and that also plays a role in the agitation.But as I saidbefore,we men of
the revolutionwill defend it with all the weaponswithin our reach.Here
the choice is clear, either the revolution or SUTEP.They want to over-
throw the government.Well, let them try if they can, and take the con-
sequences.2
This article is a preliminaryattempt to answer some questions about the
growth of SUTEP.It has to be preliminarybecause of the lack of secondary
sources, and the difficulties of investigatinga trade union whose activities
were closely followed by the police, and many of whose leaderswere either
imprisonedor in hiding. My interpretation,therefore, is more subjectivethan
it would have been for, say, a study of sugarworkersor minerswhose activities,
although involving conflict with the state, are more institutionalized.Apart
from the rather scant coveragein the daily press and the weeklies, and a few
secondary sources mentioned in the text, most of my interpretationcomes
from interviewsand conversations,with all the pitfalls that are impliedwhen
the subject in question is one of such political sensitivity and arouses strong
politicalpassions.
SUTEPAND THEPERUVIANLEFT
If the growth of SUTEP reflects the political importance of education, the
natureand characterof SUTEPreflects the structureof the PeruvianLeft. The
development of SUTEP shows the kinds of problemsthat beset the Left in
Peru, and the difficultiesof mobilizingpopulardiscontentwithina partyframe-
work. The traditionalpartieshave not managedto capturethe extensive social
changes of recent years. Apra, throughoutthe 1970s, retainedan impressive
machine and was strong locally, but also (especially in the union movement)
made many more enemies than it gained support. The CommunistParty is
probably the strongest force in the labour movement, but its almost uncon-
ditional supportfor the Velasco governmentand even for his successorat least
until 1977 has weakenedits influence. Certainlythe CP has nothing like the
membership,organization,influence and discipline of the Chilean CP at its
height.
Partly because of this weakness,especially in the fast-growingeducational
CLASSROOMMAOISTS 3
sector, which included universitiesas well as schoolteachers,the CP was badly
affected by the Sino-Sovietdivisionin 1965. The originalMaoistgroup,Bandera
Roja, emphasizedarmed strugglein the countryside;in one of the subsequent
divisions of this groupPatriaRoia was formed in the early 1970s, emphasizing
the role of the universities,students, professionalgroups and the petty bour-
geoisie. In parallel with the growth and divisions in the Maoist camp was the
proliferationof Trotskyist, Fidelista and revolutionaryApra groupsunder the
influence of the CubanRevolution.
The languageof these groups is rhetorical and rigid; they communicate in
slogansextracted from the writingsof Maoat differenttimes. Splits are frequent
- sometimes ideological, sometimes, perhaps usually, personalist. Members
constantly join and leave. These groupsare also wide open to police infiltration.
Most do little more than attract student attention, though this is significant
enough politically in a country where students are numerous, troublesome
and politically active. Most also attract some local urban or peasant support,
perhaps because a returningstudent brings with him a ready made allegiance
to attach to his organizationalefforts. But at least two groups, Vanguardia
Revolucionaria in the countryside, and Patria Roja in the mining areas and
amongst the teachers, have risen above this level. Yet it is unlikely that any
but a small number of teachers would identify themselves ideologically as
Maoist.And of coursemembershipof SUTEPis by no meansa clearcut identity,
established by carryinga union card or by paying obligatory dues. As SUTEP
was not promisedlegal recognitionby the governmentuntil 1978, it could not
organize in that way. Nevertheless,it was fairly clear that SUTEP mobilized
the sympathies of a great majority of the teachers.There was the evidence of
the elections to the teacherscooperativeswhere a largemajorityof the teachers
voted, and where a large majority voted for the SUTEP lists; there was the
evidence of the mobilizationin variousstrikeswhere both at a local and national
level most teachers followed the SUTEP line. Certainly the governmentalso
believed that SUTEP represented the teachers. It took the union seriously
enough to propose and start a series of monthly meetings between Velasco,
several ministers and the union leaders. And when negotiations failed, the
government also took the threat of SUTEP seriously enough to attempt a
fairlyintensiverepressionof its leadership.
Only a small minority of Peruvianschoolteachersare active Maoists,though
a significant number of younger teachers were trained in the late 1960s and
1970s in an atmospherethat acceptedMarxism,and especiallyits Maoistvariant,
as a doctrinal truth. But my argument is that Peruvianschoolteachers as a
whole vote for and follow Maoist leadersbecause their generalsense of social,
political and occupational frustrationis best expressed by this group;because
their opposition to the government'seducationalreformwas headedby Maoists;
and because Maoist leaders seem to offer the best possibility of redressingthe
salaryand work grievancesof the teachers.
In this sense the allegiance of the schoolteachersto the Maoist leadership
is instrumental;it is the tactical political allegiancecharacteristicaccordingto
Trotsky of that social sector that he called the 'vacillatingclass'.SUTEPrealized
that the rather un-Maoist desire of teachers for social recognition was very
strong; one of the clauses of SUTEP's proposal for a Ley Magisterialin 1971
stated that 'the crucial role (transcendencia)of the teacher must be estab-
lished by recognizingthe status (jeraquia)of the teaching profession,that is
by grantingit university status, by providingjob security, by social security
benefitsand othernot less importantaspects'.3
Three important factors will be considered in this explanation of the
growthof SUTEP:
(a) First, there was the political history of teachers' unionism. Paralleling
the dramaticexpansion of teachers'numbersin the 1960s, and their declining
economic position, was the story of the betrayal of their interests by first
the Apraand then the CommunistParty.
(b) Secondly, there was the impact on the teaching professionof the educa-
tional reform proposed by the governmentin 1972. Whateverthe underlying
intention of the reform, the reaction of the teachers was hostile. The attack
on their teaching methods and the insistence on complete changewas seen as
an insult to their professionalesteem. The insistence that they should work
harderin a new way for no extra pay was seen as a further economic blow.
The stress on ideologicalindoctrinationcontained in the reformwas not very
welcome to a group that was rapidlydevelopinga very hostile attitude to the
government's ideology. Moreover, teachers resented the imposition of the
reform from above, largely designed and implemented without consulting
teachers.
The attempt at reform also deepened the long-standingconflict between
the teachers and the Ministryof Education.Used to double dealing,indiffer-
ence, personalismo, not to speak of dishonesty and corruption, teachers
could hardly expect impartial application of the reform from a Ministry
not known for its neutrality or efficiency. This touches again on one of the
central problemsof the reform effort of the Velasco government.How could
one expect a civil service formed in one tradition, with ideas and modes of
behaviour characteristicof the social and economic structure of pre-reform
Peru, to adapt to a totally different policy without its own internal and
profoundreform?
(c) Thirdly, the explanation of schoolteachers'Maoismhas to be related to
their class position. Schooling has been seen at least since the early years of
this century as the classic form of social ascent to the middle class from the
upper ranks of the working class or the better off peasantry,and from small
towns to provincialcapitals or to Lima itself. Schoolteachershave the social
ambition of those who wish to improve their individualstatus, and the social
resentmentof those who find that crossingthe class barrieramountsto rather
little, certainlylower than expected, in terms of income or status or influence.
This group is often referredto in Peru as cholo ascendiente;a groupalienated
from its backgroundbut not always accepted in its chosen milieu.4Patria
Roja drew a great deal of its strength from the frustrationof this numerous
and dissatisfiedsocial sector. The government'sproblem was that they were
too numerousto buy off. With educationsometimesamountingto 20-25 per
cent of government expenditures, and teachers' salariesconstituting almost
90 per cent of that sector's cost, a poor state cannot afford the solution of
co-optationthroughhigh salaries.
CLASSROOMMAOISTS 5
THEPERUVIANUNIONMOVEMENT
If the political behaviour of SUTEP is shaped by the nature of the political
Left in Peru, its behaviour as a trade union must be placed in the context
of organizedlabourin that country.
The relative importance of SUTEP amongst unions partly reflects the
overall weakness and divisions of the Peruvianlabour movement. Excluding
the rural sector which employs around40 per cent of the active labour force,
the main urban categories are wage labourers who make up 27 per cent of
the total, employees who constitute 34 per cent, and so-called independent
workers who constitute another 27 per cent. Of this urban total of around
two million, perhaps some 25 per cent are organizedin unions, though this
figureis not particularlyuseful unless disaggregated.5
Most Peruvianunions are small, poor and subject to the powerful presence
of employer and state. There are, however, notable exceptions. The sugar
workers of the North coast, under Apra influence, have long been a powerful
force. The mining sector also has a tradition of militant unionism, though
its isolation and strategic importance to the economy has made it subject
to another strong tradition in Peruvian labour history, repression by the
government. The industrial reforms of the Velasco government produced in
CONACI(the national confederation of industrialcommunities) a potentially
powerful instrument of the industrial working class, counting on some
200,000 members.But the potential was not realized.
The labour movement is internally divided. The largest confederation,
the communist-dominatedConfederacion General de TrabajadoresPeruanos
(CGTP), at its peak in 1972-3 claimed the allegiance of 43 federations, and
170 unions with membership in the order of 400,000. But the CGTP has
suffered important losses; the Federacion de Pescadores to the Confedera-
cion de Trabajadoresde la Revoluci6n Peruana (CTRP), Centromin to the
ComitWde Coordinaciony Unificacion Sindical Clasista (CCUSC), and the
formation of SUTEP reduced the size of the Communistteachers'federation.
Next in size is probably the Apra's Confederacionde TrabajadoresPeruanos
(CTP), now much reduced from its earlier influence, but still powerful in
the construction sector, among the choferes, sugar workers, and though
less so now, in the textile sector. The government attempt to organize its
own central, the CTRP, rather backfired when the Lima section began to
reflect rank and file opinion rather more than the ideas of the military right
wing. The attempt to organize the forces of the so called clasista left took
form in the CCUSC. It was never entirely clear whether this was intended
to be an alternativeto the GCT or a pressuregroup inside it. Clasistaunity
lasted only a short time as sectarianparty politics soon dominated.
Although political divisions proliferated at the leadership level, rank and
file militancy has grown. The general strike of July 1977 was the culmina-
tion of this trend. It has long been argued that the labour movement in Peru
has little sense of class identity and that it is permeated by petty bourgeois
or artesanalor peasant ideas, dominated by a frequently corruptbureaucracy
of professional union leaders.6 But even if this were true, the union move-
ment has been changing in the last decade. The strike trend for the ten years
since 1965 shows a growth in the numberof strikesfrom 397 to 779; in their
durationfrom 4.8 days on averageto 11.7; in the numberof workersinvolved,
from 135,500 to 617,000; and obviously a dramaticincreasein the man days
lost.7 Although the relatively reformist atmosphere of the Velasco period
furthered these developments,one should not exaggeratethe extent of this
reformism. The Belaunde government was not notably oppressive towards
labour. Since Velasco's fall there has been a markedlyunfavourableattitude
towardslabour,andhostile anti-labourlegislation.
Leaving aside developments in the rural sector, most strikes take place
in the industrial sector (about half, followed by mining (especially between
1969 and 1971) and construction (especially between 1973 and 1975).8 An
importantdevelopmentin this period has also been the growth of white collar
militancy, obviously related overall to the trend in real wages. The growth
in unions and the favourableeconomic climatein the earlyyearsof the military
governmentpushed up wages from 100 in 1968 to 132 in 1973; and salaries
rose from 100 to 133; but by 1976 wages had declinedto 78 and salariesto
90.9 The growth of unions in the first part of this period, and the develop-
ment of institutions such as CONACImade unions stronger.After 1973 the
decline in real wages fuelled militancy. The generalstrike of 1977 was remark-
able in the extent to which it was supported(and not just in Lima),the extent
to which it was forced on a somewhat reluctant union leadership(especially
the CGT)by rank and file action, and the extent to which, thoughonly tempor-
arily,sectarianand partisandifferenceswere overcome.
EDUCATION,SCHOOLTEACHERS AND POLITICS
Schoolteachersarenot immuneto thesechanges,andtheir responsewas dramatic.
SUTEP, founded in 1972, becameprobablythe largestunion in Peru, claiming
over 100,000 members.Unlike other unions it has a genuinelynationaland not
just regionalorganization.By comparisonthere areabout 50,000 minersin Peru,
though not all are organizedand certainly not all are united. Centromin,the
most militant federation claims about 13,000 members. SUTEP speaks for
an important social sector in Peru, the socially ambitiousand mobile lower
middle class, a group assigned a pivotal political role, interestinglyenough,
both by Apraand by the Maoists.10
Teachershave a history of participationin urban,miningand ruralstruggles,
for a long time individually,but since the 1970s, collectively. Teachershave
also played an important role in that very Peruvianform of social conflict,
the local popularmobilizationuniting diversesocial groupsarounda common
grievance,which by sheer intensity and violence often secures some form of
local redress.
The political weight of schoolteachersobviously derivesfrom the political
importanceof education- both for the populationat largeand for the govern-
ment. Education has been at the heart of social conflict as the demandfor
it has grown enormouslysince the Second WorldWar,and as the expanding
educationalsystem has become a very importantsource of employment.One
of the first violent clashesof the Velasco governmentcame when it attempted
to implement a law which would have ended free schooling for secondary
school children who failed a course.This proposalled to an occupationof the
CLASSROOM
MAOISTS 7
provincialcapital of Huanta by a coalition of students, parents and peasants.
Intervention by the government to suppress the occupation led to deaths
variously estimated as between 17 and 100. On the same day as the govern-
ment promulgated its AgrarianReform Law (24 June 1969), it repealed the
education decree.1l Most of the important towns of the sierra saw uprisings
that succeeded in their aim of scrappingthe 100 soles monthly tuition fee.
A protest meeting in Ayacucho reportedly broughttogether 10,000 protesters,
and a locally based Frente del Defensa del Pueblo, dominated by Maoist
groups.12
Education has been seen by many Indiancommunitiesas a method of opposi-
tion to landlord domination, as a means of establishingdirect contact with the
outside world and the government,and as a means of securingsocial advance-
ment for children.13This is the kind of social context that would provefavour-
able to generalpublic supportfor the advancementof the pay claimsof teachers.
But governmentssince the 1940s also saw advantagesin expandingeducational
opportunities so that without having to undertake basic structural reforms,
state expansion of educationalprovisionswould satisfy social unrest. This may
have workedfor a time, but it was a short-runsolution only.
THEDEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOLTEACHERS' UNIONS
Schoolteachers' unions were first formed in the 1920s, but like most unions
they suffered from the political repression of the time and were forced into
inactivity. Like most unions of the time too, they were the natural territory
of the Apraparty.
Until the late 1950s the numbers of schoolteacherswere relatively small,
their organization weak, and their attitudes generally individualistic- there
was no talk then about joining the worker-peasantalliance. Their unions re-
flected the Apra emphasis on 'free and democraticunionism': no interference
in party politics and struggle only for economic ends. Although the primary
school teachers showed some signs of militancy, teachershad separateunions,
which they considered as associations rather than sindicatos. This division
into primary, secondary, technical and teachers of physical education suited
both the Apra and the Ministryof Education as it allowed them both to pursue
a 'divide and rule' strategy.14One of the aims of SUTEP has been to abolish
this distinction and to unite all teachers and non-teachersin the educational
sector into one union and to create a simple scale to reflect years of service
with specialpaymentsfor close work with the popularsectors.
The decline of the old style of unionism and of Apra control has its origins
in the Belaundeperiod with a dramaticexpansion of education. Between 1958
and 1968, the number of schoolchildren in public education rose from 1.5
million to 3.2 million. The number of teachers rose from 64,019 to 118,367
(85 per cent) in the same period. In 1958 the share of Peru'sGNP devoted to
education and health was 3.8 per cent (a sharp increase from the very low
figure of the 1940s); by 1963 it had risen to 6 per cent with education alone
taking 5.1 per cent, a larger share than in any other Latin Americancountry.
Primaryschool enrolment rose from 56 per cent of the population agedfive to
fourteen to 74 per cent in 1968 (when the Latin Americanaveragewas 58 per
cent). During the same period those actually finishingprimaryeducation rose
by 100 per cent, though this still remaineda low proportionof total entrants.
Secondaryschool enrolmentincreasedfrom one quarterto one half million.'s
As the governmentsteppedup its expenditureprogrammeteachersbenefited
accordingly;indeed they were promiseda great deal. In Belaunde'slaw 15215
they were promised four annualincrementsof 25 per cent each. Thoughthey
received only two of these payments they receiveda considerableincreasein
real wages. Shane Hunt calculatedthat between 1960 and 1965 an expansion
of 285 per cent in education expenditurecompriseda 52 per cent increasein
the number of teachers, a 44 per cent increasein the cost of living, an 18 per
cent increasein real wages throughoutthe country and a 49 per cent increase
in the real wages differentialbetween teachersand the generallabourforce.16
He adds that whereasthe expansionin the numberof teacherswas attributable
to general social demand for education, the expansion in relativereal wages
was attributableto their political power since the governmentwantedto mobil-
ize teachers' influence over the electorate. However,this political gesture of
the government was extremely expensive. Kuczinski argues that it was the
single most importantinfluence on the rapid rise of governmentexpenditures
during the Belauindegovernment.'7This measureamounted to about 40 per
cent of the increase in central governmentexpendituresin 1965 and 1966,
the two yearswhen the increasesweregranted.
Why did the governmentdecide to take this extraordinarystep? There was,
firstly, the perceivedpolitical power of schoolteachers.Given the restrictions
on the suffrage in Peru, the importanceof a bloc of voters as numerousas
schoolteachersin a competitive multiparty system, and their supposed con-
siderableinfluenceas communityleadersover othervoters,the Belaundegovern-
ment was anxiousto win overthe teachersfrom the controlof Apra.
Secondly, there was the social context. Education held and still holds a
high place in the values of Peruviansas a means of social advancement.One
of the first demandsof the migrantsto the towns was for educationfor their
children;one of the most frequentlyexpresseddemandsof ruralcommunities
was for a school.
Thirdly there was the ideological factor. To reformerslike Belaundethe
painless path to political modernizationvia educational developmentmust
have looked attractive. A skilled work force would foster production, and
enoughsocialmobilitywould resultto avertsocialconflict.
There was certainlyan expansionof occupationalemploymentin the educa-
tional sector, though it was not to be associatedwith social tranquillitybut
ratherthe reverse.By 1970 there were 92,000 state school teachers(2.6 per
cent of the activelabourforce). Therewere 64,000 in primaryschools(of whom
two-thirds were women), and 28,000 in secondary schools (of whom about
40 per cent were women). More than 60 per cent of these teacherswere the
graduatesof the UniversityFacultiesof Educationor of the escuelasnormales
(teacher training schools), both hotbeds of Maoist radicalismby the early
1970s. The numbersstudyingeducationrose dramatically.At a time of massive
universityexpansion, the percentageof universitystudents studyingeducation
rose from 16.5 per cent in 1960 to 39.5 per cent in 1970. The number of
normal schools rose from 26 in 1957 to 102 state and 50 privatein 1967.18
Normal schools offered the best opportunity for further education at State
MAOISTS
CLASSROOM 9
expense for those who could not get to university on financial or academic
grounds.
The Belaunde reform, instead of creatinga contented and powerful middle
sector of teachers, achieved precisely the reverse;it created a powerful and
discontented group. Most teachers(64 per cent of the total) were young gradu-
ates of the education faculties, or the escuelasnormales duringa period when
Maoist propagandain those establishmentswas very strong. The Ministry of
Education dealt with the problem of oversupply by employing teachers on
a yearly basis only, with no right to future employment, or holiday pay, the
so-called contratados.19The exact number of such temporary school teachers
is difficult to estimate. SUTEP claimed 30,000; other sources nearer 4,000.
The practice does seem to have been widespreadand though the government
may have thought that such precariousstability would give them control over
the temporaryteachers,in fact it becameyet anothersourceof resentment.
Reasons for teachers' dissatisfaction, were, amongst other factors, over-
supply of teachers,resentmentat salarylevels, worryabout stability of employ-
ment, and dislike of being sent to uncongenialprovincialposts, all of which
interacted to create strong resentment against the government. In addition
there must be added the feeling amongst teachers that their traditionalleaders,
largelythe Apra,but later the CP,had betrayedthem for party ends.
Apra initially took a great deal of credit for law 15215, but whatevercredit
it claimed had to be shared with Belauinde'sAP and in any case did not last
too long. The first small Maoist faction (BanderaRoja), though it emphasized
ruralstruggle,became active in the teachers'union in reaction to Apra'sfailure
to press for a strike in 1967 against the government'sdecision not to imple-
ment the third payment due under law 15215. Apra's rapprochementwith
the Belaunde government in 1967 meant that it mobilized its union leaders
to hold down wage claims, which following a large devaluationand a 10 per
cent inflation in the next six months meant a decline in real wages. Teachers
had other grievancesagainst Apra. The teachers' co-operative,the Asociaci6n
MutualistaMagisterial,thoughit receivedobligatorycontributionsfrom teachers,
was notorious for the few benefits it produced, and was seen as a method of
sustaining Apra influence in the union. Apra opposition to the unification
of teachers' unions in a sindicato unico became unpopularas militant teachers
began to press for such unity. Although Apra was involved in the formation
of SUTEP in 1972, it found itself in an uncomfortableminority. Apra's de-
clining position in the teachers'union was of course a reflection of its declining
role in the union movementgenerally.
Yet it was a commonplacepress assertionthat Apra still controlled SUTEP,
simply using a layer of ultra-leftleadershipto disguiseits real intentions. Leftist
Velasquistaslike Bejarhave assertedthat the SUTEPis led at the top by Maoists
but at the lower levels by Apristas,and he points to a common opposition of
both groups to the educational reform and to a common hostility towards
the Velasco government.20These argumentsoverstateApra'sresidualinfluence.
The changesin the age and social compositionof the schoolteachersmeant that
there are now relativelyfew of the Apra stalwartsof the forties and fifties, and
rather more of the Maoist generation of the expanded escuelas normales for
whom Apra signifies all that is corrupt, opportunistand certainlynot clasistain
Peruvianpolitics. Howeverone should not exaggeratethe numberof politicized
teachers whether of Aprista or Maoist ideas. After all, two-thirdsof primary
school teachersare women, who generallyplay a ratherpassiverole in Peruvian
politics, and who certainlydo not featureveryprominentlyamongstthe leader-
ship of SUTEP.
The PeruvianCommunistparty had long had some strengthamongst the
teachers'organizations,but schoolteacherssoon began to identify the CP with
the same kind of entreguistatactics as Apra.The PeruvianCP was anxious to
support the military governmentof Velasco, hoping to occupy the political
vacuum left by the virtual cessation of party activity and by the inability of
the military to generate a popular organizedbase of support.To this end it
was preparedto urge wage restraint;not a tactic that was likely to appealto
the schoolteachers.The decisive moment came with the importantteachers'
strike of September 1971.21Primaryschoolteachers,amongwhom the CP was
strongest, decided to accept the government'soffer, but secondaryteachers,
among whom the CP was weakest, declined to return to work. The govern-
ment eventuallybroke the strikeby arrestingand deportingseveralleadersand
by dismissinghundredsmore. The teachers'unions threw mutual accusations
at each other. The CP arguedthat those who wished to prolongthe strikewere
simply the ultras and the Apra, and that to continue the strike would have
played into the hands of the counterrevolution.Their opponents were quick
to attack the role of the CP,an accusationthat was convincingto those teachers
who regardedthe decision as a sellout, especiallyin virtueof widespreadpublic
supportfor the strike.
The left group organizedfor the strike did not accept the verdict of the
official leaders and from that attitude springsthe formationof the local sindi-
catos unicos, organized at national level as SUTEPin 1972. At the congress
in Cuzco in June of that year the majorgroupseemsto havebeen the PR which
controlled the delegationsof 8 of the 9 regionalorgani7ations.BR controlled
the remainingone (from the north) and some Vanguardia Revolucionariamili-
tants, Apristas,and most of the ultra-leftgroupswererepresentedin one way or
another.22
Internally the story of teachers'politics since 1972 has been the struggle
amongst the various left groups to control SUTEP, leading eventually to a
dominanceby PR, though this control was weakenedby divisionbetween the
SUTEPof Limaand the nationalorganization.PR made no secretof its hostility
towards the military government;in its view the policies simply led to the
strengtheningof imperialismand of the bourgeoisie, leading to a deformed
and dependentinternalcapitalism.23
The policy of SUTEP under PR control during the military government
was, apart from the interlude of the dialoguewith Velasco, uncompromising,
and the leadershiphas thrown the union into a series of headlongclasheswith
the government.Generally the union insists, with a usually rigid bargaining
stance, in obtaining all that it wants. Any sign of reducingdemandswould be
interpretedby other groups inside the union, only too anxious to take over,
as compromiseandpoliticalsellout.
Teachers'politics have not been limited to the educationalsphere,though
the political importanceof educationinflates the significanceof their activities.
CLASSROOMMAOISTS 11
SUTEPhas attemptedto relateeducationto an overallpolitical critique.Peruvian
society according to SUTEPis 'semifeudal,neocolonial, and in transit towards
dependent capitalism'.To perform its revolutionarymission, SUTEPofficially
set itself in 1975 the following tasks:
A. To defend the interests of teachers(and other workersin the educational
sector), to develop class consciousness through struggle and to fight against
reformist,opportunist,revisionistand reactionarytendencies.
B. To integrate the strugglesof the teacherswith those of the workersand
peasants and to fight, through CCUSC, against revisionist, collaborationist,
corporativist,participationistand yellow tendencies.
C. To unmaskthe reactionaryeducationaland culturalpolicy of the govern-
ment, to fight the penetration of cultural imperialismand social imperialism
[i.e. USSR], and to preservethe cultural heritage of the people. To develop
a national scientific, democratic and popular education and culture that will
lead the way towardsnationalliberation,populardemocracyand socialism.
D. To use the teachers' co-operatives to show the essentially capitalist
nature of the government, and to use them in the task of mobilization and
propagandaamongstteachers.24
Mobilizationwas frequent and intense in the years following SUTEP'sforma-
tion, when a wave of local protest movementsin 1972 and 1973 found SUTEP
actively involved. The strike of 1973 was SUTEP'sgreat effort to organizethe
teachersagainstthe government,and giventhe economic deteriorationthat took
place thereafter,probablythe last time that it had the opportunity of securing
salary increases. But its intransigenceprevented a deal with the government,
or much appeal to other sectors of the organizedworking class (rather than
local appeals to ad hoc movements). Although some of the local manifesta-
tions of support for SUTEP were very impressive-Arequipa and Puno for
example-and although the government promised to consider the claims of
the teachers and did in fact award a fairly considerablepay increase, at the
same time it also declared the SUTEP to be subversiveand arrestedupwards
of 400 leaders.25
Constantrepressionby the governmentbeganto take its toll. The economy
simply could not permit the often far-fetchedpay claims of SUTEPto be met.
The sectarianismof PR in SUTEPlost it allies in the union movement at large
and resulted in damaginginternal divisions. Once seen as a potential leader of
the radical movement of organizedlabour, its hostility towards the CGTand
its refusal to participatein the successful general strike of 1977, contrasting
with the attitude of every other significantleft group (and there are many of
them), intensified its isolation on the PeruvianLeft until its tactical change of
directiontowardsa more moderateattitude in 1980.
THE EDUCATIONALREFORM
The political attitudes of schoolteachersmust also be related to the proposal
of the military government to institute a thoroughgoingreform of a woefully
inadequate educational system. The reform formed part of the overallproject
of the military to modernize Peru. But the progressof the reform was not as
the government intended and the outcome was most certainly not what the
governmenthad hoped for. Like many of the other reforms of the Velasco
period,the educationalreformhas been quietly forgotten.
No one denied the need for a thoroughgoingreform of the educational
system. Facilities in rural areas especially were often very inadequate,with
50 per cent of the age group 5 to 14 not in school. Seventy-fiveper cent of
schoolsareclassifiedas inadequateby the Ministryof Education.
Perhapsmore difficult to reform was the style and content of education.
Teachers used archaic teaching methods, dependent upon learningby rote,
using text books of an often comically outdated and inappropriatesort (especi-
ally for the ruralareas).Official aims of the educationalsystem are often pain-
fully at variancewith the experienceof everydaylife, layingdown the propagation
of an idealizedvalue system - 'good habits, punctuality,truthfulness,persever-
ance, industriousness,the spirit of initiative, self-reliance,goodwill towards
one's neighbours'(accordingto the 1942 act).26Withsuch a contrastbetween
everyday life and educational values, it is little wonder that education was
not very often an educationalexperience.
The preambleto the 1972 law stated that 'the educationalprocesswill thus
awakenin the Peruvianpeople a criticalawarenessof theirconditionand stimu-
late them to participatein the historicalprocess of removingold structuresof
dependence and domination and convert them into free men committed to
forging the future of the country'. Educationwas to build upon and reinforce
threeideologicalpillars:humanism,nationalismanddemocracy(unlikeBelaunde's
statement in this field there is no referenceto Christianity).The reformshows
the influence of Freire in its emphasison conscientization,insisting that the
function of educationis to makepeople and socialgroupstake a criticalattitude
to the worldabout them, and attemptto changeit.27
Criticswere not slow in pointingto other aimsof the reform.28The emphasis
on nationalintegrationsuitedthe purposesof a militarygovernmentdetermined
to build a powerful,but not socialist,nation state. The emphasison educational
opportunity would once more allow for the kind of segmentaryincorporation
long practicedin Peru. SUTEP of course saw the whole educationalpolicy of
the governmentas aimed at underminingthe union, at fosteringclasscollabora-
tion, and as servingthe interestsof the bourgeoisieand imperialists.
Whateverthe explicit or unconscious aims of the reformers,and there was
much to commendin their efforts, the implementationof the reformfell a long
way behind its proposals.Wealthychildren still go to private schools; school
texts are not much better; facilitiesleave a lot to be desired;Quechuaspeakers
do not noticeably speakbetter Spanishor take more pride in their local tradi-
tions and they still migratein the sameproportions.The attemptto fuse school
and communityin a joint effort at a new kind of educationwas an experiment
appliedsimplyin the wrongsocial conditions.
Teacherssaw the reform as a furtherimpositionfrom above, askinggreater
effort but offering no inducements. Government programmesof retraining
turned out to be largely unsuccessful attempts at political indoctrination.
Teachersdemandeda new Ley Magisterialto embody their professionalaspira-
tions for recognitionand security. But though the governmentdid eventually
produce an ante proyecto (which SUTEPdid not like anyhow) the proposed
Ley delMagisterioneverappeared.
CLASSROOM
MAOISTS 13
Perhapsone of the least credible features of the educationalreformwas that
it was to be administeredby an unreformedcivil service. Used to decades of
contempt, arbitraryjustice, and indifference from the Ministry of Education,
how could teachers expect a total change in attitude from an unreconstituted
Ministry?29
Distorted in its application by a resistant civil service, underfinancedand
lacking popular support, the reform's chances of success were slight. It had no
chance at all when the majority of the teachers resisted it. At a time when
teachers' leaders were being arrested, deported and imprisoned and when
teachers felt acute grievancesabout their salariesand their professionalstatus,
it was too much to expect their collaborationin the process of transforming
Peruvianeducation.
TEACHERSAND THECLASSSTRUCTURE
Analysis of class structure is never straightforwardin any society, but it is an
even more complex operation in a society with the racial,regionaland occupa-
tional differences that are to be found in Peru. Moreoverof all social groups,
the middle class presents most conceptual problems,certainly more than, say,
a tightly knit oligarchyor highly organizedworkingclass.
The Peruvianmiddle classes are usually held to occupy that no man's land
between the wealthy and powerful on the one hand and the urban and rural
poor on the other. Wheredo the school teachersfit into the class system?
There is little consensus on this issue, partly because the educationalsystem
has often been seen as a mirrorof Peruviansociety. In the best privateschools
the teachers are often European, certainly white. The mestizo pupils of the
lower rank of private schools are taught by native whites, who, it is claimed,
look upon their pupils as parvenu.The mestizos teach the cholos in the public
schools of the cities whom they hold in disrespectfor their social ambitions;
and the Indians are taught by the cholos, who similarlyhold their pupils in
considerable social contempt.30 The impression is of a group in an uneasy
social situation-marginal, socially ambitious,socially frustrated;characteristics
once held to be typical of the base of Aprasupport,but now that of the Maoist
left.31
The discussionthat follows is therefore tentative and suggestiveratherthan,
in any sense, definitive. It is an attempt to show that although there are im-
portant and visible differences in the social status and ambitions of teachers,
that neverthelessthe majority are preparedto support a union committed to
militant action and radical political objectives. The evidence on the social
differentiation amongst rural and urban schoolteacherscomes from the major
anthropologicalstudies such as those of Van den Berghe and Pimov (1977),
and of Alberti and Cotler (1972); the evidence on the political activities of the
union comes from newspapers,interviewsand observation.
The social status of the schoolteachersin rural areas and small provincial
towns would seem to be higher than that of the much more numerousurban
group, but how the rural schoolteachersuse their greaterinfluence variesvery
considerably.
From studies of rural Peru one can distinguish three groups of teachers.
There is firstly the teacher whose sole ambitionis to leave the sierra,who rarely
attends school, whose attitudes are markedlyracialist,and who seeks tavour
with local notables. Secondly there is the paternalisticstyle of schoolteacher
whose attitudesand status are perhapsakin to those of a respectedlocal priest.
They are often medium-sizedlandownersas well, and are on reasonableterms
with the local notables, but not to the grossneglectof their teachingfunctions.
Then, there is the case of the teacher as local radical;militants thrust into a
leadershippositionby their greaterability to expresslocal grievances.
There are plenty of examples of all types in studies of provincialPeru. In
Puno, teachers were to the forefront in organizingthe Frente 27 de Junio,
named in honour of the people's protest at the time of the visit of Velasco's
wife. Student, labour,popularand peasantgroupsorganizeda provincialgeneral
strike in favour of recently arrestedteachers.32A recent study of Cuzco, on
the other hand, states that 'only the most inexperiencedand lowly qualified
teachers who do not have the seniority or diplomasto request urban assign-
ments are sent to Indian communities,and then they usually remainfor only
two to three years before they are transferredto betterposts'. The maintheme
of one group of teachersinterviewedon a formerhaciendawas 'the hopelessness
of their educational task with such backward, degenerate children, whose
parentswerebrutalizedby coca and alcohol'.33
There are other examples where community involvementin education has
been very high, and where such involvementhas its counterpartin dedicated
teachers, who often came from the same community, and whose teaching
methods are far in advanceof the generallylow standards.In some cases, the
teacher has been an importantcommunity leader. The more remote the area
the more crucialthe role of educationin providinglinks with the outsideworld
and opportunitiesfor social advancement,a role of lesser importancewhere
therealreadyexist a numberof institutionaland commercialcontacts.34
It would hardly be reasonableto ascribe to teachers or to the demandfor
education a primaryrole in generatingsocial unrest in the sierra. Amongst
'external' factors, political militants probably have a more important role
as catalysts. But certainlySUTEPhas welcomed and participatedin and some-
times organizedthe local protests of the small provincialtowns that are so
characteristicof recent Peruvian development. Militant schoolteachersmay
be in a minority;but they can sometimesbe a noisy and effective minority.
Urban schoolteacherstoo are socially differentiated.There are teachersin
the private schools who do not make common cause with SUTEP,though the
union does claim to have members and sympathizersamongst their ranks.
There are, as well, respected secondary school teacherswho probably think
that education should be kept out of politics. There are also a high propor-
tion of women teachers in primary schools who have not been consistently
militant, and whose income is often a secondaryand supplementaryand there-
fore not so crucial part of family income as that of the male schoolteacher
who is the primaryincomeearner.
Who, then, are the militants?They arethe youngerteachers,not far removed
from training(and political indoctrination)in the escuelas normalesand the
universityFacultiesof Education,and who work in the largerprovincialtowns
and in Lima.A split in SUTEPsuggestsa greaterdegreeof tactical moderation
in the Lima section of SUTEP as comparedwith provincialleadership.This
CLASSROOMMAOISTS 15
split might be internal and personalistand not at all related to a differentideo-

logical persuasion amongst the bulk of the schoolteachers. But perhaps the
greater possibility of obtaining other employment in Lima may lessen the
extent of economic grievance.
White collar militancy grew in Peru when, after 1968, a sympatheticgovern-
ment encouragedthe formation and growth of unions, but found after 1973
that economic decline dictated a sharp reduction in living standards.SUTEP's
militancy is, therefore, in line with the generalgrowth in labour unrest in the
1970s. To explain the particularlysharp form it took one must bear in mind
the following factors. First, the influx into the teaching profession of a large
number of socially ambitious individuals attracted by the apparently rosy
prospects offered by law 15215 of 1965. Then, the disappointmentwhen the
Belauindegovernmentrefused to implement the last two pay increasespromised
in the law. Moreover, the expectation of stability of employment was not
fulfilled as the government was forced to take unpopular measures to deal
with the problem of oversupply of teachers; and the Ministry of Education
continued to deal with problems of teachers in the same intolerant and even
contemptuous way that had long been characteristicof that Ministry.Teachers
found, therefore, that they were unable to gain acceptanceand pay comparable
with those of groups they consideredas comparable-the professionalmiddle
class, not least the military officers. It seemed a poor rewardfor all the effort
that it had cost them to rise from their origins.The political formationof these
young teachershastaken place largelyin a context that takes leftism for granted,
and arguesonly about which variantis the true one; both Apra and the PC are
dismissed as corrupt, opportunist parties serving their respective imperialisms.
The union experience of these teachers is largely that of participationin the
heady rhetoric and violent manifestations organized by SUTEP; social and
economic frustrationis replaced, for a temporaryperiod at least, by a feeling
of being in the vanguardof political transformation.Solidarity with the leader-
ship is initially cementedby the repressionthat the governmentunleashes.
In the development of SUTEPsince 1972, apart from strikes, two episodes
of particular importance stand out; firstly the conversations with Velasco,
and secondly the gainingof control over the teachers'co-operatives.
SUTEPAND THEVELASCOGOVERNMENT
The political world in Peru was ratherstartled to hear, in late 1974, that Presi-
dent Velasco was to hold a series of meetings with SUTEP.35Why should
Maoist militants reverse a policy of confrontation with the government?And
why, on the other hand, should the government initiate the process with a
union which opposed its educational policies and expressedcomplete political
rejectionof its overallaims?
The idea mainly came from Velasco, and possibly some other progressive
officers, but certainlynot from the Ministryof Education,nor from the Ministry
of the Interiorwhich opposed the meetingsfrom the first (and were happy when
they broke down). Velasco's personalstandingmade it easier for union leaders
to accept the invitation. Secondly there was an important aim that might be
achieved by accepting the invitation-the release from prison and amnesty
for the SUTEP leaders and other teachers arrestedafter strikes. This was the
most importanttacticalreasonfor acceptingthe meetingand wasput on the top
of the agenda. Thirdly there was undoubtedly rank and file pressure.Most
teachers were not deeply interested in whether the governmentwas fully or
only semi-fascist,but they did care about salary increases.If direct negotia-
tions were a method of securingthem, it might have weakenedthe leadership's
hold over the union not to accept the invitation. Either they had their griev-
ances settled, which would show their strength; or they would be rejected
which could be used as furtherevidenceof the government'sintransigence.
Why did the governmentitself want the talks? Velasco may well have felt
that the teachers'case had some justice. Cominghimself from a poor family
in a provincialtown, he knew and sympathizedwith the plight of people from
a similarorigin. Secondly neither he nor his leadersbelievedthat the Maoism
of teachers generally was very deep. The talks if they succeededmight well
moderate the leaders'position; if they failed it might drive a wedge between
the leaders and the rank and file. Moreover,teachersrepresenteda potentially
useful base of social support for the governmentif they could be won over.
Teacherswere numerous,reasonablywell organized,with considerableinfluence
locally in areas where the military had cause to feel some alarmabout social
tensions. Teachershad social originsnot dissimilarfrom those of quite a number
of army officers and it was felt that there should be some kind of sympathy
between them. The governmentwas not achievingmuch successin its attempts
to build up a popularbase. Did Velasco see the schoolteachersas the potential
core of some widerpopularmovementof supportfor the government?
Why did the talks fail? First, the Ministryof Educationand the Ministryof
the Interior wanted them to fail, and they put every obstacle in the way of
progress.Secondly, once SUTEPhad achievedits primaryobjective,the release
of its leaders from prison, and when it became clear that the objectiveswere
going to be much more difficult to obtain, its attitude hardened.Thirdly,
after three meetings SUTEPheld a conference which denounced the govern-
ment in such hostile fashion that it seemed like a calculatedinsult which the
governmentcould not accept. The congress,after salutingthe Chineserevolu-
tion, accusedthe governmentof wantingto implantdependentcapitalismin the
country, to develop neocolonialties with internationalcapital, and announced
SUTEP'sprimary objective to denounce, unmask and fight the Educational
Reform.36
These kinds of declarations,though commonplacein SUTEP publications,
were timed to lead to the ruptureof the dialogue.Why did it happen?The
reasonshave to be sought partly in the internalpolitics of SUTEP.Some groups
had never wanted the meetings, especiallyleadersidentified with the Bandera
Roja Maoistsand with VanguardiaRevolucionaria.As it becamelikely that the
dialogueswere not going to succeed, these groups began to manoeuvreinside
SUTEP accusingthe PR leaders of entreguismo.To defend themselvesagainst
these chargesthe PR grouphad to decidewhichwas more worthwhile-possible
loss of control over the union or the breakupof the dialogue.In the end they
chose to abandon the talks and mutualrecriminationsbetween the union and
the governmentstarted to flow. PR alleged that the governmentwanted only
to convert the teachersinto docile instrumentsof its ideologicalinitiative,and
that the talks were intended to divide the union. They allegedthat the govern-
MAOISTS
CLASSROOM 17
ment was intransigentand that this caused the failure, especially when the
government'sattempts to corrupt the leadershipby offers of easy and well-paid
posts in the bureaucracywere rejected. SUTEP also claimed that its demands
for the Ministryof Educationto be purgedof corruptionprovidedan additional
reasonfor the governmentto end the talks.37
The other major episode in the development of SUTEP was its gaining of
control over the teachers' co-operatives.Co-operativesof this kind in Peru are
as often associated with scandals and corruptionas they are with the handing
out of benefits to members. The teachers' co-operative under Apra control
was a rich source of pickingsfor the party, ratherless so for the teachers.The
government decided to close down the old Asociacion Mutualistaand transfer
its funds to a newly organizedsystem of regionalco-operatives.
SUTEP was opposed to these co-operatives,arguingthat they were a mere
sop to the teachersand simply servedto prolongthe life of the despisedcapitalist
system. But they were also worried that the co-operativeswould be used by
SINAMOSto manipulateteachers' political opinions. These.fearswere intensi-
fied when the governmentannounced the formation of a new teachers'union
the SERP (Sindicato de Educadores de la Revolucion Peruana) which soon
claimed to represent a majorityof schoolteachers.As the announcedelections
for the teachers' co-operativescame nearer, SUTEP changed its mind and de-
cided that it would participate.
Why the change?SUTEParguedthat once in control they would be able to
change the system of obligatory contributions to voluntary ones, a move that
would be popular with the teachers. Secondly they were confident that SERP's
claims of support were grossly inflated, and elections would be the opportunity
to show that SUTEP represented the teachers. And they were right. In the
elections they gained between 80 and 90 per cent of the vote, with CP Fentep
usually in second place, and the SERP third. These proportions have been
similarin subsequentelections for the co-operatives.38
Thirdly, of course, there was the attraction of money. The funds of the
AMMwere very considerable,as was the income from teachers'contributions
to the co-operatives.Once in control of the organizations,SUTEPand indirectly
PR came into possession of very considerablereservesthat were used for party
and union ends. But was this in fact an unmixed blessing?Governmentpolicy
towardsgroupslike PRwas not simplerepression.The governmentalso attempted
infiltration of these groups,and it can be assumedthat very often it was success-
ful. Naturallythe governmentwould have preferredto see the SERPin control
of the co-operatives. But it has been argued that it was preparedto accept
SUTEP's control on the assumption that, with some help, the sudden influx
of money into rather unstable organizationsthat lacked the solid tradition of
internal discipline of the CommunistParty would produce internal strainsthat
would divideandweaken the movement.Secondly the governmentcould always,
after a time, pursuewith greatvigourany chargesof misuse of funds.
Such was the outcome. Internalsquabblesover the use of funds were at least
one reason for the split between the Lima SUTE and the SUTEP.Soon there
were accusations and counteraccusationsof personalistmisuse of funds. The
decision to make contributions voluntary rather than obligatory reduced the
income of the co-operativesand contributed to a growingsense of crisis. The
governmentintervenedconstantlyin the affairsof the co-operativesand declared
virtuallyall of them in recesspendinginvestigation.
Perhapsthe attributionof such subtletacticsto the governmentis misplaced.
But the managementof the co-operativesdid produceinternaldivisionsinside
SUTEPand did weakenits ratherprecariousunity.
POSTSCRIPT
Labourunrestgrew in Peru as the economy deteriorated,and July 1977 saw a
widespreadgeneralstrike. The economic situationhardlypermittedthe govern-
ment to capitalize on SUTEP'stemporarydisarrayand buy off political dis-
content amongst the schoolteachers.39Governmenthostility towards SUTEP
became less forceful as the military decided to return power to civilians.A
SUTEPstrike in 1978 lasted eight weeks, enjoyed considerablepublic support,
the backingof the Church,and even of the Apra party, as Apra, now in the
public limelight in the newly elected ConstituentAssembly, sought to regain
lost influence. The 1978 strike seemed surprisinglysuccessful,even bringing
the promise of legal recognitionof the union. But most of the government's
promiseswere not redeemedand a bitter strike in 1979 ended with no guar-
antee of success.
However,this recoveryof the fortunesof the union afterthe disarrayfollow-
ing the closing of the teachersco-operativeswas not translatedinto any greater
degreeof politicalunity in the generalelection of 1980. Insteadthe Left divided
and lost supportcomparedwith its showingin the 1978 elections for the Con-
stituent Assembly.However,PatriaRoja movedawayfrom its politicalisolation
after a visit to Chinaby its leaders,and appearedto exchangea moremoderate
stanceinsidePeruin returnfor Chinesesupportfor PR.
It is doubtful if this more moderatepolitical stance will significantlychange
SUTEP'ssupport amongst rank and file teachersthough it may strengthenits
influencein the labourmovementand on the politicalLeft generally.But unless
the economy improvesdramatically,and there is no sign of this, the grievances
of teachers, even if they are economic and professionalrather than political
and ideological,will remainpowerfulincentivesto continue supportinga union
leadershipthat is seen as the most representativeof teachers'interests.
NOTES
The author would like to thank Julio Calderonof DESCOfor his generoushelp with
research,and Alfonso Barrantesfor two exceptionallyrewardingdiscussions.Julio Cotler,
Jose MariaCaballeroand GabrielaVega may also find some of theirideasappearingin this
text. To them also my thanks,but the authorof courseacceptspersonalresponsibilityfor
put forwardhere.
the interpretations
1. For a generaltreatmentof the Peruvianlabourmovement,see the author's(1980)
PenruianLabourand the MilitaryGovernmentsince 1968 (Universityof London,
Instituteof LatinAmericanStudies,WorkingPapers,No. 3). Thismonographcontains
full referencesto generalworks on Peruvianlabourand to detailedcase studies of
particulargroups.
2. Quotedin Pease,H. andVerme,0. (1974) Peru1968-1973 CronologidPoliticaDesco,
(Lima),p. 671.
3. SUTEP(1971), Ley Magisterial (Lima),p. 3.
4. For a discussionof this group see Sulmont,D. (1975), El MovimientoObreroen el
Peru 1900-1956 (Lima), p. 32; and also Paulston,R. (1971), Society, Schools and
Progressin Peru(New York),p. 11.
CLASSROOM MAOISTS 19
5. Figuresfrom Bollinger,W. (1977), 'The BourgeoisRevolutionin Peru',LatinAmerican
Perspectives,I (Summer),p. 39.
6. ComisionPolitica del Comite Centraldel PartidoComunistaRevolucionario(1976),
'Las Tareas de los ComunistasRevolucionariosen los Sindicatos',Citica Marxista
Leninista(June),p. 60.
7. Sulmont,D. (1979). ConflictosLaboralesy MoviizacionPopular,1968-1976, Centro
de Documentacion,UniversidadCatolica(Lima),p. 5.
8. Centrode ProyeccionSocial(1978), InformeSindical:Peru1977, UniversidadCatolica
(Lima),p. 25.
9. Sulmont(1979), p. 45.
10. As Hayawrote in the 1920s 'Thereis a middleclass,madeup of artisansandpeasants
who own the meansof production,of miningandindustrialworkers,smallcapitalists,
landownersand merchants.To this class belong also the intellectualworkers,the pro-
fessionals, the technicians as well as privateand state employees. It is this middle
group that is being pushedtowardsruinationby the processof imperialism.... The
great foreign firms extract our wealth and then sell it outside of the country. Con-
sequently there is no opportunity for our middleclass. This then is the abusedclass
that will lead the revolution'.(Quoted in Pike, F. (1967) TheModernHistoryof Peru
(New York), p. 240.) Comparethe analysisof the Maoistgroup,BanderaRoja, at its
Fifth NationalConferencein 1965; 'The petty bourgeoisie,composedlargelyof small
businessmen,artisans,liberalprofessionals,intellectualsand studentsis a very numerous
social stratum,impoverishedand radicalizeddue to the economicpressureof imperial-
ism and its agents.'
11. Middlebrook,K. and Palmer,D. S. (1975), MilitaryGovernmentandPoliticalDevelop-
ment: Lessonsfrom Peru, SagePapers(California),pp.15-16.
12. Gall, N. (1974), 'Peru'sEducationalReform'AmericanUniversitiesField Staff Reports,
Vol. XXI, No. 4, p. 5.
13. There is an enormousliteratureon this topic. See especiallyAlberti,G. & Cotler,J.
(1972), AspectosSocialesde la Educaci6nRuralen el Peru,I.E.P.(Lima).
14. For the backgroundto SUTEP,and indeed to the whole question, see the excellent
thesis of Julio Calderon Cockburn (1976), El Movimiento Social del Magisterio
Peruano1956-1975, UniversidadCatolica,Lima.
15. These figuresare taken from Paulston(1971) and from the veryinterestingdiscussion
in Pedro Pablo Kuczinski (1977) Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress
(Princeton).
16. Hunt, S. (1976). 'Distribution,Growth and GovernmentEconomic Behaviour',in
Chaplin,D. (ed.), PeruvianNationalism(New Jersey),p. 372.
17. Kuczinski(1977), pp. 89-91.
18. The figuresin this sectionare takenfrom Calderon(1976) and Paulston(1971).
19. For a discussionof the problem of the contratadossee Desco (1975), Informacion
PoliticaMensual,No. 37-39 (October-December),pp. 26-27, 68-69.
20. Bejar,H. (1976). La Revolucionen Trampa(Lima),p. 79.
21. Pease,H. & Verme,0. (1975), p. 974.
22. Calder6n(1976), p. 159.
23. The attitudeand tacticsof PR werebitterlycriticizedby othergroupson the Left. See,
for example,Jorgedel Prado(1976), 'ElPartidoComunistaPeruanoante la encrujicada
politica', Informe y conclusionesdel Pleno del Comite Central(Lima) (December),
p. 37; and AranaMontafiez,R. (1975), La Teoria del SindicalismoClasista(Lima),
pp. 72-73.
24. As set out in the ResolucionesV. ConvencionNacional(1975) (Lima),pp. 10-11.
25. AranaMontnfiez(1975), pp. 44-45.
26. Cited in Ebaugh, C. (1946). Education in Peru, U.S. Office of Education (Wash-
ington, D.C.), p. 20. ThomasCarter's(1965) doctoral thesis containsa good analysis
of Peruvianeducation:An analysisof some aspects of cultureand the school in Peru
(Universityof Texas).
27. Drysdale,R. and Myers,R. (1975), 'Continuityand Change:PeruvianEducation',in
Lowenthal,A. (ed.), ThePeruvianExperiment(Princeton),pp. 261-262.
28. Germana,C. (1972), 'La politica educativadel regimenmilitar'.Sociedady Politica,
No. 1 (June).
29. Paulston(1971), p. 79.
30. Molina,G. (et. al.) (1972), 'Detrasdel mito de la educacionPeruana',Cuademos
Desco (May).
31. Moncloa,F. (1977),Pert IQuePas6?(Lima).
32. NormanGall in his 1974 reportsfor the AmericanUniversitiesField Staffs paints
a vividpictureof ruralteachers.
33. Van den Berghe;P. and Primov,P. (1977), Inequalityin the PeruvianAndes: Caass
and Ethnicityin Cuzco(Missouri),pp. 79-80, 195.
34. Albertiand Cotler(1972).
35. I am very gratefulto AlfonsoBarrantes,who was presentat the talks, for discussing
them withme.
36. Calderon,J. (et. al.) (1975), Peru 1968-1974: CronologiaPolitica, Desco (Lima),
p. 1057.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.,p. 868.
39. For an account of the politics and economicsof post-VelascoPerusee Angell, A.
and Thorp, R. (1980), 'Inflation,Stabilisationand AttemptedRedemocratisation in
Peru,1975-1979', WorldDevelopment,Vol. 8, No. 11 (November).

Classroom Maoists. The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers Under Military Government - Alan Angell

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Classroom Maoists. The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers Under Military Government - Alan Angell

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

Classroom Maoists: The Politics of Peruvian Schoolteachers under Military Government

split might be internal and personalistand not at all related to a differentideo-

Вам также может понравиться